Practical Reasoning and Rationality
| dc.contributor.author | Shehan, Michael | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-04-30T19:28:16Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2009-04-30T19:28:16Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2009-04-30T19:28:16Z | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2009 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Theories of practical reasoning and rationality have been expounded at least as far back as the Greeks. Beginning with several historical perspectives, I attempt to answer the descriptive and normative questions of practical reasoning and rationality. I then turn to a popular modern attempt, expected utility theory. I conclude that this approach cannot be sustained because of inherent inconsistencies and its inability to generate advice for a class of problems that other decision procedures can handle. I conclude by offering support for a new model of practical reasoning, the practical argument model. I explain the three dimensions of normative assessment for this model: logical, inferential and epistemic. I then show how an expected utility decision-procedure is encompassed by the practical argument model and, therefore, subject to these three levels of assessment. I conclude by offering some directions for future research. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10012/4367 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.pending | false | en |
| dc.publisher | University of Waterloo | en |
| dc.subject | rationality | en |
| dc.subject | practical reasoning | en |
| dc.subject.program | Philosophy | en |
| dc.title | Practical Reasoning and Rationality | en |
| dc.type | Master Thesis | en |
| uws-etd.degree | Master of Arts | en |
| uws-etd.degree.department | Philosophy | en |
| uws.peerReviewStatus | Unreviewed | en |
| uws.scholarLevel | Graduate | en |
| uws.typeOfResource | Text | en |