Philosophy

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This is the collection for the University of Waterloo's Department of Philosophy.

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The Inextricable Weed: Rawls and the Problem of Endemic Faction
(University of Waterloo, 2024-07-19) Brown, Curtis John Crandall
John Rawls, over the course of his career, sought to construct a framework by which a liberal society could be envisioned in its ideal form which then, taken as a model, may illuminate a sure path for reform. His argument developed through three major works, A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism, and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement contended with a plethora of objections and liberal alternatives ranging from Kantian deontology to the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. Yet, there is a notable omission, namely, the problem of faction. This oversight is in all probability due to the relative dearth of interest within philosophy since Rawls’s time. In recent years, however, there has been an increased interest in topics relating to faction within political science, sociology, and social psychology and as such, a philosophical treatment is well overdue. By conducting an analysis of the Rawlsian project with special attention to the political theory of David Hume and its emphasis on the importance of faction, it will be shown that when subjected to factional pressures, the integrity of the Rawlsian society is compromised. The definition of faction is itself contentious as many of the relevant authors offer their own bespoke definitions and exclusions which invariably influence their treatment of the subject. As my analysis hews fairly close to Hume, my definition of faction is derived from his work. A faction is a group bound together by a common identity which is understood as politically salient by the group members. factional members recognize a shared group interest and actively pursue the advancement of their group. Although factions are often organized, it is not strictly necessary as suggested by Will Rogers’s famous quip, “I am not a member of any organized party — I am a Democrat” (O’Brien 1935, 162). Not all groups are necessarily factional in character; for instance, the apolitical are excluded from factional membership given their political passivity. I will begin with a survey of some of the relevant political theorists who have developed a theoretical understanding of faction. The principal authors here considered are Aristotle who represents an early attempt to provide a systematic account of the relation between sect and politics, David Hume whose theoretic account of faction will be principally referred to, and finally, Hume’s American counterparts, particularly James Madison who refined and applied Hume’s theory in the construction of the American constitutional regime. In section two Rawls’s theory as presented in Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness will be considered in depth with special attention given to his account of reasonable pluralism. In the final section, I shall provide a critical examination of the Rawlsian conception of reasonable pluralism, with the intent to illustrate that it is overly narrow and thereby excludes from Rawls’s politics potential allies of liberalism. Furthermore, I will endeavour to show the fundamental fragility that arises from an assumption of the inherent attractiveness of liberalism by considering its contingent and factional character. Although my principal concern is to illustrate this factional account and the difficulties it presents to Rawls, I shall also provide in the final section a preliminary account of what is minimally required for the success of a liberal political project namely, a policy of maximum inclusiveness such that both egalitarian and non-egalitarian liberals may recognize themselves as sharing a faction and which places this engorged liberal faction in opposition with its illiberal counterparts.
Professional Ethics for Economists: A Reflection on DeMartino's Oath
(University of Waterloo, 2024-02-16) Wass, Chris
Economists and the discipline of economics occupy positions of immense institutional and intellectual authority in the world today. Decisions made based on the advice and expertise of economists influence the lives of millions of people. Economic ideas are leaned upon to shape government and corporate agendas the world over. But this influence on the world also carries with it the possibility that such ideas and actors can be the cause of significant harm. Despite these powerful positions that economists occupy and the possibility of being responsible for harming others, there has heretofore been very little serious or sustained discussion as to the potential ethical responsibilities that they might have as a profession. Over the last few years, several economists have taken note of this absence within the field and attempted to initiate a discourse about the types of professional ethical obligations that they might share as a group. One of the leading voices in this nascent discourse has been George DeMartino and his 2011 book The Economist’s Oath – which lays down many of the core assumptions and conceptual apparatuses that have guided the conversation thus far. In his book, DeMartino offers an overview of how he perceives the profession, the problems facing it, and he argues that a promising way to proceed would be to model Professional Ethics for Economists on the practices found in the medical profession. In this thesis, I critically examine the argument made by DeMartino in The Economist’s Oath and argue for some potential alternatives as to how the overall project might proceed. In Chapter 1, I lay out what I take to be the core of DeMartino’s position and identify a number of points upon which the discourse might be expanded. In Chapter 2, I offer one such expansion of the discourse on the specific topic of economic history and add additional details to some of the key historical events discussed by DeMartino. I argue that this additional context regarding the history of economics alters how they many central assumptions of DiMartino's enterprise are understood. In this chapter, I also introduce the recent development within the AEA, wherein they deviated from the historical trend of avoiding discussion of ethical topics and recently introduced a code of professional conduct for its members. I will discuss the ways that this new code does and does not address the concerns that DeMartino raises. In Chapter 3, I focus on one of the major themes of DeMartino’s book, his reliance on an analogy between economics and medicine. I argue that this analogy in DeMartino’s book – the comparison between the economic and medical professions – has fundamental limitations and that there are other established professional ethics literatures to which more fruitful comparisons can be made. In Chapter 4, I offer two such alternatives – accounting and engineering. The first alternative that I propose is accounting ethics and in particular its use of the concept of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The second alternative explored here is engineering and the emphasis that that profession places on the principle of humility. I conclude, in Chapter 5, by applying some of these possible alternative frameworks to a selection of recent real-life examples of behaviour by economists to which such professional ethics ideas may have been usefully applied.
Genetic Renaissance: A Legal, Philosophical, and Ethical Examination of Consent Using Autonomy & Privacy in Genetic Testing
(University of Waterloo, 2023-09-28) Fedjki, Kawthar
Genetic testing has gained traction in the media with the recent Pentagon ban and continuing increases in public consumption of at-home tests. Public discourse surrounding this technology prompts further exploration of the multifaceted parameters that govern its use. This thesis takes on the task of analyzing and dissecting these comprehensive features, with a specific focus on the legal, philosophical, and ethical aspects of the matrix of genetic testing. It aims to understand the application of these layers to the different contexts of genetic testing: the clinical and research contexts, as well as the direct-to-consumer context. By examining the process of genetic testing, from obtaining informed consent and collecting samples to the interpretation and communication of results, this project aims to understand all the dimensions involved. The most prevalent dimensions are autonomy, privacy, and ownership, and it is this trifecta which is most impactful on informed consent. The examination will begin by providing an overview of the technical science behind genetic testing, to better understand the uses of this biotechnology in each of the contexts (i.e. clinical, research, and direct-to-consumer). Understanding this will allow for a smooth transition into an extensive outline of the legal, philosophical and ethical concepts that are tied to informed consent. This thesis focuses on laws and policies that are applicable in the United States of America and Canada, although there are many international regulations that vary in severity and depth. These legal frameworks essentially delineate how persons should be treated across contexts, including specific regulations surrounding how informed consent must be obtained, how samples must be stored or retained, and how personal data (e.g. genetic testing results) can be used and protected. Following from this legal backdrop, a literary and historical evaluation of informed consent is outlined to establish just how foundational it is to bioethics. And essential to this are the philosophical principles of autonomy, privacy, and ownership. Although most of the thesis will focus on established frameworks, it will raise questions about the fundamental issues that plague these concepts, including the lack of consideration of collectives in consent and ownership, and the inconsistent protocols involved in direct-to-consumer testing that allow for major trespasses on personal rights by corporations that are not required to operate as healthcare institutions. In exposing these weaknesses, this thesis does not necessarily seek to provide concrete solutions for such large problems, but rather to suggest possible criteria for solutions going forward. The main point this thesis seeks to show is that despite the huge strides in biotechnology, there is still substantial space for improvement in bioethics, with specific focus on the development of policies and legislations that can capture the nature of consent across social and testing contexts. This kind of work towards ameliorating the essential legal, philosophical, and ethical aspects is essential for ensuring the protection and empowerment of individual and collective rights, especially in emerging fields such as genetic testing, where the current frameworks are inadequately suited for comprehensive coverage.
The Free Self: What Separates Us From Machines
(University of Waterloo, 2023-08-29) Ross, Mitchell
Could a machine ever achieve consciousness? Will it ever make sense to hold a machine morally responsible? In this thesis, I argue that the architecture of SPAUN - the largest WIP functioning brain model currently in existence - makes it the most plausible contender for strong AI status, but that a hypothetically completed, future iteration of SPAUN is not guaranteed to possess qualitative experiences, consciousness, free will, or selfhood despite its biological plausibility; it therefore cannot be held morally responsible the way we are. To justify this position, I offer critiques of determinism, compatibilism, micro-functionalism, physicalism, and naturalistic accounts of the evolution of consciousness, as well as experiments in neuroscience that appear at first glance to disprove free will. In opposition to these views, I develop a novel form of dualism which posits the self as the free, non-physical, uncaused cause of its own actions, and provide arguments to justify this position. In essence, I propose - counter to Daniel Dennett - that selves are free to do otherwise (in the classical sense), that this is their purpose, and that naturalistic accounts of the existence of selfhood, consciousness, and qualitative experiences are inadequate because they lack a view to this purpose. I conclude that because SPAUN is a physically determined system, and its underlying substrate is distinct from our own, we should be wary of ascribing cognition and moral responsibility to it, since function alone does not guarantee cognition in this novel dualistic framework.
Toward the Interested Investigator: Examining the Epistemic Dimensions of Relational Theory in Zoology
(University of Waterloo, 2023-08-28) Anderson, Hannah Elise
I argue in this thesis that a research approach that is based on a meaningful relationship between a zoologist and their study subject holds unique epistemic value. It has been well established by feminist and social epistemologists that the identity and interests of the knower significantly influence the way knowledge can be created. This has been applied in philosophy of science to recognize that the identity of the scientist significantly influences the way they create scientific knowledge. Relational theorists draw our attention to the uniqueness of relationships themselves. I seek in this thesis to draw our attention to the potential epistemic influence of relationships themselves in the creation of scientific knowledge in biology. I do this by bringing together relational theory and epistemologies of ignorance to understand how scientists might influence knowledge creation in biology. I do this with a specific focus on zoology. In Chapter 1, I perform a literature review of relational theory and its applications in the philosophy of biology. I argue here that relationality presents a fruitful axis for analyzing research and knowledge creation in zoology. Next, in Chapter 2, I present what I call a researcher’s “state of interest toward relationality”. I argue here that relational theory can be used to differentiate research approaches used by zoologists. I do this using two case studies: that of Jane Goodall’s research program with chimpanzees and Eugenie Clark’s research program with sharks. Finally, in Chapter 3, I use relational theory to analyze the creation of ignorance in zoology. I argue here that a research approach where a zoologist has a high state of interest toward relationality offers unique epistemic benefits by allowing zoologists to circumvent and/or respond to the creation of some forms of ignorance. I hope that by connecting relational theory with the epistemology of ignorance in biology, we may see ways that relationships can strengthen scientific research.
A Misleading Tendency
(University of Waterloo, 2023-08-28) Miller, Nadia
Communication is a powerful tool. We use it to share information, express how we feel, coordinate in cooperative endeavors, and so much more. However, we regularly use standard communicative devices like speech and gesture to piss each other off, to manipulate each other, and to cause harm; flipping you off or calling you by a slur is no less clear a way of sending you a message than is stating a simple fact. In roughly the last decade, philosophers of language have turned their attention away from idealized communicative contexts to develop new theories about non-ideal communication, which includes phenomena like lying, misleading, and deceptive speech. The philosophical study of lies and deception predates the discipline of philosophy itself, but contemporary theories place a special emphasis on their explanatory and moral applications in real-world social and political contexts. While care has been taken in this tradition to define lying speech, and to distinguish it from speech that is ‘merely’ misleading or deceptive, insufficient care has been taken to define and distinguish misleading speech as a distinctive communicative act. This gap in the literature overlooks a class of cases that are not captured by definitions of lying and deception and their unique moral significance. In this thesis, I defend the following, novel account of misleading: Misleading: A communicative act C is misleading iff C has a tendency to cause others to reason badly I argue that this definition of misleading is the best way to capture the fact that misleading does not necessarily cause anyone to form a false belief. My view challenges prior accounts of misleading in the literature which take this element to be necessary, and thereby fail to accommodate cases of misleading that are not successful or result in something other than a false belief.
Too Many Logoi: The Role of Logoi Within Proclus' System
(University of Waterloo, 2023-08-25) Paolini, Lucas
The purpose of the present study is to understand the role of logoi within Proclus’ metaphysical system. Much of the scholarship on Proclus has largely left the topic of logoi to the side, leaving the understanding of the principle ambiguous. The study aims to show that to fully understand Proclus’ metaphysical system a better understanding of the logoi and their role within the system needs to be done. By showing how the logoi participate in the realms of Being and Becoming as well as showing their impact on causality and the World Soul, one begins to see the importance the principle has for Proclus’ epistemology and ontology. Without the logoi the metaphysical system of Proclus would be incomplete, making the principle integral to understanding Proclus.
A Social-Pluralistic View of Science Advising
(University of Waterloo, 2023-05-30) Freier, Blake
In this dissertation, I bring together two disciplines: Science, Technology, and Society studies and the Philosophy of Science, to develop a social-pluralistic account of science advising. I use three prominent theorists in the philosophy of science to critique three prominent views in the science, technology, and society field relating to science advising. I argue that the science, technology, and society literature does not fully account for the value-ladeness of scientific research. To that end, I develop a social-pluralistic account of science advising: social, because advice should come from panels or institutions rather than individuals, and pluralistic, because we should assess the credibility of advice along several dimensions of objectivity. I then apply my view to two real world examples: first, an EPA report on the harmful effects of environmental tobacco smoke, which faced lawsuits from the tobacco industry, and second, the Government of Canada’s use of Roundup Ready canola, a biotechnology, as a “value neutral” policy response to avoid discussions about the socio-cultural impact of industrial agriculture. These examples help to demonstrate the usefulness of my view in responding to real-world situations. A social-pluralistic view of science advising helps ensure that the role of values in producing scientific knowledge and science advice are legitimate, helps ensure that diverse viewpoints are actively considered as part of the advisory process, and ensures that the resulting advice is independent of any one person’s views, beliefs, or values.
Towards a Cyber Jus ad Bellum: Bridging Legal Gaps within Cyberwar Governance
(University of Waterloo, 2022-11-24) Lukaszczyk, Artur
While the capabilities of cyberweapons surge forward, our ability to effectively evaluate and govern their deployment has lagged behind. There are presently no internationally binding laws of cyberwar. In their absence, early efforts towards cyberwar governance have revolved around extending existing laws of armed conflict into cyberspace, in hopes of establishing that such laws remained binding within the cyber domain. Although this approach has proven effective at governing cyber operations resulting in physically destructive harms, the decidedly kinetic lens of this approach limits its ability to evaluate the wider spectrum of cyber operations resulting in unfamiliar harms. The goal of this project is to offer a robust evaluative framework which encompasses not only cyber operations resulting in kinetic-analogous consequences, but also disanalogous cyber operations which nonetheless pose a clear and imminent threat to the security of states. I argue that a flexible moral framework built upon the six jus ad bellum principles of the Just War Theory tradition offers an avenue by which we may formulate a strong conceptual and ethical foundation for the evaluation of a fuller spectrum of cyber operations, as well as develop norms of best practice for state conduct within cyberspace.
Learning More and Knowing Less: Big Data, Spurious Correlations, and the Problem of Ignorance
(University of Waterloo, 2022-09-28) George, Stroubakis
There are few things we can name that surpass big data’s boon for our empirical endeavours. Big data promises an ever-growing source of data that could be readily accessed by researchers in virtually any field of study. Data, as we know, are the rudiments of our knowledge claims about the world. Big data multiplied the number of data collected and stored to unfathomable numbers. But it is well known that our tools that help us sort through the datasets bring up spurious correlations. This project explores the implications of spurious correlations on our epistemic endeavours through the lens of ignorance. I will draw on recent scholarship in agnotology, the study of ignorance, namely by Nancy Tuana, Robert Proctor, and Nicholas Rescher. I will argue that spurious correlations, especially those that are less obvious to the epistemic agent can mislead the latter in forging false beliefs. In effect, big data, through the presence of spurious correlations can create ignorance. I will also argue that the epistemic agent shares in the responsibility of promoting and disseminating the ignorance that can arise from too much data. The promise of big data to provide the building blocks upon which only knowledge can stand is mistaken, for it also provides the building blocks for a new type of ignorance that is not an absence of knowledge, but the presence of something masquerading as it.
Mathematical Actualism: An Alternative Realist Philosophy of Mathematics
(University of Waterloo, 2022-09-23) Freiburger, Troy
The present thesis argues for a philosophy of mathematics, herein dubbed Actualism, which is contrasted with several existing views on the philosophy of mathematics. It begins with a brief introduction to the classical (Platonist) view on the philosophy of mathematics and examines some of the major problems with the account. Thereafter, two alternative philosophies of mathematics (mathematical Constructivism and mathematical Finitism) are examined. Constructivism is detailed in the first chapter through the work of Brouwer and Dummett and, in the second chapter, a description of Finitism is provided through the work of Dantzig and Mayberry. In the final chapter of the thesis, the underpinnings of mathematical Actualism are articulated. The central motivation behind Actualism as an alternative philosophy of mathematics arises from the desire to restore a realist thesis to mathematics that is consistent with the semantics of our modern scientific discourse, or else, with a naturalistic worldview.
Beyond Considering Surrogates’ Reports at ‘Face Value’: Theorizing and Contextualizing the Autonomy-Related Threats of Surrogacy Arrangements
(University of Waterloo, 2022-09-08) Mackenzie-Freeman, Susannah
As research on surrogacy in Canada is only emerging, this thesis seeks to incite discussion relating to the autonomy of surrogates by analyzing recent studies which capture the experiences of surrogates through surveys and interviews. Much of the current literature on surrogacy focuses on issues around commercialization which are less applicable to Canada where surrogacy is altruistic. Moreover, many scholars have either discussed the autonomy of surrogates only from a theoretical perspective, neglecting surrogates’ personal accounts, or have assumed that the reports of surrogates should be considered at ‘face value.’ Ultimately, I show how the reports of surrogates should be acknowledged but it is also important to consider contextual factors, such as whether the reports may be influenced and shaped by the constraints of surrogacy arrangements. While the reports of surrogates reveal the ways surrogates experience and often manage and resist autonomy-related threats, and in turn call into question theoretical concerns about surrogates lacking autonomy and power, certain theoretical concerns remain which are not identified in the studies, either because of empirical limitations or a failure to engage with them. Overall, my discussion is action guiding: I aim to shape emerging scholarship on surrogacy, so that it accounts for the complexity and nuances of surrogates’ experiences, and I gesture to certain policy interventions which follow from my discussion.
Deception in Data Visualization
(University of Waterloo, 2022-08-30) Adams, Kyle Kenneth James
In recent years, there has been a great deal of public discussion of misleading graphs and statistics, but this phenomenon seems to have fallen outside the scope of philosophical analysis. The philosophy of language has produced many well-developed accounts of lying with words, but so far, has not given much attention to deception with data visualizations. This thesis is a first step towards filling that gap. I consider several existing accounts which might be expected to handle cases of lying and misleading in data visualizations, and I argue that none of them do an adequate job of analyzing these kinds of lies. The first account that I consider is from Edward R. Tufte’s The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, wherein he describes principles for integrity in data visualizations. I argue that these principles do not constitute an adequate account of deception in data visualization, because they do not reflect the widely recognized lying-misleading distinction, and also his prescriptions are too vague to constitute an effective definition. I also consider accounts of lying and deception from philosophy of language, from Thomas Carson, Jennifer Saul, and Andreas Stokke. Each of these three accounts also falls short of adequately addressing lying and misleading in data visualization. In analyzing why this is, the question of what is said by a graph becomes crucial, and ultimately, turns out to be an extremely difficult question to answer. There are several confounding factors in trying to understand what is said by a graph, and therefore when it lies. The most important, I suggest, is that what is said by a graph is massively pluralistic—each contains many utterances that it can be thought of as saying. Although Stokke’s account allows for flexible contextual supplementation in response to the structure of the discourse in which the utterances take place, and therefore seems to stand the best chance of addressing this issue, it does not allow for the sort of true pluralism that is necessary here. Ultimately, I conclude that none of the existing literature is suited to handling this problem.
Speaking of 'Violence'
(University of Waterloo, 2022-08-18) Kenyon, Madeleine
In this project, I engineer a new concept, which I call a “violence figleaf”, in order to make sense of the many instances of gendered violence which are dismissed or characterized as some other kind of thing: a misunderstanding, a change of heart by the victim, a mischaracterization of the perpetrator, or any other number of things which are not “assault”, “rape”, or “violence”. Conceptual engineering promises to expand on the language and cognitive resources available to people in deciphering what, exactly, is going on when observations and moral judgements orthogonal to an instance of gendered violence are treated as relevant to the violent act. In some sense, violence figleaves are an application of Jennifer Saul’s work on racial and gender figleaves, as the underlying mechanics of the deceptive utterance track those of Saul’s figleaves. In other words, I am developing a species of the genus, 'figleaf'. At the same time, violence figleaves are a concept of their own, and represent a new conceptual resource for the analyzing and understanding of gendered violence discourse. Insofar as this work enriches conceptual resources regarding deceptive speech in contexts of gendered violence, it is a meaningful work of conceptual engineering.
The Techno-Inclusive Model of Disability: Motivations, Influences, and Applications
(University of Waterloo, 2022-08-03) Sargent, Samantha Lynne
In this thesis, I advance a techno-inclusive model of disability. I motivate the need for a techno-inclusive model by looking at the current state of affairs for both assistive technology and disability theory respectively. Seeing a gap in understanding and usefulness of current approaches to disability, I advance a techno-inclusive model of disability which is also inclusive of disabled perspectives and needs of a variety of assistive technology. I then apply the techno inclusive model to the Ontario policy context as it relates to assistive technology and make a number of recommendations to improve the current system, and argue for these changes on the basis of the techno-inclusive model.
From the Standpoint of The Reasonable Person: Epistemic Ignorance, Culpable Dispositions, and the Objective Standard
(University of Waterloo, 2022-05-16) Sewell, Jamie
The concept of reasonableness is both vital to the law and frustratingly vague. Efforts to articulate the concept often rely on “common sense” community-based notions of what counts as reasonable. While using common sense to determine reasonableness seems like a logical way to calibrate legal standards - most obviously because legal codes are meant to represent the values of the community served by them – doing so uncritically threatens the just application of the law. This is especially true where “common sense” represents the interests and perspectives of dominant groups, creating additional barriers to justice for marginalized litigants. Because of its widespread use, and its connection to important legal concepts like justice, rationality, deliberation, and fairness, we ought to wrestle reasonableness, as best we can, from the hardened grip of “common sense”. To control for problematic applications of reasonableness standards, some feminist and critical legal scholars have suggested applying subjective standards of reasonableness – calibrating what is reasonable against the capacities and knowledge of the litigants – to make the law appropriately sensitive to a wider array of reasonable behaviour. Others, like Mayo Moran in her 2003 book Rethinking the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Construction of the Objective Standard, have instead suggested that we maintain objective standards of reasonableness while identifying a different normative ground of reasonableness. Instead of appealing to common sense to determine what is reasonable, Moran suggests we appeal to the consideration one gives the important interests of others. In negligence law, where Moran’s work is focused, this makes unreasonably risky behaviour that which shows indifference to the important interests of others and deems reasonable behaviour as that which considers and responds to the important interests of others. Despite its value, an important limitation of her project is the difficulty in identifying when actions are borne of indifference to others’ interests. In this dissertation I argue that adding tools in epistemologies of ignorance helps address this limitation by offering ways of thinking about the underlying dispositions toward the important interests of others which can help identify contexts in which indifference to the interests of others is likely. Aside from being a good conceptual fit with existing legal mechanisms like inadvertence and offering clarity to the concept of reasonableness in general, adding considerations of ignorance allows us to ask different kinds of questions about what is reasonable and why, and allows us to connect moral responsibility to ignorance in more robust ways than we currently can.
Pathways of Influence: Understanding the Impacts of Philosophy of Science in Scientific Domains
(Springer, 2021-03-22) Plaisance, Kathryn S.; Michaud, Jay; McLevey, John
Philosophy of science has the potential to improve scientific practice, science policy, and science education; moreover, recent research indicates that many philosophers of science think we ought to increase the broader impacts of our work. Yet, there is little to no empirical data on how we are supposed to have an impact. To address this problem, our research team interviewed 35 philosophers of science regarding the impact of their work in science-related domains. We found that face-to-face engagement with scientists and other stakeholders was one of the most – if not the most – effective pathways to impact. Yet, working with non-philosophers and disseminating research outside philosophical venues is not what philosophers are typically trained or incentivized to do. Thus, there is a troublesome tension between the activities that are likely to lead to broader uptake of one’s work and those that are traditionally encouraged and rewarded in philosophy (and which are therefore the most consequential for careers in philosophy). We suggest several ways that philosophers of science, either as individuals or as a community, can navigate these tensions.
A Framework for Analyzing Broadly Engaged Philosophy of Science
(Cambridge University Press, 2022-01-01) Plaisance, Kathryn S.; Elliott, Kevin C.
Philosophers of science are increasingly interested in engaging with scientific communities, policy makers, and members of the public; however, the nature of this engagement has not been systematically examined. Instead of delineating a specific kind of engaged philosophy of science, as previous accounts have done, this article draws on literature from outside the discipline to develop a framework for analyzing different forms of broadly engaged philosophy of science according to two key dimensions: social interaction and epistemic integration. Clarifying the many forms of engagement available to philosophers of science can advance future scholarship on engagement and promote more strategic engagement efforts.
Utilitarian Cops: Jeremy Bentham and The Rise of Modern Policing
(University of Waterloo, 2021-10-29) Cote, Gregory
It is widely accepted that modern policing first came into existence with a bill passed in 1829, establishing the Metropolitan London Police under British Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel. It is Peel after all, who has been labeled the founder of modern policing, an English institution that inspired North American police. I argue that it was Jeremy Bentham who developed an early model of modern policing and whose work on applying his utilitarian philosophy to institutional reform directly influenced Peel’s innovation. I intend to show how Bentham and reformer Patrick Colquhoun established the first modern police department when they collaborated in drafting the Thames River Police Bill adopted by Parliament in 1800, almost thirty years before Peel’s legislation. It is the Thames River Police created by Bentham and Colquhoun that is the world’s oldest, not the Metropolitan London Police introduced by Peel. John Stuart Mill once wrote that Bentham was a great subversive. And as the great subversive whose years of work on improving police was often done in secret and whose efforts were largely ignored, it is Bentham not Peel, who should be considered the single most important figure in the development of modern policing.
Mature Minor Eligibility for Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD): An Ethical Analysis
(University of Waterloo, 2021-08-24) Morrison, Kathryn
Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) was legalized in Canada on June 17, 2016, following a landmark Supreme Court of Canada decision, Carter v. Canada (2015). Currently, the law controversially denies three groups access to MAiD: mature minors (capable children under 18), persons making advance directives, and persons with mental illness as a sole underlying condition. All three populations are excluded from access to MAiD on the grounds that they may lack the capacity to autonomously request and consent to the procedure. This Applied Philosophy Dissertation examines the prospect of extending MAiD eligibility to one of these vulnerable populations, mature minors. The question of MAiD presents conflicting legal and ethical obligations to children. One obligation is to child welfare. We have stronger duties – including legal duties – to protect children’s interests than those of adults, and we organize society such that children are treated differently to shield them as a vulnerable group. Yet we also have obligations to child self-determination. Children have a legal right to decision-making autonomy corresponding to their level of maturity. This tension between welfare and self-determination hinges in part on whether children can make genuinely autonomous choices, a source of considerable debate among child development experts. The dissertation argues that eligibility for MAiD should be calibrated according to maturity rather than age. It develops three key arguments for this conclusion. One is that an age criterion in Bill C-14 is an unjustifiable act of age discrimination. Children who are otherwise eligible for MAiD suffer to the same extent as adults, and are disadvantaged compared to adults where they cannot end this suffering on their own terms. Secondly, prohibiting mature minors from accessing MAiD does not protect their welfare, and may be harmful in cases where requests are motivated by severe pain and suffering, a low quality of life, and an unwillingness to endure continued indignities. Thirdly, the law treats mature minors inconsistently by permitting minors to refuse life-sustaining treatment, for example, a blood transfusion on religious grounds, yet prohibiting them from consenting to MAiD. This legal inconsistency is also an ethical inconsistency: mature minors are able to choose to die when they could otherwise live, yet they are unable to control how they die when their death is unavoidable.

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