A Preservationist Approach to Relevant Logic
| dc.comment.hidden | Thesis approval forms might arrive from the department after this electronic submission. | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Ferenz, Nicholas | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2014-08-29T18:17:17Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2014-08-29T18:17:17Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014-08-29 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2014 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The semantics I develop extend an approach to logic called preservationism. The preservationist approach to logic interprets non-classical consequence relations as preserving something other than truth. I specifically extend a preservationist approach, due to Bryson Brown, which interprets various paraconsistent consequence relations as preserving measures of ambiguity. Relevant logics are constructible by extending one of these logics with an implication connective. I develop a formal semantics which I show to be adequate for interesting relevant logics. I argue that the semantics I develop extend the preservationist approach to relevant logic by showing how the approach treats the implication connective. I conclude by arguing that some of the most pressing objections to the standard semantics for relevant logics do not apply to the ambiguity preservation account. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10012/8745 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.pending | false | |
| dc.publisher | University of Waterloo | en |
| dc.subject | Relevant Logic | en |
| dc.subject | Logic | en |
| dc.subject | Preservationism | en |
| dc.subject | Semantics | en |
| dc.subject.program | Philosophy | en |
| dc.title | A Preservationist Approach to Relevant Logic | en |
| dc.type | Master Thesis | en |
| uws-etd.degree | Master of Arts | en |
| uws-etd.degree.department | Philosophy | en |
| uws.peerReviewStatus | Unreviewed | en |
| uws.scholarLevel | Graduate | en |
| uws.typeOfResource | Text | en |