Lessan, JavadKarabati, Selcuk2018-10-182018-10-182018-03-01https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2017.09.024http://hdl.handle.net/10012/14009The final publication is available at Elsevier via https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2017.09.024 © 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/We study a pricing and allocation problem of a seller of multiple units of a homogeneous item, and present a semi-market mechanism in the form of an iterative ascending-bid auction. The auction elicits buyers' preferences over a set of options offered by the seller, and processes them with a random-priority assignment scheme to address buyers' "fairness" expectations. The auction's termination criterion is derived from a mixed-integer programming formulation of the preference-based capacity allocation problem. We show that the random priority- and preference-based assignment policy is a universally truthful mechanism which can also achieve a Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium. Computational results demonstrate that the auction mechanism can extract a substantial portion of the centralized system's profit, indicating its effectiveness for a seller who needs to operate under the "fairness" constraint.enAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 InternationalMulti-unit auctionsPricing and capacity allocationMixed-integer programmingArticle