Security Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution: Methods and Applications
| dc.contributor.author | Lin, Jie | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-09-27T18:38:00Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-09-27T18:38:00Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021-09-27 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2021-09-21 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be proved to be secure by laws of quantum mechanics. In this thesis, we review security proof methods in Renner's framework and discuss numerical methods to calculate asymptotic and finite key rates. These methods are highly versatile and applicable to general device-dependent QKD protocols. We also discuss analytical tools that extend the applicability of these numerical methods. We then present the asymptotic security proof against collective attacks for a variant of the twin-field QKD protocol, which can overcome the repeaterless secret-key capacity bound. Our variant reduces the sifting cost and uses non-phase-randomized coherent states as both signals and test states. We confirm the loss scaling of this protocol. Another important family of protocols that we investigate here are discrete-modulated continuous-variable QKD protocols. They are interesting due to their experimental simplicity and their great potential for massive deployment in the quantum-secured networks. Our security proof method can provide tight asymptotic key rates. We demonstrate that the postselection of data in combination with reverse reconciliation can improve the key rates. We analyze both untrusted and trusted detector noise scenarios. Our results in the trusted detector noise scenario show that we can thus cut out most of the effect of detector noise and obtain asymptotic key rates similar to those had we access to ideal detectors. Finally, we present several simple examples to illustrate our newly developed method for the numerical finite-key analysis against the most general attacks via the entropy accumulation theorem. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10012/17550 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.pending | false | |
| dc.publisher | University of Waterloo | en |
| dc.subject | quantum key distribution | en |
| dc.subject | security proof | en |
| dc.subject | numerical key rate calculation | en |
| dc.subject | discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution | en |
| dc.subject | phase-matching measurement-device-independent | en |
| dc.subject | entropy accumulation | en |
| dc.title | Security Analysis of Quantum Key Distribution: Methods and Applications | en |
| dc.type | Doctoral Thesis | en |
| uws-etd.degree | Doctor of Philosophy | en |
| uws-etd.degree.department | Physics and Astronomy | en |
| uws-etd.degree.discipline | Physics (Quantum Information) | en |
| uws-etd.degree.grantor | University of Waterloo | en |
| uws-etd.embargo.terms | 0 | en |
| uws.contributor.advisor | Lütkenhaus, Norbert | |
| uws.contributor.affiliation1 | Faculty of Science | en |
| uws.peerReviewStatus | Unreviewed | en |
| uws.published.city | Waterloo | en |
| uws.published.country | Canada | en |
| uws.published.province | Ontario | en |
| uws.scholarLevel | Graduate | en |
| uws.typeOfResource | Text | en |