Empirical Adequacy of Ranking Theory: A Behavioural and Theoretical Investigation of Human Uncertainty Representation

Abstract

Measuring and quantifying degrees of belief poses a fundamental challenge, prompting an exploration of how humans navigate uncertainty. This study investigated the application of ranking theory to human belief systems, focusing on its effectiveness in measuring degrees of disbelief across diverse contexts. Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed the reliability of negative ranks as a robust measure of disbelief in uncertain situations where belief might be shaped by personal experiences, societal, and cultural norms. Experiment 3 extended the framework by introducing positive ranks, providing a more comprehensive representation of belief and disbelief, and enabling finer distinctions between disbelief, neutrality, and belief. Experiment 4 examined ranking functions within a dynamic learning environment, demonstrating that ranks aligned more closely with objective probabilities than subjective probabilities when outcomes were clearly defined and consistently observed. Experiments 5 and 6 explored the Ellsberg Paradox, showing that ranking functions reduced ambiguity aversion and provided a more true reflection of participants’ beliefs compared to traditional choice-based methods. Overall, the findings supported ranking theory as an effective framework for understanding belief systems, highlighting its potential to simplify the cognitive demands of uncertainty assessment and reduce biases commonly associated with subjective probability models. This work laid a foundation for future research to explore ranking theory’s application in psychology as a metric for belief and its broader relevance in decision-making processes.