Psychology
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Browsing Psychology by Author "Denison, Stephanie"
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Item Can children use probability to guide their choices under uncertainty?(University of Waterloo, 2022-09-01) Lu, Julianna; Denison, StephanieWe encounter situations in our everyday lives where we need to make decisions under uncertainty. But what kind of information do we use and what abilities are helpful to us when making decisions under uncertainty? In three experiments (Total N = 180), I examined whether 3- to 7-year-olds could use numerical information (e.g., probability) to judge which of two situations presented with more or less uncertainty. Children were shown two games with different numbers of hiding locations. Using a within-subjects design, they were asked to select the game that would make it either easy or hard for someone else to find a coin that is hidden under one of the locations. Around the age of five, children selected the side with fewer hiding locations when asked to make it easy to find the coin and selected the side with more hiding locations when asked to make it hard to find the coin (Experiment 1). Findings from Experiment 2 suggest that children do this by considering the absolute number of hiding locations, rather than using perceptual cues like surface area (e.g., clutter). In Experiment 3, we simplified our procedure to examine whether younger children could make a similar inference. Findings reveal that even 4-year-olds were selecting the side with fewer hiding locations when asked which ball was easier to find and selecting the side with more hiding locations when asked which ball was harder to find. These results suggest that around age four, children can evaluate probability to make judgements about levels of uncertainty. Moreover, these results highlight that perhaps evaluating the probabilities of outcomes is a helpful tool when confronted with uncertainty.Item Children use probability to infer other people’s emotions(University of Waterloo, 2020-12-09) Doan, Tiffany; Denison, StephaniePeople’s emotional reactions often depend on probability. However, it is unknown whether children consider probability when inferring other people’s emotions. Across three papers, this dissertation shows that children (N = 1465) and adults (N = 481) use probabilistic information when inferring emotions and that this ability develops with age. Chapter Two examined whether children use probability when inferring other people’s surprise (four experiments). When inferring who would be surprised about getting a red gumball, 7-year-olds inferred that the person who had a lower chance of receiving a red gumball would be surprised, but younger children did not. Six-year-olds’ surprise inferences improved when they were prompted to consider probability, but not when prompted to consider others’ prior beliefs. Together, the findings from this chapter show development in children’s ability to use probability to infer surprise. Chapter Three examined whether children and adults use probability when inferring other people’s happiness (five experiments). When judging the quality of an outcome of two yummy and two yucky gumballs, by age 4, children judged that this outcome is better if it came from a gumball machine that contained mostly yucky gumballs than if it came from a machine that contained mostly yummy gumballs. However, it is not until age 5 that they also recognize that people would be happier with this outcome if it came from the former machine rather than the latter machine. Together, the findings from this chapter show development in children’s ability to use probability to infer happiness and a developmental lag between children’s assessments of quality and happiness. Chapter Four examined whether children and adults consider close counterfactual alternatives (that are manipulated through probability) when inferring other people’s happiness and whether they recognize that an event had a close counterfactual alternative (four experiments). When inferring a person’s happiness about choosing a regular balloon (on a blind choice) from ten closed boxes, 6-year-olds inferred that the person would be happier if they later learned that most of the remaining boxes also held regular balloons than if they mostly held special balloons. However, when asked explicitly about the counterfactual alternative, they did not recognize that a special balloon could have easily been obtained when most of the boxes contained them. Younger children did not make either inference. Children’s happiness inferences improved when extra cues were provided, such that 5- and 6-year-olds inferred that a person would be happier when they later learned that they had been physically close to many regular balloons compared to when they were physically close to many special balloons. Six-year-olds also acknowledged that the special balloon was a close counterfactual alternative when the special balloons were physically close and more numerous. Together, the findings from this chapter show that children either infer happiness without considering close counterfactual alternatives, or that counterfactuals influence children’s happiness inferences before they can explicitly acknowledge their closeness. As a whole, this dissertation provides evidence that children use probabilistic information to infer other people’s emotions.Item The development of integrating number and proportion in probabilistic decision-making(University of Waterloo, 2021-06-22) Tawfik, Reem; Denison, StephanieThe ability to integrate multiple pieces of information and use it to guide decision-making is an essential part of everyday reasoning. While it may not seem like it, the information in our environments is often numerical in nature. From simple decisions like which cashier line to stand in at the grocery store, to more consequential judgments like evaluating the chances of getting accepted into a competitive graduate program, numbers and proportions are everywhere. And while combining numerical information to make judgments and decisions sounds challenging, even young children have some of the requisite abilities to do so. In this dissertation, I describe and discuss a series of experiments that examine the developmental trajectories of integrating numerical and proportional information to make probability judgements and arrive at favourable outcomes in game-like scenarios. Chapter 2 examines whether 5- and 6-year-old children (N=160) and adults (N=68) can integrate two types of numerical information to make decisions in a probability game involving single- and multi-draw samples from different distributions. I presented children with a computer game in which they must maximize the number of green objects obtained. In order to do so successfully they were required to integrate the absolute number of draws with the proportion of targets to non-targets from which those draws are made. Across five studies, I established that 5- and 6-year-olds and adults can – under certain conditions –integrate two sources of numerical information to make decisions that maximize the odds of a favourable outcome. Chapter 3 examines the developmental origins of these integrative abilities by adapting the paradigm used in Chapter 2 to test infants (n=46). I presented them with two trial types: one where the correct response was to choose the lower draw number from the distribution with a higher proportion of target objects, and another where the correct response was to choose the higher draw number from the distribution with a lower proportion of target objects. Results from 10-12-month-olds revealed that infants were not able to combine the numerical and proportional information to make probability judgments and performed at chance levels with no effects of age or trial type. These results suggested that the ability to integrate both numerical and proportional information to make probability judgments is not yet a consistent hallmark of probabilistic reasoning within the age range we tested. Chapter 4 examines whether or not toddlers (n=40) would be successful on the same trial types used with infants. Results from 18-30-month-olds show that toddlers were able to correctly choose the larger draw number from the distribution with the lower proportion of target objects, but responded at rates no different than chance on the trial where the correct response was to choose the smaller draw number from the distribution with the larger proportion of target objects. Taken together, the results from these three sets of experiments suggest that adults and school-aged children are capable of integrating probability and number in a game-like probability task, and that these abilities may begin in toddlerhood. It appears that beginning in the second year of life, but likely not before then, human learners can consider both the distributions and the number of draws when reasoning about sampling and probability.Item Investigating Children’s Naturalistic Explorations in a Living History Museum(University of Waterloo, 2022-01-12) Attisano, Elizabeth; Denison, StephanieResearchers have taken the approach of examining children’s learning in more naturalistic settings such as museums, science centers, and zoos (e.g., Sobel & Jipson, 2015), as in-lab experiments do not resemble the situations that children most often find themselves learning in. This work has primarily focused on how children acquire science concepts from highly structured indoor exhibits, and lacks ecological validity to everyday life. A living history village, on the other hand, offers a middle ground between children’s everyday lives and other informal learning environments, as the context of the space is more similar to a child’s life. This dissertation explores the learning opportunities in a living history village at the Ken Seiling Waterloo Region Museum (WRM), and whether the content of parents and children’s conversations in these spaces resembles what one might expect given previous in-lab findings. Chapter Two examines 4- to 8-year-old children’s (N= 40, Mage=5.98 years) spontaneous interactions with parents and museum staff while exploring artifacts. The nature of discussions about artifacts evolved with child age, as the proportion of children’s talk related to simple identification of artifacts decreases with age. Parents and staff provided unique learning opportunities by discussing different aspects of artifacts at different rates, and used a variety of strategies to teach their children about different artifact properties. Children also responded to different pedagogical strategies differently; they were most engaged and produced more information in response to critical thinking questions. Using the same dataset as Chapter Two, Chapter Three examines whether there are opportunities for informal science learning for 4- to 8-year-old children in unexpected places, such as a living history village. I specifically examined the nature of science talk children were exposed to (i.e., biology, physics, or engineering; guided by the Ontario and Michigan Science Curriculums) and how these topics were discussed. Children of all ages are drawn to discussing biology, whereas children discuss more science concepts related to engineering and physics with age. Parents and staff provide different science learning opportunities for children and discuss these science concepts differently. Chapter Four explores whether it was possible to intervene on children’s (N=61; 4-to 8-years-old) exploration and learning to direct their attention to a specific feature of an artifact, namely the causal mechanisms of its operation. Prior to entering the exhibit, children were randomly assigned to receive a “component” prompt that focused their attention on the machine’s internal mechanisms or a “history” prompt as a control. Children generally discussed most aspects of the machine, including the whole machine, its parts, and to a lesser extent, its mechanisms. In the test phase, older children recalled more information than younger children about all aspects of the machine, and appeared more knowledgeable to adult coders. Children who received the component prompt were rated as more knowledgeable about the machine in the test phase, suggesting that this prompt influenced what they learned. Taken together, the results suggest that children are engaging in the living history exhibit in a meaningful way, although they require the support of both parents and staff to fully take advantage of the learning opportunities present. It also provides evidence that the laboratory findings regarding children’s artifact, science, and causal knowledge are evident in their spontaneous conversations. These findings are also a concrete step towards quantifying the educational value of visitor experiences at the WRM.Item Young Children’s Ability to Integrate Social and Numerical Information: The Origins of Base-rate Neglect(University of Waterloo, 2019-08-02) Gualtieri, Samantha; Denison, StephanieThe seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1973) sparked an interest in the biases that govern decision-making, notably due to their findings on adults’ tendency to neglect base-rate information (i.e., prior probability) when it conflicts with social information (e.g., a personality description, or testimony information). Though research over the past 45 years uncovered the conditions that lead to base-rate neglect, very little has investigated the origins of these biases. Young children can use base-rate and social information on their own, but their ability to integrate this information remains poorly understood. Do children show a preference for social information as soon as they are able to use it? Or, does their preference for social information develop over time? The current thesis explores 4- to 6-year-old children’s ability to integrate base-rate and social information, providing insight into the origins of base-rate neglect. In three projects, I assessed young children’s ability to integrate base-rate and social information. A first project investigated children’s use of base-rate information when it conflicted with individuating information (i.e., a personality description). Typically, adults classify an individual by evaluating how well the individuating information matches a stereotypical member of each social group, underusing prior base-rates of the groups in their decision. Using stereotypes familiar to young children, I presented them with an 8:2 base-rate of characters (e.g., 8 nice, 2 mean). One character was randomly selected from the group, with its membership unknown, and children were given a short personality description. By age 6, children performed similarly to adults and over relied on individuating information. Notably, 4-year-olds preferred base-rates more than the older age groups. I further explored these age differences in a second project that manipulated the quality of the base-rate and individuating information given. Six-year-olds’ use of base-rates varied with manipulations depending on the strength of the available individuating information. However, 4-year-olds consistently used base-rates across manipulations, even in situations where it would be reasonable to rely on the individuating information. Thus, children seem to initially show a preference for base-rate information and develop a bias toward individuating information by the age of 6, though attempt to reconcile individuating information with base-rates. A third project extended my findings to another type of social information. I presented children with testimony information from a witness that conflicted with base-rates. Rather than integrating information, adults typically use the witness’ accuracy alone, thus neglecting base-rates. Here, 4- and 5-year-olds relied exclusively on an accurate witness, but they integrated information when the witness was less accurate. For young children, testimony from a witness is a strong cue, even stronger than stereotypical information. With findings from the youngest age group tested to date, my dissertation provides evidence that heuristic strategies strengthen with development and vary depending on the type of social information provided. These findings highlight the importance of research on the role of age-related changes in experience and cognitive abilities in information integration strategies.