The Limits of Incrementalism: The G20, the FSB, and the International Regulatory Agenda
Loading...
Date
2012-01
Authors
Helleiner, Eric
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
De Gruyter
Abstract
At their very first summit in Washington in November 2008, the G20
leaders placed the reform of international financial regulation at the core of their
agenda. The issue has retained a central place in discussions and communiqués at
every subsequent meeting. It has been remarkable to see heads of state commit
such detailed attention in their communiqués to a topic which has historically
been the more obscure preserve of technocratic officials. Equally striking has
been the fact that policymakers have looked beyond the immediate task of
managing the crisis to focus on this more forward-looking agenda to prevent
future crises. It took more than a decade after the crisis of the early 1930s for
political leaders to agree at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference on international
financial reforms designed to prevent a repetition of that economic calamity. This
time around, the crisis has been used as an immediate catalyst for reform.
But what have the G20 leaders actually accomplished so far in this field?
There is no question that they have successfully negotiated more initiatives in this
area than in any other, initiatives that are aimed at reforming both the content and
the governance of international financial regulation. While the breadth of these
reforms has been impressive, they also suffer from some important limitations.
Despite the scale of the crisis, the reforms have been much more incremental than
radical. Their implementation has also been slow and uneven, and some important
issues have been neglected entirely. As we have entered a new phase of financial
instability unleashed by the eurozone’s difficulties, these limitations have become
increasingly evident, with political consequences that are very difficult to predict.
Description
Keywords
G20