A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation
| dc.contributor.author | Lessan, Javad | |
| dc.contributor.author | Karabati, Selcuk | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-10-18T16:13:12Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-10-18T16:13:12Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018-03-01 | |
| dc.description | The final publication is available at Elsevier via https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2017.09.024 © 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en |
| dc.description.abstract | We study a pricing and allocation problem of a seller of multiple units of a homogeneous item, and present a semi-market mechanism in the form of an iterative ascending-bid auction. The auction elicits buyers' preferences over a set of options offered by the seller, and processes them with a random-priority assignment scheme to address buyers' "fairness" expectations. The auction's termination criterion is derived from a mixed-integer programming formulation of the preference-based capacity allocation problem. We show that the random priority- and preference-based assignment policy is a universally truthful mechanism which can also achieve a Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium. Computational results demonstrate that the auction mechanism can extract a substantial portion of the centralized system's profit, indicating its effectiveness for a seller who needs to operate under the "fairness" constraint. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2017.09.024 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10012/14009 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | en |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
| dc.subject | Multi-unit auctions | en |
| dc.subject | Pricing and capacity allocation | en |
| dc.subject | Mixed-integer programming | en |
| dc.title | A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation | en |
| dc.type | Article | en |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Lessan, J., & Karabatı, S. (2018). A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation. Computers & Operations Research, 91, 237–246. doi:10.1016/j.cor.2017.09.024 | en |
| uws.contributor.affiliation1 | Faculty of Engineering | en |
| uws.contributor.affiliation2 | Civil and Environmental Engineering | en |
| uws.peerReviewStatus | Reviewed | en |
| uws.scholarLevel | Graduate | en |
| uws.typeOfResource | Text | en |
| uws.typeOfResource | Text | en |