The Inextricable Weed: Rawls and the Problem of Endemic Faction

Abstract

John Rawls, over the course of his career, sought to construct a framework by which a liberal society could be envisioned in its ideal form which then, taken as a model, may illuminate a sure path for reform. His argument developed through three major works, A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism, and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement contended with a plethora of objections and liberal alternatives ranging from Kantian deontology to the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. Yet, there is a notable omission, namely, the problem of faction. This oversight is in all probability due to the relative dearth of interest within philosophy since Rawls’s time. In recent years, however, there has been an increased interest in topics relating to faction within political science, sociology, and social psychology and as such, a philosophical treatment is well overdue. By conducting an analysis of the Rawlsian project with special attention to the political theory of David Hume and its emphasis on the importance of faction, it will be shown that when subjected to factional pressures, the integrity of the Rawlsian society is compromised. The definition of faction is itself contentious as many of the relevant authors offer their own bespoke definitions and exclusions which invariably influence their treatment of the subject. As my analysis hews fairly close to Hume, my definition of faction is derived from his work. A faction is a group bound together by a common identity which is understood as politically salient by the group members. factional members recognize a shared group interest and actively pursue the advancement of their group. Although factions are often organized, it is not strictly necessary as suggested by Will Rogers’s famous quip, “I am not a member of any organized party — I am a Democrat” (O’Brien 1935, 162). Not all groups are necessarily factional in character; for instance, the apolitical are excluded from factional membership given their political passivity.

I will begin with a survey of some of the relevant political theorists who have developed a theoretical understanding of faction. The principal authors here considered are Aristotle who represents an early attempt to provide a systematic account of the relation between sect and politics, David Hume whose theoretic account of faction will be principally referred to, and finally, Hume’s American counterparts, particularly James Madison who refined and applied Hume’s theory in the construction of the American constitutional regime. In section two Rawls’s theory as presented in Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness will be considered in depth with special attention given to his account of reasonable pluralism. In the final section, I shall provide a critical examination of the Rawlsian conception of reasonable pluralism, with the intent to illustrate that it is overly narrow and thereby excludes from Rawls’s politics potential allies of liberalism. Furthermore, I will endeavour to show the fundamental fragility that arises from an assumption of the inherent attractiveness of liberalism by considering its contingent and factional character. Although my principal concern is to illustrate this factional account and the difficulties it presents to Rawls, I shall also provide in the final section a preliminary account of what is minimally required for the success of a liberal political project namely, a policy of maximum inclusiveness such that both egalitarian and non-egalitarian liberals may recognize themselves as sharing a faction and which places this engorged liberal faction in opposition with its illiberal counterparts.