How Could I Have Known? How Undiagnosed ADHD Instantiates Hermeneutical Injustice

Abstract

In this thesis, I argue that some people with undiagnosed ADHD face hermeneutical injustice in light of their missed diagnoses. Drawing upon Miranda Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice, José Medina’s contribution to Fricker’s original account, Gaile Pohlhaus’s account of willful hermeneutical ignorance, Kristie Dotson’s concept of pernicious ignorance, Jon Leefmann’s concept of epistemic self-trust, and a variety of empirical sources, I explore the particular kinds of harm undiagnosed ADHDers face and explain why their marginalization is also wrongful, not just harmful. Using Fricker’s account, I aim to demonstrate how their inability to participate in meaning-making practices results in a lack of accurate hermeneutical resources within the dominant sphere and perpetuates their marginalization. Additionally, I rely on Pohlhaus’s account of willful ignorance as a framework for understanding how this hermeneutical marginalization is wrongful; although accurate resources about ADHD exist, they are often willfully ignored and excluded from dominant resources. In light of their unjust lack of hermeneutical power, I argue that we ought to consider undiagnosed ADHDers victims of hermeneutical injustice.