When does the chance of getting caught matter? Apprehension probability and its impact on punishment judgments

Abstract

Punishment is intended not only to respond to wrongdoing, but also to discourage future crime. Deterrence theory suggests that punishment should therefore reflect both the harm caused and the likelihood that an offender will be caught. Across five experiments, we examined whether people adjust punishment judgments according to apprehension probability—the likelihood that an offender will be caught—and victim harm. In property harm cases, participants consistently recommended harsher punishments when apprehension probability was lower, and victim harm was higher. This pattern remained whether the victim was an identifiable individual, society more broadly, or the participant. Although participants responded to apprehension probability in the direction predicted by deterrence theory for property crimes, they did not adjust their judgments as strongly as economic models would prescribe. In bodily harm cases, apprehension probability did not influence punishment judgments. Instead, punishments were driven primarily by the severity of the harm. These findings suggest that people consider deterrence when judging crimes but place limits on how strongly the apprehension probability should affect punishment. This boundary highlights possible concerns in designing effective punishments that discourage crime.