Studying Economic Sanctions Using The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

Abstract

The methodology of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is improved to show how a Graph Model can account for strength of sanctions, to introduce a trigger option to simplify a model, and to connect a Graph Model with the concept of BATNA (Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement). Two real life applications are provided to illustrate these advances: the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)/US Shale oil producers conflict, and the North-South Sudan oil pipeline dispute. Sometimes disputants attempt to manipulate behavior by threatening sanctions. Clearly, the success of this threat depends on the strength of the sanctions. This type of conflict is represented in this thesis by two identical graphs with different preferences reflecting the strength of the sanction. Both of the real world conflicts examples are analyzed in this way. The concept of a Conflict Trigger (CT) is introduced to simplify a Graph Model. If the CT is selected, the number of states in the model can be significantly reduced, thereby, simplifying the analysis. The North/South Sudan conflict illustrates the employment of a CT for reducing the complexity of the analysis. BATNA is a widely utilized principle used in the analysis of negotiations. Because many negotiations can be captured in a Graph Model, it is reasonable to ask how BATNA is connected. The four steps of BATNA are compared to a typical Graph Model of a negotiation to identify similarities and differences. The use of BATNA’s reservation value in combination with a Graph Model of a negotiation gives insight into when a negotiator would accept an offer. The application of BATNA in the North/South Sudan conflict demonstrates its value.