Intuitive Theories of Attention Shape Perceptions of Others’ Attentiveness

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

University of Waterloo

Abstract

People routinely draw on expectations about how attention operates, yet relatively little is known about the content of these intuitions—that is, how people think attention works. Across two preregistered experiments, we used judgments of others’ attentiveness to investigate these intuitive theories, examining how observers infer attentiveness from observable behaviour (e.g., how quickly someone responds to external stimuli) and situational context (e.g., how distracting the environment is). Participants completed a spatial cueing task and observed an agent performing the same task, rating the agent’s attentiveness on each trial. In Experiment 1 (N = 50), faster observed response times were associated with higher attentiveness ratings, suggesting that observers treated response speed as a cue to attentional engagement. Participants also rated agents as more attentive following invalid than valid cues, indicating sensitivity to the surrounding context. Experiment 2 (N = 35) introduced a neutral-cue condition to determine whether this difference reflected facilitation from valid cues, the attentional demands imposed by invalid cues, or both. Ratings were higher following invalid than neutral cues but did not differ between valid and neutral cues, suggesting that observers were particularly sensitive to the demands imposed by invalid cues. Response speed was also less informative following valid cues, suggesting that observers interpreted behaviour in light of context. Together, these findings suggest that people associate greater attentiveness with relatively rapid responding while also evaluating behaviour in relation to situational context. In this way, judgments of attentiveness therefore reveal people’s broader expectations about how attention operates—their intuitive theories of attention.

Description

Keywords

Citation

Collections

Endorsement

Review

Supplemented By

Referenced By