Ethnic Constructions in the Seleucid Military

by

Del John Houle

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Author’s Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Abstract

This study examines the use and meaning of ethnic denominations in Hellenistic military contexts, both in literature and epigraphy. By analyzing the epigraphic records of the settlements which provided soldiers for Hellenistic (and particularly Seleucid) armies, the study shows that military units often operated under a single ethnic denomination (i.e. “Macedonian”) while including members from a variety of ethnic backgrounds, and thus that units’ use of ethnic terminology often represented a preservation of tradition rather than an indication of its members’ geographic or genealogical origin.
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Finally, I would never have been able to begin without the unending support of my family, and in particular Elizabeth’s unwavering confidence and encouragement. For this I am grateful beyond words.

- DJ H.
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Polybius 5.79: The Armies at the Battle of Raphia, 217 BCE (trans. Evelyn Shuckburgh)

Antiochus drew his forces together. These consisted of Dahae, Carmani, and Cilicians, equipped as light-armed troops to the number of about five thousand, under the charge and command of Byttacus the Macedonian. Under Theodatus, the Aetolian, who had deserted from Ptolemy, were ten thousand picked men from the whole kingdom, armed in the Macedonian fashion, most of whom had silver shields. The number of the phalanx was twenty thousand, and they were led by Nicarchus and Theodotus Hemiolius. In addition to these there were Agrianes and Persians, who were either bowmen or slingers, to the number of two thousand. With them were a thousand Thracians, under the command of Menedemus of Alabanda. There was also a mixed force of Medes, Cissians, Cadusians, and Carmanians, amounting to five thousand men, who were assigned to the chief command of Aspasianus the Mede. Certain Arabians also and men of neighbouring tribes, to the number of ten thousand, were commanded by Zabdibelus.

The passage above is part of Polybius’ description of the forces involved in the battle of Raphia in 217 BCE. It provides an account of the composition of both forces, including a snapshot of the ethnic diversity which characterized the Seleucid force under Antiochus III; we see that the army was organized into a variety of ethnically segregated contingents, each notarized by its representative ethnonym. This account, and the few others like it with regard to the Seleucids’ other major engagements, had previously been regarded as the best source...
for our understanding of the meaning and application of ethnonyms within Hellenistic armies: that is to say, what terms like “Macedonian” and “Thracian” actually entailed in military contexts.

The purpose of the present study is to discuss the meaning and application of ethnonyms as used to describe military units within the Seleucid army. Its intent is to determine whether the Seleucid core military was composed purely of ethnic Macedonians, as some sources seem to suggest, or of a variety of ethnicities under the “Macedonian” label. More broadly, it will question the content and application of ethnonyms in Hellenistic military contexts in general, and suggest that the application of an ethnic label to a military unit is indicative of a particular military and cultural tradition rather than genealogy or geographic origin.

The core of the present discussion is the nature of Hellenistic military ethnonyms, and, more specifically, it will be argued that they do not remarkably demarcate the geographic origin or bloodlines of the members of any given military unit. That is to say, this study attempts to show that a unit labelled as "Macedonians" may well have included members who could claim neither a geographic nor genealogic origin in Macedonia. That does not mean, however, that the soldiers in question would have been "mislabeled;" they may well have considered themselves to be Macedonians by virtue of their participation in a Macedonian unit, or at least have been considered in such a way by their (genealogically) Macedonian peers.

Erich Gruen has recently argued\(^1\) that Greek ethnic identity was considerably more malleable than simple questions of origin or bloodline, and that non-Greeks possessed a

\(^1\) Gruen, 2013.
surprising degree of lateral social mobility throughout the classical period, including the ability to “become Greek” by association with Greek cultural forms. This recalls Edward Anson’s argument\(^2\) that it was acquisition of Greek language, and not one’s place of birth, which determined whether one could be considered “Greek.” It may be that in this manner, association with "Macedonian" military units served as a way for non-Macedonian soldiers to "become Macedonian;" we will see below that such units would often maintain a strong connections to the cultural orientations of their founding groups, and that members of these units were indeed capable of "transitioning" from one ethnic label to another by virtue of their service.

The question of the accuracy of the ethnonyms used by units of the Seleucid military is not new, especially with reference to the “Macedonians” of the core phalanx; rather, it has been debated fervently for much of the past century. The relevant literary sources are contradictory with regard to the genealogies of Seleucid soldiers, the “Macedonian” phalangites in particular. Appian refers to the body of the phalanx simply as “the Macedonians,”\(^3\) seemingly implying an ethnically homogenous body of Macedonian soldiers, while Polybius’ description of men “armed in the Macedonian manner”\(^4\) has led to the contrary conclusion that the term “Macedonian” was merely a military phrase denoting a style of armament.

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\(^2\) Anson, 2009.  
\(^3\) Referring to the soldiers of Antiochus III at Magnesia; Appian *Syrian War*, 32.  
\(^4\) See Polybius’s description of, notably, the soldiers of both Ptolemy and Antiochus at the battle of Raphia; 5.82.
Unfortunately, Livy’s testimony offers no further clarification; although he refers to the soldiers of the Seleucid Empire as “Syrians” rather than “Macedonians” or any sort of simile, his employment of the term is a clear attempt to derogate the Seleucid army (this will be discussed in more detail below), and thus his statements sadly cannot offer convincing evidence for the presence of Syrians (that is, people who were of Syrian descent) in the Seleucid force. Rather, Livy’s terminology should only be seen as a broad generalization that does not speak to the identity of the individual groups of soldiers.

Scholarly attempts to reconcile these difficulties are numerous. W.W. Tarn famously rejected the notion that intermarriage within Hellenistic settlements significantly affected the Greek population due to their stubborn adherence to their cultural traditions, citing Plutarch’s *Crassus* as the definitive source on the matter due to its clear acknowledgement of “mixed Greeks” and implication that they are a social class to themselves. More directly relevant to Macedonian soldiers specifically is Guy Griffith’s citation of the martial quality of the “Macedonians” as demonstrated in Appian’s account of Magnesia and Polybius’ of the parade at Daphne as evidence that the troops should not be understood as “Asiatics.” Correspondingly, Bezalel Bar-Kochva has dismissed the possibility of the inclusion of indigenous peoples in a

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5 Livy identifies the *regia ala* at that battle of Magnesia as “Syrian;” see Livy 37.40.11. Bar-Kochva’s examination (1989, 92-94) of Livy’s reference to these “Syrians” entirely dismisses Livy’s identification, suggesting that these soldiers were actually Greco-Macedonian settlers originating from both Macedonia and Anatolia; however, his argument rests on the presumption that Livy’s terminology is a corruption of his (non-extant) Polybian source material, in which he expects the unit would have been identified as Macedonian. While this conclusion is certainly in line with Livy’s assertion that all denizens of the Seleucid Empire had “become Syrian” through their residency there (Livy 38.17.11), it remains purely speculative.

6 For further discussion, see below, chapter 3, 38-40.

7 Tarn 1938, 35-39.

Macedonian formation out of hand⁹ by appealing to the different terminology applied to known Asiatic phalangites in our literary sources (i.e. ἐπίγονοι for the Persian youths in Arrian, Diodorus, and Plutarch;¹⁰ ἀντιταγμα for the Asiatic phalanx of Eumenes in Diodorus¹¹), as well as a perceived difference between the shortages of manpower experienced by Alexander and Eumenes when these units were formed and the more desirable military situation of the Seleucids. By contrast, Getzel Cohen has suggested¹² that ethnic terms such as “Macedonian” lost their racial or national connotations over time, coming to hold purely military meanings (i.e. troops dispositions or fighting styles) no later than the reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, and Frank Walbank has asserted¹³ that the term “Macedonian” referred to the fighting style of the phalanx and nothing else.

Indeed, that ethnonyms could be used in descriptions of Hellenistic forces to denote types of armament or combat disposition rather than genealogy is broadly accepted, but that is not the extent of my suggestion here; the application of an ethnonym to a military unit in our literary sources should not be understood merely as the direct result of a style of combat only. Rather, this phenomenon is the result of the preservation of a military tradition, in the same way modern military units often maintain a designation despite changes to its membership base or even distinct military function.¹⁴ Thus, the presence of “Mysian” soldiers at Daphne in

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¹⁰ Arrian, Anab. 7.6, Diodorus 17.108.1, Plut. Alex. 71.
¹¹ Diodorus 17.108.3.
¹³ Walbank, 1957, 1.608.
¹⁴ Such as the maintenance of the iconography of the United States’ famous 101st Airborne division despite its transition away from traditional parachuting, or the traditional nomenclature of the Algonquin Regiment of the Canadian Reserve Forces stationed in North Bay, Ontario (whose Algonquin population is practically non-existent to my understanding); otherwise, we might recall the gradual inclusion of recruits from a variety of ethnic backgrounds into the Waffen-SS during the second world war, an observation I owe to professor Robert Porter.
166/65 BCE,\(^{15}\) for instance, need not imply a unit of men armed or organized in the same manner as those “Mysians” fielded by previous Seleucid kings, but rather an organization of soldiers who had, simply, always been known as “Mysians.” Thus, the military ethnonyms preserved in our literary sources would be neither representative of the genealogy of a unit’s members nor simply an indication of armament, but rather an artifact of the style of recruitment employed by the Seleucids (and other Hellenistic regimes), which relied upon persistent and self-maintaining regiments settled throughout the empire.

This is a study intended to offer a fresh perspective on the matter of ethnicity within Seleucid armies by considering developments in Seleucid scholarship that have not yet been applied to this topic, such as demographic realities in Hellenistic settler communities and the issue of mixed marriages. Like previous studies of the Seleucid army, the present discussion has come to rely on our literary sources, as the reality of Hellenistic epigraphic evidence is that it presents only a highly lacunose record of individual settlements and, especially, of the military groups which resided in them; yet there remain a few pieces of important epigraphic testimony which will be discussed here, because—as we shall see—it is from these rare examples that we can deduce evidence regarding the relationship of ethnonyms and military units that must affect our interpretation of the application of ethnonyms in general, at least in military situations.

While previous studies of the Seleucid army have focused almost solely on defining ethnonyms through their representation in literary texts, the objective here will be to consider

\(^{15}\) See Polybius 5.82, and below, p. 33-4.
additional factors in the army’s recruitment that may have skewed the literary usage of ethnic terminology. As such, the first chapter of this study will be dedicated to an examination of the recruitment system employed by the Seleucid monarchy and its reliance on self-maintaining military units settled throughout the empire. This discussion is foundational to the interpretation of any literary sources that will be considered further below, and it is presented first in order to contextualize the army as it is described by ancient authors. In particular, this chapter will focus on the ‘Macedonian’ soldiers employed in the Seleucid kingdom; it is hoped that this chapter will demonstrate that the term “Macedonian” represents a changing popular body, though it maintains its original ethno-cultural designation through its members’ staunch adherence to Macedonian cultural forms.

The second chapter will then examine the military institutions installed in colonial settlements in the Hellenistic period by both Macedonians and other Hellenistic cultural groups, the means by which these institutions preserved their original cultural orientations, and the impact of these groups on the ethnonyms preserved in our literary sources. This chapter will focus on the relationship of non-literary evidence to these literary ethnonyms; it is here that we will discuss a few important epigraphic and papyrological documents that demonstrate the nuances available to ethnic labels in military contexts which are not adequately expressed by the simple ethnonyms which are used by the ancient authors. The sources presented here are not extensive; that is, the few relevant pieces of epigraphy or papyrology presents are not numerous enough to plausibly demonstrate a standard practice of military units everywhere in the Hellenistic world, and they are not intended to do so. They are intended only to demonstrate the relationship of ethnonyms to military service in specific organized units, rather
than to genealogy or geographic origin; I do not interpret them as evidence that every military ethnonym is a pseudo-ethnic construction, but only as evidence that such labels can be used in this way, and thus to suggest that we cannot confidently treat ethnonyms as an indication of genealogy or geographic origin in relation to military units.

The final chapter will then reconsider the treatment of military ethnonyms by our literary sources in the most relevant contexts; that is, the three major deployments of the Seleucid regular military at the battles of Raphia and Magnesia, as well as the parade at Daphne. These events were chosen because they are the most well-attested deployments of Seleucid military force that treat the subject of ethnonyms, and because they provide the clearest association of ethnonyms and specific military groups; it is in these narratives of major engagements that ethnonyms are attributed to specific military units and thus, they serve as the most ripe avenue for any analysis of the actual nature of these labels. It is in this section that we shall see the inconsistencies in our sources which undermine any attempt to base conclusions on ethnicity in the Seleucid army, including the practice of ethnocentrism or ethnic exclusion, on the terminology of authors such as Livy and Polybius.
Chapter One: Seleucid Recruitment and Sources of Manpower

As discussed above, the overall aim of this paper is to discuss the application of ethnonyms in Hellenistic military contexts, and to explore their meanings outside any genealogical connection with those to whom they are applied. A necessary part of this discussion must entail a response to those scholars who hold that Hellenistic military ethnonyms refer to a unit’s genealogical composition and nothing more. To that end, this chapter will maintain two foci: first, to elaborate on the foundations of military recruitment in the Seleucid empire and better our understanding of the nature of military ethnonyms and their application to a broad body of recruits, and second, to underline the demographic realities facing the migrant Greco-Macedonians in the eastern Hellenistic kingdoms in order to demonstrate the impossibility that the “Macedonians” under Antiochus III and IV were anything approaching “pure-blooded.”

Of crucial importance to our understanding of military ethnonyms is our understanding of the methods by which soldiers and veterans were recruited to serve the Seleucid Empire. There has been much discussion as to the nature of the relationship between monarch and soldier; the Hellenistic practice of settling towns and forts with groups of soldiers is well known, but it has been supposed\textsuperscript{16} that the soldiers who would be settled in towns and poleis throughout the new Hellenistic world represented a fully retired population rather than an active fighting force. Yet this seems highly unlikely; we should expect the populace of those Seleucid military settlements (especially those broadly identified as “Macedonian”) to have

endured some form of military obligation, else we would expect to see the same sort of
degradation in military quality which is so clearly demonstrated by the less consistently active
force of Ptolemaic cleruchs.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, the question of the specific nature of the relationship
between settled soldier and the Hellenistic monarch remains open.

Griffith supposed that this relationship relied on land grants; a soldier would be given a
parcel of land, a κλῆρος, in return for his oath to serve its granting monarch should the need
ever arise.\textsuperscript{18} The city-building activities of the Seleucid kings, Griffith concluded, are therefore
indicative of their drive to accumulate manpower; the establishment of communities of military
settlers (κάτοικοι\textsuperscript{19}) was often a royal effort to establish settlements which could serve as a
reliable source of professional forces, accomplished through the exchange of land for military
service.

Indeed, the assertion that the Seleucid monarchs depended on disparate settlement
groups indebted to their service by virtue of land holdings is well supported; Briant has
convincingly interpreted the various references to Seleucid units being dismissed to a variety of
disparate lands as indicative of this sort of recruitment process,\textsuperscript{20} and the recruitment of the
famous Silver Shields is described by Polybius in a similar manner.\textsuperscript{21} The same is implied for the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{17}{For the sedentary lifestyle of Ptolemaic cleruchs and a resulting degradation of military ability, see Griffith, 1935, 117, cf. Polybius 5.62.7-8. It remains a possibility that the veterans themselves would no longer be active, but merely be responsible for the oversight and training of new recruits; this would still require us to understand the military colonies as a primary supplier of Seleucid military manpower, and thus would not change the present discussion.}
\footnotetext{19}{This is the most commonly recognized terminology for Hellenistic military settlers, though its use does not universally suggest that those to whom it was applied were soldiers; see Cohen, 1991.}
\footnotetext{20}{Briant, 1978, with specific reference to the cavalry drawn from the eastern satrapies.}
\footnotetext{21}{Polybius 5.79; see above, p. 2, and below, p. 36, 37.}
\end{footnotes}
regular soldiers stationed in Antioch before the rule of Demetrius II, who were dismissed “each to their own land” upon Demetrius’ arrival and replaced with a mercenary-only army.\(^2\) 

Yet this position is not wholly satisfactory. Cohen cites\(^3\) a document from Dura (P. Dura 12) as evidence against the association of all Seleucid κλῆροι with military obligation due to its indication that women were able to inherit them. He admits that the application of its contents to Seleucid colonisation is not definitive as the document itself is quite late (3rd century CE), but maintains that the inscription presents an important consideration in this regard as Dura’s relevant legal framework would likely have been established in the Seleucid period, and the concept of the military nature of κλῆροι in the Seleucid sphere is not supported directly at all.

We need not, however, fully discard the κλῆρος as a source of Seleucid military manpower. Not only is Cohen’s criticism dependant on documentation which is too late to apply to the Seleucid realm, but moreover we know that Seleucid land grants could potentially be granted with an accompanying military obligation; we know, for example, that this practice was actively employed by Antiochus III, who settled two thousand Jewish families in Phrygia and Lydia to control the region.\(^4\) Though Bickerman\(^5\) doubted the military purpose of the settlers, I follow Bar-Kochva in the interpretation of these settlers as garrisoning soldiers due both to the clearly military intention of Antiochus’ resettlement practice and the otherwise attested employment of Babylonian Jews by the Seleucid military.\(^6\) In addition, we cannot

\(^{22}\) 1 Macc. 11.38  
\(^{24}\) Jos. Ant. 12.247-53  
\(^{25}\) Bikerman, 1938, 85-6.  
\(^{26}\) Jos. Ant. 12.119; see Bar-Kochva 1976, 5-7.
ignore the inscription from Magnesia (I.Magnesia 1 = OGIS 229) which clearly attests to the holding of κλῆροι by military settlers:

OGIS 229; Ihnken 1978, 1; Trans. Austin, 2006, 174

| [35-38] ... οἱ ἐμ Μαγνησίαι κάτοικοι οἱ τε κατὰ πόλιν ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζοὶ καὶ οἱ ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκηταί... |
| [100-103]... δεδόχθαι πολίτας τε αὐτοὺς εἶναι καὶ ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς τὰ αὐτὰ Ὀσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις ὑπάρχει, καὶ τοὺς τε κήρους αὐτῶν τοὺς δύο, ὅν τε ὁ θεὸς καὶ σωτὴρ Ἀντίοχος ἐπεχώρησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ περί ὧν Ἀλέξανδρος γεγράφηκεν, εἶναι αὐτοῖς ἀδεκατεύτους, καὶ ἐὰν προσορισθῇ ἡ χώρα, ὃν ἐξουσία οἱ πρότερον ὄντες ὃ ὅ Μαγνησίαι κάτοικοι, τῇ πόλει τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ... |

Indeed, the possibility of a κλῆρος passing into the ownership of a woman does not necessarily preclude its use by the monarchy as a source of military manpower, albeit perhaps not in every case in which the distribution of κλῆροι are attested (in any case, such ownership may always have rested on the condition of providing a son or second husband of military age to the crown).

The treaty of sympolitea between Smyrna and Magnesia-ad-Sipylus ca. 245 BCE:

| The settlers in Magnesia, both the cavalry and the infantry in the city as well as those in the field and the other inhabitants...
| .. be it resolved that they should enjoy the same right as the other citizens, and that their two lots, the one granted to the by Antiochus (!) Theos Soter and the one about which Alexander wrote, should be exempt from the tithe.... |

27 Bar-Kochva (1976, 21) sees SEG VII.13 (an elegy, ca. 7-2 BCE, in honor of Zamaspes (stratiarchos of Susa) which expresses gratitude for his irrigation programs) as evidence of the same practice at Susa, arguing that the elegy’s late (Parthian) date is irrelevant as the settlers there would have been descended from those settled by the Seleucids or even Alexander: ... ἀνθ’ ὧν μιν μεγάλης ἄκρας φρουροὶ ναετῆρες ἔστασαν μνήμαις ἄσφαλτος ἐσσομένοις, τῶν κλήρους ἀνέσωσε πάλαι λειφθέντας ἀνύδρους νάμασι Γονδείσου καρποφόρους θέμενος. 

28 This suggestion is Cohen’s; 1978, 51-2. He argues that the inheritance of a κλῆρος by a woman may still have carried military obligation, to be fulfilled perhaps by her children or other close family; she may have even been free to arrange for its fulfilment by, effectively, anyone. Regardless, although the preceding arguments are speculative, Griffith argues (1935, 158-159) that the provisions for the inheritance of κλῆροι by women are not so conclusive as we might think, as the Seleucid monarchy would have been effectively bound by traditional Greek
A convincing alternative was suggested by Bikerman, who speculated that the Seleucids recruited soldiers through regional conscription from the military colonies; soldiers would be recruited on the basis of their residence, not necessarily in exchange for any land ownership, effectively becoming levies. Correspondingly, Cohen has pointed to a collection of epigraphic sources which disclose the existence of organized groups of self-governing soldiers which collectively composed a significant political force throughout Seleucid territory.\textsuperscript{29} These groups (κοινά or “lodges” as Cohen labels them) could not only play a leading role in their settlements’ local politics, but also represent active military units which were responsible for the maintenance of their own military effectiveness (i.e. equipment maintenance and, crucially, recruitment).\textsuperscript{30} Following Bikerman and Cohen, Capdetrey has recently concluded that, unlike Ptolemaic cleruchies, Seleucid settlements (and the land grants by which they were partially composed) maintained both a military and civilian character, and that only a portion of any given settler community was likely involved in military service (but that this military relationship was quite common among Seleucid settlers).\textsuperscript{31} I would argue that these suggestions together represent the most plausible reconstructions of the recruitment of non-mercenary Hellenistic forces: soldiers may indeed have been bound to military service through the possession of land, but this may not have represented a contract with the reigning monarch, but rather with

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\begin{itemize}
  \item 29 Cohen, 1978, 76-83. See also Tarn, 8; Bickerman, 1938, 82 and Oertel, 1921, 10.
  \item 30 Cohen (1978, 52, 76, 82) argues that soldiers were recruited not only on the basis of their residency in a particular region, but specifically on the basis of their participation in a region’s local military association. For further discussion on the military organizations behind such associations, see Billows, 1995, 151 regarding the apparent settlement of soldiers with officers with whom they had previously served, indicating the settlement of full units intact. For the involvement of koina with their settlements’ political activities, Cohen cites the role played by the association of Magnesia in the negotiation of sympolity with Smyrna (77-8).
  \item 31 Capdetrey, 2007, 158-66.
\end{itemize}
regional military organizations which were responsible for their own military effectiveness. This would explain, for instance, full admission to the so-called “Mysian” unit in Fayyum being coincident on a receipt of a κλῆρος.32

These associations and the implications of their membership will be discussed in much greater detail in the following chapter; for the time being, our focus will remain on the core ethnic groups from which these associations often derived their identities, as these groups appear to have maintained individual ethnonyms in the same way modern military units maintain iconography and regalia. In particular, it is crucial to examine here the factors influencing the maintenance of a strong ‘Macedonian’ population of soldiers within a group so identified (though the concept conceivably applies to any group deriving its name from a particular ethnicity). As we will see, it is difficult to reasonably expect such groups to maintain the sort of “pure” ethnic compositions which Bar-Kochva claims, as such a phenomenon would require a much greater degree of civilian migration from Macedonia proper than is evinced to be feasible.

Indeed, it does not appear that the migrant population flowing from Greece and Macedon into the Hellenistic kingdoms was so composed as to allow the establishment of a self-sustaining Greco-Macedonian population in the purest sense. As demonstrated by C. A. La’da, Ptolemaic papyrological records indicate a strong male bias in the immigrant Macedonian population, leading to frequent intermarriage with the local Egyptian populace.

32 I reference here the advancement of the career of one Theotimos, who was admitted into the ranks of the Mysian cavalry at Fayyum upon receipt of a parcel of land in 103 BCE. This example will be discussed in more detail below, p. 51.
rather than the establishment of fully Macedonian households.\textsuperscript{33} Though there is no such clear evidence to support any similar conclusions in regards to the Seleucid kingdom, the difficulties faced by the Seleucids in encouraging even purely military migration from the Greek peninsula have been noted,\textsuperscript{34} and so it is difficult to imagine Seleucid lands enjoying a more stable civilian Macedonian population than the Ptolemaic. This implies, therefore, that military colonies would, by necessity, come to depend either on the recruitment of local peoples or children of mixed marriages.

Mixed marriages among garrisoned soldiers could hardly have been ubiquitous, however; there must have been concerns regarding the status (legal and social) of local women which would have precluded this practice from becoming universal, as illustrated comically by Plautus.\textsuperscript{35} With that said, the realities of life in a garrison could lead to such concerns being disregarded or at least tempered,\textsuperscript{36} and we know that this phenomenon occurred extensively in certain regions\textsuperscript{37} including Syria, wherein the children of Greco-Macedonian fathers and Syrian mothers would be considered “Greek” and could inherit military κλῆροι.\textsuperscript{38}

Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine the stability of military immigration from the Aegean into the Seleucid empire; ca. 16,000 Macedonians are understood to have settled in Asia generally by 319 BCE,\textsuperscript{39} but beyond this date records for immigration into Asia are non-

\textsuperscript{33} La’da, 2002; cf. Scheidel, 2004, 24-5. For a parallel with regard to the Galatians of Asia Minor, see Coşkun, 2013.
\textsuperscript{34} See below, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{35} Miles Gloriosus, act IV; cf. Chaniotis, 2002, 110-12.
\textsuperscript{36} See Ogden, 1998, 76f.
\textsuperscript{37} Launey, 1949, 714 and Mélèze-Modrzejewski, 1984, 353-376 on mixed marriages in Hellenistic Egypt.
\textsuperscript{38} Andrade, 2013, 42; Martinez-Sève, 2009, 136-37; Briant, 1982; Cohen, 1978, 85-86.
\textsuperscript{39} Billows, 1995, ch.7; Scheidel, 2001; Fischer-Bovet, 2007, 10.
existent. It is interesting to note, however, Bagnall’s observation\(^{40}\) that military units demarcated by ethnonym in the Ptolemaic realm could continue to grow even in the absence of significant immigration from their homeland, and in fact that a greater number of Ptolemaic cleruchs appear to have been descended from an original settler group which received little further reinforcement through immigration.\(^{41}\) This implies, of course, that immigration was not a necessary condition for the maintenance of ethnic traditions by the cleruchies; and thus, we should not expect it to be a necessary condition for the maintenance of military traditions in the Seleucid realm, either.\(^{42}\)

If we can accept that Greco-Macedonian immigration would not likely have provided a stable community of “Macedonian” soldiers within Hellenistic armies, we must then wonder as to the eventual fate of the “Macedonian” communities which formed the foundation of the military societies contributing to these forces. In this regard, a brief examination of the “Argyraspides,” the famous Seleucid elite infantry, may prove telling; the mythos surrounding the fabled unit held that their members were well-nigh immortal, maintaining a stable membership and fighting prowess well into the old age of each soldier. We read the following in Diodorus (19.41):

\[
καὶ γὰρ ἐτύγχανον κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν τῶν ἀργυρασπίδων οἱ νεώτατοι μὲν περὶ τὰ ἔξηκοντα ἔτη, τῶν δ’ ἄλλων οἱ πλείους μὲν περὶ τὰ ἑβδομήκοντα, τινὲς δὲ καὶ πρεσβύτεροι, πάντες δὲ ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις καὶ ταῖς ῥώμαις ἀνυπόστατοι: τοσαύτη περὶ αὐτοὺς ἦν εὐχειρία καὶ τόλμα διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν κινδύνων.
\]

\[
At this time the youngest of the Silver Shields were about sixty years old, most of the others about seventy, and some even older; but all of them were irresistible because of experience and strength, such was the skill and daring acquired through the unbroken series of their battles.
\]

\(^{40}\) Bagnall, 1984, 10-12.
\(^{41}\) Roughly two-thirds of the cleruchs counted by Uebel, 1968.
\(^{42}\) For further discussion, see Mitchell, forthcoming 2016.
Of course, we might reasonably find this assertion difficult to believe, and there is evidence to the contrary to be found in Polybius. Far from a stable unit roster of Macedonian men, Polybius tells us (5.79.4) that the Argyraspides were a unit whose ranks not only required replenishment with new recruits, but that these recruits came from a variety of geographic sources:

| ὑπὸ δὲ Θεόδοτον τὸν Αἰτωλὸν τὸν ποιησάμενον τὴν προδοσίαν ἦσαν ἐκ πάσης ἐκλελεγμένοι τῆς βασιλείας, καθωπλισμένοι δ᾽ εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον, ἄνδρες μύριοι: τούτων οἱ πλείονες ἀργυράσπιδες. | Under Theodotus, the Aetolian, who had deserted from Ptolemy, were ten thousand picked men from the whole kingdom, armed in the Macedonian fashion, most of whom had silver shields. |

We can thus see that, despite the varied nature of the Argyraspides’ recruiting base, the unit was maintained on the basis of a military tradition which predated its actual membership; in other words, it was quite important that the Argyraspides always be seen as “the Argyraspides,” and that any new blood entering the unit maintained the esprit de corps for which the unit had become known. It was this military tradition, and not the actual genealogy of the force’s members, which defined its identity.

It is quite likely that the foundational bodies of these types of units, whatever ethnonym they adhered to, were indeed homogenous groups. We cannot, however, confidently assert that these groups were capable of maintaining homogeneity through the generations; this would require us to believe that these original groups had maintained a population large
enough to represent a significant body of military manpower by the time of Daphne.\textsuperscript{43} As Rachel Mairs has demonstrated with respect to the Hellenistic east, the maintenance of Macedonian cultural forms is less evidence for a stable Macedonian population and more evidence for an acceptance of these cultural forms.\textsuperscript{44} In this case, Mairs’ position appears directly relevant: the “Macedonians” of Antiochus’ review at Daphne, for example, are unlikely to have been homogenously ethnic Macedonians for demographic reasons, but rather a body of men of indeterminate origin who had become part of a Macedonian military association which had existed in their settlement for some time.

It is an important distinction to make, however, that these would not have been “Macedonian” units by virtue of their tactical forms only; Cohen himself has discerned that the military associations present in Hellenistic colonies would serve an important role in preserving the culture of its founding group.\textsuperscript{45} These are not merely groups of “Asiatics” fighting in the Macedonian style, but rather groups of men who had come to actively participate in—and indeed assume—Macedonian cultural identity, as I shall demonstrate below.

\textsuperscript{43} In any event, intermarriage between Hellenistic military settlers and local women is simply far too well-attested to be anything other than expected in this regard. See Vatin, 1970, esp. 137; Tarn, 1938, 34-9. For this practice as early as Alexander, cf. Justin 12.4.

\textsuperscript{44} Mairs, 2006. Mairs contends that the concept of ethnicity in the Hellenistic world was malleable, and as such that the archaeological record which seems to represent distinct residential areas within cities for people of differing cultures is misleading. It is Mairs’ position that ethnicity in this period and region was largely defined by the cultural institutions one participated in and, therefore, changing one’s social behavior could effectively change one’s ethnicity over time; she therefore concludes that urban remains which were once thought to signify segregated Greco-Macedonian and Bactrian populations in cities like Ai Khanoum may actually represent segregated cultural spheres populated by people of either race.

\textsuperscript{45} Cohen, 1978, 82.
Chapter Two: The Impact of the Seleucid Recruitment System on Military Ethnonyms

As previously addressed, our best insights into the ethnic composition of the Seleucid force are given by Polybius, Livy and Appian, through their accounts of the battles of Raphia and Magnesia respectively, as well as Polybius’s account\textsuperscript{46} of the military parade held by Antiochus IV at Daphne. These accounts appear to describe a force whose units are quite clearly demarcated on lines of ethnicity, but as discussed in the previous chapter, this clarity is unsurprisingly misleading. The focus of this chapter will be to examine the impact of the methods of recruitment employed by the Seleucid army on the use and application of ethnonyms in Hellenistic military contexts. In short, I will argue that the Seleucid army’s reliance on self-administering military units which maintained traditional ethnonyms would lead to these ethnonyms being associated with recruits from a variety of geographic and cultural backgrounds.

This style of recruitment, which was discussed in the previous chapter, therefore led to the under-(or mis-)representation of certain ethnic groups in our primary literary sources for the army’s composition, as it would have obscured the genealogy of the various participants of these groups in favor of the ethnonym maintained by the group as a whole; we will see that such units often seem to have referred to themselves by a single ethnonym despite the inclusion of individuals of differing ethnic backgrounds.

To explore this assertion, we will consider a few inscriptions which illustrate the association of an ethnic moniker (including "Macedonian") with an organized military

\textsuperscript{46} Based on Athenaios, 194c-195f.
association within a settlement. These inscriptions attest to the ethno-cultural traditions of these groups; a garrison force could be identified by an ethnonym, presumably dependent on the genealogy or geographic origin of its original members, which would establish a tradition which would persist within the group despite the eventual inclusion of new members who did not identify with its founding ethnonym (which will be discussed further below).

We know of a number of epigraphic records of garrison forces identified by a specific ethnonym; several settlements in Asia Minor demonstrably maintained populations which self-identified as “Macedonians” long after their original foundation (e.g. Nakrasa\textsuperscript{47} and Doidye\textsuperscript{48}), indicating that the remaining soldier populations had maintained this identity despite intermarriage with the local populace.\textsuperscript{49} A clear example of this style of self-identification is demonstrated at Thyatira in the third century:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>OGIS 211.</strong></th>
<th>An early third-century dedicatory inscription to Seleukos I:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... τῶν ἐν Θυατείρᾳ Μακεδόνων οἱ ἡγεμόνες καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται...</td>
<td><em>The leaders and the soldiers of the Macedonians in Thyatira...</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>BCH 11, 466.32.</strong></th>
<th>A small stone containing only the identification of the garrison around Thyateira, dated to the reign of Seleukos I (306-281 BCE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... οἱ περὶ Θυάτειρα Μακεδόνες...</td>
<td><em>The Macedonians around Thyatira...</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{47} OGIS 268; CIG 3522.
\textsuperscript{48} OGIS 314
\textsuperscript{49} Which, as was explored in the previous chapter, would have represented a demographic necessity. For the maintenance of military tradition in these settlements in particular, see Griffith, 1935, 151.
The association of the term “Macedonian” with professional military associations is also evident papyrologically, as we know of a few pieces of evidence which attest to the careers of members of military associations whose epithet featured the ethnonym “Macedonian” alongside their military definitions, such as one Lysanias of Hiera Nesos who is identified as one of the “infantry of the Macedonians.” This usage of the term "Macedonian" was enough to lead Launey and Uebel to conclude that the ethnonym had come to represent only a pseudo-ethnonym (though Launey cautioned that this would not be the case in each usage), as it was tied to a military role and not, apparently, to a particular genealogy.

These theories, however, depended on the absence of any recognized connection between ethnic tradition and military service in the Hellenistic world; Launey, for instance, believed that the application of the term "Macedonian" revealed only that a soldier primarily fought as a phalangite, while the reality of the term's application is more socially complex than military armament alone. At the very least, it often appears to refer to a soldier’s participation in an organized unit which identified as a group with the ethnonym in question.

Direct evidence for this phenomenon is provided by a selection of inscriptions included below, which contain references not only to a garrison with an ethnic moniker, but also an indication of their inclusion of members that did not identify with their namesake ethnonym. Each of these pieces involves the self-identification of a military group with a primary ethnic moniker as well as an indication that only part of its membership could claim such an identity.

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50 Pp 8919; ca. 244-43 BCE, cf. Uebel, 1968, no. 90. For further examples of the usage of the term “Macedonian” to denote a settler’s military occupation, cf. Uebel nos. 344, 398, 1184, and 1322.

(these groups are usually referred to as συμπολιτευόμενοι, and are not identified with any minority ethnic\textsuperscript{52}). These inscriptions thus attest to the eventual inclusion of local indigenous people in an ethnically-demarcated military association to which they did not relate genealogically (or, more broadly, the inclusion of the general populace in an otherwise specifically labelled unit. Admittedly, the local origin of these new recruits cannot be demonstrated: it would simply represent the most convenient source of replenishment for a garrison force).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OGIS 143</th>
<th>The “Thracians” of Cyprus; an honorific inscription to Ptolemy, governor of Cyprus, ca. 150-100 BCE.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἐν Κύπρωι τασσομένων Θρακίων καὶ τῶν συμπολιτευομένων...</td>
<td>The association of Thracians stationed in Cyprus and those living with them...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OGIS 145</th>
<th>The Cypriot “Ionians;” this inscription appears to be similar in context to OGIS 143 although the first lines of the inscription are lost (ca. 150-100) BCE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἐν τῇ ἦσσω τασσομένων Ἰωνίων καὶ τῶν συμπολιτευομένων...</td>
<td>The association of Ionians stationed on the island and those living with them...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEG II.871</th>
<th>The “Boeotians” of Xoei, near Alexandria; an honorific inscription dated to the reign of Ptolemy VI (180-145 BCE):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>οἱ ἐπισυνηγμένοι ἐν Ξόει Βοιωτοῖ καὶ οἱ συμπολιτευόμενοι....</td>
<td>The Boeotians gathered together in Xoei and those living with them.....</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{52} For discussion of the inclusion of συμπολιτευόμενοι as a demographic necessity for the maintenance of military effectiveness on the part of garrison groups, see Cohen, 1978, 76-83. See also Lesquier, 1911, 120-24, who has demonstrated that the ethnic Mysian originally denoted origin but came to represent only tactical disposition and armament by the second century BCE as a variety of soldiers in “Mysian” units could be demonstrably linked to other ethnic origins (i.e. Cretans, Persians, and even Macedonians).
OGIS 143 and 145 are Cypriot, and admittedly Ptolemaic, though still relevant at present; they are extracts of dedicatory inscriptions in the name of two military associations, the Thracians and Ionians respectively, which identify their patron groups by those particular ethnic monikers alone. SEG II.871, another Ptolemaic example, is an Alexandrian dedicatory inscription established by a military association of “Boeotians.” Indeed, it appears that such groups would typically associate themselves with their (presumably) dominant or founding ethnicity, whether Macedonian in Thyatira or Thracian on Cyprus. But most relevant here are the references to the various smaller groups identified within the structure of some of these groups, as the inscriptions also make clear that these ethnicities are not comprehensive statements of the groups’ members. We see in the Cypriot inscriptions of the Thracian and Ionian κοινά, as well as the πολίτευμα of the Egyptian Boeotians, that these groups could include soldiers who did not individually identify with their dominant ethnicity. Each of these dedications identify their respective associations as inclusive of others who cannot be identified as Thracian or Ionian themselves—though they are their “co-habitants,” συμπολιτευόμενοι,

53 Van’t Dack (1984, 1329) connects the sympoliteuomenoi with the garrison at large rather than any civic association at Herakleios; Honigman (2003, 29 n. 31) places these soldiers as garrison troops at Sebennytos in the delta, and only relates them to Herakleios through the gymnasium.
they are not yet Thracians, Ionians, or Boeotians proper. The membership of these individuals within the referred organizations is implied by their inclusion in the same genitive phrases which identify the associations with their dominant ethnicities. The cited Thracian association, for example, does not dedicate their inscription by “the κοινόν of Thracians and also by those living with them,” but rather by “the κοινόν composed of Thracians and those living with them.” The distinct implication, previously noted by Cohen, appears to be that people who could not otherwise identify as Thracian could yet be admitted to and included in this κοινόν.

This practice does not appear to be confined to Cyprus, or even specifically to these associations; the cited record of the Ptolemaic Boeotian association indicates that this group included συμπολιτευόμενοι as well despite its particular ethnonym. A further notable example is the garrison at Palaemagnesia in Asia Minor, wherein a group of Persian soldiers undergo sympolity alongside others, though it is the primary group which is not identified:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OGIS 229; Ihnken 1978, 1; Trans. Austin, 2006, 174</th>
<th>The treaty of sympolitea between Smyrna and Magnesia-ad-Sipylus ca. 245 BCE:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ὑπάρχειν δὲ καὶ Ομάνει καὶ τοῖς Πέρσαις τοῖς ύπὸ Ομάνην καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σμύρνης ἀποσταλέσιν ἐπὶ τὴν φυλαχήν τοῦ χωρίου, Μενεκλεῖ τε καὶ τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτὸν τασσομένοις, τὴν τε πολιτεία[n] καὶ τάλα φυλάνθρωπα ἀ καὶ τοῖς ἐκ Μαγνησιας ἐψήφισαι, κ[α]ὶ προνοῆσαι τὸν δήμον ὅπως αὐτοῖς διδῶται ἐκ βασιλικοῦ τά τε ματρήματα καὶ τά ϋψῶνια τάλα ὡσα ἐώθει ἐκ βασιλικοῦ δidonοσθαί αὐτοῖς.</td>
<td>Omanes and the Persians under Omanes and the men sent from Smyrna to guard the fort, Menecles and those under his command, shall be granted citizenship and the other privileges which have been voted to the others from Magnesia, and the people will see to it that they are given from the royal treasury their rations and pay and everything else which is normally given to them from the royal treasury.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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55 Arthur Megaw has argued that a similar practice, though using different terminology, is evident in the epigraphy surrounding a Lycian regiment stationed on Cyprus near the close of Ptolemaic rule of the island (ca. 40/39 BCE); though the decrees of this regiment refer to the inclusion of parepilykoi, a pseudo-ethnic which he equates to the sympoliteuomenoi mentioned by the Ionian and Thracian units. Megaw, 2007, 372-3.
56 See above, SB I 1106, p. 24.
These inscriptions are perhaps the most telling pieces of evidence for the ability of the Hellenistic military colony to obscure the genealogy and origins of the local populaces of garrisoned regions. If a settlement included a military association which identified with a single ethnonym (as with the "Thracians" of OGIS 143) and that association recruited from the local populace, then this would serve as a mechanism by which a collective body of soldiers of various genealogies would come to be known by a single ethnonym. The associations cited above, and their methods of epigraphic self-identification, demonstrate the capacity for such groups to display a primary ethnic moniker ("Thracians," "Ionians," "Macedonians") while admitting members who were not of their titular ethnic origin. Thus, we might understand the Seleucid “Macedonians” or “Thracians” present in the accounts of the army’s roster in our historians as referring to a body of men bearing these identities despite varying genealogic or geographic origins. It seems most likely that these associations would maintain their traditional ethnonym as their active military roster changed, expecting new recruits to conform to its established traditions, as will be discussed shortly below.

The malleability of ethnic identity in the face of military service is further illustrated papyrologically, through the career of one Dionysios Kephalas a Ptolemaic soldier whose career can be (at least partially) determined through the extant receipts of transactions involving his land;57 in 112 BCE, Dionysios was an active soldier called a “Persian,” an ethnonym which persisted through 109 when he was promoted to serve as his unit’s rearguard captain. In 108, however, the ethnonym is no longer attached to his name, instead having been replaced by the

57 The various sources for this are discussed by Launey, 1949, 325-26, along with further comment on the phenomenon.
epithet “Macedonian.” Though we lack details on the association or military unit in which Dionysios served—which curiously involved both the Persian and Macedonian ethnonyms—the point remains that Dionysios was capable of transitioning from being "Persian" to being "Macedonian" by virtue of his military service and his position.

These units offered an avenue for indigenous involvement in the Greco-Macedonian military (and thus cultural) sphere which our sources do not adequately represent. Bar-Kochva has already noted the conspicuous absence of Syrians and Persians in our sources for the composition of the Seleucid military. We do have a scant few exceptional examples against this trend; Polybius gives reference to a unit of Persians serving alongside units of Agrianian and Thracian light infantry under a commander Menedemus at the battle of Raphia. Of immediate note is the exceptional presence of identified Persian soldiers at all, but also important is their presence alongside Thracian soldiers if we accept that the Thracian soldiers were locally raised in the region of Persis. The origin of these Thracians is admittedly uncertain; Griffith interprets these soldiers simply as Thracian mercenaries, while Launey suggests that they are the descendants of Thracian settlers in Asia Minor established by either the Seleucids or Alexander himself. However, both suggestions seem untenable, as forces from both Thrace proper and

58 See also Launey (1949, 326 n. 3) who describes a similar phenomenon affecting another soldier, Hermophilos.
59 Bar-Kochva 1976, 52, rejects the previously dominant explanation for this absence—that the general contemporary opinion in the Seleucid kingdom and the ancient world at large held that Syrians and those of Iranian descent were “effeminate and soft” (cf. Launey, 1949, 1.536, referencing Livy 35.49.8 and Plut. Moral. 197c)—but suggests an original explanation that is purely speculative: citing the critical importance of the regions in question to the Seleucid administration (a matter now in dispute; see below, n. 72), he proposes that the Seleucids simply saw “arming the Syrians” as too risky an endeavor and thus refrained from doing so, especially in light of the great concentrations of military colonies housing Macedonian military resources.
60 Polybius 5.79.6: “πρὸς δὲ τούτων Ἀγριᾶνες καὶ Πέρσαι τοξόται καὶ σφενδονῆται δισχίλιοι. μετὰ δὲ τούτων χίλιοι Θράκες, ὃν ἦγετο Μενέδημος Ἀλαβανδεύς.”
61 Griffith, 1935, 143.
62 Launey, 1949, 378.
Anatolia would have been inaccessible to Antiochus III due to their being under the control of Ptolemy IV and Achaios at this time; the most likely suggestion is that the Persians, Agrianians, and Thracians were each raised from the region of Persis, made by Bar-Kochva on the basis of their sharing of a common commander.\textsuperscript{64} Thus, we can confidently accept that the Persians mentioned by Polybius are interesting not only due to their exceptional nature among ethnic groups in the Seleucid military, but also because they appear to represent a unit identified by its specific military tradition and not solely its ethnicity, as clearly applies to the Thracians and Agrianians they serve beside.\textsuperscript{65}

However, it remains that these populations are left largely unaccounted for in our major sources for the composition of the Seleukid force. Of course, it is hardly unanimously accepted that these sources of manpower were left fully untapped. Bar-Kochva’s dismissal of the involvement of Iranian-born soldiers in the phalanx is not total, as he does suggest\textsuperscript{66} that the portion of the army’s recruiting base centered in Anatolia may have drawn from Iranian-descended soldiers possibly descended from Achaemenid settlers. With respect to the royal army in full, Billows considers\textsuperscript{67} the involvement of Asiatics, including Syrians and Mesopotamians, in the “Macedonian” regiments of the army an inevitability, and Sherwin-

\textsuperscript{63} Bar-Kochva, 1976, p. 50. These soldiers would likely have represented men recruited from their namesake lands in prior years and later settled in or around (and supplied by) the region of Persis.
\textsuperscript{64} Dumitru, 2013, while ultimately undecided, has also conceded (p. 355) that the presence of soldiers recruited from the Seleucid east is much more believable than western-raised troops due to Antiochus III’s recent campaigning against Molon. Furthermore, we know through Diodorus (19.27.5) and Polyaeus (7.40) of a Thracian military settlement in Persis, which lends further credence to Bar-Kochva’s suggestion.
\textsuperscript{65} On the usage of the term “Persian” as demarcation of a military disposition rather than ethnicity in Ptolemaic Egypt, see Lesquier, 1911, 106ff. This is quite contrary to the relative proliferation of the ethnic “Persian” in Ptolemaic military records; cf. Fischer-Bovet, 2014, 90-99.
\textsuperscript{66} Bar-Kochva, 1976, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{67} Billows, 1995, 157.
White and Kuhrt consider the treaty between Magnesia and Smyrna (OGIS 229) as evidence of direct Persian participation in the phalanx. In any case, the relative dearth of military manpower faced by the Seleucids gives us reason to expect that they would have been mobilised whenever needed; thus, we are left wondering as to their absence in our literary accounts.

It is unlikely that there is a universal explanation for the phenomenon; it would be too much to assume that every recruiting body and every military garrison operated in the same manner throughout the empire. But it now seems at least likely that one contributing factor is that organized associations of soldiers of the sort just discussed (who identified with various

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69 Tuplin is more skeptical, dismissing the Persians at Palaemagnesia as significant in any respect (2014, pp. 18) due to the inscription’s failure to specify their role in the garrison and its structure; he cautiously accepts a limited role of Iranian soldiers in the army’s cavalry, as these men are detailed by Livy (37.40.56) at the battle of Magnesia and Polybius (30.25) at the parade at Daphne. Griffith (1935, pp. 155) and Aperghis (2005, p. 200) and many others have postulated that this was a unit of cavalymen, which, while not indicated in the inscription, is entirely possible; it may even be that these were a unit of Persian light infantry attached to Timon’s phalangites, as Arrian records the inclusion of Persian light soldiers into the phalanx during Alexander’s campaigns (Arrian, Anabasis 7), and it remains that this unit of Persian soldiers is decidedly recorded as a part of a military group collectively identified as phalangites. Regarding their origin, Ihnken (1978, pp. 121) has argued that Omanes’ men are likely connected to the various contingents of Persians stationed in Asia Minor by the Achaemenids, which may have continued to operate under Seleukid dominance, a view followed by Billows without argument (1995, 175 n. 84) but rejected by Coşkun (forthcoming 2016) who instead suggests that the unit is a product of Seleucus II’s eastern campaigning and is only a recent addition to the fort’s occupants.
70 At least with respect to phalangites and “Macedonians” proper; Grainger (2014, pp. 92-3) has contrasted Ptolemy’s diligent recruitment of Macedonian settlers to populate his own military colonies with Seleucus’ dependence on the scattered and sparse garrisons left by Antigonus; this deficiency of Macedonian manpower was, of course, exacerbated by Seleucus’ lack of access to the Greek mainland for purposes of recruitment (at least until 301, when Ipsos gained him access to the Mediterranean coast; see Griffith, 1935, pp. 150-1). Even these problems seem enough to render Bar-Kochva’s adherence to the “purity” of the Macedonian ethnic with regard to the phalanx untenable, and well beyond Billows’ broad suggestion as such; the city foundations and re-foundations conducted by Seleucus I (see Grainger 2014, 93; Griffith, 1935, 148-52) allowed him access to an indigenous demographic intended to circumvent the reliance of other Hellenistic forces on Macedonian heavy infantry, and there is no reason beyond the lack of direct attestation of his soldier’s Syrian/Iranian descent in the literary sources to assume that this resource was established and then fully ignored. Alexander’s need for reinforcement was enough to lead to the establishment of the ἐπίγονοι; there was even more need on the part of the Seleucids.
differing ethnicities) had included these men, and therefore that these Syrians and Persians were present in the Seleukid standing force under other ethnonyms.

No inscription details the identity of any members of its association who do not qualify as part of their dominant ethnic; thus, the question of the specific identity of these “others” who came to be included in these groups still stands. It seems most likely that they were simply members of the local population recruited to maintain sufficient strength in the local garrison, particularly following campaigns or invasion, but the very nature of this process has obscured the identities of these people. Cohen has likened\(^7^1\) the entrance of foreigners into settlers’ associations to their eventual entrance into the colonies’ gymnasia, suggesting that such organizations existed partially as a way to ensure that new arrivals to a colony adapted to Greco-Macedonian culture exclusively rather than bringing in the influence of their own customs. Thereby, these associations would have served as a means by which a settler population could ensure the survival of its parent culture and identity in a foreign region upon which they would come to be dependent for military manpower; it would appear that one avenue for the pursuit of this goal was through the maintenance of a military tradition under which they had originally arrived.

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\(^7^1\) Cohen, 1976, pp. 82. At pp. 36, Cohen places the gymnasion at the center of Hellenistic colonial life—as a “repository of Hellenic culture” alongside its normal duties of education and training—largely responsible for fostering a sense of “Greekness” among the residents of a colony, supporting this suggestion by citing the pervasive presence of the institution among Seleucid colonies. Even in this definitively Greek institution, however—and one in fact designed to maintain the separation of Greek and non-Greek—Cohen admits that the eventual inclusion of non-Greeks was essentially inevitable, due primarily to demographic necessity but also to social pressure. We can deduce from the frequent application of ethnic monikers to military associations, as well as their capacity for the maintenance of traditional cultic and military practices, that they served the same purpose; the same function of the gymnasion, the maintenance of cultural homogeneity, can be observed in the military associations’ adherence to their unit’s traditional *esprit de corps*. 
This assertion finds support in a few additional epigraphic sources which seem to reference the preservation of ethno-cultural traditions by various soldiers' associations, especially religious practices. Of particular note is the dedication of the Boeotians in Alexandria, which clearly demonstrates the continuation of an association’s traditional cultic practices despite the inclusion of συμπολιτευόμενοι as demonstrated in SEG II.871 above):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEG II.871</th>
<th>An Alexandrian honorific inscription dated to the reign of Ptolemy VI (180-145 BCE):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δι Βασιλεί καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πατρίοις θεοῖς.</td>
<td>... To Zeus Basileus and the other ancestral gods...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are other examples of equal value, such as the following dedicatory inscription from Thera by the resident Ptolemaic dynastic cult and one member of the garrison, Diokles, which is dedicated to Egyptian deities. This inscription depicts an instance in which an individual member of the garrison was personally associated with his association’s broad religious position:72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IG XII 3, 443</th>
<th>A dedicatory inscription by the garrison on Thera, dated broadly to the reign of Ptolemy III.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Διοκλῆς καὶ οἱ Βασιλισται ... Σαράπι, Ἰσι, Ἀνουβί...</td>
<td>Diokles and the Basilistai... to Osiris, Isis, and Anubis...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is also a dedicatory inscription to Zeus Soter and Tyche Protogeneia by Philotas of Epidamnos, garrison commander of the Ptolemaic garrison at Itanos on Crete. This inscription is

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72 For the dating of these inscriptions and their involvement in the broader religious activities of the garrison, see Vidman, 1969, 88-91; for further discussion, Chaniotis, 2002, 108-9; Bagnall, 1976, 129; Hallof, Hallof and Habicht, 1998, 123 n. 84.
of particular interest as it demonstrates the impact of a military association’s religious practices on the cultic landscape of their occupied territories; it is a personal dedication on behalf only of the garrison’s commander, but it appears that the cult of these deities became established following the garrison’s presence suggesting their wider worship in the association.\textsuperscript{73}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OGIS 119</th>
<th>Dedicationary inscription by the commander of the garrison at Itanos, ca. 145 BCE.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Φιλώτας Γενθιου ὁ Ἐπιδαμνιος, χιλιαρχος και φρούραρχος, Διὶ Σωτῆρι καὶ Τύχηι Πρωτογενήια....</td>
<td>Philotas of Epidamnos, chiliarch and watch-commander, to Zeus Soter and Tyche Protogeneia...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of further note are the dedicatory inscriptions to Zeus Soter (Ἔφ. Ἀρχ., 1911, p. 52, n. 17) and Athena Nikephoros (IG IV, 1, 1.41) at Aegina which, while not explicitly linked to any Pergamene garrison in their respective texts, have been dated to the period immediately following the Pergamene occupation and appear directly linked to the presence of Pergamene military groups.\textsuperscript{74} We can therefore see that these associations often practiced cultic devotions as a unit, a practice fully understandable in light of Cohen’s interpretation of these bodies as not only military in nature but also as a method of maintaining their founders’ original cultural orientation. Each of these inscriptions demonstrates the practice of a particular religious cult by a military association as a whole, thereby corroborating the assertion that new recruits into such organizations would be exposed to an environment in which their cultural practices would

\textsuperscript{73} For the presence of this cult at Itanos following, and because of, the presence of these foreign soldiers, see Spyridakis, 1969, 44.

\textsuperscript{74} Launey, 1949, 956.
be expected to conform to that of the overall unit (though whether this extended to their private lives cannot be said).\textsuperscript{75}

The importance placed upon maintaining cultural traditions by these groups also provides another perspective on their apparent consistency of battlefield roles. As mentioned, it has been a matter of extensive scholarly debate whether the term "Macedonian" in reference to the Seleucids' pike phalanx is an ethnonym at all or merely a military designation, but the two are neither mutually exclusive nor limited to the Macedonian ethnonym; rather, the maintenance of military practices appears to have served as a method by which an association of soldiers in general could maintain its traditional sense of identity, just as with other cultural phenomena (e.g. cultic practices), not unlike modern military units.\textsuperscript{76} We know of the maintenance of traditional military practice by a unit of Thracian settler-soldiers settled in Persia itself up to at least the battle of Raphia, who continued to serve as medium-light infantry despite being removed from their traditional geographic origin, and we see the same practice in

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{75} Cohen, 1976, pp. 74-5. The inscription included at #10 recalls a dedication made by this group on behalf of Ptolemy Philometor to Zeus Basileus, along with other deities who are not specifically named. Note that the presence of συμπολιτευόμενοι in the group does not, of course, necessitate their direct involvement in the worship of a Boeotian deity, but it remains that they are recorded as being a part of a group which actively continued to pursue Boeotian cultic practices during their residency in Egypt. Cf. the inscriptions of the garrisons at Thera (IG XII 3, 443, 464, cf. Vidman, 1969, 88-91; Launey, 1949, 890; Bagnall, 1976, 124-126), Methana (IG IV, 854), Athens (IG II 1299), Attalid Aigina and Panion (cf. Chaniotis, 2002, 109; Launey, 1949, 956) for other examples of military associations maintaining either traditional religious practices or participation in the ruler cult of their founding empire. It does appear that identifying oneself with Macedonian cultural forms served some purpose in the improvement of one's social standing; this would explain certain onomastic anomalies within Grainger's gazetteer of Seleucid subjects, wherein can be found, as an example, the records of a Persian merchant who had given Greek names to his children (Grainger, 1997). There is, of course, no way to be certain of his motivations, though we may understand the desire of some to escape the tension between those of a Greco-Macedonian heritage and the local populaces of the eastern world that is so strongly expressed in the works of several Hellenistic poets (especially Meleager). Omanes and his men at Magnesia certainly seemed to benefit from their participation, as they had received the same privileges under the Smyrnean treaty as their Hellenic fellows. However, this is an issue for which significant discussion would require a degree of consideration well outside the scope of this study.

\textsuperscript{76} See above, p. 6 n. 13.}
the unit of "Agrianians" supposedly attached to these Thracians: just as the famed light unit of Alexander's forces, these "Agrianians" remained a unit of specialized light infantry, despite most likely representing only a pseudo-ethnic moniker by the time of Raphia. On this same note, the region of Persis also provides the only unit of identified Persians reported in service in the major campaigns of the Seleucids; yet, we should not see this apparent lack of involvement as representative of the extent of Persian participation in the campaigns. Rather, it seems more likely that these soldiers of Persis itself, light-armed infantry and bowmen, represent the maintenance of the Persian military tradition of famed archers and light troops—much like the Agrianians just discussed—and not of the full collection of all Persian manpower within the Seleucid force, as the latter would require the Seleucids to have fully ignored one of the more significant resources of manpower available to their empire.

If even a few of those individual units stationed throughout the Seleucid west—those in Syria who would come to form the phalanx in times of campaign—maintained their own tradition and culture as the Boeotians in Egypt or the Agrianians in Persis, then we may be able

77 Polybius 5.79: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ἀγριᾶνες καὶ Πέρσαι τοξόται καὶ σφενδονήται δισχίλιοι. μετὰ δὲ τούτων χίλιοι Θράκες, ὃν ἤγειτο Μενέδημος Αλαβανδεύς. For the armament of these soldiers, see above, n. 48. For the nature of the ethnonym applied to the Agrianians, see above, n. 61, and Bar-Kochva, 1976, 50.
78 Cf. Engels 2013, who considers Polyaenus 7.39-40 evidence of a significant population of Persians within the wider Seleucid force. However, I cannot accept this argument as the texts only refer to a declaration on the part of Antiochus for the army to observe a Persian holiday (and one further intended specifically to mollify the local Persian population); I cannot see the army’s acquiescence to this command as evidence for a present Persian military population any more than I can see the Alexandrian Boeotians’ practice of worshipping Hellenic deities as evidence that the entire association was comprised of Hellenes (see above, SEG II.871).
79 The separation of the Thracian soldiers from the main phalanx, coupled with their source in an independent military settlement, indicates that they had maintained their traditional armaments and fighting style (or as near as could be accomplished), cf. Bar-Kochva, 1976, pp. 33-34. For further discussion of this unit, see above, n. 48.
80 Bar-Kochva, 1976 pp. 50-1. The presence of Persian soldiers of some description, whether infantry or cavalry, is attested in other sources (i.e. OGIS 229), but their only mention in the primary literature is that of Polybius given above, wherein they are identified with the light-armed fighting style.
81 See below, p. 45.
to understand an underlying cause for the apparent under-representation of Syrian and Iranian soldiers in the Seleucid force: much like Omanes' Persians in Palaemagnesia,\textsuperscript{82} they would likely have employed as units subordinate to a group of phalangites, perhaps identified as Macedonian, but almost certainly obscuring their own original ethnic identity as far as most of our sources are concerned.

\textsuperscript{82} See above, p. 25.
Chapter Three: Reconsidering the Literary Sources

Having considered the nature of Seleucid recruitment and its impact on the employment of military ethnonyms, we can now effectively reconsider those literary sources which had previously informed scholarly opinion on the meaning of ethnonyms in the Seleucid army; namely, the accounts of the army’s three major deployments, at the battles of Raphia and Magnesia as well as the parade at Daphne. What follows is a brief discussion of each of these sources, which remain the most detailed extant accounts of the army’s composition, as well as their individual treatment of ethnonyms. These separate discussions will be followed by a more detailed treatment of the use of ethnonyms in these sources as a whole.

While a few select ethnonyms provided by these sources will be discussed in concert with a selection of non-literary evidence to illustrate the disconnection between military ethnonyms and genealogy, the primary concern of this chapter are the Seleucid phalangites themselves. No other body of soldiers presents such a confusing picture in the literary sources—they are sometimes “Macedonians,” sometimes not—and previous scholarly discussion of military ethnonyms has centered on these soldiers for that reason.
### 3.1: Polybius and the Battle of Raphia, 217 BCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polybius 5.82 (trans. Evelyn Shuckburgh)</th>
<th>Dispositions at the Battle of Raphia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>καὶ τὰς μὲν φάλαγγας ἀμφότεροι καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλέκτους τοὺς εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον καθωπλισμένους κατὰ πρόσωπον ἀλλήλων ἔταξαν… Αντίοχος δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐξήκοντα τῶν ἐλεφάντων, ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἦν Φίλιππος ὁ σύντροφος αὐτοῦ, πρὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρατος προέστησε, καθὼς ἐταξίσθηκε τὸν κίνδυνον αὐτὸς ἔμελλε πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Πτολεμαῖον: τούτων δὲ κατόπιν δισχιλίους μὲν ἵππες τοὺς ὑπ᾽ Ἀντίπατρον ταττομένους ἐπέστησε, δισχιλίους δὲ ἐν ἐπικαμπίῳ παρενέβαλε. παρὰ δὲ τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἐν μετώπῳ τοὺς Κρῆτας ἐστήσα: τούτων δὲ ἑξῆς ἔταξε τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μισθοφόρους: μετὰ δὲ τούτων καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον καθωπλισμένων τοὺς μετὰ Βυττάκου τοῦ Μακεδόνος ὄντας πεντακισχιλίους παρενέβαλε. τῆς δὲ ἐν τῷ κέρατος ἔθηκε δισχιλίους ἱππεῖς, ὡς ἡγεῖτο Θεμίσων, παρὰ δὲ τούτων Καρδακάς καὶ Λυδοὺς ἀκοντίστας, ἑξῆς δὲ τούτων τοὺς ὑπὸ Μενέδημον εὐζώνους, ὅντας εἰς τρισχιλίους, μετὰ δὲ τούτων Κισσίους καὶ Μήδους καὶ Καρμανίους, παρὰ δὲ τούτων Ἀραβας ἀμα τοὺς προσχώρους, συνάπτοντας τῇ φάλαγγαν. τὰ δὲ κατάλοιπα τῶν θηρίων τοῦ λαϊκοῦ κέρατος προεβάλετο, τῶν βασιλικῶν τινα γεγονότα παίδων ἐπιστήσας Μυίσκον.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Both [Antiochus III and Ptolemy IV] formed their front of their phalanx and men armed in the Macedonian manner... Antiochus also placed sixty of his elephants commanded by his foster-brother Philip in front of his right wing, on which he was to be present personally, to fight opposite Ptolemy. Behind these he stationed the two thousand cavalry commanded by Antipater, and two thousand more at right angles to them. In line with the cavalry he placed the Cretans, and next them the Greek mercenaries; with the latter he mixed two thousand of these armed in the Macedonian fashion under the command of the Macedonian Byttacus. At the extreme point of the left wing he placed two thousand cavalry under the command of Themison; by their side Cardacian and Lydian javelin-men; next them the light-armed division of three thousand, commanded by Menedemus; then the Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians; and by their side the Arabians and neighbouring peoples who continued the line up to the phalanx. The remainder of the elephants he placed in front of his left wing under the command of Myiscus, one of the boys about the court.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Polybius provides two passages dealing with the strength and composition of the participant forces at the battle of Raphia. He first discusses the available forces of both the Seleucid and Ptolemaic armies at 5.79, which was included as the opening passage of this study, and then at 5.82 describes the dispositions of each army leading to the actual combat; in both
instances, he describes the phalangites in the same way: they are καθωπλισμένοι δ᾽ εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον, and no more. This is especially interesting as Polybius does attribute the “Macedonian” ethnonym specifically to one of Antiochus’ unit commanders, one “Byttacus,” but not to the unit of phalangites specifically.

The sources for Polybius’ account of the battle are a matter of question, and there is debate surrounding whether they were of a pro-Ptolemaic or pro-Seleucid nature. The detailed knowledge Polybius expresses with regard to Ptolemaic preparations for combat certainly indicate a Ptolemaic source; Zeno of Rhodes is a possibility. A pro-Seleucid is evident in the harsh treatment of the character of Ptolemy IV, though this is not a necessary conclusion; Polybius is known to have encountered the work of Ptolemy of Megalopolis, and his criticisms of Ptolemy’s character may be similarly attributed to him or another disgruntled Ptolemaic author. In any case, it remains that there is no firm conclusion in this regard.

There is some difficulty with the numbers Polybius provides for the Ptolemaic force. The extent of the native Egyptian involvement with the phalanx is a matter of considerable debate;

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83 See the detailed record of Ptolemy’s “secret” military preparations at 5.65-8; also Ptolemy’s personal appearance in the battle line at its impact on the soldiers’ morale at 5.85.8. Cf. Bar-Kochva 1976, 128.
84 Cf. Momigliano, 1929, 189.
85 Polybius characterizes Ptolemy as a lover of luxury and an incapable administrator due to his willful ignorance of his kingdom’s foreign territories; see 5.87, 5.34, 5.42, 5.62; for this characterization as indicative of a pro-Seleucid source, see Walbank, 1957, 1.613, Otto 1928, 83, and Primo, 2009, 133-35. For an alternative argument which attributes these remarks to a Ptolemaic source influenced by dissenting voices in the Ptolemaic court, cf. Fraser, 1972, 2.144 n.180.
86 For identification of traces of Ptolemy of Megalopolis’ highly critical history of the Ptolemaic dynasty as a source for Polybius’ text, see Walbank, 1.30, 566; 2.493. For the argument of Ptolemy as the source for Polybius’ characterization of Ptolemy IV, see Emmet, 1918, X.
87 We might thereby attribute Polybius’ vague description of the Seleucid phalanx at Raphia to a simple lack of knowledge of its composition; yet, he describes the Ptolemaic phalanx in the same manner, albeit with added ethnonyms. It remains that, at the very least, he does not confidently assert that the phalangites are “Macedonian,” and his doubt is notable.
Polybius provides a total number of 25,000 for the phalanx under Ptolemy, and a body of 20,000 Egyptian soldiers armed as phalangites under the command of one Sosibius.\footnote{88 Polybius, 5.65.} These units have been variably interpreted as separate bodies, or otherwise as one unit with various ethnic designations within.\footnote{89 For the former, see Bar-Kochva, 1976, 138-40. For the latter, see Mahaffy, 1899, 140-52 and Griffith, 1935, 122-3; Mahaffy interprets the phalanx as largely Macedonian with only a minority involvement of Egyptian \textit{machimoi}, while Griffith, significantly, argues for 20000 Egyptian soldiers and only 5000 Greco-Macedonians. Bar-Kochva’s interpretation of 25000 Greco-Macedonians and 20000 Egyptians is the most directly supported by the text, which accounts for a full phalanx of 45000 (albeit with no ethnonym given for the non-Egyptian phalanx), while Griffith’s argument for a combined total of 25000 finds strong support in the conduct of the battle itself, which does not suggest the sort of overwhelming superiority in heavy manpower that a phalanx of 45000 would have provided Ptolemy and thus suggests a misunderstanding on the part of Polybius.} At present, suffice it to note that Polybius’ narrative is sufficiently unclear as to warrant debate.

Polybius provides a variety of ethnonyms associated with the Seleucid force.\footnote{90 See below, Appendix A.} Of particular note is his treatment of the light infantry under Menedemus; the cohesive deployment of Persians, Agrianes, and Thracians under a single commander has led to the belief that these units maintained only pseudo-ethnic designations, which I suggest implies their maintenance of a traditional military disposition.\footnote{91 See above, chapter 2.} This is, of course, directly relevant to the question of the relationship between military participation and ethnic identity in the Seleucid world, as it has been discussed above.

Bar-Kochva has used\footnote{92 Bar-Kochva, 1989, 90.} Polybius’ confidence that the phalangites were “Macedonians” to support the notion that these men were pure-blooded descendants of Greco-Macedonian settlers, but in fact Polybius never refers to them as “Macedonians” specifically until the
procession at Daphne (30.25) and is otherwise actually quite vague. While Bar-Kochva dismisses the genealogical implications of Polybius’ description of the Argyraspides as men “armed in Macedonian manner” only (5.79), he ignores that the same descriptor is applied to the phalanx as a whole at 5.82. Overall, Polybius does not appear to offer any real information on the genealogy of the Seleucid phalangites at Raphia, which will be important in the following discussion of the narrative he provides for the procession at Daphne.
3.2: Livy and Appian, the Battle of Magnesia (190 BCE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livy, 37.40 (trans. William McDevitte)</th>
<th>Dispositions for the Battle of Magnesia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regia acies varia magis multis gentibus, dissimilitudine armorum auxiliorumque erat. decem et sex milia peditum more Macedonum armati fuere, qui phalangitae appellabantur. haec media acies fuit... ad latus dextrum phalangitarum mille et quingentos Gallograecorum pedites opposuit. his tria milia equitum loricaturum—cataphractos ipsi appellant—adiunxit. addita his ala mille ferme equitum; agema eam vocabant; Medi erant, lecti viri, et eiusdem regionis mixti multarum gentium equites. Continens his grex sedecim elephantorum est oppositus in subsidii. ab eadem parte, paulum producto cornu, regia cohors erat; argyraspides a genere armorum appellabantur; Dahae deinde, equites sagittarii, mille et ducenti; tum levis armatura, trium milium, pari ferme numero, pars Cretenses, pars Tralles; duo milia et quingenti Mysi sagittarii his adiuncti erant. Cappadocum—ab Ariarate missi erant regi—; inde auxiliares mixti omnium generum, duo milia septingenti, et tria milia cataphractorum equitum et mille alli equites, regia ala levioribus tegumentis suis equorumque, alio haud dissimili habitu; Syri plerique erant Phrygibus et Lydis immixti. Ante hunc equitatum falcatae quadrigae et cameli, quos appellant dromadas. His insidebant Arabes sagittarii, gladios tenuis habentes longos quaterna cubita, ut ex tanta...</td>
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<tr>
<td>The king's [Antiochus III's] line was more chequered with troops of many nations, dissimilar both in their persons and armour. There was a body of sixteen thousand men armed after the manner of the Macedonians, which were called a phalanx... On the right side of the phalanx, he placed five hundred Gallograecian horsemen. To these he joined three thousand horsemen clad in complete armour, whom they call Cataphracti, or mailed. To these were added a brigade of near a thousand horse, which they called Agema. They were Medes, all picked men, with a mixture of horsemen from many other nations in that part of the world. Adjoining these, a body of sixteen elephants was placed in reserve. On the same side, a little farther on towards the wing, was the royal cohort; these were called Argyraspides, from the kind of armour which they wore. Next to these stood one thousand two hundred Dahan bowmen on horseback; then, three thousand light infantry, part Cretans and part Trallians, the number of each being equal; adjoining these, were two thousand five hundred Mysian archers. Four thousand Cyrtaean slingers and Elymaean archers mixed together covered the flank of the wing. Next to the left flank of the phalanx, stood one thousand five hundred Gallograecian horse, and two thousand Cappadocians, (which were sent by king Ariarathes) wearing the same kind of armour; then, auxiliaries of all kinds mixed together, two thousand seven hundred; then, three thousand mailed horsemen; then, one thousand other horsemen, being a royal cohort, equipped with lighter coverings for themselves and their horses, but, in other respects, not unlike the rest; they were mostly Syrians, with a mixture of Phrygians and Lydians. In the front of this body of cavalry were the chariots armed with scythes, and a kind of camels called dromedaries. These were ridden by Arabian archers, who carried thin swords four cubits long, that they might be able...</td>
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altitudine contingere hostem possent. Inde alia multitudo, par ei, quae in dextra cornu erat: primi Tarentini, deinde Gallograecorum equitum duo milia et quingenti, inde Neocrates mille et eodem armatu Cares et Cilices mille et quingenti et totidem Tralles et quattuor milia caetratorum: Pisidae erant et Pamphylii et Lycii; tum Cyrtiorum et Elymaeorum paria in dextra cornu locatis auxilia, et sedecim elephanti modico intervallo distantes.

to reach the enemy from so great a height. Then followed another multitude, like that in the right wing: first, Tarentines; then, 2500 Gallograecian horsemen; then, 1000 new Cretans, and 1500 Carians and Cilicians, armed in the same manner; then, an equal number of Trallians, with 3000 targeteers (these were Pisidians, Pamphylians, and Lycians); then came brigades of Cyrtaeans and Elymaeans, equal to the auxiliaries placed on the right wing, and sixteen elephants, separated by a small interval.

Appian, Syrian War 32 (trans. Horace White)
The total force of Antiochus was 70,000 and the strongest of these was the Macedonian phalanx of 16,000 men, still arrayed after the fashion of Alexander and Philip... His horse were stationed on either wing, consisting of the mail-clad Galatians and the Macedonian corps called the agema, so named because they were picked horsemen. An equal number of these were stationed on either side of the phalanx. Besides these the right wing had certain light-armed troops, and other horsemen with silver shields, and 200 mounted archers. On the left were the Galatian bands of the Tectosagi, the Trocmi, the Tolistoboi, and certain Cappadocians furnished by king Ariarathes [IV Eusebes], and a mingling of other tribes. There was another body of horse, mail-clad but light-armed, called the Companion cavalry. In this way Antiochus drew up his forces... Besides the forces enumerated there was a great multitude of slingers, archers, javelin throwers, and peltasts from Phrygia, Lycia, Pamphylia, Pisidia, Crete, Tralles, and Cilicia, armed after the Cretan fashion. There were also other mounted archers from the Dahae, Mysia, Elymais, and Arabia, riding on swift dromedaries, who shot arrows with dexterity from their high position, and used very long
thin knives when they came to close combat. Antiochus also placed scythe-bearing chariots in the space between the armies to begin the battle, with orders to retire after the first onset.

Though the passages of Livy and Appian, provided above, are not the only literary sources available for the battle of Magnesia,\(^\text{93}\) they are certainly the most detailed. Both sources appear to be based on that of Polybius,\(^\text{94}\) whose original text is now lost; though the two extant texts do diverge, which will be discussed briefly below, they present a largely similar account of the battle’s course and the arrangements of its combatants.

Both texts number the phalanx at the center of Antiochus’ line at 16,000, though they are recorded with a slight difference. For Livy, these men are simply “armed in the manner of the Macedonians;” for Appian, they are “Macedonians” proper. Bar-Kochva has argued\(^\text{95}\) that this difference is indicative of their common source, Polybius, referring to the phalanx as “the Macedonians,” as Livy would be expected to deny the phalangites’ Macedonian ethnic heritage while Appian would have no such motivation. Bar-Kochva’s argument does not hold water; while his criticism of Livy’s use of ethnonyms is quite valid, he bases his assertion on the premise that Polybius elsewhere refers to the phalanx as “Macedonians” consistently, whereas this is not in fact the case as was discussed above with relation to Raphia. In any case, neither

\(^{93}\) There is also Florus (1.24.16-18), Justin (36.8.1-8), and Zonaras (9.20).
\(^{94}\) Nissen, 1863, 195-7.
\(^{95}\) Bar-Kochva, 1989, 90-5.
author provides any further details as to the composition of the phalanx itself, though both provide an extensive list of other units (and other ethnonyms) involved in the army as a whole.

The primary point of the texts’ divergence is in their treatment of the Seleucid light infantry; Livy places the light troops in two separate bodies on either flank of the main force, while Appian combines them into a single list implying their cohesive deployment. Livy’s list is commonly preferred, though not universally; in either case, the issue is effectively irrelevant at present, as both sources describe the troops themselves in the same manner, and a simple misunderstanding of the light soldiers’ deployment by Livy is the likeliest explanation for this discrepancy.96

Appian’s account is not without mistakes,97 but Livy’s are considerably more telling with regard to his treatment of the battle. His account differs strongly from Justin’s, who details the rout of a significant portion of the Roman heavy infantry by Antiochus’ cavalry charge;98 Livy’s, however, places this charge solely against the small cavalry force on the Roman left.99 Thus, we

96 For arguments in support of Livy’s account, cf. Nissen, 1863, 196; Kromayer, 1922, 2.182-3. For an argument to the contrary, cf. Bar-Kochva 1976, 166, who attributes confidence in Livy’s account to its interpretation by Mommsen (1864-79) and prefers Appian on account of a more realistic depiction of the deployment of Antiochus’ light infantry. I follow Bar-Kochva, as a reconstruction of Antiochus’ battle line dependant on Appian’s account would represent a more strategically sound Seleucid deployment (Livy’s would involve a counter-deployment of light infantry on the right flank against Roman heavy cavalry, a serious mistake on the part of Antiochus); however, particulars of the battle itself are of little consequence here.

97 Bar-Kochva, 1876, 167 n.18 suggests that Appian’s accounting of the number of elephants available to Antiochus is a strong overestimation, likely based on a misunderstanding of Polybian material. Goukowsky, 2007, 400-413, has enumerated the various inconsistencies between the two accounts (almost entirely to do with where certain units are positioned) and follows Briscoe, 1981, 337-358, in preferring the details of Livy’s account.

98 Justin 31.8: Cum in dexteriore cornu pulsa legio Romana maiore dedecore quam periculo ad castra fugeret, M. Aemilius, tribunus militum, ad tutelam castrorum relictus armare se milites suos et extra uallum progresi iubet strictisque gladiis fugientibus minari, morituros dicens, ni in proelium reuertantur, infestioraque sua quam hostium castra inuenturos.

99 Livy 42.7-8. Based on Livy’s prior accounting of the forces available to each army and their relative dispositions, this version of Antiochus’ charge would represent an assault of 3000 cataphracts and 1200 Dahae against 120 Roman horsemen, a very improbable use of force. Briscoe, 1981, 350, accepts the account by virtue of Livy’s apparent detailed knowledge of the Seleucid dispositions.
likely have here a concrete instance of Livy’s pro-Roman bias influencing his reconstruction of events; while the specifics of Livy’s reconstruction of the combat are of little importance here, the influence of Livy’s personal agenda does extend to his treatment of the army’s ethnics.

Livy is the only source to record the participation of Syrians in the Seleucid army, which he does with regard to the Seleucid *regia ala* at the battle of Magnesia at 37.40 (they are “Syri plerique... Phrygibus et Lydis immixti...”) and the Seleucid force at the battle of Thermopylae generally at 36.17. This record, however, must be regarded as extremely suspect; Livy’s usage of ethnonyms is often a rhetorical device intended to denigrate, especially in regards to migrated peoples. Moreover, Livy elsewhere applies this terminology to the Seleucids and the Macedonians settled in Asia generally, claiming they have “degenerated into Syrians” at 38.17.11. Thus it should be no surprise that the only reference to Syrians given by Livy can be

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100 Plutarch does the same at *Moralia* 197; for an argument for Plutarch’s use of Livy as a source for this chapter, see Nissen, 1863, 290.

101 Livy, through a (likely invented) speech of Manlius Vulso, described the Galatians as “degenerated” due to their residence in a “soft” land, having become “Gallograeci” (38.17.9; a similar assertion is also made at 38.49 in a speech of Vulso to the senate).

102 Livy 38.17.11: *In Syros... degenerarunt. Further, 36.17: Syri et Asiatici Graeci, vilissima genera hominum et servituti nata. The Seleucids are never kings of the Macedonians, but always kings of Syria (as in *Periochae* XLV); he even applies the “Syrian” ethnonym to Seleucid soldiers of the Upper Satrapies, which he even identifies otherwise, through the oration of L. Quinctius Flamininus at 35.49: *varia enim genera armorum et multa nomina gentium inauditarum, Dahas et Medos et Cadusios et Elymaeos, Suros omnes esse, haud paulo mancipiorum melius propter servilia ingenia quam militum genus.*
demonstrably linked to military settlements populated by Macedonians;\textsuperscript{103} as such, Livy’s “Syrians” are of no use in the discussion of ethnonyms within Hellenistic armies.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{103} Bar-Kochva (1989, 92-93.) believes that the Syrians of the Seleucid regia ala must be Greco-Macedonian settlers, and that they were likely identified as such in Livy’s source material, because of the unlikelihood of a people without an illustrious history as cavalry being elevated to such an elite position within the Seleucid military. From a purely military perspective, this is a fair argument, though it rests on no further evidence; however, even discounting Bar-Kochva’s position here, Livy’s self-admitted bias against the Syrian ethnicity and other clearly spurious and purely derogatory applications of the ethnonym, especially to Seleucid Macedonians, makes this label quite suspect as well.

\textsuperscript{104} Though Briscoe understands Livy’s use of ethnonyms to be generally genuine and accurate, his position on this matter is made through reference to Bar-Kochva and he provides no comment on the controversy surrounding the meaning of “Syrian” as applied by Livy in the context of Seleucid soldiers. Briscoe, 1981, 349-351.
3.3: Polybius and the Festival at Daphne (165 BCE) and Some Conclusions on Literary Ethnonyms

Polybius 30.25 (trans. Evelyn Shuckburgh) | “Macedonians” at Daphne
---|---
καθηγοῦντό τινες Ῥωμαϊκὸν ἔχοντες καθοπλισμὸν ἐν θώραξιν ἁλυσιδωτοῖς, ἀνδρεῖς ἀκμάζοντες ταῖς ἡλικίαις πεντακισχίλιοι: μεθ’ οὓς Μυσοὶ πεντακισχίλιοι. συνεχείς δ᾽ ἦσαν Κίλικες εἰς τὸν τῶν εὐζώνων τρόπον καθωπλισμένοι τρισχίλιοι, χρυσοὺς ἔχοντες στεφάνους. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις Θρᾴκες τρισχίλιοι καὶ Γαλάται πεντακισχίλιοι. τούτοις ἐπέβαλλον Μακεδόνες δισμύριοι καὶ χαλκάσπιες πεντακισχίλιοι, ἄλλοι δὲ ἀργυράσπιδες…
... first came some men armed in the Roman fashion, with their coats made of chain armour, five thousand in the prime of life. Next came five thousand Mysians, who were followed by three thousand Cilicians armed like light infantry, and wearing gold crowns. Next to them came three thousand Thracians and five thousand Galatians. They were followed by twenty thousand Macedonians, and five thousand armed with brass shields, and others with silver shields…

In contrast to the major engagements of Antiochus III, the army displayed by Antiochus IV at his military parade at Daphne presents a few noteworthy distinctions: the strength of its phalanx, and the limitations of its ethnic contingents. Antiochus commands the largest recorded host of Macedonians—that is to say, soldiers referred to by such an ethnonym specifically—in Seleucid military history, and only a few contingents with other specific ethnonyms. Moreover, these other contingents—specifically, the Mysians and the Thracians—are valuable examples of the application of ethnic terminology to military contingents based on factors other than genealogy, as will be discussed below.¹⁰⁵

We have only Polybius to describe the composition of Antiochus’ army at Daphne; there is no way to be certain of the origins of any one contingent or body of included soldiers. The context of the event and Polybius’ treatment of it is a matter of rather developed controversy

¹⁰⁵ See pages 48-51.
and debate;\textsuperscript{106} for the purposes of the present discussion, Antiochus IV’s intent in the holding of such an event is irrelevant at present, as we are concerned only with the ethnonyms provided by Polybius within the parade’s context. Having now considered the text of the episode at Daphne as well as those at Raphia and Magnesia, we can begin to consider what the ethnonyms provided in the parade’s context actually represent.

Of first concern are the phalangites themselves; the “Macedonians,” as Polybius calls them, and with them the Argyraspides and the bronze-shields. This body of soldiers at Daphne presents two interesting distinctions. First, its size; Polybius reports twenty thousand Macedonians marching in the procession, compared with the 16000 given by Livy for the battle of Magnesia and ten thousand given by Polybius at Raphia, with a further 5000 phalangites at least between the silver- and bronze-shield divisions marching in the procession as well. Griffith connected\textsuperscript{107} this seemingly stark expansion of the phalanx with Antiochus IV’s proactive campaign of city foundations and refoundations, but this argument was based on Tcherikover’s list\textsuperscript{108} of foundations attributed to Antiochus IV; Tcherikover attributed to Epiphanes fourteen foundations, whereas we are now confident in attributing to him only five or six.\textsuperscript{109} As such, we cannot rely on Antiochus IV’s settlement activities as the sole explanation for the size and nature of his military force at Daphne.

\textsuperscript{106} Tarn, famously, regarded the festival as an imitation of a Roman triumph; Tarn, 1938, 529. Sara Johnson has convincingly rejected this position, arguing that the festival is fully understandable within purely Hellenistic contexts through comparison with the procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus at Alexandria; Johnson, 1993. Andrew Erskine has argued that the procession was simply intended as a display of power to reinforce Seleucid authority to the many visiting dignitaries; Erskine, 2013 52.
\textsuperscript{107} Griffith, 1935, 146-151.
\textsuperscript{108} Tcherikover, 1959, 176-80.
\textsuperscript{109} Hengel, 1980, 148; Goldstein, 1975, 111-17.
However, we need not account for the size of Antiochus’ phalanx as much as its classification. As mentioned above, Antiochus IV’s men are a rarity in Seleucid military history in that they are identified as “Macedonians” directly, whereas phalangites are much more commonly referred to as “armed in the Macedonian style” only, as we read in accounts of the battles at Raphia and Magnesia; it is in this distinction that we may understand its size. In his earlier account of the battle of Raphia, Polybius attributes to Antiochus III a phalanx of only 10000 Macedonians, and these he only labels as “armed in the Macedonian manner” rather than providing a firm ethnonym; but these men do not represent the full extent of the phalanx, but instead mostly composed the crack “silver shields” unit. The main body of the phalanx itself is referred to only as “the multitude,” and it is these soldiers which represent the majority of Antiochus III’s core heavy infantry, twenty thousand of them according to Polybius. The phalanx at Daphne is not so different, then, other than in how Polybius describes it; the main body of the phalanx in both instances is a contingent of men twenty thousand strong, while the Argyraspides have shrunk to only five thousand at Daphne (and even this is easily explained by the presence of the new “Roman-styled” unit of five thousand picked men110). Thus, the importance of Antiochus IV’s phalanx at Daphne is not in the question of its size—it is no larger than at Raphia—but rather the question of its “Macedonianness,” and whether its label as such bears any meaning or, conversely, whether there is significance to the absence of the ethnonym from its predecessors.

110 Sekunda, 1994, 16.
Bar-Kochva calculated the strength of the Seleucids’ potential manpower in the west at about twenty-five or thirty thousand men at the time of Daphne; this is purely with reference to phalangite heavy infantry. He based this calculation on the resources provided by the communities of Greco-Macedonian military settlers in Syria, and he provided it to support the argument that the phalanx at Daphne did not contain native Syrians; as the phalanx presented only twenty thousand men, he argued, we need not assume that it drew on any sources of manpower beyond the military colonies, whose sole purpose was to fill its ranks, as these were plentiful enough to supply it in full. Furthermore, he stresses, Polybius refers to the phalangites as "Macedonians," and not more broadly as simply phalangites or only as men "armed like Macedonians." As Polybius had used this broader terminology in other situations when armies included phalangites who were certainly not entirely Greco-Macedonian, says Bar-Kochva, Polybius’ terminology surely implies that the phalangites at Daphne were fully composed of genealogical Greco-Macedonians.

But this assertion places too much weight in Polybius' choice of terminology. Though the phalangites at Daphne are specifically referred to as Macedonians, and Polybius otherwise refers to "mixed" phalanxes much more broadly, we saw above that Polybius' account of the battle of Raphia refers to the main body of Seleucid heavies only as "the multitude of phalangites." In that earlier account, Polybius applied no ethnonym to the phalanx at all despite his application of specific ethnonyms to other national contingents. Therefore, unless we are to

111 Bar-Kochva, 1989, 92-103.
112 Polybius 5.53: τούτοις δὲ παρέθηκε τοὺς συμμαχικοὺς Κρῆτας, ὃν εἴχοντο Γαλάται Ριγόσαγες: παρὰ δὲ τούτους ἔθηκε τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ξένους καὶ μισθοφόρους, οἷς ἑπόμενον παρενέβαλε τὸ τῆς φάλαγγος σύστημα. (next to them, he positioned the Cretan allies and next them the Galatian Rhigosages. After these he placed the mercenaries from Greece and last of all the many divisions of the phalanx.)
believe that the military colonies which supplied the phalanx at Daphne were entirely inactive at the Battle of Raphia, it seems that we can actually discern very little from Polybius' choice of ethnonym for the phalanx; he not only refers to the same body of men differently on different occasions, but this same body is also labelled differently in the works of other authors.

Perhaps more important, however, is that. Bar-Kochva assumed Polybius based his use of ethnonyms on military units which maintained genealogically-based ethnonyms themselves. We have seen in the two chapters above that exactly this system of recruitment conversely produced military units whose ethnonyms had no definitive correlation with the genealogies of their membership. Beyond these, we have discussed above the implications of a few instances wherein we can discern, papyrologically, that soldiers could be identified with one ethnic early in their careers and then exchange this ethnonym for another upon promotion, including “Macedonian.”

Though the only instances of this phenomenon that we know of are Ptolemaic, the point remains that the existence of these examples must give us caution when considering the veracity of the Macedonian ethnonym in military contexts.

As mentioned above, the Mysians are an especially noteworthy inclusion in the procession, and this is because of the political situation between their homeland and the Seleucid Empire at the time of the procession. Specifically, the treaty of Apamea following his predecessor’s defeat should have forbidden Antiochus IV from recruiting Mysians at all, as they originate from within the Roman sphere of influence in Asia Minor; we should expect to find

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113 See above, p. 26; Launey, 1949, 325-6.
114 The treaty of Apamea forbade the Seleucid kings from recruiting any forces from west of the Taurus Mountains; App. Syr. 39.
these soldiers under Pergamene employ, not Seleucid. There are a few explanations available; Griffith theorized\textsuperscript{115} that the northern lands of Asia Minor were regarded as independent and exempt from the treaty’s restrictions, allowing Syrian recruiters to gather Mysians freely. By contrast, Nikolas Sekunda has reasoned\textsuperscript{116} that Eumenes II’s prior support of Antiochus IV makes a Pergamene origin for these soldiers the most likely scenario. However, it would seem to me that the most plausible explanation is Launey’s\textsuperscript{117}; that these men did not march from Asia Minor at all, but rather represented a regular military contingent resupplied with fresh recruits from within Seleucid borders.

While Launey’s theory was speculative at the time, we have now seen several other examples of ethnonyms denoting a military unit based well outside its namesake homeland. Admittedly, there is no evidence for this practice on the part of Mysians outside a few references to Mysian settlers in the army of Molon,\textsuperscript{118} but there is evidence of the use of the “Mysian” ethnonym referring to a military contingent rather than a place of origin. A few extant receipts from the Fayyum that detail exchanges of land,\textsuperscript{119} recently discussed by Colleen Fischer-Bovet,\textsuperscript{120} recall the advancement of the career of one Theotimos, a Ptolemaic soldier who begins his career under the ethnic “Persian” and transitions into a “Mysian” cavalryman upon his receipt of a land grant. Though this particular case is Ptolemaic, it should still give us

\textsuperscript{115} Griffith, 1935, 147.
\textsuperscript{116} Sekunda, 1994, 16-17.
\textsuperscript{117} Launey, 1949, 436-49; also Walbank, 1957, 449 and Sion-Jenkins, 2001, 27.
\textsuperscript{118} Polybius, 5.77: προελθὼν δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ διαβὰς τὸν Λύκον ποταμὸν προήγεν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Μυσῶν κατοικίας, ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων γενόμενος ἄρη πρὸς Καρσέας... (Continuing and crossing the Lycus river he advanced on the Mysian colonies, and after having dealt with them reached Carseae...)
\textsuperscript{119} P.Fay. 11 and 12 (115 BCE and 103 BCE respectively); PP 2793.
\textsuperscript{120} Fischer-Bovet, 2008, 87-8.
pause to consider that the ethnonym in question appears related to an established military unit, and not descent or simply a style of armament.

Like the Mysians, the Thracians are no stranger to inclusion in Seleucid forces. There were between one and three thousand of them in Antiochus III’s army at Raphia, and the same amount at Magnesia. Bar-Kochva concluded\textsuperscript{121} that the presence of three thousand Thracians at Daphne was further evidence of Antiochus’ disregard for the provisions of the treaty of Apamea as they must have originated from west of the Taurus, but this is not necessarily the case. Thracians, in fact, play a ubiquitous role in a variety of Hellenistic military engagements, as we have seen, and we know of several locales outside of Asia Minor where Thracian military colonists had settled. Polyaenus describes\textsuperscript{122} the Seleucid military settlement in Persia as inclusive of Thracians, an assertion corroborated by Polybius’ description of the Persian archers at Raphia as serving under the same commander as a Thracian contingent, as discussed above. Furthermore, we have already seen that there was an established association of Thracian soldiers on Cyprus, and this group provides us with an important consideration: despite their maintenance of the Thracian ethnonym, they appear to have included people of differing ethnicities eventually, as their dedicatory inscriptions provide reference to their admittance of cohabitants (likely local Cypriots) into their ranks. Thus, the Cypriot Thracians have demonstrated that their ethnic designation, much like that of the Mysians discussed above, could well apply not only to a style of armament or directly to an ethnic origin, but also to one’s

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\textsuperscript{121} Bar-Kochva, 1989, 306.
\textsuperscript{122} Polyaenus 7.39: ...ἐνταῦθα Μακεδόνων καὶ Θρᾳκῶν ἱππεῖς τριακοσίους, ὁπλίτας τρισχιλίους ἀποκρύφας συνέταξεν... (… There [Cheiles] stationed three hundred Macedonian and Thracian cavalrymen, along with three thousand heavy-armed troops...)
participation in an established military organization; that one could be a “Thracian” by being accepted into and serving with a unit of other “Thracians” and not only by actually coming from Thrace or as easily as fighting with a rhomphaia.

Thus, we can see that the “Macedonians” involved in the various major Seleucid military engagements are attested in conflicting manners across our literary sources. Furthermore, there is evidence for several Seleucid military units maintaining an ethnic designation, yet recruiting members of various ethnicities, along with evidence of soldiers elsewhere in the Hellenistic world transitioning from one ethnic to another by virtue of military promotion. Thus, I would contend that what little we do know of ethnonyms and their application to military settlers should bring any literary ethnic identification in a military context into question. We simply cannot know from where the Mysians of Daphne came; that they are associated with such an ethnonym should give us no reason to expect of them an origin in Asia Minor.
Conclusion

At this point, I would assert that the self-administered military associations which served as a resource of effective manpower for the core Seleucid military developed into effectively multi-ethnic organizations despite their self-identification with particular origins. If this conclusion is plausible, then we might understand why Appian and (occasionally) Polybius label the Seleucid phalangites simply as “Macedonians,” as they would presumably have been composed of several units from several associations which may very well have self-identified as (and, therefore, been recorded as) Macedonian, just as nearly every other unit in the Seleucid roll calls receives only a single ethnic label by way of identification. Furthermore, this may offer an explanation for Livy’s complete avoidance of ethnic terminology regarding the phalanx at the battle of Magnesia, as it may well have been a conglomeration of numerous ethnicities drawn both from the local populations of each association’s parent city and the descendants of the Macedonian military settlers themselves. That the phalanx may have been organized in this way should not surprise us: when Alexander created the ἐπίγονοι, Arrian\textsuperscript{123} tells us that these foreign soldiers were also divided into units with Macedonian organizational names.

One of the original goals of this study was to determine a reason for the absence of Syrians and Persians in the Seleucid military lists presented by our extant historiographers; while no “smoking gun” has been found on this account, it would appear to be possible that these ethnic groups were, at some point, involved in other ethnically-identified units within the Seleucid military, and that such access brought with it association with these other identities

\textsuperscript{123} Arrian, \textit{Anabasis} 7.11.
themselves. Although we cannot point to any direct evidence of Syrian interaction with
Hellenistic military associations, we have seen that organized associations of soldiers served as
route by which local peoples could become connected to a foreign ethnic identity. We have
seen that Hellenistic armies in general—including the Seleucid—appear to have relied at least
in part on garrison forces established in military associations stationed in individual cities, and
that these associations often identified themselves with reference to a single ethnic despite the
inclusion of members from different ethnicities. We have also seen that the literary evidence
used to support the understanding of the core Seleucid phalanx as homogenously Macedonian
is misunderstood at best, and contradictory at worst. Therefore, it would appear that the
recruitment system for the Seleucid military produced soldiers who could potentially (and very
likely) have been identified with (effectively) any ethnonym, as they would become associated
with such labels primarily by virtue of the units in which they served, and in particular, the
traditions which those units had preserved. Recognizing this phenomenon may provide us with
an explanation for the apparent absence of Syrian and Persian soldiers in the Seleucid military:
they may well have been present, but were simply identified with the other soldiers beside
whom they fought.
Appendix A: Ethnonyms in the Seleucid Army

Presented here, for reference, is a collection of the ethnonyms provided by our main literary sources on the composition of the Seleucid army (Polybius, Livy and Appian) in each of the three primary episodes in which this information is given (namely the battles of Raphia and Magnesia, as well as the procession of Antiochus IV at Daphne).

The ethnonyms are organized below, first in a simple and all-inclusive alphabetical list, followed by a succinct list of the ethnonyms given in each primary episode by year, illustrating the development of the Seleucid military’s ethnic composition as it is recounted by our sources from Raphia to Daphne. Finally, they are presented again, organized per episode, but with the details surrounding their role and organization within the Seleucid force also provided to facilitate a clearer depiction of each unit’s composition and extent of involvement with the Seleucid force.

Of course, of primary note is the complete absence of any direct reference to “Macedonians” in any source until the procession at Daphne, as well as the declining involvement of Greek mercenaries following the battle at Raphia. Also noteworthy is the considerably less varied list of ethnonyms provided for the Daphne parade, coinciding with the introduction of the Macedonian ethnonym proper (and in significant number).
### A.1: Seleucid Military Ethnonyms Organized by Reference Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Year</th>
<th>Ethnonyms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>217 BCE (Raphia, as per Polybius 5.79 &amp; 5.82):</td>
<td>Agrianians, Arabs, Cadusians, Carmanians, Cilicians, Cissians, Cretans, Greeks, Lydians, Medes, Persians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190 BCE (Magnesia, as per Livy 37.40):</td>
<td>Arabians, Cappadocians, Carians, Cilicians, Cretans, Cyrtians, Dahae, Elymians, Galatians (Gallograeci), Lycians, Lydians, Mysians, Pisidians, Phrygians, Tarentines, Thracians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166/5 BCE (Daphne, as per Polybius 30.25):</td>
<td>Cilicians, Galatians (Gauls), Macedonians, Mysians, Nisaeans, Thracians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### A.2: Seleucid Military Ethnonyms Organized by Military Role (including unnamed contingents)

#### Battle of Raphia (Polybius, 5.79, 82)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnonyms</th>
<th>Non-specified contingents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### Battle of Magnesia (Livy 37.40)

**Ethnonyms**

- **Arabians:** Cavalry (unquantified).
- **Cappadocians:** 2000 soldiers (unclassified).
- **Carians, Cilicians:** 1500 soldiers (unclassified).
- **Cretans, Thracians:** 3000 soldiers (unclassified, but likely light infantry).
- “Neocretans:” Unquantified and unclassified, but this time separate from the Cretans proper.
- **Cyrtians (Kurds)** and Elymians: 4000 soldiers, grouped despite differing battlefield roles (slingers and cavalry respectively; this may represent a simple peculiarity of the text, but is not impossible in practice).
- **Dahae:** 1200 missile cavalry.
- **Galatians:** 5500 Cavalry (in two units of 1500, one on each wing, and one further unit of 2500).\(^{125}\)
- **Lyrians:** Unquantified, unclassified.
- **Mysians:** 2500 Soldiers (unclassified).
- **Phrygians:** Unquantified, unclassified.
- **Pisidians, Pamphylians, Lycians:** 3000 soldiers (unclassified).
- **Tarentines:** Unquantified, unclassified.
- **Thracians:** 1500 Soldiers, listed separately from those organized with the Cretans above.

**Non-specified contingents**

- “Mixed auxiliaries:” 2700.
- Cataphracts: 3000.
- Argyraspides: Unquantified.
- “Phalangites:” 16000.

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### Procession at Daphne (Polybius 30.25)

**Ethnonyms:**

- **Cilicians:** 3000 light-armed soldiers.
- **Galatians (Gauls):** 5000 Soldiers (unclassified).
- **Macedonians:** 20000 heavy infantry.
- **Mysians:** 5000 Soldiers (unclassified).
- **Nisaeans:** 1000 cavalry.
- **Thracians:** 3000 soldiers (unclassified; likely light infantry).

**Non-specified contingents:**

- Argyraspides: “Some.”
- Cataphracts: 1500.
- “Citizen cavalry:” 3000
- Elite cavalry (Agema; Companions): 4000.
- Infantry “armed in the Roman style:” 5000.

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124 Potts, 2014, 111.
125 There is some disagreement over the number of Galatians in the battle line, possibly indicated a conflation of various units in Polybius’ text by Appian or a double-counting of some by Livy the number may be between 1-2 thousand too high here. Cf. Griffith, 1935, 145-6.
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