UWSpace is currently experiencing technical difficulties resulting from its recent migration to a new version of its software. These technical issues are not affecting the submission and browse features of the site. UWaterloo community members may continue submitting items to UWSpace. We apologize for the inconvenience, and are actively working to resolve these technical issues.
 

Key Randomization Countermeasures to Power Analysis Attacks on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Date

2007-04-25T20:28:14Z

Authors

Ebeid, Nevine Maurice

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

University of Waterloo

Abstract

It is essential to secure the implementation of cryptosystems in embedded devices agains side-channel attacks. Namely, in order to resist differential (DPA) attacks, randomization techniques should be employed to decorrelate the data processed by the device from secret key parts resulting in the value of this data. Among the countermeasures that appeared in the literature were those that resulted in a random representation of the key known as the binary signed digit representation (BSD). We have discovered some interesting properties related to the number of possible BSD representations for an integer and we have proposed a different randomization algorithm. We have also carried our study to the $\tau$-adic representation of integers which is employed in elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECCs) using Koblitz curves. We have then dealt with another randomization countermeasure which is based on randomly splitting the key. We have investigated the secure employment of this countermeasure in the context of ECCs.

Description

Keywords

Binary signed-digit representations, DPA countermeasures, tau-adic representation

LC Keywords

Citation