Disciplinary directors: Evidence from the appointments of outside directors who have fired CEOs
| dc.contributor.author | Cai, Jay | |
| dc.contributor.author | Nguyen, Tu | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-10-22T18:59:50Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-10-22T18:59:50Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018-11-01 | |
| dc.description | The final publication is available at Elsevier via https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.09.012 © 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en |
| dc.description.abstract | By examining board appointments of outside directors who have previously fired a CEO, we study how directors’ willingness to take disciplinary actions is related to a firm's performance and risk-taking. Such directors (‘disciplinary directors’) appear to benefit firms with weak monitoring, but hurt firms in innovative industries. Firms appointing a disciplinary director subsequently exhibit lower idiosyncratic risk, leverage, and R&D expense, make fewer acquisitions, and are more likely to replace poorly performing CEOs. Overall, disciplinary directors appear to influence managerial behavior and shareholder wealth. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.09.012 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10012/14048 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | en |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
| dc.subject | Board of directors | en |
| dc.subject | CEO turnover | en |
| dc.subject | Director reputation | en |
| dc.subject | Disciplinary effects | en |
| dc.subject | Risk-taking | en |
| dc.title | Disciplinary directors: Evidence from the appointments of outside directors who have fired CEOs | en |
| dc.type | Article | en |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Cai, J., & Nguyen, T. (2018). Disciplinary directors: Evidence from the appointments of outside directors who have fired CEOs. Journal of Banking & Finance, 96, 221–235. doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.09.012 | en |
| uws.contributor.affiliation1 | Faculty of Mathematics | en |
| uws.contributor.affiliation2 | School of Accounting and Finance | en |
| uws.peerReviewStatus | Reviewed | en |
| uws.scholarLevel | Faculty | en |
| uws.typeOfResource | Text | en |
| uws.typeOfResource | Text | en |