Walking Onions: Scaling Distribution of Information Safely in Anonymity Networks
| dc.contributor.author | Komlo, Chelsea | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-07T16:32:54Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-08-07T16:32:54Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-08-07 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2020-07-27 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Scaling anonymity networks offers unique security challenges, as attackers can exploit differing views of the network’s topology to perform epistemic and route capture attacks. Anonymity networks in practice, such as Tor, have opted for security over scalability by requiring participants to share a globally consistent view of all relays to prevent these kinds of attacks. Such an approach requires each user to maintain up-to-date information about every relay, causing the total amount of data each user must download every epoch to scale linearly with the number of relays. As the number of clients increases, more relays must be added to provide bandwidth, further exacerbating the total load on the network. In this work, we present Walking Onions, a set of protocols improving scalability for anonymity networks. Walking Onions enables constant-size scaling of the information each user must download in every epoch, even as the number of relays in the network grows. Furthermore, we show how relaxing the clients’ bandwidth growth from constant to logarithmic can enable an outsized improvement to relays’ bandwidth costs. Notably, Walking Onions offers the same security properties as current designs that require a globally consistent network view. We present two protocol variants. The first requires minimal changes from current onion-routing systems. The second presents a more significant design change, thereby reducing the latency required to establish a path through the network while providing better forward secrecy than previous such constructions. We evaluate Walking Onions against a generalized onion-routing anonymity network and discuss tradeoffs among the approaches. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10012/16103 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.pending | false | |
| dc.publisher | University of Waterloo | en |
| dc.subject | cryptography | en |
| dc.subject | privacy | en |
| dc.subject | anonymity | en |
| dc.subject | Tor | en |
| dc.title | Walking Onions: Scaling Distribution of Information Safely in Anonymity Networks | en |
| dc.type | Master Thesis | en |
| uws-etd.degree | Master of Mathematics | en |
| uws-etd.degree.department | David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science | en |
| uws-etd.degree.discipline | Computer Science | en |
| uws-etd.degree.grantor | University of Waterloo | en |
| uws.contributor.advisor | Goldberg, Ian | |
| uws.contributor.affiliation1 | Faculty of Mathematics | en |
| uws.peerReviewStatus | Unreviewed | en |
| uws.published.city | Waterloo | en |
| uws.published.country | Canada | en |
| uws.published.province | Ontario | en |
| uws.scholarLevel | Graduate | en |
| uws.typeOfResource | Text | en |