dc.contributor.author | Komlo, Chelsea | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-07 16:32:54 (GMT) | |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-07 16:32:54 (GMT) | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-08-07 | |
dc.date.submitted | 2020-07-27 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10012/16103 | |
dc.description.abstract | Scaling anonymity networks offers unique security challenges, as
attackers can exploit differing views of the network’s topology to
perform epistemic and route capture attacks. Anonymity networks in
practice, such as Tor, have opted for security over scalability by
requiring participants to share a globally consistent view of all relays
to prevent these kinds of attacks. Such an approach requires each user
to maintain up-to-date information about every relay, causing the total
amount of data each user must download every epoch to scale linearly
with the number of relays. As the number of clients increases, more
relays must be added to provide bandwidth, further exacerbating the
total load on the network.
In this work, we present Walking Onions, a set of protocols improving
scalability for anonymity networks. Walking Onions enables constant-size
scaling of the information each user must download in every epoch, even
as the number of relays in the network grows. Furthermore, we show how
relaxing the clients’ bandwidth growth from constant to logarithmic can
enable an outsized improvement to relays’ bandwidth costs. Notably,
Walking Onions offers the same security properties as current designs
that require a globally consistent network view. We present two protocol
variants. The first requires minimal changes from current onion-routing
systems. The second presents a more significant design change, thereby
reducing the latency required to establish a path through the network
while providing better forward secrecy than previous such constructions.
We evaluate Walking Onions against a generalized onion-routing anonymity
network and discuss tradeoffs among the approaches. | en |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | University of Waterloo | en |
dc.subject | cryptography | en |
dc.subject | privacy | en |
dc.subject | anonymity | en |
dc.subject | Tor | en |
dc.title | Walking Onions: Scaling Distribution of Information Safely in Anonymity Networks | en |
dc.type | Master Thesis | en |
dc.pending | false | |
uws-etd.degree.department | David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science | en |
uws-etd.degree.discipline | Computer Science | en |
uws-etd.degree.grantor | University of Waterloo | en |
uws-etd.degree | Master of Mathematics | en |
uws.contributor.advisor | Goldberg, Ian | |
uws.contributor.affiliation1 | Faculty of Mathematics | en |
uws.published.city | Waterloo | en |
uws.published.country | Canada | en |
uws.published.province | Ontario | en |
uws.typeOfResource | Text | en |
uws.peerReviewStatus | Unreviewed | en |
uws.scholarLevel | Graduate | en |