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dc.contributor.authorZhao, Shi
dc.contributor.authorBauch, Chris T.
dc.contributor.authorHe, Daihai
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-22 17:38:16 (GMT)
dc.date.available2018-08-22 17:38:16 (GMT)
dc.date.issued2018-08-20
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10012/13639
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2018.0515
dc.descriptionThis is an accepted manuscript that has been accepted for publication by the Royal Society in the Journal of the Royal Society Interface and is made available under the following terms: https://royalsociety.org/journals/ethics-policies/media-embargo/en
dc.description.abstractVisitors can play an important role in the spread of infections. Here, we incorporate an epidemic model into a game theoretical framework to investigate the effects of travel strategies on infection control. Potential visitors must decide whether to travel to a destination that is at risk of infectious disease outbreaks. We compare the individually optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategy to the group optimal strategy that maximizes the overall population utility. Economic epidemiological models often find that individual and group optimal strategies are very different. In contrast, we find perfect agreement between individual and group optimal strategies across a wide parameter regime. For more limited regimes where disagreement does occur, the disagreement is (1) generally very extreme; (2) highly sensitive to small changes in infection transmissibility and visitor costs/benefits; and (3) can manifest either in a higher travel volume for individual optimal than group optimal strategies, or vice versa. The simulations show qualitative agreement with the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Beijing, China. We conclude that a conflict between individual and group optimal visitor travel strategies during outbreaks may not generally be a problem, although extreme differences could emerge suddenly under certain changes in economic and epidemiological conditions.en
dc.description.sponsorshipEarly Career Scheme grant from the Hong Kong Research 343 Grant Council || PolyU 251001/14Men
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherThe Royal Societyen
dc.titleStrategic Decision-making about Travel during Disease Outbreaks: a Game Theoretical Approachen
dc.typeArticleen
dcterms.bibliographicCitationZhao S, Bauch CT, He D. 2018 Strategic decision making about travel during disease outbreaks: a game theoretical approach. J. R. Soc. Interface 20180515. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2018.0515
uws.contributor.affiliation1Faculty of Mathematicsen
uws.contributor.affiliation2Applied Mathematicsen
uws.typeOfResourceTexten
uws.peerReviewStatusRevieweden
uws.scholarLevelFacultyen


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