On Spoken Confidence: Characteristics of Explicit Metacognition in Reasoning

Abstract

In this thesis, I assess how explicit, subjective evaluations of confidence influence monitoring and control (i.e., metacognitive) processes in reasoning. Metacognitive processes play a crucial role in modern dual-process theories of reasoning and decision-making, the consequences of which have been implicated in numerous significant real-world decisional outcomes. It is tacitly assumed that monitoring one’s reasoning for the purpose of optimal deployment of controlled, deliberative processing functions similarly to monitoring one’s reasoning for the purpose of providing a judgment of confidence, despite evidence from other domains indicating otherwise. This thesis takes a critical step toward evaluating metacognitive theories of reasoning and their broader application by assessing the degree to which standard approaches represent realistic accounts of metacognitive processes. To aid in interpretation of the work directly testing this possibility, I first present six experiments addressing foundational issues with respect to the operation of metacognition in reasoning. Chapter 2 provides evidence for a causal relationship between confidence judgments and controlled behavior (specifically deliberation), a reality often assumed in the absence of direct evidence. I demonstrate across four experiments that processing manipulations affect confidence and influence control behavior, consistent with a causal relationship, but also that it is possible to target control behaviour without mirroring effects on confidence. Chapter 3 develops a simple predictive model of confidence that identifies heretofore unidentified, item-based predictors of confidence. This simple model allows a unique approach to testing the central question in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 investigates whether the relationship between confidence and controlled behavior partly depends on the requirement to make explicit confidence judgments. Using a paradigm adapted from research involving nonhuman primates, I compare implicit and explicit confidence conditions. Results reveal small differences in controlled behavior and substantial differences in monitoring. In the present thesis, I provide evidence of plausibly systematic influences of common measurement approaches on reasoning. To this effect, it is likely that the reasoning processes in which individuals engage in day-to-day life are reliably different than those commonly assessed in the lab. This has practical, but also theoretical implications which I discuss.