Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorYang, Meng 15:25:24 (GMT) 15:25:24 (GMT)
dc.description.abstractSecurity experts confront new attacks on TLS/SSL every year. Ever since the compression side-channel attacks CRIME and BREACH were presented during security conferences in 2012 and 2013, online users connecting to HTTP servers that run TLS version 1.2 are susceptible of being impersonated. We set up three Randomized Lempel-Ziv Models, which are built on Lempel-Ziv77, to confront this attack. Our three models change the deterministic characteristic of the compression algorithm: each compression with the same input gives output of different lengths. We implemented SSL/TLS protocol and the Lempel-Ziv77 compression algorithm, and used them as a base for our simulations of compression side-channel attack. After performing the simulations, all three models successfully prevented the attack. However, we demonstrate that our randomized models can still be broken by a stronger version of compression side-channel attack that we created. But this latter attack has a greater time complexity and is easily detectable. Finally, from the results, we conclude that our models couldn't compress as well as Lempel-Ziv77, but they can be used against compression side-channel attacks.en
dc.publisherUniversity of Waterlooen
dc.subjectLempel-Ziv compressionen
dc.subjectcompression side-channel attacken
dc.titleRandomized Lempel-Ziv Compression for Anti-Compression Side-Channel Attacksen
dc.typeMaster Thesisen
dc.pendingfalse and Computer Engineeringen and Computer Engineeringen of Waterlooen
uws-etd.degreeMaster of Applied Scienceen
uws.contributor.advisorGuang, Gong
uws.contributor.affiliation1Faculty of Engineeringen

Files in this item


This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record


University of Waterloo Library
200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1
519 888 4883

All items in UWSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

DSpace software

Service outages