Rewards of Risky Interdependence in Same- and Cross-Race Interactions: Inducing Trust via High-Stakes Cooperation

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Date

2025-09-04

Advisor

Bergsieker, Hilary

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University of Waterloo

Abstract

Mutual trust is vital for interpersonal relationships but often hard to build. Five experiments (N = 1001) grounded in Interdependence Theory tested a novel method to boost trust—beyond mere liking—between strangers. In Studies 1-3, Canadian undergraduates completed closeness-building tasks in same- and cross-race dyads, followed by an either “risky” (real money, visible choices) or “safe” (no money, secret choices) iterative prisoner’s dilemma game. The risky game consistently elicited more cooperation and increased trust (twice as much as liking). These trust gains (a) emerged for both same- and cross-race dyads, (b) were mediated by increased cooperation, and (c) generalized to a subsequent negotiation task, where the riskier scenario reduced exploitation concerns and behavioural awkwardness. In Studies 4 and 5, participants forecasting this exact procedure underestimated how much risky cooperative tasks build trust. Together, these findings demonstrate benefits of high-stakes interdependence for establishing interpersonal trust, even across racial group boundaries.

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Keywords

trust, diversity, interdependence, prisoner's dilemma, trust development

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