Developing Models Using Game Theory for Analyzing the Interaction of Various Stakeholders in Energy Systems
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Air pollution, global warming, climate change, and economic development are all reasons for governments around the world to incentivize the development of renewable energy generation technologies and plan for a transition toward a low-carbon economy. The development of renewable energy projects as well as the liberation in electricity systems has led to the emergence of multiple stakeholders in energy systems. While the research focused on investigating the objective of a single stakeholder in an energy system is abundant in the literature, considering the objectives of all stakeholders in a multi-stakeholder model is a gap in the research. This thesis is aimed at developing a multilevel framework for modeling and analyzing the interaction of various stakeholders in energy systems. The models developed in this thesis are focused on investigating two areas: 1. The role of energy storage systems in Ontario and how they can be used to reduce GHG emissions in the province, and 2. Analyzing the interaction of the heat and electricity supply systems in Great Britain. The contribution of this thesis is presented through four studies. The objective of the first study is to investigate the effect and cost-efficiency of different renewable energy incentives and potential for wind and hydrogen energy systems to the perceived viability of a microgrid project from the prospective of different stakeholders, i.e., government, energy hub operator and energy consumer in the province of Ontario, Canada. Hourly simulation of a microgrid in which wind and/or hydrogen are produced is used for the analysis. Results show that using underground seasonal storage leads to the government paying less incentive per kg of CO2 emission reduction as it lowers the levelized cost of hydrogen and provides a higher carbon emission reduction potential. Results of the first study also show that for the same incentive policy, incentivizing hydrogen production with grid electricity or a blend of wind power and grid electricity and producing hydrogen using wind power with underground hydrogen storage are more cost-efficient options for government than incentivizing wind power production. Regarding the renewable energy incentives, a combination of capital grant and FIT is shown to be a more cost-efficient incentive program for the government than FIT only programs. However, FIT programs are more effective for promoting the development of renewable energy technologies. In the second study, the advantages of energy incentives for all the stakeholders in an energy system were analyzed in the context of a microgrid using a more comprehensive approach. In the second study, the effect of health impacts from fossil fuel consumption and taxes collected from the energy hub operator and energy consumer are considered in the model. The stakeholders considered in the second study include the government, the energy hub operator, and the energy consumer. Two streams of energy incentives were compared in the second study: incentives for renewable energy generation technologies and incentives for energy storage technologies. The first stream aims to increase the share of renewable energies in the electricity system while the second stream aims the development of systems which use clean electricity to replace fossil fuels in other sectors of an energy system such as the transportation, residential and industrial sectors. The results of the analysis in the second study show that replacing fossil fuel-based electricity generation with wind and solar power is a less expensive way for the energy consumer to reduce GHG emissions (60 and 92 CAD per tonne of CO2e for wind and solar, respectively) compared to investing on energy storage technologies (225 and 317 CAD per tonne of CO2e for Power-to-Gas and battery-powered forklifts, respectively). However, considering the current Ontario's electricity mix, incentives for the Power-to-Gas and battery-powered technologies are less expensive ways to reduce emissions compared to replacing the grid with wind and solar power technologies (1479 and 2418 CAD per tonne of CO2e for wind and solar, respectively). The analysis in the second study also shows that battery storage and hydrogen storage are complementary technologies for reducing GHG emissions in Ontario. This third study aims at developing a game theory model for assessing the potential of fuel cell-powered and battery-powered forklifts for reducing GHG emissions in the province of Ontario, Canada. Two stakeholders are considered in the developed model: government and energy consumer, which is an industrial facility operating forklifts. The energy consumer, which is assumed to be an industrial facility, operates 150 diesel forklifts but has the option of replacing them with fuel cell-powered and battery-powered forklifts. The government can encourage this replacement by allocating a percentage of Ontario's surplus power to the energy consumer at a discounted price. The discount is assumed to be in the form of exempting the energy consumer from paying the global adjustment. As a result, the energy consumer only pays the hourly Ontario electricity price when discounted power is available. Discounted electricity will decrease the cost of operating battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts for the energy consumer and will encourage the use of those technologies instead of diesel forklifts. The government has an incentive to pursue such policy as the replacement of diesel forklifts with fuel cell-powered and battery-powered forklifts will reduce GHG emissions and subsequently, the social cost of carbon in the province. The results of the third study show that when the government does not allocate discounted power to the energy consumer, energy consumer does not reduce emissions and keeps using the 150 diesel forklifts. However, when the government provides 0.1% of Ontario's surplus power at each hour to the energy consumer at a discounted price, the energy consumer replaces 31 of diesel forklifts with battery-powered forklifts. When the percentage of discounted power is 0.6% of Ontario's surplus power at each hour, energy consumer replaces 91 of diesel forklifts with battery-powered forklifts and 54 of diesel forklifts with fuel cell-powered forklifts. A policy of discounting surplus power to encourage replacing diesel forklifts with battery-powered and fuel cell-powered forklifts is shown to benefit both stakeholders in the system. The third study also shows that the deployment of both fuel-cell powered and battery-powered forklifts is effective in reducing GHG emissions in Ontario when surplus clean power is available. Battery-powered forklifts are more cost-effective when lower levels of discounted power are available; however, with an increase in the level of available discounted power, fuel cell-powered forklifts become more cost-effective technologies compared to battery-powered forklifts. The same methodology is also used for analyzing the potential of clean surplus power in Ontario to reduce GHG emissions in the residential sector. In the fourth study, an iterative optimization model is developed to analyze the interaction of heat and electricity sectors at a national level in Great Britain. Independent mathematical models for optimizing the selection of technologies in heat and electricity supply systems are developed in the fourth study. The optimal mix of technologies for supplying electricity and heat were then calculated iteratively to take into account the interactions between the electricity and heat systems and their fragmented planning strategies. The capacity and operation of various technologies for electricity generation were optimized to supply electricity demand with a minimum annual cost. Then, the heat supply options were determined through minimization of the annualized cost of the heat supply system. Iterative optimization of electricity and heat was continued until an equilibrium was achieved. The results of the iterative approach were compared with a centralized optimization model in which heat and electricity problems are solved simultaneously.
Cite this version of the work
Ehsan Haghi (2020). Developing Models Using Game Theory for Analyzing the Interaction of Various Stakeholders in Energy Systems. UWSpace. http://hdl.handle.net/10012/15486