Probability and intentional action

dc.contributor.authorEricson, Spencer R.
dc.contributor.authorDenison, Stephanie
dc.contributor.authorTurri, John
dc.contributor.authorFriedman, Ori
dc.date.accessioned2026-11-17T19:31:54Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.descriptionThe final publication is available at Elsevier via https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101551. © 2023. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.description.abstractHow does probability affect attributions of intentionality? In five experiments (total N = 1410), we provide evidence for a probability raising account holding that people are more likely to see the outcome of an agent’s action as intentional if the agent does something to increase the odds of that outcome. Experiment 1 found that high probability without probability raising does not suffice for strong attributions of intentionality. Participants were more likely to conclude a girl intentionally obtained a desired gumball from a single gumball machine when it offered favorable odds for getting that kind of gumball compared with when it offered poor odds, but their attributions of intentionality were lukewarm. Experiments 2 and 3 then found stronger attributions of intentionality when the girl raised her probability of success by choosing to use machines offering favorable odds over machines offering poor odds. Finally, Experiments 4 and 5 examined whether these effects of probability raising might reduce to consideration of agents’ beliefs and expectations. We found that although these mental states do matter, probability raising matters too—people attribute intentional actions to agents who increase their odds of success, rather than to agents who merely become convinced that success is likely. We discuss the implications of these findings for claims that control and skill contribute to attributions of intentional action.
dc.description.sponsorshipNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101551
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10012/24696
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCognitive Psychology; 141; 101551
dc.subjectintentional action
dc.subjectprobability raising
dc.subjectchoice
dc.subjecttheory of mind
dc.subjectprobability
dc.titleProbability and intentional action
dc.typeArticle
dcterms.bibliographicCitationEricson, S.R., Denison, S., Turri, J., & Friedman, O. (2023). Probability and intentional action. Cognitive Psychology, 141, 101551. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2023.101551
uws.contributor.affiliation1Faculty of Arts
uws.contributor.affiliation2Psychology
uws.peerReviewStatusReviewed
uws.scholarLevelFaculty
uws.typeOfResourceTexten

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