Cross-monotonic Cost-Sharing Methods for Network Design Games

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Date

2007-09-26T16:49:30Z

Authors

Wheatley, David

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University of Waterloo

Abstract

In this thesis we consider some network design games that arise from common network design problems. A network design game involves multiple players who control nodes in a network, each of which has a personal interest in seeing their nodes connected in some manner. To this end, the players will submit bids to a mechanism whose task will be to select which of the players to connect, how to connect their nodes, and how much to charge each player for the connection. We rely on many fundamental results from mechanism design (from [8], [9] & [5]) in this thesis and focus our efforts on designing and analyzing cost-sharing methods. That is, for a given set of players and their connection requirements, our algorithms compute a solution that satisfies all the players’ requirements and calculates ’fair’ prices to charge each of them for the connection. Our cost-sharing methods use a primal-dual framework developed by Agrawal, Klein and Ravi in [1] and generalized by Goemans &Williamson in [3]. We modify the algorithms by using the concept of death-time introduced by K¨onemann, Leonardi & Sch¨afer in [6]. Our main result is a 2-budget balanced and cross-monotonic cost sharing method for the downwards monotone set cover game, which arises naturally from any downwards monotone 0, 1-function. We have also designed a 2-budget balanced and cross-monotonic cost sharing method for two versions of the edge cover game arising from the edge cover problem. These games are special cases of the downwards monotone set cover game. By a result by Immorlica, Mahdian & Mirrokni in [4] our result is best possible for the edge cover game. We also designed a cross-monotonic cost sharing method for a network design game we call the Even Parity Connection game arising from the T-Join problem that generalizes proper cut requirement functions. We can show our algorithm returns cost shares that recover at least half the cost of the solution. We conjecture that our cost sharing method for the even parity connection game is competitive and thus 2-budget balance.

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Game Theory, Network Design, Cost-Sharing Methods

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