Message Authentication and Recognition Protocols Using Two-Channel Cryptography
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We propose a formal model for non-interactive message authentication protocols (NIMAPs) using two channels and analyze all the attacks that can occur in this model. Further, we introduce the notion of hybrid-collision resistant (HCR) hash functions. This leads to a new proposal for a NIMAP based on HCR hash functions. This protocol is as efficient as the best previous NIMAP while having a very simple structure and not requiring any long strings to be authenticated ahead of time. We investigate interactive message authentication protocols (IMAPs) and propose a new IMAP, based on the existence of interactive-collision resistant (ICR) hash functions, a new notion of hash function security. The efficient and easy-to-use structure of our IMAP makes it very practical in real world ad hoc network scenarios. We also look at message recognition protocols (MRPs) and prove that there is a one-to-one correspondence between non-interactive MRPs and digital signature schemes with message recovery. Further, we look at an existing recognition protocol and point out its inability to recover in case of a specific adversarial disruption. We improve this protocol by suggesting a variant which is equipped with a resynchronization process. Moreover, another variant of the protocol is proposed which self-recovers in case of an intrusion. Finally, we propose a new design for message recognition in ad hoc networks which does not make use of hash chains. This new design uses random passwords that are being refreshed in each session, as opposed to precomputed elements of a hash chain.
Cite this version of the work
Atefeh Mashatan (2008). Message Authentication and Recognition Protocols Using Two-Channel Cryptography. UWSpace. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/4122