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    • Naturalizing Moral Judgment 

      Pecoskie, Theresa K. (University of Waterloo, 2006-12-18)
      Philosophers have traditionally attempted to solve metaethical disputes about the nature of moral judgment through reasoned argument alone. Empirical evidence about how we do make moral judgments is often overlooked in ...
    • Sentimentalism, Affective Response, and the Justification of Normative Moral Judgments 

      Menken, Kyle (University of Waterloo, 2006)
      Sentimentalism as an ethical view makes a particular claim about moral judgment: to judge that something is right/wrong is to have a sentiment/emotion of approbation/disapprobation, or some kind of positive/negative feeling, ...

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