The Red Road to Victory: Soviet Combat Training 1917-1945
Abstract
This thesis provides a comprehensive account of early Soviet combat training and its
associated attitudes from 1917 to 1945. From its inception in 1918 and throughout the evolution
of Soviet military doctrine and practice, the Red Army paid insufficient attention to existing and
growing deficiencies in military training. Due to a combination of Bolshevik ideology, leftover
Imperial Russian influences, and unique historical circumstances, Soviet leaders – both
deliberately and accidentally – embraced a military culture based on amateurism and
dilettantism. The military leadership’s systemic oversights regarding combat training and
military professionalism undermined the tactical combat capacity of the Soviet Armed Forces in
the short and long term. While Joseph Stalin’s dictatorial policies had a negative impact on
combat training during the 1930s, they merely exacerbated an existing crisis that began with the
formation of the Soviet state in 1917. Despite periodic efforts to remedy this problem, military
reformists largely failed to overcome the formidable institutional forces that continue to advance
a harmful military culture on combat training to the present day. This study also provides
valuable historical context to a similar crisis in combat training faced by the Russian Armed
Forces during their ongoing invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Cite this version of the work
Anton Parkhomenko
(2023).
The Red Road to Victory: Soviet Combat Training 1917-1945. UWSpace.
http://hdl.handle.net/10012/19087
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