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dc.contributor.authorShehan, Michael
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-30 19:28:16 (GMT)
dc.date.available2009-04-30 19:28:16 (GMT)
dc.date.issued2009-04-30T19:28:16Z
dc.date.submitted2009
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10012/4367
dc.description.abstractTheories of practical reasoning and rationality have been expounded at least as far back as the Greeks. Beginning with several historical perspectives, I attempt to answer the descriptive and normative questions of practical reasoning and rationality. I then turn to a popular modern attempt, expected utility theory. I conclude that this approach cannot be sustained because of inherent inconsistencies and its inability to generate advice for a class of problems that other decision procedures can handle. I conclude by offering support for a new model of practical reasoning, the practical argument model. I explain the three dimensions of normative assessment for this model: logical, inferential and epistemic. I then show how an expected utility decision-procedure is encompassed by the practical argument model and, therefore, subject to these three levels of assessment. I conclude by offering some directions for future research.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity of Waterlooen
dc.subjectrationalityen
dc.subjectpractical reasoningen
dc.titlePractical Reasoning and Rationalityen
dc.typeMaster Thesisen
dc.pendingfalseen
dc.subject.programPhilosophyen
uws-etd.degree.departmentPhilosophyen
uws-etd.degreeMaster of Artsen
uws.typeOfResourceTexten
uws.peerReviewStatusUnrevieweden
uws.scholarLevelGraduateen


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