Conservatism and British imperialism in India: finding the local roots of empire in Britain and India

by

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Author’s Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

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Abstract

This thesis explores the importance of political conservatism in shaping the ideological and political foundations of British imperialism in India between 1857 and 1914. From the Indian Revolt to the rise of Indian nationalism, it examines how British and Indian conservatives attempted to define a conceptual and institutional framework of empire which politically opposed liberal imperialism to the First World War. It relies upon a biographical analysis to examine how intellectual configurations defined distinct political positions on Indian empire. This study reveals the extent that local conservative inclination and action, through political actors such as Lord Ellenborough, Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Mayo, Lord Lytton, the Kathiawar States, Roper Lethbridge, and M.M. Bhownaggree, shaped public and partisan discourse on empire. It argues that British and Indian conservatives evoked shared principles centered in locality, prescription, and imagination to challenge, mollify, and supplant the universal and centralizing ambitions of liberal imperialists and nationalists with the employment of pre-modern ideas and institutions. It is argued that this response to liberalism conditioned their shared contribution and collaboration towards an imperial framework predicated principally upon respecting and supporting local autonomy and traditional authority in a hierarchical and divided India. This formulated political positions and policy on Indian empire which advocated for the state’s primacy, paternal local authority and property obligation, and veneration for the transcendent qualities of tradition and religion. Moreover, this framework conditioned a challenge to a European civilizational definitions of race and identity, with an incorporative and vertical identity and subjectionhood determined by a state’s, group’s, or individual’s national belonging as well as loyalty and obligation to the Crown.
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Thesis Introduction: Finding the Local Roots of Conservative Empire

This thesis explores the importance of political conservatism in shaping the ideological and political foundations of British imperialism in India between 1857 and 1914. From the Indian Revolt to the rise of Indian nationalism, it examines how British and Indian conservatives attempted to define a conceptual and institutional framework of empire which politically opposed liberal imperialism to the First World War. It relies upon a biographical analysis to examine how intellectual configurations defined distinct political positions on British imperialism in India. This study reveals the extent that local conservative inclination and action, through political actors such as Lord Ellenborough, Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Mayo, Lord Lytton, the Kathiawar States, M.M. Bhownaggree, and Roper Lethbridge, shaped public and partisan discourse regarding the objectives of Indian Empire. It argues that British and Indian conservatives evoked shared principles centered in locality, prescription, and imagination to challenge, mollify, and supplant the universal and centralizing ambitions of liberal imperialists and nationalists.

This thesis contributes to British imperial historiography on two levels. First, it will show that British and Indian conservatives expanded local and pre-modern political and social concepts to influence the nature and purpose of Indian Empire in the nineteenth century. Second, it demonstrates that British and Indian conservatives collaborated in defining an imperial framework which corresponded with their ideas and institutions. While seeing the “modern period” as starting in the eighteenth century, this study defines “modernity” conceptually as the product of liberal ideology which adhered to the universal applicability of progress, scientific rationalism, and individual autonomy. It is shown that British and Indian conservatives viewed
liberalism as an alien and intrusive political and social force, and responded with the employment of pre-modern ideas and institutions predicated on locality, prescription, and imagination. It is argued that British and Indian conservative responses to liberalism conditioned their shared contribution and collaboration towards an imperial framework predicated principally upon respecting and supporting local autonomy and traditional authority. This formulated political positions and policy on Indian Empire that advocated for the state’s primacy, paternal local authority and property obligation, and veneration for the transcendent qualities of tradition and religion.

**Historiography: Imperializing British and Indian Conservatism**

A growing scholarship on British conservatism’s philosophical underpinnings illustrates that its principles and policies were enforced by a skeptical view of human nature which proscribed limits to state and individual reasoning. Using the term “conservative” to label adherents of tory and conservative political philosophies, this thesis demonstrates that eighteenth century toryism informed the intellectual development of British conservatism in the nineteenth century. On state primacy, Roger Scruton argues that “the conservative believes in the power of the state as necessary to the state’s authority, and will seek to establish and enforce that power in the face of every influence that opposes it.” He argues that in contrast to a Lockean individualist perspective, conservatives believe that people exist in a ‘non-contractual’ pre-existing social order defined through a natural bond of locality. This contextualizes conservatism’s commitment to property. He explains that conservatives maintain a romantic perspective of property which
seeks to fuse capitalism with a feudal obligation of duty.\textsuperscript{1} Nigel Ashford and Stephen Davies argue that conservatives conceive that an individual’s duties and responsibilities are determined within a particular social context. Just like the individual, the conservative sees political and social institutional legitimacy deriving from their endurance over time in a specific environment.\textsuperscript{2} Noël O’Sullivan contends that conservatives believe in an unmalleable and unintelligible world, and, therefore, accept the limits that the latter places on an individual’s or state’s reason and will. Moreover, conservatives comprehend that these limits and the variety of individual and group wants make compromise necessary for a functioning society.\textsuperscript{3}

This recognition of human nature’s rational limit informs a conservative’s cautious approach to reform. Greatly influenced by Edmund Burke’s \textit{Reflections on the French Revolution} (1790), Ted Honderich relates an individual’s self-identity and self-interest to historically familiar political and social institutions. This leads to an aversion to complete change, but acceptance of gradual reform through existing institutions.\textsuperscript{4} Levente Nagy sees conservatives’ propensity for measured and reflective change from their acknowledgement of the national growth of society through organic interaction, extra-human religious, psychological, and natural influences, and traditional ideas of the good life.\textsuperscript{5} Arthur Aughey combines concepts of an organic society and limited human reason to propose that conservatives envision societal

\textsuperscript{1} Roger Scruton, \textit{The meaning of conservatism, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition} (London: Macmillan, 1984), 21-31, 115.
\textsuperscript{2} Nigel Ashford and Stephen Davies ed., \textit{A dictionary of conservative and libertarian thought} (London: Routledge, 1991), 46-47.
harmony as the outcome of individual and mass conformity to locality and custom. This literature illustrates that British conservatives had a natural inclination towards acknowledging and conciliating societal difference in imagining and constructing political and social institutions. This thesis demonstrates that this inclination informed conservative political positions on the function of the state, property obligation, and religion and custom in the context of British imperialism in India.

In the historiography on British imperialism in India there have been attempts to demonstrate a conservative perspective and influence on empire. This scholarship mostly views conservative influence as a late eighteenth and early nineteenth century relic, or a reactionary impulse tied to ideologies of national and racial superiority. Anna Gambles reveals that British conservatives applied a coherent and intellectual “conservative political economy,” which prioritized state and property interests, to Britain and India early in the nineteenth century. In opposing the liberal abstract principles of free trade and laissez faire economics, she illustrates that Tories, and later Conservatives, glorified a nationally and historically defined “Propertied Constitution.” Gambles argues that in defending the Corn Laws and instituting the income tax, conservatives sought to maintain the State’s relationship with the economy to ensure mutual consumption and social stability. In regards to empire, she reveals that conservatives respected England’s and India’s specific national experiences. As the East India Company was seen to

represent a local and evolved Indian institution, it also secured India’s distance from influencing England’s constitution.\(^8\) Moreover, she demonstrates that metropolitan conservatives criticized the 1793 Permanent Settlement as a destructive foreign intervention to Indian revenue and property organization.\(^9\)

Christopher A. Bayly reveals disparate conservative reactions to an emergent liberal imperialism early in the nineteenth century. In *Imperial Meridian* (1989), Bayly contends that British imperialism from 1780 to 1830 was informed by a “constructive conservatism,” which conditioned a patriotic, militaristic, agriculturalist, and evangelical nationalist policy on empire. He argues that it was an evangelical nationalization that sharpened racial attitudes and character stereotypes.\(^10\) In *Recovering Liberties* (2012), Bayly argues that separate British and Indian “neoconservative” entities emerged in opposition to a burgeoning liberal imperialism early in the nineteenth century. As British conservatives supported the East India Company’s mercantile and cultural non-intervention policies, he sees Indian “neoconservatism” as a Hindu bourgeois defense of “their rights” to protect religious knowledge, purity, and livelihood from colonialism.\(^11\) Although limiting his analysis to the early nineteenth century, Bayly’s recognition that British and Indian conservatives were modern and national reactions to the universal ambitions of liberal empire provides an interesting conceptual basis to examine whether these similar responses led to imperial conservative collaborations later in the century.

\(^8\) Gambles, *Protection and politics*, 158-160.
\(^9\) Ibid, 164.
Eric Stokes, George Bearce, and Thomas Metcalf argue that British conservatism had an impact on imperial governance in India. Eric Stokes reveals a conservative response to utilitarian reform in India early in the nineteenth century. He argues that although this metropolitan philosophy had a substantial effect to initiating educational, economic, and social reform in India, there existed an alternative conservative style of imperial governance in western and southern India. Stokes demonstrates that Governors Thomas Munro, Mountstuart Elphinstone, Charles Metcalfe, and John Malcolm were driven by a Burkean attachment to history, as they pursued collaborative relationships with local paternal rulers and opposed radical schemes of reform.12 Bearce argues that Burke, along with Sir William Jones and William Robertson, embodied a conservative sentiment on India in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. In showing that Burke believed in India’s position as a civilized polity defined through a prescribed hierarchy and system of social obligation, Bearce contends that he advocated that British rule of the Subcontinent should be through the country’s institutions which reflected the history and experiences of the people. Although Bearce sees Munro and Mountstuart Elphinstone as proponents of this conservative perspective in resisting the rapid westernization of local Indian culture, he submits that British conservatism failed amid the rise of utilitarianism and liberalism in India. This, he argues, reflected its inability to resolve the contraction of wanting to maintain India’s institutions while establishing imperial power.13


Metcalf maintains that British imperialism became more informed by conservative principles following the Indian Revolt. In *Aftermath of Revolt* (1964), Metcalf reveals that ‘liberal conservatism’ informed a governing policy which supported the aristocratic classes and social non-interference.¹⁴ Preceding the Revolt, he traces an outline of a conservative political tradition in the East India Company among Governors Malcolm, Munro, and Mountstuart Elphinstone, who argued that a respect for tradition and the recognition of local character should caution against transformative liberal reform.¹⁵ From Viceroy’s Lord Canning’s policy to secure the favour of princes and property to Lord Cranborne’s opposition of Mysore annexation and support for the re-installation of its prince in the 1860s, he demonstrates that this tradition was maintained in combination with liberal attitudes of laissez faire in the Indian Civil Service.¹⁶

In *Ideologies of the Raj* (1994), Metcalf perceives the advent of British conservatism in India as a reactionary force sustained by an ideology of racial difference late in the nineteenth century. He argues that there existed an ideological tension between race similarity and difference which defined the contradictory nature of British imperialism in the nineteenth century. He demonstrates that although a liberal conception of human universality underpinned British policies towards improving the Indian people through English education and culture in the first half of the century, after the 1857 Mutiny this was challenged by a British conception of

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racial difference which sustained the protection of a traditional, yet inferior and divided Indian society.\textsuperscript{17} He contends that Britons in India applied “scientific” methods of categorization to historicize ethnic, religious, and linguistic racial difference, allied with Benjamin Disraeli’s “neo-Tory” re-fashioning of the British Empire as a global military power in an increasingly nationalistic world. According to Metcalf, this alignment led to a political preference for identified “natural leaders,” such as princes, large landowners, and religious heads.\textsuperscript{18} Metcalf is influenced by Bernard Cohn’s study on the foundations of colonial knowledge, and a postcolonial scholarship examining the cultural foundations for a European ideology of race superiority.\textsuperscript{19} For Metcalf, Henry Maine’s concept of the “Village Community,” where India is incorporated yet segregated as “ancient” compared to Europe within a liberal civilizational scale, became the excuse for the British to curtail liberal reform towards individual liberty and self-government.\textsuperscript{20}

This scholarship demonstrates the prevalence of alternative conservative perspectives and political positions on British imperialism which opposed and modified a liberal civilizational ideology in nineteenth century India. It shows that rather than being a hegemonic and homogenous force, Britain’s Indian Empire was continually redefined by various intellectual and individual influences. Its limitation, however, is an inability to locate the intellectual lineage,

\textsuperscript{18} Metcalf, \textit{Ideologies of the Raj}, 113-159.
\textsuperscript{20} Metcalf, \textit{Ideologies of the Raj}, 68-72.
diversity, and applicability of British conservatism in India. Although Bayly appropriately expands metropolitan conservatism to encompass a “neo-conservative” perspective on Indian Empire, for him conservatives were not an ideologically or socially cohesive political force beyond the early nineteenth century. Metcalf’s “liberal conservatism” and “neo-Toryism” emphasize an alternative conservative imperial perspective, yet, unlike Bayly, he does not fully contextualize this perspective within a British political and intellectual lineage. Despite demonstrating that Disraeli’s efforts to turn the British Empire into a national enterprise reflected a Tory ideology, he does not explore how Toryism’s intellectual relationship with nationality could lead British conservatives to hold a more sympathetic understanding of India and its people. This thesis demonstrates that conservatives challenged a liberal civilizing perspective of racial difference and European superiority by prioritizing locality and prescription to identify, differentiate, and incorporate individuals and groups within empire.

Ian Copland begins to draw important connections between the Conservative Party and a pro-aristocratic policy in India. He demonstrates that Lord Stanley’s authored 1858 Queen’s Proclamation and Canning’s imperial reconciliation of Indian princes, which protected their status and authority in exchange for better government, anticipating Mayo and Lytton’s later positions. In emphasizing Mayo, Lytton, and Bombay Governors Sir Seymour Fitzgerald (1867-1872) and James Fergusson (1880-1885) as Conservative government appointments, he argues that they shared a feudatory policy of improving princely governance in partnership with
Britain’s Indian Empire.\textsuperscript{21} Moreover, Copland relates metropolitan partisan politics with British policy in India. He demonstrates that the appointments of Bombay Governors Richard Temple (1877-1880) and Fergusson, both Conservative MPs, were attempts by Disraeli’s Conservative government to aid Lytton’s Indian policy.\textsuperscript{22} Although establishing these partisan relationships, which are often neglected by historians, Copland does not consider how policy and appointment were shaped by deeper ideological considerations. Beyond showing that Liberal government appointments, such as Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State for India (1859-1866), and Viceroy Lord Elgin (1862-1863) and John Lawrence (1864-1869), were skeptical of reforming princely rule, and showing that Lytton’s feudal Imperial Assemblage reflected an aristocratic mentality, there is little effort to connect these ideas to political philosophies in Britain.

Next, this study explores the intellectual and political outlines of an Indian conservative constituency late in the nineteenth century. Like its British variant, it is argued that Indian conservatism was a modern configuration which employed and espoused pre-modern institutions and concepts to critique liberal political and social reform. Moreover, it is contended that like Indian liberals, moderates, and extremists of the period, conservatives and conservatism existed as a local intellectual and political response to the particular features of empire and imperial politics in India. It represented a coherent response from princely states, as well as Parsi and Muslim minority communities who feared that liberal democratization and centralization harmed

\textsuperscript{21} Ian Copland, \textit{The British Raj and the Indian Princes: Paramountcy in Western India, 1857-1930} (Bombay: Orient Longman, 1982), 126, 128-159.
\textsuperscript{22} Copland, \textit{The British Raj and the Indian Princes}, 153-154.
their local autonomy and authority. This political conglomeration shared an intellectual adherence to locality and prescription, and contributed to an imaginative imperial discourse centered upon loyalism and obligation. It is argued that Indian conservatives advocated for local and imperial collaboration, and promoted the Empire’s assistance in enabling graduated social and economic development.

In demonstrating the imperial intersection of British and Indian politics, it is shown that Britain’s and India’s conservatives collaborated to oppose similar liberal partisan associations on questions regarding empire and nationalism in the nineteenth century. Just as liberals and moderates looked to the British Liberal Party as proponents of constitutional reform in India, Indian conservatives aligned with the British Conservative Party to oppose Indian nationalism and promulgate a conception of a politically divided, socially hierarchical, and culturally diverse empire. Beyond representing an imperial “anti-Congress party,” conservative political opposition to British and Indian liberalism represented a deeper intellectual divide concerning the nature and purpose of British imperialism in India. As Indian liberals saw the Empire as a means to spread the civilizational blessings of progress, scientific rationalism, and individual liberty that enabled democracy, self-government, and a capitalist economy, Indian conservatives viewed the Empire as strictly defined through imperial collaborations between local and prescriptive institutions. Therefore, they rejected Indian nationalism’s political and bureaucratic

centralization as unrepresentative of a divided, hierarchical, and diverse India. Instead, Indian conservatives imagined India as a diversely populated and geographical space held in aggregate by a paramount empire. Therefore, each individual and community held a vertical upward loyalty and obligation to the imperial state which was reciprocated downwards to the people of India.

This imperial framework collaborated with indigenous political traditions in India. Bhikhu Parekh and V.R. Mehta demonstrate that Hindu and Muslim political theories imagined an organically layered and ordered society in which the ruler facilitated each group’s particular obligation.\(^{24}\) Jesse Palsetia shows that Parsis maintained a traditionally non-hierarchical society and a distinctive cultural and social identity by adapting to indigenous and colonial surroundings. In regards to the latter, he argues that a Parsi minority developed a narrative which related their financial and social success to British imperial power.\(^{25}\) Beyond peace and security, these political traditions informed an imperial framework sustained by reciprocal loyalty and obligation. This enabled cooperation towards administrative reform as well as social and economic development. This allowed the princely states, Muslim, and Parsi communities to strengthen traditional authority and institutions through participating in imperial power and public initiatives. In response to the historiography above, this thesis demonstrates that British and Indian conservatives employed locally developed institutions and ideas to define an


alternative imperial framework which challenged, mollified, and supplanted a predominant liberal imperialism in India.

Historiography: Debating Liberalism’s Imperial Dominance in the British Empire.

Historians have recognized liberal ideology’s predominance in defining the modern ideological and institutional foundations of British imperialism and colonial nationalism in the nineteenth century. Scholars have established how liberalism informed an ‘imperial civilizing mission’ which determined not only colonial authoritarianism, racism, and violence, but also the global spread of western education, market capitalism, democracy, and nationalism. They argue that Europeans and western educated indigenous groups employed a universal conception of human nature predicated on the precepts of reasoned progress and individualism to westernize and control the colonial periphery.

John Gallagher, Ronald Robinson, Andrew Porter, and Andrew Thompson argue that the British state, politicians, and the middle class were active participants in applying liberal ideologies of free trade, humanitarianism, and self-governance to British imperialism in the nineteenth century. Gallagher and Robinson’s seminal article “The Imperialism of Free Trade” (1953) reveals how a metropolitan liberal free trade ideology became the motivating force for British global expansion from the early nineteenth century. They contend that the British State’s enforcement of “informal empire” through “treaties of free trade” in South America led to “formal empire,” as the State increased territorial control to secure trade routes late in the
nineteenth century. Porter argues that a liberal humanitarian impulse encouraged British imperialism early in the nineteenth century. Specifically, he focuses on the Abolitionist Movement, a collection of public associations involved in trying to stop Britain’s participation in slavery and the slave trade, and the Aborigines’ Protection Society, an association that advocated for the humane treatment of non-European populations. He explains that they obtained popular and parliamentary support by capitalizing on a humanitarian ideology that promoted native trusteeship through encouraging free enterprise, labour, and self-governance. In regards to political reform and empire, Thompson demonstrates how the colonial implementation of liberal representative self-governance influenced the development of similar institutions in Britain. He contends that just as 1860s colonial constitutional developments encouraged the British Second Reform Act (1867), support for the Indian National Congress and the Indian parliamentary group influenced metropolitan politics late in the nineteenth century.

Catherine Hall and Jennifer Pitts illustrate that liberal motivations of empire shaped an “imperial civilizing mission” which sought to promulgate a western world view and knowledge to transform and control the colonial world. They argue that this sustained an ideological discourse which enforced European race superiority and difference over the non-European world. Catherine Hall contends that the failure of West Indian emancipated Blacks to subscribe to liberal ideals of political economy and individualism accentuated metropolitan prejudicial

28 Andrew Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back?: The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century (Harrow: Pearson, 2005), 139.
perceptions of cultural and racial difference.  Jennifer Pitts demonstrates how the failure of liberals to understand and transform the colonial world resulted in liberalism becoming intellectually tolerant of imperialism defined by racial difference and political authoritarianism. Pitt argues that this toleration was absent in an earlier liberal skeptical tradition, endorsed by Edmund Burke, David Hume and Jeremy Bentham, which questioned European superiority and promoted sympathy for cultural difference. Although providing much insight into British imperial thought, this scholarship is often deterministic in emphasizing liberalism’s role in enforcing a homogeneous and hegemonic experience of empire. In an approach that largely monitors liberal European voices, this historical work discounts the prevalence of variance and resistance from metropolitan and colonial interests. Specifically, it overlooks the capacity of local, pre-modern, and non-liberal ideas and institutions to shape the global British Empire.

Uday Singh Mehta, David Cannadine, and Indian subalternists provide alternative conceptual frameworks for examining British Indian Empire. Mehta’s study on Edmund Burke provides significant insight into a main progenitor of modern conservative thought. He argues that contrary to a liberal world view predicated on the universal application of European reasoned progress through individual consent, Burke recognized the plurality of local experience and difference in conceptualizing Britain’s imperial relationship in India. Mehta demonstrates how, from Locke to James and John Stuart Mill, a liberal epistemology and ontology tied to

individual reason about political consent and democracy became a civilizational measure by which Europe compared itself to India. He proposes that British liberals’ failure to find or educate similar characteristics in India represented their inability to understand and sympathize with societal difference defined by territory.\(^{31}\) In contrast, Mehta demonstrates that Burke recognized the importance of locality to informing individual identity and community institutions through the production of shared experience and habits. Moreover, Burke believed that beyond reason, individual and social prejudices were informed by an inheritance of location and history which eventually manifested itself as nationalism.\(^{32}\) In recognizing these foundations of difference, Mehta determines that Burke employed a “conversational” approach to India which allowed the communication of difference without a hindrance of “presupposed knowledge.”\(^{33}\) This thesis shows that Burke’s recognition and acceptance of difference influenced conservative imperial ideology throughout the nineteenth century.

David Cannadine’s research on British upper class anxiety towards liberal modernity in Britain and the Empire provides an additional imperial theoretical framework which credits the challenge of pre-modern concepts to liberal notions of race and civilizational superiority. In *Ornamentalism* (2001), he argues that an aristocratic hierarchical mentality informed British

imperialism from the 1790s to 1820s and the 1870s to 1950s, with the interim period representing reform and rejection based on egalitarian principles. He demonstrates that British upper class governing and administrative dominance allowed social prejudices in Britain to shape imperial practice. He shows that this class’s pre-Enlightenment mentality shaped its view of empire as a functional social entity defined by individual status over collective racial attributes. In India, and later in Africa, he argues that their mentality informed a perception of unchanging and socially hierarchical colonial environments. He proposes that this informed a collaborative imperial policy of strengthening indigenous rulers through a system of honours, and a genuine admiration for individual princes and social caste systems which maintained tradition against urban industrial capital and democracy.

Despite providing a useful framework to understand social class significance in defining British imperialism, it is questionable to what extent aristocratic sentiment on British imperialism was homogenous during these periods. Beyond a consideration that imperial perspective could evolve over the study’s 160 year focus, there is also a notable absence of analysis on the political and ideological divisions within the British upper class itself. The personality and governing differences of Whig Lord Bentinck and Tory Ellenborough, or Conservative Lytton and Liberal Lord Ripon later in the century, reveals a deeper political partisan relationship between Indian empire and British politics. It is interesting to note that

35 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, 58-59, 67.
unlike Cannadine’s earlier work *The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy* (1990), in *Ornamentalism* he does not associate the British upper class in the imperial setting with Conservative politics in Britain. This thesis demonstrates that Cannadine’s elucidation of aristocratic paternalism, skepticism of modernity in favour of tradition, prescription and hierarchy in empire resembled popular components of British and Indian imperial politics late in the nineteenth century.

Recently, Indian Subaltern scholarship has problematized the shared attempts of British imperialists and colonial nationalists to control India through the destruction of pre-modern indigenous institutions. A growing segment of this scholarship has convincingly argued that the British and Indian Nationalists were unable to establish western themed hegemony, and that princely, caste, and religious practices were able to sustain themselves through the colonial period. From a critique of Indian nationalists’ reliance on colonial progress and modernity over indigenous epistemology and ontology, Ranajit Guha argues that pre-modern concepts, such as *dharma*, informed imperial perspectives on the state’s relationship with society and the individual. Hira Singh contends that India’s princes resisted political economy and influenced imperial practice, especially the British adoption of durbars, through their active employment of traditional values relating to kinship. This thesis proposes to demonstrate that British and

36 Cannadine, *The decline and fall of the British aristocracy.*
Indian conservatives utilized pre-modern ideas and institutions to challenge liberal imperial reasoning and objectives in Indian Empire.

This thesis reveals that liberal imperialist’s universal and centralizing ambition motivated local conservative political reactions in Britain and in India from the nineteenth century. It demonstrates the pervasiveness of partisan political ideology and politics in determining local responses to empire. As liberal modernity increasingly defined the motives of British imperialists and a western educated Indian elites, British and India conservatives collaborated in conceiving, constructing, and communicating an imperial ideology predicated on protecting local and prescriptive institutions. To that end, this thesis utilizes scholarship that has conceptualized the British Empire as a global, collaborative, and structured entity defined by local political, social, and cultural ideas.

Bayly’s *The Rise of the Modern World 1780-1914* (2004) argues that from the late eighteenth century, western colonialism reinforced locally instigated processes which eventually produced global uniformity in bodily habits, ideas, and governing practices amidst nationalistic particularities. By combining the local, regional, and national into a global historical narrative, he demonstrates how a global commercial middle class, nationalist upheaval, and the spread of liberal ideologies were products of local responses to western colonialism.³⁹ Frederick Cooper's *Colonial in Question* (2005), and later co-publication *Empires in World History* (2009) with Jane Burbank, argue that empires had a substantial influence on world history, as they represented

multi-ethnic collaborative political entities. Cooper and Burbank contend that the modern French and British empires were global entities which relied on mutually beneficial collaborative relationships with non-European local elites to maintain political and economic paramountcy.\textsuperscript{40} This argument critiques postcolonial scholarship which emphasizes European imperialism’s political, social and cultural hegemony over colonial societies. In \textit{Colonialism in Question}, Cooper argues that postcolonialists and postmodernists are incorrect in depicting Europe as the single transformational ideological force in the colonial world. Therefore, a framework that places empire as the central analytical unit is needed to incorporate the reality of non-Western influences in shaping historical definitions of identity, globalization, and modernity. Cooper contends that as “identity” is a restrictive term which places people in static groups and “globalization” represents the unchallenged reality of western dominance, “modernity” is an abstract term utilized increasingly by different groups.\textsuperscript{41} In emphasising that the British and French empires’ diverse nature and size placed limitations on central administrative control, he contends that power was delegated and negotiated with indigenous elites and cultural interests that sought to define their own status and identity in a mutually beneficial imperial relationship.\textsuperscript{42} This scholarship demonstrates that western imperialists had to conciliate local non-Europeans elites, ideas, and institutions to maintain political and economic paramountcy in the colonial world. While Bayly demonstrates local influence in structuring global convergence, Cooper and

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\textsuperscript{41} Cooper, \textit{Colonialism in Question}, 105-110.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid, 200-201.
\end{flushright}
Burbank show that local collaboration informed the political and governing aspects of European imperialism.

**Thesis Outline: Conservative Imperialism in Indian Empire**

The process of British and Indian conservative collaboration is explored through an analysis of three periods, represented by three sections in this thesis. The first section examines British conservative inclination and action on the 1857 Indian Revolt, as well as the Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation in 1858. It focuses on the political philosophy and relationship with British imperialism of Robert Law, Lord Ellenborough, President of the Board of Control (1829-30, 1834-35, 1841, and 1858) and Governor General (1842-1844), and Benjamin Disraeli, Conservative MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852, 1858-1859, 1866-1868), and Prime Minister (1868, 1874-1880). It argues that their critical and imaginative response to British imperial policy before and during the Revolt, and legislative participation in the 1858 Act and Queen’s Proclamation reflected a coherent metropolitan conservative ideology applied to the Indian Empire.

This section demonstrates that London partisan politics was the forum in which the British public interpreted and responded to the Indian Revolt. In literature on the metropolitan reaction to the Revolt, Gautam Chakravarty’s contention that British victory over Indian mutineers reinforced British racial superiority is challenged by Christopher Herbert’s view that
this event produced an existential challenge to Victorian cultural idealism on empire. In contrast, this thesis supports Salahuddin Malik’s argument that the participation of multiple political and institutional interests created varying perspectives on the causes, nature, and consequences of the Revolt. Moreover, Malik describes how this formed a rudimentary political division between a Whig and military school, and a coalition representing the Conservative Party, missionaries stationed in India, Chartists, and ‘moralists’ who reacted “sympathetically towards Indians and the outbreak as a socio-political rebellion or revolution.” This thesis demonstrates that British conservatives employed the ideas of Burke and a Tory political tradition, each predicated on social prejudice and imaginative adherence to locality and prescription, to interpret the sepoys and popular uprising in India. It is shown that just as conservatives defended local authority, property, and the Church of England against liberal political and economic reforms in Britain, they saw liberal civilizing reform as leading to national discontent through the destruction of India’s native states, property tenure, and religious custom. It is argued that British conservatism’s inclination towards locality and prescription allowed them to be sympathetic to this destruction instigated by western feelings of civilizational superiority.


The first chapter explores how Ellenborough’s official experience with the Indian Empire informed a critical response to liberal policy during the Revolt. It argues that as a British and Indian statesman, he maintained a particular Tory inclination that India must be ruled in accordance with the country’s local political, social, and religious customs. In the only comprehensive biography of Ellenborough, one which was written in 1939, Albert H. Imlah argues that his perceived failure in India, being recalled after two years in 1844, reflected a sustained criticism from liberal political opponents in England. He proposes that this opposition reflected Ellenborough’s Tory mentality which disdained the value of popular opinion, and believed that good government was predicated on conciliating the people to aristocratic rule.45 Lastly, Imlah demonstrates that Ellenborough respected India’s political and cultural institutions. This included a wish to conciliate native princes to British paramountcy, and to protect native custom from the intrusive but necessary interventions of modern science.46 This thesis argues that Ellenborough’s aristocratic and conciliatory mentality reflected a conservative inclination towards locality and prescription which respected societal difference in India. It demonstrates his coherent legacy towards Crown rule, the necessity of reconciling princely and propertied interests to Britain, and non-interference with religious custom. It is also proposed that Ellenborough’s imaginative attempt to conciliate local custom and sentiment with the Somnauth Proclamation (1842) represented a lasting conservative inclination to use the imperial state to engage with the multiple facets of Indian society. During the Revolt, his criticisms of state

supported Christian proselytism, and public denouncement of Canning’s Oude “confiscation” Proclamation reflected a wider conservative sympathetic response to a socially intrusive Indian government.

The second chapter demonstrates that Disraeli’s adherence to a Burkean and Tory political tradition skeptical of liberal modernity informed an imperial perspective on India. It is shown that Disraeli expanded a Young England critique of Whig political centralization and social destruction in England to Ireland, Ceylon, and India. A prominent voice in an extensive historiography on Disraeli’s personal life and career, Robert Blake argues that Disraeli had no firm political or philosophical convictions. For example, he contends that his 1840s associational contributions to the Young England group was politically motivated and did not inform policy as Conservative Party leader in the 1860s.47 In a study of Disraeli’s literary career, Michael Flavin, in contrast, contends that although he saw political opportunity in Young England, it offered a forum to express an anti-Whig political philosophy which critiqued progress and industrial capitalism through an espousal of aristocratic rule and social responsibility.48 Peter Jupp and Paul Smith contend that Disraeli promoted prescription and questioned abstract reason as the guiding historical force for state and society.49 In regards to Disraeli’s Young England literary voyage to the East in Tancred, Patrick Brantlinger argues that he exhibited a “positive orientalism” which was contrary to contemporary interpretations of the “orient.” In challenging Edward Said’s

contention that Disraeli saw the orient through a British imperialist perspective, Brantlinger argues that his promotion of the racial “genius” of Hebrews and the Arabs represented an attempt to contest personal prejudice, and the racial and cultural stereotyping exhibited in James Mill’s *History of British India*.  

In expanding upon Flavin’s, Jupp’s and Brantlinger’s analyses, this thesis establishes how Disraeli’s attachment to a Tory political tradition informed an original perspective on British imperialism in India. Through a literary analysis of Disraeli’s Young England novels and other earlier political tracts, it argues that his principles of *noblesse oblige*, individual and property obligation, and religious reverence informed a historical argument that Britain was obligated to protect India’s ancient institutions. This conditioned Disraeli’s 1857 contention that a “national revolt” in India was instigated by a Whig political ascendency in Britain that supported Governor General Lord Dalhousie’s (1848-1856) policy of state annexation, property confiscation, and religious interference. The third chapter reveals that Ellenborough and Disraeli’s conservative political response to the Revolt informed a new imperial policy embodied in Lord Stanley’s 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation. These documents, which substituted Company for Crown rule, protected prince and property rights, and pledged religious and non-interference and enshrined a conservative vertical imperial framework.

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predicated upon a discourse of reciprocal loyalty and obligation.

The second section explores British and Indian conservative collaborative endeavors to challenge liberal imperialism through protecting and enhancing local and prescriptive institutions in India. It demonstrates how the viceregal policies of Richard Bourke, hereafter Lord Mayo, and Robert Bulwer, hereafter Lord Lytton, effecting princely collaboration and paternal obligation were embraced by Indian rulers in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Chapter four examines how Mayo’s viceroyship (1869-1872) centered upon socially-based, aristocratic principles of state paternalism, political decentralization, and property obligation. It is shown that Mayo’s youthful travels in Russia, and experience as a Protestant landowner and Conservative Chief Secretary for Ireland (1852, 1858-1859, 1866-1868) in a religiously divided Ireland influenced his time in India. It is argued that this background conditioned Mayo’s inclination and policy that the British paramount power should protect and enhance India’s unrepresented national interests through ryot, rural peasant population, and Muslim education, and instructing India’s princes and property interests on good governance. Mayo’s biographers demonstrate his governing and intellectual contribution to British imperialism in India. William Wilson Hunter relates Mayo’s Indian viceregal tenure to his experiences in Ireland. He argues that in India Mayo implemented novel schemes of financial de-centralization, as well as princely education and collaboration that were similar to his earlier progressive initiatives for Ireland. S.R. Bakshi illustrates that Mayo’s guiding focus was decentralization. This meant not only

downloading authority and resources to provincial and local governments to undertake expansive programs of public works, but also meant a non-intervention policy with the personal authority and affairs of Indian chiefs.  

George Pottinger sees Mayo’s Indian legacy as an effort to improve agriculture and the condition of the masses. He argues that Mayo’s charitable efforts during the Irish Potato Famine led him to propose an Indian agriculture department, promote vernacular education for India’s mass and Muslim population, and engage India’s princes and chiefs. This chapter demonstrates that Mayo’s decentralization policy as well as engagement with India’s princes and mass population reflected a conservative imperial tradition informed by an aristocratic inclination forged amidst the sectarian strife in Ireland. In focusing on his Irish minority background as a Protestant landowner, it is argued that Mayo believed that the Empire should encourage state and landed paternal obligation to defend and mediate the various national interests of a socially and religiously divided Indian Subcontinent.

Chapter five examines Lytton’s viceregal (1876-1880) political program of princely engagement and collaboration through the attempted establishment of an Indian Privy Council at the 1877 Imperial Assemblage. It shows that Lytton’s political and literary critique of British aristocratic decline in modern society informed the color and purpose of the Delhi Assemblage, which proclaimed Queen Victoria’s elevation to Empress of India following the Royal Titles Act (1876). It is argued that the Assemblage and the Council was an imagined conservative endeavor, supported by Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for India (1866-1867 and 1874-1878),

and opposed by British Liberals, to strengthen aristocratic leadership in empire through a closer individual association between the Viceroy and Indian princes. Lytton’s biographers prioritize his diplomatic over literary career, non-political association, and non-racist attitude to understanding his tenure in India. Lady Betty Balfour’s early twentieth century publications of Lytton’s personal and official correspondence remain the most comprehensive published collection available. It is interesting to note, however, that this collection reveals little regarding the mutual hostility between Lytton and official Anglo-Indians, or his failure to create an Indian Privy Council.54 E. Niell Raymond argues that Lytton shunned party association and a career in the House of Lords. He demonstrates that the influence of his conservative father, Edward Bulwer Lytton, cabinet minister and close friend to Disraeli, was moderated by a close friendship with Liberal reform MP John Foster. Raymond praises Lytton’s genuine conviction to helping the Indian people by reducing the salt duty and the fiscal deficit despite opposition from the Indian Civil Service and the Viceroy Council.55 For Mary Lutyens, the mutual animosity between Lytton and his Anglo-Indian administration represented the former’s aversion and challenge to color prejudice, and efforts to reconcile India’s population with British rule. She briefly explains that this hostility was the product of Lytton’s dissatisfaction with English

culture, social convention, including a dislike for sport and hunting, and his disdain for attending church service.\(^5^6\)

An outsider status and non-partisan affiliation are themes supported in Aurelia Brooks Harlan’s biography of Lytton as a poet writing under the pen name “Owen Meredith.” Harlan depicts Lytton as an outsider to English society, including his life-long criticism of time spent at Harrow School and ridicule of the narrow and static nature of English culture. Harlan states that although Lytton professed a belief that poetry and politics were incompatible, his work did express a brand of “utopian liberalism” influenced by John Foster. She argues that “Utopian liberalism” informed Lytton’s social and political criticism of the upper and middle classes in Britain.\(^5^7\) In addressing this scholarship, this chapter explores how Lytton’s literary expressions were crucial to defining his perspective and policy as Viceroy of India. In contrast to Harlan’s contention, it demonstrates that Lytton’s association with his father and Disraeli informed a conservative- themed literary critique of a weakening British aristocracy and decadent middle class which was a significant political influence in India. Moreover, it is argued that Lytton’s failure to enact an Indian Privy Council because of Anglo-Indian and Liberal opposition strengthened a partisan association with Disraeli, Salisbury, and the Conservative Party.

Scholarship on Lytton’s 1877 Imperial Assemblage, or Delhi Durbar, has focused on its significant representation of British imperial perception and policy in the late nineteenth century.


L.A. Knight viewed the Assemblage’s pronouncement of the Royal Titles Act as an attempt to increase British executive power over the House of Commons through Indian prince collaboration.\(^{58}\) David Washbrook sees Lytton’s spectacle as part of a conservative counter-reaction to liberal imperialism.\(^{59}\) Metcalf argues that the atmosphere of Lytton’s Assemblage was heavily influenced by Henry Maine and Alfred Lyall’s inclinations to view India through Europe’s feudal and medieval past.\(^{60}\) In extending Bernard Cohn’s argument that the British attempted to construct a “ritual idiom” to present their authority to India early in the nineteenth century, Alan Trevithick argues that the 1877, 1902, and 1911 Imperial Durbars were manipulative constructions to use ritual ceremony to gain support among the princes and masses.\(^{61}\) Chapter five stresses that Lytton’s Assemblage and Indian Privy Council represented an extension of his imagined literary response to British aristocratic decline in the modern period.

Chapter six examines how the Kathiawar States in Western India, responded to Mayo’s and Lytton’s sentiments and policies towards imperial princely collaboration. In addressing scholarship which considers Indian state agency in the British Empire, it is shown that the States were active in fashioning a coherent and self-motivated response to European imperialism in the late nineteenth century. It is contended that Kathiawar’s indigenous rulers utilized British


initiatives of political decentralization, education, and public works to strengthen their local autonomy and authority against external intervention. This chapter demonstrates that their participation through the Karbharis (first ministers) States’ Meeting (1869) and the Rajkumar College (1870) allowed them to secure political position by enabling managerial and financial contribution towards the region’s social and economic development.

Recent historiography on Britain’s relationship with the Indian states demonstrates that indigenous polities embraced western-themed administrative, social, and economic reforms to enhance local autonomy and authority. It challenges an earlier literature which argued that British indirect rule meant princely state subordination. Copland argues that Indian heads of state in western India, with powers mostly devolved to officials, maintained their traditional guardianship of dharma (social unity) despite engagement with Mayo and Lytton’s pro-princely sentiments on education and public works. Manu Bhagavan and Aya Ikegame illustrate that larger princely states, including Mysore and Hyderabad, were eager to adopt and adapt western modern administration and education to strengthen local power and culture. Ikegame pinpoints Mayo’s policy influence for the opening of the Mysore Royal School, an institution which mirrored the English Public School structure and upper class value dissemination.


65 Ikegame, *Princely India Re-Imagined*, 56.
Ramusack contends that indigenous states remained autonomous entities which continued a process of state formation from the pre-British period. She demonstrates that Mayo’s efforts towards princely education represented a period of enhanced British intervention in Indian states beginning in the 1870s. She argues, however, that the princely states increased their revenue and secured themselves from internal and external challengers through British desires to create a strong traditional and collaborative ruling class.\footnote{Barbara N. Ramusack, \textit{The Indian Princes and Their States} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5-7, 111.} Waltraud Ernst and Biswamoy Pati contend that India’s dominant landed interests resisted British attempts to subvert traditional rights until the 1880s.\footnote{Waltraud Ernst and Biswamoy Pati, \textit{India’s Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism} (London: Routledge, 2007), 18.}

Howard Spodek’s and Harald Tambs-Lyche’s studies on Kathiawar society present contrasting viewpoints on the impact of British paramountcy to the region’s rulers. Spodek argues that after the 1808 Walker Settlement, which established fixed state borders under British paramountcy, and increasingly from the 1860s, the British controlled local chiefs by elevating and changing their big landowner status to a new ruling class estranged from the population.\footnote{Howard Spodek, \textit{Urban-rural integration in regional development: a case study of Saurashtra, India, 1800-1960} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 37-45.} In contrast, Harald Tambs-Lyche contends that the British influence was minimal, as the Settlement merely renewed indigenous state and social formation underway since the eighteenth century.\footnote{Harald Tambs-Lyche, \textit{Power, profit, poetry: traditional society in Kathiawar, western India} (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 275.)}

Spodek’s thesis that British paramountcy changed the Kathiawar chiefs’ political and social dynamic with their people has resonated in the region’s historiography. John McLeod contends
that the Settlement precipitated the Kathiawar rulers’ disassociation with the *bhayats* (nobles) and mass population. He argues that this represented the former’s reduction of state expenditure on the military which traditionally maintained social cohesion and defined the political distribution of power.\textsuperscript{70} Focusing on the poor economic condition of Kathiawar’s smaller states in the first half of the twentieth century, Uchhrangai Kesharai Oza maintains that mass poverty and economic stagnation were the result of maladministration, extortion, and crippling taxes from the chiefs, *bhayats*, and *zamindars* (large landowners).\textsuperscript{71} While not directly addressing the cultural and economic consequences of Britain’s relationship with Kathiawar’s rulers, this chapter confronts the contention that the latter were increasingly controlled by the British paramount power. It shows that in the post-Revolt period, the Kathiawar States, despite allegations of misrule and corruption, collectively engaged in defending and enhancing local autonomy and authority through participating in imperial initiatives towards social and economic development.

The last section explores British and Indian conservative collaborative responses to liberal imperialism and nationalism from the 1880s to 1914. In contrast to the previous sections which focused on senior British and Indian statesman, these last chapters focus on Sir Roper Lethbridge’s and Sir Mancherjee Merwanjee Bhowanggree’s contribution to a conservative imperial tradition and framework in India. As British conservative MPs and Indian reform advocates, it is argued that they challenged liberal imperial and national orthodoxy through

\textsuperscript{70} John McLeod, *Sovereignty, power, control: politics in the states of western India* (Boston: Brill, 1999), 24-28.
\textsuperscript{71} Uchhrangai Kesharai Oza, *The serfs of Kathiawar: Studies in the land revenue administration of smaller states in Kathiawar* (Rajkot: Kathiawar Sadhana Services, 1945), 38-54.
expounding conservative alternatives which promoted the imperial state’s benevolent recognition of India’s internal differences and national separation from Britain. In contrast to a national political identity espoused by Indian nationalists, Lethbridge and Bhownaggree saw the nation of India as an aggregately populated geographical space held together through a vertical political association with the Crown and Empire. Responding to Indian nationalism, this represented an evolution of conservative thinking from seeing India’s as a land of many nations to a consolidated nation of nations supported through imperial cooperation, security, and benevolence.

Chapter seven examines Lethbridge’s encouragement of British imperial collaboration with India’s national political and economic interests into the twentieth century. It is shown that through official experience in the Bengal Education Service (1866-1876) and as Lytton’s Press Commissioner (1878-1881), he argued that the British arrogation of princely authority and English-educated Indian requests for political participation harmed imperial strength and unity. Correcting an absence of biographical analysis on Lethbridge, this chapter illustrates his role in incorporating India within a larger British conservative debate concerning replacing liberal free trade and laissez-faire economy with state enforced tariff reform and imperial protection. Specifically, this chapter argues that Lethbridge endeavoured to conciliate British and Indian national interests within a strengthened imperial subjecthood. This included an endorsement of

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Lytton’s program of constituted princely collaboration, and legitimizing Indian economic swadeshi (self-sufficiency) within a protective scheme of imperial preference.

Chapter eight examines Bhownaggree’s representation of Indian and imperial conservative collaboration in the late nineteenth century. His opposition to the Indian National Congress (1885) and tenure as Conservative Party MP for London’s Bethnal Green North-East (1895-1905) has led to scant, yet critical historiographical attention. Jonathan Schneer and R.P. Masani argue that Bhownaggree was compliant to British power, subversive to Indian nationalism, and lacked any interest in or popular credibility on Indian reform.73 Omar Ralph and John Hinells’ 1995 short biography challenges this reputation by detailing Bhownaggree’s objection to increased taxation in India, the treatment of Indians in South Africa, and advocacy for British investment in scientific, technical, and vocational education in India.74 McLeod demonstrates that Bhownaggree’s philanthropy in Bombay and England conditioned his entry into British politics.75 This chapter shows that his experience in the Kathiawar State of Bhavnagar as Judicial Councilor and Agent in Bombay, and association with Western India’s Parsi community informed an adherence to a conservative imperial tradition and framework. It is argued that Bhownaggree’s self-claimed representation for “conservative India” and an “anti-congress party,” joined by Parsi and Muslim minority groups, reflected an acknowledgement of India’s internal differences and separation from Britain. This informed his contribution to a

conservative imperial discourse of good government predicated on reciprocal loyalty and obligation. It is contended that this sustained Bhownaggree’s promotion of a Kathiawar and Bombay model of development for India, in which a benevolent imperial state was obligated to support local autonomy and agency in effecting education and industrial reform for India’s mass population. This thesis argues that Bhownaggree’s and Lethbridge’s response to Indian nationalism represented an ideologically coherent conservative tradition constituted following the Indian Revolt. In 1857 and in the late nineteenth century, conservatives endeavored to define an imperial framework based on a vertical and reciprocal loyalty and obligation to a Crown and Empire which conciliated and prioritized India’s particular institutions.
Section I: A Tory Response to the Indian Revolt

Section Introduction

This section examines how British conservatives responded to the 1857 Indian Revolt, the Government of India Act of 1858, and the 1858 Queen’s Proclamation. It explores how prominent Conservative statesman Edward Law, Earl of Ellenborough and Benjamin Disraeli interpreted the sepoy and popular uprising through Tory political philosophy and British partisan politics. While Ellenborough’s political career was defined through experience with India compared to Disraeli’s literary and parliamentary view of empire, they shared a conservative imperial inclination predicated upon tory themes of locality, prescription, and imagination. In valuing place, hierarchy, and the moral virtues of loyalty and obligation, they argued that the Revolt represented the legitimate expression of popular and national discontent against British liberal destruction of traditional political, social, and religious institutions.

The first chapter examines how Ellenborough’s political experience as President of the Board of the Control, Governor General, and in parliamentary opposition informed a critical response to British and Governor General’s Lord Canning’s escalation of the Revolt. In confronting contemporary and historical criticism regarding his mental soundness, it is shown that Ellenborough maintained a continuity of thought and action which advocated for Britain’s imperial obligation to sympathize and conciliate with India’s national interests. It is argued that this principle informed political support for crown rule, social respect, and state non-interference, and fiscal economy and material development which were integral components of the Indian
Empire after 1858. The second chapter contextualizes Disraeli’s parliamentary condemnation of British liberal culpability for the Indian Revolt. It is shown that his literary endeavors and political association with a Tory political tradition and Young England Movement in the 1830s-1840s defined an imperial perspective on Britain’s relationship with Ireland, Ceylon, and India. This informed a contention that whiggism’s oligarchic, capitalist, and sectarian ambitions, which besieged England’s ancient institutions, were being replicated under the guise of progress and reason across empire. It is argued that this contention encouraged Disraeli’s partisan response to the Revolt, where he blamed Whig Indian governance, personified by Governor General Lord Dalhousie’s (1848-1856) policies of state annexation, property confiscation, and religious interference, for causing a “national revolt” against the British. The third chapter demonstrates how Ellenborough and Disraeli’s Indian Revolt response, and influence within Lord Derby’s Conservative government (1858-1859), shaped Lord Stanley’s authored 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation. It is shown that these documents redefined British governance in India along conservative principles which endorsed a view of India’s differences and the necessity of collaboration with its varied national interests. It argues that they enshrined a non-civilizational conception of race and racial difference, which defined local belonging and imperial identity within a framework of vertical obligation and loyalty reciprocated between the Crown, princely and property interests, and ethnic and religious communities.
Chapter 1: Lord Ellenborough and Tory Imperialism

I said incidentally to-day, 'I will not sit here to sacrifice India to England,' a sentiment which escaped me, but which I feel to be correct, not only socially but politically.¹ (Political Diary, 13 April, 1829)

I now look forward with apprehension to the danger likely to arise from the insolence of office—which even in my time led to one insurrection—from disregard of military duties, from the absence of due consideration for the native officers and troops, and...from the forgetfulness of that great principle by which our Indian empire was acquired, respect for the religious prejudices and for the social habits of the people.² (Ellenborough to the House of Lords, 2 April, 1852)

Introduction

Throughout his long political career, Ellenborough maintained that British imperialism in India, legitimated by conquest, relied upon respecting the country’s national political, propertied, and religious interests. This chapter contextualizes Ellenborough’s contention that the Indian Revolt was caused and sustained by British intervention into India’s religious and property custom. His advocacy and respect for India’s difference informed a contention that Canning’s Oudh Proclamation (1858), which prescribed mass property confiscation in the recently annexed province, instigated a “national revolt” and “legitimate war” against the British. It is shown that Ellenborough maintained a political conception of Indian Empire and “imperial subjecthood” which prescribed Britain and India’s mutual acceptance of each other’s legitimacy and

² Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd Ser., vol. 120, 02 Apr., 1852, col. 555.
obligations. This conditioned his continued advocacy for incorporating India’s princes into a feudal relationship with the Crown, opposition to unsolicited British legislative interference with local custom, and a “Mughal styled” program of economic and social development. Lastly, it is argued that Ellenborough divisive reputation in Britain, which led to his official recall as Governor General in 1844 and resignation from the Board of Control in 1858, arose from his imagined and earnest endeavors to disregard metropolitan convention and social prejudice to conciliate India’s history and institutions within an imperial polity.

Responding to the Indian Revolt

In political opposition and as the President of the Board of Control amidst the Indian Revolt in 1857-58, Ellenborough maintained that the uprisings were a direct result of British interference with the religious and property settlement in India. He criticized Canning’s governorship for instigating and sustaining a revolt motivated by popular national feeling. Early in the conflict, Ellenborough proposed that “discontent and mutiny” was caused by a popular apprehension that the Government wished to interfere with religion. He pointed to Canning’s subscription to missionary societies, and argued that the continuance of this practice would lead to the collapse of British power in India: “you will see the most bloody revolution which has at any time occurred in India. The English will be expelled from India; and, expelled from that country, they will not leave behind them a dozen sincere converts to Christianity.”

In July 1857, Ellenborough contended that the overwhelming evidence that the sepoy revolt was sparked by

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animal greased cartridges proved this event’s religious nature. Looking to the future, he remarked that this offered an opportunity to convince the population that government policy had always advocated religious non-interference.4

Returning to the Board of Control as part of Derby’s Conservative government in February 1858, Ellenborough maintained criticism of Canning’s response to an increasingly popular revolt. Focusing on Canning’s 1858 Oudh Proclamation, a province recently annexed to British India by Dalhousie in 1856, he argued that its proposed confiscation of the country’s propertied and religious foundations prolonged the conflict. Delivered when British troops regained control of Lucknow, Canning’s proclamation stated that all property in the territory, excluding land from the five largest landowners who remained loyal to the Government, would be forfeited unless landed proprietors claimed their loyalty to the State.5 For Ellenborough, this policy introduced national motivations for revolt in Awadh, as it entailed an assault on the country’s social and religious foundations. His response to the sepoy mutiny and popular uprising reflected a Tory societal inclination that the British paramount power must respect and conciliate India’s particular institutions and custom.

Respect and Justice to Traditional Authority

From 1828 at the Board of Control, Ellenborough insisted that Britain’s governance and role as paramount power rested upon a moral obligation to abide and enhance India’s

5 09 May, 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fols. 2482-2485, 3067, Edward Law, 1st Earl of Ellenborough:Papers (hereafter EP), National Archives (hereafter NA).
local and prescriptive institutions. To India’s princes and land owners, he defined a conception of “imperial subjecthood” based on British and Indian mutual loyalty, obligation, and privilege. This entailed that each side accepted the other’s ruling legitimacy along prescribed guidelines of good governance. He argued that India’s princes had to loyally accept British paramountcy which was legitimated by conquest and the maintenance of security. In return, Britain must recognize the princes’ privilege, as loyal “imperial subjects” and traditional rulers, to claim grievance against any unfair treatment. As Governor General, Ellenborough used this framework to defend native authority, property, and religious custom, but also to justify state annexation.

This respect for princely rule allowed Ellenborough to support Canning’s press censoring during Indian Revolt. He argued that if newspapers questioned native princes’ fidelity or supposed that the re-establishment of power meant a continued annexation policy, the whole of central India, chiefs and subjects, would turn against Britain. In 1858, this fear was confirmed, as he was convinced that Awadh annexation and confiscation had intensified an uprising into a “national revolt” against the British. Although not opposed to intervention to ensure good government or thwart aggression against Britain’s territory and allies, he maintained that the Paramount Power’s responsibility was to respect and treat fairly India’s traditional leadership.

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More than twenty years earlier, Ellenborough had warned the British and Indian governments against Awadh annexation and property confiscation. In 1834, he challenged the Whig administration’s tacit approval of Governor General Lord Bentinck’s (1833-1835) plan to annex the Awadh Kingdom for the settlement of outstanding debts to Company creditors. In a letter to an official in India, Ellenborough argued that it was unprecedented for the Board of Control to sanction state annexation. Moreover, it was contrary to a past moderate and non-interventionist governing policy which allowed Awadh’s King to reform his country. In parliament, Ellenborough maintained that, contrary to Bentinck’s argument that Awadh suffered from misgovernment, the real motive for annexation was to redress the King’s longstanding debt to Company officials. He argued that this debt was illegal and should be forfeited, as it was legally established that no European should make or purchase loans or enter into bonds with a “native” prince. This lack of sympathy for Company officials’ private financial engagements was evident a couple years earlier. In 1832, he opposed a

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7 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 23, 05 May, 1834, cols. 476-487. Building upon parliament’s removal of the East India Company’s Indian trading monopoly in 1817, the 1833 Government of India Act effectively made them a purely administrative entity in India. Although the Court of Directors, the Company’s executive body in London, maintained the power of political appointment, parliament’s late eighteenth century creation of the Board of Control, headed by a British cabinet minister mandated to monitor India’s government, curtailed their independence. On a history of the East India Company and their nineteenth century status see Anthony Webster, The Twilight of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics, 1790-1860 (Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 2009); Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

8 29 Apr. 1834, Pro 30/12/8, fol. 29, EP, NA.
parliamentary motion which asked the British government to reimburse loans made to a
*Zamindar* of Nozeed.\(^9\)

In the previous debate, Ellenborough contended that government endorsement of unjust interference with a friendly power for debt repayment risked onto England and Englishmen in India “…the stain of cupidity and extortion.” He submitted that these actions would return Britain to a shameful policy in India which

…had not prevailed for the last fifty years in India; and they would imitate transactions, the recollection of which were regarded with shame, and which had been stigmatized by the law as criminal. Such principles of government in India…were, on the impeachment of Mr. Hastings, condemned by the noble Earl opposite, by Mr. Burke, Mr. Fox and other great men of the day.\(^10\)

To maintain a just and moderate character towards the princes, he urged upon the British and Indian government “the essential importance of not interfering in the internal affairs of allied or friendly States.” If, however, they had to intervene “for the protection of the public interest…[and] for the purpose of relieving the people from oppression,” they must avoid “sordid and selfish motives.”\(^11\)

Prophetically in 1834, Ellenborough argued that any annexation of Awadh for the purpose of extracting revenue would present difficulties due to the people’s warlike nature, and challenge the moral basis of British rule. Just as in 1858, he continued that British forces

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\(^11\) Ibid, 484.
“would find it a matter of the greatest difficulty to retain possession of the country without the authority of the Sovereign; the feelings of all the men of influence and power, as well as the mass of the people, would render any such attempt extremely dangerous.” Moreover, he contended that the consequences of resorting “…to the ancient system of extorting every farthing from the resources of an unfortunate people” would be so morally reprehensible that “…he should not desire the maintenance of our Indian possessions for one day.”

Throughout his career, Ellenborough maintained that just as India’s princes had a loyal obligation to promote and practice good governance in their respective territories, Britain was reciprocally obligated to respect and treat fairly India’s people.

In 1852, Ellenborough condemned the Indian government’s confiscation of Ameer Ali Morad’s northern Sind territories after he was found guilty of forging documents to increase his land. He argued that not only was the Ameer denied the basic advantages of an impartial tribunal and taintless evidence, but that the punishment should be commensurate with the offense. He proposed that the root of the injustice was treating the Ameer as a subject and a state. As an independent Prince and British ally, he argued that the Government was dealing with a state and, therefore, should not impose upon a Sovereign and his people absolute territorial forfeit. To act in such a matter “…would shake the confidence of all the native populations.

princes of India in the fidelity of this country to its engagements, and in its kind feeling to those who had served it."

In 1856, Ellenborough presented a parliamentary petition regarding the legal proceeding against Punjab’s Pertaub Singh and Bisheu Singh. This saw the Government remove one-fourth of their land title instantly, and two-fourths from inheritors once they died. He submitted that his purpose in presenting the petition was to make it known that all imperial subjects had parliamentary recourse, and that the native gentry’s destruction had deeper consequences for Indian society and British paramountcy. He argued that although the British, as the victor over a country conquered in 1849 had the right to punish those who aided enemy forces, Pertaub and Bisheu were respectable gentlemen and deserved equitable treatment as government allies. In emphasizing the Kingdom of Awadh, Ameer Ali Morad, and the Singh’s loyalty in defending their claims against the Indian government, Ellenborough maintained that this behavior necessitated Britain’s reciprocal obligation to accept their legitimacy as local political and social leaders.

For Ellenborough, these examples of annexation and destruction of traditional authority represented the Indian government’s financial motivation to extract revenue from the land. In 1856, he argued that this motivation was destroying the foundations of India’s ancient society. He stated that unlike his 1843 Sind conquest as Governor General, where

property and rank were respected, the British in the Punjab introduced a system “…which was to annihilate the ancient possessors of the soil, to substitute none for them, and to have none whatever between the Government and the field labourer.” For India altogether, he stated that this approach had a dramatic effect on the Subcontinent’s natural social hierarchy:

For there could be no doubt that our severe fiscal administration had, against our desire, had the effect of so changing the distribution of property there, as to produce a state of society of which there were few instances in the history of the world—he meant a state of society without any or very rare gradations of rank—a nation without a gentry.  

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Amid a parliamentary debate regarding India’s future government in 1853, Ellenborough submitted that although the last thirty years of British rule bought real improvement to India, it had also produced substantial change and great wrong. Specifically, he argued that a lack of “…sufficient knowledge of the tenure of the land and the rights of individuals” had “…gone far to destroy the higher classes of that country.” To Ellenborough, the Government of India’s disrespect for the loyal princes and propertied classes represented an overarching disregard for the country’s particular political history and social customs. Like the Mughals before them, the British paramount power was obligated to enact material improvement while protecting and conciliating India’s diverse national interests.

Social non-interference

Beyond the political and propertied interests, Ellenborough maintained that the British government had a moral obligation to respect and not interfere with the social customs of the people. He maintained an opposition to state-sponsored westernization instigated by liberal social and legal reformers from the 1830s. Specifically, he opposed settler colonization, a unified code of law, and proceeded cautiously on initiatives fighting slavery and expanding Indian official employment. On colonization, Ellenborough rebuked and censured Bentinck’s efforts in 1830 to ease regulations on European settlement.\(^\text{18}\)

Responding to Lord Lansdowne’s, the Whig Lord President of the Council, proposal of introducing European settlers and capital to expand economic development in India, he argued that English capitalists had no interest or history in a country which had been developed by the Crown’s civil and military servants.\(^\text{19}\) With regards to Lansdowne’s scheme for a unified code of law for Europeans and the people of India, he believed that suitting the law to European tastes would be dangerous to “native” feeling:

> If they were to alter the laws there so as to induce Europeans to live under them, they must, in doing so, violate all the prejudices and feelings of the natives; and, instead of producing satisfaction, they would excite abhorrence and disgust amongst the natives throughout the whole of India.\(^\text{20}\)


\(^\text{19}\) Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser., vol. 19, 05 Jul. 1833, col. 189.

\(^\text{20}\) Ibid.
Mediating European and local prejudices guided Ellenborough’s thoughts on slavery in India. Although in principle in favor of the abolition of the slave trade, he argued that the metropolitan government should refrain from criminalizing practices which were tied deeply to religion and society. He warned against treating West Indian slavery as similar to that in India. He contended that what existed in the latter was caste slavery, and that any attempt to abolish this would abolish caste. The consequence of that action would be unthinkable to peace:

It would be a violent outrage on the feelings and prejudices of the natives of India thus to abolish all castes there, and to say, that slavery should no longer exist in that country. The attempt to establish such a state of things would lead most certainly to bloodshed in every part of India. In fact, it was insanity to make the attempt.  

Ellenborough proposed that the best means to combat slavery was to allow the Indian government to slowly institute change based on their local knowledge and facility. In 1841, he cautioned against English sensational judgment on Indian practices in response to Lord Brougham’s reading of an official report which described how Indian slave dealers murdered parents to sell their children into slavery. He retorted that just as in India, in Scotland, which he remarked “was generally admitted to be the most moral part of the United Kingdom,” heinous crime also occurred such as people being “…murdered for the sake of obtaining the value of their dead bodies.” This cautious mentality also defined his sentiments on the abolition of sati.

22 Lord Ellenborough to Lord Brougham, 06 Nov. 1841, Pro 30/12/11, fol. 129, EP, NA.  
the Hindu ritual of widow burning after her husband’s death. Through supportive of
criminalization, he supported Sir John Malcom’s, Governor of Bombay (1827-1830), quiet law
repeal and amendment over Bentinck’s promulgation of Regulation XVII, which he called a
“pompous document.”24

His stance on colonization, law, and slavery reflected his longstanding contention that the
British in India should maintain respect and sympathy for the local customs and prejudices of the
people. During a parliamentary debate on the Company’s charter in 1852, Ellenborough shared
his growing “apprehension” regarding the consequences of increased state interference with
India’s religious and social custom. Prophetically, he warned that Britain’s internal security in
India relied upon not disturbing the good feelings of the “Native” army and population:

I now look forward with apprehension to the danger likely to arise from the insolence
of office—which even in my time led to one insurrection—from disregard of military
duties, from the absence of due consideration for the native officers and troops,
and…from the forgetfulness of that great principle by which our Indian empire was
acquired, respect for the religious prejudices and for the social habits of the people.25

A year later, Ellenborough supported Lord Monteagle’s petition from Bengal Hindus
complaining about new state legislation which changed the inheritance laws. He argued that in
legalizing the ability of Christian converts from Hinduism to inherit ancestral lands, the

24 Ellenborough and Colchester, A Political Diary, 1828-1830, 363 (20 Sept. 1830). On Lord Bentinck actions on
Sati and relationship with liberal reform in India, see Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History
petitioners faced a real grievance from a law which severed the social obligations between religion and property. Moreover, he proposed that the State’s implicit protection of a Christian convert, against the customary punishments of his former community, signified its partiality. Therefore, it invalidated Hindu trust and consent towards British governance which was based on religious non-interference.\textsuperscript{26} This aversion to legislative interference with India’s social custom and religious practice reflected a Tory mentality which aligned imperial governance with respecting and engaging the country’s local circumstances. Whether in opposition or state office, Ellenborough refused to countenance metropolitan prejudice and practice when considering India’s national interests within the Empire.

**Conservative Economy and the Employment of “Responsible Natives”**

From his earliest days at the Board of Control, Ellenborough maintained that Britain had a moral obligation to promote fiscal economy and material development in India. He pursued reduced taxes through lower public expenditure, and state assistance for expanding agricultural cultivation and an imperial export trade. For both objectives, Ellenborough, in opposition and in the Government, chastised the Company for lack of financial restraint and policies furthering economic development. In 1829, he communicated to Cabinet why the Company was to blame for financial deterioration in India:

I mentioned that the character of the local Government was 'disrespect and disobedience.' That nothing but a long continuance of strict rule could bring India

\textsuperscript{26} Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser., vol. 127, 26 May 1853, cols. 561-564.
into real subjection. It was this disobedience which was the chief source of increased expenditure.\textsuperscript{27}

Debating the provisions for the Company’s new charter in 1833, Ellenborough argued that India would greatly benefit from more public money towards water tank and canal construction. Despite this, the British Indian government failed to meet the standard of public benevolence set by “previous sovereigns” and was “…much inferior to the government of the Moguls.”\textsuperscript{28} In 1835, he rejected the Court of Director’s request to cover rising pension expenses by raising taxes. He argued that the pension system should be reformed based on the realization that too often “…we indulge our feelings for individuals at the expense of the people of India,” and that the diminishing profits on the country’s resources made it necessary as public trustees “…to place restraint upon ourselves.”\textsuperscript{29}

Ellenborough maintained that the Company needed to adopt measures for lowering public expenditure. Guided by class prejudice, this included replacing Europeans with “responsible natives” in official administrative positions to reduce cost and promote greater trust between the State and the people. In 1829, he admonished the Company for not employing more Indians, stating that “the more we could avail ourselves of the services of the natives in the fiscal and judicial administration the better… as there was no doubt that there were capable natives to

\textsuperscript{27} Ellenborough, 13 Nov. 1829, in Ellenborough and Colchester, \textit{A Political Diary, 1828-1830}, 129-135.  
\textsuperscript{28} Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser., vol. 20, 05 Aug. 1833, cols. 310.  
\textsuperscript{29} Ellenborough to Court of Directors, 17 Feb. 1835, Pro 30/12/08, fols. 65-71, EP, NA.
be found.” A year later in parliament, he contended that reducing expenditure necessitated that “… the most deserving amongst the natives” should be employed “…in situations of higher authority and trust than they had hitherto been accustomed to fill.” He maintained that this employment should be achieved cautiously and gradually, and with respect to India’s social hierarchy. In response to Lord Lansdowne’s argument that the ultimate goal of Britain’s “providential” position was to incorporate Indians into every state office, Ellenborough contended that he shared this sentiment with the obvious exceptions of political and military offices.

His social prejudice also conditioned this employment. This informed an opposition to Eurasians and ‘lower status’ Indians receiving western education or taking positions of administrative responsibility. To Ellenborough, a “responsible native” represented an individual’s status and belonging to the Subcontinent’s particular social and cultural environment. To Lord Auckland, President of the Board of Trade (1830-1834), he argued in 1830 that, along with increasing revenue through fiscal economy and tea production, the focus should be on “the employment of responsible natives instead of Europeans whose work is now done by irresponsible Natives.” The term “irresponsible natives” applied to the employment of “half-castes,” people with mixed European and Indian ethnicity, due to their outsider status in

30 Ellenborough, 16 Dec. 1829, in Ellenborough and Colchester, A Political Diary, 1828-1830, 149
33 Lord Ellenborough to Lord Auckland, 24 Nov. 1830, Pro 30/12/08, fol. 6, EP, NA.
India. In 1830, Ellenborough opposed Lord Carlisle’s petition regretting the lack of status and employment for this group.\textsuperscript{34} In 1833, he explained that this objection was based on avoiding “native” ill will over the latter’s supposed social privilege and connection. Also, he argued that their anomalous position made them “not as trustworthy as the natives.”\textsuperscript{35}

In an 1853 statement critical of English education expansion and its connection with public employment, he regretted that it allowed lower caste children to gain an expectation of public employment despite their unrespectable status.\textsuperscript{36} Generally, he contended that English education’s general application would harm Britain’s position in India. He argued that its dissemination among the higher and upper classes would make British rule just as impossible for India’s people as if “the people of England…[had]to bear the constant immigration of Brahmin and Mussulman young gentlemen, if they should be sent over every year to occupy the great offices in this country.”\textsuperscript{37} His bias against the English educated and Eurasian individuals represented a Tory inclination towards social belonging. Unlike the titled, propertied, and indigenous “responsible native,” these groups lacked public accountability as they were unrepresentative of the current social order. This informed a typical conservative response to British liberal interventions in India’s society and culture, and a latent prejudice against English educated Indians that appropriated European values.

\textsuperscript{34} Ellenborough, 29 Mar. 1830, in Ellenborough and Colchester, \textit{A Political Diary, 1828-1830}, 217.
\textsuperscript{35} Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser., vol. 20, 05 Aug. 1833, col. 315.
\textsuperscript{36} Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser, vol. 124, 25 Feb. 1853, col. 636.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, col. 632.
Despite being wary of English educational propagation, Ellenborough maintained that Britain must rely upon consultation and conciliation with the country’s disparate interests. Specifically, he argued that this was extremely important over issues of religion and taxation. In 1853, he proposed that further public consultation would have restrained the Indian government’s legislative changes to civil laws on religion and inheritance which upset Bengal’s Hindu community.\(^\text{38}\) In 1860, he suggested a consultative council on taxation be established with equal Indian and European representation. He contended that this would produce better policy, as the Government should not solely rely on Europeans’ views to decide appropriate taxation for the unique circumstances of India. Moreover, he believed that the British solely deciding the country’s taxation without consulting “…a single Native out of 120,000,000…was a monstrous inconsistency and contrary to all views that we ought to entertain upon the subject of just and beneficial legislation for India.”\(^\text{39}\) Amidst the Revolt in 1858, he stated to John Lafevre, civil service commissioner in charge of official examinations, that candidates for India, preferably “well-educated gentlemen,” should know Muslim, Hindu, and English law principles. He argued that they should also be given a book which explains how the two major Indian communities raise their revenue.\(^\text{40}\) Ellenborough’s views on fiscal economy, suitable Indian employment, and public consultation represented his core principle that the British paramount power must act solely for the imperial and national interests of India. This prescribed limits on British

\(^{38}\) Ibid, col. 638.
\(^{40}\) Ellenborough to John Lafevre, 25 Apr. 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fol. 2909, EP, NA.
interference in the country’s political, social, and cultural institutions, while at same time acknowledging that their imperial rule was only legitimated and sustained through promoting the population’s general physical and material good.

Imperial Development and Trade

For Ellenborough, the British had a moral obligation to promote India’s economic development and trade with the Empire. This included a conservative argument at the beginning and end of the nineteenth century that India’s resources and trade strengthened Britain against foreign competitors. In 1835, Ellenborough questioned the Company’s inaction over the abolition of internal transit duties, which, he stated, hampered India’s economic development and trade with England. To the Directors, he argued that this inaction, plus a duty preference for English cotton importers expressed through duties, had risked the people’s moral and material improvement. Concluding, he challenged British fiscal superiority in Asia:

…before we can proceed to advice other nations to reform their systems of internal taxation, we must at least reform our own, and make that perfect which appears at present to be inferior to the system of every state in Asia, with the simple exception of Lahore.41

For Ellenborough, India’s cotton cultivation and trade facilitated local and imperial prosperity. Promoting a protective imperial free trade system, he suggested that Indian cotton would enhance the local economy and allow Britain to become less reliant upon the United States. In 41 Ellenborough to Court of Directors, 17 Mar. 1835, Pro 30/12/08, fols. 101, 115, EP, NA.
1831, he opposed a new duty on Indian raw material which abolished imperial preference towards India by equaling its cotton duty to that paid by the United States.\textsuperscript{42} In 1851, he maintained that the prohibitive cost of transporting raw produce to the coast frustrated the fulfilment of England’s and India’s greatest commercial objective of being independent from the United States for the supply of cotton.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{Crown Rule and Feudatory India}

During his time at the Board of Control, Ellenborough argued that Crown rule would promote efficient government and reconcile local interests to the Empire. He maintained a career advocacy that this change would introduce strict economy and remedy the high costs of duplicate government. In 1829, he proposed to Cabinet that the present governing system was one of great delay and expense. To his diary following the meeting, he expressed the benefits of Crown rule: “…the substitute the King's government for that of the Company. I am sure that in doing so I shall confer a great benefit upon India and effect the measure which is most likely to retain for England the possession of India.”\textsuperscript{44} Leading up to the Company’s 1833 charter renewal, Ellenborough found that the Company’s Chairs, including Lord Elphinstone and the Duke of Wellington, were opposed to his proposition that the King’s name be the title for India’s

\textsuperscript{42} Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser., vol. 2, 17 Aug. 1831, col. 620.  
\textsuperscript{43} Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser., vol.117, 02 Jun. 1851, col. 342.  
\textsuperscript{44}Ellenborough, 13 Nov. 1829, in Ellenborough and Colchester, \textit{A Political Diary, 1828-1830}, 131.
government. 45 Despite this opposition, he maintained that Crown rule would transmit historical and cultural legitimacy to the princes and people of India. In 1843 as Governor General, he communicated to Queen Victoria the necessity of the Indian government instilling a sense of historical continuity for the princes. Without this, he imagined the great difficulty faced by Britain in maintaining an empire where the native chiefs have “no natural place” and “must be continually in apprehension of some design to invade their rights and to appropriate their territories.” He proposed that this difficulty could be removed “…were your Majesty to become the nominal head of the empire.” After depicting to Victoria the colorful scene of the Governor General leading a seven thousand man procession of chiefs and their retainers to the old Mughal imperial capital of Delhi, he argued that the princes’ positive acceptance of her as “Empress” would create a perception that the British government was a partner and benefactor in India:

The princes and chiefs of India would be proud of their position as the feudatories of an empress; and some judicious measures calculated to gratify the feelings of a sensitive race..[and] inspire just confidence in the intentions of their sovereign, would make the hereditary leaders of this great people cordially co-operate with the British Government in measures for the improvement of their subjects and their dominions.”46

By 1853, Ellenborough concluded that the Government of India should be separated completely from the East India Company. He contended that with a president and a council

45Ellenborough, 10 Jun. 1829, Ibid., 49; Ellenborough, 16 May 1829, Ibid, 37.
under the Crown’s full authority, the Government could “bestow greater happiness upon the Indian people.”\textsuperscript{47} As we shall see, Ellenborough’s respect for nationality, Crown rule, and non-intervention informed his governorship of India, as well as his and the Conservative Party’s response to the Indian Revolt with the 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation.

**Governor General**

As Governor General of India from 1842 to 1844, Ellenborough’s expressed goal was to promote India’s economic development while maintaining a strict respect for local social and religious custom. Despite this aspiration, his tenure was dominated by an inherited war in Afghanistan, and subsequent military interventions against princely authority in Sind and Gwalior. His reaction to these events reflected a Tory inclination to govern based on the particular political, social and, religious customs and prejudices of the Subcontinent. It is argued that this inclination, which conditioned his unwillingness to compromise India’s particular interests for British prejudices and interests, produced metropolitan criticism and his eventual official recall.

For Ellenborough, his governing perspective and policy was guided by the sense of India’s physical separation and historical uniqueness from England. At the Board of Control in

\textsuperscript{47} Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser., vol. 127, 13 May, 1853, col. 309.
1829, he responded to a potential Russian invasion into Afghanistan and India with the view that the Indian government should act unrestrained of metropolitan and European concerns as an “Asiatic Power.”

In an 1842 statement to the Directors upon accepting the governorship, he stated that his primary objective was to pursue India’s economic development in a spirit which attempted “…to emulate the magnificent beneficence of the mahomendan emperors in their great works of public utility.” He argued that canal and irrigation expansion as well as the “accouterments of European civilization” would be accomplished with “…regard for the feelings and even the prejudices of the Natives of India.” Although his first duty was to the people of India, he would strive to unite the interests of his “native and…adopted country.”

It was Ellenborough’s Tory inclination to govern as an “Asiatic power” and in the interests of his “adopted country” which defined his engagement with India’s population. This is clearly represented in Ellenborough’s 1842 Somnauth Proclamation to the Hindu community during the British war with Muslim Afghanistan. It represented an imaginative effort to reconcile British paramountcy to the supposed prejudices of India’s majority population. Proclaimed a national trophy of victory for India, it announced the British Indian Army’s return of the Somnauth Temple sandalwood gates after centuries of possession by a remnant of an earlier

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48Ellenborough, 30 Oct. 1829, in Ellenborough and Colchester, *A Political Diary*, 123; Ellenborough, 16 Dec. 1829, Ibid, 149. See on British fears of a Russian invasion see Metcalf and Metcalf, *A Concise History of India*, 89. They demonstrate that the first Afghan War (1842) was a British response to the threat of a Russian advance towards the Hindu Kush. This represented the last phrase of British northward expansion. They argued that to the north-west, the British sought to control the lower Indus valley and the Sind as the means to control Afghanistan as a buffer state against Russian expansion.

49Ellenborough, Nov. 1841, Pro 30/12/11, fols. 397-403, EP, NA.
Muslim invading power. It reveals that Ellenborough viewed the Hindu population, over the Muslim and other inhabitants, as India’s indigenous population. Although admiring Mughal imperial power, the Proclamation was an attempt to inspire Hindus to support Britain’s efforts against a Muslim Afghan enemy.

To Queen Victoria in October 1842, he proposed that “The progress of the gates from Ferozepore to Somnauth will be one great national triumph, and their restoration to India will endear the Government to the whole people.” The Proclamation’s language extolled to Hindu princes and people that the returned gates were a “national triumph,” and an example of India’s strength under British guardianship:

My Brothers and my Friends.-Our victorious army bears the gates of the temple of Somnauth in triumph from Affghanistain [sic], and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahmoud looks upon the ruins of Ghaznee...The insult of 800 years is at last avenged. The gates of the temple of Somnauth, so long the memorial of your humiliation, are [to] become the proudest record of your national glory-the proof of your superiority in arms over the nations beyond the Indus.

To the princes, he argued that their allegiance and affection to the British paramount power strengthened their authority and brought glory to their people:

...My Brothers and my Friends.-I have ever relied with confidence upon your attachment to the British Government. You see how worthy it proves itself of your love, when, regarding your honour as its own, it exerts the power of its arms to restore to you the gates of the temple of Somnauth, so long the memorial of your subjection to the Afghans[sic].

50 Ellenborough to Victoria, Oct 1842, in Ellenborough and Wellington, History of the Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough, 52.
To you, Princes and Chiefs of Sirhind, of Rajwarrs, of Malwa, and Guzerate, I shall commit this glorious trophy of successful war. You will, yourselves, with all honour, transmit the gates of sandal-wood through your respective territories, to the restored temple of Somnauth.

He contended that the Gates’ return reflected a British and Indian shared national triumph:

For myself, identified with you in interest and in feeling, I regard with all your enthusiasm the high achievements of that heroic army, reflecting alike immortal honour upon my native and upon my adopted country.

…May that good providence, which has hitherto so manifestly protected me, still extend to me its favour, that I may so use the power no intrusted to my hands, as to advance your prosperity and secure your happiness, by placing the union of our two countries upon foundation which may render it eternal.51

Ellenborough’s Somnauth Proclamation was an imaginative endeavour to engage the history, custom, and sentiments of India’s people for the purpose of reconciling the country’s national interests with British imperial ambition.

In Britain, the Somnauth Gates’ restoration and proclamation raised questions regarding Ellenborough’s political and moral judgement. In parliament, critics argued that his action and language excited Muslim and Hindu religious tension, and demonstrated a partiality towards the latter at the expense of Christianity. E. Vernon Smith, Whig MP and future President of the Board of Control (1855-1858), argued that Ellenborough’s Christian reason had to be questioned over his idolization of “Hindoo rites, or at least those of juggernaut.” He proposed that “…as they [Hindus] seem opposed even to the plain injunctions of a natural religion…deeply founded

51 Times, 11 Jan. 1843, p. 5
in error, and to be productive...of a serious evil,” the Indian government is not “…obliged or at liberty to show them any degree of positive sanction or encouragement.”52 Prime Minister Robert Peel and the Conservative government responded with the assertion that the Governor General merely endeavoured to conciliate India’s national feeling with a war prize. However, they were forced to reply to the allegations that he sacrificed Christian for Eastern values. Peel tried to reassure the House of Ellenborough’s Christianity, by reading the latter’s letter to the Chaplains of the Upper Provinces of India which communicated his prayer and “humble thanksgiving to Almighty God” for their recent escape from drought. Peel submitted that “…is it possible that he can be charged with a desire to represent himself as a favourer of Hindooism? What sentiments could be more worthy of a Christian Governor?”53 The Times proposed that Ellenborough’s pompous actions and proclamation illustrated to them an adoption of a Napoleonic demeanour, and that his references to the Temple made them “…unaffectedly tremble for the Governor-General’s Christianity.” They implored him “to temper his enthusiastic temperament…for his adopted country,” quipping

let him be on guard against the seduction-let him steel his mind by the thought of his family-his English estates-his seat in the House of Peers, to which a worshipper of Jughernaut [sic] or Vishnu has never yet been admitted-let him think of the associations of his childhood, and the friends of his more mature years-let him think of the dishes he would be obliged to forgo if he were a Brahmin-of the religious luxuries of Exeter-hail-the temporal ones of a Cabinet dinner-let him think of

52 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 66, 09 Feb. 1843, col. 347.
anything, do anything, desire anything, rather than yield to the temptations which will solicit him.\textsuperscript{54}

Lord John Russell, Whig opposition leader in the Commons, was skeptical of Ellenborough’s judgement. He elucidated that this proclamation was not the sole objection to his conduct, but rather his information from India informed “…an opinion that it would be dangerous to trust Lord Ellenborough with the sole, undivided command of our immense empire in India.”\textsuperscript{55}

In response to criticism, Ellenborough argued that the Somnauth Gates’ restoration and proclamation were necessary appeals to India’s history, custom, and prejudices for the maintenance of British power. In responding to the Duke of Wellington’s communication of metropolitan disapproval, he responded bluntly that “The measure was a politic measure for India-and I ought only to look to India. If I were to abstain from doing anything here which could be disapproved by gentlemen over their firesides in England I should lose India.” Moreover, it was an action which attempted to remove the people of India’s serious indifference to the Government. To that end, he argued that “…I must throw over English Prejudices and act in the spirit of a native, not of a foreign governor.”\textsuperscript{56}

In 1843, Ellenborough attracted significant criticism from the Court of Directors for his unconventional response to popular uprisings in Saugar, in the Central Provinces. He argued that

\textsuperscript{54} The Times, 12 Jan. 1843, p. 4
\textsuperscript{55} Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 66, 09 Feb. 1843, col. 377.
\textsuperscript{56} Ellenborough to Wellington, 22 Mar. 1843, in Ellenborough and Wellington, History of the Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough, 358.
the uprisings were the result of the civil administration’s lack of social courtesy towards the local population. In response, he removed the district’s entire European administration and replaced them with military personnel. In receiving a report from Col. William Sleeman on the causes of the instability, he physically underlined the author’s conclusion that the root of ill feeling was an insolence of office: “The Europeans officers no longer show that courtesy towards the middle and high chaps, and that kindness towards the humble which characterized the officers of our day; and the native officers either imitate or take advantage of this.” 57 To the Directors, he argued that this lack of courtesy towards local social status “…deprived us of the sympathies and cooperation of the great body of the people.” 58 Laying out his rationale for installing military administration, he submitted that their shared combat experience with Indians allowed them to treat the population with more respect as they knew “the best part of the native character.” Unlike the civil servant who “…only see the worst part of the Native character,” Military officers have served the best part of the native character; they have seen the soldiers on service, and have shared his hardships and his dangers—they…have acquired a kindly disposition towards the natives, and it was this disposition which I was, above all things, desirous of substituting the administration of the Saugar territory for that which appeared to me to have prevailed there. 59

This action, which acknowledged and countered prevalent British racial and social prejudice, reflected an attempt to enforce a sympathetic understanding of India’s particular habits and

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57 1843, Pro 30/12/11, fol. 2839, EP, NA.
58 Ellenborough to Court of Directors, 15 Jan. 1844, Pro 30/12/11, fol. 3010, EP, NA.
59 Ellenborough to Court of Directors, 15 Jan. 1844, Pro 30/12/11, fols. 3005-3006, EP, NA.
institutions. For Ellenborough, the military’s closeness with the population, through shared experience, represented a good model which determined that the British paramount power needed to remain attuned and adaptive to India’s unique political and social environment.

Ellenborough’s 1843 Sind intervention and dethronement of its traditional authority drew additional metropolitan criticism. For his detractors, this action reflected a direct contradiction to earlier pronouncements against British expansion beyond the Indus and Ganges rivers. In Parliament, Lord Ashley, Conservative MP and Tory radical, introduced a motion condemning Ellenborough’s imprisonment of Sind’s Amirs and territorial motivations in the area. He argued that despite the Amirs being faithful British allies during the Afghan War, Ellenborough forced them to cede territory which he gave to a neighbouring state as a reward for fidelity. In a lengthy, anonymous, and well-researched pamphlet titled *Lord Ellenborough and India* (1844), the writer illustrates that Ellenborough warned the Amirs of the consequences of infidelity, and instructed Sir Charles Napier to find any infraction to legitimate annexation or intrigue into local succession.

Ellenborough’s Sind campaign, and subsequent Gwalior intervention of the same year, reflected a belief that the British paramount power must maintain a dominant military presence in a country which was historically accustomed to intrigue and conflict. For Ellenborough, India

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60 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 72, 08 Feb. 1844, col. 342.
61 *India and Lord Ellenborough*, 3rd ed. (London: WH Dalton, 1844), 87-103. An abridged version of this pamphlet was also published in a five part series in *Times* from 21 Dec. 1844 to 03 Jan. 1845.
was a diverse and inherently unstable country which needed a strong external hand to maintain peace and prosperity. With regards to Sind, he submitted to Wellington that the military intervention was justified by the Amirs’ treachery, and to refute an opinion that the British had retreated from Afghanistan. Believing that British power was constantly threatened from neighbouring powers, he contended that the invasion, which secured territory in the lower Indus, provided a launching pad for future campaigns against Afghanistan.\(^\text{62}\) In regards to British intervention in Gwalior, he explained to Victoria that social instability and violence in that territory, and threats against bordering possessions necessitated government intervention. He argued that in India, unlike the balance of power which existed in Europe, British power destroyed all others. Therefore, any hesitation to restore security would make the princes and Britain’s own subjects doubt British power.\(^\text{63}\)

In July 1844, the Court of Directors recalled Ellenborough from office. This was affected by the Company’s and metropolitan political opponents’ routine criticism of the nature and tone of his policy in India. In a supportive yet straightforward communication to Ellenborough, Wellington summarized this criticism. In regards to the Company, he expressed that they were upset with Ellenborough over his absence from the seat of government in Calcutta, and for not


seeking approval for the large expenses incurred by military installation expansion. Following the controversy over Somnauth and Sind, Wellington captured the mood against Ellenborough’s Indian administration:

The opposition in Parliament had, at a very early period of the session, endeavoured by sarcasm, and observations upon passages and words in your general orders and letter upon the gates of Somnauth, to ridicule your pacific professions, to place them in contrast with your conduct in Scinde[sic], and to draw the conclusion that, notwithstanding your blame of the conduct of your predecessor in office, you were acting with views of conquest inconsistent with the declarations and principle of the law.65

In response, Ellenborough contended that prioritizing India’s interests over metropolitan opinion and the Company’s monetary pursuits was the reason for his unpopularity. Resigned to his eventual recall a month earlier, he argued that the Company, both individually and collectively, were hostile to his different mode of governing India which put the public interests over their

…scrupulous regard for individual interests, and none at all for those of the public, which has, indeed, here no representative but the Governor-General, are necessarily most hostile to an Administration conducted, like mine, upon totally different principles, and they give to their account of actions and sayings and events the colour of their own disappointed minds.66

Contemporary and historiographical reflections upon Ellenborough mental soundness overlook the fact that he maintained a consistent thread of opinion on Britain’s imperial

65 Wellington to Ellenborough, 05 Aug. 1843, Ibid, 388.
relationship with India. His official rebuke amidst metropolitan criticism reflected his uncompromising inclination that British interests, whether they be financial or cultural propagation, must be checked by a sympathetic acknowledgement of India’s particular political and social environment. Beyond maintaining order, the state needed to be attuned and adaptive to local material needs, habits, and feelings of the people.

Ellenborough and the “national revolt in Awadh

Ellenborough’s response to the Indian Revolt in opposition and as President of the Board of Control reflected a continuity of thought and tone regarding British imperialism in India. Just like in 1844, in 1858 this perspective and manner led to his forced resignation from Cabinet following his public and publicized rebuke of Canning’s Oudh Proclamation. As noted, Ellenborough maintained, public and privately, that this document’s sanction of mass property confiscation fueled a nationally oriented revolt and hostility against the British. In arguing that this revolt was not equated to a military mutiny, he resisted growing race antagonism against India’s population by expressing sympathy for the rationale and plight of Awadh resistance.

In 1858 at the Board of Control, Ellenborough was concerned about the British forces’ violent retribution on Indian civilians. He received communication from British officials familiar with Northern India that condemned the Proclamation and British brutality in Awadh. Writing to Ellenborough, Frederick Currie, former judge in Allahabad, Lahore Resident, and Company
director, argued that the Proclamation was universally condemned among officials in India. He stated that along with the Proclamation, the British and Indian papers’ exaggerations on rebel atrocities and calls for vengeance had “…excited the vindictive feelings of officers.” Moreover, he contended that a British reputation for justice and moderation was being questioned by the local populous:

We hear of stories of arbitrary and unwarrantable proceedings even by civil officers, and the number of innocent lives that have been sacrificed by the undiscriminating ferocity of the soldiers, especially of the newly arrived…is perfectly frightful.”

Mr. Edwards, from Calcutta, asked Ellenborough to stop the practice of special courts, stating that “The people are becoming terrified by our operations, and in a terror stricken multitude there is fearful danger.” Colonel Henry Marion Durand, Ellenborough’s former aide-de-camp and private secretary, now Agent in Indore, suggested that Sir. C. Campbell and Sir James Outram “…were all opposed to this confiscation proclamation, one of them saving ‘it was good for a ten years war.”

This criticism informed Ellenborough’s condemnatory Secret Dispatch to Canning dated 18 April 1858. He argued to Canning that his Proclamation exacerbated a popular and legitimate

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69 Currie to Lord Ellenborough, 09 Apr, 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fols. 2482-2485, EP, 30/12/09, NA.
70 Edwards to Ellenborough, 09 Apr. 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fol. 2487, EP, NA.
uprising which was largely conditioned by the recent 1856 British annexation. He detailed a hostile environment in which the British had publicly dethroned and substituted a native sovereign with foreign rule, and changed the revenue settlement that deprived landowners of the means to provide wealth and power to their families. He contended that amidst these deprivations the revolt had a

…rather the character of a legitimate war, than that of Rebellion, and that the people of Oude should rather be regarded with indulgent consideration, than made the objects of a penalty, exceeding in extent, and in severity almost any which has been recorded in history as inflicted upon a subdued nation.

In a Lords debate condemning the Dispatch’s subsequent publication in the Times, Ellenborough maintained that he acted in the local population’s best interests and their future conciliation to the Empire. He contended that the Proclamation’s confiscation decree was contrary to the spirit of clemency and amnesty which resembled the current Conservative government’s policy on India. In sum, he illustrated that the British government had two contrary options in confronting the Indian Revolt: “It is practically this:—Shall the Government of India be conducted on the principles of justice and clemency, or shall it be conducted on the principles of severity which appear in the Proclamation of Lord Canning?” In proposing that his fellow Lords understood “…the expression of ‘the proprietary right,” he submitted that for the people of India it had stronger resonance as confiscation was unknown.

72 Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to Canning, 19 Apr. 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fols. 2736-2906, EP, NA.
73 Secret Committee of the Court of Directors to Canning, 19 Apr. 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fol. 2740, EP, NA.
in the country’s history. Beyond reminding their lordships of the negative consequences of property confiscation in Ireland, he stated that even the former Muslim conquerors of India respected proprietorship in India:

Whatever have been the changes of dynasty, the storm of war has swept over village communities, and the property of individuals from the lowest to the highest has always been respected. The wise conquerors of India changed little but the Ruler—they left everything standing—and on that account it is that they were enabled to establish a permanent Government.75

For Awadh’s soldiers, Ellenborough proposed that property confiscation amounted to the final straw in Britain’s brutal repression of the revolt. He tried to invoke British public sympathy for the rebels’ situation and feeling. He argued that amidst threats and acts of brutal violence, they had now no material means to maintain their society’s religious foundations:

They have been threatened with hanging, with being blown from guns, with transportation; and they are now under a panic, hardly knowing what they are to do. What must be their feelings when, while disarmed and incapable of committing any act against the Government, however indignant they might be at the dishonour they had sustained—what must be their feelings, I say, when they find that all their property is at once confiscated, and that they have not a home to go to? More than this—the Mahomedan mosques, the Hindoo temples, all are supported by the land of the country…The whole of this, however, is confiscated; the whole means of maintaining both religions are unwisely, rashly taken away. All the provision for objects of charity, for orphans and widows, is swept away.76

In conclusion, he reiterated that his letter’s aim was to stem violence by offering Oudh’s people hope under British rule: “They were men who had been fighting without hope. I
wished to give them hope. I gave them the hope of returning to their homes, to their villages, to all the comforts of their families”. 77

For Ellenborough, the opposition to his dispatch and pressure to leave the Government represented a partisan divide over India between a sympathetic Conservative administration and a Whig policy of repression and confiscation. In a letter to Disraeli following his resignation, Ellenborough argued that his dispatch “afforded the only hope of tranquilizing the natives and controlling our maddened people who seem to have lost all regard for human life and human suffering.” 78 He maintained that India’s only hope for imperial reconciliation rested with himself and the Conservative government. In correspondence with John Parkington, Wellington, and Disraeli, he contended that the Proclamation had to be sanctioned by the former Whig government, and that the fall of Derby’s administration would lead to India’s despair. 79

Conclusion

This chapter challenges a contemporary and historical perception that Ellenborough’s political career was coloured by eccentricity and insubordination. It argued that in state office and political opposition, he maintained a consistent Tory national perspective and policy on British imperialism in India. This represented a challenge and attempted

77 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 150, 14 May 1858, col. 605.
78 Ellenborough to Disraeli, 17 May 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fol. 3206, EP, NA.
79 Ellenborough to Disraeli, 17 May 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fol. 3206, EP, NA; Ellenborough to Parkington, 16 May 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fol. 3203, EP, NA; Ellenborough to Wellington, 17 May 1858, Pro 30/12/9, fol. 3222, EP, NA.
mollification of ascended liberal civilizing currents which informed westernization and racial superiority from the 1830s to the Indian Revolt. As President of the Board of Control and Governor General, he maintained that Britain had a moral obligation to govern through India’s particular political and social environment by respecting the institutions, habits, and feelings of the people. This represented the core principle of a wider imperial polity and “subjecthood” predicated on reciprocal obligation and loyalty. It informed Ellenborough’s state intervention against instability and disloyalty in the Sind and Gwailor, and his punishment of Company officials who disrespected local social hierarchy and custom. Outside India, this defined his condemnation of loyal prince and gentry displacement, and his rebuke of state interference in India’s religious and inheritance customs. It conditioned his sympathetic response and calls for British moderation to Awadh’s “legitimate” uprising during the Revolt. His official condemnation of Canning’s Awadh’s “confiscation” Proclamation reflected a Tory inclination that Britain’s moral obligation as an imperial power was to protect the country’s entangled political, propertied, and, religious institutions. Ellenborough’s perspective and political positions informed a wider conservative response to the Indian Revolt. Moreover, it informed a Conservative ministry’s imaginative reformulation of an imperial framework in India by the 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation.
Chapter 2: Disraeli’s Challenge to Whig Ascendency in India

“...a party has arisen in the State who demand that the principle of political liberalism shall consequently be carried to its extent; which it appears to them is impossible without getting rid of the fragments of the old constitution that remain. This is the destructive party.”\(^{80}\) (Disraeli, 1844)

“There is not a race so proud, so willful, so rash, and so obstinate. They live in a misty clime, on raw meats, and wines of fire. They laugh at their fathers, and never say a prayer. They pass their days in the chase, gaming, and all violent courses. They have all the power of the State, and all its wealth; and when they can wring no more from their peasants, they plunder the kings of India”\(^{81}\) (Disraeli, 1847)

Introduction

Unlike Ellenborough, Disraeli had little experience with Indian issues and had never been to India. Although involved in parliamentary commissions on Ceylon and India, it is argued that his inclination and action towards the Subcontinent was informed by political conditions in Britain and Ireland as well as literary engagements with the Middle East. Moreover, this chapter demonstrates that it was a Tory and Young England critique of Whig espoused liberal modernity and reasoned progress which defined Disraeli’s perspective on British Indian Empire. This conditioned Disraeli’s skepticism of European modern civilization’s superiority over Asia, and defined a conception of civilizational difference based upon locality and prescription. It is argued

\(^{80}\) Benjamin Disraeli, *Coningsby or the new generation* (Teddington, Middlesex: The Echo Library, 2007), 254.

\(^{81}\) Benjamin Disraeli, *Tancred: or the new crusade* (Teddington, Middlesex: The Echo Library, 2007), 168.
that this skepticism of modernity and partisan critique of the Whigs defined his sympathetic response to the national characteristics of the Indian Revolt.

The Indian Revolt

On 27 July 1857, Disraeli made a lengthy, comprehensive, and partisan parliamentary assault on recent British Company governance in India. In confronting what he argued was the lethargic and unsophisticated response of Lord Palmerston’s Whig Government (1855-1858) to the Revolt, he challenged parliament to consider Britain’s responsibility for the escalating crisis in India. Disraeli’s contention reflected a Tory political philosophy uniquely expressed through the imaginations of the Young England Movement which revered the national and social values of noblesse oblige, expansive privilege, and religious reverence. With similar arguments used to denounce Whiggism’s oligarchic and liberal destruction of England ancient institutions, Disraeli critiqued a Whig policy of similar national destruction in India which reversed a traditional imperial policy to protect and engage political, propertied, and religious interests in India.82

For Disraeli, this reversal in policy matched the Whigs re-ascendancy to government and Dalhousie’s appointment to Governor General in 1848. He ascribed three reasons for the Indian and British governments’ responsibility for the Revolt: “first, our forcible destruction of native authority; next, our disturbance of the settlement of property and thirdly, our tampering with the religion of the people.”83 Focusing on Dalhousie’s annexation of Awadh in 1856, he contended

that the sepoy mutiny and popular uprisings were not predicated on military service or superstitious grievances, but represented a “national war of revolt.” In November 1857, he stated to Lord Derby that the “paramount and proximate cause was to be found in the annexation of Oudh.” Disraeli’s contention that Britain’s destruction of India’s ancient and national institutions led to the Revolt was informed by his vehement Tory defense against Whiggism and liberal reform in Britain and Ireland before 1857.

A Tory defense against Whig Ascendancy

From his early days as a political outsider and parliamentary backbencher to his ascension to Prime Minister, Disraeli adhered to a tory political tradition and philosophy from the eighteenth century. This adherence that prefaced an involvement with the Young England Movement in the 1840s made Disraeli a distinctive and rogue figure within the post-1832 Reform Act Conservative Party early in his career. In 1835, in a letter to Viscount Howick on the Tory’s previous political support for shortened parliaments, he argued that “I'm willing to admit that primitive toryism...may be a very different faith from the one at present by its votaries: nevertheless I am a primitive tory.” In his novel Coningsby, published in 1844, he contended that the post-reform Conservative Party was controlled by “Pseudo-Tories,” who perpetuated a “…mantra of political exclusion and economic restriction” that was contrary to a tory reverence

84 Ibid, col. 442.
for the universal principals of nationality. For Disraeli, the proponents of true Tory principals were in the lineage of eighteenth century statesmen culminating in William Pitt’s defense against the Whig oligarchy’s centralizing and exclusionary motivations devised from the 1688 Glorious Revolution.

From this political narrative, Disraeli maintained throughout his career that the Tory Party and Toryism were inherent defenders of national political, social, and religious institutions against the abstract, universal, and transformative nature of liberalism. In a letter to Edward Beadan in 1835, Disraeli stated that “I hold one of the first principles of Toryism to be that government is instituted for the welfare of the many...This is why the Tories maintain national institutions.” In 1837, he proposed to Maidstone’s electors that it was the Conservative Party’s “...object to resist liberalism in politics...[which] is only another phrase for an attack upon the protestant religion and the English poor.” To Buckinghamshire’s electors in 1847, he hoped “...that [in the] great struggle between popular principles and liberal opinion, which is the characteristics of our age, I hope ever to be found on the side of the people, and of the institutions of England.” In his famous 1872 London Crystal Palace speech, he inaugurated a popular conservative platform that would dominate late Victorian politics. He argued that: “the

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87 Disraeli, *Coningsby*, 53
89 Disraeli to Beadan, 2 Jul. 1835, in Disraeli, *Benjamin Disraeli Letters*, vol. II, 55-70

78
Tory party, unless it is a national party, is nothing. It is not a confederacy of nobles, it is not a democratic multitude; it is a party formed from all the numerous classes in the realm-classes alike and equal before the law, but whose different conditions and different aims give vigorous variety to our national life.”

In advocating a clear contrast between the Conservative and Liberal parties, he used the political stage to challenge the precepts of nineteenth-century Victorian liberalism. Specifically, he critiqued liberalism’s abstract and cosmopolitan disregard for national interests: “Influenced…by the philosophy and politics of the continent…[liberalism] substitute[d] cosmopolitan for national principles; and they baptized the new scheme of politics with the plausible name of ‘liberalism.’” Moreover, he condemned a liberal civilizing world view which “…attack[s] the institutions of the country under the name of Reform, and to make war on the manners and customs of the people of this country under the pretext of Progress.”

It is important not to underestimate the extent that Disraeli’s partisan rhetoric was informed by a substantive and consistent intellectual inclination towards the national and social consequences of liberalism. This defined his conservative world view which saw liberal modern reform predicated on societal precepts of reasoned progress as a transformative and destructive force in England, Ireland, and India.

Disraeli’s critique of western liberalism resonates through his early political and creative writings. In “Spirit of Whiggism” (1836), Disraeli proposed that the England’s institutions and

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population needed to be defended from a factious Whig interest. He argued that the tory defense of the Church of England and the dual houses of parliament represented their organic embodiment of the nation:

Now, a nation is a work of art and a work of time. A nation is gradually created by a variety of influences—the influence of original organization, of climate, soil, religion, laws, customs, manners, extraordinary accidents and incidents in their history, and the individual character of their illustrious citizens. These influences create the nation—these form the national mind, and produce in the course of centuries a high degree of civilization. If you destroy the political institutions which these influences have called into force…you destroy the nation.93

Resembling Burke’s argument on the importance of locality for instilling local and national identity, Disraeli submitted that England’s political institutions represented the English people’s particular history and character. In contrast, Disraeli contended that Whigs pursued a destructive reform program predicated on the rallying cry of enlightenment principles such as the “equality of man.” He submitted that its end result was the submission of the local and hierarchical to the liberal centralization of a progressive metropole:

Let us suppose our ancient monarchy abolished, our independent hierarchy reduced to a stipendiary sect, the gentlemen of England deprived of their magisterial functions, and metropolitan prefects and sub-prefect established in the counties and principal towns, commanding a vigorous and vigilant police, and backed by an army under the immediate orders of a single House of Parliament. But where then will be the liberties of England? Who would dare disobey London? the enlightened and reformed metropolis!94

94 Ibid, 339.
Young England

In the 1840s, Disraeli espoused and contributed to the Young England Movement’s negation of a Whig ideology of progress with a Tory historical narrative and political philosophy based upon feudal inspired values and a romantic reverence for the nation. It centered around four individual Conservative MPs, Disraeli, George Smythe, Lord John Manners, and Alexander Baillie Cochrane, with auxiliary support from around a dozen other MPs. It promoted the use of imagination to pursue a platform of noble obligation, the expansive privileges and rights of propertied and labor, and religious reverence to correct the ills of modern society.\(^5\) In the preface for *Lothiar* (1870), Disraeli recalled the imagination, philosophy, and objectives of Young England:

> They recognised imagination in the government of nations as a quality not less important than reason. They trusted much to popular sentiment, which rested on an heroic tradition and was sustained by the high spirit of a free aristocracy…they looked upon the health and knowledge of the multitude as not the least precious part of the wealth of nations. In asserting the doctrine of race, they were entirely opposed to the equality of man, and similar abstract dogmas, which have destroyed ancient society without creating a satisfactory substitute. Resting on popular privileges, they held that no society could be durable unless it was built upon principles of loyalty and religious reverence…\(^6\)

The role of imagination as a device to critique and espouse a positive alternative to the reasoned foundations of modern society would inform Disraeli’s political engagement with England and empire.

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Disraeli and Young England engaged with the prominent “Condition of England” question in the 1840s. They proposed to elevate the poor in utilitarian England with education on the feudal virtues of duty, obligation, and community. For Manners, the future 7th Duke of Portland and a leading voice of Young England inside and outside parliament, the poor’s degradation reflected the loss of feudal principles of community and mutual obligation due to the rise of industrial capital. This represented a nostalgia for Britain’s pre-industrial feudal past reflected in his poem titled “England’s Trust” (1841):

Each knew his place-King, peasant, peer, or priest-
The Greatest owned connexion with the lease;  
From rank to rank the generous feeling ran,  
And linked society as man to man

Gone are those days, and gone the ties that then  
Bound peers and gentry to their fellow men.  
Now, in their place, behold the modern slave,  
Doomed, from the very cradle to the grave,  
To tread his lonely path of care and toil.97

In an 1844 North-West speaking tour to the industrial towns of Birmingham, Manchester, and Bingley, Manners and Disraeli promoted recreation for working laborer to re-inspire the moral spirit of noble obligation, duty, and community. Speaking to the Birmingham Athenic Institute on the importance of recreational activity, Manners praised the institution for their efforts in “…bringing back [the] manly games of traditional England,” which once united the classes and bought a spirit of peace such as in the “Palmiest days of feudalism [where] the barons of England were accustomed to sit at the same table and

partake of the same fare with those beneath them."^98 In a speech supporting initiatives promoting field
garden allotments for laborers in Bingley, Disraeli expressed Young England’s lamentation and solution
for social disunity. He argued that instruction in duty and sympathy were urgently needed to move away
from a mantra of exclusiveness, and influence national manners towards ameliorating the social
condition and stability of England.^99 For Disraeli, the decline of mutual sympathy across England’s
various interests and classes was the product of a Whig ideological assault on nationality since the
seventeenth century.

In his Young England inspired novels, *Coningsby, Sybil,* and *Tancred,* Disraeli imagined
an English political and economic social landscape divided by exclusion and mass degradation.
Through these works, Disraeli employs a Tory historical narrative to explain Whiggism’s role in
dissolving noble obligation, expropriating the people’s rights, and banning religious toleration.
He contended that a Whig exclusionary promulgation of sectarian religion and market capitalism
led to a lower moral condition of the rich and the poor. These texts also challenged the political,
economic, and cultural foundations of European civilization and its claimed superiority around
the world.

For Disraeli, the plunder of the church, the Crown’s submission, capitalism, and
sectarianism were the prevalent themes degrading and disuniting England. In *Coningsby: or The
New Generation* (1844), Disraeli explains that it is from the sixteenth-century plunder of church

^98 Manners to Birmingham Athletic Institution, 26 Aug. 1844, item 66, fol. 6, Hughendan Papers (hereafter HP), Old
Bodleian Library (Hereafter OBL).
^99 Disraeli in Bingley, 11 Oct. 1844, item 66, fol. 41-45, HP, OBL.

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lands during the Reformation that the local and imperial roots of a Whig mantra of political exclusion are traced:

They have in that time pulled down thrones and churches, changed dynasties, abrogated and remodeled parliaments; they have disfranchised Scotland and confiscated Ireland. One may admire the vigour and consistency of the Whig Party, and recognize in their careers that unity of purpose that can only spring from a great principle; but the Whigs introduced sectarian religion, sectarian religion led to political exclusion, and political exclusion was accompanied by commercial restraint.”

In *Sybil, or The Two Nations* (1845), a book which focuses on England’s industrial North-West, Disraeli’s character Lord Marney represents the Whig oligarch. His elevation from commissioner to knighthood through the confiscation of church property and the plundering of monasteries during the Reformation, and to a peerage for rejecting James II’s restitution of religious tolerance and Church property in the 1688 Glorious Revolution, Marney symbolized the ambitious and exclusive Whig aristocratic governing mentality during the period. For Disraeli, the introduction of “Dutch Finance,” or finance capitalism, accentuated the aristocratic governing class’s dissociation from the peasant classes:

pursued more or less for nearly a century and a half, has ended in the degradation of a fettered and burdened multitude, made national debt a habit, it has made credit a ruling power…it has introduced a loose, inexact haphazard, and dishonest spirit in the conduct of both public and private life; a spirit dazzling and yet dastardly; reckless of consequences and yet shrinking from responsibility…these are the evils, but ought perhaps cheerfully to be encountered for the greater blessings of civil and religious liberty”

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100 Disraeli, *Coningsby*, 58-59.
In *Sybil*, Disraeli’s portrayal of the stagnant and impoverished town of Marney is represented as the consequence of a Whig exclusion in England. In the monastic ruins above the town, the main character Egremont, younger brother to Lord Marney, learns from two strangers that the historical relationship between the church and the people had been destroyed by an ascendant capitalist aristocracy. We learn that unlike the present day when the small proprietor is forced from his country cottage to the town by the landowner to find wage work, the old monastery was a point of refuge, council, and defense for the poor. In the present, however, the poor stand apart from a State and Church controlled by an aristocracy. This creates an England of two separate classes: “between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are… ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts, and feelings.”¹⁰³ For Disraeli, the symbol of a ruined monastery, ruined by an aristocratic family power that disassociates from rather than fulfills its obligations to the poor, signifies how the doctrines of religious liberty and material advancement have degraded the moral bonds of the nation.

In *Tancred: Or the New Crusade* (1847), the last novel in the Young England trilogy, Disraeli is most introspective on the condition of European morality and spirituality, and its comparisons with the East. In Tancred’s, the main character, discussion with his father, the Duke of Bellamount, on England’s progressive material development, Disraeli lays out a Young

England critique of modern society. Tancred argues that in the progression of material industry there is a moral deterioration of aristocratic virtue:

I see nothing but fresh causes of moral deterioration. You have announced to the millions that their welfare is to be tested by the amount of their wages...You propose for their conduct the least ennobling of all impulses. If you have seen an aristocracy invariably becomes degraded under such influence, if all the vices of a middle class may be traced to such an absorbing motive; why are we to believe that the people should be more pure, or that they should escape the catastrophe of the policy that confounds the happiness with the wealth of nations.\textsuperscript{104}

Through the young noblemen Tancred and a variety of stereotypical Eastern characters, Disraeli travels to the East to critique a materially obsessed and morally degraded British society. This is done through Tancred’s interaction with the strengths of Eastern morality and spirituality. In confronting the presupposed superiority of European civilization, Disraeli introduces to the reader the extensive civilizing influences of the East. In explaining British prejudices against Judaism, he contends that Europeans are “...touched by a presumptuous jealousy of the long predominance of that oriental intellect to which they owed their civilization.”\textsuperscript{105} With regards to the Church and the English nation, Disraeli writes that “the deficiency of oriental knowledge” in a State controlled and monitored church limits its doctrinal and spiritual influence over the government and the market place.\textsuperscript{106} With regards to English Christian proselytism in the East, the character Fakredden questions their motivations and suitability as the “English have no religious principles.”\textsuperscript{107} Disraeli also questions the credibility and legitimacy of England’s

\textsuperscript{104} Disraeli, Tancred, 36.
\textsuperscript{105} Disraeli, Tancred, 119.
\textsuperscript{106} Disraeli, Tancred, 50.
\textsuperscript{107} Disraeli, Tancred, 304.
interference and modification to Eastern political constitutions. In recounting the recent political upheaval and religious violence in Lebanon in 1842, Disraeli argues that English attempts to introduce sectarian government into a region accustomed to a feudal system, although satisfactory to “Exeter Hall,” had the contrary result of unifying the entire country against Europe. In Tancred, Disraeli expanded a criticism of Whiggism’s forced moral and material deprivation in England to argue that western civilization had little to complement the institutions and customs of the East. In suggesting that the East could morally improve the West in terms of respecting history and religious reverence, he challenged liberalism’s credibility as superior civilizing force in England and throughout the Empire. This allowed Disraeli to remain skeptical of liberal imperialism’s propagation of reasoned progress, and stay sympathetic to national and social difference.

Whiggism and Ireland

For Disraeli, Ireland’s material plight and social turmoil represented the consequences of the Whigs’ unmitigated destruction and overthrow of an ancient constitution with sectarian state and religious principles. To Disraeli and Young England, what was needed for Ireland was English sympathy for the laws, customs, and feelings of the Irish people. Manners argued that the Government should desist from altering the

…old manners and ancient feelings of a generous hearted people; I implore them to desist from striving to effect such a revolution…by accepting their traditional habits

108 Disraeli, Tancred, 240.
and ideas, by appealing to and governing by their unhesitating faith, and hereditary feudalism…"109

In the House, Richard Monckton Milnes contended that the Irish were the most religious and faithful people in the world, and that it was the evils of religious ascendancy (State Church dominance) which was the root of all disturbances in Ireland.110 Disraeli proposed that the removal of Charles I and James II in the name of political and religious liberty unleashed onto Ireland hundreds of years of confiscation, humiliation, and discrimination at the hands of an alien church and aristocracy.111

For Disraeli, Irish distress and violence were the result of a Whig exclusionary ideology which attempted to impose foreign social elites and institutions onto a historically and religiously cognizant Irish people. In an 1844 debate concerning the state of Ireland, Disraeli argued that it was not the Tories, but the Whig Party, who made a factitious aristocracy out of the lands of the church, introduced the Penal Codes, and infused a puritanical spirit within the Church of Ireland. In trying to evoke sympathy for the Irish plight in the House of Commons, he contended that these changes had inflicted on “…a starving population, an absentee aristocracy, and an alien Church, and in addition, the weakest executive in the world.”112 To Disraeli, a Tory alternative in Ireland resembled the reign of Charles I, in which there was political and civil equality for

112 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 72, 16 Feb. 1844, cols. 1009, 1016.
Roman Catholics, an encouragement of their service in judicial and legislative positions, and Anglican and Catholic Church equality. In responding to the claims that English institutions were needed to improve Ireland’s condition, he contended that this concept had produced Irish dissatisfaction. Just as earlier he contended against the introduction of English styled municipal corporations in Ireland, Disraeli stated:

Justice in Ireland was then said to mean, an identity of institutions with England. He believed that to be the greatest fallacy that could be brought forward. He always thought that the greatest cause of misery in Ireland was the identity of institutions with England…How could people ask for an identity of institutions when the very primary and most important institution of all—the union of Church and State—was opposed by the Irish people?

Disraeli argued that Ireland’s material plight and social violence was due to a Whig attempt to destroy nationality and impose foreign institutions on the people. In response, he laid out an alternative Tory imperialism in Ireland. Looking back to the Stuart kings, he imagined an English monarch which protected and conciliated Irish nationality for the imperial interest. Beyond Ireland, Disraeli maintained that sympathy for human difference and distress should inform parliamentary consideration for all subjects of the British Empire.

Ceylon

In an 1850 Commons debate responding to a recent popular uprising in Ceylon, Disraeli challenged the House, and especially its most liberal proponents, to consider sympathetically

113 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol.72, 16 Feb. 1844, cols. 1007-08.
their political and moral obligation towards Britain’s Eastern subjects. In arguing that little had been heard concerning the condition of the local people during the debate, he criticized the arguments of liberal reformers John Roebuck and J. Hobb that Ceylon was a prize of conquest and should not be accountable to parliament.\textsuperscript{115} Disraeli highlighted Ceylon’s victims, and Britain’s responsibility to maintain good governance, justice, and moderation for all subjects of the Empire. Quoting a Ceylon newspaper, he questioned the activities and conduct of the British authority: “The soldiers are pillaging the houses, digging up the floors to find money and jewelry belonging to the hiding villagers, confiscated under martial law. The scenes at present enacted in the neighbourhood of Matelle are a disgrace to a civilized Government.” He concluded that this situation merited a parliamentary interference: “…the circumstances must be fresh in the recollection of every Member of the House. I look to them as circumstances which are dangerous to our tenure of our Colonies. This, I think, of all others is the case in which the Parliament of England ought to interfere.”\textsuperscript{116} For Disraeli, the Imperial parliament was politically and morally responsible for the well-being of the Crown’s and the East India Company’s subjects. In appropriating a Young England condemnation of social exclusiveness, and the virtue of noble obligation, he argued that MPs should protect all imperial subjects against colonial injustice.

\textbf{Whig Culpability for the Indian Revolt}

\textsuperscript{115} Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 117, 29 May 1851, col. 244. 
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid, col. 248.
During the 1857 Indian Revolt, Disraeli again insisted that the Imperial parliament should be accountable for the escalating distress and popular uprisings caused by a recent British policy of destroying nationality through state annexation, land confiscation, and interference in religious custom. His perspective on India reflected his Tory defense of nationality and the moral principles of noblesse oblige, expansive social privilege for rich and poor, and religious reverence. This informed his opposition to the destructive forces of liberalism in India. Similar in consequence to a Whig usurpation of a free monarchy, land proprietorship, and the Anglican Church, he saw the Indian government’s new policy of dethroning princes and state annexation, as well as interference in Hinduism as direct attacks on the bonds of nationality in India. As with Ireland, Disraeli argued that stability and loyalty in India was conditional on Britain’s political acknowledgment of the different political institutions, social rights, and customs which characterized the various nationalities of India.

Before the Revolt, Disraeli was a consistent critic of the East India Company’s activities in India. In 1843, he supported Lord Ashley’s motion condemning Governor General Ellenborough’s conquest of Sind and dethronement of its princes.117 In Tancred, Disraeli summarized British tactics and intentions in India through the Fakredden character, who morally defended his countless attempts at intrigue to gain possession of Lebanon and Syria by arguing: “Why, England won India by intrigue. Do you think they are not intriguing in the Punjaub at this

moment.” In this novel as well, he communicates England and India’s religious differences within the British imperial context. In explaining that Tancred’s pilgrimage to Asia Minor was justified as it represented the historical birthplace of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, he sets as a contrast the “rational and refined” Indian Brahmin’s visit to England: “The land which the Hindoo visits is not his land, nor his father’s land; the laws which regulate it are not his laws, and the faith which fills its temples is not the revelation that floats upon his sacred Ganges.” This passage should be read as a clever allegorical critique on English colonization in India. It is a veiled warning to the self-confident rational and civilized Englishmen against the dangers of not considering the laws and religion which define India and its people. In Sybil, he criticized and discredited the intentions of liberal proponents for civilized progress in the metropole and across the Empire. For example, he noted England and India’s comparable social distress: “Infanticide is practiced as extensively and as legally in England as it is on the banks of the Ganges: a circumstance which apparently has not yet engaged the attention of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts.” Amidst the 1853 debate on renewing the East India Company’s charter, Lord Stanley’s private journal suggests that Disraeli disliked the Company’s Whig westernization policy, and thought the Company should be either abolished or

118 Disraeli, Tancred, 142.
119 Disraeli, Tancred, 183-184
renewed for a limited term. For Disraeli, it was the consequences of a Whig ideology tied to reasoned progress, capital, and sectarian religion that destroyed the ancient constitutions of England and Ireland, and next threatened a similar usurpation in India.

From the Revolt’s outset, Disraeli treated Indian policy as tied intrinsically to domestic politics. He argued to Lord Henry Lennox that the responsibility for the Indian Revolt was not so much the Company’s administrative failings, but Downing Street policy. Before his speech to the Commons, Disraeli’s co-owned newspaper *The Press* criticized the Government’s treatment of the sepoys and the landed proprietors of recently-annexed Awadh. Agreeing with Ellenborough’s argument that the sepoys had legitimate grievances for being overworked, underpaid, and having their Hindu religion slighted by distant officers, they pointed to European growing prejudice as the prime motivation for their mutiny: “the subscriptions of the English officers to their festivals withdrawn under the pretense that they are idolatrous, and the line more and more plainly marked which separates them from the ruling race.” In regards to the Company’s Awadh annexation, *The Press* laid down its consequential relationship with the growing popular uprising in the country:

…the annexation to our empire has brought with it only increased extortion and oppression…We hear from all sides of landowners dispossessed, of rent free tenures

arbitrarily set aside, and of the assessment of whole districts being altered at pleasure. 124

At the beginning of January amidst popular British calls for revenge following the reports of Indian massacres of English civilians, *The Press* maintained its argument that the revolt’s causes laid directly with India’s administration:

How much gratifying to attribute our disasters to the treachery of pampered sepoys, or to some other cause wholly beyond our control, than to show it to have been the natural result of continued misgovernment...added to a system of spoliation so grasping as must sooner or later have caused an explosion among the most patient people upon the globe. 125

In the House of Commons, Disraeli argued that the Whig government’s 1848 appointment of Dalhousie and support for his policies made them responsible for the Sepoy and popular uprising in India. His account of British error from that date represented an attempt to coalesce partisan conservative support and opinion on the Revolt. To that end, he rebuked Dalhousie’s actions for destroying native political authority, property settlement, and religious custom which consequently led to the Revolt. Stressing the importance of religion to Indian society, he argued that the Government’s assault on Hinduism’s relationship with the political and propertied institutions of the country struck at the heart of nationality in India. As an example, he focused on Dalhousie’s refusal to recognize the significance of adoption to perpetuating native dynasties and property tenure. He expounded that adoption was the “very corner stone of Hindoo society,”

and in regards to the transference of title and property was “…not only a civil right, but a religious privilege; the whole frame-work of Indian society is established upon that principle.”

To Disraeli, the Government’s restriction of this right was motivated by a need for additional revenue. He submitted that the annexation and confiscation of lands from the Raja of Satara in 1848, the Rajah of Benares in 1854, the King of Awadh in 1856, and dozens of smaller kingdoms was done so as to extract additional revenue from the Indian population.

In response to the argument that some native states had spurious territorial claims and, therefore, could be removed without social disturbance, he warned that this reasoning could be easily applied to England. Similar to Lord Marney and the confiscation of the Marney Monastery, he argued that although India, suffering from many revolutions and conquests, had fictitious landed titles, England had its share as well: “Any person, for instance, in possession of church lands or of a Royal manor, who could not prove that the land was rightfully acquired by the persons from who he inherited or purchased it, might have his whole property confiscated.”

Drawing a parallel to the political and religious consequences of church land confiscations during England’s sixteenth century reformation, he begged MPs to appreciate how this new system of confiscation and taxation was producing revolutionary change in Indian society. In addition, he noted that beyond extracting two-thirds of a million pounds from landed proprietors due to the rental of land, the Government’s new policy of giving individual annuities

127 Ibid, col. 458.
instead of hereditary pensions to former native chiefs caused considerable social unrest. This, he argued, reduced “…once ancient royal families and nobles….to a state of the utmost humiliation” and instilled upon their people the scene of “…their ancient sovereigns reduced to absolute beggary.”

For Disraeli, the relationship between a “native” sovereign and his people had been brutally usurped in Awadh’s recent annexation. He contended that under no circumstances should the King of Awadh’s misconduct be a pretense for abolishing a whole kingdom, especially one which had been Britain’s faithful ally and had not violated any agreed treaty. In illustrative language, Disraeli argued that British conduct in Awadh had produced suspicion regarding British motivations among the Hindu and Muslim princes:

The moment the throne of Oude was declared vacant, the English troops poured in; the Royal treasury was ransacked, and the furniture and jewels of the King and his wives were seized. From that instant the Mahomedan princes were all alienated. For the first time the Mahomedan princes felt that they had an identity of interest with the Hindoo Rajahs. From that moment they threw aside the sullen pride of former conquerors who would not condescend to sympathize with the victims of Sattara.

With regards to the sentiment of Awadh-raised soldiers in the British Sepoy army, Disraeli portrayed their forceful dislocation from a traditional social position of privilege and standing. Unlike in the past where joining the British Army gave the sepoy tenure and income security to

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maintain a small proprietorship which was as “...dear to him as the tenure of a Kentish yeoman,”

Disraeli argued that now the

Sepoy returns now to his village, and finds it belong to the Company, and that the rigid revenue system of India is applied to his small property...The Oude Sepoy finds himself subjected to a hard and novel system of taxation and revenue. He finds he has lost political privileges and his territorial position.¹³⁰

Lastly, Disraeli challenged the Indian government’s interference with Hindu religious customs on inheritance and widow remarriage. In particular, he condemned two Legislative Council Acts which stated that no one should be deprived of an inheritance for changing religions, and which legalized remarriage for Hindu widowers. These laws, argued Disraeli, attacked Hindu society which bonded religion and property together in a sacred trust. More dangerously, it insinuated in Indian minds that the Government was intentionally trying to remodel society.¹³¹ Just as Disraeli and Young England defended Irish nationality from the imposition of foreign English institutions, so India’s nationalities needed to be protected from a British liberal transformative ideology bent on overthrowing the ancient political, property, and religious customs of the Subcontinent.

For Disraeli, the long term solution to India’s grievances was to bring England and India closer together under a shared monarch. In Tancred, with the words of Farredenn to Tancred on the latter’s hope for a spiritual reconciliation between East and West, we see a gleam of

Disraeli’s imperial vision in India: “Let the Queen of the English collect a great fleet, let her stow away all her treasure, bullion, gold plate, and precious arms; be accompanied by all her court and chief people, and transfer the seat of her empire from London to Delhi.” In stating that “…you can only act upon the opinion of Eastern nations through their imagination,” Disraeli, in 1857, argued that the government should immediately send a royal commission to investigate the causes of the revolt, and issue a royal proclamation stating that the “…Queen of England is not a Sovereign who will countenance the violation of treaties…disturb the settlement of property…[and will] respect their laws, their usages, their customs, and, above all, their religion.” This argument informed the new 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation which constituted British Crown rule, and a new conservative imperial framework promoting non-interference and conciliation in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Disraeli’s 1857 speech to the House of Commons elicited substantial and partisan press reaction across Britain. Critical of the timing and sincerity of Disraeli’s speech, The Times contended that his arguments were not supported by evidence and resembled more of an artist’s touch. They further argued that not only were his contentions on the annexation of Awadh not supported by facts, but actually the various reforms introduced by the Indian Government were beneficial for the native people. The Morning Post contended that there was no evidence of a “national revolt,” and that Disraeli’s “great swelling theories” and “inflated commonplaces” were only a rallying cry to unite a divided Conservative

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132 Disraeli, Tancred, 181.
Party. More biting, *The Standard* argued that in attempting to gain from this public calamity, “The House saw clearly that the ex-CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER was half so anxious for the sepoy or the native as he was moved by the recollections of office.” Somewhat removed from London partisanship, the *Leeds Mercury* argued that although there might be arguments for Indian misgovernment, there was no evidence that the population was dissatisfied, especially as annexations had been going on for over a century.

The *Morning Chronicle* thought that Disraeli delivered a good and non-partisan speech which condemned Dalhousie’s annexation and reformist policies. In supporting his idea for a royal proclamation and royal commission to understand India’s grievances, they acknowledged that annexation had produced the current uprisings:

“these vast acquisitions had been made at a great risk-that the patient astonishment of the Hindoo was mistaken for submission to the new order of things-and that a discontent was produced which smoldered under the surface, and which has at last broken in insurrection”

In a subsequent article, they supported Disraeli’s contention that this was a national insurrection rather than a troop mutiny. They linked the latest news of massacres with a sympathetic perspective on native feelings: “the intensity of this passion for revenge shows how long and

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deeply the natives must have pondered on their wrongs." The *Lincolnshire Chronicle* concurred with Disraeli’s arguments that the destruction of native authority, through annexations by the Company, was a prime cause of the revolt. In highlighting the conspiracy to dethrone the King of Awadh as an example of the Company’s history of tyranny, injustice, and misgovernment over India, they bluntly maintained that

> The policy of continual annexations must bring with it a retribution in course of time…When we accuse the United States of filibustering, and a desire to extend their territory by arms, how can we, with any appearance of consistency, continue to depose the native sovereigns of the East, to give the inhabitants of the their kingdoms the doubtful advantage of a Government by the East India Company and a system of exorbitant taxation, enforced by torture, to provide enormous salaries for the servants of the company, and to keep up an army for the purpose of continuing our oppressions?140

**Conclusion**

This chapter demonstrates that Disraeli contributed to a Tory historical narrative and political philosophy in the literary voice of Young England and as a Conservative politician and in such a way as to interpret and respond to British imperialism in India. Like with England and Ireland, it is argued that Disraeli applied political and social principles tied to noblesse oblige, expansive social privilege, and religious reverence to define a conservative opposition and alternative to protect local institutions in India from liberalism’s destructive modern application of reasoned progress. As a Whig ascendency in England and Ireland overthrew a free monarchy, independent Church, and moral aristocracy to the

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determent of social unity and sympathy, so a British Whig supported the Indian government’s dethronement of princes, state interference with Hindu tradition, and stripping agreed allowance and property rights. Disraeli’s use of Young England to expound British capability for instigating a “national revolt” reflected a consistency and expansion of an argument concerning conservatism’s inclination to use imagination to establish and expound national principals. Moreover, Disraeli employed an imagined understanding of India to legitimate Indian grievance and elicit British sympathy for the toppled prince or disenfranchised sepoy. It is argued that this represented his skepticism of western civilization’s claimed superiority over the Indian people. Moreover, this defined his separation from popular opinion which saw the Indian people’s revolt against British governance as an example of their latent racial inferiority. As noted with Ireland, this represented a view that British imperial rule should recognize and accommodate the racial and social differences which were a natural product of history and tradition. Months later in government, Disraeli and fellow Conservatives again used imagination to construct a conservative imperial framework which incorporated national interests as integral components to Indian Empire.
Chapter 3: 1858 Government of India Act and the Queen’s Proclamation

Introduction
The 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation produced by Derby’s Conservative government represented a Tory refashioning of Britain’s Indian Empire following the Indian Revolt. In replacing the East India Company with Crown rule, they constituted an imperial framework which acknowledged India’s internal differences and separation from Britain by stating its determination to protect and engage its national institutions and customs. This chapter explores how Disraeli’s and Ellenborough’s legislative engagement and disagreement on the Act represented disparate attempts to refashion Indian empire upon tory principles. Next, it is shown that their sentiments defined Lord Stanley’s authored Queen’s Proclamation in December 1858. It is argued that the Proclamation was a distinctly conservative document. It constituted British Indian Empire and a wider imperial identity on a vertical relationship between the Crown and a socially hierarchical and culturally divided population of India. It challenged liberal civilizing ambitions by establishing a collaborative imperial framework based upon Britain’s reciprocal loyalty and obligation with disparate princely, propertied, and ethnic and cultural groups in India.

Government of India Act (1858)

The conservative Government of India Act (1858) was the product of substantial partisan amendment and debate concerning the re-establishment of the British Indian Empire following
the Revolt.\textsuperscript{141} It represented a Conservative opportunity to reintroduce and succeed upon the Whig’s failed bill earlier that year which was opposed by Radicals and Conservative. Their opposition reflected the bill’s proposal to consolidate Indian authority in a Secretary of State and a small executive council. With the Whig government’s collapse due to Common’s non-confidence, Disraeli, now Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader in the House of Commons, introduced the Conservative attempt to refashion Indian empire through a conciliation of tory and radical principles. It inscribed Crown rule over India with a Secretary of State for India and an executive Indian Council that would be responsible for appointing and supervising a Governor General and a newly named Indian Civil Service. In contrast to the earlier bill, Disraeli’s defined an expanded and representative Council which attempted to conciliate British and “Indian” opinion.

In the bill’s first reading in March 1858, Disraeli introduced the Government’s plans for a new eighteen member Indian Council composed of nine crown appointments and nine elected officials. Beyond an attempt to appeal to the democratic instincts of Radical MPs, this scheme was consistent with Disraeli’s views on “Tory democracy” and national engagement with empire. With regards to the appointments, it proposed that one member would be an official with at least five years of experience with native princes, while eight would be officials from government and military service in the local Presidencies.\textsuperscript{142} The council’s elective element was

\textsuperscript{141} For a summary of the 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation see Metcalf & Metcalf, A Concise History of India, 102-104.
\textsuperscript{142} Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser., vol. 149, 26 Mar. 1858, cols. 822-823.
the bill’s most criticized element in parliament and the press. Questioned for its constitutionality and practicality, the proposal called for the election of nine councilors to six year terms. These would include four elected from a constituency of men with Indian experience and Indian residence of at least fifteen years, and five from Britain’s principal seats of industry: London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow, and Belfast. Following substantial amendment representing Conservative and Radical opposition to this scheme, the final Act would construct a titled Council of India with fifteen lifetime members who had at least ten years of experience in India.

Ellenborough was thoroughly engaged in the composition of the 1858 Act, including opposition to Disraeli’s council experiment. As argued in the previous chapter, Ellenborough was a career advocate for Crown rule and local representation in Indian governance. He maintained that the Crown’s status and authority would promote financial economy over a duplicative double government, and secure the trust and affection of India’s princes and people towards British paramountcy. In July 1858 to the House of Lords, he proposed that the overriding objective of the new Indian government bill was to secure its acceptance of the country’s population. Therefore, he could see no better way than through the Queen’s personal protection of the people’s religion and property rights. With regard to the new Indian council, Ellenborough was influential in proposing a responsible advisory institution which represented the official experiences of the local Indian presidencies. He argued that the need of

143 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 149, 26 Mar. 1858, cols. 825-827.
representation from across the Subcontinent reflected the differences between the Presidencies, which he compared to differing European states. Regarding the proposed council’s electoral component, he argued that it was a dangerous proposition which, if enacted, could seriously undermine the quality of governance in India. This reflected his consistent opposition to metropolitan interference with India’s government, and a latent class favoritism towards men of property in the political and administrative positions of Indian governance. Before Disraeli’s introduction of the Bill, he argued to Stanley that an elected council member would alert Indians to the danger of further state interference with religion.\(^{145}\) To Derby, he communicated that any election for the Indian Council could lead to partisan expressions on issues relating to education and proselytism which would cause serious unrest in India.\(^{146}\)

Ellenborough’s second point of contention with the Council’s representative element, especially from the chief urban and industrial towns, was the introduction of the non-gentry into positions of political and administrative patronage. To Derby, he contended that the lack of a “reliable landlord body” in these towns would leave considerable patronage to the “sons of tailors and other shopkeepers” who would prove to be “…men…very inferior to the English gentlemen who have…led our armies.” This sentiment also informed an opposition to competitive examinations for the new Indian Civil Service. Again to Derby, he considered competitive examinations a democratic measure which, if enacted, “…must lower the character

\(^{145}\) Ellenborough to Stanley, 07 Mar. 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fol. 655, EP, NA.
\(^{146}\) Ellenborough to Derby, 08 Apr. 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fol. 2241, EP, NA.
of the Public Service—in which high feelings of honor are of far more value than high educational attainment…”¹⁴⁷ In the Lords, Ellenborough lamented that competitive examinations might lead to the sons of grocers and tailors taking spots away from the sons of gentry who could not afford the costs of education. He considered the proposal an “unasked for act of homage to democracy,” which would question British moral superiority in India, and challenge the principle that “the higher a man’s position in life the greater his consideration of the people under him.”¹⁴⁸ This sentiment reflected similar concerns that Britain had subdued India’s native gentry and curtailed their political participation as intermediaries. He saw the British gentry as expressly qualified, from their paternal positions of local authority, to govern in the national interests of the local people. Although disagreeing on the Indian council’s composition, Disraeli and Ellenborough shared a basic conviction that Britain had to govern India with an acknowledgement of, respect for, and engagement with its diverse local and prescriptive interests.

Stanley’s 1858 Queen’s Proclamation was an attempt to conciliate India’s political, propertied, and religious interests to the British Empire. It gave the Crown’s guarantee that its Indian government would refrain from state annexation, undermining property right, confiscating titles, and discriminating against or interfering with the people’s religious beliefs. Just like Disraeli and Ellenborough, Stanley argued for British culpability for the Indian Revolt. He also chastised Canning’s continued instigation of the conflict. The Proclamation represented his

¹⁴⁷ Ellenborough to Derby, 03 Mar. 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fols. 2079-2082, EP. NA.
acknowledgement that Britain had failed to respect and engage India’s propertied, religious, and political interests. Stanley joined Ellenborough’s condemnation of Canning’s Oudh Proclamation. In the Commons, he contended against the ‘arbitrary’ and ‘indiscriminate’ nature of the proclamation, and affirmed the local taluqdar’s proprietary land rights against the notion that confiscation was legal because all land in India belonged to the Government. As the first Secretary of State for India, he told Canning that the Government could not retract Ellenborough’s earlier condemnation as it seemed correct that compulsory land sales in Oudh did alienate the people. In December 1858, Disraeli praised Stanley’s comments to graduating cadets at the Royal Military College on avoiding prejudice and respecting local custom in India. In this speech, he emphasized past British error and harm for not recognizing the necessity of having a knowledge of and empathy for the local population:

Examine native habits, native ideas, native character; do it in a spirit of fairness, and you will gain at least this…that you will avoid that ignorant and unwise contempt for all this is Asiatic, which, political and personally, does Englishmen so much harm in the East.

To Canning on the details of the Queen’s Proclamation, Stanley recognized that past Indian discontent was largely instigated by Britain not respecting religious neutrality. In a speech in

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149 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 150, 17 May 1858, col. 750.
150 Stanley to Canning, 19 Nov. 1858, Mss Eur. Photo Eur. 477/22, BL, AAS.
152 Times, 11 Dec 1858, p. 8.
153 Stanley to Canning, 8 Sep. 1858, Mss Eur. Photo. Eur 477/8, BL, AAS.
early 1859 to the Commons, he repudiated territorial annexation “which…has undoubtedly in a great degree been the cause of the present disaster” as a component of future British policy.\textsuperscript{154}

The Queen’s Proclamation endeavored to rectify British errors on territorial annexation, property settlement, and religious interference. To India’s princes and landowners, the document assured that all the previous treaties made with the Company would be honored and that ancestral claims would be respected. Moreover, it pledged that the Government had no further ambition towards territorial expansion, and local status, rights, and customs would be incorporated within a collaborative system supporting peace and good governance in India:

We desire no extension of our present territorial processions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own, and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.\textsuperscript{155}

Towards the landowners, the Proclamation ensured that the Government would honestly consider the title and right of ancestral proprietorship:

We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors and we desire to protect them in all rights connected there with, subject to the equitable demands of the State; and we will that generally, in framing and administering the law due regard to be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India.\textsuperscript{156}

\textsuperscript{154} Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser., 14 Feb. 1859, cols. 358, 370.
\textsuperscript{155} The Times, 12 Jun. 1858, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
With regards to the State’s relationship with the people’s religion, it stated that the Government, despite its preference, would maintain a strict principle of non-interference:

Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity and acknowledged with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be in our royal will and pleasure that none to be in anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all should enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law, and we strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure.\textsuperscript{157}

Next, the Proclamation reiterated a commitment made in the 1833 Indian Act towards the state’s employment of the local people. It asserted that natives, whatever their race or creed, should “…be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge.”\textsuperscript{158} Lastly, it offered clemency and peace to the rebels defeated by superior British force in the field, excluding those who committed murder or knowingly harbored those who murdered British subjects. To all others “in arms against the government, we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty, and oblivion of all offenses against ourselves, our crown, and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits.”\textsuperscript{159}

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\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} Times, 12 Jun. 1858, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
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Section Conclusion

The 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation represented a British conservative intellectual and political reformation of Indian Empire which remained influential until later in the nineteenth century. These documents represented a concerted conservative effort to challenge and supplant the universal and centralizing principles of liberal imperialism in India. Primarily, they represented Ellenborough’s and Disraeli’s coherent Tory argument that British culpability for the Indian Revolt was due to liberalism’s intentional destruction of the country’s political, propertied, and religious institutions. In response, the Act and Proclamation prescribed the Crown’s rule and protection over these national institutions. It also established a framework by which these institutions could collaborate with empire through demonstrating a reciprocal loyalty and obligation to imperial authority. For Ellenborough, Crown rule eliminated the inefficiencies of double government, and provided historical and political continuity to the country’s ruling elite and mass population. To Disraeli and the Young England imagination, the Whigs promulgation of liberal reasoned progress informed the Indian government’s deliberate destruction of princely authority, property confiscation and disenfranchisement, and religious custom. In response, the Queen’s Proclamation established a strong monarchy to protect India’s distinctive nationalities, and promote the feudal principles of noble obligation, expansive social privileges, and religious reverence. Disraeli’s introduction of the Royal Titles Act in 1876, which assented to Queen Victoria’s request to become the Empress of India, was a further testament to
his imaginative inclination and action towards conciliating India’s unique historical and political traditions to the British Empire.

Lastly, the Queen’s Proclamation established an imperial framework and identity which informed future conservative engagement and collaboration in India. It constituted an alternative to predominant European standards in assessing political, social, and racial characteristics, by prioritizing a polity’s, groups’, and individual’s belonging to India’s particular local and historical environment. Later in the nineteenth century, this conception of belonging informed British conservative collaboration with accepted political and social elites that were believed to represent the natural leaders of India’s diverse society. For the latter, this framework allowed them to protect local autonomy and authority against imperialist and nationalist interference by espousing a vertical loyalty and obligation to the Crown.
Section 2: Forging Conservative Collaborations in the Indian Empire

Section Introduction

This section examines the intellectual and political foundations for conservative collaboration in India following the Indian Revolt and the Queen’s Proclamation. In demonstrating that the Indian Empire was a polity informed by local compromise and resistance, the next three chapters explore how imperial practice was shaped by the collaboration of British and Indian concepts and institutions. Chapters four and five examine how Viceroy of India, Richard Bourke, Earl of Mayo (1869-1872), styled Lord Naas (1842-1867) and then the fifth Earl of Mayo (1868-1872) (hereafter referred to as Mayo), and Robert Bulwer, Earl of Lytton (1876-1880), styled as 2nd Baron Lytton (1873-1880) and then Earl of Lytton (1880-1892) (hereafter referred to as Lytton), implemented a conservative program of engagement with Indian states, the propertied elite, and mass population.

Although Mayo and Lytton accepted of western intellectual and moral superiority over the East, they maintained a conservative and aristocratic skepticism concerning political liberalism’s reforming ambitions at home and in the Empire. As physical and ideological representatives of Britain’s aristocracy, they espoused a concept of paternal good governance institutionally centered on social hierarchy and individual leadership and defined by values of loyalty and obligation. Mayo’s Irish identity as a Protestant landowner and Lytton’s literary criticism of modern aristocratic decline contributed to a conservative imperial framework which
attempted to conciliate India’s traditional interests. It is argued that despite British and Anglo-Indian opposition, they sought to empower the Indian states’ collaborative engagement with the British paramount power. Moreover, they sought to use British power and a collaborative relationship with the states to politically influence and materially improve the condition of the mass population. Chapter six explores how the Kathiawar States in Western India responded to this engagement within the framework established by the Queen’s Proclamation. It is argued that their political participation and financial contribution towards imperial initiatives of public works, security, and education allowed them to strengthen their local autonomy and authority against British and Indian political centralization at the end of the nineteenth century.
Chapter 4: Mayo the Irish-Indian Viceroy

Introduction

As a Conservative MP (1847-1868) and Chief Secretary for Ireland (1852, 1858-59, 1866-68), Richard Bourke’s, Lord Mayo’s political experience mediating class and sectarian division in Ireland defined his tenure as India’s Viceroy from 1868 to 1872.¹ In both colonial peripheries, the self-identified Irish statesman anchored imperial good governance upon the state’s paternal recognition of the people’s particular institutions and customs. It is contended that Mayo’s privileged position as a minority Irish Protestant landowner defined for him a view that the state was the guarantor of social stability, and, therefore, was obligated to protect propertied interests and religious difference. In India, Mayo implemented a governing policy centered upon the aristocratic principles of decentralization and reciprocal obligation which was often at the expense of an entrenched liberal tradition and a British Anglo-Indian interest. As decentralization acknowledged India’s diverse circumstances by downloading political authority and financial resources to provincial governments, reciprocal obligation informed the Paramount Power’s and feudatory Indian states’ responsibility to govern in the best interests of the people. Specifically, it is argued that Mayo’s sentiments on land tenure and taxation, as well as initiatives to expand mass vernacular, Muslim, and princely education reflected a conservative

¹ The Chief Secretary for Ireland is a member of the British Cabinet responsible for governing Ireland in coordination with the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, located in Dublin.
imperial tradition predicated on engaging India’s internal national differences through collaborating with its aristocracy and materially improving its mass population.

**Irish Identity**

Mayo was descended from a Norman noble family which settled in Ireland in the twelfth century. This informed his lifelong affinity for Ireland and identity as a Protestant Irishman. During his thirty-five year political career, Mayo advocated for the country’s social improvement and internal unity while emphasizing its external difference from Great Britain.² As an Anglican landowner, first in the County Meath then at the family’s principal estate in Palmerstown near Dublin, he defended the rights of property against tenant interests. Despite this, he denounced sectarian extremism on both sides and advocated for a balanced approach on education and religion. In British politics, Mayo’s Irish identity and interest were politically compatible with a career friendship with Disraeli, Conservative Party membership, and as a cabinet minister in successive Conservative governments.

Mayo’s Irish identification and pride was expressed from his entry to the British House of Commons to his last career appointment as Viceroy of India. In 1849, Mayo, MP for Kildare (1847-1852), supported the Whig government’s continued suspension of Habeas Corpus, stating that “as an Irishman” he gladly supported “any measure which would insure, over for a short

² Hunter, *Comprehensive History of Indian Empire: The Earl of Mayo*, 8.
time, a continuance of peace.” Following his investment of the Knight Grand Commander of the
Order of the Star of India on the Prince of Wales, Mayo told Disraeli that “you would like to
have seen the English Prince decorated...by an Irish Viceroy.” As Viceroy of India, Mayo
remarked to Derby that posterity would have to admit “that the poor paddy that the Times told
everyone was not fit to be trusted with the care of a W. India island was without firing a shot or
moving a solider made British influence paramount in regions which have been for years the
hard nut of Anglo-Indian politicians.” To the Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India (1868-
1874), Mayo voiced a desire for peace in Ireland, while also explaining its uniqueness from the
rest of the United Kingdom. Ascribing blame for recent violence on both the Protestant
Orangemen and Catholic Fenians, he argued that its cause was the imposition of foreign concepts
and modes of government to Ireland. He expressed that he had “long thought that though the
British constitution is the finest thing in the world for Englishmen & Scottishmen, it is a failure
as a means of govt in Ireland.” For Mayo, Ireland required a strong British state which protected
landlord privilege and obligation while acknowledging the country’s history and religious
divisions.

Disraeli and the Conservative Party

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4 Mayo to Disraeli, 11 Jan. 1870, B/XX/90/2, fol. 107, HP, OBL.
5 Mayo to Derby, 30 Jan. 1870, MS 7490/152, fol. 122, Mayo Papers (hereafter MP), Cambridge University Library
(hereafter CUL).
6 Mayo to Argyll, 29 Jul. 1869, MS 7490/150, fol. 145, MP, CUL.
Mayo’s propensity to emphasize his Irish identity and Ireland’s difference from Britain was compatible with a Conservative Party increasingly under Disraeli’s leadership. Mayo and Disraeli’s shared perspective on Ireland informed a personal and career friendship. It is evident that Mayo viewed Disraeli as a key patron. On leaving England for India, Mayo stated to Disraeli that “For 20 years I have followed your fortunes-you have made me what I am-you can do nothing more for me-except to keep me in remembrance.”

This friendship was informed by similar inclinations and political positions on Ireland. This included a belief in Ireland’s distinctiveness within the United Kingdom, support for economic protection, and agreement about Whiggism’s detrimental effect on the country. This shared position on Ireland informed Mayo and Disraeli’s early correspondence. In an 1850 letter regarding local sentiment on Irish land reform, Mayo held that a recent Whig proposal was responsible for tenant rent agitation, and somewhat agreed with fellow Irish Tories that confiscation could soon take place.

In 1851, he expressed a concern that the Whig’s Parliamentary Election (Ireland) Act (1850) endangered his own parliamentary seat in Kildare, as it expanded the franchise of Roman Catholics. In 1860, Mayo reminisced with Disraeli on their past achievements and political failures to convince parliament on the necessity of reform amidst growing Fenian insurrection and agrarian

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7 Mayo to Disraeli, 10 Nov. 1868, B/XX/90/2, fol. 83, HP, OBL.
8 Mayo to Disraeli, 12 Nov. 1850, B/XX/90/2, fol. 1, HP, OBL.
crime. He argued that the public was aware of their beneficial policy but “no one will give us credit for the way we dealt with that country.” Moreover, in believing that their initiatives could have benefited all sections of the population, he submitted that

I think before long when you have a rampant orange voluntary church, the Presbyterians, Red republicans, & the Priest educated in Fenian Diocesan Seminaries, people will wonder how wise men could, for party objects, or for the qualification of bigotry, denounce a policy which would have secured to Ireland quiet and peace for ever.\(^{10}\)

In terms of state economic protection for Irish agriculture, Mayo attacked a Whig mantra of free trade for destroying the rural economy. In July 1851 to the House of Commons, he contended that the open import of flour from France and America was devastating Ireland’s once prosperous milling industry. He stated that unlike past statesman “from the beginning of the century” who cared deeply about developing agriculture, the Whig Party perpetuated “new theories” which were hostile to the farmer. In arguing that “it has of late been quite the fashion with a certain party in this country to undervalue and run down our own workmen,” Mayo laid out the Whig prejudice against farmers:

The farmer, I well remember, has constantly been described as most deficient in intelligence, ignorant of his profession, uneducated and stupid, little better than the clod of the soil, and utterly unequal to the management of a farm, that perhaps he and his fathers had lives on in honour and comfort for thirty generations; he was opposed to all progress, a thing of a past age-brutal, boorish, and superstitious, strongly suspected of an inordinate love of beer, and a belief in witchcraft.\(^{11}\)

\(^{10}\) Mayo to Disraeli, 05 Feb. 1869, MS 7490/149, fol. 152, MP, CUL.

\(^{11}\) Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser., vol. 118, 15 Jul. 1851, cols 796-807. This is a reference to the nearly unbroken period of Tory Party governance from 1783-1830. In 1815, the Lord Liverpool’s Tory government re-introduced import protection on cereal for British farmers. This protection was removed by Peel’s
Underpinning his association with Disraeli and the Conservative Party was an aristocratic inclination towards validating governing principles centered upon social hierarchy and paternal obligation.

**Confronting British Prejudice of Autocratic Russia**

Through personal experiences in Russia and Ireland, he approached India with the belief that the state as well as property owners were paternally obligated to the larger community. In a published account of travels through autocratic Russia titled *St. Petersburg and Moscow* (1845), a young Mayo considered questions relating to state authority and aristocratic obligation. In displaying his fondness for practical over philosophical reasoning, he stated that he was “not going to give to the world an abstruse political dissertation on Russian Government…but a mere account of my own doings, and to tell plainly the little I saw and heard.” While doing so, Mayo challenged negative Western European perceptions of Russia by expressing personal observations and judgements regarding its social hierarchy and education.  

He confronted the period’s most popular Russian travel narrative, Marquis de Custine’s *Empire of the Czar* (1839). In remonstrating against its blatant bias towards the country, he argued that “Any person reading this book must be impressed with the unaccountable bitterness that pervaded the government, supported by Whigs, in 1846. See Norman McCord, *British History 1815-1906* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 25. On agricultural protection and the Tory Party see Gambles, *Protection and Politics*  


whole work, which discolors every fact mentioned, every impression recorded, and the more sincere hater of Russia, her system of government, and her people…” In response, he sought to explain and contradict the stereotypes concerning the Russian State’s autocratic nature. One tactic was comparing Russian institutions and social norms with their equivalent in Britain. For example, Mayo moderated western misconceptions on the social impact of state press censorship. This included his approval of its protection against the personal slander of private and public officials. Although favorable to the rights of the press, which were “the bulwark of British liberty,” he proposed that “at the same time, I should like to see editors milder in their attacks, and less partial in their praise.” He also criticized popular British attitudes towards their monarchy as compared to Russia and other countries in Europe. In stating that “The people, in all foreign countries, I think behave much better towards their princes…,” he lamented that “the great desire of the people of England to see their sovereign arises…[is] I fear more from a mere feeling of curiosity than of respect or regard.”

Beyond reacting to British bias, Mayo evaluated and critiqued Russia’s deep social divisions. He argued that Russian propensity to behave subordinately towards their social betters represented the deep divide between the aristocracy and serf population. He submitted that Russian society’s major social flaw, exacerbated by the lack of a middle class, who brought the

14 Bourke, St. Petersburg and Moscow, 69.
15 Bourke, 110-111.
16 Bourke, 143.
“cramping irons of the constitutional edifice” to England, was the social and emotional distance between serf and aristocrat:

The Serf in his sweepkin may walk in the palace of his lord, or may watch by his master’s gate, but no feeling in his breast tells him that he is born of the same race, or formed for the same purposes; and the great lord, knowing his superiority of birth, education, and descent, looks forth on his horde of slaves, with all benignity, and kind attention; but it is the affection of a good herd, for a noble and faithful beast…never the least participation in a single right of fellowship or friendship.\(^\text{17}\)

Although lamenting that serfdom perpetrated an inferior class “sunk in deep ignorance, rudeness and slavery,” he argued that it would take “some years” for serfs to be educated and allowed civil rights. Lastly, Mayo challenged Britons to reconsider their constitutional prejudices against Russia’s autocratic rule and ruler. He admired Czar Nicholas’s (1796-1855) “immense burden and singular responsibility” in governing over a large and diverse empire. Mayo’s foremost praise centered upon Russia’s state system of national education. Stating that the Czar was the “head schoolmaster of his realm,” he claimed that this system would create a Russian patriotic feeling among all classes and within the “children of many nations, religions, and tongues.”\(^\text{18}\)

Mayo’s perception of the Russian Empire’s positive mediation of social division and the condition of the masses, through maintaining peace and promoting national education, influenced his perspective on Ireland and India.

**Defending Landed Interests in Ireland**

\(^{17}\) Bourke, 154.  
\(^{18}\) Bourke, 247, 225.
Mayo maintained that the imperial parliament needed to respect the Irish landowning class’ particular rights and obligations, and treat Ireland on a national basis in regards to education and religious reverence. As a Conservative MP and Chief Secretary for Ireland, he was an outspoken opponent of London’s attempts to radically re-balance landlord and tenant rights in Ireland. His opposition to Irish land reform bills was prefaced by an ideological validation of the landlord’s paternal obligation to the community. Moreover, this informed a suspicion of commercial middle class interests in rural Ireland.

In successive parliamentary debates on Irish land reform, Mayo accused the Whig government of serving the exploitative interests of an agitating commercial class. In 1850, Mayo challenged new legislation that created a small class of fee paying peasant proprietors as “perfectly utopian” and contrary to the interests of the mass population. He contended that this would radically change the nature of rural society by removing the landlord’s protection of the peasant and tenant “in times of distress and difficulty.” He compared this scheme to the French Revolutionary Government’s 1789 edict which confiscated the Catholic Church’s landed estates for the creation of fee paying proprietors. Invoking Edmund Burke’s contemporary contention that this edict would lead to peasant wealth extortion, Mayo argued that the current bill would hand over encumbered estates to “men who had no connexion with the country, but were merely land jobbers.”19 Also in 1850, Mayo opposed the Whig’s Landlord and Tenant Bill which

proposed to implement juried deliberation on compulsory tenant compensation for land improvement. He proposed that this scheme should be rejected as it represented the radical aims of the newly formed Tenant League. He argued that this organization, which promoted fixity of tenure for tenants and compensation for land improvement, was motivated by a narrow class interest which wished to reduce the landowner to a mere rent collector. He warned that they ignored the interests of the laborers “…upon whose strong arms, the prosperity of both landlord and tenant depended…”

In 1866, Mayo denied that the rural population was leading agitation against the Government. He submitted that the arrest statistics showed that the Fenian conspirators were “ninety-nine out of every 100 persons” from the trade and commercial sectors. As Chief Secretary for Ireland in 1867, Mayo remonstrated, while seeking an extension of the Suspension of Habeas Corpus Act, that it was primarily the shop keeping class and tradesmen who were sympathetic and involved in Fenian insurrectionary movements. To Argyll in 1870, Mayo argued that the latest Irish bill would “lead to land jobbery and subdivision in some districts-and

22 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 185, 21 Feb. 1867, col. 733. Organizationally established with the creation of the Irish Republican Brotherhood in 1858, Fenianism sought a democratic Irish Republic. This group was influenced ideologically from republicanism in the United States and the 1848 revolutions in France and Italy, as well as internal class frustrations among the lower middle class concerning social mobility in Ireland. Hachey and McCaffrey, The Irish Experience Since 1800, 76.

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may increase the attorney and shopkeeping class of landlords who are the greatest tyrants in the country.”

This aristocratic prejudice against the incorporation and activity of an alien commercial class in rural Ireland informed a comparable admonishment to an Anglo-Indian official and Indian middle class in India. In both Ireland and India, Mayo personified an aristocratic governing mentality which imbued the state’s and property’s paternal obligation for the larger community.

**Irish Chief Secretary**

As Chief Secretary for Ireland, Mayo pursued a policy on land and education which attempted to reconcile growing class and religious division. On land, Mayo, while open to tenant compensation for land improvement, favored fixity of tenure for large landowners. He vehemently opposed John Bright’s proposal for state loans towards tenant property purchase, and John Stuart Mill’s more ambitious plan for the state’s valuing, purchasing, and re-distribution of land for the purpose of re-letting. Mayo responded that land tenure was protected under the current system of large landlords, and that France and Eastern Europe were examples of the failure of small proprietorships. In 1867, he proposed a scheme that, he argued, balanced tenant and landlord rights. This allowed both parties to seek state permission and funds for land

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23 Mayo to Argyll, 22 Aug. 1870, MS 7940/154, MP, CUL. Mayo is referring to the Liberal government’s 1870 Land Act. This legislation not only forced landlords to compensate evictees for improvements and inconveniences they had suffered, but also created an opportunity for tenants of Church property to own their land with help of government grants. See Hachey and McCaffrey, *The Irish Experience Since 1800*, 80.

24 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 190, 10 Mar., 1868, col. 1356.
improvement. The state would also have the power of enforcing repayment. Unlike previous Liberal proposals which used courts and juries to compel landlords to accept and compensate tenants, this plan secured landlord interests by giving oversight and authority to a sympathetic Imperial State.

Beyond being the guardian of landlord and tenant relations, Mayo saw the Imperial State as a paternal force which maintained social unity amidst sectarian division in Ireland. Unlike the Conservative Party’s growing religious intolerance towards Roman Catholics, Mayo, with Disraeli, sought to use the state to mediate the country’s divergent religious interests. To Disraeli in 1859, Mayo expressed a willingness to recruit Catholics into Indian and colonial official positions. Moreover, the Conservative statesmen tried to counter growing calls for Irish Church disestablishment from William Gladstone and the Liberal Party. Although Mayo was unwilling to diminish the dominant rights and privileges of the Established Protestant Irish Church, he advocated for the state’s continued engagement with all major churches in Ireland to maintain social peace in a religiously zealous country. To the idea of introducing a voluntary system of religious financial support (which would disproportionally hurt the Irish Church), he responded that removing state endowments and grants to the Irish Protestant (Anglican), Presbyterian, and

26 Mayo to Disraeli, 17 May 1859, B/xx/90/2, fol. 28, HP, OBL.
27 The disestablishment of the Protestant Irish Church was achieved by Gladstone’s Liberal government in 1869 with the Irish Church Act (1869). Opposed by the Conservatives, this Act placed the Protestant Church as equal under the law and removed state aid. See Comerford, “Conspiring brotherhoods and contending elites, 1857-63”, in A New History of Ireland, edited by W.E. Vaughan, 443.
Roman Catholic churches would “do nothing but increase religious rancour and strife, and make doctrinal differences a greater subject of controversy than they have been hitherto.”

With regards to religion and education, Mayo believed that the state had an obligation to respect the population’s diverse religious convictions. In 1853, he resisted pressure from political colleagues to enhance educational privileges for the minority Anglican community in Ireland. He argued that the success of the country’s national system of education to hold “the sympathies and affections of so great a portion of the people of Ireland” was its secular foundation. In objecting to the suggestion that Protestant clergy could be used to teach Catholics, he “disclaimed all desire to convert a system of education supported by the public funds into a system of proselytism.”

By July 1859, Mayo became convinced, from increasing popular discontentment against state instruction, that a secular system was unsuited for Ireland, and a truly national system of education should be implemented. In government again from 1866-1868, he promoted additional educational opportunities for Roman Catholics. He proposed the establishment of a third Irish university catering to Roman Catholics to balance the Protestant institutions of Trinity College and Dublin College. In attempting to invoke sympathy for Catholics who were excluded

28 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 191, 03 Apr. 1868, cols. 869-871. As of 1861, Ireland religious population was 72% Roman Catholic, 12% Church of Ireland, and 9% Presbyterian. See Comerford, “Ireland 1850-70: Post Famine and Mid-Victorian,” in A New History of Ireland, edited by W.E. Vaughan, 286.

29 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 126, 26 Apr. 1853, cols. 603-604. The national system of education in Ireland was established with the creation of the Board of National Education in 1831. This regulatory body set the curriculum, provided the majority of funding, instructed teachers, and manage the operations of over 4,000 schools with 400,000 pupils by 1845. Although envisioned as a mechanism for providing secular education, it became largely denominational and therefore popular with the majority catholic population. See Oliver Macdonage, “The economy and society, 1830-45” in A New History of Ireland, edited by W.E. Vaughan, 233.
from higher education by the largely Protestant House of Commons, he asked MPs to consider whether they would object to sending “their sons to Universities where the Roman Catholic religion alone was taught.” Increasing Irish class and sectarian division informed Mayo’s inclination and policy as Viceroy of India. From being the lead Cabinet Minister responsible for Britain’s closest imperial possession to the Queen’s Viceroy of its most populated colony, Mayo maintained that the state held a paternal obligation to facilitate social harmony by respecting and mediating the particular circumstances and needs of the populace.

**Irish-Indian Viceroy**

On his arrival in India in fall 1868, Mayo confided to William Vesey-Fitzgerald, fellow Irishman and Governor of the Bombay Presidency (1867-1872), that he understood and could apply in India the principles on which all good governance was based. In India, Mayo tempered a general advocacy for the global spread of British civilization with a conservative policy that supported localism and prescriptive institutions. This centered upon an aristocratic social bias towards decentralization and paternal obligation. Beyond downloading administrative and monetary authority to local governments including Indian member municipal councils, Mayo proposed initiatives that made the Paramount Power an authority which respected and strengthened India’s indigenous institutions and customs. His support for mass vernacular and Muslim higher education at the expense of English instruction, and promotion of collegial

30 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 190, 10 Mar. 1868, cols. 1382-1384.
31 Mayo to Fergusson, 19 Oct. 1868, MS 7490/147, fol. 30, MP, CUL.
institutions for India’s landed class reflected a wider political and ideological reorientation of imperial policy towards conciliating India’s “traditional” constituencies to British rule.

Similar to other Victorian statesman in India and throughout the British Empire, Mayo subscribed to a western liberal ideology which championed political, social, and material progress. According to Owen Tudor Burne, Mayo’s Private Secretary, Mayo was a “progressive and liberal man” who promoted education and good governance as the means to obtain India’s popular affection to Britain.32 In the Convocation Speech to the graduates of the University of Calcutta, Mayo promoted the spread of western civilization in terms which transcended racial difference. He challenged young Indians to compare their learned knowledge of history, literature, and technological innovation to that of another country. In stating that the British Empire was educating the “pioneers of civilization and progress in every corner of the world,” he proposed that the practical purpose of this education was to “bring closer together subjects of our queen, be they dark or fair—whether they reside in the east or the west…”33 As a political conservative, however, Mayo facilitated progress through the improvement of indigenous state institutions and social practices. In attempt to broaden instruction to all Indian subjects beyond the Hindu middle class, he promoted state funded mass vernacular education and encourage the development of Muslim and princely education. These initiatives defined a larger conservative challenge to the entrenched legacy of liberal civilizing reform in India.

32 Sir Owen Tudor Burne, Memories (London: Edward Arnold, 1907), 86.
33 Mayo, 04 Apr. 1869, MS 7490/71/1, MP, CUL.
Decentralization

Mayo’s overarching political objective was the decentralization of imperial governance to respond to India’s specific local circumstances and needs. Besides the financial motivations of reducing central government expenditure and fiscal deficit, Mayo’s proposal for giving provincial governments’ greater authority and resources represented a principled agenda to instruct and empower paternal obligation as the central component of good governance. To tackle the Indian government’s 1,000,000£ deficit, Mayo proposed cost savings and retrenchment through comprehensive program that expanded powers for provincial and local governments. In his proposal, the central government would give a lump sum payment to provincial and municipal authorities to fund, at their discretion, jails, registration police, education, roads, civil buildings, and medical services. A memo summarizing the proposal’s objectives and rationale stated that localizing permission and funding enhanced the local government’s ability to ensure community prosperity.34 This decentralization policy included expanded opportunities for Indian representation and government administration. To William Muir, Lieutenant-Governor of the North Western Provinces (1868-1874), Mayo stated that the plan to implement a local cess (tax) in the North Western Provinces was the first step in a larger policy towards improving administration and gradually developing municipal government across India. He argued that this would remedy a disgraceful inaction from the British Indian

34 Financial Department, Government of India to Government of Bengal, 17 Mar. 1870, MS 7490/25/6, MP, CUL. For more detail of his decentralization scheme see Hunter, The Earl of Mayo, 14.
government towards developing self-governing institutions: “we have been governing in India for one hundred years and that if we were to depart tomorrow it should leave no traces of any serious attempt have been made to entrust the native of this country in the administration of affairs.”

On native employment, Mayo gave a conditional acceptance to Indians filling all administrative positions in particular departments. He expressed to Lord Napier, Governor of the Madras Presidency (1866-1872), the willingness to appoint Indians to the legal and judicial departments, but not as officers in the police as they were not fit. In responding to Lord Argyll, the Liberal Secretary of State for India, sentiments supporting native employment opportunity, Mayo contended that this objective “cannot sacrifice energy & honest administration” as this would lead to suffering among the poorer parts of the population. In stating that it would be a long time before there would be available applicants for the higher branches of government, he insisted that to hire “corrupt or stupid natives” in the meantime would cause much popular resentment and make it harder to fulfill this object in the future. Mayo’s recourse to Victorian racial and cultural stereotypes of educated Indians was conditioned by an aristocratic prejudice which was skeptical of the middle classes’ suitability in administering a rural environment like Ireland and India.

Privileging the Land and Landed Interests

35 Mayo to Muir, 17 Jun. 1870, MS 7490/153, fol. 351, MP, CUL.
36 Mayo to Napier, 18 Apr. 1869, MS 7490/149, fol. 93, MP, CUL.
37 Mayo to Argyll, 19 Apr. 1869, MS 7490/149, fol. 99, MP, CUL.
As had been the case with Ireland, Mayo was specially attached to issues regarding the state’s relationship with land and property in India. He argued that as the Paramount Power had propriety right over all land in India, it must adhere to ancient customs which endowed cultivators with security of tenure and management in exchange for their good governance. Early in office, Mayo promoted the creation of a central department of agriculture with branches in the Presidencies, as the subject was one upon which all interests depended. In a note discussing measures for land rent assessment, Mayo principally distinguished land revenue from local taxation. He argued that as the latter represented a cess (tax) for specific local needs, the former was rent to which the government was entitled as the chief proprietor and administer of all land. In advocating for a rent assessment tied to a price scale value of produce (a scheme which he proposed for Ireland), he contended that the Government was entitled to a profit share as compensation for the growing demand of imperial administration. He voiced his opinion on the Government’s rights and relationship with tenant farmers while deliberating on the controversial and divisive Punjab Tenancy Bill. He argued that India’s land customs and property rights were based on the proprietor’s strength or cunning to maintain land possession and negotiate a fair rent or tax from the state.

38 Mayo to Napier, 18 Apr. 1869, MS 7490/149, fol. 93, MP, CUL.
39 Mayo, 07 Feb., 1871, MS 7490/26/20, MP, CUL. In regards to his proposed valuation reform in Ireland see Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 121, 27 May 1852, col. 1205.
Although believing that it would be impossible to apply European rules to the Punjab, he was, nonetheless, influenced by Ireland when determining landlord and tenant rights across India. To Argyll, he advocated for a system which gave “as much security of tenure as is possible constituent with propriety right & retaining to the landlord the power of obtaining from time to time such as enhancement of rent as fairly proportionate to the general increase of agricultural price.”\(^\text{40}\) In regards to extending Bengal’s Permanent Settlement to the North Western Province, Mayo suggested that the deciding principle of the fair fixity of land tenure was not dissimilar between Europe and India.\(^\text{41}\) He contended that imperial policy should strive to offer “the greatest amount of permanency in occupancy that can be obtained, which is consistent with securing a fair division of profit as between the parties who possess a direct interest in the land.”\(^\text{42}\) Mayo’s belief in the state’s proprietary right to collect land revenue and support tenure security and management informed a broader policy of instructing good governance in India. For Mayo, the state and large land holders’ were jointly privileged and obligated to improve the condition of the masses.

\(^{40}\) Mayo to Argyll, 29 Jul. 1869, MS 7490/150, fol. 145, MP, CUL. This bill was a legacy of former Viceroy John Lawrence. It recognized the land tenure claims of the region’s smaller proprietors. On the details of the internal debate concerning the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868 see G.R.G. Hambly, “Richard Temple and the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868,” *English Historical Review*, vol. 79, 310 (Jan. 1964), pp. 47-66.

\(^{41}\) Established by Governor General Lord Cornwallis, the Bengal Permanent Settlement of 1793 guarantied Zamindars land ownership in exchange for a fixed rent payment to the East India Company. See Peers, *India under Colonial Rule*, 46.

\(^{42}\) Mayo, 24 May 1871, MS 7490/26, fol. 21, MP, CUL.
Challenging the Liberal Establishment

Mayo’s perspective and bias towards the land informed a criticism against Anglo-Indian and English educated Indian response to his retrenchment and education proposals. This represented a conservative inclination towards India’s national interests over alien race and class privilege. In regards to British official and business hostile reaction to retrenchment, he argued that this represented their avaricious mentality which sacrificed Indian good governance predicated upon obligation. He was not afraid to challenge British privilege for the sake of economy. Finding scope for spending reduction, he quipped to Argyll that he had never met a communication officer, secretary, doctor, or civil official “who did not complain about their accommodations which could probably be provided for half the cost.”

To Argyll, he proposed tax increases against European interests. Beyond an increased income tax, he argued that there should be an additional tax on landowners residing out of India and on earned interest off Indian debt.

To Argyll, Mayo attacked the blatant self-interest of Anglo-Indians following their public opposition to the income tax:

They are a class who do not care a farthing for the country. They come here to get as much money out of the Blacks as they can, and desire to go home as soon as possible. They object to pay a farthing towards the welfare & govt of a country which is to them a source of wealth, and their general tendency is to abuse & resist any govt who tries to do its duty. I have no sympathy with this class & they know it.

43 Mayo to Argyll, 14 Dec. 1870, MS 7490/155, fol. 303, MP, CUL.
44 Mayo to Argyll, 21 Feb. 1869, MS 7490/148, fol. 71, MP, CUL.
45 Mayo to Argyll, 09 Nov. 1870, MS 7490/155, fol. 31, MP, CUL.
To Napier, Mayo believed that personal abuse from Anglo-Indians and the well-to-do Indian community represented their greedy and selfish nature. He argued that as the former “…look on India as a milk cow for themselves…[and] do not pretend to have any other object than the rapid acquirement of as much money as will enable them to live at home in idleness,” the latter’s “only idea of taxation is to ravish the poor.”46 Amidst this opposition, Mayo counseled Argyll against appointing commercial men to the Indian Council, as they had no experience with a country where the majority of industry was tied to the land.47

**State funded Mass Education**

Mayo challenged vested interests and prejudices in an effort to expand state funded vernacular education for Hindus and Muslims. In Bengal, he argued that the state could legally force the land holders’ financial contribution to the expansion of vernacular mass education. He contended that as the Indian government had proprietary right over all land, it could impose specific taxation for public works to instill the benefits of civilization.48 Moreover, he dismissed objections regarding the legality of raising additional revenue beyond the Permanent Settlement. He submitted that mass social improvement justified the imposition of an education cess on landed proprietors.49 In regards to the value of mass

46 Mayo to Napier, 06 Aug. 1870, MS 7490/154, fol. 125, MP, CUL.
47 Mayo to Argyll, 22 Aug. 1870, MS 7490/154, MP, CUL.
48 Mayo, 07 Feb. 1871, MS. 7490/26, fol. 20, MP, CUL.
49 Mayo, Sep. 1869, MS 7490/9/15, MP, CUL.
vernacular education, Mayo challenged opposition based on social and racial prejudice. This included arguments that “native” prejudices hampered a system of popular instruction, and that its success would reduce the size of the manual labor force. He responded that the state held an obligation to promulgate education and knowledge across India. He stated that “we must act on the broad principle namely that it is our duty to extend by any legitimate means to all over whom we have influence the opportunity of acquiring the elements of knowledge.” Moreover, Mayo denied that the objective of mass education in India was “utopian.” Although admitting the difficulty and the length of time required, he stated the state should be committed to placing education on a national basis in India.

I never admit that plans of enlightenment and intellectual elevation for the masses in this or any country in the world are utopian, or that we have not at our disposal means and resources sufficient at all event to commend the performance of what, in this respect, I believe to be a national duty.50

Similar to his retrenchment and tax proposals, Mayo interpreted opposition to the reorientation of education funding from higher to vernacular instruction as motivated by sectional self-interest. Specifically, Mayo warned against India’s English-educated minority monopolized state funded instruction at the poor’s expense. A memo from the Home Department to Argyll argued that higher education needed to be more self-supporting, and that available

50 Mayo, Sep. 1869, MS 7490/9/15, MP, CUL. 135
resources should be directed towards improving opportunity for the masses who could not afford to help themselves. Quoting Lord Stanley’s 1859 contention, as Secretary of State for India, that “individuals and classes who require more than a simple elementary education may…be left to exert themselves with or without the assistance of Government,” they submitted that it was grossly unfair that the bulk of imperial revenue for education went to the higher classes. In a subsequent memo to London, they contended that lucrative employment alone motivated personal expense towards participation in English language instruction. In contrast, vernacular instruction required state aid as it led to no such opportunity. Mayo addressed local criticism to his proposal of reducing the grant to university education by sharply rebuking English-educated Indians. To Sir Eskine Perry, former Supreme Court Chief Justice and current member of the Council of India, he argued that as the poor received little state aid, the “Calcutta Baboo gets the spoils…which enables him to obtain a living as a Doctor or a Lawyer.” In subsequent correspondence, Mayo related education in India to England and lamented Perry’s support for the “filtration theory” of knowledge from high to low classes in the Subcontinent. He argued that “surely England is a good instance of its absolute failure,” as the educated upper and middle classes stand apart from “…the masses, in the big towns, and a great portion of the agricultural poor, [who are] as ignorant…then they were in the days of Henry VIII.” In comparison, Mayo

51 Home Department, Indian Government to Argyll, 08 Feb. 1870, MS 7490/1/4, MP, CUL.
52 Home Department, Indian Government to Argyll, 25 Oct. 1870, MS 7490/9/32, MP, CUL.
53 Mayo to Perry, 23 Mar. 1870, MS 7490/152, fol. 268, MP, CUL. Baboo or babu is a Bengali term for office clerk. For the British in late nineteenth century, this term was often used pejoratively to denote English educated Indians effeminacy and cultural alienness.
stated that in India a “few hundred Baboos,” who could pay for themselves, are state educated at the expense of the millions who are left behind. In regards to the small class’ intentions and ambitions, he contended that “the more education you give them the more they will try & keep it to themselves...and make their better knowledge a means of tyranny.”

Mayo’s allusion to this class’s ambition became a standard conservative reaction, which implied that English-educated political reformers and the Indian National Congress were driven by alien and selfish motives in the late nineteenth century.

**Muslim Education**

In addition to the masses, Mayo promoted expanded state aid to encourage Muslim participation in higher education. He praised and respected the Muslim tradition in India, and compared their imperial lineage to that of the Protestant community in Ireland. In his notes, he expressed the regret that “so large and important class, possessing a classical literature replete with works of profound learning and great value...” were not obtaining the benefits of current education. After conversing with Syed Ahmed Khan, former civil servant and Muslim community leader in Northern India, Mayo perceived a similarity between the India’s Muslim population and the Irish Anglican minority. He argued that just as Lord Stanley’s successful system of national education in Ireland, officially secular but in practice largely denominational, benefited the majority Catholic population and slighted Anglicans, in India most Muslims for religious reasons avoided state sponsored schooling. In response, Mayo advocated that grants-in-

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54 Mayo to Perry, 26 Jul. 1870, MS 7490/154, fol. 85, MP, CUL.
aid should be expanded to construct Muslim schools which would instruct in vernacular languages including Arabic and Persian. In 1875, Syed Ahmed Khan’s subsequent efforts led to the construction of Aligarh College, which became a center for Muslim intellectual and nationalist thought into the twentieth century. Mayo’s promotion of vernacular and Muslim education became a popular plank for conservatives who were increasingly skeptical of the relationship between English education and a Hindu dominated Indian National Congress late in the nineteenth century.

Princely Education

Mayo’s efforts to expand princely education through minority instruction and the expansion of exclusive colleges had a substantial influence later in the century. This advocacy was predicated on an Irish aristocratic inclination which favored the state’s and landed class’ paternal obligation to the larger community. In 1870, Mayo communicated to Rajputana’s landed elites his opinion on the British paramount power’s relationship with India’s rulers. He argued that in exchange for British protection for their ancient rights and customs, they should assist the former in respecting the rights and privileges of the people under their care. This included the security of property, construction of roads and irrigation, encouragement of education, and relief for the sick. To that end, he expressed a personal desire to assist their education towards the establishment of a school at Ajmere. He proposed that this institution should be exclusive to the

55 Mayo, 26 Jun. 1871, MS 7490/9/39, MP, CUL.
region’s princes, chiefs, and *thakdoors*, and would offer them instruction to fulfill and strengthen their positions as rulers and guardians.\(^5^7\) In correspondence with Queen Victoria, Mayo hoped that the “very proud and very ignorant” princes and *thakdoors*, who “occupy a similar position as…the English Barons did in the Reign of King John,” could be educated at a new “Indian Eton” established at Ajmere.\(^5^8\) Following the school’s 1875 opening it was named Mayo College in commemoration of the former Viceroy. He also supported the efforts of W.W. Anderson, Political Resident of Kathiawar (1867-1874), in establishing the Rajkumar College (1870) in Rajkot, Kathiawar.\(^5^9\) Mayo and Rajkumar were joined by other Indian “public” schools across India such as Daly College, Indore College, and Aitchison College. As we shall see in chapter six, these colleges were sites where local princes, chiefs, and nobles strengthened their authority and participated in establishing modes of imperial collaboration with the Paramount Power.

In addition, Mayo promoted minority guardianships for the education of young princes in large and small Indian states. His primary focus was the minority administrations in Mysore and Hyderabad. In Mysore, Burne, Mayo’s Private Secretary, gave a glowing report of the young Maharaja’s education and physical activity under British stewardship. Beyond a strict class regiment of reading, writing, arithmetic, and geography, the young Prince was allowed, and preferred, “fun and merriment”: “The little M. only seems to have one thought—his school and

\(^{5^7}\) Mayo, 11 Nov. 1870, MS 7490/71/7, fol. 6, MP, CUL.
\(^{5^8}\) Mayo to Victoria, 09 Nov. 1870, MS 7490/155, fol. 65, MP, CUL.
cricket—and it is I am told very amusing to watch how he himself has resisted all the wills of his mother & courtiers to prevent his joining.”

In Hyderabad, Mayo supported the co-regency of Nawab Shams-Ul-Umara and Salar Jung during the minority of Nazam Mir Mahabub Ali Khan. To Argyll, he stated that with Jung, who “one of the ablest & wisest men in India,” and able political residents, there was hope of a lengthy period of good government in the Kingdom. As a reward for those chiefs who properly administered their polities upon the Viceroy’s standards, Mayo welcomed their incorporation and continued instruction as participants in the upper levels Indian government. To Lord Napier, he expressed his hope that the Prince of Travancore, Maharajah Ayilyam Thirunal, would serve on the Legislative Council in Calcutta. He proposed that “I should like to give the council such a character as would induce the chiefs who are administrating their own states well, to come & take lessons in good govt with us at Calcutta.”

Conclusion

As an Irishman and Chief Secretary for Ireland in successive Conservative governments, Mayo’s experience with social and religious division in Ireland informed his inclination and action as Viceroy of India. In continuing a conservative imperial tradition as prescribed by the 1858 Queen’s Proclamation, he promoted an aristocratic definition of paternal good governance which determined the state and landed interests obligation to protect, mediate, and engage India’s various prescriptive institutions and customs. This informed a policy of decentralization

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60 Burne to Mayo, 15 Feb. 1871, MS 7490/66, fol. 6, MP, CUL.
61 Mayo to Argyll, 02 Mar. 1869, MS 7490/148, fol. 82, MP, CUL.
62 Mayo to Napier, 02 Jul. 1869, MS 7490/150, fol. 19, MP, CUL.
which localized the utilization of imperial resources and influence. In a direct response to a liberal imperialism tradition, Mayo overrode Anglo-Indian and English educated Indian opposition to assert the State’s obligation to act for what he deemed to be the national interests of the country. Just as he advocated State financial support for the Anglican, Presbyterian, and Catholic churches as well as an education system receptive to religious prejudice in Ireland, in India Mayo sponsored a Muslim University and mass vernacular primary education to cater to and improve the knowledge and condition of the people.

With regards to the landed political and propertied interests, Mayo saw the state’s role as not only a protector, but also as an instructor in the principles of good governance. He argued that in return for preserving landed interests’ local autonomy, and security of property and tenure, the British Paramount Power had the right to insist upon their financial and political contribution towards the implementation of fair justice and economic improvement for the masses. For India’s princes, chiefs, and nobility, Mayo’s sponsorship of minority education as well as Mayo and Rajkumar colleges reflected a desire to instruct this class on their obligations to the imperial state and the population under their charge. As we shall see in the following chapters, Mayo’s engagements towards princely education produced the foundation for the Indian princes’ collaboration in British imperialism late in the nineteenth century.
Chapter 5: Lytton’s “Indian Privy Council”

Introduction

This chapter examines Robert Bulwer, Lord Lytton’s political program of Indian state engagement and collaboration surrounding the Imperial Assemblage in 1876-1877. Specifically, it explores his proposed creation of an Indian Privy Council. Beyond a ceremony which marked the ascension of Queen Victoria to Empress of India, Lytton designed the Assemblage as a means to strengthen the Indian princes’ political and sentimental relationship with the British paramount power, constituted in the 1858 Queen’s Proclamation. While noting his Victorian acceptance of western civilizational superiority, Lytton’s vision was politically and philosophically consistent with a British conservative tradition on India. Moreover, Lytton’s association with the Conservative Party and Lord Salisbury was affirmed by Liberal opposition to the Royal Titles Act (1876), the Assemblage, and the Indian Privy Council. Lytton’s past literary criticism concerning a politically declining, morally depreciating, and unimaginative British aristocracy informed his political program which encouraged Indian rulers’ imperial leadership and contribution towards the governance of empire. Through showing an intellectual relationship with Disraeli’s skepticism of British perspective and prejudice on India, this chapter contends that Lytton’s princely collaboration resembled a contribution to Ellenborough’s and Mayo’s recognition and legitimatization of India’s historical internal differences and dissimilarity from Britain.
The Unlikely Viceroy

Unlike Mayo, Lytton, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s second Viceroy of India, was not a political or partisan figure. His appointment as Viceroy was the result of Lord John Manners, Lord Powis, and Lord Carnarvon each declining the office. Also, it was unusual for a Foreign Office diplomat, published poet, and man with no party association or Indian and colonial service experience to receive an executive position in India. Despite his status as a political outsider, Lytton’s inclination and policy represented a contribution to a British conservative tradition in India. Just as Mayo utilized the state to instruct a new generation of Indian elites on their political and social obligation, Lytton sought to strengthen this group’s governing and military leadership as collaborating partners with the British paramount power. His objective centered upon the creation of an Indian Privy Council, which he envisioned as a consultative body consisting of the Viceroy, leading Anglo-Indian statesman, and high ranking Indian princes. Although Lytton’s initiatives were mostly resisted by Anglo-Indians and British liberals, he laid the foundation for India’s princes and landed elites to increasingly use British imperialism to strengthen their local autonomy and authority.

A Modern Cynic

Lytton privately and poetically expressed a comprehensive cynicism about modernity in Britain. Although an exponent of small “l” liberalism at home and abroad tied to individual

63 Lutyens, *The Lyttons in India*, 1.
liberty, he increasingly condemned the consequences of democratization, capitalism, and scientific rationalism to Britain’s social and political framework. Similar to Disraeli’s literary pursuits in the 1830s and 1840s, Lytton lamented the overturning of aristocratic values centered on individual leadership and social obligation with the material interests of modern capital and democratic governance. This resulted in his criticism of the aristocratic and middle classes, as well as growing distrust of British radical politics. To his close friend and Liberal MP John Foster, Lytton expressed an early dissatisfaction with the upper and middling classes’ actions and sentiments. In 1866, he argued that the upper class had lost their moral leadership and credibility on affairs at home and abroad:

The purely aristocratic element is not without a sort of chivalry of its own kind, but unfortunately it is a chivalry always on the wrong side of every great question…which would have plunged England into a disastrous and iniquitous war for the purpose of pulling into life a barbarous slave power…which would defend, against justice, humanity, and common sense, women-flogging and man murdering Governor Eyre…and maintain the Irish Establishment Church rates, and every kind of vexatious oath, on the plea of standing by the Church versus the nation.64

If the aristocracy had a misguided sense of moral responsibility in the affairs of state, Lytton submitted that the middle class was “too wealthy” to have any chivalry at all. With respect to the avaricious middle class character “Peckshiff” in Charles Dickens’ story *The Life and Adventures of Marin Chuzzlewit* (1844), he contended that their “political conscience whose organ is the city article, has already made England to be esteemed through Europe—somewhat more than justly,

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though not altogether without cause—as the Peckshiff of nations.\(^{65}\) In contrast, Lytton praised working class ideals. To Foster, he argued that they held characteristics which he was “proud to call English—great fortitude, patience, and endurance, quick enthusiasm and generous sympathy for a cause not exclusively profitable…”\(^{66}\) Later to Foster, he contended that the working class was restrained by ruling class’ institutions and interests regarding the implementation of mass compulsory education. He concluded that compulsory education would have to proceed an extension of the suffrage, and if to that end it “must be the dissolution of Church and State. I shall fervently rejoice to see that…”\(^{67}\)

“Owen Meredith”

In the 1850s and 1860s, Lytton used his poetry to express concerns on the social consequences of the modern age. This centered on the latter’s curtailment of individual identity and leadership. In *Lucile* (1860), Lytton decried the fall of individual significance and assertion in the current complex era “where man becomes the age.”\(^{68}\) A love story centered on the tribulations of heroine Lucile, villain Duc Eugene de Luvois, and hero Lord Alfred Vargave, it expressed Lytton’s pertinent feelings on the different social classes in modern Britain. As the aristocratic Alfred is portrayed as a lost soul and unable to define his self-purpose, he must guard against being defrauded by the avaricious middle class banker and liberal philanthropist Sir

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\(^{67}\) Lytton to Foster, Dec. 1866, in Balfour, *Personal & Literary Letters*, 217.

In a small poem titled “The Wife’s Tragedy” (1855), Lytton criticized the English aristocracy’s social and political decline. Much allied with his radical sentiments at the time, he recounted their previous but now declining leadership of the people now eager for constitutional change:

Strange. These crowds whose instincts guide them
Fail to get the thing they would,
Till we nobles stand beside them
Give our names or shed our blood
From of old this hath been so,
For me too were with first
In the fight fought long ago
When the chain of Charles was burst

Who but we set Freedom’s border
Wrenched at Runnymede from John?
Who but we stand, towers of order,
Twixt the red cap and the Throne.

In the present day, however, Lytton sees England’s nobles abandoning the people’s noble ambitions towards reform:

And they wrong us, England’s Peers,
Us, the vanguard of the land,
Who should say the march of years
Makes us shrink at Truth’s right hand.  

King Poppy

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Lytton’s most politically contentious poem was “King Poppy.” Biographer Aureilia Harlan contends that this poem, begun in 1874, and kept secret during his tenure as Viceroy, revised twice, and published after his death in 1892, should be read as a story of Lytton’s life, experiences, and sentiments. This work challenges the dominance of scientific rationalism and the absence of imagination in modern British governance. This political and social critique reflected Lytton’s admiration for poet and literary critic Matthew Arnold. Lytton shared Arnold’s contempt for England’s narrow-mindedness, intellectually stagnant aristocracy, and overreliance on reason as opposed to imagination, intellect, and aesthetics. This admiration informed an attempt to solicit fellow English poet and friend Robert Browning to arrange a meeting between him and Arnold. Lytton stated that although “I would love to meet him,” if that could not be arranged then tell him “I have watched and applauded his combat with the Goliaths of Philistia.”

King Poppy is a satirical portrayal of the mechanization of government as well as the ineptness and hypocrisy of aristocratic statesmen in the late nineteenth century. It is an imaginative story of an aspiring poppy’s (the flower) elevation to kingship in the kingdom Diadummiania. Following the trials and tribulations of popular Princess Diadema, the heir apparent, who dies in exile, the last section satirically details the kingdom’s future mode of

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73 Lytton to Browning, 13 Mar. 1867, in Aurelia Brooks Harland and J. Lee Harlan, JR eds., _Letters from Owen Meredith (Robert, First Earl of Lytton) to Robert and Elizabeth Browning_ (Baylor University, 1936), 223.
governance. After hearing of his child’s death, King Poppy instructs the Master Pilgrim to construct a replacement for the princess. The Master Pilgrim explains his creation as

A Government Machine, expressly made
And fitted with the necessary gear
For carrying on the business of the realm
With Regularity. Now, this machine,
Said Pilgrim, was a puppet, that imposed
So perfectly on public confidence
Its representative contrivances…

This puppet suited to its age and easily controlled was an invention loved by the public
As “The greatest invention of the age.” “the puppet” was beloved by the people and moreover as Living Princesses sometimes go astray.
The Puppet-Princess never will contract
A misalliance; nor, if rightly work’d,
Act counter to whatever rules are framed
For its procedure.

In regards to the constitution, Pilgrim stated that the puppet’s construction should remain a secret. He argued that the government should “never reveal the unreality” to the easily led masses, as the “echoes of Departed Royalty” lead

solemn influence to the hollow forms
They Haunt for ages. Be upon your guard!
The People, an incorrigible dunce,
Is quick to feel, tho’ slow to understand;
And, in its awkward fits of sentiment.

74 Earl of Lytton, *King Poppy* (London: Longmans, Green, and CO, 1892), 285.
75 Lytton, *King Poppy*, 286.
76 Ibid.
Rejecting a seat in the new Cabinet, the Pilgrim concludes that the Ministers should be enlightened liberal statesman and proclaim liberty as part of the Constitution. In response to their disbelief and former attempts to curtail liberty, he argued to them

Your Excellencies are about to start
A Government exclusively maintain’d
Upon appearances, and what appears
Most liberal, looks best. But, after all,
The little that I ask means nothing much

The Pilgrims last addition was the insertion in the puppet-princess of a little wheel

This new wheel henceforth
It would be necessary to wind up
Once every year. ‘Twas call’d “The-Queen’s-Speech-Wheel.”

This closing reference to the Queen’s Speech ceremony, which inaugurates a parliamentary session, should be seen as a sharp critique of the current constitutional establishment and its aristocratic ruling class. A monarch limited to the mechanical procedure of formality symbolized the submission of individual will and activity to the collective force of a systematic age.

This poem reflected Lytton’s growing discontent with the consequences to individual character and assertion by the heavy reliance of reason over imagination in modern British society. Before King Poppy, Lytton expressed an admiration for the strong leadership and national ambitions of Louis Napoleon. To Browning in 1860, he defended and praised the character and national ambition of Napoleon, who was in his opinion “a man of undoubted

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77 Ibid, 288-289.
genius, and unquestionably as a great constructor.”78 To Mrs C.W. Earle (1836-1925), his sister in law and subsequent publisher on horticulture, in 1880, he stated that the purpose of King Poppy was to illustrate “what a poor tissue of unreality human life would be if the much-despised influence of imagination were banished from it.” In focusing on the lineage of rational political philosophy from Bentham to Mill and the lessons from “the modern school of historical science,” he argued that governance had become less practical and individual character meaningless in a world moved by the mechanism of great forces.79 To Earle in 1882, Lytton dismissed the theories and ideas of his youth and espoused a deep cynicism regarding individual character in a modern and rational Britain. He argued that scientific positivism led to a “dispersion rather than concentration of emotional forces” which resulted in “a general diffusion of mediocre comfort and well-being adapted to the satisfaction and production of mediocre character.” With respect to democratic politics, he advised the separation of politics from science and philosophy. He contended that contrary to the old Tory metaphysical doctrine of the divine right of royal and ruling powers, and radical theory prefaced on the Rights of Man and the natural equality of society, the growth of government as a “healthy natural organism is not logical, simple and symmetrical, but various, intricate, and full of salutary anomalies.”80

78 Lytton to Browning, 03 Sep. 1860, in Harland and Harlan, Letters from Owen Meredith, 159.
Modern Democracy and Empire

Moreover, his post-India review of King Poppy reflected a later pessimism concerning English radicalism as a philosophy and political force at the end of the nineteenth century. This centered on what he saw as the incompatibility of expansive democracy with the British Empire. In India, Lytton, in 1878, had expressed his frustration to Frederic Harrison (1831-1923), historian and liberal thinker, on English radicalism’s destructive ambitions. In signifying a wider purpose for the British Empire as a moral and European force beyond narrow national interest, he feared that its good standing in Europe was threatened by all the political parties and its irreconcilability with domestic institutions. In singling out radicalism’s “utter want of patriotism and practical common sense,” he contended that “it would willingly burn down every rafter of the great fabric of the British Empire in order to roast in the ashes some of its own little half-addled theoretical eggs.”

In 1885, Lytton responded to concerns that the introduction of local government in Ireland would lead to the oppression of landlords and Protestants. He argued to John Tyndall, Professor of Physics at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, that he viewed “modern democracy as the hugest humbug under the sun—and, as applied to the administration of so complex and artificial an empire as ours, the most mischievous form of social insanity.”

1832 and Disraeli

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81 Lytton to Harrison, 02 Apr. 1878, in Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters, 97.
82 Lytton to Tyndall, 30 Sep. 1885, in Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters, 297.
Lytton’s post-India critique of liberal radicalism and political admiration for Disraeli are expressed in his biography of his father published in 1883. In recounting Edward Bulwer’s (1803-1873) literary and political career, Lytton infused a commentary on significant events throughout his life span which was critical of Liberalism. Although a subsequent biography, published in 1948, by his grandson Victor Bulwer-Lytton, 2nd Earl of Lytton, shows that Edward Bulwer was in favor of the 1832 Reform Bill, Lytton focuses his attention on condemning the Whig movement for reform.83 To Lytton, the Reform Bill was a partisan and publicly unwanted event. While stating that “The Whigs saw, and seized with great ability, the opportunity to make themselves the mouth piece of an all but universal settlement,” their partisans in the press made sure to contrive and enforce the public’s growing excitement for expanded suffrage:

The Liberal press surpassed itself in the language of personal menace, detraction, and vituperation. The noblest characters, the most exemplary lives, the finest intellects, and the greatest public services, failed to shelter from its aspirations those who had the courage to express opinions adverse to the popular demand.84

Also in the biography, Lytton highlights Bulwer’s friendship with Disraeli, adding words of praise to the latter’s literary and intellectual abilities. His view of Disraeli as a politician was much improved following his tenure as Viceroy and the former’s death in 1880. Although his earlier correspondence reveals an underwhelming response to Disraeli 1858’s Government of India Bill, and speech on his 1867 parliamentary reform bill, he labelled the Tory Premier as a

man of “indomitable will and persevering genius.” He shows that his father was an admiral of Disraeli’s early work, especially the “Wondrous Tale of Alroy” (1833), and that they remained friends throughout their lives. In regards to “Tale of Alroy,” Lytton admired the author’s achievement of authenticity in depicting the spirit of the East. He remarked that its underrated praise reflected the author’s ability to overcome English class prejudices towards the East:

Perhaps it is that, in all productions inspired by the Spirit of the East, the stamp of genius is like the seal of Solomon, which reveals nothing to those who have never felt the wizardry of Oriental spells: and whilst, in its conception, the “Tale of Alroy” is uncongenial to the taste of a middle-class insular public such as ours, its execution transgresses the sobriety of imagination and expression desiderated by our literary connoisseurs.

Including *Tancred*, Lytton argued that “No other English Statesman or author has shown…so clear a conception of the permanent conditions of Eastern Life and thought, or so profound a penetration in the moral recesses of Eastern Character.” This feat is extraordinary as he contends that

Englishman carry with them, in the balls of their eyes and the convolutions of their brain, so much of their own island that, after years of external contact with Orientals, they remain unconscious that the formulas of Western thought and habits of Western feeling are quite inapplicable to the Eastern World.

85 Ibid, 326, In opposing the Council component of the Government of India Bill (1858), Lytton remarked “Dizzy’s ludicrous speech on Indian Legislation has not only disgusted all thinking men in the House, but also a large section of his own party. To my thinking it was like a fraudulent attempt to get 20 shillings change out of a bad sovereign…” Lytton to Browning, Apr. 1858, in Haran and Haran, *Letters from Owen Meredith*, 144. On Lytton’s underwhelming reaction to Disraeli’s parliamentary performance see Balfour, *Personal & Literary Letters*, 217.


Lytton’s admiration for Disraeli centred upon the latter’s ability to transcend the narrow confines of western rationalism to explore the East’s essential difference from the West. This not only resembled Lytton’s maturing critique of the application of reason in modern Britain, but also, as we shall see, his frustrated experiences of trying to incorporate his imaginative version of India’s history and difference to construct a foundation for British imperialism in India.

Interpreting India

As Viceroy (1876-1880), Lytton embarked on an ambitious political program to strengthen executive authority and aristocratic leadership in India. While acknowledging Britain’s obligation to gradually spread a superior European civilization throughout the subcontinent, Lytton focused on strengthening and empowering India’s traditional institutions as collaborative partners with British imperialism. He repudiated past failures to entice a growing English educated Indian class and mass population with the spread of western education and public works. Instead, he argued that Britain’s future as the paramount power in India relied on engaging and collaborating with India’s princes and chiefs, in his opinion they were the natural leaders of India’s society, as subordinate imperial partners. In 1876-1877, Lytton utilized Queen Victoria and the Conservative government’s proposal to make the former styled as Empress of India, to institute a wider political program centered upon the Imperial Assemblage and the establishment of an Indian Privy Council. In contrast to what he satirized in King Poppy as the
weakening executive and aristocratic political leadership in Britain, Lytton sought to strengthen viceregal authority through a collaborative relationship with a powerful Indian aristocracy.

Arriving at Bombay as a political outsider in April 1876, Lytton ended his viceregal tenure in 1880 as a partisan and contentious figure. Lytton responded to British Liberal opposition to the Royal Titles Bill and Imperial Assemblage by becoming closely associated with Lord Salisbury, archconservative and Secretary of State for India till 1878, and the Conservative government. On general Indian governance, Lytton continued Mayo’s efforts to decentralize control and revenue, as well as to reduce the size of the Indian Civil Service bureaucracy.  

With regards to his philosophical perspective on Britain’s purpose in India, Lytton, like Mayo, saw British imperialism as a civilizing force for social and character improvement in India. While emphasizing India’s internal differences and distinctiveness from a morally superior British society, he believed that Britain had a providential obligation to effect gradual social improvement and transformation over the conservative and passive society. In contrast to liberal or radical approaches, Lytton argued that British obligations were best enacted by engaging and collaboration with India’s traditional ruling class.

Cultural Exchanges

At the State Banquet during the Assemblage on New Year’s Day 1877, he laid out his general sentiments on India. In seeing India as a land “multitudinous in its traditions, as well as

88 Lytton to Stephen, 14 Apr. 1876, in Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters, 8; Lytton to Salisbury, 24 Sept. 1876, in Balfour, The History of Lord Lytton’s Indian Administration, 461.
in its inhabitants, almost infinite in the variety of races which populate it, and of the creeds which has shaped their character…,” he stated that the British Empire has undertaken the goal of enhancing the “collective social life and character of the population of the Empire.”

Lytton objected to the protocol of not allowing female members of the Viceroy’s family to attend state functions as it would give offence to high ranking natives. Lytton, stated, to Sir Henry Ponsonby, Private Secretary to Queen Victoria (1870-1895), that it was wrong that “we,” meaning English or Europeans, were “bound to conform our own social life and customs to the low standard of those whose masters we are by reason of our superior social enlightenment.” He argued that Britain should continue to encourage, through example and persuasion, the local population to modify its customs: “We have put down suttee with the strong hand, and have done much to improve the position of Hindu widows and Mahometal wives. We established Zenana schools (schools for women) throughout India, and extorting the better class of natives to educate their women and humanist female life in their homes.”

In explaining his 1878 decision to restrict the freedom of the vernacular press, Lytton claimed that Britain had to be careful when introducing foreign institutions to India. He argued that they were effecting “a gradual but gigantic revolution—the greatest and most momentous social, moral and religious, as well as political, revolution which, perhaps, the world has ever witnessed.”

90 Lytton to Possonby, 12 Jan. 1877, in Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters, 51.
Lytton believed that this civilizing sentiment’s gradual success was possible due to the social passivity of conservative India. To Lord Cranbrook, the Secretary of State for India (1878-1880) on the popular custom of infant marriages in northern India, Lytton, although agreeing on the conservative approach to social change through legislation and consultation, speculated on Britain’s ability to be more aggressive on reforming a historically passive society:

All I have heard and seen in this country inclines me to believe that we might, perhaps, have imposed with impunity any laws of this kind immediately after the Mutiny. Had we then proclaimed that henceforth the whole population was to be Christianized (being conquered), that no religion but that of the conquering power would be recognized, and that all institutions must be brought into conformity therewith, it is possible that even the most turbulent of our native subjects would have acquiesced…seeing in it only their history has accustomed them to regard as fair and natural, or, at any rate, inevitable…92

In a subsequent dispatch to Cranbrook on proposed modifications to the army reserve system, he argued that in a country like India which was “the stronghold of social conservatism and inveterate habit” a man removed from home for two or twenty years would not affect his position in the community.93

While espousing Britain’s potential benefit to India, Lytton believed that the East once had and still could expand the intellectual horizons of the West. This belief centered on the harmony of the mystical and imaginative qualities of the East with the practical aspects of

92 Lytton to Cranbrook, 16 May 1878, Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters, 104. On Lytton’s rationale for the censorship proscribed in the Vernacular Press Act see Balfour, The History of Lord Lytton’s Indian Administration, 502-523.
93 Lytton to Cranbrook, 14 Jun. 1878, in Balfour The History of Lord Lytton’s Indian Administration, 106.
western scientific rationalism. At the foundation stone ceremony for the new Muslim Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarth, a project envisioned and supported by Mayo, Lytton expressed that its establishment reflected the repayment of a western intellectual debt to the East. He contended that when Christian societies were just emerging out of intellectual darkness and social barbarism, Muslims were establishing schools of medicine, math, and philosophy. Moreover, he pointed out that the Moorish engineers’ fifteenth century application of science continued to sustain the populations of Spain and Portugal. In exchange, Lytton argued that as “providence has not confided to any single race a permanent initiative in the direction of human thought,” the West would now, through the new college, implant the benefits and understanding of western science to India’s Muslim community. To the Annual Convocation of the Calcutta University in March 1877, Lytton communicated the advantages of harmonizing western and eastern characteristics of thinking. While stating that the “highest possible standard of native character” would be its elevation in practical thinking towards the “closet possible harmony with western thought,” he believed, however, that “the average European intellect needs development on the imaginative and sympathetic side of it.” Resembling the sentiment and verse in Disraeli’s *Tancred*, he contended that the East’s intellectual gift to the world influenced “not only the parent of the Vedas and Puranan; not merely the inspirer of Budha and of Mahomet. It is the East

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94 Lytton, 07 Jan. 1877, Mss Eur. E218/57, fol. 38, BL, AAS.
that raised the first altars of Jahova; it is the East that was the chosen birthplace of Christianity.”

To an audience of Rajput ruling families at Mayo College in 1879, Lytton emphasized the social element of education to instilling good governance and common imperial sentiment. He contended that as social relations are based on character or tone, the goal of the College’s instruction was to instill “elevating influences” to “the dominant races and superior classes of native India…whose tone the social harmony of the whole Empire is so largely dependent—by giving to them that community of interest and tendency in the higher activities of mind and body.” Lastly, he touched upon the similarities of position and spirit between the Rajput Clans and English aristocracy. He argued that both had maintained the premier position in the political hierarchy of their ancient races by inhibiting similar characteristics of “energy, fearlessness, love of healthful exercise and scorn of unmanly ease.” This sentiment towards harmonizing East and West, as well as advocating a “community of interest” between Britain and India’s higher classes informed Lytton’s political program surrounding the Imperial Assemblage in 1876-1877.

**Enemy to Anglo-India**

Lytton’s reorientation of imperial policy towards conciliating India’s aristocracy to become contributing partners in Britain’s Indian empire was opposed by his Viceroy Council, the Council of India in London, and the Indian Civil Service. Early in his tenure, Lytton was already 

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95 Lytton, 10 Mar. 1877, Mss Eur. E218/57, fols. 46-58, BL, AAS.
complaining, in partisan terms, about the Viceroy Council’s hostility to him. To Disraeli regarding the need to keep the plans for an imperial durbar secret, he remarked that “you...know that my Councilors are all Liberals—that is to say narrow minded persons, and also practical men, or, in their words, men incapable of giving practical effect to an idea.”97 With regards to their opinion of him, he quipped to Disraeli “I can only say what Lord North said of his Generals in the American War—‘I hope they may frighten the enemy, for I am sure they frighten me.” As to any assistance they might offer him, he stated “I might as well consult a committee of undertakers as to best means of prolonging my life, as they at present all in a conspiracy to oppose everything which is suggested from the India office.”98 On their ability and character, Lytton lamented to Salisbury on the danger of a “tyranny of six second rate men, saturated with prejudice & personal feeling.”99 This feeling extended to the members of the Secretary of State’s Council of India, who were near unanimously opposed to Lytton’s plan for an Indian Privy Council. In 1876, he expressed to Salisbury his sympathy for the latter being at the mercy of men “who seem to represent the coagulated stupidity of Anglo-Indian prejudices and traditions, wholly inapplicable to the present situation.”100 In July 1876, Lytton received the condemnation of the Anglo-Indian community, the British official and unofficial community in India, for his rebuke of the North Western Province Government’s failure to respond to the low sentence of a

97 Lytton to Disraeli, 21 Apr. 1876, B/XX/105/1, fol. 74, HP, OBL.
98 Lytton to Disraeli, 22 Apr. 1876, Mss Eur.E218/23, fol. 105, BL, AAS.
99 Lytton to Salisbury, 27 Apr. 1876, Mss Eur. E218/23, BL, AAS.
100 Lytton to Salisbury, 15 Nov. 1876, Mss Eur. 218/23, fol. 608, BL, AAS.
fine laid against Mr. Fuller, a merchant, for the killing an Indian.  

Salisbury commended Lytton’s action, arguing that “In case of white against black, there is no real public opinion to check brutality in India; and your censures must do the work which public reprobation would do at home.”

**Princely Collaboration**

For Lytton, the means to secure Britain’s imperial position over the mass population in India was to strengthen a relationship with the country’s princes and chiefs. Rather than continuing, at great expense, to be the agent of economic development and social improvement, the paramount power had to utilize and strengthen traditional institutions of authority over a conservative society. To Queen Victoria, Lytton laid out his planned re-orientation of imperial policy from the modern to a traditional focus. He argued that a past policy of placating India’s population through public works development had misunderstood the conservative nature of the country:

> I think we have hitherto relied too much for popular gratitude on the great improvement we have undoubtedly effected in the position of the ryot, by means of costly canals and irrigation works, which have embarrassed our finances, and are as yet so little appreciated by the Hindu rustic, that they don’t pay the expense of making them.

Moreover, he drew a parallel with Austria’s failure to halt the Italian nationalist and unification movement (1830-1850s) to show the folly of focusing on the masses at the expense of the

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101 Lutyens, *The Lyttons in India*, 34.
102 Salisbury to Lytton, 16 Aug. 1876, IOR NEG. 11688/1, fol. 167, BL, AAS.
103 Lytton to Victoria, 04 May 1876, Mss Eur. E218/23, fol. 134, BL, AAS.
aristocracy. He argued that when Italy’s nobility became alienated from Austria and conspired against it, “the peasantry either remained inert or else followed the lead of their natural superiors in rebelling against their benefactress.” To Salisbury, Lytton considered this example as comparable to British India, and argued that unlike in Italy “the Indian Chiefs and Princes are not mere noblese. They are a powerful aristocracy.” This resembled their ability, over English educated Indians and even the British, to influence and control the mass population. He contended that unlike the pretended political representation of native opinion from the “Baboos...who really represent nothing but the social anomaly of their own position,” the inert mass “will move in obedience not with its British benefactors, but to its native chiefs and princes, however tyrannical they may be.”

For Lytton, the failure of the British paramount power to create an emotional bond with India’s aristocracy represented a lost opportunity to strengthen imperial defense. Although his efforts to engage India’s aristocracy were associated with ensuring a readied defense against Russian expansion towards Afghanistan, they were prefaced by an intellectual and social bias which utilized history and imagination to validate governing executive authority and leadership. In an 1876 confidential memo, Lytton argued that the Indian states have not understood or reciprocated the benefit that they have received from an association with Britain. Despite the protection they receive from the Paramount Power against external attack and internal rebellion,

104 Ibid.
as well as the extension of civilization through railways, telegraph, and commerce, he contended that “it can hardly be said that our relationships with them are satisfactory, or that we have succeeded, in any great degree, in securing their effectual co-operation, or in associating their personal interest and authority with the imperial administration.” To remedy princely indifference to imperial security and administration, Lytton proposed that in exchange for the Indian states’ military cooperation and contribution to imperial defense, the Paramount Power would offer them greater internal autonomy. Without infringing on the spirit of the Queen’s Proclamation, he suggested the revision of outstanding treaties to define clearly the responsibility of the Political Agents and the native feudatories.

In 1877, Lytton expressed, once again in a confidential memo, a determination to seek political support in the Indian Government and among the Indian States for the latter’s participation in imperial defense. He stated that the Viceroy Council’s refusal to reconsider their earlier objection for a scheme of princely political co-operation, and their offhanded rejection of two requests from Indian princes, who were Councilors of the Empire and held honorary rank of General in the British Army, for purchasing arms reflected an embarrassment for the Government. Specifically, he argued that refusing the Maharaja Holkar of Indore’s request for rifled muskets and carbines revealed the contradiction of Britain’s relationship with the native feudatories as “we set rules for them to ask us for permission, forbidding own manufacture, yet refuse their request

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106 Lytton, 1876, Mss Eur. E218/141, fol. 274, BL, AAS.
107 Ibid.
with ‘undisguised mistrust.’ In response, Lytton expressed his intention to nominate a committee whose object would be to determine the present status of the native armies, and whether their relationship with the Supreme Government might be remodeled without effecting current treaties.\(^{108}\) Lytton envisioned a larger imperial role for the Indian states, who, he believed, were “morally bound to contribute to the general defence of the Empire.” To that end, he proposed that every chief should furnish a contingent to do garrison duty and general task work, which would be placed under British control in a war at imperial expense.\(^{109}\) His proposal would set the formative stages towards establishing the Imperial Service Troops in 1885, a reserve force raised by large Indian states for service in the British Indian Army.\(^{110}\) Lytton’s attempts to establish a greater facility for Indian state engagement in the imperial military apparatus of India reflected a larger political program centered upon inspiring the country’s aristocracy to become participating subordinate partners in the British Empire.

**Imperial Assemblage and the Indian Privy Council**

Lytton inaugurated a political program of Indian state engagement and conciliation at the Imperial Assemblage held in December 1876 till January 1877. This elaborate assembly was held on the plains outside Delhi, the seat of the former Mughal Empire and the spot of British defeat and subsequent victory against Indian rebels in 1857-58. It was meticulously orchestrated

\(^{108}\) Lytton, 1877, Mss Eur. E218/141, fol. 279, BL, AAS.
\(^{109}\) Ibid, fols. 283-285
\(^{110}\) For the components of this program, plus a wider account of princely state contribution to the British Military in India see Ramusack, *The Indian Princes and Their States*, 122.
to inspire loyalty to the British Empire amongst the attending sixty-three ruling chiefs and numerous minor nobilities. To that end, Lytton distributed emoluments steeped in history and imagination to fortify the feudatory bond between the newly proclaimed Queen Empress of India and the country’s powerful aristocracy. The proposed rewards to be dispensed for past and continued loyalty at the Assemblage were the presentation of banners, medals, a native peerage sanctioned by the Imperial Crown (including the expansion of the Order of the Star of India founded in 1861), the appointment of top native chiefs to military commands, and, most significantly, the establishment of an Indian Privy Council.

Lytton’s Imperial Assemblage employed history and imagination to implement a practical program of political collaboration with India’s native states. In an April letter to Victoria, Lytton expressed his belief that every possible flattery and award should be associated with the new title which “places Her Authority upon that ancient throne of the Moguls, with which the imagination and traditions of your Majesty’s Indian Subjects associate the splendor of supreme power…”

Lytton was personally involved with the particular details of the Assemblage. To Disraeli, he apologized for nit-picking over the presentation and program of the event: “I am afraid I may have seemed fussy or frivolous about the decorative details of the Delhi assemblage…The decorative details of an Indian pageant are like those parts of an animal which are no use at for butcher’s meat, and are even unfit for scientific dissection, but from

111 Lytton to Victoria, 21 Apr. 1876, Mss Eur. 218/23, fol. 102, BL, AAS.
which augurs draw the omens that move armies and influence princes.” 112 Again to Disraeli, he argued that the native population expected that the Durbar announcement would inaugurate and incentivize a new era which was more favorable to their feelings and interests. In suggesting that the proposed presentation of guns and heralded banners would satisfy the princes’ great attachment “to their family pedigrees and ancestral records,” he contended that these emoluments were necessary to entice their loyalty to the crown: “Here is a great feudal aristocracy which we cannot get rid of, which we are avowedly anxious to conciliate and command, but which we have as yet done next to nothing to rally round the British Crown as its feudal head.” 113 To Salisbury, Lytton contended that the princes and chiefs’ expense and trouble during the latest visit of the Prince of Wales fueled a warranted expectation that they were entitled to material recognition. 114

History and imagination defined the character of the material emoluments and the verbal expressions of friendship to the Indian princes and chiefs. These themes expressed Britain’s recognition and thanks of India’s aristocratic contribution to British imperialism in India. On the presentation of banners to the Princes, Lytton exclaimed that they “never be unfurled without reminding you, not only of the close union between the throne of England and our loyal princely house, but also of the earnest desire of the paramount power to see your dynasty strong,

112 Lytton to Disraeli, 03 Oct. 1876, in Balfour, *The History of Lord Lytton’s Indian Administration*, 114.
114 Lytton to Salisbury, 11 May 1876, Mss Eur. 218/23, fol. 147, BL, AAS.
prosperous, and permanent.”¹¹⁵ In stating that the Empress title was in recognition of European and Native joint efforts to ensure Her Majesty’s supremacy over India, Lytton called on India’s “natural leaders” to further fulfill their responsibilities proscribed “by birth, rank, and hereditary influence” to engage with the institutions and ideas of empire.¹¹⁶ Outside the ceremonial atmosphere, Lytton met with Mayo College’s governing council, comprised partly by Rajput chiefs, for their first meeting. As President of the institution, Lytton sanctioned the council’s decisions regarding the plans for the new college buildings, to publish its first report in both English and Urdu, set a three month vacation period for pupils, and accept the offer of iron gates from former graduate Maharaja of Alwar.¹¹⁷

The centerpiece of Lytton’s political program surrounding the Imperial Assemblage was the creation of a consultative Indian Privy Council. Although adamant that his proposed council would not transfer any political power to India’s princes or popular opinion, Lytton pressed for a politically significant institution which would incorporate the active participation of India’s premier aristocracy to the governance of Indian empire. At the lead and behest of the Viceroy, it would be a purely consultative body consisting of high ranked princes, all Governors and Lieutenant-Governors, honorary members of the Royal Family, as well as former and current members of the Viceroy’s Council. His proposals were discussed among Victoria, Disraeli, and

¹¹⁶ Lytton, “Imperial Assemblage at Delhi Speech to the Native Princes,” 23 Dec. 1876, Mss Eur. E218/57, fol. 23-27, BL, AAS.
Salisbury, but were kept secret from the Viceroy’s Council, Indian Civil Service, and the public. Lytton’s proposals were scrutinized and eventually watered down. In April, Lytton assured Disraeli that his scheme would have no effect on administration or “give the least real power to the Native Chiefs,” but rather it would “flatter their *amour proper*” and ensure their ability to be personally influenced by the Viceroy. However, he contended that if the princes could have any practical effect on the council, it would “tend to check the obstructive propensities of the English mercantile members.”  

Lytton’s sentiment reflected a personal class bias which was present while planning the particular membership of the council. In rejecting a suggestion, expressed by Salisbury, on the inclusion of local European council members in the council, Lytton contended that this would “swamp” the native element “composed only of the very greatest Chiefs and Princes.” He remonstrated that if the princes found themselves not only outnumbered, but outnumbered by “British officials of no rank or status, they would regard the whole thing as a mockery.” Lastly, if admission to a council under the Sovereign, which also had honorary members of the Royal family, was truly to be respected by the “great natives,” it would not be appropriate to “include all the scrubs of the local council, ‘Gibbs’, and others.”

**Anglo-Indian and Liberal Opposition to the Indian Privy Council**

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118 Lytton to Disraeli, 30 Apr. 1876, Mss Eur. 218/23, fol. 120, BL, AAS.

On the release of his proposals in November 1876, Lytton was frustrated by the resoundingly negative response to his council proposal from the British Privy Council and the Council of India in London. For Lytton, this antagonism embodied the combination of Liberal Party opposition to the Royal Titles Bill with Anglo-Indian hostility towards his leadership. Earlier in September to Salisbury, Lytton communicated his frustration with military and civil opposition to his proposed amalgamation of native armies, and entrusting native princes with military commands. In a lengthy letter to Victoria, he argued that the princes deserved recognition for their past financial and military contributions to the Indian government, and that the council would be a small concession to this expectation. On the council, Lytton expressed frustration at London’s opposition to his proposal which “form[ed] the backbone of our whole political programme.” He explained that this was the result of a concerted effort by the Anglo-Indian press to spread nonsense regarding the Assemblage’s expense and unpopularity with native chiefs. Lastly, he suggested that if the Crown ever lost India it would not be because of her Indian subjects, but “through party spirit at home, and the disloyalty, and insubordination, of those members of your Majesty’s Indian Civil Service…” In the same mail dispatch to Britain, Lytton was confounded by Salisbury’s inability to convince the Council to support the purposed Indian council. He argued that his own Legal Department had claimed that the proposal would not need legislation, and that it would be popular at home as it was in accordance with the views

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120 Lytton to Salisbury, 28 Sep. 1876, Mss Eur. 218/23, fol. 487, BL, AAS.  
121 Lytton to Victoria, 15 Nov. 1876, Mss Eur. 218/23, fol. 608, BL, AAS.  
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of John Bright, Henry Fawcett, and others. To a compromise which created the title
“Councillor to the Empress” to be individually bestowed to selected princes, Lytton praised
Salisbury’s efforts despite personal disappointment. He stated that although it was sufficient to
meet his objective, “I should have preferred the creation of an organized council.”

The opposition from the Privy and Viceroy Councils centered upon Lytton’s proposal to
attach the status appendage “Right Honourable” to the title of Indian Privy Council members,
and how this institution might reduce the Viceroy’s power and leave him exposed to native
sentiment. Sir. H. Rawlinson, a member of the Council of India since 1868, stated that the
general feeling of the Council was against the Indian council, as the Councilors believed that it
would either be too ineffective or dangerous. His personal opinion against the measure was that
bringing the princes into direct relations with the Viceroy would weaken the latter. Sir George
Birdwood, Indologist and Civil Servant, regretted that the signifier “most honourable” was not to
be given to the Councilors of the Empress. He stated that the proposed Indian council faced
overwhelming opposition, and that only Sir Battle Frere and Sir Robert Montgomery were for
it.

Lytton’s proposals regarding the Imperial Assemblage and the Indian Privy Council were
discussed and revised with the aid of Salisbury throughout 1876. The Viceroy and the Secretary

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122 Lytton to Salisbury, 15 Nov. 1876, Mss Eur. 218/23, fol. 605, BL, AAS.
123 Lytton to Victoria, 22 Nov. 1876, Mss Eur. 218/23, fol. 623, BL, AAS.
124 Rawlinson to Lytton, 10 Nov. 1876, Mss Eur. E218/49, fol. 205, BL, AAS.
125 Birdwood to Lytton, 15 Dec. 1876, Mss Eur. E218/49, fol. 242, BL, AAS.
of State for India shared an aristocratic mentality which permeated their perspective on princely engagement and conciliation in India. Both critical of democracy and mass politics in Britain, they attempted to mediate its influence in India through strengthening the relationship between the Queen and her feudal princes. Furthermore, this mentality was informed by a shared class contempt for English educated Indians and an Anglo-Indian constituency who, they believed, worked contrary to wider imperial interests in India.

In a July response to Lytton’s May correspondence concerning the politically inert Indian masses and the need for engaging the country’s aristocracy for securing the British Empire in India, Salisbury evoked his feelings on the masses in Europe to challenge a tradition of liberal imperialism in India. He sympathized with Lytton’s view on India’s masses, arguing that nothing was clearer in the “history of this century all over Christendom than the political lifelessness of the masses,” and that “If this is true in the west-how much more in India?” In moving up the social spectrum, he criticized the loyalty of the English-educated middle class in India. In referring to them as “a deadly legacy from Metcalf and Macaulay,” he argued that “they never give any political strength to the state…In India they cannot be anything else than opposition in quiet times, rebels in times of trouble.” On the aristocracy, he argued that despite “English arrogance working against you…,” it was worth trying to engage this group as their self-interest must be strong on our side.” In emphasizing that “The Point is to get their sentiment with us too,” he supported the proposed Indian Privy Council as “a very good idea.”

126 Salisbury to Lytton, 09 Jul. 1876, IOR NEG. 11688/1, fols. 90-91, BL, AAS.
In June 1876, Salisbury communicated his support, and that of Disraeli, for Lytton’s vision for proclaiming the Queen’s new title, but warned of domestic public opinion. In addition, he backed Lytton’s ideas for conveying military titles and eventual commands to Native princes. He argued that if carried out circumspectly and over time, “it is an idea having great promise of future strength to the Empire.” As he saw no reason not to confer military titles at the Proclamation, he contended that giving some of their armies recognized status in the British army, and later allowing them to perform duties outside their own districts might be possible.

Although supportive of the general scheme of conveying honors, titles, and establishing an Indian Privy Council, Salisbury expressed to Lytton his and likely Anglo-Indian objections over specific details of his program. These related to the transference of political power from established institutions to more representative bodies. For the Conservative Secretary of State, it was the possible expansion of Anglo-Indian political power which represented the real danger of Lytton’s proposal. In regards to the council, Salisbury asked Lytton if giving councilors honorary seats in the Legislative Council was a necessary component of the plan. He argued that in lieu of the loud opposition to the Royal Titles Bill, the difficulty of legislating honorary membership would be compounded with Anglo-Indian objections to being outvoted and subjected to “coloured” men. In believing that there was no reason to invest the council with any

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127 Salisbury to Lytton, 16 Jun. 1876, IOR NEG. 11688/1, fol. 102, BL, AAS.
128 Salisbury to Lytton, 23 Jun. 1876, IOR NEG. 11688/1, fol. 107, BL, AAS.
share of government over British India, he preferred Lytton earlier remarks that “The Council should be considered entirely separate and distinct from any existing institution.”

For Salisbury, the danger of investing the Indian Privy Council with real authority was not enhancing the powers of India’s aristocracy, but rather providing a representative outlet for the Anglo-Indian community. He warned that the creation of a new imperial council with real authority would motivate Anglo-Indian demands, with support from English public opinion, for representative institutions. Although arguing that Indians would respond to the idea with ridicule:

In England, however, people are so ignorant, so impulsive, so apt to be cajoled by constitutional formulas, and philanthropic catchwords, that the possibility or a successful cry for giving power to the “people” is a danger which must not be despised. My only apprehension with respect to the new imperial council is lest in some way or other it should end in opening a road to power to the white unofficial community.

To Lytton in July, Salisbury linked a distrust over an increasingly unified and racially antagonistic Anglo-Indian community with the necessity of imperial collaboration with India’s princes. In expressing concern with a unified racist sentiment in the British army in India which mirrored that of West Indian planters and confederate slave owners, he argued for the necessity of Lytton’s plans of princely engagement accompanying the Proclamation. He stated that if England wanted to remain supreme

129 Salisbury to Lytton, 13 Jul. 1876, IOR NEG. 11688/1, fols. 133-137, BL, AAS.
130 Salisbury to Lytton, 30 Aug. 1876, IOR NEG. 11688/1, fol. 184, BL, AAS.
she must be able to appeal to the colour against the white, as well as to the white against the coloured. It is therefore not merely as a matter of sentiment and of justice, but...of safety, that we ought to try and lay the foundations of some feeling on the part of the coloured races towards the crown.  

In a subsequent dispatch to the Viceroy, Salisbury stated his disapproval and concerns over the remarks expressed in a recent personal interview with Mr. MacLean of the *Bombay Gazette*. He contended that MacLean represented “a typical specimen of the wild and ferocious Anglo-Indian” who

reproduced all that bragging fatuity which is so many places-Jamaica-St. Domingo-Cuba-Confederate State-and others has induced the resident white population to dream that they can defy their own government with one hand and keep supremacy over the coloured multitudes by their side with the other.

After this experience, he was further convinced “of the necessity of providing the Indian government with an oriental as well as European leg to stand upon.”  

In agreeing with Lytton’s acquiescence to dropping honorary membership on the Legislative Council for Indian Privy Councillors, Salisbury remarked “The only enemies, I believe, who will ever seriously threaten England’s power in India, are her own sons.”

In contrast to the Anglo-Indian community, Salisbury believed that the self-interest of India’s princes were drawing them closer to imperial partnership with Britain. On the merits for their participation in the purposed council, he argued that what they received from Britain, such

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131 Salisbury to Lytton, 07 Jul., 1876, IOR NEG. 11688/1, fols. 129-131, BL, AAS.
132 Salisbury to Lytton, 13 Jul., 1876, IOR NEG. 11688/1, fol. 133, BL, AAS.
133 Salisbury to Lytton, 30 Aug. 1876, IOR NEG.11688/1, fol. 184, BL, AAS.
as a protected border, internal peace, and commercial treaties, as well as an improved culture and widened ideas, robbed them of their internal influence and made them more dependant on Britain. Therefore, this dependency defined the necessity of such a consultative council in India in which “…the common weal of Empire should be exchanged where all can meet and hear, rather than by isolated communication.” Salisbury’s support for Lytton’s council, and a closer political and emotional connection with India’s aristocracy, represented a wider apprehension concerning the destructive role of liberal representative institutions to the British Empire. Ridiculing the racist sentiments and political aspirations of the Anglo-Indian community, Salisbury wished to strengthen Britain’s empire through aristocratic class unity rather than racial ascendancy.

Salisbury communicated to Lytton the British Privy Council’s vehement opposition to the establishment of an Indian Privy Council. He stated that beyond their contention that legal opinion was against it and that parliamentary opposition might upset relations with the native princes, the adjoining Anglo-Indian official hostility made opposition too strong. Salisbury related Liberal Party opposition to the Royal Titles Bill with hostility against the current proposal. He argued that the mostly Liberal membered Privy Council, who disliked the new Royal title, was opposed to an imperial counterpart “which you and I had attached so much importance.” Beyond remarking that this partisan association made them adverse to all propositions, he contended that they represented an “old mercantile dislike of display in any

134 Salisbury to Lytton, 30 Aug. 1876, IOR NEG.11688/1, fol. 184, BL, AAS.
form, and of all the circumstance of power, under which Lord Ellenborough used to suffer.” In regards to official opinion in India, he believed that the “violence and unrestrained animosities of Gladstone and Lowe” motivated discontent against your tenure which, if the proposal was pushed through, would have a dangerous effect in India.135 On the response of the Council of India, Salisbury argued that all but two members supported the measure, while “some were exceedingly violent” in opposition. Although with “loudly expressed unwillingness,” they accepted the other proposals and granted twenty chiefs and great officers to receive the title of Councilor of the Empress.136

Conclusion

Lytton’s attempt to inaugurate at the Imperial Assemblage a new Indian Privy Council with full participation and title given to India’s leading princes reflected a continuation of a conservative imperial tradition defined in the 1858 Queen’s Proclamation. If Mayo laid the groundwork for instructing India’s aristocracy in the principles of paternal good governance, Lytton strengthened their opportunity to be active leaders through their political and military incorporation as subordinate feudal partners within Britain’s Indian empire. In decrying the decline of individual agency and aristocratic moral leadership in England, Lytton sought to strengthen the Viceroy’s and his princely feudatories’ executive authority as agents of the now

135 Salisbury to Lytton, 10 Nov. 1876, IOR NEG. 11688/1, fols. 291-296, BL, AAS.
136 Salisbury to Lytton, 17 Nov. 1876, IOR NEG. 11688/1, fol. 299, BL, AAS. Councilors of the Empress from India included Raja of Bundi, Maharaja of Cashmere and Jammu, Maharaja of Gwalior, Maharaja of Indore, Maharaja of Jaipur, Raja of Jind, Nawab of Rampur, Maharaja of Travancore. For a full list see Wheeler, The History of the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi, 137.
titled Queen Empress. Lytton’s recourse to history and imagination in the Imperial Assemblage, which prescribed an imperial framework which bonded Crown, Lord, and peasant in common interest, was a particular Tory concept of validating rank and status through nostalgia and emotion. In exchange for Indian princely participation in the Indian Privy Council and acknowledgment of other emoluments such as peerages, banners, and honorary military titles, he envisioned a collaborative imperial framework in which princes contributed men, money, and their leadership to the maintenance of empire. Although frustrated by Anglo-Indian and liberal rejection of his measures which, he argued, stemmed from Liberal Party opposition to the Royal Titles Bill, Lytton’s ideas for imperial collaboration with India’s aristocracy had a sustained legacy beyond the nineteenth century. His tenure strengthened a political and ideological association between the Paramount Power and Indian states which became foundational to conservative opposition against Indian nationalism from the 1880s. Politically, the Imperial Service Corps and later the Chamber of Princes (1920) were institutions which not only allowed Britain to maintain some semblance of popular legitimacy, but expanded Indian opportunity for willing collaboration with empire. Ideologically, Lytton’s program continued the political reorientation of Indian empire from its nineteenth-century liberal foundations to a conservative framework tied to an aristocratic mentality which favored locality, prescription, and imagination as the basis for good governance. Beyond validating rank, status, and difference, this created an alternative imperial framework which encouraged Indians to defend and enhance local interests through a vertical imperial identity against British and Indian nationalist interventions.
Lytton’s and Salisbury’s conservative sentiments towards enticing Indian state participation in the political and military facets of empire reflected a wider apprehension concerning the limits and vulnerability of British imperial control. This reflected a British conservative perspective introduced by Ellenborough and strengthened with the Indian Revolt. This perspective held that Britain’s Indian empire must remain an “Indian” institution which incorporated the country’s local and historical circumstances. Just as Ellenborough’s Somnath Proclamation sought to flatter India’s princes with history and “local” verse, Lytton’s Imperial Assemblage’s imaginative portrayal of continuity from Mughal to British imperialism was a conservative attempt to secure India’s representation in the Empire. This allowed the Indian states to take advantage of these efforts of conciliation, and make the British Empire an institution which protected and strengthened local autonomy. Challenging the philosophical instincts of British liberal empire to politically enforce universally applicable, culturally western concepts and institutions, conservative imperialism ascribed the moral and practical necessity of local collaboration. This cemented a political and ideological relationship between the British paramount power, India’s princes, and cultural minorities which attempted to forestall the spread of liberal national and representative institutions in India later in the nineteenth century.
Chapter 6: The Kathiawar States and Conservative Empire.

Introduction

This chapter examines how the Indian states of the Kathiawar region in Western India contributed to a conservative governing framework of British imperialism in the late nineteenth century. Their rulers collaborated with a British conservative political and ideological emphasis on locality and prescription to strengthen local sovereignty and authority under Britain’s raj. This group of mostly ethnic Rajput states on the Kathiawar (Saurashtra) peninsula, which is north of Mumbai (Bombay) and straddles the Gulf of Kambhat and the Arabian Sea, came under British informal influence with the Walker Settlement in 1808. This ended decades of conflict, froze state borders, and shifted the region’s political suzerainty from the Maratha Confederacy, later represented in the Gaekwad of Baroda, to the East India Company. In 1822, Britain’s informal influenced was enhanced with the establishment of the Kathiawar Political Agency under the Bombay Presidency. This informal and ambiguous political status sustained disagreement concerning sovereignty and authority between the Kathiawar States and the British paramount power.

This analysis shows that following the 1858 Queen’s Proclamation, the Kathiawar States appropriated Mayo’s and Lytton’s conservative policies and sentiments on decentralization and

aristocratic leadership. It focuses on how the States’ simultaneously resisted and contributed to the British Empire through their participation in the Karbharis’ States Meeting and Rajkumar College. This apparent contradiction between the States’ resisting and contributing to British imperialism reflected the underlying governing reality of Britain's Indian Empire. From the outset, British rule was restrained by limited financial and administrative resources. This necessitated an imperial policy of securing acquiescence from local political and social groups to maintain empire. For British conservatives, liberal imperialism’s attempted mid-nineteenth century political centralization and spread of western civilization had shown itself incompatible to this policy by causing the Indian Revolt. The Queen’s Proclamation, as well as Mayo’s and Lytton’s advocacy for the re-establishment of locality and prescription along aristocratic principles, represented a conservative governing framework which understood the physical and material limitations of Britain’s authority in India. For Kathiawar’s states, British aristocratic bias and habitual reliance on their financial resources for politically consolidating empire provided an opportunity and means to strengthen local autonomy and authority.

The Karbharis’ States Meeting and Rajkumar College represented the Kathiawar States’ collective contribution, management, and participation in imperial governance and consolidation in the late nineteenth century. These institutions were a response to a series of judicial, criminal, and administrative jurisdictional disputes which queried Kathiawar’s political position within the Empire in the 1860s and 1870s. Besides disagreement, these institutions represented growing cooperation between Kathiawar and Britain in terms of joint British and Indian administration
over a minor ruler, public works development, and education. The Karbharis’ States Meeting, established in 1869, was a deliberative body of Kathiawar’s State Karbharis (Diwans or First Ministers) chaired by the Political Agent. Its conception and raison d’être represented the States’ collective attempt to protect local authority through the finance and management of imperial initiatives and institutions. With the Kathiawar States’ financial support, Rajkumar College, opened in 1870, was an education and training centre for the region’s future chiefs and ruling families. As the British, including Mayo, Lytton, and Lord Curzon, former Conservative MP (1886-1898) and Viceroy (1899-1905), envisioned and celebrated the College as an adapted English Public School for creating a new aristocratic class, Indian critics saw it as a centre for poor education and cultural indoctrination. Nonetheless, Rajkumar and the proliferation of princely education across India represented a British and Indian collaboration to shape a new imperial ruling class.

Debating Sovereignty and Demanding Autonomy

In the post-Revolt period, the Kathiawar States and the British peacefully clashed and resolved issues concerning state sovereignty and authority in the region. In the 1860s, the States successfully challenged the Indian government’s right to impose an income tax on the grounds that they fell outside the borders of formal British jurisdiction. In 1866, the Thakore of Bhavnagar, Jaswantsinhji (1854-1870), negotiated, with the efforts of Sir Merwanji N. Bhownaggree, father to M.M. Bhownaggree, the repossession of civil and criminal jurisdiction over 116 villages. This settlement was contrary to previous official opinion which argued,
according to an 1859 enquiry on Bhavnagar's claims, that Jaswantsinhji was just a hereditary lease holder and not a sovereign ruler.\(^{139}\)

This ruling reflected Kathiawar’s active response to British interference, and official disagreement concerning the region’s sovereignty and the appropriateness of intervention. These considerations were apparent in the response to Maj. Keatinge’s, Kathiawar Political Agent from 1863 to 1867, comprehensive set of reforms for Kathiawar. These reforms included the establishment of new administrative divisions, the introduction of a standardized currency, a new code of laws, British judicial intervention for the Garasias, an ethnic tribal group, and a new state classification. The latter allowed 1-4 Class states to have varying internal control over judicial and financial administration. In the First Class State of Bhavnagar, whose classification allowed for full internal jurisdiction, Jaswantsinhji checked Keatinge’s reforms which imposed British governing authority over his territory. Although receptive to the Political Agent’s efforts to standardize law and monetary practice, he opposed the adoption of the British Indian Civil and Criminal Codes of Procedure in Bhavnagar. Alternatively, he codified the country’s customary laws along the framework proposed by Mountstuart Elphinstone while Governor of Bombay in 1827.\(^{140}\)

In London, the India Office repeatedly questioned the depth and tone of Keatinge’s

\(^{139}\) Harilal Savailal, Samaldas Parmananddas (Bombay: Tatva-Vivechaha Press, 1912), 100.

reforms. In 1864, Charles Wood, Liberal Secretary of State for India (1859-1866), argued to Viceroy John Lawrence (1864-1869) that these measures should have been considered in detail by the Imperial Government, and that the loyalty and dignity of Kathiawar’s chiefs necessitated discretion when considering reform.\textsuperscript{141} To the Government of Bombay, Wood regretted Keatinge’s “premature action” and contended that British involvement in Kathiawar should be guided by “past promises and pledges to the Chiefs.” Moreover, he was uncertain that the chiefs agreed to the reforms.\textsuperscript{142} The subsequent Conservative administration in London was more disparaging of Keatinge’s reforms. Writing to the Indian government, Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for India (1866-1867) and later the Earl of Salisbury, censured the Political Agent for his new code of laws and continued “minute interference” in Kathiawar. In stating that the British were dealing with chiefs “remarkably tenacious of their rights and dignities, and by no means keenly alive to the advantages of English Civilization,” he argued that the latter’s alarm to the reforms was “very natural.” Furthermore, Cranborne lamented that the Political Agent “appears to have taken pleasure in ostentatiously forcing upon them a European system of administration.”\textsuperscript{143}

Col W.W. Anderson’s, Kathiawar Political Agent from 1867 to 1874, continued implementation of political and administrative reforms faced local resistance from the region’s larger states. They successfully rebuffed Anderson’s attempt to appoint a Judicial Agent to hear

\textsuperscript{141} Wood to Lawrence, 16 Dec. 1864, IOR/L/PS/732/36, BL, AAS.
\textsuperscript{142} Wood to Government of Bombay, 16 Dec. 1864, IOR/L/PS/745/22, BL, AAS.
\textsuperscript{143} Cranborne to Government of India, Aug. 1866, IOR/L/PS/745/22, BL, AAS.
Garasias complaints against state rulers, and to create a new Kathiawar police force paid for by the States. The 1884 Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency states that Anderson’s establishment of the Sabha Court (Courts of the States), which intervened on behalf of the Garasias “who failed to get justice from the chiefs,” represented a victory, as it made the chiefs relinquish internal jurisdiction over their vassals to British supervision.\(^{144}\) However, Harilal Savailal, biographer of Samaldas Parmananddas, Diwan of Bhavnagar (1879-1884), contends that the First Class States successfully rebuffed the Political Agent by appealing and receiving a compromise from the Bombay Government. After the Kathiawar Chiefs’ personal appeal and consultation with Seymour Fitzgerald, Governor of Bombay (1867-1872), the Judicial Agent scheme was replaced with the Sabha Court which had the power to hear grievances and fix obligations.\(^{145}\) Also known as the Rajasthanik Court, it consisted of the Political Agent, as President, and six government appointed members from a list recommended by the States.\(^ {146}\) Savailal argues that the Court, which lasted over 25 years, and the precedent of appealing directly to Bombay’s Governor above the Political Agent, was seen a significant victory by the States.\(^ {147}\)

Again, Anderson’s scheme to create a re-vamped Kathiawar police force to replace the established Federal Seebundy (police corps) was vigorously and successfully opposed by the

\(^{144}\) Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Volume VIII: Kathiawar (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1884), 310.

\(^{145}\) Harilal Savailal, Samaldas Parmananddas (Bombay: Tatva-Vivechaha Press, 1912), 172.


\(^{147}\) Savailal, Samaldas Parmananddas, 174.
The former’s contention that this force was needed to respond to an elevated level of violence and lawlessness failed to convince local rulers to fund its creation. The Agent’s views were collaborated by official reports. The Superintendent of the Federal Seebundy in the Southern Division of Kathiawar expressed that the current force was inefficient due to low morale. He argued that the contingent, manned by foreigners and desis (local people), received no tenure or pensions and therefore suffered from low character and a high turnover rate. In 1873, the Kathiawar Political Agency contended that the States were apathetic in their response to elevating levels of violence, which included thirty-nine villages being attacked, dozens killed or wounded, and over Rs92000 in stolen property. In response to Anderson, the States communicated their strong apprehension concerning the necessity of further expense on policing, and the possibility of losing internal jurisdiction over criminal proceedings. In discussions which revolved around the dispute over the Sabha Court, the States again appealed directly to Fitzgerald. A letter from the Princes of Nawanagar, Bhavnagar, and Junagadh questioned Anderson’s rationale for a new police force, and hoped that the Governor would maintain an earlier promise that no decision would be made without further consultation with them. Specifically, they argued that the measure was “unnecessary, needlessly expensive, and seeking...

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149 Humfrey to Anderson, 1873, IOR/R/2/18/280/43, fol. 115, BL, AAS.
150 IOR/R/2/280/43, fol. 4, BL, AAS.
to introduce quite an anomalous authority, ill calculated to serve the end it may have in view.”

They responded with a counter proposal which maintained their sovereignty and jurisdiction. It suggested that local *taluqdars* should be responsible for law enforcement on their own land, be given allowance to follow, apprehend, and kill resisting criminals across jurisdictional boundaries, and seek state assistance if needed. Moreover, they expressed their continued confusion over the necessity for a new police force. They argued that the country was more peaceful, and that many states had already organized disciplined forces at enormous expense.

Lastly, they recalled an 1861 Bombay government resolution authorizing native state responsibility for capturing criminals and promising British non-interference.

In a reply to Charles Gonne, the Government of Bombay’s Political Secretary (1864-1884), Anderson argued that he kept the States’ Karbhari fully informed of his intentions, and that their proposed reforms were an act of procrastination. Additionally, he remarked that the Bombay government’s acceptance of delay would only “encourage an unseemly and unnecessary contest between the political agent and the chiefs under his control.” Whether delay or the legitimate expression of grievance towards the Agent, Kathiawar’s rulers continued to communicated their concerns to the Bombay government. In 1872, the Rana of Porbandar complained about Anderson’s refusal to return 100 hundred men loaned to the Federal Seebundy

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151 Nawanagar, Bhavnagar, and Junagadh to Fitzgerald, 11 Apr. 1872, IOR/R/2/18/267/45, fol. 158, BL, AAS.
152 Anderson to Gonne, 25 May, 1872, IOR/R/2/18/267/45, fol. 17, BL, AAS.
153 Anderson to Gonne, 25 May, 1872, IOR/R/2/18/267/45, fol. 17, BL, AAS.
154 Anderson to Gonne, 27 Jun. 1872, IOR/R/2/18/267/45, fol. 162, BL, AAS.
to repress Wagheer (a caste group in Kathiawar) criminals in 1866. In 1874, the Nawab of Junagadh, in correspondence with Philip Edmund Wodehouse, Governor of Bombay (1872-1877), labelled Anderson’s police proposal “unwise, unnecessary and uncalled for,” and that the Wagheers were forced into a criminal element by the latter’s policies. The States’ ability to resist and supersede the Political Agent’s authority on the Sabha Court and a new police force by exacting compromise from the Bombay government, revealed British administrative and financial limitations in exercising paramount control. Into the 1870s, the States collectively took advantage of these limitations to maintain their local autonomy and authority by utilizing British initiatives towards decentralization and princely education and leadership.

Joint Minority Administrations

Amid this increasing disagreement, the 1860s and 1870s saw the British and the Kathiawar States undertake constructive schemes of joint minority administrations. Supported and expanded under Mayo, this framework facilitated joint British and Indian governing administration and supervision over minority age rulers. This occurred in the State of Rajkot in 1867, the State of Gondal in 1869, and Bhavnagar in 1870. In the latter, E.H. Percival, later J.W. Watson, and Gaorishankar Udayashankar’s, the State’s Diwan, joint administration, during Takhtsingji’s (1870-1896) minority between 1870 and 1877, demonstrated successful British and Kathiawar state cooperation. This included major reforms to the revenue system, reduced tariffs

155 Rana of Porbandar to Government of Bombay, 1872, IOR/R/2/18/273/56, BL, AAS.
156 Nawab of Junagadh to Wodehouse, 21 Jul. 1874, IOR/R2/18/267/45, fol. 98, BL, AAS.
on exported and imported goods, construction of bridges and canals, planting trees, and the opening of a high school in Bhavnagar. According to David Wedderburn (1835-1882), Liberal MP, world traveller, and brother-in-law to Percival, in his article titled “Protected Princes in India” (1878) for The Nineteenth Century, the combination of Indian and British influence made Bhavnagar’s joint administration the most successful minority government in India. Although noting that the European administrator had overriding authority in a disagreement with the “Native” member, he maintained that this had never occurred in six years as “a happy blending of European and native ideas was accomplished.” To Wedderburn, this blending effected a particular advantage in regards to enacting appropriate reform in Kathiawar: “The Native minister, thoroughly understanding his own country, kept his European colleague clear of the besetting error of forcing on changes beneficial in themselves, but premature.”

Udayashankar’s influence and Percival’s consideration for Bhavnagar’s interests was demonstrated over the Sabha Court and Kathiawar police force. In his note to Gonne, Anderson noted his frustration and surprise that Percival was “participating” in the States’ “procrastination” over the issues. The success of Bhavnagar’s joint administration raised the profile of the States’ Karbhars, and informed the States’ association and contribution to the establishment of

159 Anderson to Gonne, 27 Jun. 1872, IOR/R/2/18/267/45, fol. 162, BL, AAS.
Rajkumar College.

Karbharis States’ Meeting

In 1869, Anderson proposed a constitution for Kathiawar centred upon the creation of a “Legislative Council of Kattywar”. In a draft copy to Gonne, Article One stated that the Council’s political and administrative purpose was “To legislate rules and regulations for the better administration of civil as well as criminal justice in the province and for the purpose of securing the rights and privileges of the several states.”\(^{160}\) With the Political Agent as President and twenty-two state representatives, the Council would be restricted to criminal and civil administration, and prohibited from interfering with the internal affairs of an individual state. Moreover, the President could veto any legislation which was deemed contrary to the spirit of British Indian legislation, Imperial government policy, or contrary to the Walker Settlement.\(^{161}\) Anderson’s proposed constitution met overt opposition from the Bombay government and the First Class States of Kathiawar. Bombay argued that although one day a need would arise for such a council, “There are other antecedent reforms necessary” before the establishment of such an institution.\(^{162}\) On the other hand, the Kathiawar Chiefs contended that their local autonomy and legislative power would be curtailed by the council. A year later, they responded by establishing their own representative institution for joint deliberation and uniform action called the Karbharis’ States Meeting.

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\(^{160}\) Anderson to Gonne, 30 Sep. 1869, IOR/R/2/18/232/43, BL, AAS.

\(^{161}\) Anderson to Gonne, 30 Sep. 1869, IOR/R/2/18/232/43, BL, AAS.

\(^{162}\) Bombay Government to Anderson, 23 Mar. 1870, IOR/R/2/18/232/43, BL, AAS.
Established in 1870, the Karbharis’ States Meeting was a representative body of Class 1-4 Karbhari that convened annually and maintained a series of committees which operated year round. According to its self-produced 1947 manual detailing its history and organization, the Karbharis’ two central objectives were to deliberate as well as take joint and uniform action in response to Agency proposals which may affect all states, and maintain, manage, and operate all the States’ Central Institutions. To that end, it established a Cadre Committee, which received reports from the Central institutions, a Re-appropriation Committee, which transferred available funds to earmarked budget items, a Falo Committee, which collected money to fund the budget, an Audit Committee, and a Standing Committee which administered correspondence and fixed the agenda for the Annual Meeting. The latter ensured that the Karbharis could negotiate and reach a unanimous agreement at the Annual Meeting.\(^{163}\)

To the Bombay *Times of India*, the Karbharis’ States Meeting was a significant and colourful event despite the internal secrecy of its proceedings. In their 1886 report of the Meeting, they commended the institution as representing a “modified form of local self-government,” and praised its contribution to the civil hospital as well as Garasias and female education. This approval was tempered with the comment that its praiseworthy activities relied greatly upon the Political Agent’s “tact and temper” as the Meeting’s President.\(^ {164}\) In addition, the *Times of India* usually remarked on the outside carnival atmosphere surrounding the event.


\(^{164}\) *Times of India*, 16 Aug. 1888, p. 4.
As the 1886 report remarked that the Meeting’s “usual liveliness” was moderated by the illness of the Governor’s wife, an 1888 editorial contrasted the jovial sport and entertainment surrounding the event with the Meeting’s internal secrecy.165

The Karbharis represented an important mechanism for the Kathiawar States to assert their local autonomy and authority through financing and managing British inspired institutions and reforms. Primarily, this represented the Karbharis’ financial contribution, management, and supervision of the General Fund and Central Institutions. Established in 1879, the General Fund spawned from an earlier gift of Rs35000 by Kathiawar’s major states and Rs100000 by the State of Bhavnagar in a demonstration of loyalty upon the visit of the Duke of Edinburgh in 1871. In the 1870s, these states each made significant Rs10000 contributions to a permanent road fund which had constructed 559 miles of road by 1878.166 The General Fund consolidated state efforts towards financing public works and the Central Institutions. It called for an Rs121000 annual contribution to be supplied by Class 1-4 States, with additional funds available only after negotiations between the Political Agent and the Karbharis.167 Additionally, the States’ agreement with the Agency prescribed that in exchange for this annual contribution, District Officers could no longer levy money for projects. Moreover, the Fund’s annual budget had to be jointly sanctioned by the Karbharis and the Political Agent.168

165 Times of India, 23 Aug. 1886, p. 4; Times of India, 16 Aug. 1888, p. 4.
166 A Manual of Karbharis’ Meeting, 49,440-444.
167 Ibid, 50-59, 444.
168 Savailal, Samaldas Parmananddas, 229.
As stated in the Karbharis manual, the Central Institutions were “items of contribution…paid for and maintained by the States of Kathiawar for the common benefit of the States and the Agency.”\textsuperscript{169} The Karbharis maintained complete financial management as well as decision over appointments regarding these institutions. With regards to education, the major items of funding were the Hunter’s Training College, Barton Female Training College, and Rajkumar College. The States’ monetary contribution to Hunter, which increased yearly from Rs1000 in 1879 to Rs9200 in 1886, and Barton, which they allotted Rs36300 through a special subscription with an additional Rs3960 yearly in grants and scholarships, ensured their supervision and control over these institutions.\textsuperscript{170} The construction and maintenance of Rajkumar College was the most significant expenditure under the Karbharis’ supervision. Until the establishment of an Indian government grant in 1904, the Kathiawar States were primarily responsible for funding the College. In 1868, Kathiawar’s states subscribed Rs30000 out of the Rs50000 needed, the remaining Rs20000 coming from the Bombay government’s Infanticide Fund, for the construction of the original buildings. In 1874 and 1878, the minor Thakore of Bhavnagar, under joint administration, donated Rs70000 to establish a permanent Endowment Fund for the College. In August 1897, a Karbharis resolution established that the States would contribute yearly the amount equal to the Fund’s interest or deficit so that the Fund’s principal could grow.\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{169} A Manual of Karbharis’ Meeting, 37.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid, 97-152.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid, 214.
The Kathiawar States’ financial contribution and supervision of Hunter, Barton, and Rajkumar Colleges allowed their Karbhari to prevent unwanted British interference over budgetary issues and staff appointments. In 1899, the Karbharis affirmed their control over staff appointments at Hunter by overriding the decision of the Principal. This led to the Bombay government’s confirmation that all candidates forwarded to the Political Agent for approval must be chosen by the States’ representatives. With regards to Rajkumar, the Karbharis defended its budgetary authority against the School’s College Council which was strongly influenced by its President, the Political Agent, and other European members including the Principal and the Government’s Director of Education. The Karbharis rejected proposals in 1885, 1908, and 1910 to surrender their budgetary authority to the College Council. In 1911, the Karbharis defended their trusteeship over the Endowment Fund after a challenge from the School’s Principal. Moreover, the Principal’s request that the College Council should have the right to spend beyond the Karbharis’ prescribed budget was refused by the States. In 1923, they successfully rebuffed the Political Agent’s attempt to supersede their budgetary authority over Rajkumar. Maintaining financial control over the Central Institutions remained paramount for the Kathiawar States. In 1880, they refused an offer of a state grant for Rajkumar from the Bombay Government who were concerned over the School’s repeated deficits. Although adamant to

172 Ibid, 68.
175 Ibid, 65.
176 Ibid 282.
maintain their prescribed authority, the Karbharis were willing to provide additional money and allow outside financial support for the improvement of the College under the right conditions. At the request of the College Committee in 1892, they approved additional funds to appoint a Law Lectureship for the purpose of giving students an education on basic legal principals.\(^{177}\) In 1904, they accepted Viceroy Lord Curzon’s (1899-1905) proposal to standardize and centralize funding for Rajkumar and a system of princely education in India. This meant relinquishing their control over the appointment of a European Vice-Principal in exchange for a grant to the College from the Indian Government.\(^{178}\) The Karbharis’ Meeting agenda papers for 1933 demonstrates its supervisory function over the Central Institutions and public works in Kathiawar. Beyond a series of accounting tables listing the minute budget elements of Hunter, Barton, and Rajkumar Colleges, there is included a series of explanatory notes requesting additional funds from the Karbharis. With an ending statement from the Political Agency concerning the merit of the request and a recommendation on its acceptance, in 1933 Barton College requested a recurrent Rs100 travel grant, two new harmoniums worth Rs150, and Rs50 for a new globe.\(^{179}\)

The Karbharis represented the Kathiawar States’ collective response to the political agent’s administrative interference over the region’s judicial, criminal, and educational initiatives. In a 1900 speech to the princes and chiefs of Kathiawar, Curzon praised their

\(^{177}\) Ibid, 294.
\(^{178}\) Ibid, 284.
\(^{179}\) Agenda Papers for the Karbharis’ Meeting: to be held on the 10th March (Morvi: Maharaja of Morvi, 1933), 20-21.
representative body as resembling a “species of local diet or parliament.” Moreover, he commended the States’ for their beneficial mutual cooperation: “The Chiefs of this Province reminded me in fact of a soft medieval guild constituted for the purposes of co-operation in matters where the interests of all coincide, or can be best be advanced by common actions.”

The States’ ability to supersede the political agent and gain recognition from Bombay, Calcutta, and London represented their contribution and management of British inspired public works education. The Kathiawar States appropriated these reforms not only to strengthen local autonomy and authority, but also develop a voice to influence the constitutional makeup of British India into the twentieth century,

**Rajkumar College**

The Rajkumar College represented a joint British and Kathiawar contribution to developing a new imperial ruling class in India. As the British saw the institution as the means to mould a Victorian valued, aristocratic class in India, Kathiawar’s chiefs viewed their financial contribution and physical enrollment as validating an elevated political status within the British Empire. Rajkumar’s facilitation of these twin objectives made it an imperial institution. Conceptually, Rajkumar College was founded and operated upon British racial prejudice informed by Victorian and aristocratic social values. Initially promoted by Keatinge, Rajkumar, located centrally at Rajkot in Kathiawar, represented an expansion of princely education as communicated by Mayo’s 1870 speech in Ajmere. Following Rajkumar, Mayo College (1875) in

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Rajputana, Daly College (1882) in Indore, and Aitchison College (1886) in Lahore served as the major centres for princely education in the late nineteenth century.

In an attempt to counter what they believed to be the degrading social influence of a ruling court’s child rearing practices, the British employed Eton and the English Public School model to disseminate aristocratic and Victorian values for training young chiefs and their families as future governors. Removed from their courts, either as State Wards or upon agreement of the child’s family, and placed in these colleges which resembled highly decorative boarding schools, Kathiawar and Indian ruling families were exposed to an academic and physical curriculum which attempted to instill the values of independence, manliness, chivalry, and loyalty. Although Rajkumar was officially inspired and intellectually defined by British initiatives, the role of Indian financial contribution, supervision, and student participation made this an imperial institution. It represented a space in which not only the Kathiawar ruling elite could contribute and participate in the British Empire, but also gain knowledge and social legitimacy for strengthening state autonomy and authority.

For the British, the establishment of schools for princely education reflected their concerns over the lack of proper education and negative character influences emanating from ruling courts across India. In a response to the Government of Bombay’s circular seeking opinion on education for chiefs, Keatinge communicated the necessity of such an endeavour to mitigate domestic influences:

No person acquainted only with our own Province, or with the educated Natives of
our Presidency, can conceive the degraded atmosphere in which lads are brought up, who are destined to rule over several hundred villages, to enjoy incomes amounting to lacs of rupees, and to possess powers of life and death over their own subjects.

Keatinge elaborated that in the smaller states youths were negatively affected by “the contact with slaves, opium-eaters, and drunkards…” At Rajkumar College’s opening ceremony in December 1870, Anderson and Governor Fitzgerald defined the institution’s role as intellectually and physically fitting Kathiawar’s ruling class with the moral strength of manly character. Anderson stated that at Rajkumar, the region’s youths would be exposed to “a manly education and physical training in order to make them strong and healthy and intelligent governors and administrators of the people of their ancestral dominions.” After, Fitzgerald praised Anderson’s emphasis on the physical as well as mental education at the College. In associating physical assertion with genteel values, he argued that the pupils should “take pleasure in feats of strength and activity, to ride well, to shoot well, to have the taste for manly pursuits which as English country gentlemen seldom fails to obtain at a public school.” Speaking at the College’s Tenth Prize Day Ceremony to assembled pupils, alumni, staff, and officials in 1880, James Fergusson, Governor of Bombay (1880-1885), expressed that the pupils’ study and exercise were suited for purposes beyond developing intelligence and strengthening

"constituencies.” In determining that the College served to build character, he contended that it would fit them to “lead manly lives, to rise above indulgence in sensual ease, and to practice virtue in [their] future spheres.” At the Twelfth Prize Day Ceremony in January 1883, Mr. Selby, the acting Principal of Rajkumar, elaborated on the College’s political and social influence upon its graduates. He argued that although at first their education in English ideas had only facilitated contact with English opinion and society, later the pupils’ shared experience and education produced a community of interest which was novel in Kathiawar:

They feel the benefit of their education in their own enlarged capacities and extended influence. In this way there is, I believe, growing up a corporate feeling which is of great value from an educational point of view. It acts in their way when men or boy begin to feel that they are no longer isolated units, but that they are bound together by membership of one body and at one a standard of conduct in created to which every member of the body must conform.

Beyond Kathiawar, the attempt to create an aristocratic class in India with British values, through the establishment of princely colleges modelled after the English Public School, became a political objective of the British Raj into the twentieth century. In 1902, Curzon headed a conference at Calcutta dedicated to consolidating and improving a system of princely education. Its goals were to inquire into princely college operation, and propose means to increase Indian state participation. Opening the conference, Curzon speculated upon the failings of the current system and Indian state objections towards participation. He proposed solutions which

\[^{184}\text{Speech of Fergusson, 25 Dec. 1880, in Bhavnagar, } Forty Years of Rajkumar College, \text{ Vol. II, 148.}\]
\[^{185}\text{Speech of Selby, 15 Jan. 1883, in Bhavnagar, } Forty Years of Rajkumar College, \text{ Vol. II, 171.}\]
emphasised the applicability of the English Public School model to instructing India’s aristocratic class. Similar to wider British rationale for establishing princely colleges, Curzon considered it an opportunity for India’s ruling elite to disassociate themselves from “the hot-house atmosphere of indulgence and adulation in which bygone times too many of the Native Aristocracy have been brought up.” Similar to Mayo’s contention that British guidance in developing princely instruction strengthened the legitimacy of ancient rulers, he argued that this education would make “their sons and relatives better and more useful men; and not to stunt their liberties, but to invigorate their freedom.”\(^{186}\) For Curzon, India’s ruling class’ consistent opposition and non-involvement with British guided education represented the deeply conservative nature of Indian society. He submitted that in trying to model the colleges after the English public school, which represented a combination of British aristocratic and democratic principles, they were seen as an affront to India’s prescribed race and class distinctions.\(^{187}\) Curzon proposed that to induce more chiefs to commit their sons and family to these institutions, they should remain distinctive from the broader system of English higher education in India. Therefore, the princely colleges must be “seminaries for the aristocratic classes” in which education had a businesslike and practical focus and “…constituted not to prepare for examination, but to prepare for life.” Lastly, Curzon purposed an appropriate standard curriculum. He submitted that the lesser chiefs and \textit{jagirdars} or \textit{zamindars} should be taught


cultivation and administrative skills, and that prominent rulers should receive “all-round education” in political science, history, geography, mathematics, and political economy.\textsuperscript{188} Most of Curzon’s proposals informed the development of a common curriculum and Diploma Program in a second conference held at Ajmere in 1904. Beyond the established subjects of History, English and Indian, and Geography, the Diploma required courses in law, political economy, and land revenue. In addition, the 1904 reforms included the establishment of imperial grants for the colleges to lower the costs of tuition and hire European staff. Lastly, it made college instructors Indian Civil Servants and facilitated their transfer between institutions.\textsuperscript{189}

Although Rajkumar’s conception and curriculum were defined by British initiative and values, the Kathiawar States’ substantial contribution to its operation and enrolment created a new space for personal and state relationships among the region’s future rulers. As the Bombay Government’s Director of Public Instruction determined the curriculum and the Principal controlled the School’s daily operation, the States participated on its governing bodies. These were the College Committee, later the College Council, and the Board of Visitors. The College Committee, established by an 1871 Karbharis Resolution, was body of twelve members entrusted with the school’s general management. It consisted of six European officials, including the Political Agent and Director of Public Instruction, and six Indian members chosen by the States. In 1889, four extra members from the States were added to the Committee.\textsuperscript{190} Three years later,

\textsuperscript{189} Bhavnagar, \textit{Forty Years of Rajkumar College}, Vol. I, 90-98.  
\textsuperscript{190} \textit{A Manual of the Karbharis’ Meetings}, 209.
the Bombay government reformed the Committee in an attempt to increase Indian participation and enrollment in the College. Now known as the College Council, it settled at fifteen members plus the President in which twelve members were elected from the Board of Visitors. The latter body consisted of every prince, chief, and administrator who made a substantial financial donation and enrolled their son or ward, all former pupils, and those who were once an Education Commissioner, Judicial Officer, or Political Agent. The vote remained with the Chiefs.¹⁹¹

The College had an enrollment of twelve pupils in its augural years, among them important Court Wards including the Thakores of Bhavnagar, Morvi, Rajkot, and the heir-apparent of Wadhwan. In this period, Rajkumar and other princely colleges relied on the enrollment of Court Wards under the supervision of a Political Agency or provincial government. In two years, the number of pupils increased to twenty-two. J.B. Pelie, Acting Political Agent in 1873 and Political Agent 1874-1878, submitted that the pupils were not wanting in their studies and were “equally happy and full of spirit at cavalry drill, in the gymnasium, and at a match of cricket or foot-ball.”¹⁹² In 1878, enrollment increased to thirty-five students, although a significant number were still Wards. In this year, the Kathiawar Agency reported on the students’ excellent conduct and the rising confidence of the local chiefs in sending their sons to Rajkumar.¹⁹³ As per the intentions of British officials and Charles McNaughton (1870-1894), the

¹⁹¹ Ibid, 406.
¹⁹² Gonne, 28 Aug. 1873, IOR/R/2/18/295/76.
¹⁹³ Bombay Political Department, 30 Oct. 1878, IOR/L/P&S/7/351/34, BL, AAS.
School’s first Principal (1870-1894), the pupils received a combination of academic and physical instruction during their time in Rajkot. Usually enrolled between the age of twelve and nineteen, the pupils were placed in a class system tied to age and skill attainment. Until 1904 and the introduction of the Diploma Course, there was no degree requirement for students. They simply left the School at their parents’ request or upon the completion of their minority.

At the First Prize-Speech Day Ceremony, the pupils performed readings of English and Gujarati works. These included the Thakore of Limbdi’s rendition of Matthew Arnold’s “Sohrab and Rustum” (1853), Harisinhji of Bhavnagar’s performance of Thomas Babington Macaulay’s “Clive” (1840), and the Thakore of Morvi’s recital of Mansukram’s “The Duty of Man.”\textsuperscript{194} These readings represented the importance that history and biography featured in the College’s early curriculum. A report from the Bombay Education Department on the College’s operation argued that these subjects were producing positives effect on the young princes.\textsuperscript{195} A report by Mr. M. Macmillian, future Principal and Professor of English Literature at Elphinstone College, questioned the appropriateness of the pupils’ additional labours on poetry and classic literature. Rather than learning how to read and recite Shakespeare’s \textit{Macbeth} and Homer’s \textit{Iliad}, he argued that the pupils should focus on the acquirement of written and conversational English for communication with high government officials.\textsuperscript{196} Pupils were routinely tested in reading, composition, grammar, dictation, and recitation. At the age of fourteen, the Thakore of Gondal,

\textsuperscript{194} Bhavnagar, \textit{Forty Years of Rajkumar College}, Vol. II, 35.  
\textsuperscript{195} Bhavnagar, \textit{Forty Years of Rajkumar College}, Vol. I, 72.  
\textsuperscript{196} Bhavnagar, \textit{Forty Years of Rajkumar College}, Vol. II, 72-73.
Shree Bhagvat Sinhjee, was receiving English instruction in subjects including English and Gujarati literature, verse, history of England and India, astronomy, geometry, algebra, arithmetic and natural philosophy. A sample of Rajkumar’s Diploma examination in 1910 and Class One curriculum reveals a later significance on history and geography specifically relating to the British Empire. As the pupils read from Cyril Ransome’s History of England (1899) and Vincent Arthur Smith’s History of India (1906), in geography they learned and replicated maps of India and the British colonies

Physical instruction was significant in Rajkumar’s daily routine and extra-curricular activity. This included military-styled drills, riding on horseback, gymnastics, athletics, and field sports. Although it is unclear whether Rajkumar’s physical instruction reflected British stereotypes concerning Rajput’s society martial nature, Kathiawar did possess a cultural and social tradition which emphasized militant characteristics and attributes. J.A. Mangan, in his study of the association between British imperialism and the Victorian game ethic, views India’s princely colleges as conduits in which Victorian imperialists attempted to reproduce characteristics of manliness and leadership among the country’s young ruling class. On the other hand, Tambs-Lyche’s study on Rajputs in Kathiawar and Malavika Kasturi’s analysis on

Rajput lineages in North India demonstrate how this ethnic and Hindu community maintained a social adherence to martial valour, skill, and loyalty which sustained a cultural definition of masculinity.\textsuperscript{200} In regards to Kathiawar, Tambs-Lyche sees that a local devotion to Rama (God-King) informed kingship and vassalage ideals which promoted obedience to authority and a code of honor from the seventeenth century. Moreover, he argues that the requirement of martial valour and skill to obtain and hold territory, made the horse an important symbol for power and ceremony. The similarity between Victorian and Rajput ideals of masculine behaviour encouraged Kathiawar’s future ruling class to participate and excel in Rajkumar’s curriculum. According to British reports from Rajkumar, the Kathiawar pupils showed considerable horsemanship and were enthusiastic on the playing field.\textsuperscript{201}

As a former pupil, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan’s 1898 study of the College illustrates the institution’s daily physical and academic routine. At 6am they began drills, gymnastics, and exercises. Following their class time from 10am to 5pm with an hour’s lunch, the pupils engaged in further physical assertion by rotating through different sporting activities including cricket, racquets, football, and tennis until dinner at 8pm and bedtime at 10pm.\textsuperscript{202} The Principal and faculty measured pupils’ physical activity along with their academic achievement. Although academically gifted, Sinhjee of Gondal was criticized by Principal Mcnaughton for being “too

\textsuperscript{201} Macnaghten to Director of Public Instruction, May 1872, IOR/R/2/18/275, BL, AAS.
\textsuperscript{202} Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, \textit{The Ruling Chiefs of Western India and the Rajkumar College} (Bombay: Thacker, 1898), 14.
much inclined to be sedentary and physically inactive.”\textsuperscript{203} In addition to a resident drill master, from 1897 the College employed a Cricket Coach at a pay of Rs75 per month.\textsuperscript{204} The promotion of cricket and its appropriation by the pupils, past and present, made the sport a vehicle for inter-Kathiawar competition and friendship. In 1876, Rajkumar College competed in its first match with the Kathiawar High School, with its side losing 77 to 46.\textsuperscript{205} Besides playing matches against Mayo and Daly Colleges, the Rajkumar side competed against teams organized by former pupils Jasvatsinhji of Limbdi and Kalubha of Wadhwan.\textsuperscript{206} In 1899, Rajkumar’s Principal, C.W. Weddington, established the “Old Boys Gathering,” a recurring event in which alumni interacted with current pupils in a series of physical activities.\textsuperscript{207} Like external political interference which motivated the establishment of the Karbharis’ States Meeting, the appropriation of cricket shows that a British-inspired educational and recreational curriculum facilitated common experiences and collective reactions from pupils at Rajkumar.

Britons acquainted with Kathiawar were pleased with the class of Indian English Public School graduates at Rajkumar College. In 1873, Peile expressed to Gonne that the early class of pupils at Rajkumar were now demonstrating “a mental and physical activity, a cultivated lively and natural manner, and a capacity for school boy friendships and for mixing with English

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\textsuperscript{203} Singh, \textit{Shree Bhagvat Sinhjee}, 27.
\textsuperscript{204} \textit{A Manual of Karbharis’ Meeting}, 361.
\textsuperscript{205} Bhavnagar, \textit{Forty Years of Rajkumar College}, Vol. II, 69.
\textsuperscript{206} Bhavnagar, \textit{Forty Years of Rajkumar College}, Vol. I, 160.
\end{flushleft}
society…” To the British and British Indian Press, the College had created a class of loyal, liberal, manly, and independent princes keen to be junior partners in the Empire. *Blackwood’s Magazine*, in a larger feature on Kathiawar in 1876, expressed admiration that at Rajkumar the region’s chiefs were “well-instructed, well-trained, well-looked after even during their amusements” which were “regulated so as to aid in the development of manly and social qualities.” Beyond creating a new type of chief quite unaccustomed in Kathiawar, they believed that practices at Rajkumar would, if applied to England, “effect a good deal of change in the rising nobility and gentry of England.”²⁰⁹ In 1879, the *Times of India* preferred education at Rajkumar to the previous practice of hiring resident English tutors in Kutch and Baroda. In reviewing the College’s character building, academic, and physical activities, they remarked that its education “is something more than mere knowledge of books…the young princes acquire some notions of chivalry, manliness, and practical experience of the ways of life.” Moreover, they argued that this instruction and the environment, which treated the pupils equally, resembled “the manner of our public schools at home.” They cautioned, however, that due to India’s class divisions “English equality cannot quite be expected in an Indian College.”²¹⁰ Emphasizing Mayo’s desire to create an “Indian Eton” at Ajmere, the *Times of India* anticipated that the College’s graduates would play an important political and social role in British India. In 1884,

²⁰⁸ Pelie to Gonne, 17 Feb. 1873, IOR/R/2/18/295, fol.76, BL, AAS.
²¹⁰ *Times of India*, 09 May, 1879, p. 2.
they contended that as Rajkumar’s pupils were learning “new ideas and responsibilities fitted to their position,” it could be imagined that just as “The Duke of Wellington is popularly reported to have said that the Battle of Waterloo was really won on the play-grounds of Eton. The Rajkot Eton is likely to have an influence quite as important upon the future history of Western India.” In 1886, the *Times of India* listed the accomplishments of recent graduates. It argued that “The Eton of Western India is now a very important political factor,” which represented an “increasing amount of confidence on the part of the native aristocracy.” Sir William Wilson Hunter’s 1892 study of the Bombay Presidency argued that Rajkumar College, and the general incorporation of English education had a significant influence on the latest generation of Kathiawar rulers. He especially credited Rajkumar’s influence for Takhatsinhji’s conduct and character. He proposed that this represented Takhatsinhji’s ability to rule independently from officials, and his proclivity to spend revenue “wisely and liberally” while remaining “thoroughly loyal to the British Power.”

Unlike their English counterparts, the Indian Press mostly criticized academic and cultural instruction at Rajkumar. Representative of growing nationalist sentiment, this press questioned the type and quality of administrative instruction as compared to the system of higher education. It also noted that British cultural indoctrination alienated Indian princes from the

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211 *Times of India*, 24 Nov. 1884, p. 4.
212 *Times of India*, 29 Jan. 1886, p. 4.
indigenous population. The *Native Opinion*, published in the *Times of India* in 1877, questioned the Kathiawar princes’ desire to utilise the disseminated education, and criticized its impact on their relationship with the British. They recalled an incident in which the young Maharaja of Kolhapour stood at attention when the Assistant Political Agent entered the room, and communicated with the visiting Governor that he was told at Rajkumar to offer a standing salaam to every European he saw. They argued that this incident was “indicative of the fashion in which the mind of the Princes is being moulded and taught to regard as heaven-born every European they meet with in the street.”

In 1887, the *Mahratta* submitted that the chiefs’ education at Rajkumar not only ill-prepared them for their sole responsibility of governing states, but also taught them morally questionable British practices. It argued that beyond a lack of knowledge and training in judicial and administrative work, the College taught them to “become fine gentlemen; they learn to appreciate manly sports such as cricket, racing or any other of the nature; they are well taught how to spend money like princes.”

In 1888, the *Indu Praskesh* highlighted Rajkumar’s social and cultural indoctrination. It contended that although the training of princes was of “national importance,” the Government’s efforts to reform princely schools had not improved these institutions. In addition, they compared the schools’ graduates to the “completely Anglicized” Duli p Singh to show how English education was separating princes from their subjects.

Two years later, the *Praskesh* again summed up the Anglicizing influence

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emanating from Rajkumar and similar colleges:

The education at present imparted to the Native Princes in the Rajkumar Colleges is not what it should be. It only makes them regular, neat, liberal-minded, jolly, appreciative...In fact, they thereby acquire qualities possessed by an English gentleman, along with some English vices which it would be better not to enumerate. But the education required to make a good administrator is, in the opinion of some men, kept out of reach. 217

Outside the press, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan maintained that Rajkumar needed various reforms to improve the educational and social experiences of its pupils. Beyond the introduction of higher educated and gentlemanly European and English instructors, the College should provide more instruction and examination on revenue and judicial subjects, as well as practical training in administration. Moreover, he argued that it should associate more closely with Kathiawar’s public school system, and accept enrollment from a larger section of wealthy families as this would facilitate beneficial contact among social groups. 218

It is apparent that Kathiawar’s princes and chiefs were mostly pleased with their instruction and experiences at Rajkumar College. Takhtsingji of Bhavnagar, one of the first pupils enrolled in 1870, donated Rs50000 to expand the College Hall. 219 At its opening ceremony in 1879, Takhtsingji communicated his commitment to the Empire with a fondness for his experiences at Rajkumar

These two buildings here in Rajkot, which we are opening to-day, are indeed the fulfillment of the natural wishes of my heard: It is natural that, as a Chief, I should

218 Khan, The Ruling Chiefs of Western India and the Rajkumar College, 18-26.
wish to celebrate the assumption of the title of Empress by that great Sovereign under whose sway our small Principalities enjoy the blessings of peace. It is natural, too, that I should wish to increase the capacity of the influence of a College in which I spent the early years of my youth, and of which I have very present and happy recollections, that’s to the care and kindness of my preceptor, Mr. Macnaghten, for whom I cannot but always have the greatest affection.220

Upon taking their state thrones, Kathiawar’s princes and chiefs communicated a belief that Rajkumar’s instruction would benefit their personal rule and relationship with the British Empire. In 1882, the Maharajah of Edar expressed a hope that his education at Rajkumar and from private tutors “would show good results.”221 Sinhjee of Gondal, at his installation ceremony in 1884, expressed gratitude to the Bombay Government and Rajkumar College, especially Mr. Macnaghten, for their attention to his studies in India and England.222 In 1885, the Thakore of Wudhwan stated that “I owe much to the Rajkumar College and to Macnaghten personally, who has taken great interest in the progress of my studies.”223

Although most pupils ended their education at Rajkumar, a few prominent students continued their studies in England and India. Some also received positions in the Indian government. For example, Sinhjee, following Rajkumar, studied Medicine at Edinburgh University in 1886, and received an honorary LL.D degree from Edinburgh in 1887.224

221 Times of India, 14 Jul. 1882, p. 5
223 Times of India, 24 Nov. 1885, p. 4
224 Dave, A Short History of Gondal, 153, 156.
Harbhamji of Morvi, who earned an M.A and later became a Barrister of Law, and Jehangir Mian, Shakh Saheb of Mangrol, attained positions in the Indian Civil Service. The latter received an appointment as a Statutory Civilian, was posted in Ahmedabad and placed in charge of the Dholka Taluka. Jasvantshingji of Limbdi was the College’s first student appointed to the Bombay Legislative Council in 1884, a position held for two years. The conferences at Calcutta and Ajmere to standardize princely education reflected a continued wariness from Indian ruling families to sending their sons and heirs to Rajkumar and other colleges. The Maharaja of Kolhapur’s, Shri Shahu Chhatrapati, experiences and reflections of Rajkumar, between 1886 and 1889, provides a mixed account of the institution’s value in developing a princely class in India. A.B. Latthe’s memoir of Chhatrapati details how the young Maharaja enjoyed and excelled at Horse Riding and Shikar (big game hunting), and made a lifelong friend of Bhavsingji, Prince of Bhavnagar (1896-1919), as well as sporting and vacation partners with the Princes of Jumnagar and Dharangadra. Later in life, Latthe’s accounts Chhatrapati’s dissatisfaction with instruction at the chiefs’ colleges, and his refusal to send his sons to any of them. The Maharaja expressed his opinion concerning the colleges’ limitations in a note to his fellow princes before the Conference of Princes in 1916. In disputing the notion that India’s

225 Bhavnagar, *Forty Years at Rajkumar College*, 205.
princes refused to educate their sons due to carelessness or tradition, he argued that they were willing “to send them to colleges like the Deccan or the Elphinstone College or even to England and America. But they are not sent to our present Chiefs Colleges. This is because these Colleges are not properly equipped and manned.”

Section Conclusion

Rajkumar College and the Karbharis’ States Meeting provided spaces for the Kathiawar States to define their engagement and collaboration with the British Empire. In responding to the Queen’s Proclamation’s conservative emphasis on locality and prescription, which informed Mayo and Lytton’s efforts to support princely authority and leadership, the States strengthened their autonomy through contributing to imperial consolidation. The Karbharis’ General Fund and administration over the Central Institutions allowed the States to set the parameters of British intervention. Moreover, the States utilized their financial and participatory contribution in disseminating western infrastructure and education to strengthen state power and forge an external relationship with the Imperial government. For Kathiawar’s young princes and chiefs, Rajkumar College provided the means to legitimate personal rule through the adaption of European ideas and practices. Takhtsingji, Sinhjee, Chhatrapati, and an early generation of graduates pursued education and sport to forge new personal relationships and open conduits to collaborate equally and independently with Britain. Greater political decentralization and princely participation in English education informed future imperial engagement in the Imperial Cadet Corps and the Chamber of Princes (1920). Moreover, this sustained a conservative political opposition to Indian nationalism in the late nineteenth century.
Section III: A Conservative Challenge to Liberal Imperialism and Nationalism

Introduction

This section focuses on conservative imperialism’s reaction to heightened British and Indian nationalist sentiment in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. It is shown that British and Indian conservatives maintained an adherence to the principles of locality and prescription to interpret a politically divided and socially diverse Indian Empire. The following chapters examine Sir Roper Lethbridge’s (1840-1919) and Sir Mancherjee Merwanjee Bhownaggree’s (1851-1933) contribution to a conservative imperial framework for India. Both men applied conservative principles, defined in Britain and Western India, to develop positive alternatives to liberal imperialism and nationalism. While espousing Britain’s engagement with India’s national interests, they favored an imperial framework which determined a conception of an aggregately populated and geographically defined “Indian nation.” As a result, Lethbridge and Bhownaggree rejected metropolitan and liberal centralization as the guiding theme of imperialist and nationalist identity. They challenged metropolitan initiated liberal free trade, laissez-faire economics, and democracy as ignoring India’s diverse political, social, and material conditions. Instead, they favored the Imperial state’s political and financial support for the specific and diverse national interests of the Subcontinent. Moreover, they espoused an imperial identity based upon individuals’ and groups’ “vertical” relationships with the Crown, and denied the applicability of horizontal national associations in India.
Chapter seven examines Lethbridge’s conservative advocacy for British imperial conciliation and collaboration with India’s political and economic national interests before the First World War. It is argued that his Indian Civil Service career and Tariff Reform Movement association conditioned an attempt to include India within contemporary British conservative schemes to strengthen empire through political and economic federation. This chapter shows that Lethbridge contended that British constitution of princely state sovereignty and obligation, and conciliation of educated Indian aspirations for political participation and economic *swadeshi* (self-sufficiently) would create an inclusive imperial subjecthood and strengthen the Empire. Chapter eight explores how Bhownaggree’s Indian conservatism and conservative imperialism was influenced by employment in the Kathiawar State of Bhavnagar and relationship with Bombay’s Parsi community. This analysis shows that buoyed by Parsi and Muslim minority anti-Congress sentiment, he promoted a Kathiawar and Bombay model of British-Indian cooperation to develop female and technical education for India’s mass population. It is argued that Bhownaggree maintained that the British Empire held a benevolent obligation to encourage the peoples of India’s individual, communal, and mass economic and social prosperity in India, South Africa, and throughout the British Empire.

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Chapter 7: Sir Roper Lethbridge and Imperial Federation with India

Introduction

This chapter examines Sir Roper Lethbridge’s conservative advocacy for a nationally inclusive imperial framework till the First World War. With rhetoric that often evoked a partisan association to Disraeli and Lytton while decrying Ripon and the “radical party,” he, and likeminded conservatives such as Frederic Pincott, proposed that Britain should increase their collaboration with India’s princely and educated elites. To that end, he proposed expanded political and economic opportunity for India’s educated class, a “constituted union” between Princely and British India, and a fiscal system of imperial preference.

Conservative Critic

Returning to England in the early 1880s after state service in India, Lethbridge shared British conservative concerns regarding the growing association between English radicalism and Indian educated opinion and its threat to the stability of British rule in India. Lethbridge’s avoidance of racial arguments in support of British power, which were popular among conservative commentators, signified an ideological association with Disraeli and a conservative imperial tradition defined in 1858 and 1877. Nonetheless, Lethbridge and British conservatives felt that the Marquis of Ripon’s, Viceroy of India (1880-1884), application of British radical principles to accommodate Indian demands for political and economic reform was unsuitable and dangerous. Through associating Ripon with Gladstone’s Irish policy, they argued that repealing Lytton’s vernacular press restrictions, the Ilbert Bill (1883), Local Government Resolution
(1882), and the Bengal Tenancy Act (1885) instigated harmful race and class animosities which imperiled India’s peace and security.

Lethbridge’s avoidance of metropolitan racial stereotypes in explaining Britain’s Indian Empire represented a dissociation with conservative journalism in the late nineteenth century. With Irish and Scottish home rule becoming contentious issues in British politics, conservative periodicals argued that India’s internal race, class, and gender divisions required British strength and force of character to keep peace and promote social development. In April 1886, the Quarterly Review suggested that recent Indian demands for local self-government did not originate with the population. It argued that their inspiration lay with “the sentimentalisists and philosophers…” of the English radical party who “tried their utmost to persuade the natives that what they want is ‘home rule’—that panacea for all the evils of modern life which is likely to entail so many new burdens and trials upon us.”¹ In January 1888, the Quarterly Review emphasized the relationship between Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule support and Ripon’s precepts in India:

It is a serious thing to find that the same theories, which have given us Fenianism and Parnellism to encounter, are being actively promulgated in India by Englishmen as well as by Hindoos. There can scarcely be a question that, if Mr. Gladstone had been permitted to carry out his scheme of disintegration in Ireland, the demand of the same kind in India must either have been granted, or we should had to resist by force of arms.²

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The *Scots Observer*, later the *National Observer* in 1891, argued that Gladstone, Ripon, and British radicals were ideologically determined to break up the United Kingdom and the British Empire. In 1890, they claimed that if the Liberal Party returned to office, “they would speedily set about the work of disintegration in India and colonies which they have already begun in the United Kingdom.”³ In 1891, they warned of India’s dismay if Ripon returned to Simla, the summer residence of Anglo-India, amidst the resurgence of treason in Ireland.⁴

The *Observer* and other conservative periodicals emphasized British racial superiority over India’s divided population to argue for continued despotic rule and limited self-government. In an article depicting the English national character, the *Observer* boasted of an Englishman’s forceful ability to face the terrifying complicity of ruling India: “he sets his foot on the Hindoo’s neck; and it is found not only that is the only possible way but also that it is the best of all for the hindoo…” In 1897, it argued that Britain ruled India by the sword and conquest, and that western styled self-governance was an impossibility as “No training or evolution can change a women into a man.”⁵

⁴ *National Observer*, vol. 6, 154 (1891), p. 595.
of life”; that without Britain they would face extinction from the “fiercer and hardier peoples of the peninsula.” Moreover, the *Saturday Review* derided the Indian National Congress’s request for simultaneous examinations as the forerunner for their oligarchic and despotic rule. In suggesting that the educated Bengali wished to monopolize control of political and administrative state offices to control India, it argued that the martial races would not acquiesce to being ruled by a race they have repeatedly conquered. The above viewpoints represented a British conservative racially-focused anxiety about Indian nationalism and its threat to British power. While sharing the same broad concerns, Lethbridge accentuated a non-racial conception of imperial subjecthood predicated within the inclusion of distinctive national interests to the British Empire.

Like Lethbridge, Frederic Pincott, published linguist, orientalist, and frequent columnist in conservative periodicals, sought to conciliate India’s national political and economic aspirations within a conservative framework of empire. In the *National Review* editorial pages of October 1891, Pincott lambasted the Conservative Party’s antagonistic attitude towards the moderate, and now political organized, intelligent classes of India. Stating that the Party had abandoned its eighteenth-century political reform roots, he proposed that it was losing an

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opportunity to represent naturally conservative populations at home and in India. He argued that
the Party’s disinterest or hostility towards redressing grievances, such as police oppression,
manipulation of juries and municipalities, severe taxation, appropriation of India’s trade,
disregard for public feeling with regards to the Age of Consent Act, and renewed
“Dalhousianism” in Manipur, had caused agitation from all classes in India. As a result, he
contended that “Indian Conservatism finds itself in alliance with English socialism…,” having to
“agitiate for the most elementary rights of humanity by the assistance of the open opponents of
Conservatism.”8 His solution was to abandon British despotic rule, and allow for the election of
“independent men” to the legislative councils.9

In the National Review in 1889 and 1890, Pincott defended the Indian National Congress
and the proposed Indian Councils Bill against British conservative “prejudice and anger.” He
denied that Congressmen were acting in a seditious and ambitious manner, but were experienced
British and Indian statesmen who embodied educated opinion across the country.10 In the
subsequent article, Pincott contended that extending local election and legislative debate to India
would install a system cherished in England’s past which was suited for the current state of
India’s society. He stated that these moderate reforms simulated Tudor era parliaments which
merely “…discussed, advised, objected, ratified, provided funds, demanded, but did not always

obtain…” In both articles, Pincott suggested that Disraeli supported the incorporation of Native members to the Supreme Legislative Council in 1858. Therefore, Pincott proposed that Conservatives had a “special interest in the introduction of the representative and elective principle into India, because it is a right which Mr. Disraeli himself sought to confer on the country thirty years ago.”

Though unclear whether Disraeli made this specific proposal, Pincott and Lethbridge utilized his past expressions of national sympathy for India with respect to the Indian Revolt, Queen’s Proclamation, and the Royal Titles Act to convince British conservatives and Indian nationalists that their interests could be conciliated within an imperial framework.

Conservative India and Disraeli

Lethbridge’s official experience with conservative governance in India, and engagement with its educated and landed elites informed a Disraelian national perspective on empire as a British politician. In 1877, Lethbridge defended the Indian government’s interventionist frontier policy as opposed to the “Masterly Inactivity” doctrine under former Gladstone appointed administrations. He argued that Mayo’s initiation and Lytton’s continuation of a forward policy recognized that Britain’s lack of internal support and strategic position in India necessitated the appeasement or destruction of potentially hostile foreign powers in Central Asia to forestall possible Russian expansion. In 1878, a friendship with O.J. Burne, Mayo’s Private Secretary and then Lytton’s Secretary of the Political and Secret Department, secured Lethbridge the post

of India’s only Press Commissioner under the Vernacular Press Act (1878). In 1880, Lethbridge defended Lytton’s press policy as “remedial legislation” which addressed the “vast amount of absolutely irresponsible and reckless writing, and amongst the more disreputable papers, a system of extortion and black-mail…” He argued that this legislation which, through the Press Commissionership, provided official information was meant to assist the majority of vernacular press editors, who were “men of thought and education; earnest and true men, anxious to lead their fellow-countrymen aright in the path of enlightenment.”

Exiting the Indian Civil Service following the abolition of the Press Commissionership in 1881, Lethbridge was a likely detractor of Ripon’s viceregal policy. Specifically, he criticized the Ilbert Bill, Bengal Tenancy Bill, and blamed higher education reforms for causing popular and official dissension against the Government. With regards to the Ilbert Bill’s initial proposal to allow Indian judges to adjudicate and sentence Europeans outside the Presidency cities, Lethbridge alleged that Ripon and Courtenay Ilbert, legal adviser to the Viceroy’s council, were unnecessarily concentrated on issues of race and prejudice. Apart from challenging inherited British “rights and privileges”, which were “accepted with good will” by our “native friends and fellow-subjects,” he argued that Ripon’s capitulation from the controversial provision

13 Burne to Lethbridge, 30 May 1878, Mss Eur. B. 182A, fol. 54, Sir Roper Lethbridge Papers (hereafter LP), BL, AAS.
legitimated an incendiary claim by the Bill’s Anglo-Indian critics of “native” unfitness. Lastly, he wondered to the National Review readers: “how long before other privileges are taken away by the next viceroy desirous of making a name for himself in the radical party.”

Also, in 1883 Lethbridge condemned Ripon and Ilbert’s Bengal land reforms. His criticism was informed by a long standing dispute over state, landlord, and tenant rights in Ireland. In a speech, later published, to the East India Association, he believed that the proposed legislation represented a revolutionary upheaval of the relationship between the state, zamindar, and ryot. He contended that the Bill, which gave proprietary right to the ryot to sell his tenancy and allowed the state to set a fair rent, stripped landlord privilege and right as bestowed by the Permanent Settlement. In addition, the ryot’s right to sell empowered a “new class of middlemen, consisting chiefly of money-lenders.” He reasoned that unlike the landlord’s state and tenant obligations, the Bill reduced the ryot to “day labourers” or “mere serfs” at the whims of those who were ‘utterly devoid of sympathy for the actual cultivators.” He concluded that although action was needed to appease popular hostility against the exploitative practices of Indigo planters, this process was hijacked by reformers looking to Ireland for inspiration:

In the meantime a school reformers had come into power in India, whose eyes appear to been dazzled by the splendid achievements of slap-dash land-reform in Ireland. And thus it has come about, that what was to have been a tiny measure of redress has grown into a magnificent measure of confiscation.

17 Roper Lethbridge, The mischief threatened by the Bengal Tenancy Bill: a paper read before the East India Association (London: East India Association, 1883), 4-9.
18 Lethbridge, The mischief threatened by the Bengal Tenancy Bill, 22.
19 Lethbridge, The mischief threatened by the Bengal Tenancy Bill, 29.
Two years later, Lethbridge disparaged an article in the *National Review* which proposed that the Bengal Tenancy Bill was a conservative measure. He stated that he could understand “a Socialist or Radical approving of such a measure; for he goes back to the nature rights of man, or to the figments of the antiquary, to justify spoliation.”

A member of the Bengal Education Service for eight years including the Principal of Krishnagar College, Lethbridge defended English higher education and its graduates in India. Unlike the growing resentment and opposition to this instruction by fellow British conservatives, he believed that the state was obliged to train a new class of “leaders and pioneers” for the propagation of western learning to India’s masses.

In his *A Short History of India* (1881), Lethbridge appreciated Bentinck’s social and administrative policy and Rammohan Roy’s (1772-1833) efforts to promote western learning, labelling him the “Great Bengali Reformer.” In 1882, he opposed the Hunter Commission Report which recommended the eventual end of direct state support for higher education, encouraged private institutions, and grants-in-aids for

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vernacular instruction. While not objecting to state sponsored primary education, he maintained that funds should not be diverted from higher education which filtered knowledge to the population. Although teaching the ryot reading, writing, and arithmetic was important, he argued that the present system’s key benefit was the “creation of a class of instructors and leaders, of inventors and intelligent capitalists, of jurists and legislators, of schools and savants, of statesmen and philanthropists.” Moreover, he believed that the men trained in these institutions would eventually “bring India into her proper place in the comity of nations.”

His official experience with English education informed a career advocacy for the political and economic aspirations of its growing class of graduates inside the British Empire.

Conservative Candidate

As a Conservative Member of Parliament for North Kensington, Lethbridge maintained an intellectual association with Disraeli’s views on empire and trade. Lethbridge campaigned as a Disraelian “progressive conservative,” promising a sympathetic approach to Ireland, Indian administrative reform, and fiscal reform towards “fair trade.” On Ireland, he advocated for the highest level of self-government compatible with continued membership in the Empire, and a “frank sympathy with their feelings on religious education and similar questions.”

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26 Mss Eur. B. 182A, fol. 116, LP, BL, AAS.
India, his election pamphlet and address supported Lord Randolph Churchill’s call for a detailed inquiry on Indian administration that confronted the “grievances of our fellow-subjects, without distinction of race, creed, or color, in that country.” Moreover, he believed that strengthening Britain’s ties with the Colonies and India would “pave the way for a British Imperial Federation that would be at once the dominant factor in the commercial system of the world, and the most powerful champion of peace and civilization.”

Conciliating Princely and Educated Elites

In Parliament, Lethbridge queried the Imperial government on behalf of the career and political interests of India’s English educated community, and expressed a growing frustration over the government’s inaction over administrative reform. This included their employment in the uncovenanted branch of the Indian Civil Service, and election to India’s legislative councils. In 1886 and 1887, Lethbridge questioned the Under Secretary of State, Sir John Gorst, as to whether Bengal’s “Native officials” promoted to previously European-held positions were being paid one-third less and therefore being fined for their exceptional ability. In September 1886, he requested government clarification on whether a proposed royal commission to investigate uncovenanted and covenanted services would include “Native opinion” and the possibility of the “native” employment into higher ranks. He later admonished the Indian government’s

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27 Mss Eur. B. 182 A, fol. 110, 116. LP, BL, AAS.
committee on these subjects for excluding the uncovenanted service and “native opinion.” In 1888, he argued that a royal commission on the Indian government’s administration, a key Congress request, was wanted by the people of India as well as official and unofficial Englishmen. Beyond the “enormity” of the Home Charges, he stated that India’s growing expense for external military expeditions, and the prey of “Native States and Native Potentates” from “London speculators” showed that “the interests of India were neglected in favour of the interests of England.” Apart from stating that there were educated, qualified, and eminent “Natives” who could serve on such a commission, Lethbridge supported legislative council interpellation, or the right of Indian members to questioned and debate legislation such as the budget, to increase popular consultation. In response to parliamentary resolution which highlighted a rumored fiscal deficit by the Indian Government, he argued “that the Government ought to study wiser and more intelligent economy in their administration, and endeavour to meet Native Public opinion both in matters of finance and administration…” This included indigenous representation on legislative councils, in which they were “admirably qualified for.”

In addition to the educated classes, Lethbridge advocated for the rights and privileges of India’s princes and chiefs. He maintained that just as the Imperial parliament had a responsibility to protect their interests, the Indian Government should consult and incorporate them into the

Empire’s political and military machinery. This argument was informed by an appreciation of the 1858 Queen’s Proclamation and Lytton’s policy of princely collaboration. In Parliament, Lethbridge frequently questioned the Under-Secretary State for India regarding princely grievances and imperial contributions. These included the infant Gond Raja of Nagpur’s claim that the Indian Government had reduced a hereditary allowance since the State’s annexation in 1854, and whether recognition had been given to the Maharajah of Darbhanga, Maharajah of Mysore, and Nizam of Hyderabad for material contributions towards imperial defense.\(^{35}\) In an 1906 article on the Prince of Wales’s proposed visit to India, he associated the turn from a mid-nineteenth century “Little England” anti-imperialism to support for the “Imperial Idea” in Britain and India with Victoria becoming Empress and the 1877 Imperial Assemblage. He argued that this event and the previous Royal tours gave India’s chiefs and soldiers a felt association and prestige in the Empire:

Potentates whose ancestors for a thousand years have traced their pedigrees back to the sun or the moon, and who scorned alliances with the Moghul conquerors, have gladly accepted the suzerainty of the Kaisar-i-Hind—for he is no longer a foreigner, and his crown and sceptre are those of Rama himself.\(^{36}\)

In *his Short History of India*, he credited the princes and chiefs’ “noble spirit of patriotism and fidelity” to the Indian Government during the 1857 Revolt. From this, he credited Mayo’s

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“introduction of a true spirit of friendship between the Indian Empire and Feudatory Princes,” including the concept of an “Indian Eton” at Ajmere. Lethbridge’s association and support for this class was indicated by his published encyclopedia of ruling princes and aristocracy titled *The Golden Book of India* (1893). In the preface, he stated that compiling such a record was to encourage the Indian Government to establish a “Heralds’ College” or “Chancery of Dignities,” as Lytton purposed in 1877, to redress the lack of coordinated recording and certification of Indian and Imperial honors and titles.

Lethbridge’s financial relationship with the State of Hyderabad was criticized by the Indian government. Their apprehension focused on Lethbridge’s financial arrangement with the Nizam, and whether this motivated the former’s published statements regarding the Hyderabad’s Berar territorial claims. In 1894, Hyderabad Prime Minister’s complained to the Political Resident about Lethbridge’s “violent and disgraceful” response to his refusal to sanction the latter’s offer to publically support the Berar claim in exchange for money. This included Lethbridge’s refusal to leave the Prince’s residence unless he received jewelry which could be exchanged for money in England. Lethbridge maintained a long and lucrative financial arrangement with Hyderabad, which included eight years of annuity as high as Rs80,000 until

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39 On Hyderabad’s history with British India see Ramusack, *The Indian Princes and Their States*, 60-65, 193.
40 13 Apr. 1894, R/1/1/1288, fol. 16, 18.
In 1894, Lethbridge advised Lord Elgin, the new Viceroy, to respect the Paramount Power’s reciprocal obligation to Native States. This included Hyderabad’s Berar claims which the government had resisted by past threats and coercion. The above circumstances injured Lethbridge’s reputation at the India Office and in Calcutta. Despite the Indian Foreign Department’s patronage of the *Golden Book of India*, they expressed wariness about future associations with Lethbridge because of Hyderabad. It is unclear to what extent his Hyderabad advocacy was motivated by financial gain over ideological considerations. However, his consistent public activity to redress princely grievance, as well as similar action to conciliate educated Indians, reveals a deeper intellectual interest in British and Indian national collaboration. Moreover, he contributed to a larger public dialogue on incorporating Princely India within a constituted imperial framework which gathered importance into the twentieth century.

In the 1894 article on Elgin, Lethbridge waded into a growing debate concerning the position and status of Indian feudatories in relation to imperial governance in India. He argued that the 1858 Proclamation, the imperial style, and the proposed “Council of the Empire” had revolutionized the relationship between the Crown and the feudatories, and promulgated an “imperial constitution” in India. In a subsequent article for the *Review*, which reviewed C.L.

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41 R/1/1/1288, fol.16.
43 R/1/1/1288, fol. 25.
44 Roper Lethbridge, “The New Viceroy and our Indian Protectorate,” 60.
Tupper’s *Our Indian Protectorates* (1893) and Lee-Warner’s *The Protected Princes of India* (1894), he expounded the possibilities of strengthening this relationship for imperial unity. After historically tracing British policy towards the Indian states, he advocated for a “political code” or “constitutional union” to establish clear lines of authority and obligations between the Indian Government and princely states. He argued that although 1877 halted an encroachment policy, a code was needed to show feudatories “exactly where their independence ceases, and where British interests legitimately begin.” Lethbridge believed that Lytton’s 1877 “Proclamation of the Empire” and appointment of Councilors of the Empress went far towards establishing a “Constitutional Union.” Moreover, he expressed “no doubt” that the reason why these proposals remained just words, without practical effect to the Princes receiving greater independence or acknowledging more responsibilities, was due to “the ignorance and stupidity of a section of the English Press…” Agreeing with the sentiment expressed in the Earl of Meath’s recent proposal in the *Nineteenth Century* to include a self-selected contingent of Indian Princes in the House of Lords, he argued that the Princes should be functional Councilors of the Empress and elevated to “hereditary constitutional rulers of their provinces under the Empire, with

recognized sovereign rights, and with Imperial Rank suited to their position as Princes of the Empire.**48

Below the ruler, Lethbridge believed that expanded Princely authority and independence meant increased opportunity for Indian statesmanship and administration. He argued that “under a properly constituted unit,” the states’ prime ministers should be accorded equal status with Lieutenant Governors and Chief Commissioners. In addition, this system would allow the educated classes’ further capacity to develop their administrative abilities. In conclusion, he stated that a “constituted unit,” which clearly defined a state’s autonomy within a broader imperial union, would expand natural state patriotism to a larger loyalty for the Empire.**49

Lethbridge’s advocacy for expanded Indian participation in the legislative councils and a constitutional apparatus to strengthen Indian state cooperation with British power, reflected a mostly conservative preoccupation with establishing a nationally inclusive imperial framework to oppose narrow nationalist sentiment in Britain and India.

**Tariff Reform and Imperial Preference**

Lethbridge was actively associated with predominantly British conservative movements for protective tariff reform and wider imperial economic federation between Britain, the Dominions, and India. These movements represented a challenge to a liberal imperial orthodoxy of free trade and laissez-faire economics. They advocated for the state’s participation in


enhancing national economic and social development through enforcing trade restrictions against foreign interests and promoting local industry. Unlike many tariff reformers in Britain, Lethbridge recognized and legitimated Indian economic nationalism, crystallized by the Swadeshi movement and boycott beginning in 1905. Although triggered by Curzon’s 1905 Bengal partition, this movement represented a longstanding Indian resentment against British trade privilege centered in free trade. Lethbridge’s objective was to convince British and Indian opinion that divergent national interests could be reconciled through imperial commercial federation.

In Britain, Lethbridge was an original member of the Imperial Federation League (1884) and Vice-president of the Tariff Reform League. At the local level, he was President of the Devonshire Tariff Reform League, which represented the county of his principle residence, Exbourne Manor, and compiled a history of Devonshire families who had settled in the colonies and America. Lethbridge’s political association to tariff reform and imperial economic federation was influenced by Disraeli’s policy and partisan rhetoric which amalgamated imperial and national interests. In an article on Disraeli and Tariff Reform, Lethbridge argued that the former retained a political opposition to British radicalism’s anti-imperial and socially divisive free trade program:

By temperament and inclination he was disposed to view with suspicion the demagogues of the Anti-Corn Law League, who appealed—like their Radical-

50 For an account of this partition, which divided the old Bengal province into new Hindu and Muslim majority provinces, and the resulting Indian nationalist opposition see Metcalf and Metcalf, Concise History of India, 154.  
51 Roper Lethbridge, “Hands Across the Sea,” 1903.
Socialist successors of to-day—to the class jealousy, to sectarian bigotry, and to partisan prejudice, in order to subvert the capital institutions of the country.\textsuperscript{52}

In challenging a historical narrative of Disraeli’s eventual embrace of free trade, Lethbridge argued that he maintained support for a distinctive “Tory Free Trade” reciprocity policy pursued by young William Pitt, Viscount Bolingbroke, and William Huskisson. Moreover, he linked Disraeli to the current political debate over tariff reform. He contended that Disraeli believed that trade reciprocity promoted working class employment interests, and strengthened the connections between Britain, the Colonies, and India.\textsuperscript{53}

Beyond India, Lethbridge and George E. Foster, Canadian Conservative statesman, appealed to the British public to oppose Canadian Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier’s 1911 reciprocity agreement with the United States. This appeal evoked conservative partisan criticism that alleged that liberal anti-imperialism in Canada would be applied to India. Foster argued that Laurier betrayed his support of Canada’s former Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald’s “National Policy” of developing joint “national and imperial aspirations,” for a fiscal union and possible amalgamation with the United States. Taking the British perspective, Lethbridge directed blame at radical politicians Henry Asquith, Britain’s Liberal Prime Minister, and James Bryce, Britain’s American ambassador for this agreement. In pointing to the agreement’s likely inclusion of a “most-favoured nation-clause” which would “smash at one blow the whole of the

\textsuperscript{53} Lethbridge, “Lord Beaconsfield as a Tariff Reformer,” 936-938.
great national and imperial system that Canada has built up for herself…” he contended that Asquith and Bryce were disciples of Goldwin Smith’s view that Canada would benefit from absorption by the United States.\textsuperscript{54} Lethbridge replicated an argument that Canada’s national interest was tied to the British Empire to convince British and Indian public opinion to support India’s inclusion within a scheme of imperial commercial federation.

From the 1880s, Lethbridge maintained that a British favored free trade fiscal policy stoked Indian nationalist sentiment by hampering India’s internal development and external trade. He proposed that the British and Indian governments respond to economic swadeshi by abandoning trade tariffs which harmed India for the benefit of Lancashire cotton and other metropolitan interests. Specifically, he argued that an imperial free trade or preference system would mutually benefit British and Indian economies, and would create a politically secure and materially self-sufficient empire based upon an expansive and incorporative imperial subjecthood.

As early as 1885, Lethbridge placed India at the center of a scheme for imperial economic federation. In the \textit{National Review}, he proposed that India’s potential for investment and supply of raw material and consumers would compensate for any loss in foreign trade.\textsuperscript{55} As a Member of Parliament in 1888, Lethbridge was critical of the Imperial government’s trade and excise


policy with India. He submitted that “the hideous cynicism of our fiscal system in India” centered upon a contradictory and harmful free trade policy:

We forced India to sacrifice immense sums of revenue and to admit our cotton goods free of import duties, because, forsooth, of the immutable verities of Free Trade, and then we put heavy duties on every pound of tea that comes into this country from India, we tax Indian tobacco up the hilt, and we laid upon the Indian silver industry such restrictive duties and regulations that that industry was in a fair way to be altogether destroyed.  

To the *Times of India* in 1905, Lethbridge lamented the reintroduction of a five percent general tariff on Indian cotton goods originally introduced by the previous Liberal government in 1884. This levy was meant to equalize the tariff paid by British and Indian cotton producers. While labeled an act of free trade, this policy allowed high cost British producers to protect themselves in the domestic market against Indian producers. He expounded that the House of Commons should act for the Empire’s common good, and not upon materially selfish motives or reasons of race. While stating that British rule was admirable for its history of political and religious toleration, he argued that the imposition of free trade represented a breach of an established policy which allowed India to manage her own fiscal system for her own interests. He believed that London’s needed to trust the “man on the spot” and solicit intelligent opinion from India, and, therefore, not force “on India at the point of the bayonet” a prejudiced policy “to maintain a free market for British manufactures.” Lastly, he was certain that if imperial free trade was ever

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realized “…Britain and India, thus welded together as one great commercial and industrial unit, will be self-contained and self-sufficing, and able to defy the competition of the world.”

Lethbridge’s sympathetic responses to swadeshi attempted to promote imperial free trade and preference as a fiscal solution to satisfy Indian and British economic interests. With partisan rhetoric representative of Disraeli, Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform League, he maintained that prejudicial British “Cobdenite” free trade motivated a legitimate response from educated Indians who wished to foster and support India’s nascent industry. In 1907, Lethbridge confronted British skeptics concerning swadeshi’s representative nature. He submitted that it had universal appeal in India, which included past free trade advocates such as Dadabhai Naoroji, Indian National Congress, and Liberal MPs. In response, he proposed that imperial preference represented the middle ground between free trade and protection. A year later, he again challenged British opinion to recognize Swadeshi as a legitimate national aspiration: “If we will consent to put aside our Cobdenite fanaticism…and recognize swadeshi as the wise and legitimate application of that modern spirit of Nationalism in the organization of industry and commerce that has inspired every civilized community in the world…..” Moreover, he eulogized Dr. Rash Behari Ghosh’s words that as Indians, “We love England, with all her faults, but we love India more,” as the sentiments of the “truest imperialism.”

58 Roper Lethbridge, “Imperial Preference, or Cobdenism, or Swadeshi—Which Policy is Best for India.” *The Imperial and Asiatic quarterly review and Oriental and colonial record.* vol. 24, 47 (1907), pp. 5, 9.
Lethbridge faced significant British and Indian opposition, official and public, to his proposals of imperial preference in India. In Britain, Joseph Chamberlain’s 1903 tariff reform proposals offered increased import duties to protect the manufacturing sector of the economy, and imperial preference for raw materials from the self-governing Dominions. These proposals were unpopular among free trade advocates in the Conservative government and Liberal Party. In regards to India, Conservatives Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India (1895-1903), and Curzon were free traders who opposed an extension of Chamberlain’s vision to the Subcontinent.\textsuperscript{60} Curzon and the Indian government’s opposition to imperial preference in India reflected a sound economic argument regarding the country’s external trade and domestic economy. In 1903, an Indian Finance and Commerce Department Report to the Secretary of State of India argued that India’s position as a debtor country, especially in regards to interest and pension obligations to Britain, and general reliance on a raw resource export trade to nations outside the Empire made imperial preference a risky proposition. This included the threat of retaliation from foreign countries, which could reduce their purchase of raw resources to an extent that the British market could not absorb, and increased costs for consumers by the exclusion or raised prices of cheaper foreign goods.\textsuperscript{61} Lastly, the Report argued that the powerful Lancashire cotton manufacturing lobby in Parliament would not allow the Indian Government to

\textsuperscript{60} Hamilton to Curzon, 28 May 1903, Mss Eur. F111/162, fol. 34, Papers of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (hereafter CP), BL, AAS; Curzon to Godley, 09 Aug. 1903, fol. 69, CP, BL, AAS.

\textsuperscript{61} India Department of Finance and Commerce. East India (Tariffs). Views of the Government of India on the Question of Preferential Tariffs. 1904 Cd. 1931, 5.
pursue a tariff policy contrary to their interests, as shown by the imposition of the excise cotton
duty on Indian mills in 1894. This opinion was reiterated by Sir James Mackay, the Indian
Government representative, at the 1907 Imperial Conference. Moreover, influenced by
swadeshi’s popular support, Mackay, an avid Free Trade advocate and member of the Cobden
Club, argued that if Britain enacted a protective tariff, Indian manufactures would demand an
equal right to protect their own industries. Growing Indian nationalist sentiment in favor of
non-discriminative economic protection through tariff barriers challenged the rising of support
for imperial preference led by British conservative statesmen and Anglo-Indians following the
First World War.

In substantial publications in 1907 and 1913, Lethbridge promoted imperial free trade and
preference as the means to satisfy British and Indian economic nationalism, and encourage a
nationally inclusive imperial subjecthood. In India and Imperial Preference (1907), Lethbridge
utilized quantitative and qualitative analysis to argue that imperial preference answered India’s
educated classes’ legitimate national aspirations towards industrial and trade development. In
seeing swadeshi as a substantive response to Indian fiscal inequality, he submitted that it
symbolized “India…awakening like Japan, to her own greatness and inherent capabilities.”
Therefore, the United Kingdom and India must be held together “on the strength of mutual

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62 India Department of Finance and Commerce. East India (Tariffs), 7.
interest and respect.” He contended that this inequality was maintained by the radical party’s “free trade fanaticism.” This continued prejudicial tariffs against India’s trade to Britain, especially on tea and tobacco, and allowed foreign powers to dump low cost goods in the subcontinent. He contended that British radicals used an intellectual free trade adherence to mask their overt racial discrimination against Indian interests:

They are also fond of pretending that they make no difference of class, colour, or creed; and yet, I maintain, not even a Free Forder would seriously contend that we should force on the Canadians or the Australians such excise duties as those which are imposed on the Indian products of Indian mills and factories merely to gratify Cobdenite prejudices.

He concluded that as a result of treating Indians as foreigners in fiscal matters, Britain “cannot be surprised if India carries out the rule to the disagreeable extent of socially boycotting British and foreign goods with impartiality.”

Next, he argued that the current fiscal system allowed foreign countries to drain India’s raw materials for domestic industrial expansion and then sell their cheap products back to the subcontinent. For this, he ridiculed the radicals’ lack of patriotism at the expense of clouded abstractions which seemed to be unhinged from the present realities of national ambition and rivalry:

If there was no such things as Foreign Governments with hostile tariffs, or foreign nations with clashing ambitions, who are delighted to take full advantage of our

65 Lethbridge, India and Imperial Preference, 34.
66 Ibid, 67.
67 Ibid, 53.
cosmopolitan philanthropy, though very careful not to reciprocate it—then indeed we might hope to see a Cobenite millennium ruled by the laws of a cosmopolitan political economy undisturbed by considerations of patriotism.

In contrast, he submitted that like British adherents of Chamberlain’s ideals towards the constitution of a “United States of the British Empire,” India’s educated classes subscribed to Alexander Hamilton’s and Frederic List’s theories of national commercial federation.\(^6\) Lethbridge contended that imperial preference satisfied these demands. It would protect nascent industries, increase custom revenue to pay debt and fight famine, increase standards of living and purchasing power of the masses, secure markets for the country’s commodities, and give opportunity for thousands of young Indian gentleman seeking employment.\(^7\)

In conclusion, Lethbridge believed that the Government of India should enter a commercial federation on equal and sovereign terms with Britain and the Anglo-Dominions. This would remove an Indian feeling of “alienness” from the rest of empire, as it would facilitate their rightful claims for “equal imperial rights” and a “common imperial citizenship.” To that end, he argued that the “ultra-democratic colonies” might need further “education and persuasion” to accept “the ordinary rights of imperial citizenship as inherent in every Indian-born subject of the King-Empire.” Regardless, India must enter into “Imperial Commercial Federation” as “sovereign states, under her own emperor and Government, on absolutely equal

\(^6\) Ibid, 16.
\(^7\) Ibid, 57.
terms with other member of that federation.”70 Although unclear concerning the representative nature of India’s sovereign status, Lethbridge’s conditions regarding its equality in economic federation resembled those advocated by educated Indians. It was the unresolved question of Indian representation which made Indian nationalists and British conservatives skeptical of imperial preference for India.

In 1913, Lethbridge published a revised statement *The Indian Offer of Imperial Preference*. This responded to Gandadhhar Chitnavis’, Imperial Legislative Council Member for the Central Provinces, resolution for the introduction of imperial preference. In the preface, Lethbridge highlighted the views of Bhownaggree, Joseph Chamberlin, and Bonar Law on Indian fiscal policy. Austin Chamberlin, former Chancellor of the Exchequer (1903-1905) and future Secretary of State for India (1915-1917), provided the introduction which criticized British economic policy towards India. He argued that “No one who is willing to face facts and admit the truth, even when it is unpalatable truth, will deny that the fiscal and economic policy now imposed on India by its British rulers is hateful to Indian opinion.”71

In the text, Lethbridge praised Chitnavis’ resolution favoring an increased tariff against foreign manufactures to compensate for the recent loss of opium revenue. Moreover, he concurred with the latter’s condemnation of the excise tax on Indian cotton production. In remarking that many Indian Councilors were trained economists who “have their Friedrich List

70 Ibid, 77, 82.
at their fingers’-ends,” he agreed with Chitnavis that foreign countries were the real rivals to Lancashire cotton sold in India and that the duty remission from all English and Indian goods benefited the poor population.\footnote{In regards to the Lancashire Cotton Lobby and Indian Empire see Peter Harnetty, \textit{Imperialism and Free Trade: Lancashire and India in the Mid-Nineteenth Century} (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1972).} Lastly, he stated that Chitnavis’ argument that a “Customs Union” provided India a secure and dignified fiscal position, showed “remarkable political insight.”\footnote{Lethbridge, \textit{The Indian Offer of Imperial Preference}, 13-14.} Similar to 1907, Lethbridge concluded that India’s “request” for closer commercial federation must be allied with greater individual and national equality: “unfair and improper treatment of British Indians in the Transvaal…shows clearly enough that these considerations are of infinite importance where national self-respect is concerned.”\footnote{Ibid, 131-132.} Although Chitnavis’ 1913 resolution was supported by the Council’s elected and non-official members because it advocated protection, wider Indian intellectual and popular opinion was skeptical of India’s advantage under a scheme of imperial preference.

The Indian English language press and academics uniformly condemned imperial preference as a novel method to maintain British political and economic dominance over India. In Allahabad, \textit{The Leader} exposed the inherent contradiction of argument made by conservative tariff reformers and Anglo-Indians regarding the mutual benefit of preference for British and Indian economic development. As the scheme was formulated to protect and enhance British industry, including the lucrative Lancashire cotton manufactures who already dominated India’s

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import market, how could this proposal help Indian cotton mills?\textsuperscript{75} In 1917, Calcutta’s \textit{Amrita Bazar Patrika}, responding to the 1917 Imperial Conference’s imperial preference discussions, believed that this scheme would hold India hostage to British and colonial exporters who would destroy the competition, raise prices on consumers, and enforce lower prices for raw materials. It argued that unlike the Dominions who had fiscal autonomy and could enter into this agreement on their own terms, imperial preference would be imposed in India not by the chosen representatives of India, but by the representative of the British nation, by the Government of India which owes no manner of accountability to the Indian taxpayer, and which is itself completely controlled by the Secretary of State for India, who is himself again, subject to the authority of the British Cabinet and the British Parliament, who hold their high and profitable office at the pleasure of the British voters.\textsuperscript{76}

This sentiment was shared by Indian economists, who emphasized that India’s desire for trade protection for its infant industries was incompatible with an imperial preference system. V.G. Kale, Professor of History and Economics at Fergusson College in Poona, argued that Lethbridge and his allies had no support in India. He argued that although the Indian people were opposed to free trade, which had “killed or assisted to kill our national industries and is the stumbling block in the path of our industrial progress,” an imperial customs union was worse as it would consign India, who had no say in shaping policy, to a purely agricultural nation.\textsuperscript{77} In 1915 and 1922, Pramathanath Banerjea, the Minto Professor of Economics at the University of

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Leader}, 15 May 1913, p. 10.  
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Amrita Bazar Patrika}, 18 May 1917; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 08 Jun. 1917.  
Calcutta, contended that imperial preference clearly benefited British industry through cheaper raw materials and increased its market share at the expense of Indian and foreign competitors. Moreover, he stated that India should not be asked to sacrifice in any “imperial zollverein” while it remained at an inferior political position, and while its people were subjected to race prejudice from fellow members of the Empire.  

In Britain, Lethbridge actively corresponded with Conservative and Indian statesman to promote India’s inclusion within an imperial preference system. This included Austin Chamberlain and Andrew Bonar Law to whom he sent published articles and congratulations on tariff reform speeches. The former, along with Joseph Chamberlain, encouraged Lethbridge to seek high profiled support in India in order to encourage more discussion in the Tariff Reform League. Bonar Law received his articles with great interest, agreeing that the current fiscal system was unresponsive to Indian interests. In 1913, Bonar Law chaired a meeting which included the public exponents of India and Imperial preference, Lethbridge, Sir Edward Law, former financial member of the Viceroy Council, Sir Edward Sassoon, Conservative MP and Sir Charles Elliot and others who propose detailed investigation and promotion of public sentiment for imperial preference in India. Although the First World War interrupted this work,

78 Pramathanath Banerjea, *Fiscal Policy in India* (Calcutta: Macmillan and Co., 1922), 236-244.  
79 A. Ward to Lethbridge, 01 Nov. 1907, Mss Eur. B. 182B, fol. 198, LP, BL, AAS.  
Lethbridge’s advocacy and arguments shaped a critical debate on Indian participation in schemes of imperial economic federation.

In 1919, Britain introduced a preferential rate on existing import duties for empire producers. This was its first effort to reciprocate preferences given to British products by the self-governing dominions since the late nineteenth century. In 1920, this led the Indian Government to form a committee to study imperial preference. Chaired by Dinshaw Edulji Wacha, its Report, representative of mixed Indian and British official opinion, argued that India’s adoption of preference would have a neutral effect, and that the fear of tariff retaliation was unwarranted in the current atmosphere.  

A year later, at the behest of the newly elected and reformed Legislative Council, the Government established a Fiscal Commission lead by Ibrahim Rahimtulla to investigate tariff policy and adopting imperial preference. Reflecting a series of consultations across the major industrial centers of India, its 1922 report argued that India’s incorporation within a scheme of imperial preference needed to be voluntary and beneficial to the country’s economic development.  

Led by Rahimtulla and the Indian majority on the Commission, the report’s dissenting opinion argued that India’s adoption of preference must be

465-473. Also at this meeting were Sir Donald Robertson, Theodore Morison, Valentine Chirol, Leo Amery, William Hewins, Percy Hurd.
conditional upon attaining political fiscal autonomy and addressing Indian racial discrimination throughout the Empire.84

Conclusion

Lethbridge’s attempt to conciliate distinct British and Indian national interests within schemes of imperial federation represented an intellectual and political development out of the conservative imperial tradition in India. For Lethbridge, British consultation with elite interests, such as English educated Indians and a princely “constituted union,” would allow the Imperial and Indian governments to avoid policies which favored metropolitan trade and finance. From personal experience with both groups, he applied British conservative ideals of tariff reform and imperial preference to promote imperial unity. This represented an alternative to liberal imperialist and nationalist orthodoxy which were increasingly in conflict in the late nineteenth century. Similar to the situation with Canada, this meant conciliating India’s divergent national political and economic interest within a common imperial commercial policy and subjecthood. In channeling a Disraelian national sympathy for Ireland and India, and building upon a critique of liberalism’s abstract and universal precepts, he admonished “Cobdenite” free trade dogmatism for disregarding Indian swadeshi’s legitimate and patriotic aspirations. His proposal to “square the circle” with imperial preference, or “Imperial Swadeshi,” which mutually protected and enhanced Indian and British national interests, reflected a distinctly conservative alternative to liberal empire. Lastly, Lethbridge demonstrated that despite metropolitan conservative popular

84 Ibid, 192-199.
opinion, British and imperial conservative traditions could sustain a nationally inclusive and non-racial perspective on Indian Empire. This allowed Indian conservative interests and individuals, such as the Kathiawar States and Bhownaggree, to be represented in metropolitan opinion and imperial policy.
Chapter 8: M.M Bhownaggree and Conservatism in Western India

Introduction

This chapter focuses on Mancherjee Merwanjee Bhownaggree’s contribution to imperial and Indian conservatism in India. It is shown that his experience as the Judicial Agent and Councilor for the Bhavnagar State in Kathiawar, and ethnic and social association with Bombay’s Parsi community informed a conservative governing perspective on Indian Empire. This perspective defined his self-claimed and self-defined representation of “conservative India,” which promoted imperial state benevolence to enhance the mass population’s economic and social opportunity. Tracing Bhownaggree’s political and intellectual association with a Parsi and Muslim Indian conservative “anti-Congress party” in Western India, this chapter reveals how he pursued a Kathiawar and Bombay model of economic and social development which emphasized local decision as well as British and Indian collaboration. As an Indian and British political representative, he proposed a state-supported system of female and technical education to revive national industries and reverse economic and social stagnation in India. In prefacing these reforms as the imperial state’s obligation towards India’s unrepresented and loyal masses, we shall see how he extended this argument to define Britain’s responsibility to secure civic and economic rights for Indian communities across the Empire. Bhownaggree’s inclination and action represented the coalescence of Indian and British conservatism which challenged the universal and centralizing aspects of liberal imperialism and nationalism heading into the twentieth century.
Bhavnagar

Bhownaggree’s official experience with Kathiawar’s State of Bhavnagar, and social association with Bombay’s Parsi community, shaped his conservative imperialism which opposed Indian nationalism and promoted state sponsored social development in India. As Bhavnagar’s Judicial Agent in Bombay and Judicial Councilor, he developed an appreciation for the benefits of British modeled administration to Indian princely governance. Moreover, this experience informed his advocacy for state support for public works and education and his deep hostility towards India’s vernacular press. As noted in the previous section, the Kathiawar States defended their local autonomy and authority through liberally funding public works and education across the peninsula. The First Class State of Bhavnagar provided substantive support for various public initiatives, including the Bhavnagar to Gondal Railway and multiple contributions to Rajkumar College. In regards to the former, Bhownaggree, as Bhavnagar’s Bombay Agent, negotiated the railway’s financial terms with the Bombay government in 1878.85 In 1885, the construction of Samaldas College was an addition to the existing establishment of 134 schools, including 12 schools for female education, in Bhavnagar. Moreover, Takhtsinghji, Thakore of Bhavnagar, sponsored female medical education and contributed to a new Arts College in Karachi.86

85 Savailal, 184.
86 IOR/R/1/713/24.
The 1877-88 Kathiawar Administration Report described Bhavnagar’s administration as “liberal and progressive under the personal care of His Highness Sir Takhtsingki.”\(^8^7\) This report referred to ongoing reforms to the State’s ruling council, established in 1887. As noted, Bhavnagar and the Kathiawar States were a small representation of a larger movement by Indian polities to incorporate western political and administrative reforms to strengthen local authority and autonomy. Occupying one of Bhavnagar’s four council seats as Judicial Councilor, Bhownaggree was an outspoken proponent of introducing western practices to reform council. For Bhownaggree and other councilors, reforms were needed to provide greater oversight for large financial outlays on road and rail expansion. These reforms included proposals for monthly council meetings, council approval for expenditures totaling over Rs5000 and appointments costing over Rs200, increased council supervision over public works, greater competition for public works over Rs1000, and council approval of annual budgets before submission to the Prince.\(^8^8\) In an explanation of his vote supporting the above proposals, Bhownaggree argued that they would promote transparency and communication among the various state departments:

> while there would be ample opportunities afforded to the Councillors to check or minimise any inherent or newly-imported defects in any branch of administration, the good influence of the more efficient departments would be reflected on the rest, and eventually a degree of harmonious proportion would be attained which is essential to the effective working of any well-meaning government.\(^8^9\)

\(^{87}\) IOR/P/3344/812.
\(^{88}\) IOR/R/2/737/240.
\(^{89}\) IOR/R/2/737/240.
As Bhavnagar’s Judicial Agent in Bombay, Bhownaggree’s obligation was to defend and exonerate the Princely State from false accusations of misrule made by individuals and the vernacular press. In the late 1880s, Takhatsinhji and his councilors, including Bhownaggree, were accused of misrule and violence in petitions to the Bombay government and in the Gujarati press. In January 1887, the Nyayadarshak, from Ahmadabad, argued that the Bombay government should appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate state sanctioned murder and land confiscation in Bhavnagar. The Praja Mitra, from Karachi, raised concerns over Bhavnagar’s Nagar Brahmin officials’ dominant and tyrannical conduct, and the State’s expense towards acquiring a knighthood for Takhatsinhji, which included an Rs80000 gift and Rs36000 annuity to Bhownaggree. In 1889 and 1890, Brahmachair Madhawanand Sadanand, local merchant, published the most explicit claims of abuse in multiple issues of the Bhavnagar Exposure Gazette. In this publication and an earlier petition to the Bombay government in August 1889, Sudanand accused Takhatsinhji of murder, tyranny, oppression, bribery, and lavish expense on different women. Moreover, he claimed that his chief advisers, including Bhownaggree, were encouraging these practices, and profiting from their assurance that they had unlimited influence with the Bombay government. The Gazette was also informed by a separate petition submitted by Chhuggunlal Soonderjee, Bhavnagar resident and professional

90 IOR/L/R/142 1887.
91 IOR/L/R/142 1887.
92 IOR/L/R/145 1890.
pleader. In September 1889, he accused Bhavnagar’s ruler of intimidating and falsely accusing two female servants of stealing state ornaments in order to cover up his “illicit intercourse” with them.\textsuperscript{93} The Bombay Presidency press mostly discredited Sadanand’s and Soonderjee’s charges. The \textit{Native Opinion, Gujararti,} and \textit{Kathiawar Times} saw these accusations as frivolous, arguing that they should be answered in court or suppressed. \textsuperscript{94}

In 1890, Bhownaggree pursued a successful defamation suit against Sadanand, Soonderjee and their accomplices. In a letter to W. Lee-Warner, secretary to the Bombay government’s Political & Judicial Department, requesting a record of telegraph, railway, and registered letters, Bhownaggree argued that Sadanand’s allegations were groundless and that “a strong conspiracy had been formed to procure the downfall of his Highness and of his administration.” Moreover, he contended that these actions represented “an act of treason and revolt against the state.”\textsuperscript{95} In correspondence with Edward Ollivant, Kathiawar’s Political Agent, Takhatsinhji expressed hope that the Government might enact the means of protecting native states from “scurrilous attacks” made in British territory.\textsuperscript{96} On 17 January 1890, Bombay’s government informed the Kathiawar Political Agent that they would assist Bhownaggree and other agents prepared to instigate criminal proceedings against Sadanand or the publisher.\textsuperscript{97} In Britain, the \textit{Saturday Review} praised Bhavnagar’s ruler for taking action against Sadanand and

\textsuperscript{93} IOR/R/2/737/240.
\textsuperscript{94} IOR/L/R/145 1890.
\textsuperscript{95} IOR/R/2/744/273 1890.
\textsuperscript{96} IOR/R/2/744/273 1890.
\textsuperscript{97} IOR/R/2/737/240.
Soonderjee. In addition, it proposed that a penal code modification should target seditious remarks from political agitators who were likely to prey on the ryot. \(^{98}\)

... 

Bhownaggree’s official experience in Bhavnagar and the Kathiawar States informed a lasting apprehension of British influence on Indian administration, and the value of princely rule to Indian empire. In 1903, Bhownaggree argued, in response to Lee-Warner’s Society of the Arts paper on the Bombay Presidency, that the “Native” states represented a bulwark for British power and provided a system where “native” statesmen could adopt British methods of administration. \(^{99}\) In 1905 to the House of Commons, Bhownaggree proposed that the Government of India should reconsider Lytton’s scheme for an “Indian Privy Council.” He submitted that such a council would create a mechanism for a new generation of well-educated and intelligent chiefs to advise and consult the Viceroy. He argued that their advice was valuable and legitimate “by the large stake they held in the safety and welfare of our Indian Empire, and by virtue of their representative and responsible positions…” \(^{100}\) His experience reforming and defending Bhavnagar, influenced an ideological association with conservative imperialism which criticized Indian nationalism and its medium in the vernacular press. With the support of a larger anti-congress party in Western India, Bhownaggree was able to attain electoral success in the British Conservative Party and promote social reform for the Subcontinent.

\(^{98}\) Saturday Review, 06 Set. 1890, vol. 70, 1819, 268.


For Bhownaggree, Bhavnagar’s treatment informed a subsequent view that the vernacular press was a dangerous outlet which echoed the socially unrepresentative opinions of young and English-educated Indian nationalists. In 1897, Bhownaggree’s article in the *Fortnightly Review* vilified British radicalism’s influence on the vernacular press for enticing agitation and violence against British rule. He argued that Ripon’s Ilbert Bill and Vernacular Press Act repeal led to the proliferation of political organization and opposition across India. This allowed a new generation of politicians and journalists to use this press to criticize the Government, and propose unrealistic remedies for India’s real and imagined problems. Moreover, the press represented the opinions of a minority and unrepresentative English-educated class in Congress who were eager to apply western political notions of nationalism and individualism to a divided India:

The example of the agitators against the Ripon regime, gave reality and living impulse to those sentimental and theoretical precepts which they has imbibed in their school-days from English classics regarding the rights and liberty of the subject, the freedom of speech and the Press, and the integrity of nations, without their able to discriminate between the natural and physical constitution of a united and well-developed people and a disjointed, divided and dwarfed conglomeration of such communities as form the populations of India.  

Conservative and Anti-Congress Represented for India

Bhownaggree maintained that India needed a conservative and anti-Congress spokesman in Britain that truly represented the country’s majority and landed interests. As Bhavnagar’s Bombay agent, Bhownaggree used his position to pursue a determination to enter British politics.

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on the Conservative Party ticket. This included building an association with Conservative
statesman and Governor of Bombay Lord Harris (1890-1895). As a former Conservative House
of Lords member and Under-Secretary of State for India (1885), Harris vouched and arranged
contacts for Bhownaggree with Party statesman and operatives. This reflected their personal
acquaintance. In February 1891, Lord and Lady Harris opened the Awabai Bhownaggree Home
for Nurses, instituted in commemoration of Bhownaggree’s recently deceased sister.102 Later that
month, Harris invited Bhownaggree to a luncheon with the family.103 In March, Harris penned a
letter of introduction for Bhownaggree to Lord Cross, Secretary of State for India (1886-1892).
He explained his deed on the grounds of Bhownaggree’s Bhavnagar service, financial
collection to female education in the Presidency, and advocacy for the suppression of disloyal
and seditious newspapers. Although not agreeing on the last point, the Governor believed him to
be “quite safe” and a “loyal, trustworthy and intelligent Parsi.”104 In the spring of 1891,
Bhownaggree met Curzon, Lord Dufferin, Lord Northbrook, and was granted an interview with
Cross. The latter remarked to Harris that he “…had a very interesting meeting with M.
Bhownaggree though I entirely differ from him as to the suppression of native papers.”105

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102 Bhownaggree to Birdwood, 17 Feb. 1891, Mss Eur F216/21, fol. 71, George Birdwood Papers (hearafter BP),
BL, AAS.
103 Bhownaggree to Birdwood, 23 Feb. 1891, fol. 72, Mss Eur. F216/21, fol. 72, BP, BL, AAS.
104 Harris to Cross, 28 Mar. 1891, Mss Eur. E256/1, fol. 138, Papers of 4th Baron Harris as Governor of Bombay
1890-95 (hearafter HP), BL, AAS.
105 Bhownaggree to Birdwood, 04 Apr. 1891, fol. 33, Mss Eur. F216/33, BP, BL, AAS; Bhownaggree to Birdwood,
08 Jun. 1892, fol. 43, Mss Eur. F216/33; Cross to Harris, 11 Jun. 1891, fol. 63 Mss Eur. E243/20, Papers of 1st
Viscount Cross as Secretary of State for India 1886-92 (hearafter CP), BL, AAS.
To his friend Sir George Birdwood, Bhownaggree described a recent interview with Harris in which he expressed thoughts on India, the parliamentary “India Party,” and representing the Conservative Party in Britain. In this letter, he detailed how he expressed a worry to the Governor on the serious danger that the British might perceive India as being “all liberal and radical” which hated the Conservative Party. And that he believed Congress advocacy for political reform was misrepresenting India’s traditions, customs, religions, and surrounding “atmosphere” which made her “solid conservative.” Therefore, he proposed that his Conservative Party candidature and representation for “conservative India” would discredit radicalism as a political force in the Subcontinent. Lastly, he communicated to Harris that his proposal found support among an important Parsi constituency in Bombay:

Every one of wealth and influence and most of all Parsees, who have seen me, wonder why I haven’t yet stood for a conservative constituency. They all think it was time the congress fad of radicalism was laid bare, and nonsense talked to the English public unchallenged in the name of the people of India was exposed.106

Bhownaggree left that meeting with Harris’ support and personal letter of introduction for Capital Middleton, Political Agent for the Central Conservative Association.107 Later in 1894, he met with Middleton and was introduced to Party Leader Salisbury.108
In Britain and India, Bhownaggree maintained that the British Empire was a benevolent institution and force which allowed political participation, social elevation, and equal rights. Moreover, he argued that it allowed parliamentary representation for India’s conservative and uneducated majority who were opposed or ambivalent to Indian nationalism. As chair of the dinner celebration for Dadabhoi Naoroji’s 1892 election victory as a Liberal candidate in London’s Central Finsbury, Bhownaggree emphasized how this event reflected the Empire’s allowance for equal opportunity. Although Bhownaggree was an opponent of the Congress which Naoroji advocated for in Britain, he argued that Naoroji’s victory was a “patriotic act” by the local constituents. More importantly, it signified that “the British Empire embraces in its fold…the millions of their Indian fellow-subjects whom the electors of central Finsbury regard as fit for the enjoyment of equal rights with themselves.”

In his own 1895 election campaign, Bhownaggree defined his possible, yet narrow, representation of a divided India. He stated to the Mercury that he represented the large groups in India who opposed the Indian National Congress’s western program of political reform. While stating that no one person could represent India “in the complete sense of the term,” he claimed to speak for the majority population who opposed “those of the natives of India who demand impossible rights and advocate advanced methods of government utterly unsuited to the conditions of India.”

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109 On Naoroji’s personal and political background see Munni Rawal, Dadabhai Naoroji: A Prophet of Indian Nationalism (1855-1900) (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1989); Omar Ralph, Naoroji The First Asian MP. A Biography of Dadabhai Naoroji: India’s Patriot and Britain (St. John, Antigua, Hansib Caribbean, 1997).
110 Times of India, 16 Aug. 1894, p. 7.
111 Mercury, in Times of India, 28 May 1895, p. 6.
promoted the “large hereditary of territorial class who have stake in the country,” and understood that the “…maintenance of the rights of property are wrapped up in the paramountcy of a great overshadowing power like the British.” Lastly, he described India as the “most intensely Conservative country under the sun, and rapid change is abhorrent to all the instincts and traditions of its inhabitants.”

Dinshaw Edulji Wacha’s correspondence with Naoroji reveals that Bhownaggree’s claimed representation for “conservative India,” and praise from the Parsi and Muslim community were met with abhorrence and anxiety from Congress supporters in Western India. Specifically, their negative reaction centered on an apprehension concerning the size and profile of Bhownaggree’s support in the Bombay Presidency. This concern represented Bombay’s history of factional politics between commercial elites, or Shetias, and the English educated minority on issues regarding municipal reform and Indian nationalism. For Wacha, Naoroji, and Bombay’s vernacular press, the Conservative MPs’ anti-Congress views were motivated by self-promotion and career opportunity. In 1893, Wacha complained to Naoroji that Takhtsinghji’s pronouncement that he did not sympathize with Congress was “of course…Mr. Bhownaggree’s [sic] inspiration.” He added that the latter’s reasoning was “simply to advance

\[\text{112} \text{ Mercury, in Times of India, 28 May 1895, p. 6.}\]
his own interests.”114 In the subsequent year, Wacha felt betrayed that Bhownaggree, “under the aegis of Salisbury and Balfour” and with the “ear of the India office,” might stand as Naoroji’s rival in the upcoming election. He asked “Could political arrogance and personal conceit go further.”115 In response to Bhownaggree’s British electioneering and claims of Indian representation, Wacha told Naoroji that “so deep-rooted is the conviction of India as to the hollowness of B’s pretension to pose as the representative of ‘conservative India’ that even long before you said anything about the matter, the Indian papers hurled back the pretension.”116

Parsi and Muslim Support for Bhownaggree and British Imperialism

The above anxiety peaked during Bhownaggree’s 1896 tour of Western India when he was met with admiration from Parsi commercial and official elites as well as sections of the Muslim community. Leading up to the visit, Wacha’s correspondence with Naoroji demonstrated the Congress Party’s concern that this event might be used as government propaganda which showed conservative and anti-congress support. Specifically, it revealed nationalist efforts to discourage public memorials and demonstrations in Bhownaggree’s honor. This included Nanabhoy Chichgur and the Chichgur family’s attempt to hold a demonstration at the Phoenix Club. Their discouragement of Dosabhoy Framji Karaka and R.D. Setna’s door to door soliciting to raise participants for a public dinner. They also ridiculed Dr. Cowasji Hormusji, Chairman of

the Municipal Corporation, R.M. Patell, later Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, Noor Mahomed Jairaj Peerbhoy, Sheriff of Bombay, Harkisondas Narotumdas, Municipal Councilor and Sheriff of Bombay, and others’ attempts to form a representative committee.\textsuperscript{117} In addition, Wacha acclaimed Sir Cowasji Jehanghir, N.N. Wadia, Merwanji Dalal, and Shapurji Bharucha as part of the “Bhownuggree [sic] clique.”\textsuperscript{118}

In December 1896, Omar Jamal and the Bombay Muslim community gave Bhownaggree a public rally at the Muzafferabad Hall. Wacha argued that this gathering was made possible by the followers of Aga Khan, a British ally and the leader of the Khojas community who were a key component amongst the Ismaili community, who favored the Bhavnagar State because of a recent beneficial ruling over property. Moreover, he interpreted this event as demonstrating the Indian MP’s actual unpopularity with Bombay’s enlightened and representative elements: “If the enlightened and educated refuse to give him a demonstrative, he seeks the backward Mahomedans, backward Jains and so forth to give him éclat.”\textsuperscript{119} The \textit{Kasier-I-Hind}, an English-Marathi newspaper in Bombay, shared similar views as to the demonstration’s representative nature. They contended that although led by a wealthy, albeit politically and socially


uninfluential, part of the Muslim community, the crowd’s majority were “so backward that they hardly understand what politics is, much less party politics and Parliamentary warfare.”\textsuperscript{120} In contrast, the \textit{Pioneer}, an Anglo-Indian newspaper from Allahabad, remarked glowingly that the gathering was a novel occurrence in a racially divided Bombay: “It may be mentioned that is perhaps the first instance in the history of the city, in which the Mahomedan community has in a public meeting assembled and entertained a member of another community and presented him with an address by way of acknowledging his public service.”\textsuperscript{121}

The encouragement that Bhownaggree received from Bombay’s Parsi and Muslim communities reflected the broad outlines of an anti-congress constituency in Western India. For the Parsi official and business elites listed above, the British Empire protected their security, financial prosperity, as well as an active participation in local governance. The Parsis’ public and political reputation were directly associated with their private and associational benevolence to Western India’s economic and social development.\textsuperscript{122} The Jejeebhoy and Tata families were consistent benefactors to the social and economic development of the municipality.\textsuperscript{123} Active supporters of Bhownaggree, the Wadia family spent the proceeds of their successful shipbuilding

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\item \textsuperscript{120} \textit{Kaiser-I-Hind}, 06 Dec. 1896, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{121} \textit{Pioneer}, 11 Dec. 1896, p. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{122} In regards to Indian Philanthropy in Bombay and Western India see Preeti Chopra, \textit{A Joint Enterprise: Indian Elites and the Making of British Bombay} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).
\end{itemize}
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company on various causes, including the Obstetric Hospital in 1888. Prominent banker Sir Cowasjee Jehanghier, titled Baronet Readymoney, financial success facilitated civic appointments as Justice of the Peace and Income Tax Commissioner, and charitable donations to Bombay hospitals and a Rs 50,000 gift to the Civil Engineering College.

Publications by Dosabhoy Framjee Karaka and S.B. Bharucha maintained that Parsi loyalty to the British Empire represented the latter’s ability to secure local culture as well as India’s social and economic advancement. Karaka, a consummate biographer, Chairman of the Bombay Municipal Corporation, and advocate for Parsis in India, deeply admired his community’s association with the Empire. Amidst the Indian Revolt in 1858, he published a vindication of British rule which highlighted its advantages for personal and property security compared to preceding Muslim and Maratha governance. In his comprehensive History of the Parsis (1884), he stated that Parsis held a “deep rooted conviction” of the British power’s blessings in enabling prosperity, and were therefore proud to be seen as the most loyal population in India. In a speech titled “Unrest in India” to the Edinburgh Parsi Union in 1908, Bharucha argued that the Parsi religion’s “clannish” nature “cultivated a passionate loyalty to the Empire…under which we have the freedom of conscience and the freedom of individual initiative.”

In terms of growing Indian unrest, he jointly criticized the negatives aspects of

125 Masani, *N.M. Wadia and His Foundation*, 69.
European imperialism and the radical elements of Indian nationalism. To the former, he lambasted Mr. Kipling and the “White Man’s Burden” for the white race’s violence in Africa and China, as well as the prejudice and aloofness of young “Competition wallas” in India. To the latter, he condemned the growing violence and agitation of Indian anarchists. He argued that although the upper classes and masses were not affected by this movement, the involvement of self-interested and misguided students and youth represented a clear danger for India’s future.129

In Bombay, the Rast Goftar represented Parsi communal and anti-congress opinion late in the nineteenth century. In 1897, the Goftar responded to the negative torrent of Indian press comment on Bhownaggree’s visit by demonstrating his reception in Kathiawar, Sholapore, Hyderabad, and other places across India. They argued that until some other Indian “proves himself worthy of the honour” of entering parliament, “he is the only representative there of the teeming millions of India.”130 In subsequent articles, they demonstrated the positive reaction of the English press and politicians to Bhownaggree’s anti-congress parliamentary sentiment.131 In receiving a Knight Commandership of the Indian Empire, the Goftar praised Bhownaggree’s anti-congress representation of India: “His name is familiar all over India; and we have no doubt that as the selfish aims and objects of those who have identified themselves with the Congress

130 Rast Goftar, in the Times of India, 20 Jan. 1897, p. 3. For a consolidated record of India press criticism of Bhownaggree see The Indian Political Estimate of Mr. Bhavngagr, M.P. or the Bhavnagri Boom Exposed (Bombay 1897).
131 Rast Goftar, in the Times of India, 18 Feb. 1897, p. 3.
movement are more and more laid bare and exposed, his services to this country will be better appreciated and recognized.\textsuperscript{132}

The Goftar’s support for Bhownaggree represented a wider Parsi communal apprehension concerning the centralizing, democratizing, agitating agenda of the Hindu dominated Congress Party.\textsuperscript{133} In 1889, it tempered enthusiasm for the Congress’s existence and aims with a concern over their methods, particularly their claim to represent the grievances of all India’s communities. Moreover, it created a distorted and dangerous view of deplorable British rule in India: “At the very best, a one-sided view of the administration will be presented to the millions who are too illiterate and ignorant to balance the good they enjoy with the evil which they are told they endure.” In regards to Congress political reform advocacy for greater aspects of home rule, the Goftar cautioned the loss of British control and implementation of representative government for India’s peace: “…far from ushering in a gold era of universal brotherhood among the peoples of India, would create disunion ad disaffection.”\textsuperscript{134} In 1892, amidst the Indian Council Bill debate, it remarked on the Salvation Army’s William Booth’s visit to state that the Congress had ignored India’s social and economic questions.\textsuperscript{135} In 1897, it

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\item\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Rast Goftar}, 27 Jun. 1897, IOR/L/R/5/152.
\item\textsuperscript{133} For further analysis on the Rast Gofter’s association with Parsi opinion in Bombay see Palsetia, \textit{The Parsis of India}, 306-314.
\item\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Rast Goftar}, 08 Dec. 1889, IOR/L/R/5/144.
\item\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Rast Goftar}, 03 Jan. 1892, IOR/L/R/5/145.
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categorically argued that the Parsis community remained “staunch supporters of the British” and would “never join the INC congress party.”

With regards to Western India’s diverse minority Muslim population, the late nineteenth century saw political organization proliferate in response to increasing majority Hindu involvement in the Indian Civil Service, local, provincial, and imperial legislative councils, and the Indian National Congress. In the 1890s, Muslim opposition to Congress was additionally informed by the latter’s friendship with Gladstone’s Liberal Party, who condemned the treatment of Christian minorities in the Balkans by the Sultan of Turkey and Muslim Caliphate. Moulvi Rafiuddin Ahmed was a leading spokesman for Muslim opposition to Congress, Muslims equal rights in India, and British support for the Turkish Sultan. Ahmed was the son of Moulvi Ahmed Sabib, a prominent religious leader in Poona. Ahmed obtained an English education in India before studying for the bar in England. While there, he was engaged as Queen Victoria’s Hindustani language tutor, and became Vice-President of the Aujuman-I-Islam (Muslim Society) in London. In India, Ahmed was instrumental in establishing provincial Muslim Leagues in Bombay, Poona, and Bengal between 1907 and 1909.

In 1894, Ahmed’s speech to the Leeds Junior Conservative Club started rumors, in the British and Indian press, that he might be considered as a Conservative Party candidate in the 1895 general election. Although this remained just a rumour, his speech in Leeds, commended by Sir John Gorst, former Under-Secretary of State for India, revealed how Muslim dual opposition to the Congress Party and the Liberal Party found an appreciative audience among British conservatives. He argued that India was “not fit for democracy” and that Home Rule was “madness” due to the Hindu population’s political dominance. He related these requests to an ambitious Hindu-dominated Congress that was attempting to establish control over India’s Muslims through association with the British Liberal Party. In revealing how Ripon’s Municipal Resolution allowed complete Hindu control of Pune’s local council despite only representing 60% of the population, he compared besieged Muslims to Ireland’s minority Protestant community. In relating Naoroji’s twin advocacy for Irish Home Rule and Indian self-governing reform, Ahmed sought the audience’s support in sponsoring a Muslim Conservative MP:

If India had, indeed, become a party question and the Radicals in India had got the support of the Irish Party and of the Radicals in the House of Commons, then the Mahomedans could not do better than follow the good example of the Irish Protestants and make common cause with the Unionists.140 Although not adopted by the Conservative Party in 1895, Ahmed maintained that the British authority should defend and enhance the political and social prospects of Indian

140 Times of India, 11 Dec. 1894, p. 6.
Muslims against a Hindu Congress, as well as condemn incendiary remarks regarding Islam and Turkey made by William Gladstone and British liberals.\textsuperscript{141}

In the British Press throughout the 1890s, Ahmed combatted Muslim political and social exclusion in India, and the harmful effects to pan-Islamic public opinion across the Empire of British policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan of Turkey.\textsuperscript{142} In the \textit{National Review}, Ahmed stated that the change in Turkish popular “Islamic feeling” away from Britain and towards Russia had consequences for British power in India. In stating that the British Empire was the greatest Muslim power in terms of population, he contended that Britain should acknowledge and remedy Muslim social and civil disabilities in India. In comparison, he pointed out that Russia afforded Muslims better opportunities for education, advancement in the military, and in the diplomatic service.\textsuperscript{143} At an 1894 meeting of the Anjuman-i-Islam in response to recent British metropolitan agitation against Ottoman treatment of the Armenian community, Ahmed’s resolution condemned the protests as furthering a “misrepresentation of Islamic Law and religion…for political purposes.”\textsuperscript{144} In 1897, he blamed recurring excitement on “designing ministers Christian ministers, imbued with a secret hatred of Islam, and Forward Liberals inebriated with party fanaticism…” He argued that this resulted in the growth of an Islam versus

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\textsuperscript{141} Zakarla, \textit{Rise of Muslims in Indian Politics}, 79. Zakarla argues that it was opposition from the \textit{Times of India} and the Anglo-Indian community which convinced the Conservative Party to drop Ahmed in favor of Bhownaggree as a candidate in the 1895 General Election.
\textsuperscript{142} On Pan-Islamism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Özcan, Azmi, \textit{Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877-1924} (New York: Brill, 1997).
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Times}, 22 Dec. 1894, p. 7.
\end{flushright}
Christianity mentality which pulled Muslims away from Britain as “the more Mr. Gladstone and Exeter Hall denounced the Caliph, the closer did the Moslems draw towards him.”¹⁴⁵ He concluded that compared to Disraeli’s policy of supporting Turkey’s internal reform, now “England is of opinion that Turkey will not improve herself, and that therefore she should cease to support her.”¹⁴⁶ For Ahmed and Bhownaggree, their Congress Party opposition was predicated on the idea that British power should protect and enhance local interests through expanding the social and economic prospects of the mass population.

A Benevolent Imperial State and Education in India

From the 1880s, Bhownaggree advocated for the imperial state’s benevolent participation in promoting social and economic development for India’s masses. This included the expansion of female medical education, and technical instruction in commercial and industrial knowledge to revive indigenous forms of material prosperity. As seen with his opposition to the vernacular press, Bhownaggree was a consistent critic of state-supported English education in India. Bhownaggree maintained an early conviction that this instruction was unnecessary and inhibited India’s modern development. In 1882, this conviction informed a negative response to Lethbridge’s paper to the National Indian Association, a non-political organization which promoted educational opportunities for Indians in India and Britain, on the public utility of state-

funded English higher education. Though praising Lethbridge for his sympathy for India’s people, Bhownaggree believed that state education had begun thirty years too soon and “at the wrong end.” He argued that any beneficial education system must begin with the masses, and that funds should be diverted from higher instruction towards that purpose.\textsuperscript{147} In 1897, he argued that English education had instigated agitation against the Indian government on behalf of the Indian National Congress. Moreover, it continued India’s economic decline through enabling the proliferation of lawyers, journalists, and clerks who added nothing to the country’s industrial and commercial development.\textsuperscript{148}

To the Society of the Arts, the House of Commons, and in speeches across India, Bhownaggree promoted state support for female and technical education. In 1885, Bhownaggree promoted female education to the Society of Arts. He encouraged the Indian government to support an initiative which had deep historical roots in the country, and would elevate the mental and material condition of women across India. In claiming that the recent Muslim conquest hardened Hindu caste distinctions and practices such as child marriage and female isolation, it was contact with western civilization and the coordinated interests of Parsee, Hindu, and Europeans which had begun to restore the traditional treatment of women.\textsuperscript{149} With state material support, even redirected from male education, and encouragement, he argued that educated

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Journal of the National Indian Association}, 140 (Aug. 1882), pp. 435, 470.  
\textsuperscript{148} Bhownaggree, “The Present Agitation in India in the Vernacular Press,” 308.  
Indians could take the lead on changing current prejudices against women. Specifically, Bhownaggree encouraged female medical training as nurses. As noted, he funded, with the Indian government’s assistance, the Awabai Bhownaggree Home for Nurses. This facility provided training for twenty nurses at a time for community service.

With regards to technical education, Bhownaggree promoted a state system of industrial and commercial instruction to revive indigenous and national economic prosperity across India. As seen in the preceding chapter, hastening India’s industrial and economic development was a popular demand among Indian commentators and academics heading into the twentieth century. Responding to a Society of Arts paper on the production and consumption of tussur silk in Britain by Mr. Wardle in 1890, and a subsequent question by George Birdwood, Bhownaggree quipped:

While you gentlemen are engaged in developing such industries as constitute the wealth of your nation, we, in India, are only industrious in manufacturing Bachelors and Masters of Arts. The mad race after so-called academic education on which people in India are started, accounts for a good deal of their sad neglect of solid industrial pursuits.

In 1897, Bhownaggree presented a paper to this forum outlining the necessity for a technical education system in India. He argued that it would address the country’s current economic

150 Bhownaggree, “The Present Condition and Future Prospects and Female Education in India,” 459.
stagnation caused by the decline of native industries against advanced western competition. He proposed that India’s export of raw resources and labor to the West was the result of the neglect of technical education by the state and educated Indians. Specifically, he focused on India’s lack of industrial and commercial expertise in agriculture and manufacturing. He provided statistics on the raw export and finished import totals of wool, seeds, and sugar to show that a lack of local expertise in developing such products sustained a transfer of wealth to foreign countries and commercial middle men. With regards to the manufacture of personal and household items for the middle and wealthy classes, he challenged the lasting fallacy that India represented a huge emporium of industries. He demonstrated that all these items were European made, and that even local furniture was only put into form by springs, lining, hinges, nails, locks, and tools made abroad.\textsuperscript{153} He contended that “a little labour on the spot” through local manufacturing would “offer to millions of her poorest inhabitants the means of subsistence.\textsuperscript{154}

Moreover, he submitted that this transference of wealth was sustained by a generational prejudice against industrial pursuits in favor of literary and professional education. As an example, he showcased the changing attitude of Bombay’s Parsi community in regards to the growing popularity of non-trade work: “The sons of former merchants and dockmasters, of furniture makers and ship-chandlers, are most of them glutting the medical and legal professions

\textsuperscript{154} M.M. Bhownaggree, “Technical education in India,” p. 1002.
or content to be petty clerks and school teachers.”¹⁵⁵ In terms of a way forward, he highlighted Bombay’s Victoria Technical Institute, a state sponsored institution which taught the production of household and office goods, and Raja Deen Dayal’s photographic business as demonstrating India’s capacity for industrial pursuits. He concluded that technical instruction would raise the people’s estimation of British dominion over the subcontinent.¹⁵⁶

In a 1901 *Times of India* interview regarding famine in North-central and Western India, Bhownaggree proposed that the current devastation was the result of the population’s over reliance on the agricultural industry.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, he argued that this was compounded by a drain of money from the export of raw materials and importation of foreign made goods from continental powers. In contrast to Naoroji’s famous “drain theory” that laid the blame for India’s poverty on its official and commercial financial obligations to Britain, Bhownaggree maintained that the wealth drain was the consequence of prioritizing academic over technical instruction.¹⁵⁸ He argued that if industrial, scientific, and technical workshops were founded fifty years ago instead of universities, “the natives of India would have...been by now manufactures, skilled artisans and labourers...they would not be a quarter so dependent as they are now upon foreign

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¹⁵⁵ Ibid p. 1005.
¹⁵⁶ Ibid, pp. 1004, 1007.
¹⁵⁷ It is estimated that 581,000 people died in the Bombay Presidency due to the famine between 1899 and 1902. Michelle Burge McAlpin, *Subject to Famine: Food Crises and Economic Change in Western India, 1860-1920* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 76. McAlpin argues that this was caused by prolonged drought, overreliance and insufficient employment in the agricultural sector, and an unprepared government relief system. McAlpin, 205-210.
¹⁵⁸ Dadabhai Naoroji “Poverty of India,” in Dadabhai Naoroji, *Poverty and un-British rule in India* (New Delhi, India: Low Price Publications, 1990), 4-22
manufactures…which they require for everyday use.”159 Later in 1901, he traveled to Bombay, Bhavnagar, Surat, and Ahmedanagar to promote technical education for social and economic development. In a public address in Surat, Bhownaggree stated that a lack of industrial growth had caused perpetual famine and disease in India. He urged the audience to equate industrial development to national strength: “If it is your aim…to strengthen her national existence, to enable her to retain the benefit of her vast resources, to hold her own against the attacks and affronts levelled against her by more enterprising rivals, you must insist on this weakness being removed, this decay of your industrial energy.”160 In Ahmednagar, he proposed that there existed a crying want for a well-regulated system of technical education in India.161 In a large reception hosted by N.N. Wadia and Jametjee Jejeebhoy at Bombay’s Town Hall, Bhownaggree stated that he was pleased to see the early development of industrial schools and training in the City. Trying to reach a note of conciliation with political opponents in the nationalist camps, he proposed that different viewpoints towards achieving national progress and prosperity should be freely discussed. He argued that the development of indigenous crafts and resources, and the treatment of Indians in South Africa were issues which everyone could “unite to educate the whole country of her just privileges.”162

159 Times of India, 07 Sep. 1900, p. 6.
160 Times of India, 19 Dec. 1901, p. 4.
161 Times of India, 14 Jan. 1902, p. 5.
162 Times of India, 20 Jan. 1902, p. 4.
To the United Wards Club of the City of London in 1902, Bhownaggree, with N.M. Wadia, advocated for the development of technical education and industrial development in India. Focusing on India’s tea industry, he related the consumptive interests of his English working class constituents with the employment needs of Indian laborers. He encouraged the Chancellor of the Exchequer to consider protecting this industry from foreign competition by lowering the tariff on Indian tea.\textsuperscript{163} In 1903, Bhownaggree attempted to mollify English mercantile interests to India’s industrial development. In response to a Society of Arts paper on cotton growing in the British Empire, he argued that beyond state support for base technical training, the Government should promote indigenous production by removing the injustice of the excise duty forced on Indian cotton manufactures. He proposed that the maintenance of “this monstrous duty” would be detrimental to Lancashire interests as it encouraged “a middle educated class of great influence” to prevent the growth of Indian cotton for English production.\textsuperscript{164} Although at odds with the political demands of Indian nationalists, Bhownaggree partnered with them in advancing a demand for the State’s obligation to support India’s technical and material development. In denying that Indian Home Rule would reverse India’s economic degradation, he maintained that a nationally inclusive British Empire could enhance the country’s social and material prosperity.

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Times of India}, 8 Dec. 1902, p. 9.
During and after his tenure as Conservative MP for Bethnal Green North-East, Bhownaggree’s political position on tariff reform and Indian emigration centered on the advantages that the Empire could have for British and Indian national and individual prosperity. To that end, he negotiated India’s inclusion within Joseph Chamberlain’s vision of imperial unity which pervaded conservative politics early in the twentieth century. Like most others in the Conservative Party following Joseph Chamberlain’s 1903 pronouncement in favor of preferential tariffs to protect British and imperial trade from foreign competition, Bhownaggree transitioned from an early caution to eventual support for the program. To his constituency, he initially argued that although personally unconvinced by preferential tariffs, he supported an inquiry to determine whether they would improve the standard of living for London’s working men. Moreover, in comparing Britain’s 1.4 million in starvation to the prosperous tariff protected countries of the United States, Germany, and France, he wondered whether the Empire could alleviate the material condition of the population:

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\text{We have at our disposal the market of a world-wide empire; we have the skill and the resources and the energy to fill those markets, and yet we find ourselves beaten in those very markets by foreign competitors, our own workmen left unemployed, while those of other countries find profitable occupation.}^{165}
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In November 1903, the *Times of India* credited Bhownaggree’s correspondence with Chamberlain for incorporating India into a larger debate on imperial preference. Although stating that he doubted the advantages, the *Times* related his support for an inquiry with the likes of

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\(^{165}\) *Times of India*, 03 Aug. 1903, p. 6.
Lethbridge and Sir Edward Sassoon. In a meeting with the North-East Conservative and Unionist Association a month later, he aligned with the constituents’ view by stating that depressed local handicraft and industrial production had shown that Cobden’s free trade ideals were not working. In the 1905 election, in which Bhownaggree was defeated by Sir E. Cronwall, Chairman of the London Country Council, he supported tariff reform and imperial preference which, he argued, would inhibit foreign goods from entering Britain, Ireland, India, and other parts of the Empire.

Bhownaggree solicited British understanding and action towards protecting the economic and social rights of Indian communities throughout the Empire. Responding to lascar living and working conditions and abuses against Indian migrants in South Africa and Canada, he contended that the Imperial government was obligated to defend their equal status as common imperial subjects. In terms of Lascars serving on British merchant and government vessels, Bhownaggree challenged English attempts to deter their employment. This included being a witness in the Merchant Marine Committee’s 1903 investigation of Lascar employment in Britain. He challenged J. Havelock Wilson, British Seamen’s Union member, on the point that a recent ruling proscribing lascars equal living accommodations was fair. Although personally not opposed to the principle of equal accommodation, Bhownaggree argued that Lascars did not need the increased space and comfort, and it discouraged their employment by raising costs on

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166 Times of India, 30 Nov. 1903, p. 6.
167 Times of India, 01 Dec. 1903, p. 4.
the employer. To a lascar filled hall in Bombay, Bhownaggree stated that their labor competed with European and not British sailors, and that the English working class’s natural tendency to protect themselves from foreign labor would be checked by patriotism for the Empire and India. He believed that the knowledge that they were depriving “their fellow-subjects their inherent right to legitimate occupation and to deprive them of their almost sole means of subsistence…” would encourage their sympathy. \(^{170}\) In 1904, Bhownaggree condemned the Australian government’s decision to refuse an imperial mail contract due to deliveries possibly being made by lascar-manned ships. In a Society of Arts discussion, he proposed that advocates for imperial unity should begin by denouncing restrictions on Indian movement and emigration which caused irritation in India: “He did not think he would be doing his duty as a citizen of Imperial Britain, if…he did not point out that great defect which had been made manifest in many ways in the policy of Australian Commonwealth.”\(^{171}\)

Bhownaggree’s predominant concern was the equal treatment of Indian emigrants and overseas communities and emigration throughout the Empire. Specifically, he condemned the denial of equal economic and social rights to Indians in South Africa and Canada. He argued that rather than a national concern for protecting local trade, their restrictions on Indian emigration,

\(^{169}\) Times of India, 03 Feb. 1903, p. 5.
\(^{170}\) Times of India, 21 Feb. 1903, p.7.

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possession of property, and civil rights were due to the racial prejudice of white colonialists. He maintained that Britain had an imperial obligation to protect and enhance Indian interests within the empire as common imperial subjects. In an interview for the Graphic, published in the Times of India, Bhownaggree proposed that Indians in the Transvaal had been better treated under the Boers than they were under current British rule. He argued that although British opinion condemned Paul Kruger’s, former President of the South African Republic, unfair treatment of Indians leading to the South African War, the current British government continued to treat British Indians “as if there were semi-savages” at the prejudicial behest of the Colony’s White League.\(^\text{172}\) In 1902 correspondence with Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Bhownaggree detailed the deteriorating plight of Indians in the British Transvaal. Emphasizing Britain’s previous pledges towards color non-discrimination, including Chamberlain’s 1897 Colonial Conference speech opposing restrictive immigration laws, he argued that the Imperial government had the right and obligation to protect the Indians against Transvaal’s attempts to remove their civic and economic liberties. This included provisions that all new Indian traders must live and transact in designated Bazaars unless they pass an English education test. In addition, Indians were subjected to property appropriation without the right to appeal, disallowed from municipal electoral rolls, and coolies, Indian indentured labor, were restricted from remaining after their employment.\(^\text{173}\) In referring to Chamberlain’s mission to

\(^{172}\) *Times of India*, 30 Aug. 1904, p. 3.  
\(^{173}\) Bhownaggree to Chamberlain, 15 Sep. 1902, in Correspondence relating to the Position of British Indians in the Transvaal, Cd. 1684, Aug. 1904. This refers to the Transvaal government’s Bazaar Notice No. 356 of 1903. On the
strengthen imperial unity, Bhownaggree warned that a failure to redress Indian humiliation and injustice would mean “the Imperial connection is dissolved into a mere figment.” With a close association to Bombay’s merchant community, he took issue with the social degradation faced by traders. He argued that this included their forced congregation with lower class coolies, and a broad colonial terminology that classified Indians with the Chinese as “Asiatic” or with “uncivilized” Africans as “Native”.

In 1905, Bhownaggre introduced a parliamentary motion lambasting the degrading and harsh measures faced by Indian subjects in British colonies, especially South Africa. It called on the Imperial and Indian governments to intervene for Indian fair treatment as British subjects. He argued that if the colonial governments would not protect “the elementary rights and liberties of British citizenship,” the Government of India should retaliate with a reciprocation of restrictive laws against colonials. This would clearly show that “the real sting…against British Indians consisted in lowering them in the sight of other peoples of the globe.” In 1913, Bhownaggre presided over the London Canadian Indian Immigration Committee which protested against the Government of Canada’s newest restrictions on Indian immigrants. This centered on their 1907 “continuous journey clause” which excluded Indian entry into Canada if they stopped at another

Transvaal’s reasoning, correspondence with the British Government, and Indian protest on the measure see Bala Pillay, British Indians in the Transvaal: Trade, Politics and Imperial Relations, 1885-1906 (London: Longman, 1976), 141-145.

174 Bhownaggree to Chamberlain, 15 Sep. 1902 in Correspondence relating to the Position of British Indians in the Transvaal, Cd. 1684, Aug. 1904.
175 Ibid
port on route. Bhownaggree contended that this ordinance made Indian immigration, which had already amounted to 4,500 people who were mostly Sikh, employed in agriculture, and settled in British Columbia, almost impossible as no commercial steamship travelled directly from India to Canada, and no direct ticket could be purchased in India to Canada. 177 While a twin Parsi and British identity informed a class and race prejudice, Bhownaggree argued for an incorporative common imperial subjecthood which entitled certain “alienable” rights to Indians under the Crown. In a career elevation through Bhavnagar, Bombay, and Bethnal Green, his opposition to Indian nationalism, advocacy for female and technical education, and protection of Indians abroad, was predicated on the principle that the British Empire had a benevolent obligation to encourage expansive economic opportunity for India’s diverse populations.

Conclusion

Bhownaggree’s experience with Bhavnagar and Parsi’s benevolent collaboration with the British paramount power informed his contribution to a conservative imperial tradition in India. His contention that the Imperial state was reciprocally obligated to encourage local and prescriptive actors to jointly contribute for India’s national development represented a challenge to liberal

imperialist’s and Indian nationalist’s centralizing and democratic ambitions in India. Bhownaggree proposed definitions of empire and nation to suit the subcontinent’s particular divisional landscape. Rather than the universal application of metropolitan political laissez-faire economy and representative institutions, Bhownaggree saw the Imperial state as obliged to promote the social and economic development of the aggregate national interests of India. In rejecting the Indian National Congress’s determination to create a homogeneous Indian nationality, he proposed and defended, in the case of lascars and in South Africa, the people of India’s vertical association and equality as common imperial subjects. This represented not only a contribution to conservative imperialism in India, but also to a larger conservative movement to strengthen empire as a nationally prescribed institution in Britain and the Dominions.
Section Conclusion

Lethbridge’s and Bhownaggree’s contributions to a conservative imperial tradition reflected their efforts to conciliate British and Indian national sentiment within a mutually inclusive and beneficial conception of empire. Primarily, this meant encouraging British politicians and commentators, especially in conservative circles, to incorporate India’s national characteristics within an inclusive and non-racial framework of empire. In legitimating the Empire’s compatibility with local and national difference, both figures challenged the universal and centralizing precepts of liberal imperialism and Indian nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In criticizing the prejudiced effects of a metropolitan liberal political economy of free trade and laissez-faire, they argued that the Imperial state had an obligation to protect and enhance the skills and industries needed for India’s social and economic development. Moreover, they argued for an inclusive empire which allowed Indian states, minority communities, and social elites to locally contribute to an imperial institution which reciprocally protected their political and economic autonomy. Therefore, they argued for an inclusive and non-racial definition of imperial subjecthood which entitled all populations reasonable equality under the Crown. Although ultimately failing to convince British and Indian nationalists to conciliate their interests within an inclusive imperial framework, they utilized personal experience and an existent conservative tradition, defined by Ellenborough, Disraeli, Mayo, Lytton, and the Kathiawar States, to promote discussion of India’s national status and condition in the British Empire.
Thesis Conclusion: Conservative Imperialism Defined

This thesis has argued that a conservative imperial tradition in India was predicated upon the primary concepts of locality, prescription, and imagination. Through a study of British and Indian conservatives from the Indian Revolt to the First World War, it has been argued that these concepts informed coherent intellectual challenges and political alternatives to the universal, centralizing, and rational precepts of liberal imperialism and nationalism. This study reveals that Britons and Indians employed local and pre-modern forms to define an oppositional and constructive conservative imperial framework. Conservatives responded to the Indian Revolt, Imperial Assemblage, and Indian Nationalism by communicating their apprehensions and solutions through partisan discourses within the imperial intersection of British and Indian politics. All conservatives contended that the British Empire in India must be a collaborative institution which conciliated local and national institutions, customs, and prejudices.

This thesis has demonstrated that British and Indian conservatives had intellectual capacity and coherency to broaden locally conceived ideologies and institutions to address the philosophical and governing dynamics of a global empire. In a sense, this represented their ability to comprehend and structure a diverse polity through a political and social philosophy predicated upon the assumption of an irrational and differentiated human nature. More specifically, they had to adapt a political and social creed, which is instinctively nationalist and hierarchical, to imagine and define imperial objectives and common identity. Rather than viewing conservatives as too parochial or nationalist to approach empire, this dissertation’s
central premise is that nineteenth century conservative understanding(s) of human nature facilitated an essential imperial recognition, acceptance, and collaboration with difference.

The significance of locality, prescription, and imagination to shaping conservative inclination and action on Indian empire is shown in the preceding chapters. An attachment to locality and prescription is resonant in Mayo’s and Bhownaggree’s experience and engagement with empire. Their espousal of a conservative imperial discourse of loyalism and obligation reflected their minority and privileged position within the empire. Mayo’s experience mitigating political, social, and sectarian strife as Irish Chief Secretary shaped his Indian viceroyalty. This informed a principled acknowledgement that the state had a reciprocal paternal obligation to decentralize authority and empower a well-instructed princely and propertied interest. Moreover, his Irish experience in trying to accommodate a national education system for disparate Anglican and Catholic communities informed a recognition that the state must provide scholastic opportunities for India’s marginalized ryot and Muslim communities. Bhownaggree’s association with the Conservative Party, and proclaimed representation of “conservative India” and an “anti-congress party,” reflected a belief that only the British Empire could defend, enable, and collaborate with Bhavnagar’s and the Parsis’ local autonomy and authority. This position informed a conception of an “Indian nation” as a politically divided, socially hierarchical, and culturally divided space and population held in aggregate by separate vertical loyalties and obligations to Britain. Therefore, he rejected a liberal conception of a horizontal Indian national identity and political centralization as proposed by the Indian National Congress and the
vernacular press. In implementing constitutional reform in Bhavnagar and associating with a charitable Bombay Parsi community elite, he argued that constructive initiatives, such as female and industrial education to raise India’s mass material condition, required benevolent British collaboration with local states, groups, and individuals.

The expressions of imperial loyalty and obligation from an Irish Protestant and Indian Parsi reflected the significance of imagination for conservatives to conceptualize, construct, and communicate a functional imperial polity. This thesis has proposed that conservative imagination was defined by an intellectual association and political deference to pre-modern ideas and institutions based upon local, historical, and transcendent qualities. Specifically, it used place, precedent, and the extraordinary to challenge liberalism’s reasoned and progressive justifications for empire. This informed a significant departure from a liberal civilizational, European conception of race and identity. This thesis argued that conservatives imagined an imperial polity in which individuals and groups were identified, differentiated, and incorporated through their supposed belonging to a particular place, tradition, and custom.

For Disraeli, it was Young England’s feudal and historical imagination that conceived Tory political opposition to Whig’s liberal destruction of India’s beneficial and harmonious ancient institutions which bonded prince, property, and religious custom. Through his novels, he critiqued liberal “progress” for causing moral and social decay in England, and questioned how this qualified western civilizational knowledge and spiritual superiority over the East. The latter informed Disraeli’s derision of liberal imperialism’s destruction of national institutions and
social harmony in Ireland and India. Amidst the Indian Revolt, this derision informed his argument that it was British culpability over the Whig Party’s state sanction of political annexation, property confiscation, and religious interference which led to “national” uprisings across India.

Ellenborough and Lytton employed imagination in appropriating India’s historical political, social, and cultural representations to entice traditional ruling and mass support for the British Empire. Their unpopularity among British, and especially Liberal, commentators represented their disregard for metropolitan race and social prejudice in order to conciliate India’s national interests. Ellenborough’s contended that he acted upon the historical and political traditions of his “adopted country” in regards to the Somnauth Proclamation, the sacking of Saugar’s European administration for social disrespect, and intervening militarily in Sind and Gwailor. His contention that the British paramount power should act like an “Asiatic country,” informed his partisan condemnation of Canning’s Oudh “confiscation” Proclamation which lacked sympathy and justice for a population disturbed by British annexation and religious interference. Lytton’s Imperial Assemblage and Indian Privy Council employed traditional titles, symbols, and practices to inspire aristocratic loyalty and collaboration to empire. These were imaginative endeavors to use pre-modern devices for strengthening aristocratic leadership and authority against the individually degenerative qualities of modern society and political liberalism. Moreover, Lytton and Ellenborough shared a vision of reincarnating the spirit of Mughal power by elevating Queen Victoria to Empress over a feudatory India in the old imperial
capital of Delhi. This represented a conservative endeavor to equate British imperialism with the Subcontinent’s history and political tradition.

It was an expansive conservative imagination tied to locality and prescription that embodied the 1858 Queen’s Proclamation and Lethbridge’s scheme for imperial federation. Both were conservative imperial responses to Indian national discontent caused by liberal imperialist and nationalist ambitions. For Disraeli, Ellenborough, and Stanley, the Queen’s Proclamation replaced avaricious corporate administration with the nobler foundations of Crown rule, and redressed a legacy of liberal state annexation, property confiscation, and cultural interference. It established an Indian Queen and administration which was obligated to protect and collaborate with India’s princes, secure property title, and not interfere with local religion. It constituted a “vertical” imperial polity and identity defined by a reciprocal loyalty and obligation between the Crown and different Indian States, property interests, and ethnic and religious groups. Moreover, the Proclamation informed a conception of a hierarchical and culturally divided India held in aggregate by an external British power. This prioritized a definition of belonging whereas states, groups, and individuals could link their local status to a greater imperial identity and subjecthood. This conditioned a British Conservative acceptance of Bhownaggree’s twin Bhavnagar and Parsi identities with empire, but discriminated against Naoroji and the Indian nationalists who were seen as alien to India for fashioning a horizontal national identity around western education and political philosophy. As with the Parsi and the Muslim communities’ opposition to Indian nationalism through empire loyalism and obligation, this created an
opportunity for the Kathiawar States to enhance local autonomy and authority through imperial collaboration. Just as they established the Karbharis States’ Meeting to protect their independence from political agent centralization, they contributed and participated with a British initiated Rajkumar College to strengthened individual leadership and form imperial associations. In utilizing the space provided by Mayo’s and Lytton’s recognition of British financial and political weakness in India, they funded and managed social and economic local development to strengthen state autonomy and authority in the British Empire.

Lethbridge’s conservative endeavors to conciliate Indian national interests to empire was an imagined response to the growing antagonism between liberal imperialism and nationalism in the late nineteenth century. He recognized that educated Indians’ legitimate national expressions to protect domestic political and economic interests while maintaining a loyal imperial contribution were being thwarted by liberal free trade and laissez faire orthodoxy. He argued that it was only through a conservative imperial tradition of Disraeli and Lytton that the Empire could be strengthened through the necessary establishment of a constituted union with India’s princes and an imperial preference system to enhance British and Indian industry. Moreover, his arguments for imperial preference reflected Ellenborough’s mid-nineteenth century contention that India’s exclusive trade with empire, and not the United States, would mutually strengthen British and Indian material development. The failure of Lethbridge and British conservatives to fit the national “square” into the imperial “hole” represented their inability to convince Indian commentators that metropolitan decision and prejudice would facilitate a fair and equal imperial
economic system for India’s industrial development. Moreover, a conservative imperial tradition which viewed India as a divided country only held together by British power made it hard to acknowledge that a democratic and centralizing liberal nationalist movement could represent the Subcontinent’s interests.

Just like British conservatives, Indian conservatives, who expanded their political and social identity with a higher loyalty and obligation to the Empire, became increasingly unrepresentative in twentieth century India. While accepting Hardiman’s argument that an Indian political conservatism was non-existent after Indian Independence in 1947, this thesis demonstrates that there existed an ideologically and discursively coherent conservative “anti-congress party” in the late nineteenth century. Politically determined to protect local and prescriptive institutions through loyalty and obligation to empire, they challenged the Indian National Congress’ abstract and centralize representation of India. As was the case across the empire, a conservative imperialism in India weakened following the national sacrifices of the First World War. Many conservatives like Coswanji Jehandier became moderate liberals to defend measured constitutional progress under British guidance against more “extreme” nationalists. Increasing British capitulation to a Hindu dominated Indian Nation Congress, influenced Muslim loyalists, like Raffiudin, to engage in a Muslim nationalist cause for an independent Pakistan. Bhownaggree maintained his loyalty to British imperialism, but was increasingly politically isolated while living in Britain. The princes, including those of the First Class Kathiawar States, organized themselves to defend their autonomous interests within the
Chamber of Princes. The princes, however, tied to vertical allegiances with the Crown became unable to engage in collaborative horizontal action. Their autonomous positions became increasingly indefensible with imperial dissolution and Indian federal governance.

The failure of conservative imperialism represented the success of liberal nationalism. It represented Lethbridge’s and Bhownaggree’s inability to refashion a conservative imperial tradition, based on local or national vertical loyalties and obligations to empire, to conciliate the increasingly self-interested and democratic British and Indian nationalist interests. Despite this failure, the thesis shows that from the Indian Revolt to 1914, conservatives actively shaped British imperial perspective and practice in India. They employed local, prescriptive, and imaginative inclinations and institutions to challenge a liberal civilizing mission, and construct an imperial framework which centered on collaborative relationships. The longevity of conservative thought and collaborative participation in empire warrants further study on how imperial perspective and policy were politically contested in local and global areas.
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