Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorJuliato, Marcio
dc.date.accessioned2011-04-28 16:02:02 (GMT)
dc.date.available2011-04-28 16:02:02 (GMT)
dc.date.issued2011-04-28T16:02:02Z
dc.date.submitted2011
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10012/5876
dc.description.abstractSpacecrafts are extensively used by public and private sectors to support a variety of services. Considering the cost and the strategic importance of these spacecrafts, there has been an increasing demand to utilize strong cryptographic primitives to assure their security. Moreover, it is of utmost importance to consider fault tolerance in their designs due to the harsh environment found in space, while keeping low area and power consumption. The problem of recovering spacecrafts from failures or attacks, and bringing them back to an operational and safe state is crucial for reliability. Despite the recent interest in incorporating on-board security, there is limited research in this area. This research proposes a trusted hardware module approach for recovering the spacecrafts subsystems and their cryptographic capabilities after an attack or a major failure has happened. The proposed fault tolerant trusted modules are capable of performing platform restoration as well as recovering the cryptographic capabilities of the spacecraft. This research also proposes efficient fault tolerant architectures for the secure hash (SHA-2) and message authentication code (HMAC) algorithms. The proposed architectures are the first in the literature to detect and correct errors by using Hamming codes to protect the main registers. Furthermore, a quantitative analysis of the probability of failure of the proposed fault tolerance mechanisms is introduced. Based upon an extensive set of experimental results along with probability of failure analysis, it was possible to show that the proposed fault tolerant scheme based on information redundancy leads to a better implementation and provides better SEU resistance than the traditional Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR). The fault tolerant cryptographic primitives introduced in this research are of crucial importance for the implementation of on-board security in spacecrafts.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherUniversity of Waterlooen
dc.subjectSecurityen
dc.subjectCryptographyen
dc.subjectFault Toleranceen
dc.subjectTrusted Platformen
dc.subjectSpace Systemsen
dc.subjectHash Functionsen
dc.subjectSecure Hash Algorithmen
dc.subjectSHA-2en
dc.subjectKeyed-Hash Message Authentication Codeen
dc.subjectHMACen
dc.subjectHardware Implementationen
dc.subjectFPGAen
dc.subjectApplication Specific Processoren
dc.subjectCustom Instructionen
dc.subjectHW/SW Partitioningen
dc.titleFault Tolerant Cryptographic Primitives for Space Applicationsen
dc.typeDoctoral Thesisen
dc.pendingfalseen
dc.subject.programElectrical and Computer Engineeringen
uws-etd.degree.departmentElectrical and Computer Engineeringen
uws-etd.degreeDoctor of Philosophyen
uws.typeOfResourceTexten
uws.peerReviewStatusUnrevieweden
uws.scholarLevelGraduateen


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record


UWSpace

University of Waterloo Library
200 University Avenue West
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1
519 888 4883

All items in UWSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

DSpace software

Service outages