On the nature of civil and political religion, a re-examination of the civil religion thesis

Abstract

The notion of civil religion, as it appears in the literature, has been too narrowly conceived. While the roots of the concept can be traced back to the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau and Emile Durkheim (two very different traditions), sociological analyses of this topic have been guided, almost exclusively, by a Durkheimian approach. This perspective seeks to explain religion in terms of an alleged 'spontaneous' integrative role which is considered crucial to the understanding of the civil religious phenomenon. In so doing, it neglects the coercive and divisive potential of civil religion, and wrongly relegates the coercive type (whose 'theology' is dependent on the state) to third world countries. The current conceptualization of civil religion, particularly in its American usage and understanding, emphasizes the religious and cultural dimension of the concept, and fails to give due consideration to its political and ideological foundations. It is also too limited to be of use in the field of comparative studies. By neglecting to understand civil religion in its original Rousseauan meaning, sociological scholarship has unintentionally encouraged a misinterpretation of the civil religion concept, and attained a one-sided view of the civil religious phenomenon.

This dissertation proposes a critique of the notion of civil religion as it is conceived and employed by Robert Bellah and other American scholars. It challenges some of the most commonly-accepted assumptions of the civil religion thesis. The lack of a clear distinction between Rousseau's and Durkheim's ideas constitutes the key to this critique. It is argued that most other 'problems' and deficiencies encountered in the literature stem from this omission. Although the analysis concentrates largely on the United States, it is supported by an examination of the comparative literature.

In seeking to advance the analysis of civil religion, a model is offered which orders civil religions in a continuum in terms of their theoretical sources and political significance. The continuum ranges from civil religion as culture (the Durkheimian "civil" approach) to civil religion as ideology (the Rousseauan "political" approach). At one end of the spectrum is the classical position developed by Durkheim, which asserts that each collectivity has a 'sacred' quality and a common religion. At the other end, civil religion is conceived in terms of a particular political order, as advocated by Rousseau. The continuum is understood in the Weberian sense of two 'ideal types.' Civil religion is neither 'cultural' nor 'ideological' in any absolute sense. This means that the 'cultural' and 'ideological' aspects of civil religion can be conceptually distinguished but not separated in reality. How civil religion 'operates' in each case is an important conceptual issue, and having distinct analytic categories with which to make such comparisons is essential in terms of theoretical and empirical concerns. This broadened conception enriches the study of civil religion, by providing a better sociological tool with which to compare 'shades' and types of civil religion both within societies and among them.