Decolonization, Indigenous Internationalism, and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples

by

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A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2014

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Abstract
This dissertation investigates the history of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) and the broader movement of Indigenous internationalism. It argues that Indigenous internationalists were inspired by the process of decolonization, and used its logic to establish a new political identity. The foundation of the WCIP helped create a network of Indigenous peoples that expressed international solidarity between historically unconnected communities. The international efforts of Indigenous activists were encouraged both by personal experiences of international travel and post-secondary education, and by the general growth of international non-governmental organizations during the late twentieth century. The growing importance of international non-governmental organizations helped the WCIP secure funding from international developmental aid agencies, a factor which pushed the organization to increase its focus on apolitical economic development relative to the anti-colonial objectives which inspired its foundation. This dissertation examines how Indigenous international organizations became embroiled in the Cold War conflict in Latin America, and the difficulties this situation posed for both the WCIP and the International Indian Treaty Council. Finally, it examines how the prominence of the World Council faded, as major international bodies like the United Nations began to acknowledge the importance of Indigenous peoples, and as Indigenous organizations sought to participate directly in new international fora rather than contributing through the WCIP.
Acknowledgements

While completing this dissertation, I have benefited from financial assistance provided by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, University of Waterloo, the Tri-University History Program, the University of Waterloo History Department, and the Research Council of Norway's Leiv Eiriksson Mobility Program.

Many people at the University of Tromsø who showed me tremendous hospitality and great academic support, including Else Grete Broderstad, Hildegunn Bruland, Bjørg Evjen, Bjørn Hatteng, Terje Lilleeng, and Torjer Olsen, among others at the Centre for Sami Studies, and Henry Minde in the History Department. Additional thanks to Ánte Máhtte Eira for helping to dig my rental car out of the snow in Guovdageadnu, and to Gunhild B. Sara Buljo (mamasara.org) for taking the time to meet me.

Numerous people within the Tri-University History Program have been helpful and supportive over the course of my research, including Professors Gary Bruce, John English, Andrew Hunt, Heather MacDougall, Wendy Mitchinson, David Monod, Bruce Muirhead, and Sebastian Siebel-Achenbach. Jill Campbell-Miller and Scott Harrison have also provided valuable advice and assistance in times of need. Special thanks are owed to Professors Ken Coates, Susan Neylan and James Walker for being so generous with their support, wisdom, and encouragement. Donna Hayes has been a great friend and an unending source of assistance that made so much of this possible.

Thanks to Scott Rutherford and Professor Jacob Tropp for your valuable remarks and your academic companionship.

This work would not have been possible without the support of numerous librarians and archivists around the world, including numerous staff members at Library & Archives Canada and at the South West Research Centre Archives, the Sami Archives (Nils Jørgen Nystø), NORAD Archives (Evelyn Exmundo), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dæhlen Sverre), the UBCIC Resource Centre (Alissa Cherry), DoCip (Benigno Delgado), the Clara Thomas Archives & Special Collections (Anna St.Onge) and the Assembly of First Nations (Dennis Borynec). Special thanks to Ted Harms at the University of Waterloo Library, who went to great lengths in securing rare and distant resources for my research.
Thanks as well to Doreen Manuel (runningwolf.ca) for trusting me with the invaluable contents of her father's personal diaries, as well as some of his recorded speeches.

All of my interviewees have been kind, supportive, helpful, and understanding: Clem Chartier, Rodrigo Contreras, Sam Deloria, Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Hugh Faulkner, Leif Halonen, Wayne Kines, Pōkā Laenui, Guy Lavallée, Ronald Leger, Ole-Henrik Magga, Louise Mandell, Robert Petersen, Marie Smallface-Marule, Ánde Somby, and Niillas Somby. Thank you all so much. I hope I have captured your stories fairly. Material from four additional interviewees was not able to be used in this work for a variety of reasons, but I expect to use it in the future work, and I certainly appreciate the time you took to speak with me. Thanks to Christopher Rompre for putting me in touch with my first interviewee which got me started off on the right foot.

Thanks as well to the many people that helped guide me to this point: the historians who have advised me and inspired me in the past—Greg Blue, Ian MacPherson (RIP), István Rév, Alfred Rieber, Georgia Sitara, Serhy Yekelchyk, and Susan Zimmermann—as well as my parents, my sister, and my extended family. My work on this dissertation has continuously benefited from the loving support and the astute academic advice of my wife Kata.

Professor Daniel Gorman, your encouragement and assistance began even before you became my supervisor, and only increased over the years. I could not have hoped for a better guide. Thank you.
Dedication

Dedicated to Kata, for everything.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

This dissertation uses the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP)—founded in 1975 and in continual operation until 1997—to investigate the topic of Indigenous internationalism, particularly organized Indigenous internationalism. By Indigenous internationalism, I mean the co-operation of different historically unconnected peoples on the basis of a shared quality of being Indigenous, and by organized, I mean formal relationships rather than loose networks of individuals. The subject is approached from two different fields of history that have rarely been connected in past scholarship: the history of Indigenous peoples,¹ and the history of organized internationalism. It is perhaps not a surprise that these two areas of study have not commonly overlapped in historical scholarship. Not only are the two words—Indigenous and international—oxymoronic, but the birth of organized Indigenous internationalism is a relatively recent event. Nonetheless, by addressing the concerns of both historical fields, I feel this single study can help provide each with clues to some of the most important questions asked by each field's respective scholars. The dissertation will therefore assess the history of the WCIP, both as an Indigenous organization, and as an international one.

This dissertation will argue that Indigenous internationalists, inspired by African anti-colonial activism and Third-Worldism, applied the logic of decolonization to the situation of

¹ “Indigenous” is capitalized throughout this dissertation to make a distinction between the broader dictionary definition of the word (which might include “indigenous plants”) and its specific political connotation when adopted to describe peoples. Although the world “peoples” is sometimes also capitalized in the phrase “Indigenous Peoples” to draw attention to the group rights guaranteed to all peoples by various international documents and laws, this dissertation relies on the pluralization of “peoples” to make that same point.
all peoples whose lands had been invaded and whose right to self-determination had been withheld. The founders of the World Council used this definition to forge a new political identity through which Indigenous peoples could unite as a bloc. Beyond the formal organization itself, the World Council helped create a network of Indigenous peoples that expressed solidarity between otherwise unrelated communities. Indigenous activists were encouraged to organize internationally both by their personal experiences of international travel and post-secondary education, and by the general growth of international non-governmental organizations during this period. This period of growth enabled the World Council to secure funding from various national governments and state-run international developmental aid agencies, a factor which pushed the organization to increase its focus on apolitical economic development relative to the anti-colonial objectives which inspired its foundation. Those member organizations from wealthier and more stable regions could help attract international attention to the frequently ignored violent oppression faced by Indigenous peoples in the Global South. The large populations of Indigenous peoples in Central and South America lent numerical strength to Indigenous peoples of North America, Europe, Australia and Aotearoa (who all make up small minorities within their nation states) but, owing to the WCIP's structure, they also came to dominate the organization's focus. The political situation in Latin America during the late twentieth century also drew the World Council into the larger Cold War conflict, a complex environment it was unable to navigate skillfully. As major international bodies responded to the demands of Indigenous internationalists, Indigenous organizations became less enamoured with the World Council,
seeking instead to participate directly in new Indigenous fora created by the United Nations, and ultimately spelling the end of the WCIP.

While the dissertation is focused on the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, it also compares the WCIP to another organization (the International Indian Treaty Council – IITC), and investigates the broader issue of Indigenous internationalism as lived personal experience. The political discourse that was adopted by the World Council's founders, as well as the founders of the Treaty Council, requires that this work should also be placed in a third field of historical scholarship, the history of decolonization. Just as Indigenous internationalists challenged the division between Indigenous peoples and other decolonizing peoples, this dissertation critiques the removal of Indigenous history from the broader context of global colonization and decolonization. Although a complete analysis of anti-colonial theory would be out of place, this introduction will provide readers with an overview of key concepts promoted by anti-colonial leaders which influenced the founders of the WCIP. Additionally, it will provide a brief summary of other relevant literature which adds context for this study, namely scholarship on the process of globalization and examinations of our modern system of global governance and organized internationalism.

1.1 Historiography

This dissertation makes an original contribution to the relatively limited scholarship on international Indigenous activism. The only historian to focus, in any significant way, on the World Council of Indigenous Peoples is Henry Minde at the University of Tromsø. His numerous chapters and edited collections provide much of the history of the organization,
though, understandably, he tends to focus on Sámi involvement. This dissertation complements his shorter works with additional information from interviews and archival research.

Ronald Niezen's *The Origins of Indigenism* provides a good if brief survey of the history of international Indigenous activity, and its final chapter provides a critical look at the ideas of “self-determination without succession” that the World Council of Indigenous Peoples would adopt. This dissertation shares Niezen's argument that the “fulfillment of the self-determination goals of indigenous peoples would constitute a completion of the process of decolonization through mechanisms that would not (or not necessarily) involve the creation of new nation-states.” As will be shown, however, the World Council's adoption of that goal meant its efforts challenged not only individual nation states, but also basic logic of the system of nation states itself. Such an enormous goal affected the World Council's success and level of support in the international arena, relative to the International Indian Treaty Council, which initially adopted the goal of more traditional independence for the *Sioux* Nation.

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In Ken Coates' comparative history of Indigenous peoples, he acknowledges the influence of global political changes on the birth of an international Indigenous movement:

The recognition of the rights and aspirations of tribal societies did not emerge in a vacuum after World War II. The complaints of indigenous peoples were not new, nor was their desire to gain the attention of national governments. What changed – and this is profoundly important – was the international standing of ethnic minorities and the emergence of a fairly uniform condemnation of the philosophical underpinnings of colonization. The post-World War II preoccupation with human rights, decolonization and self-determination created a new political atmosphere, one sensitive to the rights of identifiable groups and more respectful of different cultures, values and traditions.\(^4\)

This dissertation will look more closely at specific examples of the influence of the post-war process of decolonization on both Indigenous individuals and Indigenous international organizations. Coates' work also summarizes the feelings of Indigenous peoples overcoming their isolation through international meetings and co-operation:

It helped to discover that one's problems were part of an international pattern, that other indigenous peoples faced similar challenges, and that the broad effects of western industrialization and capitalism had marginalized the traditional owners of the land. Hearing descriptions of the historical origins and power of institutionalized racism and anti-indigenous sentiment provided a welcome explanation for problems with local newcomers. And while it was disturbing to learn of acts of genocide perpetrated against indigenous groups around the world, such information was ultimately empowering.\(^5\)

Chapter Three of this dissertation will examine these kinds of thoughts and emotions in more detail in the context of the first global meeting of Indigenous peoples in 1974.

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\(^5\) Coates, 243.
Anthony Hall's immense work, *The American Empire and the Fourth World*, surveys the history of Indigenous resistance to European and American imperialism, and also provides an analysis of the practical and theoretical sources that inspired George Manuel, the first President of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, with the idea for such an organization. Most of these works rely heavily or exclusively on Douglas Sanders' *The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples*, George Manuel and Michael Posluns' *The Fourth World* and Peter McFarlane's *Brotherhood to Nationhood*. As described below, one of this dissertation's original contributions is its systematic assessment of the documentation created by the World Council, along with numerous personal interviews to provide a more detailed picture of the organization's foundations and activities.

Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz's *Indians of the Americas* gives a good survey of activity related to Indigenous rights (by both Indigenous and non-Indigenous organizations), including brief summaries of the WCIP and IITC up to 1984, when the book was published. Much of the book focuses on Indigenous relationships with the United States and Nicaraguan governments, rather than on Indigenous internationalism per se.

Although no academic studies focusing specifically on the WCIP have yet been published, the organization has been the focus of two unpublished Masters theses. The first was completed by Rise M. Massey of the University of British Columbia in 1986. Although

it gives an excellent overview of the strategies adopted by the World Council during its first
decade, it is nonetheless a work of political science rather than history, and thus, asks
different questions of its subject (primarily, the effectiveness of WCIP strategy) than does this
dissertation. The second thesis was completed by Deirdre Duquette at the University of
Victoria in 1993. While also a work of Political Science, it addresses some of the same topics
addressed in this dissertation, particularly the influence of Canadian International
Development Agency funding for the World Council, which I explore in Chapter Four.10

1.2 Precursors

The World Council of Indigenous Peoples is a useful subject of study partly because it
exemplified a new level of organized Indigenous internationalism that far surpassed anything
seen before. Nonetheless, a number of actors and organizations can be considered precursors
to the World Council, and they provide important context for its establishment. Notable
eamples of non-Indigenous international anti-colonial solidarity can be found in Marcus
Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association and the Pan-African congresses of the
20th century. While they have received some scholarly attention, further work could approach
these topics from the perspective of the history of internationalism rather than political
history.11 This kind of scholarship is demonstrated in the work of Brent Hayes Edwards,
which examines the loosely knit network forged across empires by men like the Trinidadian

11 Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965); Imanuel
Geiss, The Pan-African Movement: a History of Pan-Africanism in America, Europe, and Africa (New
Africa and the African Diaspora (New York: Routledge 2011)
George Padmore and the French West African Tiemoko Garan Kouyaté.\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, recent work by John Maynard suggests that Garveyism had a substantial effect on Indigenous politics in Australia in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{13} These organizations, however, were largely based in a notion of shared ethnicity and geography, which, as I will demonstrate, was not the case for the WCIP.\textsuperscript{14}

Nor was the concept of Indigenous internationalism in the 1960s and 1970s the first attempt by Indigenous peoples to seek international attention for their cause. There were many Indigenous delegations which sought audiences with imperial leaders.\textsuperscript{15} When their petitions to the crown failed during the 1920s, Māori political and spiritual leader T. W. Ratana\textsuperscript{16}, and Haudenosaunee leader Deskaheh Levi General\textsuperscript{17} both attempted (unsuccessfully) to raise their concerns in the newest international forum, the League of Nations. Yet these men made no claim to represent a broad category of Indigenous peoples. Moreover, prior to the decolonization of Africa and Asia, there was little reason to consider the cases of Deskaheh and Ratana as something distinct from the other anti-colonial activists

\textsuperscript{13} John Maynard (University of Newcastle), “Marching to a Different Beat: The Influence of the International Black Diaspora on Aboriginal Australia,” Unpublished paper, courtesy of Ben Silverstein.
\textsuperscript{15} For more on these and other petitioners to the Crown, see Ravi de Costa, “Identity, Authority, and the Moral Worlds of Indigenous Petitions,” \textit{Comparative Studies in Society and History} 48:3 (July 2006).
\textsuperscript{17} To date, the most detailed account of Deskaheh Levi General's time in Europe is Joëlle Rostkowski, “The Redman's Appeal for Justice: Deskaheh and the League of Nations,” in \textit{Indians and Europe: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays}, ed. Christian F. Feest (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989)
who hoped for change from the League of Nations. One might argue, on the contrary, that it was the rejection of their petitions as “domestic issues” which helped formalize that very category as one distinct from other colonized groups. As will be shown, the very concept of “Indigeneity” is deeply rooted in the exclusion of certain peoples from the post-WWII process of decolonization.

Closer parallels might be drawn between the World Council and other attempts at forming transnational Indigenous organizations. Skwxwú7mesh activist Andy Paull attempted to establish a North American Indian Brotherhood (NAIB) in order to unite Indigenous peoples across the Canada-United States border. Paull's work was a direct influence on George Manuel, who later founded the WCIP. Manuel would go on to serve as president of the NAIB after Paull's death in 1959 until 1963. Steven Crum has written about a similar “Pan-Indian” organization, the League of North American Indians, founded in 1935 by Lawrence Twoaxe, a Kanien'kehá:ka man originally from Kahnawà:ke but living in California. The League gained members from both Canada and the United States, but according to Crum, Twoaxe

21 McFarlane, 50.
22 McFarlane, 57, 68. By this point, however, the NAIB seems to have been “North American” in name only, with its membership drawing entirely from Indigenous communities within the borders of the province of British Columbia. Manuel resigned in 1963 to encourage unity among the Indigenous organizations within that province.
...wanted the League to become a Western Hemispheric organization with leaders from Canada, the United States, and Mexico and other Latin American countries. However, it never had actual Indian representation south of the Rio Grande because of the physical distance Mexican tribes would have had to travel. Nevertheless, some Indian leaders down south expressed a deep interest in the organization.  

Crum notes that the League has remained “almost invisible in twentieth-century Native American history,” largely because “for much of its existence, [it] barely functioned as an organization.” The organization's membership was primarily working class without the means to travel across the continent. Over time, it seems to have focused more on relations with the American government, and lost the participation of its members from Canada, before its final collapse in 1970. The World Council faced challenges owing to the physical distance between its members, but advances in technology made travel significantly cheaper and often altogether unnecessary, a change deeply enmeshed in the process of globalization addressed below. Certainly, Indigenous peoples have never been bound by the borders of modern nation states, and many have formed alliances and regional organizations that have transcended those borders, but for the most part, these are people who have shared historical and/or cultural ties, a shared connection to a specific physical landscape, or who share specific adversaries in the form of governments and legislation. In this way, they might be best compared with Pan-Africanist organizations mentioned above. The Indigenous

24 Ibid., 49.
25 Ibid., 55, 49.
26 Ibid., 50
27 Ibid., 53-54.
internationalism of the World Council, on the other hand, linked those with no historical or
cultural ties, and no “shared space” of geography.

The trans-Atlantic influence of African politics and anti-colonial philosophy on the
founders of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples and of the International Indian Treaty
Council is also not without precedents. As early as 1921, a decision by the British Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in favour of Chief Oluwa for his title to lands in
Lagos, Nigeria, inspired an organization called the Allied Tribes (of British Columbia,
Canada) to make a similar (though unsuccessful) petition to the Privy Council.²⁹ While the
Allied Tribes clearly recognized the similarity in the two situations, it seems they had no
intention (or means) to form an international organization based on that similarity.³⁰ By the
1960s, however, more sustained connections were possible. During that decade and the
following one, many Indigenous activists around the world likely recognized the similarities
in between their situation and that of the decolonizing nations of Africa. For instance,
Howard Adams, a Marxist Métis scholar from St. Louis, Saskatchewan, Canada, used Third-
Worldist discourse in his 1975 book *Prison of Grass*, in which he discusses the
“underdevelopment”, “decolonization,” and “liberation” of Canada and asserts that the

²⁹ Paul Tennant, *Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989*
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990), 101. For the Privy Council’s Oluwa decision, see
Ibhawoh offers a comparison between treaty-making in Africa and Canada in the 19th century, and touches
upon the influences they had on each other. Bonny Ibhwoh, “Cultural Negotiations and Colonial Treaty-

Certainly, non-Indigenous organizations like Aboriginal Protection Society, founded in 1837, was as
interested in African “aborigines” as those living in Australia and the Americas. See William E. Unrau,
“An International Perspective on American Indian Policy: The South Australian Protector and Aborigines

³⁰ It is noteworthy, however, that Andy Paull, the early Indigenous internationalist and mentor to George
Manuel described above, was a prominent member of the Allied Tribes and its petition. It seems plausible
that this idea of a shared situation with African tribes may have influenced (at least subconsciously) Paull’s
desire to form an international organization, which he passed down to George Manuel. Tennant, 101.
“examples of Third World liberation struggles have also fostered...native nationalism” in North America.\(^{31}\) As the discourse of decolonization had been taken up and publicized by the Black Power movement in the United States, numerous examples of its impact on young Indigenous radicals in North America can surely be found,\(^ {32}\) but the impact of anti-colonial thought on Indigenous intellectuals in South America has received far less attention. Jose Antonio Lucero has examined the powerful influence of Martinique-born anti-colonial writer Frantz Fanon on Fausto Reinaga, a revolutionary Indigenous intellectual from Bolivia. The latter's 1969 work, \textit{La Revolución India} begins by quoting the entire final chapter of Fanon's \textit{The Wretched of the Earth}, which insists that the colonized abandon mimicry of European culture, and look elsewhere for an alternative.\(^ {33}\) Reinaga answers by proposing the idea of \textit{Indianidad}, which Lucero compares to Aimé Césaire's concept of \textit{negritude}, in that they both rejected European culture in favour of a culture rooted in the shared historical experiences of a people (Blacks in the case of Césaire and Indians in the case of Reinaga).\(^ {34}\) In this way, Reinaga rejected the idea of differentiating between Indigenous nationalities, favouring a single Indigenous nationality that would comprise the majority of the Bolivian population, and ultimately “lead to a continental revolution of 'IndoAmerica.'”\(^ {35}\) Reinaga accepted an invitation to attend the founding meeting of the International Indian Treaty Council in 1974,

\(^{32}\) One description of this link can be found in Bryan Palmer, “Indians in All Tribes: the Birth of Red Power,” in \textit{Debating Dissent: Canada and the Sixties}, eds., Gregory S. Kealey, Lara Campbell, and Dominique Clément (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). Howard Adams, for example was profoundly affected when hearing Malcolm X speak at Berkley.
\(^{34}\) Lucero, “Fanon in the Andes,” 16-17.
\(^{35}\) Ibid., 18.
but he did not have the financial means to make the trip to the United States.\textsuperscript{36} Although this dissertation is not able to fully document the important influence of Reinaga's ideas of \textit{indianidad} and \textit{indianismo}, it is certain that they had a significant impact, including beyond the borders of Bolivia.\textsuperscript{37}

This dissertation does not argue, therefore, that the WCIP was the only example of anti-colonial thought influencing the work of Indigenous activists. The founders of the World Council, however, did use the logic of decolonization as the basis for their organization, which helped to create a broad, even global definition of Indigeneity that differed from North American native nationalism or South American \textit{indianidad} or \textit{indianismo}. It was not bounded by culture, colour or region, but rooted in a shared political experience of invasion, colonization and subjugation. In this way, Indigeneity as defined by Indigenous internationalism has as much or more in common with the idea of Third-Worldism as it does with traditional systems of cultural, linguistic and kinship links between Indigenous peoples. On the other hand, the Indigenous internationalism was not simply the unaltered transplant of Third-Worldist ideas to new locations. The World Council adopted but also adapted, abandoning those conceptions that did not meet their needs and challenging those that threatened their values. The connections between Indigenous internationalism and Third-Worldism, as well as the similarities and differences between the two movements, are explored more thoroughly in the second and third chapters respectively.

\textsuperscript{36} US National Archives, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-1976, Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, Electronic Telegrams, Film # D740128-0207, Document # 1974LAPAZ03292, correspondence from US Embassy in La Paz to US Secretary of State, 22 May 1974.

1.3 Third-Worldism

Because this dissertation will make frequent references to the influence of the Third World on Indigenous internationalists, it is worth spending some time explaining what is meant by that term. The term was coined by Alfred Sauvy who used it to set apart “those called, by the United Nations, the underdeveloped countries” from the great power blocs of the Capitalist West and the Communist East. Sauvy acknowledged that, much like the French Revolution's Third Estate, the ignored and exploited Third World might itself want to “be something.” Sauvy, however, gave no indication of what he thought the Third World wanted to be, except perhaps, not ignored or exploited. While the First and Second Worlds of his metaphor were defined by their East/West geographies and Communist/Capitalist ideologies, the Third World had neither a specific geography nor a clear ideology.

The 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia (organized by President Sukarno who had led his country to independence) might be considered the first international meeting of the Third World. Its list of delegates was limited, however, compared to Sauvy's definition of the Third World, as Latin American states were not included. Instead delegates to the Bandung Conference came primarily from those countries that had recently escaped (or were working to escape) the grasp of European empires, and this was their primary point of commonality. With participation from two distant continents, there was no presence of any shared ethnicity or culture, like had been seen in the Pan-African conferences mentioned above. According to historian Vijay Prashad, “[u]nity for the people of the Third World came from a political position against colonialism and imperialism, not from any intrinsic cultural  

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or racial commonalities. If you fought against colonialism and stood against imperialism, then you were part of the Third World.”  

This definition, based in a shared history of imperialism, was purely political, but it allowed for unity between delegates whose politics and ideologies were otherwise antithetical. As such, it “found common currency among most of the delegates to the Bandung meeting, whether of the Left (China), the centre (India and Burma), or the Right (Turkey and the Philippines).”

An analysis by Robert Vitalis asserts that the so-called “movement” of the Third World never became particularly united. Indonesia's Sukarno, China's Zhou Enlai, India's Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and others each tried to dominate various agglomerations of (mostly) post-colonial states in ways that suited their own interests and ideologies.

Vitalis specifically disputes the notion that the 1955 Asian-African conference in Bandung, Indonesia led directly to the creation of a Non-Aligned Movement, or any movement at all. He equally critiques any suggestion that Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was truly made up of members committed to Cold-War neutrality, evidenced in part by the participation of Cuba at the NAM's founding meeting in Belgrade in 1961. On the contrary, the meeting was designed by Nasser to undermine Sukarno's hopes for a second Asian-African Conference. A sequel to Bandung would have, by definition, excluded Nasser's ally Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, and accepted the participation of a great number of countries hostile to Nasser's Egypt. Although the 1961

40 Ibid., 34.
42 Ibid., 272-274.
Belgrade Conference would condemn imperialism, it was explicitly organized around “non-alignment” rather than “anti-imperialism,” in part to allow Nasser and Tito to control the list of invitees.\textsuperscript{43} Nkrumah's efforts to organize the 1958 Conference of Independent African States was, on the contrary, designed to allow him to challenge Nasser's claim to the leadership of and vision for the Third World. Vitalis suggests that Nkrumah may well have seen Nasser's Egypt as a possible source of imperialism within Africa.\textsuperscript{44}

With all these tensions between ideologically diverse actors, the Third World can hardly be said to have embodied a single ideology. Third-Worldism was never a single coherent idea or movement, but a cluster of disparate (sometimes conflicting) thoughts espoused by a range of activists and leaders with different interests and goals. Nonetheless, historian Mark Berger has attempted to pick out some commonalities. He lists four tenets shared by at least most leaders involved in the broad Third-Worldist movement:

1) the 'popular masses' in the Third World had 'revolutionary aspirations';

2) the fulfilment of these aspirations was an inevitable working out of history that linked pre-colonial forms of egalitarianism to the realisation of a future utopia;

3) the vehicle for the achievement of this transformation was a strong and centralised nation-state; and

4) in foreign policy terms these nation-states should form an alliance that would act collectively under the umbrella of various regional and international forms of political and economic co-operation, such as the non-alignment movement and the United Nations.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 273.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 275-76.
What is relevant to this dissertation, however, are the key ideas from which Indigenous leaders seem to have drawn inspiration. These are items two and four from Berger's list above, namely a) the elevation of pre-colonial culture as a just and legitimate alternative to Western economic and political systems, and b) some degree of collaboration between colonized peoples at the international level to secure each other's liberation. When the following chapters refer to the influence of Third-Worldism, it is usually these two ideas that are being discussed.

Examples of this first element—the search for an alternative to Western political-economic systems in local culture and history—include the work of Nehru, Sukarno and Nasser. Each of these men espoused his own nationalist/socialist theory, seeking to temper the Soviet model of socialism with elements required for their own national contexts. Such an alternative political-economic philosophy is perhaps best exemplified by Sukarno's conception of NASAKOM: Nasionalisme, Agama (religion) and Komunisme. Each of these leaders had what Berger calls a “complicated relationship” with socialism. Examples of the second element—anti-colonial collaboration—range from group statements made at the 1955 Bandung conference “declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end,” to the 1963 establishment of the Organization of

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46 The requirement of centralized government or even independent statehood was not necessarily adopted by Indigenous internationalists, nor were the demands for economic industrialization espoused by many Third World leaders.

47 Berger, 15-17.

48 Ibid., 20.

African Unity with the eradication of “all forms of colonialism from Africa” included as one of its five espoused purposes.  

1.3.1 Nyerere, Ujamaa, and Internationalism

Tanzania's President Julius Kambarage Nyerere is a particularly good example of a post-colonial leader that both rejected Western political-economic systems in favour of one based in pre-colonial culture, and promoted the international collaboration of colonized peoples to bring about each other's liberation. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, Nyerere left a particularly strong mark on George Manuel, helping to inspire in Manuel a deep desire to organize Indigenous peoples internationally. For this reason, it is worth looking more closely at Nyerere's vision of Third-Worldism and Pan-Africanism. Nyerere was born in 1922 in the recently-established British League of Nations mandate of Tanganyika. After obtaining a teaching certificate in the nearby British colony of Uganda, he travelled to the United Kingdom where he earned a Master's degree in history and economics at the University of Edinburgh in 1952. The importance of this time in both a neighbouring African colony and in the colonial metropole in shaping his political views should not be underestimated. After his time in Uganda, he became secretary of the Tabora branch of the Pan-Africanist organization, the Tanganyikan African Association. In Edinburgh, he was deeply influenced by Fabian socialism, with its stress on the importance of reform, and

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51 The United Republic of Tanzania is the product of a 1964 merger between the independent states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Incidentally, this made him the first Tanganyikan to earn any university degree. Guy Martin, African Political Thought (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 98.
certainly would have gained a deeper understanding of the process of European
colonization. Upon his return to Tanganyika, he formed the Tanganyika African National
Union (TANU) in 1954. This process of international travel as a spark to both Pan-
Africanism and anti-colonial activism was relatively common throughout Africa, and as will
be shown in Chapter Two, it was a process that was repeated to some degree by Indigenous
activists some decades later.

Nyerere was particularly focused on establishing a philosophy or ideology to guide
both TANU and African leaders in general. He came up with the concept of using *Ujamaa*
(generally translated as “socialism” or “African socialism” but more literally meaning
“familyhood” in Swahili) as the organizing principle for society. He made a strong
distinction that his ideology was not a variant of European socialism, but instead, based
entirely in pre-colonial traditions of equality and sharing. The Marxists' belief in the essential
role of class struggle in life did not fit with his understanding of African community any
more than did the focus on self-interest inherent to capitalism. Nyerere insisted he was not
...importing a foreign ideology into Tanzania and trying to smother our distinct social patterns with it. We have deliberately decided to
grow, as a society, out of our own roots, but in a particular direction and towards a particular kind of objective. We are doing this by
emphasizing certain characteristics of our traditional organization, and extending them so that they can embrace the possibilities of
modern technology and enable us to meet the challenge of life in the twentieth century world.

54 Martin, 98.
56 Martin Odei Ajei, “Africa's Development: The Imperatives of Indigenous Knowledge and Values,” (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of South Africa, 2007).
Nyerere demanded a return to this sense of familyhood, and the rejection of selfish individualism, a quality he blamed on colonialism. Prior to the imposition of colonial/capitalist education, “an African could not think of himself apart from that community in which he lived.”58 While many Third World leaders would emphasize the importance of pre-colonial culture as a guiding principle for their post-independence societies, Nyerere's commitment was perhaps the most pure. Unlike Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah who wanted to temper Marxism with “African personality,” Nyerere saw the need for a wholly different ideology.59 As will be demonstrated in this dissertation, it was this complete rejection of European systems that would help guide the World Council of Indigenous People's approach to decolonization in its early years.

Although Nyerere was committed to bringing about a uniquely African social system in Tanzania, his interests lay far beyond his own national borders. Nyerere was a committed Pan-Africanist and internationalist. The same Arusha Declaration that laid out TANU's plans for the country also lists co-operation “with all political parties in Africa engaged in the liberation of all Africa” among the party's principle aims.60 It also commits the government to co-operate “with other states in Africa in bringing about African unity” and to “[work]


59 Martin, 87-91. Nyerere was not necessarily successful with his vision, to say the least. P. L. E. Idahosa comments that TANU's policies “resulted in many features that are the opposite of what *ujamaa* was intended to achieve: forced villageization, the absence of participation coupled with alienation from the state, bureaucratization, increased class differentiations, low agricultural production and industry acquisition of most the state's development resources.” P. L. E. Idahosa, as quoted by Martin, 101. For a nuanced analysis of the legacy of *Ujamaa* both as a somewhat utopian ideology and as a practical attempt at economic development, see Bonny Ibawoh and J. I. Dibua, “Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in Africa,” *African Journal of Political Science* 8:1 (2003).

tirelessly towards world peace and security through the United Nations Organization.”

Nyerere's commitment to Pan-Africanism is evidenced in his support for the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963. As its name suggests, the OAU was created “to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States” and “to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa.” At the organization's founding summit, Nyerere agreed to host a semi-autonomous OAU Liberation Committee, and personally provided the “most emphatic” response to its creation, insisting that “from now on our brethren in non-independent Africa should be helped by independent Africa....we are prepared to die a little for the final removal of the humiliation of colonialism from the face of Africa.” His words were followed with action. Following Ian Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965, the OAU met in Addis Ababa and delivered an ultimatum to Britain, which was perceived as complacent about the threat of another “racist minority government” in Africa. When Britain failed to take sufficient action on the issue, Tanzania (and Guinea) followed through ending diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom on 15 December, at a tremendous economic cost. Nyerere stressed, however, that Tanzania had no plans to leave the Commonwealth. While the severing of relations with Britain might cause strains within the Commonwealth, he insisted that his commitment to internationalism was demonstrated by honouring Tanzania's promises to the OAU. “If we are disloyal to the OAU,” he asked in a speech to Tanzania's National Assembly, “how can we be trusted to be loyal to the

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61 Ibid., 233.
63 Červenka, 12.
65 Ibid., 115.
Commonwealth—or to the United Nations for that matter? Nyerere's vision for Tanzania and Africa included a host of other ideas that would not connect so well with Indigenous internationalism, including his opposition to “tribalism” and his commitment to majority rule, but as will be seen, his concept of Ujamaa and his determined internationalism and solidarity would prove deeply inspirational.

1.4 Globalization

It would be negligent to examine an organization called the World Council of Indigenous peoples without addressing the issue of globalization, particularly when the organization operated during the same decades that the term became so prominent in public discourse. Although the relationship between globalization and the WCIP is not the explicit focus of this dissertation, it is a theme worth examining in some detail from the outset in order to understand the ways in which the organization was both part of and separate from the broader social trend.

Jan Aarte Scholte's detailed examination of globalization acknowledges that, even among the scholarly community, there are numerous and diverse definitions for the term. He summarizes what he sees as the five primary definitions of globalization (internationalization, liberalization, universalization, modernization, and the spread of supraterritoriality) before analyzing the usefulness of each. Globalization as internationalism suggests that the concept refers to increased cross-border relations between countries, particularly through economic trade and interdependence. Liberalization refers to a

66 Ibid., 131.
process whereby government imposed restrictions on movement (or people, products, etc.) are removed to create a more “open” global economy. Universalization describes a global “cultural synthesis” or homogenization of experience with the spread of ideas, techniques and products to every corner of the world. Globalization as modernization describes “westernization” or even “colonization,” or more specifically, the spread of rationalism, capitalism, industrialism and bureaucratism around the world, allegedly destroying the self-determination of societies and states as it progresses. Finally, defining globalization as “deterritorialization” or the spread of “supraterritoriality” suggests that the world is undergoing a major reconfiguration whereby “social space is not wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distances and territorial borders.”68 While all of these processes may be occurring, Scholte insists that only the last one is a particularly useful definition, as the others either have synonyms, or are older, re-occurring processes not unique to the late twentieth century.69 According to Scholte, this “deterritorializing” globalization challenges the use of territorialism (“the practice of understanding the social world and conducting studies about it through the lens of territorial geography”) as the methodological basis of social research.70

When defined as the spread of supraterritoriality, globalization does not imply a process that has affected all people evenly. According to Scholte, “[u]niversality means being spread worldwide, while globality implies qualities of transworld concurrence and coordination... Universality says something about territorial extent, whereas globality says

68 Ibid., 16.
69 Ibid., 50.
70 Ibid., 56.
something about space-time relations.” Similarly, he makes a strong distinction between globality and internationality:

Whereas international relations are interterritorial relations, global relations are supraterritorial relations. International relations are cross-border exchanges over distance, while global relations are trans-border relations without distance... Internality is embedded in territorial space; globality transcends that geography. Using Scholte's definition, there is certainly good reason to think that “Indigenous globalism” might be a better term to describe the World Council of Indigenous People than “Indigenous internationalism.” It was, as we will see, an organization at least theoretically open to membership regardless of distance or geography. Nonetheless, this dissertation will predominantly use the terms “international” and “internationalism” to describe the collaboration of Indigenous peoples around the world. The term is used in a way that is inclusive of activities and relationships that were not global or supraterritorial in focus or nature, as well as those that were. To some degree the growth of Indigenous internationalism is influenced by and connected to most, if not all, of the possible definitions mentioned by Scholte. This dissertation will question when and how Indigenous internationalism could accurately be described as global, in the sense of creating or using a supraterritorial space.

Scholte's examination also describes the effects of globalization on societies. Relevant to this study is his assertion that new supraterritorial communication technologies (as well as supraterritorial markets, production, and finance) have led to the creation of supraterritorial organizations and, to some degree, supraterritorial consciousness and solidarity. Although

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71 Ibid., 50.
72 Ibid., 49.
73 Ibid., 53-54.
the World Council itself is not referenced in Scholte's work, he does address the broader movement of Indigenous internationalism specifically as part of a grouping he calls non-state “ethno-nations” (in contrast to “state-nations”). These “ethno-nations” (including “tribes”, “ethnic groups”, “Indigenous peoples” and “minorities”) do not challenge the principle of nationhood, but reproduce it in new ways. He asserts that globalization encouraged the growth or increased prominence of these “ethno-nations” in at least three ways:

1) The rise of supraterritoriality has “reduced the relative power of the state... to shape a nation to match its jurisdiction” which has effectively given “ethnic movements... more room to grow.”

2) Etho-nationalism has emerged partly in reaction to the increased intrusions of powerful new supraterritorial constituents (global companies, global financial markets, etc.). Scholte gives the examples of native Hawaiian reaction to increased global tourism, local reaction to the actions of global resource extraction corporations, and the North American Free Trade Agreement as the “immediate trigger for the Zapatista rebellion” in 1994.

3) Finally, ethno-national movements have managed to utilize global communications technology and transnational forums for their own causes. He references worldwide


75 Scholte, 168.

76 Ibid., 168.
meetings of Indigenous peoples, and also mentions that “air, telephone and computer networks” have allowed “the Navajo in America to aid the Saami in Scandinavia and the Cree in Canada to assist the Miskito in Central America.”\textsuperscript{77} This also includes the “codification of indigenous peoples' rights in suprastate law” by the United Nations.\textsuperscript{78}

Undoubtedly the first two effects help explain the rise of Indigenous activism, and the third describes (in part) what organizations like the World Council have done. This dissertation, however, will illustrate in a more practical sense how and explain why this third change came about. What motivated Indigenous groups to take action beyond their nation states, and what happened when they did so? Additionally, while Scholte acknowledges the creation of global consciousnesses and new supraterritorial identities, he provides only superficial investigation how this might work for “ethno-nations” deeply rooted in their territorial identities. If the global/local hybrid identities that he mentions are indeed occurring, the seemingly self-contradictory term of “Indigenous internationalism” surely provides the ideal case study.

On a related note, the dissertation is quite consciously placed outside the context of any regional or national histories. Because the World Council’s headquarters were established in Canada and it received a great deal of funding from the Canadian government, it certainly could be examined through the lens of Canadian political history. To do so, however, would diminish the significance (and in some cases, dominance) of Indigenous peoples from elsewhere in the world who participated enthusiastically in the organization. The World Council and the project of Indigenous internationalism was as much the product of their

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 168.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 168.
national contexts as it was of the Canadian one. A study from the Canadian perspective could well be a valuable one, but it would ask significantly different questions than the ones raised in the following chapters. Perhaps more importantly, the WCIP was an international organization that challenged the system of nation states and sought to make political connections without regard for geographic location. It remains to be seen whether these goals made the World Council a “global” or “globalizing” organization, but to utilize a traditional “territorialist” approach is clearly inappropriate for such a study.

The multi-national, multi-cultural, multi-lingual nature of the organization also made it problematic to approach the work from the point of any one Indigenous culture at the expense of the others. The author has tried to use endonyms (the names used by peoples for themselves) and to use place names in the local Indigenous languages as much as possible, but the innumerable quantity of these (frequently understudied and nearly extinct) languages with complex and disputed orthographies makes this a difficult task. Any errors or omissions in this regard are not the result of carelessness or lack of respect.

This work is not simply concerned with international (or global) consciousness or communication between Indigenous people, but with the intersection between that communication and a specific element of the internationalism of the twentieth century, the international organization. Akira Iriye's *Global Community* (2002) charts the steady growth of international organizations, particularly non-governmental ones, since the late nineteenth century in an attempt to explain that growth and the effect it has had on modern international

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79 For the sake of consistency, I have italicized the names of all Indigenous peoples/ethnicities, except when used as part of an organization's name, in which case I use their own spelling. Direct quotations also include the spelling in the original document.
relations. Iriye posits that the explosion of international organizations that occurred in the 1970s was the result of the growth of international corporations and of the changing relationships between national governments and the societies they governed.\(^\text{80}\) To some degree, the creation of domestic civil societies gave birth to an international civil society that expanded particularly in the directions of “human rights, humanitarian relief, developmental assistance, environmental protection and cultural exchange.”\(^\text{81}\) As will be seen in subsequent chapters, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples was part of the global expansion of organized internationalism during the 1970s and 80s. In short, while this dissertation aims to examine the specific factors that led directly to the creation of Indigenous international organizations, it will also place their nascence in the broader context of the worldwide changes during the twentieth century.

### 1.5 Sources

As the history of the WCIP is relatively recent, I was able to rely on both archival and oral sources for my research. In terms of the former, the WCIP fonds at Library and Archives Canada (LAC) in Ottawa have been incredibly helpful. The organization's records were actually thrown out and almost literally ended up in the “ash heap of history”, before being recovered from a furnace room and eventually given a home at LAC.\(^\text{82}\) The fonds contain 53 boxes of documents. Some of these documents were particularly useful to research (like meeting minutes and annual reports) but much of the documentation was less useful, such as announcements and promotional material sent to the WCIP by its member organizations, or

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\(^{81}\) Ibid., 134.

\(^{82}\) The task of reorganizing the documents for the fonds was completed by Zuzanka Kutena of Australia. Wayne Kines, personal interview, 28 October 2013;
invitations and programs for meetings attended by WCIP delegates but not organized by the organization itself. The greatest limitation of the fonds, however, is their temporal focus; they are overwhelmingly weighted toward the second decade of the World Council's life. World Council documents dated before 1980 are particularly rare within the fonds. If WCIP documents from that era still exist, it seems likely that they would have been kept by Canada's Assembly of First Nations (formerly the National Indian Brotherhood, NIB), as George Manuel was head of both organizations at that time. Through personal correspondence with the Assembly of First Nations, I learned that much of the NIB documentation had been microfilmed and placed in a resource centre. Unfortunately, when that resource centre was closed over a decade ago, all the material was hurriedly packed into boxes and placed in long-term storage without an inventory.83 It remains inaccessible to researchers.

Small amounts of information about the earlier period were accessible from a variety of other sources. Library and Archives Canada also provided access to certain files from the Canadian Department of External Affairs related to the WCIP. The Resource Centre of the Union of BC Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) also houses a number of key documents and access to Nesika (a short-lived UBCIC newsletter) through its online database of Indigenous news sources was occasionally quite helpful. The United Nations Archives in New York also hosts a small number of relevant documents related to the WCIP. Although the Norwegian National Archives in Oslo does not house documents useful to this research, its branch, the Sámi Archives in Kautokeino/Guovdageaidnu, contained a decent collection related to the Sami

83 Dennis Borync (Assembly of First Nations), personal correspondence, 9 February 2012.
Council's participation in World Council business. Additionally, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Agency for Development both have in-house archives that document their respective relationships with the WCIP, particularly during the 1980s. The University of New Mexico's Center for Southwest Research and Special Collections houses a significant collection of documents related to the International Indian Treaty Council that was also important to this study.

In terms of media coverage, the Southern Alberta Newspaper Collection at the University of Lethbridge hosts a digitized collection of *Kainai News*, a newspaper from the nearby Kainai Nation. Together with the Lethbridge Herald, it gave frequent coverage to the World Council, especially while the organization was based in Lethbridge. Larger American and Canadian newspapers also occasionally covered the WCIP. The newsletters of the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs were also a good source of external (if not entirely neutral) information on the World Council. Back issues of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations' *Saskatchewan Indian* are archived online by the Saskatchewan Indian Cultural Centre.

Published autobiographies, including Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz's *Blood on the Border* and Clem Chartier's *Witness to Resistance*, were an important source for my research into Indigenous internationalism during the Miskitu/Sandinista conflict. Peter McFarlane's biography of George Manuel, *Brotherhood to Nationhood*, was a particularly helpful introduction to the creation of the World Council. Manuel's daughter, Doreen Manuel, was

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kind enough to allow me access to eleven years of her father's unpublished diaries. With few omissions, he kept a daily record of his work for the National Indian Brotherhood, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, and the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs. The diaries provided insight into his inspiration and ideas more than any published report ever would, and perhaps even more than a personal interview would, if Manuel were still alive. They were, at times, emotionally difficult to read as he discussed the successes and challenges of the movement and his personal life. Nonetheless, this study is enormously richer because of their inclusion. Unfortunately, Manuel's diary from 1981 was missing when I accessed the others. It was unclear if it has been lost, simply misplaced, or never existed at all.

Finally, I undertook numerous personal interviews which provided essential information to understand the ideas behind Indigenous internationalism, the work of Indigenous international organizations, and the effect that work had on those involved. I interviewed twenty-one individuals in total, some of them multiple times. Three of these interviewees answered exclusively via email, but I spoke to the remaining eighteen either by telephone or, when possible, in person. While interviews varied in length, the fourteen interviewees that agreed to be recorded provided me with twenty-one hours of digital recorded interviews. Some of the information recorded, including some entire interviews, went beyond the scope of this dissertation and were therefore not included. There are, nevertheless, some notable gaps among the list of interviewees. Most regrettably, and despite my best efforts, I was unable to make contact with any Indigenous members of the World Council's executive council from Central or South America. When I could find contact

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86 Unfortunately, some of these interviews, while fascinating, concerned events that, for reasons of scope, could not be included in this dissertation.
information, my attempts to arrange interviews received no response. Although this does limit my understanding of their involvement, I hope my interviews with WCIP Secretariat staff (Indigenous and non-Indigenous) from both Central and South America have at least helped to fill this lacuna. There are other important testimonies that are also missing. Aslak Nils Sara represented the Sámi on the WCIP executive for most of the organization's existence, and was therefore the longest serving executive council member by quite a margin. Unfortunately, his death in 1996 made this impossible, so I have relied on interviews with other prominent members of the Sami Council, including Ole Henrik Magga and Leif Halonen. While I managed to contact Jimmie Durham (whom Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz credits with the idea of the International Indian Treaty Council), he was unwilling to be interviewed for this study, as were other key members like Paul Chaat Smith and Bill Means. Luckily, Durham had given a number of other published interviews that touched on his experiences with the Treaty Council, and he also published collections that include his writing from that time, which gave me a better picture of his vision of the organization. Nonetheless, I was not able to undertake an extensive comparison between the World Council and the Treaty Council throughout the dissertation. I also tried unsuccessfully to arrange interviews with numerous other prominent people mentioned in the dissertation in connection with the World Council, such as Jacob Marule, Douglas Sanders, Irja Seurujärvi-Kari, and Leif Dunfjeld.

1.6 Chapter Summary

The body of this dissertation is broken up into seven chapters, all interconnected and ordered chronologically, but each also distinct in its focus. Chapter Two examines the prehistory of the WCIP and the IITC, and specifically, how the ideas to create these organizations were first formed in the minds of their founders. It charts the direct and indirect influence of anti-colonialism on Marie Smallface-Marule, George Manuel, and Jimmie Durham, and how these two organizations took Indigenous internationalism in very different directions.

Chapter Three examines the first preparatory meeting in Georgetown, Guyana in 1974, a year before the first World Conference of Indigenous Peoples. It provides personal background for many of the World Council's key players and member organizations, and examines the social context which they share, to explain their similar motivations for overcoming isolation and forming an Indigenous international organization. The chapter argues that the working definition of “Indigenous” that they chose suggests a strong connection between their vision for Indigenous decolonization and Third-Worldist conceptions of decolonization. At the same time, the proposals they made for the future structure of the future World Council demonstrate the ways their anti-colonialism was quite different than that of the Third World.

Chapter Four traces the various sources of funding for the World Council and the effect these donors had on the organization's activities. As funding sources shifted from religious groups and foreign affairs departments towards those focused on International development, there was some pressure to adopt a greater focus on economic development at
the expense of earlier demands for decolonization and Indigenous sovereignty. The chapter examines the degree to which the World Council was able to resist this pressure, and the effect it had on the organization and its members.

Chapter Five looks at the case of Niillas Somby, a Sámi activist who sought asylum with North American Indigenous groups in the 1980s. While he crossed the Atlantic for his own personal reasons, Somby ended up assisting his hosts in their fight to assert sovereignty from the Canadian government. Although Somby did receive substantial (if unofficial) support from members of the World Council, this chapter focuses less on the organization itself, and more on the personal effects of the broader movement of Indigenous internationalism.

Chapter Six looks at WCIP and IITC involvement with the conflict between the Miskitu people and Nicaragua's Sandinista government during that country's Contra War of the 1980s. International Indigenous involvement created serious political fractures in both organizations. The investigation highlights the challenges of “neutral” international advocacy during the Cold War, and emphasizes the ways in which competing forces of imperialism continue to make Indigenous solidarity a problematic exercise.

Finally, Chapter Seven offers some insight into the collapse of the World Council in 1997, and surveys where the movement of Indigenous internationalism went thereafter. It also connects the themes and ideas discussed in the dissertation, and makes suggestions for further research.
Chapter 2
Another Wave of Anti-Colonialism:
The Origins of Indigenous Internationalism

The pressures on imperial powers to release their colonies to independence intensified during the first half of the twentieth century – so much so that most territories and peoples annexed into empires at the turn of the century would come to be ruled locally by the peoples indigenous to those lands by the 1960s. To examine an animated map of decolonizing Africa is to see a vast wave of changing colours across the continent.\(^1\) That wave of decolonization, however, continued on after surging through Africa. It changed shape and affected a far greater number and range of peoples than most early anti-colonial activists had imagined. It flowed over the legislative breakwaters that governments consciously included in United Nations resolutions to block its reach. Peoples who had been subject to processes of colonization (sometimes similar, sometimes quite different), but who, for a variety of reasons, fell outside the accepted definitions of “colonized peoples” came to identify with each other and recognized the similarities between their situations and those of decolonizing nations in Africa and Asia. This chapter will investigate how that first wave of decolonization informed and inspired (and to a lesser degree, directly aided) a subsequent wave of decolonization: Indigenous internationalism.

Undoubtedly, the struggles of “capital-i” Indigenous peoples, whether for basic human rights or for sovereignty, began long before the process of decolonization in Africa.

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and Asia. The historical relationships between forces of colonization and Indigenous peoples around the world are unsurprisingly varied, but they all include some elements of resistance sustained over time. Given the definition that Indigenous peoples have maintained their own separate identity from colonizing people, some degree of continued resistance to assimilation is inherent to what makes a people Indigenous. The second wave of decolonization did not grow from silent, still water, but merely helped change the shape and pitch of resistance by combining, for the first time, the efforts of many otherwise unconnected peoples into one.

While most of this dissertation focuses on the history of an organization called the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), this chapter will offer a comparison of its origins with those of another organization, the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC). While both groups were inspired by and in some cases directly aided by Third-Worldism (the broad international movement of Cold-War-era anti-colonial activism), the leadership of each group took ideas about international cooperation, national sovereignty and the importance of culture to national self-development, and applied them in new ways. Thus, Indigenous Internationalism was not a linear continuation of mid-20th century decolonization in a different setting, but a redirection adapted to suit different peoples. The leaders of this new wave of decolonization were sometimes wary, sometimes critical of their predecessors.

### 2.1 Third-Worldism and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples

Officially, the story of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples begins on the Tseshahat reservation on Vancouver Island, at the head of the 40-kilometre-long Alberni inlet,
near the town of Port Alberni, British Columbia, Canada. This small, rather isolated community typifies both the political and the more basic geographic meanings of the word indigenous. The Tseshaht Reservation is a community set aside by the Canadian government for a people who predate the European colonization of North America. The “aht” in the Nuu-chah-nulth language means “people” and the “Tsesha” (or “Ćišaa”) refers to a nearby island, the reputed place of origin of the Tseshaht – they could hardly be more indigenous to the land on which they live.² Yet in October 1975, Indigenous delegates from 19 different countries and four different continents travelled to this same community where they met and founded the WCIP.³

The meeting took over a year of preparation by a smaller group of organizers with support from other existing Indigenous organizations, but the idea of an international conference of Indigenous peoples began in the mind of George Manuel. Manuel was a Secwepemc man from the Neskonlith Indian Band, a government-registered “status” Indian in Canada, and in 1975, the head of Canada's National Indian Brotherhood (NIB)⁴. The NIB (which became the Assembly of First Nations in 1985) was still in its infancy, having been formed just a few years before Manuel was elected its national chief in 1970, yet during his

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² "We are Tseshaht," [http://www.tseshaht.com/history-culture/history>; Professor Jeff Comtassell of the Indigenous Governance Program at the University of Victoria is currently conducting an extensive oral history project, “An Oral History of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples,” investigating the impact of the 1975 World Conference of Indigenous Peoples on the people of Tseshaht. [http://web.uvic.ca/igov/index.php/oral-history-project]
⁴ Peter McFarlane's biography of Manuel gives an excellent account of his life. Brotherhood to Nationhood: George Manuel and the Making of the Modern Indian Movement (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1993).
six years leading the organization, it increased in both prestige and power. George Manuel's
growing awareness of the similarities in the situations of Indigenous peoples living in Canada
with those living outside North America was sparked, in part, by a trip to the South Pacific.
On the suggestion of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Okanagan Liberal MP Len Marchand
and Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Jean Chrétien, organized a tour of
New Zealand, essentially to compare that country's policies for Māori people with Canada's
Indian policy. As head of the NIB, Manuel was invited to join the delegation.\(^5\)

The group left for New Zealand in March 1971, and Manuel experienced a trip that
included both frustrating encounters with New Zealand's politicians and exciting, eye-
opening interactions with the Indigenous people living there in all-too-familiar
circumstances.\(^6\) The countries' aboriginal policies did differ. New Zealand's parliament had
four seats permanently set aside for Māori MPs, while in Canada, Marchand was the first
Indigenous federal politician elected in the 20\(^{th}\) century (his only predecessor, Louis Riel, had
been hanged for treason in 1885). But George Manuel was struck by the great similarities in
the social positions of peoples so far from each other geographically, yet who had
experienced similar histories of colonialism. In a later report, he noted that a similar value-
system was being imposed by the state in both countries, and that the “psychological effects
of this show up especially in the school system. Although the [Māori] drop-out rate is not as
high as our 94\%, it still shows that the present school curricula is destructive to a very great
degree.”\(^7\) The parallels he saw between the Australian government's aboriginal policies (that
country being the second destination in the tour) and his own seem to have strengthened one

\(^5\) McFarlane, 156.
\(^6\) Ibid., 158.
\(^7\) Whitehorse Star, 27 May 1971.
idea in his mind: the historic and ongoing experience of the British empire was something fundamental that these peoples shared with Indigenous peoples in Canada. “Just as much as the Maoris and the Aborigines,” he reported, “the Indian people in Canada are dark people in a White Commonwealth.”

Yet it was the formal link of Commonwealth which had not only facilitated the tour, but perhaps made Manuel's mind more open to look for these social connections between Indigenous peoples. Sam Deloria, a member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe who served as the first Secretary General of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, emphasizes this link as fundamental to basis of the WCIP, and something Indigenous activists from the United States, like himself, could not offer:

I think the historical perspective differences between the Canadian view and the British Commonwealth view, and our [American] view were what made the difference. I hate to speak up for the solidarity of a relic of the colonial era <laughs> but I think it's absolutely true. (...) His ability to reach out to the Spanish speaking nations was considerably reduced, not only because he didn't speak Spanish but because they didn't have that sense of family, and he sure as hell did with respect to the British Commonwealth.

Thus, in the very same year that Britain lost control over the last three of its former territories in the Middle East (Qatar, Bahrain, and the Trucial Sheikhdoms), the Indigenous peoples in the Commonwealth's three remaining “White Dominions” may have first

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8 Report on the New Zealand and Australia tour by George Manuel, 1971, p15, quoted in McFarlane, 159. For a broader comparison of the respective policies of the countries Manuel visited, see Andrew Armitage, *Comparing the Policy of Aboriginal Assimilation: Australia, Canada and New Zealand* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1995). The overlap between New Zealand and Canadian colonial policy was sometimes quite apparent; the Douglas Treaties, some of the few signed in George Manuel's home province of British Columbia, were based on land conveyance forms used by the New Zealand Company to purchase Māori lands. Hamar Foster, “The Saanichton Bay Marina Case: Imperial Law, Colonial History and Competing Theories of Aboriginal Title,” *University of British Columbia Law Review* 23:3 (1989), 629-236.

9 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
considered working together in opposition to the perceived continuation of colonialism. What is perhaps more surprising in Manuel's report, however, is that feelings of solidarity already extended beyond Australia, New Zealand and Canada, or even the United States: “We share with the Maori and Aborigine, and I suspect also with many different African peoples, not only this common struggle but also the very real progress we have made in the past decade.”

To explain what George Manuel believed Indigenous people in Canada shared with African peoples, and why this was on his mind at all in 1971, I turn to his (then recently hired) assistant, Marie Smallface-Marule.

2.1.1 Smallface-Marule and the Influence of African-Socialism

Raised on the Kainai Reserve in southern Alberta, Marie Smallface became active in Canadian Indigenous politics while studying sociology and anthropology at the University of Alberta in Edmonton from 1962-1966. She participated in the National Indian Council (a culturally-focused predecessor of the National Indian Brotherhood), and competed in its 1964 Princess Pageant as the princess for Alberta. She became involved with the Canadian Indian Youth Council (1965) along with Cree leader Harold Cardinal, who would be elected as its president in 1966. She was active at the local Native Friendship Centre in Edmonton, and with the Indian Association of Alberta. While attending university, however, Smallface also joined a social group called “Club International” which had many members from the wide

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10 McFarlane, 160. My emphasis.
array of international students at the University of Alberta. Club International held internationally themed dinners and hosted a variety of speakers, but most notably, it gave Canadian students the opportunity to meet other students from around the world. Smallface became friends with a number of African graduate students and became quite interested in the politics of decolonization. It was the University's Dean of Women, Mary Saretta Sparling, however, who first suggested that she join Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) to do work in Africa.

Smallface began her first term with CUSO in 1966, working at a girl's camp in Zambia's Northern Province, near Lake Tanganyika, but later moved south to the capital, Lusaka. There she worked with an Indian official, evaluating Zambia's UNESCO-sponsored literacy program. At the time, Lusaka was a major centre for anti-colonial activism in Africa. Independent Zambia's first leader, President Kenneth Kaunda, adopted a philosophy of “African Socialism” (similar to that of Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Zambia's north-eastern neighbour) and maintained an outward looking policy which supported decolonization and African liberation. Having gained independence in 1964, Zambia remained nearly surrounded by Africa's remaining colonial and Apartheid strongholds: Angola, Rhodesia, Mozambique, and South West Africa. While hesitant to allow foreign combatants inside the country (fearing an invasion by the White-supremacist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa), Kaunda allowed a variety of anti-colonial organizations to base their headquarters near Lake Tanganyika, but later moved south to the capital, Lusaka. There she worked with an Indian official, evaluating Zambia's UNESCO-sponsored literacy program. At the time, Lusaka was a major centre for anti-colonial activism in Africa. Independent Zambia's first leader, President Kenneth Kaunda, adopted a philosophy of “African Socialism” (similar to that of Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Zambia's north-eastern neighbour) and maintained an outward looking policy which supported decolonization and African liberation. Having gained independence in 1964, Zambia remained nearly surrounded by Africa's remaining colonial and Apartheid strongholds: Angola, Rhodesia, Mozambique, and South West Africa. While hesitant to allow foreign combatants inside the country (fearing an invasion by the White-supremacist regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa), Kaunda allowed a variety of anti-colonial organizations to base their headquarters

13 Marie Smallface's social circle also contained members of Students for a Democratic Society, but the Club International became more important to her personally. Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
14 While a Nigerian friend from Club International suggested she try to find a placement in his country, this proved difficult or impossible, perhaps because of the 1966 military coup and the lead-up to the Nigerian Civil War. Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
15 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
out of Zambia and even set up a “Liberation Center” for their work in the Kamwala area of Lusaka.\textsuperscript{16} When Marie Smallface arrived in Lusaka, the city (and particularly the expatriate community) was filled with anti-colonial excitement. She made contacts with numerous activists and eventually married Jacob Marule, a member of South Africa’s African National Congress who was working out of Lusaka.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, Zambia's solidarity with foreign African liberation movements demonstrated the ability of those with some degree of power and independence to aid those with less. The country was also a prominent member of the international anti-colonial Non-Aligned Movement; Lusaka hosted the third Non-Aligned Movement conference in 1970, at which Kaunda was elected the organization's chairperson.\textsuperscript{18} These policies may well have influenced Smallface-Marule's later expectations about the responsibilities of Indigenous peoples in wealthy countries with regards to their allies around the world in more desperate situations.

While abroad, she travelled to Tanzania and became particularly intrigued by Nyerere's ideas of “African Socialism.”

He accepted the fact of the communalism of most of their tribal nations. (...) He believed that you couldn't bring in Marxism to such nations of people, that you had to base their development on their own language, their own culture, their own heritage. That's where you develop... from there. To use their natural cooperation tendency to bring about change (...) building from the communities upwards as opposed to imposing... \textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{17} Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{18} Hatch, 231.
\textsuperscript{19} Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
For Smallface-Marule, this respect for culture and tradition while pursuing decolonization held great promise for her own people as well, and she would soon help convince George Manuel of the importance of an equivalent Indigenous philosophy to guide his politics.

After two terms with CUSO and four years in Africa, Marie Smallface-Marule returned to Canada in the fall of 1970, while Jacob Marule spent time at the agricultural centre in Kentville, Nova Scotia. With a recommendation from Harold Cardinal, George Manuel agreed to hire Smallface-Marule to the small staff of the National Indian Brotherhood in Ottawa.²⁰ She had the academic background that Manuel lacked, and held strong political ideals. They got along well; he would soon consider her “the backbone of the NIB”²¹ and, within a few years, his “closest political colleague.”²² In the acknowledgements to his Indigenous political manifesto, he specifically credits her as “the first person to be able to show me, from direct and personal experience, the close relationship and common bonds between our own condition as Indian people, and the struggles of other aboriginal peoples and the nations of the Third World.”²³

Smallface-Marule also had acquired a number of contacts through CUSO, through her time in Africa, and through her husband, all of whom would continue to influence the political direction of her friend and employer, George Manuel. The Marules hosted regular parties at their home and invited Marie's co-workers as well as various guests from around the world, particularly African diplomats and students. Manuel mentions these parties in his

²⁰ Officially, Smallface-Marule was hired on as a secretary (in January 1971) since that was the only position for which the NIB had funding, but by April 1971, she was the Brotherhood's Executive Director. McFarlane, 129
²¹ George Manuel Diaries (hereafter GMD), 10 April 1972.
²² GMD, 1 February 1976.
1971 diary, and although he does not explicitly state their effect on his political thinking, their growing influence is quite clear. In Manuel's report to the NIB General Assembly in July 1971, he makes references to African demands for *Uhuru* (freedom).\(^{24}\) For Manuel, African demands for decolonization now seemed relevant to his demands for Indigenous rights in Canada. Smallface-Marule (and the friends Manuel made through her) had begun to re-frame his political philosophy from the perspective of the blossoming “Third-Worldist” movement of the time. It may have been George Manuel's meeting with *Māori* activists that made him first consider the possibility of an Indigenous international organization, but it was Mbuto Milando, the Executive Secretary of the Tanzanian High Commission and a good friend of the Marules, who would suggest an appropriate context: the links of solidarity between Indigenous peoples could best be described as the “Fourth World.”\(^{25}\)

The forging of these ideological connections only intensified after George Manuel's next international trip: in early December, he found himself with his assistant Ron Shackleton on a flight to Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. Jean Chretien, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, had initially been invited as Canada's delegate to the tenth anniversary of Tanganyikan independence, but Smallface-Marule had worked her contacts in the High Commission to secure an extra place for Manuel.\(^{26}\) Chretien was forced to back out for unrelated reasons, leaving Manuel and Shackleton as Canada's sole official delegates, earning them VIP treatment in Dar Es Salaam. Like other guests, they were provided with a

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\(^{24}\) McFarlane, 134-135.
\(^{25}\) Manuel and Posluns, xvi. McFarlane, 160.
\(^{26}\) McFarlane, 108-119, 161. Chretien and Manuel had recently faced off over the former's controversial 1969 White Paper which aimed to eliminate any special status for Indigenous people in Canada. Manuel had helped form the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs in response to the proposals, which were discarded in the face of strong opposition. Tanganyika, having achieved independence in 1961, united with Zanzibar to form Tanzania in 1974.
show of Tanzanian developments since independence: exhibits on manufacturing, agriculture, and livestock; a “school display of gymnastics at the Dar Es Salaam National Stadium” featuring thousands of Tanzanian children; and an impressive military parade. They were invited to a presidential reception, where they first saw President Julius Nyerere as well as Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda, and another reception hosted by local members of CUSO. Smallface-Marule believes that the “whole experience also cemented our friendship because [Manuel] realized all the things I'd said about my experiences there and my interests in Nyerere and his philosophies. His African socialist thoughts were something I held very dearly and George became very interested in that as well.” He would later acknowledge that he “did not really appreciate the identification between our [Indigenous] situation and that of the Third World Peoples... until I went to Tanzania.” On December 11, Manuel had a personal meeting with President Nyerere at his Presidential Palace in Oyster Bay, where he informed him that the Indians of Canada subscribe to the 1957 statement of Nkrumah that Ghana's independence is incomplete until all of Africa is free and Nyerere['s] statement that Africans are not Europeans, cannot be Europeans, and do not want to be Europeans.

The logic behind Manuel's choice of quotes to reference in his brief meeting is unmistakeable. Firstly, these were philosophies of African anti-colonialism, as expressed by two of its most formidable spokesmen, Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah and Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. Secondly, however, Manuel must have felt these were the anti-

27 GMD, 7-9 December 1971.
28 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
29 Manuel and Posluns, 244. Manuel points out that his children had repeatedly tried to draw that connection for him, suggesting that a younger generation was perhaps more open to such a comparison.
30 GMD, 11 December 1971.
31 Under Kwame Nkrumah's leadership, the Gold Coast to be the first African colony to gain independence (as Ghana). He promoted not just Pan-African cooperation, but favoured the immediate liberation and union of all African states. Julius Nyerere helped lead Tanganyika to independence, and was also a staunch
colonial ideas which applied most directly to Indigenous peoples around the world. Like Africans, all Indigenous peoples had an obligation to help each other secure the self-determination of their Indigenous brothers and sisters. Like Africans, Indigenous peoples rejected the assimilationist policies imposed upon them by colonial governments. That Nkrumah was referring to the obligation of the formally independent to aid others seeking such independence (a situation quite different from that of Indigenous peoples), and that Nyerere was referring to a non-alignment and alternative economic models rather than to a conscious rejection of cultural assimilation, is beside the point. Manuel had taken their ideas of decolonization and Third-Worldism and reformulated them into his own vision: a second wave of decolonization and the Fourth World.

George Manuel's visit made the front page of the national daily newspaper, *The Standard*, and the article makes his desires quite explicit. He asserts that the “the objectives of his movement are akin to those of Tanzania” and that a “reason for our visit is to consult with other members of the Third World and to learn from whatever they are doing to solve their problems.”32 Upon his return to Canada, Manuel spent time reading Nyerere's book, *Uhuru Na Ujamaa (Freedom and Socialism)*, and commented in his diary that it “is very enlightening and I am getting many good ideas from it. They have identical problems as Indians.”33 His positive impression of Nyerere seems to have held firmly in his mind for quite

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32 “Canada Red Indians seek ties with us”, *The Standard*, 13 December 1971. McFarlane details the political fallout for Canada resulting from this interview and Manuel's other negative comments about the Canadian government while in Tanzania. McFarlane, 163-4.

33 GMD, 5 January 1972
some time. Manuel's comments, following a family trip to the local drive-in cinema the
following April, demonstrate both the personal relevance of his trip to Tanzania, and his
ability to weave together different stories in his mind which could inform and inspire his
political efforts:

I am very restless these days. So much is going through my mind.
The show I seen [sic] last night “The Ten Commandments” at the
Britannia Drive-In Theatre in Ottawa. The story of the show
described how Moses freed his people the Hebrews from the
Egyptian bondage. The story described the deep belief he had that no
man should be a slave or servant to another, no matter what color of
skin he had as long as he is a human being. It brought memories back
of my visit in Tanzania, East Africa with President Julius Nyerere and
his philosophy that no man should be subjected by another no matter
for what purpose. It also reminded me of how the white race has
subjected the Indians of North America and all the people of the
world to slavery and oppression. We are fighting back and will
continue. 

Rodrigo Contreras, who would later work with the WCIP, remembers George Manuel's
lasting impression of the visit. Manuel's inspiration by and keen affinity for Nyerere
contrasted with his disappointment with other leaders in Africa. This is confirmed in
Manuel's diary entries—as late as 1975, he writes:

34 GMD, 8-9 April 1972. In his book on the Third World, Vijay Prashad notes the strong influence that Julius
Nyerere had on George Manuel, but points out that the influence was not so strong in reverse: “Nyerere's
consideration for this Canadian Native leader did not extend to the Barabaig, a cattle-herding clan of the
Datoga community, who moved across Tanzania at will. In 1968 Nyerere's regime removed the Barabaig
from their homelands. It was the kind of displacement that had become commonplace in the South, and it
is precisely what had spurred the independent political organizing among those who would seize on the
category of the indigenous, join the WCIP, and work through the channels opened up by the UN.” Vijay
35 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
I went to Carleton University. I lectured political science students from Trinidad West Indies on my political observations of the Third World liberation freedom fighters who have become nationalist bourgeoisie in their respective countries, excepting Julius Nyerere [of] Tanzania. I had some of the students up in arms, but I held my own with no problem.36

Nearly a decade after his trip to Africa, George Manuel had maintained his faith in Nyerere and gave a 20-day tour of British Columbia's Indigenous peoples to Anthony Hokororo, Acting High Commissioner of Tanzania in March 1982. In a diary entry recorded on that trip, he muses,

The Indians of BC and the Tanzanian people have a common history of being colonized by the English. Our experience of being exploited, deprived, leaves the scars of poverty. Our common struggle for freedom from poverty for a common purpose is the idea of exchange of our people.37

George Manuel's growing friendship with Marie Smallface-Marule and her husband Jacob also seems to have provided an ongoing reminder of the links between African anti-colonialism and Indigenous peoples' struggle. This connection was expressed implicitly in his diary the day after a party at the Marules' home in March 1972. Manuel records reading about the African National Congress and describing the “waning political strength of Imperialism due to the committed resistance of anti-imperialists all over the world, including North American Indians, as part of the oppressed race by Imperialist philosophy and principal.”38

36 GMD, 30 June 1976.
37 GMD, 2-21 March 1972.
38 GMD, 19 March 1972.
2.1.2 International Support for a Growing Network of Indigenous Peoples

George Manuel's links with the international community grew enormously during his trip to Sweden for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in June 1972, where he served as an adviser to the Canadian Government delegation. Smallface-Marule had secured Manuel's invitation through James MacDonald, head of the Canadian Labour Congress. Manuel attended partly out of concern that environmental destruction was “a threat to the very existence of the culture and way of life” of Indigenous peoples, but also to promote Indigenous rights in Europe and with all members of the United Nations. After arriving in Stockholm, Manuel learned that there were “a number of Indians from both Canada and the United States but [they] are not organized together. They are here individually presenting their local problems to an international conference.” He managed to meet with some Hopi delegates from Oraibi, Arizona, but was disappointed in his failure to co-ordinate the “Indian program” with the American Indians attending the conference. He did, however, make other contacts.

Jacob Marule, who was also in Stockholm, arranged two meetings for Manuel at local embassies. First, he met Tanzanian Michael Lukumbuzya (who was then serving as Ambassador to Sweden but would soon become the High Commissioner to Canada) and

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39 Owing partly to a boycott of the UNCHE Stockholm Conference by the Soviet bloc, leaders of “Third World” governments took a particularly prominent role, contesting Western critiques of industrial development as environmentally damaging. Adil Najam, “Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to Participation to Engagement,” *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 5:3 (2005), 307-309. Manuel not only attended Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s speech which claimed that “poverty is the worst form of pollution,” but also witnessed the “extreme heated debate” and the clear lines of conflict, nothing that “Third World” delegates “appear to be the only ones pushing for and debating for amendments.” Unfortunately, his thoughts on the content of the debate were not recorded in his diary. GMD, 8 & 14 June 1972.
40 McFarlane, 166.
41 GMD, 4 June 1972.
42 GMD, 6 & 10 June 1972.
discussed “the political development of the third world.” Manuel also visited the Chinese Embassy, and talked about a possible NIB Executive Council tour of the People's Republic of China. Certainly, his interest in Third-Worldism and the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement remained strong, but it was a surprising alliance with locals that may have helped broaden his understanding of the word “Indigenous.” A Copenhagen-based organization of anthropologists, the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), together with a Swedish journalist helped organize a meeting between Manuel and some Sámi people in Northern Sweden. A seven-seat propeller plane took him 1,000 km north to the Sámi community of Rensjön, where he was greeted by Chief Johan Kuhmunen and others. They agreed to “exchange legal and political information on aboriginal rights” and to participate in the planning of an International Indigenous Peoples Conference. If the pale, often blonde, Sámi were to be involved, then international Indigenous politics could not be framed as a simple issue of “race”—it was about domination by outsiders, regardless of skin colour. This connection is certainly reminiscent of shift of the pre-war Pan-Africanists towards participation in the meetings of Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization or the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1950s and 60s, and the realization of a shared experience of imperialism across imperial, ethnic, or geographic boundaries. In his history of that movement, Colin Legum notes that Black Pan-Africanists “found political expression in associations with peoples of other colours and indeed, also with Europeans who have been

43 GMD, 11 & 13 June 1972.
44 GMD, 13 June 1972
45 GMD, 8 & 9 June 1972. Also present for the trip were Manuel's assistant, Jamie Deacey; Gun Leanders, the journalist who helped arrange the trip, Ake Malmstrom; and a legal consultant for the Sámi, Tomas Cramer. McFarlane, 166-9.
willing to identify themselves with their struggle for emancipation.” Or as Kofi Baako, Ghana's Minister of Defence, stated in discussing Nkrumahism, “Anti-Imperialism knows no colour.” While there is no evidence that Manuel consciously modelled his own movement after this mindset, it seems reasonable that it may have affected him. Manuel's continued relationship with African diplomats, and most recently, with Chinese ones, may well have encouraged Manuel to put aside any biases he may have had, and look for allies where other Indigenous activists had not.

This budding idea of an International Indigenous Peoples Conference received quite a mixed response from “First World” allies. Both Leftists and academics (and especially leftist academics) were quite supportive, perhaps none more so than Helge Kleivan of the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. When IWGIA was formed at the 38th International Congress of Americanists, most of its members were concerned with the violent atrocities then being committed in South America at that time. Helge Kleivan, a Norwegian anthropologist and, from 1973 onward, a professor of Eskimology at the University of Copenhagen, had been instrumental in setting up the organization, and sought to encourage anthropologists to take on a greater role in advocacy for the peoples they studied.

47 Ibid., 41.
48 The press release announcing the organization's establishment mentions the “wholesale extermination of Indian tribes” in Brazil, the bombing of Indian villages in Peru, the decimation of the Bari people and Yuko peoples near the Colombia-Venezuela border. Dahl also mentions that a 1963 massacre of Cinta Larga people in Matto Grosso, Brazil, only made public in 1967, was particularly upsetting to its founding members. Jens Dahl, IWGIA: A History (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2009), 22-24.
association with fellow professors Peter Aaby and Robert Petersen, he helped organize the 1973 Arctic Peoples’ Conference. Sámi, Dene, and Inuit peoples from various countries within the Arctic region gathered in Copenhagen in November, and for some, it was Kleivan that introduced them to the idea of capital-i Indigenous peoples. On 16 June 1972, following the UN Conference on the Human Environment, George Manuel travelled to Copenhagen and met with Helge Kleivan to discuss the possibility of organizing a World Conference of Indigenous Peoples the following year. Receiving an enthusiastic response, Manuel met with Kleivan again the following day to begin planning. IWGIA would later help host the second preparatory meeting for the conference, would negotiate financial support for the conference itself, and when the WCIP nearly collapsed from bankruptcy in its first few years, IWGIA again helped negotiate crucial funding.

From Copenhagen, Manuel travelled to London, England where he met with Colonel J. R. Patrick Montgomery of the Anti-Slavery Society. In his diary, Manuel noted that the Anti-Slavery Association was planning a conference of its own on the issue of Indigenous peoples, and Montgomery suggested there should not be a duplicate effort. Others that became involved with the conference, including Marie Smallface-Marule, Rodrigo Contreras

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50 Dahl, 38
51 GMD, 16-17 June 1972.
52 In the form of a “small grant from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA).” Dahl, 30.
53 In this case, the funding came from Norway. Marie Smallface-Marule, “A Tribute to Helge Kleivan,” Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), WCIP Fonds, 9349, (hereafter WCIPF), Vol. 20.21, WCIP Newsletter (February 1984), 1.
and Sam Deloria, remember Manuel's oral account of the meeting as somewhat more irritated. “Their colonial attitudes toward him were really annoying to George,” recalls Smallface-Marule. “They basically told him that we weren't capable of organizing such an event, that really, they should do it for us.” Sam Deloria remembers being told that the Anti-Slavery Society said they “had it all under control, so since the Indigenous peoples were totally lacking in organizational skill, [Manuel] should just go home and rest assured that everything was taken care of. He accepted that with some amusement and proceeded ahead.” At his next stop in Geneva, Switzerland, Manuel met with representatives of the World Council Churches (WCC) to discuss the possibility of the NIB seeking Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) status at the UN, and to seek support for a World Conference of Indigenous Peoples. They felt the possibility of NGO status was excellent, and offered to “go as far as co-sponsor the [conference] and absorb a large share of the cost.”

Certain Canadian and American groups were helpful as well. Manuel met regularly throughout the 1970s with Pat Kerwin and Jim MacDonald of the Canadian Labour Congress, who helped provide support for Manuel's vision of Indigenous internationalism.

Marie Smallface-Marule's CUSO contacts were also useful; a friend from the organization

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55 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
56 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
57 The representatives were American Rev. Dwain C. Epps and Nawaz Dawood. Dawood seems to have studied at the University of Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, which might explain his presence as a contact, or it could be coincidence. GMD, 19 June 1972. The WCC had already endorsed the idea of Indigenous liberation by supporting the 1971 Declaration of Barbados for the Liberation of the Indians, the result of an anthropological conference (organized by the Ethnology Department of the University of Berne) in Bridgetown, Barbados, 25-30 January 1971. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, *Indians of the Americas: Human Rights and Self-Determination* (London: Zed, 1984), 60. For a collection of symposium papers and the Barbados Declaration itself, see Walter Dostal (ed.), *The Situation of the Indian in South America: Contributions to the Study of Inter-Ethnic Conflict in the Non-Andean Regions of South America* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1972).
58 Diaries of George Manuel, 1971-1976

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had married an Ecuadorian (Rodrigo Contreras) who was requested to help with translations
and seeking Indigenous contacts in Central and South America.\(^{59}\) Contreras continued
working with the WCIP, on and off, for most of its existence. University of British Columbia
law professor Douglas Sanders was also incredibly supportive and helpful. In October 1974,
Manuel attended a Third World Peoples Conference, organized by the Commission on Justice
and Liberation of the US National Council of Churches, that seemed to have further
influenced his thoughts on neo-colonialism.\(^{60}\)

2.1.3 Support from the Third World

Third-Worldist leaders were perhaps limited by their ability and interests from
offering large-scale support for this second wave of decolonization, but there was some
amount of practical support, particularly through the United Nations system. In August 1972,
the General Assembly of Manuel's National Indian Brotherhood officially endorsed the idea
that the organization should seek NGO status with the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC).\(^{61}\) The timing could not have been better. In 1965, the ECOSOC Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities had launched
the “Special Study on Racial Discrimination in the Political, Economic, Social and Cultural
Spheres” and a resulting report by Special Rapporteur Hernan Santa Cruz included a chapter
on discrimination against Indigenous populations.\(^{62}\) This led the Sub-Commission to request

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59 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011. Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June
2010.
60 GMD, 30 September – 2 October 1974.
61 Doug Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, 11. At the same meeting, the
NIB agreed to sponsor an “Indigenous Peoples World Conference.” The application to gain ECOSOC
status for the NIB was, from the beginning, completed with the intention of transferring that status to an
Indigenous international organization, should one be created in the future. GMD, 10 Aug. 1972.
I, Chapter I, 12. United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Sub-Commission on Prevention of
a more extensive “Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations” in 1971. Although it came to be known as the Martínez Cobo Report, much of the writing was done by Augusto Willemsen-Díaz, a young lawyer from Guatemala who had also written the aforementioned chapter in Hernan Santa Cruz's report.63 While working on the study, Willemsen-Díaz came to realize the lack of Indigenous representation at the UN, including in the Sub-Commission that had launched an investigation into their situation, and struggled to convince Indigenous leaders to participate at the UN.64 It was into this environment that the NIB was submitting its bid for NGO status, the first application from an Indigenous organization, and delegates from the Third World rallied in support.

In February 1974, when George Manuel appeared at an ECOSOC meeting in New York to defend his organization's request, he recalls in his diary that he was

...questioned harshly by developed nation representatives on our reasons for our application for membership. There was a very heavy debate with the developed nation’s delegates rejecting our application and with the Third World Nations strongly debating on our behalf and supporting the view that we were the only ones that could possibly represent our unique problems...65

64 Willemsen-Díaz, 20.
65 GMD, 6 February 1974. He received written confirmation that the NIB had been granted roster status on 13 June 1974. According to Rodrigo Contreras, Manuel became skeptical of the minimal advantages that were gained by ECOSOC roster status, and looked forward to gaining the status of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which had been awarded a special observer seat in the UN General Assembly in November 1974. When he was told roster status gave him “a window” to the United Nations, Manuel replied, “No, I want to [enter] by the door.” Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010. At the founding WCIP conference in 1975, Sam Deloria cynically pointed out that the NIB shared roster status with such lowly organizations as the International Federation of Pedestrians (1971) and the International Federation of Beekeepers' Associations (1972). Ha-Shilth-Sa (newspaper), 4 December 1975.
Occasionally, support from the Third-Worldist movement was even more direct. In July 1973, IWGIA was invited to host the first preparatory meeting for the conference, but instead that first historic meeting took place in Georgetown, Guyana.  

Why was the first global meeting of Indigenous Peoples organized in Guyana? The country's foreign policy at the time was well suited to fostering a second wave of anti-colonialism. After the country gained independence, Guyana's first Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham, had pushed through a series of measures to identify his government more clearly with the Non-Aligned Movement. In 1972, in preparation for hosting the first Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, a group of Wai-Wai were hired to build a 55ft-tall version of their traditional thatched roof hut (benab) in the centre of Georgetown. Known as the Umana Yana, the building would serve as a venue for both the Non-Aligned Conference, but also for the WCIP preparatory meeting two years later. That the Guyanese government had mobilized the country's Indigenous population as a symbol of an anti-colonial philosophy in 1972 may help explain the desire to support the foundation of an Indigenous international organization.

The Guyanese High Commissioner to Canada at the time, Robert Moore, was a friend of Marie Smallface-Marule and he seemed agreeable to hosting a preparatory meeting in Georgetown. The country's Foreign Minister, Shridath Ramphal, (soon to be Secretary-General of the Commonwealth of Nations) was also involved early on. Smallface-Marule was sent to Guyana in the fall of 1973 to negotiate the arrangements, and while the results of her trip were “positive in every respect” they were now faced with the task of securing the

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67 Smallface-Marule also visited Columbia and Ecuador to seek out Indigenous contacts for the meeting. Smallface-Marule, personal interviews, 26 May 2011; 13 June 2012; GMD, 8 August 1973.
necessary funding for the preparatory meeting. Later in December, Smallface-Marule and Manuel visited the Tanzanian High Commission in the hopes of a meeting with President Muammar Gaddafi to secure funding, but this seems to have been for the NIB rather than for the World Council. Again the following month, an NIB think tank meeting proposed that they should “contact and solicit support from third world countries” for a hypothetical Canadian Indian nation. No explicit talk of seeking financial support from Third-Worldist leadership for an international Indigenous meeting appears on record, but if such funding had been provided to the NIB, it seems likely that Manuel would have spent it on his international vision as well.

Instead, they turned to the Canadian Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The NIB received a poor response, possibly because relations were somewhat strained at that point over a “nasty letter the Hon. Jean Chretien, Minister of DIAND wrote and hand delivered to [Manuel]” after a speech Smallface-Marule had delivered in Toronto criticizing the Canadian government. Stu Igliasias, the Special Assistant to Hugh Faulkner (then Secretary of State for Canada), was more impressed with the plan for a conference, yet government funding was still not secured. Eventually, it was church groups, including the World Council of Churches, that would pay for the Georgetown meeting. Although the bulk of funds came from these religious organizations, the meeting received enthusiastic support.

70 GMD, 10 January 1973.
71 After the meeting had occurred and the WCIP had been established, however, Manuel, Smallface-Marule, and others did meet with a Mohammad Maharume to discuss “the possibility of funding the World Council of Indigenous Peoples from one or some of the Arab countries.” GMD, 6 March 1976.
73 GMD, 6 December 1973.
from numerous Guyanese government officials, including opening speeches by the Ministers of Interior Affairs and Economic Development, a tour of Indigenous areas led by Philip Duncan, an Indigenous Minister of State, and a reception by Prime Minister Burnham.\textsuperscript{75} Notably, the Guyanese government housed all the visiting delegates and observers at the Pegasus Hotel, directly across the street from the \textit{Umana Yana} hut mentioned above, which served to host some of their meetings.\textsuperscript{76}

After the founding WCIP conference, the World Council's executive tended to focus on Indigenous rights without frequent references to decolonization in Africa or Asia, the Non-Aligned Movement or Third-Worldism. Yet the World Council leadership seems to have recognized that the plans for a New International Economic Order (NIEO)—a Third-Worldist vision for an international system of trade that ostensibly favoured “developing countries”\textsuperscript{77}—were not \textit{necessarily} consistent with the interests of the world's Indigenous peoples.

Developing countries, once colonies of the technological and industrial powers, have become the consumers of the future and seek to institute a second industrial revolution by ravaging tribal areas to which indigenous peoples have been moved. The last frontier on earth is now the last home and territories of indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{78}

In 1979, WCIP delegates presented a paper at the Northwest Regional Conference on the Emerging International Economic Order, which proposed modifications to the NIEO to

\textsuperscript{75} GMD, 5-12 April 1974. Duncan would visit Canada later that year and was hosted by Indigenous leadership in Ottawa and Winnipeg. GMD, 26-31 July 1974.
\textsuperscript{76} Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 13 June 2012; GMD, 5-12 April 1974.
guarantee Indigenous sovereignty, land and resource rights.\textsuperscript{79} This new wave of decolonization had begun to distinguish itself from the first.

\textbf{2.2 Third-Worldism and International Indian Treaty Council}

The other major international Indigenous group, the International Indian Treaty Council, was quite different from the WCIP, likely because it had a rather different beginning. It roots lie in the radical American Indian Movement, which was founded in 1968 and focused its attention on local protests against the American government and the Bureau of Indian Affairs.\textsuperscript{80} It was Jimmie Durham, an unregistered Tsalagi sculptor living in Geneva, Switzerland, who brought an international focus to AIM in the mid-1970s.

Durham had been an Indigenous activist in the Southwestern United States in the 1950s and early 1960s, but described himself as “a naive resister,' not knowing how or what to resist.”\textsuperscript{81} Discharged after a brief stint in the US Navy but losing hope in the progress of his efforts as an activist, he moved to Europe in 1968.\textsuperscript{82} He enrolled in \textit{L'Ecole des Beaux Arts} in Geneva and his wife worked for the World Council of Churches, but he spent a great deal of time socializing with UN workers and delegates.\textsuperscript{83} Among these delegates were those


\textsuperscript{81} Rhonda Meier, “Re-Membering the Colonial Present: Jimmie Durham's Serious Dance” (MA Thesis, Concordia University, 1999), 10.

\textsuperscript{82} Jimmie Durham. \textit{Columbus Day: Poems, Drawings and Stories about American Indian Life and Death in the Nineteen-Seventies} (West End Press, 1983), 5.

\textsuperscript{83} Meier, 11. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010. Unfortunately, none of the interviews or writings that Durham has published includes the name of this wife in Geneva or her precise
representing African liberation organizations; Durham associated with Amilcar Cabral (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), members of the African National Congress (ANC) and the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and other African nationalists.\textsuperscript{84} It was through this contact with anti-colonial activists that Durham was struck by the obvious comparison: AIM was also a decolonization movement and the United States was a colonizer.\textsuperscript{85} In the early 1970s, his analysis was clearly conscious of anti-colonial struggles: “We are, by every criterion, colonized \textit{nations of people}, whose culture is not Western.”\textsuperscript{86}

Following the armed conflict between AIM members and US law enforcement at Wounded Knee in 1973, the United States' National Council of Churches sent Durham and his wife to visit the Pine Ridge Reservation and investigate how they might help.\textsuperscript{87} As AIM members saw it, it was the international attention that Wounded Knee received which helped prevent more violence by the US government. “We got telegrams and letters of support from all over the world at the same time which helped to raise our awareness that there were other people struggling to free themselves from some form of colonization.”\textsuperscript{88} With this in mind, Durham pitched the idea of an international Indigenous non-governmental role at the World Council of Churches.

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85 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010.
87 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010
organization to members of AIM, who agreed to organize a conference with this intended purpose.

The resulting International Indian Treaty Conference was held from 8-16 June 1974 at the Chief Gall Resort, a small motel, conference centre and campground on the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation. The meeting included a number of prominent guest speakers, including Princeton professor of international law Richard Falk, and South African expatriate anti-apartheid lawyer and Amnesty International board member Joel Carleson. While AIM spokesmen had previously announced an expectation of 2,000 participants for the conference, the exact number that arrived and from where they came is difficult to surmise.

An article in the Billings Daily Gazette on the second day of the conference mentions that about 200 people had arrived the first day but Durham asserts the total attendees was around four thousand. Media access was restricted by police, who also set up road blocks and recorded license plates in the area during the first day of the conference. The geographic origin of the guests does not seem to have been published in any public source. The official

89 Chicago Tribune, 9 June 1974; David Hauser, The Only True America: Following the Trail of Lewis and Clark, (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2000), 151.
94 Dunbar-Ortiz mentions the presence of “intensely radicalized Mapuche Indian exiles from Pinochet's Chile.” The quantity and geographic origin of international attendees is described very differently by other scholars but I have found no reputable contemporary source that offers a detailed account the geographical areas of participation. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2005), 34.
declaration from the conference asserts only that delegates “represented 97 Indian tribes and Nations from across North and South America.”

2.3 A Different View of Decolonization and Internationalism

Needless to say, the first International Indian Treaty Conference was a very different affair than the first World Conference of Indigenous peoples. The meeting was less formal and more radical; it was overshadowed by a hostile police presence; and participation does not appear to have extended beyond the Americas. Born of the conflict between AIM's 1960s American radicalism and the US government's Counter Intelligence Program, the Treaty Council had a far more militant edge than the World Council, and it was far more focused on the issues of the United States. The IITC was initially meant to serve as the international wing of AIM, not as an independent organization. The Treaty Council's immediate goal was to pursue “independent nation status for the Sioux nation (as defined in the 1868 US-Sioux Treaty).”

The official declaration from the 1974 conference, announced that the IITC would set up offices in Washington, D.C. and New York city in order to use “the international forces necessary to obtain the recognition of our treaties” and to serve as an information source “concerning issues, developments and any legislative attempt affecting Native Nations by the United States of America.” At least initially, the organization made little pretence of representing Indigenous peoples outside the USA.

The founders were not unsympathetic to the concerns of other Indigenous peoples however, and they expected their main strategy to yield positive results elsewhere: “the

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96 Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 33.
97 IITC, “Declaration of Continuing Independence.”
presence of one Indian nation in the UN system would set the necessary precedent for others.”98 The founding declaration also calls for the end of “all colonial governments” and pledges “assistance to all other sovereign people who seek their own independence.”99 A statement of solidarity with “the colonized Puerto Rican People in their struggle for Independence” is likely a nod to Third-Worldism, despite the fact that Independence was also being sought from the United States in that case.100 Subsequent IITC conferences included guests from liberation organizations like the Zimbabwe African National Union, and a representative of the pro-independence Puerto Rican Socialist Party.101 Durham's knowledge of and interest in Third Worldism needed time to spread throughout the Treaty Council's membership.

Nevertheless, the goal was to make use of the international system, and the language and ideas of decolonization, to achieve specific goals related to the United States. Durham felt the Council's goal was “to find a way for the Indians of the two Americas to work together without forming an organization.”102 He was wary, however, of anything more than expressions of solidarity with other Indigenous peoples, particularly outside the Western hemisphere, which he worried might cost him the support of the Third World.

Then there began to be the idea of Fourth World People. I saw it as one of the most urgent things to fight. We were not for indigenous rights; we were not for indigenous peoples; we were not for Fourth World peoples – we were only for the rights of say, the Cherokee Nation or the Iroquois Confederacy as a nation of people. As soon as

98 Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 34.
99 IITC, “Declaration of Continuing Independence.”
100 Ibid.
101 Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 35.
we allowed ourselves to be connected to indigenous peoples worldwide, we would have lost any support from the African countries that we needed in the UN. They didn't want to hear about their own indigenous people in their own countries, they automatically would say: “this is part of some primitivism that England has put all of us in. (...) Part of our decolonization process is to get away from that primitivism.” That's what all the African countries were on about in the sixties and seventies. To get away from tribalism and to get away from people as defined as part of the land. I was afraid we would lose that support completely... 103

Durham was undoubtedly influenced by the first wave of decolonization, and aimed to use its successes to work towards a second wave, starting in the “internal colonies” of the United States. Yet he chose to adopt the rhetoric and philosophies of the movement only so far as they were of practical benefit, but placed his hope in the international area as the best chance to achieve Indigenous decolonization. The increased number of post-colonial states in the UN General Assembly had created a substantial power shift in that arena. Durham would stress this latter point with Treaty Council members, encouraging bridge-building with members of the Non-Aligned Movement, who held a majority at the UN, rather than with Western States. 104 Perhaps more realist than idealist, he was willing to put on a variety of faces to gain the allies he needed at the UN and the support he needed at home:

I said this to this group and this to that group, trying to get someone to be on our side. I got known as a kind of Soviet style communist for a while, just because I saw the Soviets were willing to help us in the UN in a certain way. They controlled a lot of little parts of the UN. They really needed to know that what we wanted was socialism in the US and not decolonisation of the Cherokee nation. So, to them I said, “yes of course, our problem is class in the US, absolutely, there's no question, we don't want a thousand independent little nations, with our own passports and our own post offices.” I wasn't lying, that isn't what we want, 300 independent little groups of people, because the

103 Papastergiadis and Turney, 14.
104 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010.
US would just crush us. (...) By saying that to the Russians and the Poles, they became my best buddies. Then the Africans would ask about decolonisation. We would say, “yes here's our treaty we are some sort of independent nation, here the US has colonised us and we want to be independent of the US, we have the right and here is the treaty that proves we are some sort of independent nation just like you!” Then I would go back to the reservations, this reservation says it wants total independence from the US, the other one says – they want some tractors. I say, “yes, that's our struggle, our struggle is tractors!”

The strategy worked and the international community rallied to support the organization. On 10 February 1977, the IITC became the first Indigenous organization to secure “Category II” consultative status at ECOSOC, years before the WCIP would gain that privilege.105 The organization, mused Durham that year, might later apply for UN General Assembly non-member observer status, a category he described as being granted “to new countries...which have applied for membership and to liberation movements which look like they are winning something and/or which have the political backing from many countries.”106 Indigenous scholar Vine Deloria Jr. notes that “Durham did a remarkable job for the Treaty Council,” obtaining “sympathetic hearings for the Indian cause” from various United Nations member-states and forming friendships “with numerous staff people on the committees and subcommittees that were part of the vast United Nations administrative apparatus.”107 He suggests that the Treaty Council's origins in and focus on the United States may well have

105 University of New Mexico Center for South West Research (hereafter UNMCSWR), Roger A. Finzel American Indian Movement Papers, MSS 711 BC, Box 2, Folder 21, NGO/5, Committee on NGOs, 371st Meeting, United Nations Press Release, Committee Grants United Nations Consultative Status to Five Non-Governmental Organizations, 10 February 1977. Dunbar-Ortiz, Indians of the Americas, 33. While the WCIP effectively took over the National Indian Brotherhood's roster (observer) status soon after it was founded, it would not gain its own Category II status until 1981. Personal correspondence, ECOSOC Civil Society Network, 19 June 2012.
aided the organization: the “United Nations could hardly shunt aside an aggressive organization which sought to represent the indigenous peoples of the most powerful nation on earth.”

It seems likely that the Treaty Council's politics were more appealing to Socialist and Third-Worldist members of the UN, and international human rights organizations, than those of the WCIP. Membership in the World Council was based on national organizations, generally those recognized by state governments, like the National Indian Brotherhood in Canada, the National Congress of American Indians in the United States, or the Nordic Saami Council in Scandinavia. This left the World Council open to accusations of collusion with Western governments. Durham himself would accuse federally-recognized “tribal governments” in the United States of being, “[i]n the classic Third World model... a 'puppet' group of élites... completely subservient to the federal government.” As Sam Deloria sees it, “the scholarly community seemed pretty much in agreement that these guys [state-recognized Indigenous leaders] were sellouts, and the real Indians, the good Indians were the Treaty Council and AIM.” He sees the choice of the international human rights community to favour the IITC as one based in paternalistic or racist expectations:

the other groups fit more into the kind of Indians they were looking for – they wore feathers and they talked about the “four-leggeds” and they fit the spiritual mascot model that the world human rights community really wanted in Indigenous people.

108 Ibid.
110 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
111 Ibid.
Conversely, however, it may have been Durham's personal connections to diplomats and NGO leadership in Geneva which won their hearts. An associate from the Treaty Council, Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz asserts that “Jimmie was unique in that he was trusted and people [in Geneva] knew his politics... so he had some connections and they gave him the green light.”\footnote{Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010.} Durham himself felt that his time in Geneva and the connections he had made there taught him to speak the language of the international community which gave the IITC such an advantage: “I knew the vocabulary to speak. If I hadn't known it...I couldn't have gotten anywhere.”\footnote{Papastergiadis and Turney, 25.} For Durham, the struggle was to convince those within the UN system, as well as general Third-Worldist opinion, that the IITC's claims were legitimately subject to international law. He felt “Indigenous people” was just “a nonsense phrase” to describe “colonized people who are not officially colonized according to the UN standards of who is colonized.”\footnote{Indian Summer in Geneva: Indigenous peoples of the Americas at the United Nations, Kisos Films 1986} The UN standards he referred to are likely those contained in the “UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514)”, adopted in December 1960. This statement specifically promised that “[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”\footnote{UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples General Assembly Resolution, 1514 A/RES/1514 (XV).} This would seem to provide a precedent for Indigenous self-determination, had it not been quickly restricted by Resolution 1541 which defined a colony as “a territory which is geographically separate... from the country administering it” – the so-called “blue water” or “salt water”
thesis. And perhaps for this reason, Durham never felt that he could fully convince African ambassadors to the UN that Indigenous peoples could or should gain UN General Assembly status as independent states. In the end, he found more support from the American and European left, groups he consciously courted.

In April 1976, the Treaty Council convinced the United Nations' NGO Committee on Human Rights' Sub-Committee on Racism and De-colonization to hold a conference for Indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere. The IITC itself organized the “International NGO Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in the Americas” in Geneva for September 1977. Although the conference itself was a great success, uncomfortable situations were created, not just for World Council delegates (who were made to feel decidedly unwelcome), but also for Jimmy Durham. Organizers had attempted to secure international trips for delegates, following the meeting, to promote Indigenous rights around the world. Most of the funding came from the Eastern Bloc countries and from strong socialist parties in Western Europe. Despite opposition, Russell Means was adamant that he would accept an invitation from Idi Amin to visit Uganda. This lead Durham to resign from the IITC immediately prior to the conference, fearing for his reputation and that of the Treaty

116 This longstanding principle was unsuccessfully opposed in the 1950s by Belgian delegates to the UN who suggested (in what became known as the “Belgian thesis” that there was no reason to limit self-determination to overseas territories. Although the authors asserted concern for the rights of Indigenous peoples, one author, Ferdinand Van Langenhove, would later acknowledge that the thesis was a tactic to divert criticism of overseas colonies. Patrick Thornberry, “Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Oct. 1989), 874; “UN General Assembly Resolution Defining the Three Options for Self-determination General Assembly Resolution 1541,” A/RES/1541(XV).

117 Durham, A Certain Lack of Coherence, vii-viii. Durham seems to have had, however, a decent working relationship with Salim Ahmed Salim, Tanzania's ambassador to the UN during the 1970s, a prominent supporter of the Non-Aligned Movement, and later, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity. Papastergiadis and Turney, 13-15.

118 GMD, 23 September 1977.

119 Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010.
Council “in the eyes of progressive African leaders.”\textsuperscript{120} Although Durham did go back to run
the Treaty Council from its New York office, his return was short lived. Because of AIM’s
insistence on “grassroots” style of organizing and disdain for state-recognized tribal
governments, it lacked the organized base structure that the WCIP could rely on. From
Durham's point of view, this became a serious liability when, “[b]ecause of the poor level of
organization and lack of political development in AIM at its base, the international work [of
the IITC] became too large a part of the Movement's focus.”\textsuperscript{121} Feeling disillusioned from
political infighting, a lack of support from below, and the ever more determined personal
attacks from the US government, he resigned from the organization in 1979.\textsuperscript{122}

\textbf{2.4 Contrasting Visions of Indigenous Internationalism}

To draw useful lessons from the examination of these two organizations, we must
question whether what they were doing in the mid-1970s was really new. To some degree, it
was not new at all. In both Canada and the United States, there had always been Indigenous
leaders who saw their peoples as separate from nation states that surrounded them. Certainly,
the IITC’s effort to seek UN membership for the Sioux Nation had very similar precursors. As
noted in the introduction, Deskaheh had asserted in the 1920s that the Haudenosaunee were a
sovereign people. While noting that they were not formally requesting it, he declared that
they were “ready to accept for the purpose of this dispute, if invited, the obligation of
membership in the League of Nations.”\textsuperscript{123} In August 1956, Howard Barrett, Sr. (Tribal

\textsuperscript{120} Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, \textit{Blood on the Border}, 38.
\textsuperscript{121} Durham, “An Open Letter,” 53.
\textsuperscript{123} Levi General, “To the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands,” quoted in Ronald
Niezen, “Recognizing Indigenism: Canadian Unity and the International Movement of Indigenous
Chairman of the Confederated Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw) formally requested admittance to the United Nations, arguing that, because the United States had failed to ratify their 1855 treaty, any land contained in that document remained unceded. Yet the IITC offered differences in basic strategy, rather than goals. What Jimmie Durham realized was that

we had to go about international work much more strategically. We had to organize. We had to find the most stupid bureaucratic ways that is acceptable to the United Nations to the body of nations, to make an entry into international affairs. The only thing that was new to us was making that bureaucratic effort, making the organizational effort to spend years finding out how to be effective in international affairs.

For Durham, the first wave of decolonization had simply cleared a path for future secessions by Indigenous peoples to form independent states. At best, it could provide much needed allies in the Third World from whom assistance might be gained. In the 1980s and 90s, however, the Treaty Council broadened its vision and came to rely far more on other Indigenous allies. This may well have resulted from the increased space made available in the international arena by the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UN-WGIP), established in 1982. Durham's position shifted too after he left the organization as well; by 1985, he seemed more open to the idea of a formal alliance of Indigenous nations, and described dreams of...

...making a real organization of Indian nations...like the Organization of African States... that would work together economically. (...) What people are now learning in Nicaragua could be very useful to us in

124 David R.M. Beck, ““Standing out here in the surf”: the termination and restoration of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians of Western Oregon in historical perspective.” Oregon Historical Quarterly 110:1 (Spring 2009), 6.
Bolivia or in the United States. And of course in the international workings, it can be more effective as we continue working together.\textsuperscript{126}

The vision espoused by the World Council, however, was quite different from the start. Marie Smallface-Marule and George Manuel were, in some ways, more idealistic than Durham. They imagined the WCIP representing the concerns of all Indigenous peoples at an international level, as an advocate for their Indigenous rights (whether within a nation state or independently)\textsuperscript{127}. This vision proved an even greater intellectual challenge for the United Nations. The UN is based on a system where the rights of specific peoples are advocated for by the nation states which represent them. To have an explicitly non-state actor like the World Council demanding a place to advocate for Indigenous peoples is to fit a square peg in a round hole—it challenges the UN's basic framework of world order. As mentioned earlier, Manuel had his sights on UN General Assembly non-member observer status, a special category afforded only to the special cases of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Vatican. Furthermore, from early on, the WCIP was promoted the idea of full legal sovereignty for Indigenous peoples without (necessarily) independence. The World Council insisted the rights to self-determination afforded them the right to be neither nation-states nor ethnic minorities:

Instead of 'national minorities' indigenous groups are separate and distinct peoples surrounded by nation-states. (...) As distinct peoples, indigenous groups must become recognized as a significant part of the global dialogue concerned with setting world priorities and the settlement of intergroup controversies.\textsuperscript{128}

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\textsuperscript{127} Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.\
\textsuperscript{128} Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs Resource Centre (herafter UBCICRC), World Council of Indigenous Peoples Submission to the Preparatory Committee for a New International Strategy for the
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While the right of all peoples to sovereignty was accepted by the United Nations system in principle, the idea that it could be asserted in this way by Indigenous peoples (whose territory often crosses state borders) would pose a serious threat to the international stability for which the United Nations aims.  

Despite these substantial differences between the two organizations and their visions, there are nonetheless enough similarities to suggest they are part of the same movement or wave, and that they both owe an intellectual debt to the first wave of decolonization. Firstly, both organizations can clearly trace their origins to Indigenous activists living overseas in centres for anti-colonial activity: Lusaka in the case of Smallface-Marule and Geneva for Jimmie Durham. These were foundational experiences for both of these individuals, and would be reflected in the ideas of both organizations. Secondly, Smallface-Marule, Manuel and Durham all formalized their efforts into broad, strategic organizations for Indigenous sovereignty, not formally affiliated with a single group or a single issue. This made the Indigenous internationalism different from the past international efforts of Deskaheh or T.W. Ratana, which proved to be short-lived and wholly unsuccessful. It meant a state government could no longer deny the legitimacy of these voices in the international arena by framing their interests as purely domestic issues. Finally, both organizations relied heavily on support from international NGOs like IWGIA, but placed much of their hope in the United Nations as an arbiter of justice. During the 1960s and 70s, the efforts made by Third-Worldist leadership in the UN looked incredibly fruitful—they largely controlled the General Assembly and

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129 It may have been an awareness of the British Commonwealth and its nuanced conceptions of sovereignty and autonomy which made this alternative vision seem more plausible to Manuel and Smallface-Marule than it might have been to Durham.
many of the UN's important sub-organizations. The promise for Indigenous peoples to share in this power was a tremendous attraction upon which both the World Council and the Treaty Council placed their hopes.
Chapter 3
Out of Isolation:
The 1974 Preparatory Meeting in Georgetown Guyana

To the peoples of Guyana, to the peoples of the world represented here today, we extend our warmest and most sincere greetings to you all. We who are self-appointed representatives of Maori Youth today offer our very best wishes to this Conference and to the hopeful results which we enlighten ourselves with as being of dire importance for the betterment of Mankind. We regret that our presence with you all today is a physical impossibility. However, we are already deep within the hearts of a number of people present here today and we remain consoled in the knowledge that our Elder Dr. Rangi Walker will extend to you all not only this but also our love and unison on the many things that we all hold so dear—the love of our Ancestral Lands, the respect, love and comfort of our elders and the abundantly rich cultures which are indeed our most indigenous rights. Kia kaha kia toa kia manawanui. [Be strong, be brave, be lion-hearted.]

– Letter from Maori Youth Council, 1974

Although it was small in size, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples' first preparatory meeting in Georgetown, Guyana (8-11 April 1974) is worthy of deeper investigation for several reasons. First, it was the first multi-regional meeting of Indigenous peoples. Although notably preceded by at least one other major multinational meeting of Indigenous peoples, the Arctic Peoples Conference held at Copenhagen in 1973 (with delegates from Alaska, Greenland, Northern Canada, and the Nordic Countries), that meeting was obviously regional in focus. While the Georgetown meeting lacked participation from every major region of the World, it did involve attendees from the four corners of the earth, with delegates from Australia, Canada, Greenland, New Zealand, Norway, the United States, 1


and (to some degree) Colombia. Second, in many ways, the meeting determined the structure, focus, and discourse of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples when it was founded the following year. The definition of “Indigenous,” the required qualities of future delegates, and the general approach to Indigenous politics at a global level were decided in Georgetown. Finally, on a more practical level, the meeting’s detailed transcript provides one of the earliest sources which outlines the aims and desires of the delegates for the future of Indigenous internationalism. This chapter describes the personal backgrounds of the delegates who met in Georgetown, and analyzes their commonalities and sources of inspiration, the conclusions they reached, and the plans they made. A comparison between Third-Worldist anti-colonial leaders and these early Indigenous internationalists suggests that the similarities in backgrounds between the two groups encouraged them to arrive at similar answers about the nature of their oppression and propose similar solutions. Both groups understood colonialism in largely the same way, and resolved to attack it using analogous tactics. Both groups fought to secure collective rights, rather than just individual human rights. Nonetheless, the broader nature of Indigenous internationalism and the minority status of most Indigenous peoples required the future World Council to go further that the Third-Worldists by challenging the Westphalian system of nation states rather than simply attempting to join it.

3.1 The Delegates and their commonalities

Official delegates to the preparatory meeting in Georgetown included George Manuel (Secwepemc of Canada; National Indian Brotherhood of Canada), Ranginui “Rangi” J. Walker (Te Whakatōhea Māori of New Zealand; Maori Council), Angmalortok Olsen (Inuit
of Greenland, Denmark; Pekatigit Kalatdlit / The Greenlandic Association), Phillip “Sam” Deloria (Standing Rock Sioux of the United States; National Congress of American Indians), Aslak Nils Sara (Sámi of Norway; Nordic Sami Council of Sweden, Finland and Norway), and Peter “Gary” Williams (Gumbaynggirr of Australia; Aboriginal Legal Service). There were also twelve official observers from Canada and Guyana, and a number of other staff in attendance.\(^3\)

The delegates were quite varied in their political experience, but their level of education was fairly consistent. Walker's involvement in Māori affairs was, by his own

\(^3\) The six observers from Canada were Victor Adolph (Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs), Forrest Walkem (Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs), Dr. Ahab Spence (Manitoba Indian Brotherhood), Andrew Delisle (Indians of Quebec Association), Rev. Ernest Willie (Anglican Church of Canada), and Mrs. Jean Goodwill (Nēhiyaw; working with Canadian Secretary of State; daughter of John Tootooosis, a prominent Nēhiyaw political leader). Canadian observers came at their own expense, in some cases paying out of their own pockets. It appears that some participated in both formal and informal discussions to some degree, but their comments are generally not recorded in the transcripts. The seven observers from Guyana were the Honourable Philip Duncan, (from the Wapishiana tribe of the Rupununi, member of Parliament since 1964 at the age of 21, Parliamentary secretary for Amerindian Affairs for some time, now Regional Minister for Rupununi Region); Dick Laurentino (a Macushi village councillor from St. Ignatius Village); Theresa La Rose (an Arawak Catholic nun and welfare officer for Amerindian Affairs from the Moruca reserve); David Brooks, (Indigenous village captain or Touchaus, from Panima); Gertrude Fitzpatrick (Guyana's only female Touchaus, from Kwebanna in the North West District); Patrick Norton (Touchaus from River's View, and community development worked attached to the Ministry of Co-operatives and National Mobilization); and Eugene Stoby, (an Arawak Member of Parliament, also from the Moruca reserve). Guyanese government attendees included Dr. Ptolemy Reid (Deputy Prime Minister), and Miss Sheila King a Senior Liaison Officer and organizing secretary for the Council on the Affairs and Status of Women in Guyana. It seems there was some controversy over the meeting within the Guyanese government, as Minister of National Development, Kenneth King, bowed out of his agreed role as opening speaker in opposition to the meeting. Also present were staff members of the National Indian Brotherhood also present included Fr Guy Lavallée (seconded from the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace), Clive Linklater (Executive Director of the N.I.B., who chaired much of the meeting), Marie Smallface-Marule, and Douglas Sanders. While Jean Goodwill is listed with observers in the meeting's official press release, in the meeting minutes Marie Smallface-Marule describes her as being a temporary member of the NIB staff for the purposes of the conference. The Guyanese government also provided reporting staff from the Parliament Office and the Appeal Court of Guyana, and a photographer from the Guyana Information Services. Aside from Clive Linklater and Andrew Delisle, none of the observers or staff members made any comments that appear in the transcript, though they may have participated in the (unrecorded) discussion groups during the meeting and certainly, in informal discussions in the evenings. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript; LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript; LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, letter from Ormond W. Díaz (Canadian High Commissioner in Guyana) to Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 26 April 1974.
description, “relatively recent.” Born in 1932, he had become a secretary of the Auckland Maori District Council in 1969, and a member of the New Zealand Maori Council in 1970. Also in 1970, he had completed his Ph.D. in Anthropology at Auckland University, and was working at the Centre for Continuing Education there, liaising between the Māori and Pakeha communities. While introducing himself on the first day of the conference, Walker made a point of distinguishing himself from the “truly radical” activists, describing himself instead as a “conservative person...concerned to see that our country does not produce any strife or any trouble.”

Despite his description of Māori politics being split between the radical and conservative, Walker’s critique may be less concerned with the potential for social upheaval than on the basic conceptions underlying the movement. In July 1973, his “Kōrero” editorial column in the New Zealand Listener compared the New Zealand Maori Council to the NAACP in the United States, a “conservative body dedicated to achieving its aims by persuasion,” and contrasted it with “radical Maori groups” such as Nga Tamatoa, which might claim broader allegiance if calmer voices are ignored. But Walker specifically describes the “radicals” as “decultured Maoris who have dipped into Marxist and Black Power literature.” His own analysis seems to root Māori problems in the historical injustices of colonialism and assimilation policy, rather than in colour prejudice or the material

4 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
6 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript. Walker failed to mention, however, that he had personally organized the Young Māori Leaders Conference where Nga Tamatoa had been founded. Ranginui Walker, Nga Tau Tohetohe (Auckland, N.Z.: Penguin, 1987), 12.
7 My emphasis. Walker, Nga Tau Tohetohe, 96-97.
inequality of the class system. Thus, he asserted, a greater respect for “the traditional cultural base of the Maori” in search of decolonization was a better tactic than the “radical” race-based politics of African-Americans.  

Olsen was born in Qaanaaq, Greenland but moved to Denmark in 1937 at the age of ten. At that time, he spoke not a word of Danish. He continued his education to become an electrical engineer, married, and lived in Copenhagen before joining the Inuit organization *Pekatigit Kalatdlit*. At the time of the conference, he was serving as its Chair, as well as a representative on the Land Council in Greenland (*Grønlands Landsråd*). In *The Last Kings of Thule*, Jean Malaurie describes Olsen as “representative of the Greenlandic intelligentsia.”

Williams was by far the youngest of the group. He was not yet 30 years old, and he had spent much of his life living on the Bellwoods Aboriginal Reserve in Nambucca Heads, New South Wales. In 1963, he was one of the first two Indigenous students to enrol at Sydney University, and would join the 1965 Australian “Freedom Ride” for Indigenous rights. Nevertheless, Williams described his participation in Indigenous politics as “rather marginal” until 1970. Since then, he had supported the Aboriginal Tent Embassy in Canberra,

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8 Walker, *Nga Tau Tohetohe*, 98.
9 In some documents, Olsen's given name is written as Angmalortoq rather than Angmalortok, but the latter seems to be more common. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
13 John Cleverly and Janet Mooney, *Taking Our Place: Aboriginal Education and the Story of the Koori Centre at the University of Sydney* (Sydney University Press, 2009), 29-32.
helped found the Aboriginal Legal Service in Redfern, and become the head of that organization as well as the Aboriginal Medical Service.\textsuperscript{14}

Deloria, in his 30s, had completed his undergraduate degree (in 1964) and most of a law degree at Yale, before taking up the position of director at the American Indian Law Centre at the University of New Mexico.\textsuperscript{15} He attended the meeting representing the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), the National Tribal Chairmen's Association (NCTA), and Americans for Indian Opportunity.\textsuperscript{16} The NCAI was by far the oldest, largest and most powerful pan-tribal organization in the United States. Although its membership was strictly from the elected governments of federally recognized tribes, the increased involvement of militant Native Americans from off reserve in the NCAI caused some leaders to fear a takeover and form a new organization, the NTCA, in 1971.\textsuperscript{17}

Aslak Nils Sara, age 40, had earned a degree in Chemistry from the University of Oslo in 1969, after which he worked with the Norwegian Department of Environment.\textsuperscript{18} It

\textsuperscript{14} LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript. It was in the early 1970s that urban Indigenous activists in the Redfern neighbourhood of Sydney began to launch their own programs and services to address their needs, the Aboriginal Legal Service and Aboriginal Medical Service being two of the most important examples. See Kay Anderson, “Savagery and Urbanity: Struggles over Aboriginal Housing, Redfern, 1970–73” in \textit{Settlement: A History of Australian Indigenous Housing}, ed., Peter Read (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2000), 130-143.

\textsuperscript{15} Yale Daily News, 10 November 2005. <http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2005/11/10/deloria-64-champions-native-american-rights/> While Deloria's mood during the proceedings was frequently jocular—musing, for instance, on the possibility of the C.I.A. taking high altitude photographs of delegates from U2 spy-planes—his legal background was clearly quite helpful in analyzing and formulating resolutions for the group. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.

\textsuperscript{16} LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.


\textsuperscript{18} Bjorn Aarseth, “Aslak Nils Sara” in \textit{Norwegian Encyclopedia (Store Norske Leksikon)}, <http://snl.no/nbl_biografi/Aslak_Nils_Sara/utdypning>. Among Sara’s classmates in Oslo was Nils-Aslak Valkeapää, a prominent Finnish Sámi artist and political leader who would also attend the first World Conference of Indigenous Peoples in 1975. Jukka Nyyssönen, “‘Everybody recognized that we were not white:’ Sami Identity Politics in Finland, 1945-1990,” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Tromso, 2007). Sara’s studies were not limited to Chemistry—he also took courses in “philosophy and other things... He knew much about the history of ideas and that kind of thing.” Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview, 5 April
was in that capacity that he and George Manuel had first met in Stockholm during the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972.\(^{19}\) He attended the Georgetown meeting representing the Sami Parliament in Finland, the Association of Swedish Samis, the Association of Norwegian Samis (which he had directed from 1968-71), and the Association of Norwegian Reindeer Herders. At the time of the meeting, he was serving as Director of the Nordic Sami Institute, which had opened the previous fall.\(^{20}\)

A two-person Colombian delegation led by Manuel Trino Morales (\textit{Guambía of Colombia}; \textit{Consejo Regional Indígena de el Cauca}), had made it as far as the Pegasus Hotel in Georgetown but was unable to attend the meeting; they lacked proof of a yellow fever vaccination “and so were quarantined and returned home as expeditiously as possible.”\(^{21}\) George Manuel’s protests to the Guyanese government on behalf of the expelled delegates were ignored.\(^{22}\) Whether the Yellow Fever threat was, in this instance, a serious concern or merely a convenient pretence to remove politically problematic guests who might endanger Guyana’s relationship with nearby Colombia is unclear.\(^{23}\)


\(^{20}\) LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.

\(^{21}\) LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, letter from Ormond W. Dier (Canadian High Commission, Georgetown) to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 26 April 1974.

\(^{22}\) George Manuel Diaries (hereafter GMD), 8 April 1974.

\(^{23}\) Colombia’s Horecio Calle (\textit{Consejo Regional Indígena de el Cauca}) was also listed as an official observer in the meeting’s documents. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript; LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, letter from Ormond W. Diaz (Canadian High Commissioner in Guyana) to Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 26 April 1974; LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, International Preparatory Meeting of the Indigenous Peoples Conference, Official Delegates List; George Manuel Diaries, 5-12 April 1974. Trino Morales did successfully attend the second preparatory meeting in Copenhagen the following year. For more on Morales, see Christian Gros and Trino Morales, \textit{¡A mí no me manda nadie! : historia de vida de Trino Morales}, (Bogotá D.C.: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, 2009.)
When examining the biographies of the delegates, what is perhaps most striking is the level of education at the table. With George Manuel as the sole exception, everyone had at least some amount of post-secondary education. Most would have been among the first generation of Indigenous peoples in their home countries to reach that stage of study. Any formal education increases one’s ability to effectively communicate an argument in ways the non-Indigenous can understand, but post-secondary education in particular may well have shaped the ideas of these delegates in specific ways. Post-secondary education, at least at that point, was generally available only in large urban centres so attendance would have forced Indigenous students to leave their home communities. For Deloria, the experience of being the only Native American in his class at Harvard encouraged him to seek out other Indigenous people in Connecticut, and engage politically beyond his Sioux community.24 As mentioned above, it was Gary Williams’ move to Sydney that helped prompt his political activism, setting up organizations for any urban aboriginals in the city. Olsen states that it was only in succeeding to live “down there [in Denmark] … that I discovered that I could be of use to my people.”25 While George Manuel did not, himself, have much education, a later conversation with Sámi activist Niillas Somby suggests he recognized its usefulness as a tool. In the early 1980s, Somby's younger brother Ánde was studying law, as was Manuel's son Arthur. Somby was somewhat skeptical of “all this so called high-level education,” worried it might “lead us faster into... the Western system.”26 Manuel asserted that, so long as these young people do not lose touch with their culture, their post-secondary education enable

25 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
26 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
them to understand Western systems and, thus, to “make connections and adapt their way of working to the decolonization of [Indigenous lands].”

The impact of post-secondary education and its surrounding experience is strikingly reminiscent of the process that had occurred in Africa not long before. A great number of anti-colonial leaders (including Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta, Guinea-Bissau’s Amilcar Cabral, Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, and Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah) had studied abroad, only to return home not just politicized, but increasingly supportive of Pan-Africanism. Within the French Empire, a great number of post-independence leaders had all studied at the same school, l’École normale supérieure William Ponty in today’s Senegal. The school did not exist to educate future academics—its diploma was invalid outside of Africa—but to train African civil servants. Nonetheless, students were instructed in language, mathematics, natural sciences and sciences humaines, and they absorbed important lessons about the universal nature of French Republicanism, secularism and modernity that would influence their later political careers. Even among those who did not pursue an education, simply the experience of living and working in the metropole could foster a stronger affinity to one’s colonial peers from other regions. They recognized that the oppression their people faced was not unique,


but consistent (albeit not identical) throughout the empire, and even across different empires. This knowledge helped them formulate a deeper critique of imperialism as a system (rather than just focusing on local injustices) and wield it more effectively in solidarity and even cooperation with each other. The 1936 election victory of the French Popular Front, with its Socialist promises of universal liberty and equality, and a reformist vision for the empire, was also an important influence at least on anti-colonial leaders from French Africa.\textsuperscript{30} It was not only their education, but also the political environment in the metropole during their youth which shaped these men's post-colonial vision.

With the Indigenous delegates in Georgetown, it seems that, much like the pattern of previous anti-colonial activists, it was not only their education but also the broader contemporary political discourse which influenced them; in this case, it was the discourse of the Third-Worldists and the anti-colonial internationalist “New Left” which they encountered during their studies. Ole Henrik Magga, an associate of Aslak Nils Sara's, suggests the “student spirit” of Paris' May 1968 had a deep influence him and other Sámi students in university at the time: “You had to analyze things, and you should be able to change things. It was your duty to do something.”\textsuperscript{31} In his analysis of the internationalization of Sámi activism, historian Henry Minde writes that

\begin{quote}
[t]his change of attitude towards the Sami as an indigenous people reflected the changing ideological climate that took place in the youth culture of the western world, especially in university environs... An increasing number of young Sami people began to study at the old universities in the south throughout the 1960s and 1970s, in Norway as well as Sweden and Finland. A new generation of Sami politicians were inspired by ideas of equality and the right of self-determination,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{30} Chafer, 446-449.
\textsuperscript{31} Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
such as those set down in declarations of human rights and conventions, and those expressed in conflicts in the Third World....

Minde further notes that in 1969, a collection of articles was published in Oslo entitled *Nordisk nykolonialisme. Samiske problem I dag* (Nordic Neocolonialism: Sámi Problems Today), clearly indicating that academics were beginning to draw links between the situation in Norway and those of the Third World. Gary Foley, a friend of Gary Williams, states in an essay on his own political involvement at the time that, in Sydney, he and Williams “were starting to encounter new people and new ideas.” Heather Goodall describes this new input as “diverse groupings of young people who sometimes called themselves 'New Left', but who might just as well associate themselves in Australia with the anarchist, libertarian traditions.”

Foley acknowledges that they were “influenced by the anti-colonial movements in India and Africa' and writers like Frantz Fanon, Jean Paul Sartre and Albert Camus,” who criticized the inherent racism and violence of European empires. The ideas of the “New
Left” and other strains of student/youth activism during the 1960s and '70 were vital in shaping the approach of this generation of Indigenous leaders around the world.

Many of the Indigenous delegates at Georgetown had been shaped by their education, their experiences in urban centres, and by the ideas of the Third World anti-colonialism that permeated the student circles around the world during the 1960s and '70s. In much the same way as similar experiences had affected African anti-colonial activists, these influences encouraged Indigenous activists to look outside the confines of their own national situation, and to evaluate what Indigeneity meant at a global rather than a local level. Like the students in French colonial Africa, they took seriously the ideals espoused by another political movement (in this case, the Third World rather than the Popular Front) and built their plan with those ideals in mind. Third-Worldism and Indigenous Internationalism grew out of similar circumstances, and as we will see, both movements sought to overcome oppression in similar ways.

3.2 Overcoming Isolation

While education and life in their respective metropoles had connected these delegates both with their Indigenous brethren within their countries and with new political discourses of anti-colonialism, what remained lacking was a solid connection with other peoples in similar circumstances. Both Olsen and Williams, from islands on opposite sides of the globe, commented on a similar feeling of isolation. “We are very interested in this conference because it has dawned upon us,” said Olsen, “that even though we sit in the far corner of the world, there is a movement through the whole world of ideas and of peoples...”\(^{37}\) Williams

\(^{37}\) LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
echoed this feeling of remoteness, and a need for better communication with other
Indigenous peoples: “[In] Australia we are pretty much isolated and anything that happens in
another part of the world concerning aboriginal peoples reaches us a long while after the
event has happened.” The feeling of isolation, however, was partly the result of history and
political domination, not just geography. The process of colonization had, in some cases,
separated families across state borders, segregated interrelated communities onto reserves,
and impeded traditions of cooperation and sharing within nations. Looking just within the
United States, the International Indian Treaty Council's Jimmy Durham argued that American
Indians were struggling “to break out of isolation.” The advances in technology of the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries not only facilitated peoples to overcome geographical
isolation, but they also enabled them to form alliances with others which would help them
overcome political isolation as well.

Indigenous Australians’ lack of consistent communication with other Indigenous
peoples may be partly responsible for the nature of their political mobilization until that
point. The influence of African-American activism on Indigenous Australians, by contrast,
had a long history, and by the 1960s, the Koori of South East Australia increasingly saw
parallels between the urban poverty and racism they faced with the situation in the United
States. Self-identification on the basis of race/colour (“Black Australians”) seems more
common about Indigenous activism in Australia than elsewhere, leading to the copying of

38 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
39 Jimmie Durham, “American Indian Culture: Traditionalism and Spiritualism in a Revolutionary Struggle,”
40 These “others” might include related groups and historical enemies within a region, as well as those with
whom there was no previous contact at all.
41 See John Maynard, Fight for Liberty and Freedom: The Origins of Australian Aboriginal Activism
both tactics and goals from the American Civil Rights movement (in the form of Freedom Rides for civil rights) and African-American radicalism (in more militant action, and protests against police brutality).\textsuperscript{42} Gary Foley describes the influence of African-American troops on Rest and Recuperation leave in Australia from the Vietnam War, who “gravitated toward the Sydney Black community in Redfern.”\textsuperscript{43} While the rise of the American Indian Movement and Red Power would certainly have made the Australian news, Redfern activists were equally aware of the work of the Black Panthers as they were of the Occupation of Alcatraz, and that Eldridge Cleaver’s \textit{Soul on Ice} was as popular as Dee Brown’s \textit{Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee}.\textsuperscript{44} This may have contributed to Indigenous Australians placing more emphasis on the eradication of racism relative to Indigenous rights to land or self-determination than did Indigenous peoples elsewhere.\textsuperscript{45}

In his closing comments at the meeting, Walker declared:

\textsuperscript{42} Inter alia, see: Kathy Lothia, “Moving Blackwards: Black Power and the Aboriginal Embassy,” in \textit{Transgressions: Critical Australian Indigenous Histories}, eds. Ingereth Macfarlane and Mark Hannah (Canberra: Australian National University E-Press and Aboriginal History Inc., 2006), 19-34. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Red Power movement in the United States was also influenced by African-American activism and actively used the discourse of both skin colour and race. Some elements of race-based ideology have appeared in Central and South America as well. For Fausto Reinaga's use of race in his ideas of \textit{Indianidad}, see Lucero, 16-17.

\textsuperscript{43} Foley, “Black Power in Redfern.”

\textsuperscript{44} Heather Goodall, \textit{Invasion to Embassy}, as quoted in Foley, “Black Power in Redfern.” The influence of African-American activism was not limited to Australia. Ole Henrik Magga was struck by the painful similarities with life in \textit{Sápmi} when reading James Baldwin's \textit{The Fire Next Time}. Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview. In the 1971 edition of his influential book, \textit{Greetings from Lapland, Sámi} activist Nils-Aslak Valkapää makes comparisons between \textit{Sámi} life and the life of 19th century African-American slave Nat Turner, though in the 1978 edition, after having attended the World Conference of Indigenous Peoples, he acknowledges, “I could easily have taken an Indian as an example, instead of Nat Turner...[but]...at that time it was better to talk about negroes than Indians.” Nils-Aslak Valkapää, \textit{Greetings from Lapland: The Sami – Europe's Forgotten People}, translated by Beverly Wahl (London: Zed Press, 1983), 110. Nonetheless, these types of comparisons certainly do not seem to have been as common as they were in Australia.

\textsuperscript{45} Both the particular historical and modern circumstances of Indigenous relations with Australian settler society likely provide as much if not more explanation for this political orientation. Moreover, Heather Goodall has done excellent work in complicating the dichotomy between civil rights and land rights in Australia, emphasizing that both were considered important by Indigenous activists. Heather Goodall, \textit{Invasion to Embassy}, 311-312.
This is an historic occasion; it is time that we came together and shared our thoughts, shared our common problems, because we fight our lonely battles in our own lands but sometimes the battle seems to be insurmountable and when we meet together and find that we have much in common, we go back to our respective countries with renewed vitality to take up the struggles, the cause of indigenous peoples.  

Beyond the meeting in Georgetown, it was the possibility of a larger World Conference of Indigenous Peoples, and the idea of a permanent organization of Indigenous Peoples that delegates hoped would overcome that sort of geo-political isolation. They were coming to the same realization that had struck George Manuel during his trips to New Zealand, Australia and Sweden. Most Indigenous peoples might be small minorities in their own countries, but if they united, they could create a larger and more powerful bloc. In his opening address, George Manuel suggested that international connections are simply the logical extension of his political experience, moving from the organization of his own community, to the provincial, and then national level. Walker described the theoretical power given to Māori through their assigned parliamentary seats, but narrates how Māori efforts to criticize racism within New Zealand at the United Nations were hampered by domestic partisan politics. He hoped that creating an international Indigenous organization would finally give Māori “an international voice.”

Every delegate could see the advantages of such an organization, even Olsen who asserted that the people of Greenland were in a good position relative to other Indigenous...
peoples: “We are progressing politically and we are so far ahead now that we are beginning to discuss home rule.” He acknowledged this might make some wonder if Greenlanders had anything to gain from such an organization, but “on the other hand, it is so that we want to break our isolation and also we know that we have a lot to learn. Also we know that we have had disasters happen to our culture and want to find our way back again. This we cannot do unless we have contact with our brethren across the borders.” Delegates imagined that an international organization could function partly as information clearing house to disseminate information between Indigenous peoples and overcome this isolation.

Eventually, a resolution was proposed by Walker and passed unanimously. It declared:

That an international Conference of Indigenous Peoples be held for the purpose of:

1) The meaningful exchange of information (organizational, legal, sociological and cultural, etc.) to strengthen voluntary associations of indigenous people in various countries to:

a) reduce the possibility of physical and cultural genocide;

b) combat racism;

c) ensure political, economic and social justice;

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52 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript. Regarding the term “home rule,” in The American Empire and the Fourth World, Anthony Hall notes Manuel's frequent use of the terms “responsible government” and “home rule” in his book The Fourth World. The former, says Hall, had been used to describe constitutional self-government within the British Empire, whereas the latter was used for “more limited forms of decolonization” in places like Indian and West Africa. By referencing both, Manuel presented Indigenous “aspirations for decolonization as a manifestation and extension of the same urges motivating colonized peoples throughout Europe's overseas realms, including those liberal-minded Canadians who have been encouraged to celebrate the constitutional evolution of their own country 'from colony to nation.'” Anthony J. Hall, The American Empire and the Fourth World (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 287.

53 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.

54 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
d) establish and strengthen the concept of indigenous and cultural rights;

2) The consideration of the feasibility of a permanent International organization of Indigenous peoples;

3) That there continue to be meaningful exchange of information between the representatives at this meeting.\(^{55}\)

Immediately noticeable is the fact that the phrase “meaningful exchange of information” is used twice: the conference should itself serve as a venue for the exchange of information, but even if a permanent organization was not created, attendees should continue that exchange of information independently.\(^{56}\) Perhaps more importantly, the purposes of such an exchange are also made explicit, and they are primarily political in nature and focused on collective rights. The individual human right to security from violence might be implied, but it is a \textit{collective} right to security from genocide that is prioritized. Similarly, racism might impact an individual but it is an act perpetrated against a group. Indigenous and cultural rights are clearly collective rights. Thus, the initial statement of this first global meeting of Indigenous peoples is clearly expressing a desire for collective rights rather than the individual rights generally guaranteed by the post-war consensus on human rights. Furthermore, while economics and society are mentioned, it is in the context of economic and social \textit{justice} not economic or social development. These are goals to overcome the

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\(^{55}\) LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.

\(^{56}\) Keck and Sikkink suggest the use of “information politics” by “transnational advocacy networks” is most effective when local testimony (about human rights abuses, for example) are combined with technical and statistical information, and diffused abroad. These same advocacy networks are able to use this information as part of “leverage politics” whereby more powerful members of the network mobilize to hold up states to public scrutiny or shaming. This is, in to no small degree, the role the World Council would play. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, “Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics,” \textit{International Social Science Journal} 51:159 (March 1999), 95-97.
historically and politically derived structural problems of Indigenous peoples through political empowerment ("the strengthening of voluntary associations"), rather than to find technical solutions for people lacking sufficient employment, housing, infrastructure or healthcare.\(^{57}\)

An evident parallel exists with the 1955 Afro–Asian Conference (Bandung, Indonesia), held to organize opposition to imperialism and colonialism. While that meeting's Final Communiqué was far more supportive of economic development, it also "condemned racialism as a means of cultural suppression," stressed the need for cultural rights (including the right to study in one's own language), and promoted global cultural co-operation between colonial peoples.\(^{58}\) European colonization had not only suppressed national cultures, it had prevented communication and co-operation between the peoples of Africa and Asia, but delegates at Bandung were "animated by a keen and sincere desire to renew their old cultural contacts and develop new ones in the context of the modern world."\(^{59}\) As stated, European colonization had, at least in some cases, similarly divided Indigenous peoples with imposed borders and forcibly isolated them on reservations. As regional and national organizations had grown, these old lines of communication had been restored, but the planned international conference would provide Indigenous peoples with an opportunity to develop new contacts which had never before existed. At very least, lines of communication between Indigenous peoples would be kept open so that none would remain isolated. Perhaps most importantly, however, the Afro-Asian Conference supported the principle of self-determination not simply

\(^{57}\) The World Council's shifting approach to economic and social development is addressed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.


\(^{59}\) "Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung."
as a human right, but as “a pre-requisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights.” With this prerequisite, the delegates intended to challenge assertions by European colonial powers that human rights could be respected in colonial settings under foreign subjugation. Delegates in Georgetown provided clear examples of the result when individual civil rights were formally granted to colonial peoples but whose collective rights to self-determination had not been acknowledged. In the future, they hoped to involve others who had been afforded neither individual civil rights nor collective sovereignty rights. Just like the delegates at Bandung, they resolved to overcome their isolation and to demand their collective rights and those of Indigenous peoples everywhere. Having arrived at similar conclusions about their oppression as had Third World anti-colonialists, they also proposed a similar solution: an international alliance (this time for Indigenous peoples) to secure collective rights for all, including the right to self-determination.

3.3 Definition

Sam Deloria was the first to propose arriving at a definition of Indigenous groups, so as to decide who might attend the conference. Given Olsen's comments about the generally positive state of affairs in Greenland, however, he proposed that,

...we may want to develop these definitions in such a way as to get at them as societies or cultures and not defining them as victims of oppression, that is, there may be indigenous peoples in some circumstances throughout the world who do not feel that they are victims of oppression or feel that their relationship with their own Government is satisfactory and I think that that should not operate to discourage them from attending the Conference because by the

60 “Final Communiqué of the Asian-African conference of Bandung.”
example that they are able to set they may be able to help lead the way and show some useful example to other peoples.  

The door was to be left as wide as possible, and at Gary Williams' suggestion, it was accepted that the definition they reached would be purely for the purposes of the first world conference. Those delegates attending the larger meeting would be allowed to redefine “Indigenous” for the purposes of a permanent organization if they so wished.  

Deloria and Walker recommended the use of the term “Indigenous People” over “Aboriginal People” and came up with the following definition, which was accepted by the others:

The term 'Indigenous People' refers to people living in countries which have a population composed of differing ethnic or racial groups who are descendants of the earliest populations living in the area and who do not, as a group, control the national government of the countries within which they live.

This definition was intentionally broad so as to avoid proscribing the attendance of wanted groups, though Deloria acknowledged that “it may cover more than are appropriate.” Henry Minde has suggested that this definition is a clear nod to the Sámi. Certainly, it does not exclude them on the basis of skin colour, geography or their much longer relationship with a settler society, but there is little reason to expect that it would include any of these factors—such a definition might exclude many others as well. The definition is explicitly political not cultural. As Douglas Sanders notes in his account of the meeting, this definition does not define Indigenous peoples as a mere ethnic minority;

62 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.  
63 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.  
64 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.  
65 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.  
ignoring relative population size left the door open to Indigenous peoples of several Central and South American countries who make up a majority or near majority of their national population, yet were politically marginalized. Nor does it define Indigenous peoples based on any shared ethnic, cultural, economic or social traits (a shared belief in “closeness to the land”, for instance, did not figure in here). It defines them instead by their relationship with settlers. It is this definition which draws the strongest connection between Indigenous internationalism and pre-existing forms of International anti-colonialism. Your culture, your family line, your ethnicity, or your language might make you Secwepemc, Sioux, Māori or Sámi, regardless of your relationship with others; but according to the definition accepted in Georgetown, it is a shared history of invasion, colonialism or outside settlement and a shared experience of marginalization which made you Indigenous. It was, if anything, only a broadened definition of anti-colonial Third-Worldism.

At the same time, the definition did not restrict membership to those who had been subject to European colonization. The International Indian Treaty Council, by contrast, had done effectively that by limiting its focus to Indigenous Peoples of the Western Hemisphere. While the issue was not discussed in Georgetown, this theoretically allowed


68 It is worth contrasting this definition with the one employed by the International Labour Organization’s 1957 Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, which defines Indigenous people according to their social and economic conditions (being “less advanced” than the rest of the national community) and to the degree to which they live “in conformity with the social, economic and cultural institutions” as they were at the time of contact. ILO Convention 107: “Convention concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries” <http://www.ilo.org/iollex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C107> The Georgetown definition is quite close to the working definition adopted in 1972 for ECOSOC’s “Martínez Cobo Report.” For an analysis of the latter, see Henry Minde, “The Destination and the Journey: Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations from the 1960s through 1985,” in Indigenous Peoples: Self-determination, Knowledge, Indigeneity, ed. Henry Minde (Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers, 2008), 56-58.

69 See Chapter Two, page 62-64.
for the participation of populations in Asia and Africa. No Indigenous peoples from either of these continents were represented at the founding conference in 1975, but there were some efforts to connect with groups in the U.S.S.R, China and other parts of Asia.\footnote{Sanders, \textit{The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples}, 13.} This omission was officially for “practical reasons,” in areas where the division between Indigenous and non-Indigenous was perhaps less apparent.\footnote{Sanders, \textit{The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples}, 13. The division between colonizer and colonized is not actually very straightforward. The WCIP seems to have simply chosen to ignore the problematic of including, for example, Canadian Métis with heritage from both camps. Moreover, the widespread intermarriage between European settlers and Indigenous peoples throughout Central and South America during the colonial period makes a contemporary distinction between the two somewhat arbitrary as well.} Sam Deloria asserts that it was not from a lack of “interest in those areas, but we figured it would be biting off more than we could chew” in the early days of the organization.\footnote{Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.} No African tribal groups would ever join the World Council, but some in-roads would eventually be made in Asia. At the World Council's 1977 General Assembly, delegates from Australia were given a mandate to organize a Pacific Regional Council, which would include Indigenous peoples of Australia, Aotearoa (New Zealand), Papua New Guinea, the Polynesian Islands and the Ainu of Japan.\footnote{LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Dave Monture, "Notes on the Second General Assembly of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples," 24-27 August 1977.} On the final day of the 1981 WCIP General Assembly in Canberra, observers from Asia (including Ainu from Japan, as well as representatives from Thailand and India) addressed the delegates.\footnote{IWGIA Newsletter 27 (June 1981), 5.} By the time of the 1990 General Assembly, the World Council's many regional branches included the Pacific Asia Council of Indigenous Peoples (PACIP) directed by Pōkā Laenui (Hayden Burgess) of Hawaii. PACIP claimed membership throughout Asia, but there is little evidence these organizations played a serious role at the World Council at all, aside from

\textit{\footnote{70 Sanders, \textit{The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples}, 13.} 
\footnote{71 Sanders, \textit{The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples}, 13.} 
\footnote{72 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.} 
\footnote{73 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Dave Monture, "Notes on the Second General Assembly of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples," 24-27 August 1977.} 
\footnote{74 \textit{IWGIA Newsletter} 27 (June 1981), 5.}
Laenui's consistent contributions.\textsuperscript{75}

Anti-colonial leaders meeting at Bandung had sought to create a large network of allies to support the rights of the colonized to self-determination. But whereas Third World anti-colonial leaders had seemingly accepted (whether out of intimidation by certain Western powers or out of concern for their own state sovereignty) the “salt-water thesis” which defined colonies as geographically separate from their colonizers, the anti-colonialism of Indigenous internationalism challenged that legal limitation. It aimed to create a new network which supported the rights of self-determination for those subject to “internal colonization” as well.\textsuperscript{76} And although Third-Worldist leaders had seemingly limited their definition of colonialism to the actions of European powers, the delegates in Georgetown were open (at least in principle in the long term, if not in practice in the short term) to alliances with those who had been “colonized” by non-European powers as well.

3.4 Structure

Technically, it was delegates at the larger international conference in 1975 who set the formal structure of the eventual World Council of Indigenous Peoples. Yet it was those

\textsuperscript{75} A report from PACIP listed member organizations from India, Burma, Bangladesh, Taiwan, Guam, Australia, Aotearoa/New Zealand, Kanaky/New Caledonia, French Polynesia, West Papua, East Timor, the Republic of the South Moluccas (in exile), Sri Lanka, Saipan, Palau and Hawaii, as well as informal contacts in Japan, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and the Philippines. LAC, WCIP Fonds, 9349 (hereafter WCIPF), Vol. 4.8, Report of PACIP Membership, 30 July 1990. There was even some discussion of organizing the seventh WCIP General Assembly in either the Philippines or India, but the executive council eventually decided on Xelajú (Quetzaltenango), Guatemala instead. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 13.5, letter from Donald Rojas (WCIP, President) to Prof A.K. Kisku (Indian Council of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, Secretary General), 26 June 1992.

meeting in Georgetown who set the rules that determined who was to be invited to the conference, which undoubtedly had a profound influence on the later organization. In terms of accreditation, the group agreed that three delegates should be accepted from each country with an Indigenous population, selected, where possible, by a recognized representative national body. When no such organization existed, delegates could be selected on the basis of population size, geographic region within their country, and tribal affiliations. For the planned international organization, a policy paper approved by delegates suggested that “full membership” only be awarded to groups forming a “recognized representative national body”, whereas groups from those countries without one be awarded merely “associate membership” and Indigenous people without any organized body be awarded “observer membership.”

Deloria acknowledged that the definition of a “recognized representative national body” was problematic, but accepted that no better phrasing had been proposed. The requirement lent itself well to most of the delegates in Georgetown. Manuel's National Indian Brotherhood was not only an association of leaders of bands recognized by the Canadian government, but it was also funded primarily by that government itself. The Maori Council, which Walker was representing, was actually created by the government of New Zealand, as part of the 1962 Maori Welfare Act. Greenland's Provincial Land Council, for which Olsen

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77 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
78 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
79 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
80 Peter McFarlane retells much of the early history of the National Indian Brotherhood and the reasons for its structure in *Brotherhood to Nationhood: George Manuel and the Making of the Modern Indian Movement*, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1993).
81 In 1979, this act was renamed the Maori Community Development Act. See also, R. J. Walker, “The Genesis of Maori Activism,” *The Journal of the Polynesian Society* 93:3 (1984), 275.
was an elected representative, was similarly the creation of the Danish government where it had an official advisory role.\textsuperscript{82} Although Williams was not personally affiliated with it, Australia also had a national organization, the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee which had been set up by the Whitlam government in 1973 with an advisory capacity.\textsuperscript{83} The National Congress of American Indians was, theoretically, financially independent but its membership was only made up of federally recognized American Indian tribes. Sweden, Norway and Finland each had at least one national Sámi organization; these had differing relationships with their respective state governments, but the umbrella Nordic Sami Council (established in 1956) was largely independent.\textsuperscript{84} Given this background, the use of the word “recognized” might appear to suggest that the WCIP preferred official state recognition of an organization for members, but this was certainly not the case. Both individuals and organizations without any state sanction were welcomed as members of the organization.\textsuperscript{85} At the founding meeting in 1975, for instance, numerous attendees were determined to avoid any publicity as their participation placed them at personal risk from state violence. At least one delegate, Constantino Lima, was imprisoned upon his return to Bolivia.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{82} The Grønlands Landsråd (alternatively translated as Provincial Council or Land Council) was the result of a 1950 amalgamation of two regional councils which dating back to 1911. See Axel Kjær Sørensen “Greenland: From Colony to Home Rule” in Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World, ed., Sven Tägil (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1995), 85-105.  

\textsuperscript{83} Quentin Beresford, Rob Riley: An Aboriginal Leader's Quest for Justice (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 2006), 122-123. The succeeding government of Fraser restructured the committee as the National Aboriginal Conference in 1977, which formally affiliated itself with the WCIP in 1979. UBCIC Resource Centre (hereafter UBCICRC), Ross (Jirra) Moore, A Report on the Organization of the 3rd General Assembly W.C.I.P., 27 April-2 May 1981, Canberra, Australia.  


\textsuperscript{85} As will be seen in Chapter Six, however, the World Council did effectively refuse membership to armed organizations.  

\textsuperscript{86} Constantino Lima, a WCIP delegate and member of MINK'A was arrested on 23 June 1976. Following international appeals, he was released on 18 March 1977 and exiled. He immediately travelled to Canada International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs Newsletter No 15 (September 1976), 2, and No. 18
“recognized representative” seems to have meant recognized by the conference organizers as representative, but the specific means to make such a judgement were never spelled out. Nevertheless, state-recognized and funded organizations (like the National Indian Brotherhood) were certainly not excluded from membership. Since few (if any) countries have only a single homogenous Indigenous group, the World Council's preference for national organizations effectively gave preference to organizations that were secular and “pan-tribal” in their membership, and formal modern political organizations in their structure. Whether this was done for the sake of simplicity, or because of the biases of the delegates, it must have seemed logical to structure representation at the conference along similar lines. This tendency, however, had the potential to cause political tensions in various contexts, between those that favoured “traditionalist” structures and those willing to adopt “modern” or “western” organizational structures. Such divisions had already been a source of hostility in the United States, between the NCAI and the American Indian Movement, but it was a point of conflict elsewhere too. The tension between younger, more radical Sámi activists like Ánde Somby, and Aslak Nils Sara's generation was also largely about basic organizational structures:

If you make up a copy of a more Norwegian institution then you get a lot of shortcuts. The budget routines and the work routines and all this framework area already in place... so you don't have to reinvent the wheel... But then you can have this other approach, [which says] that embedded in the Norwegian [structures] there are Norwegian values...87

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(August 1977).

In contrast, Sam Deloria points out that, whatever their faults, the members of NCAI could at least claim to have been formally elected by those they claimed to represent, whereas other activists were often self-appointed representatives. Nevertheless, that delegates from countries with this level of national organization would seek to form an international organization is likely not a coincidence. As mentioned above, Manuel saw a logical progression in Canada from local, to provincial, to federal organizations which ended with an international organization. Both the Sámi and Greenland's Inuit had already sought transnational regional connections with the Arctic Circumpolar Conference and the Nordic Sami Council; for them it was only an additional step to form an even broader international organization.

The decision to use the boundaries of nation states at all, instead of traditional cultural/ethnic ones, seems somewhat strange for Indigenous people who expressly questioned (if not challenged) the legitimacy of state borders and insisted on the right to self-determination as peoples. While this incongruity was not discussed in Georgetown, it was surely a compromise for the sake of practicality, as acknowledged later in a study of WCIP membership. The Sámi of Scandinavia, the only group of countries represented by a single delegate at Georgetown, would later be the only group to apply to the World Council as single organization representing multiple countries, the Nordic Sami Council. The Sami Council was exceptional, however, in that it represented the only Indigenous people with the World Council, “whose territory extends over more than one state where there are no other Indigenous populations within those states” and because of this, their unique arrangement

88 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
“did not affect the representation of any other Indigenous population.”\textsuperscript{90} The issue was raised again in the early 1980s, when both the \textit{Haudenosaunee} (a confederation of Indigenous nations spanning the US/Canadian border) and \textit{Nishnawbe Askii Nation} (a smaller confederation of nations, all located within a northern region of the Canadian province of Ontario) both requested representation at WCIP general assemblies.\textsuperscript{91}

In the analysis of the WCIP's legal consultant, the advantages of representation by state were clear. First, states are “the recognized units of international law” and the bodies with the most power to “affect the lives of Indigenous peoples.”\textsuperscript{92} By contrast, finding a definition for “people,” “nation” or “tribe” acceptable to all participants would likely prove impossible. Secondly, because Indigenous peoples have typically organized sub-state or state-level political organizations, those Indigenous peoples living in multiple countries often lack a supranational body to represent them as a single people.\textsuperscript{93} The decision to organize the World Council's representation by state also kept the number of member organizations relatively low (ensuring general assemblies would be of a manageable size), and helped ensure that members would be large enough to enable their participation at the international level. Finally, the World Council's report on its membership structure asserts that most Indigenous peoples were seeking “self-determination \textit{within} the existing structures of States” rather than full independence.\textsuperscript{94} Had the members of the World Council been strictly seeking

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 3-4.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 5. See the Haudenosaunee formal request for membership in LAC, WCIF, Vol. 16.24.
\textsuperscript{93} Douglas cites notable exceptions such as the \textit{Mapuche} (Chile and Argentina), the \textit{Kuna/Tule} (Panama and Colombia), the \textit{Papago/Tohono O'odham} (United States and Mexico), and the \textit{Blackfoot/Niitsitapi} (United States and Canada). Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 3-4.
secession from states (as the International Indian Treaty Council did for the Sioux Nation\textsuperscript{95}), they would have logically sought representation according to the \textit{nation} they hoped would form a new state. But instead of seeking the traditional rights of statehood for Indigenous peoples, they were seeking alternative rights, which at times overlapped with the rights of states and in other ways superseded them. At the subsequent preparatory meeting in Copenhagen (16-18 June 1975), Sam Deloria would emphasize that Indigenous demands for self-determination were conceived as a challenge to the idea of complete sovereignty for states. He asserted that, “in general terms what we are moving towards...is the fact that the concept of national sovereignty is limited and that one limitation on the concept of national sovereignty is the existence of indigenous people...we have the right to maintain our political existence.”\textsuperscript{96} Paradoxically, the desire to challenge the state-based framework of the international arena meant using that framework as basis for their system of membership.

Delegates in Georgetown agreed that the advance documentation to be provided at the conference should be modelled on United Nations requirements. It was further suggested that each country's delegates should submit a report on the situation of Indigenous peoples from their home country, possibly seeking help with statistics from the United Nations.\textsuperscript{97} This suggests not only a clear identification with the United Nations, but an acknowledgement of the information being compiled for ECOSOC's Martínez Cobo report. By contrast, Augusto

\textsuperscript{95} See Chapter Two, page 62.
\textsuperscript{97} One of the sub-committees formed at the meeting also recommended that the planning of the conference be broken up between a coordinating committee (made up of staff in the host country) and a policy board (comprising of the present delegates with the possible addition of new members from other countries). Another sub-committee committee recommended that the executive of a new organization might be rotated between countries, or that the world might be divided, regionally, into three or four sections. A combination of these ideas was later adopted as the structure of the World Council, with a local secretariat at a central office in Canada, and an executive committee of elected representatives. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7/Part I, Georgetown Transcript.
Willemsen-Díaz, the primary author of the aforementioned report, was invited to observe the preparatory meeting in Georgetown (and was keen to accept), but the UN Human Rights Division would not permit him to attend. As Willemsen-Díaz later recalled, his superiors “stated that the process was by no means a clear one, and that it was not known what results would be obtained nor whether there would be complaints against UN member states, in what terms, and that it was not appropriate for members of the General Secretariat to participate in this kind of meeting.”\textsuperscript{98} After the founding of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations would eventually become more supportive of its goals.

\textbf{3.5 Conclusion}

The proceedings of this preparatory meeting tell us a great deal about the origins of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, and about its historical significance as an organization, even before it undertook any practical actions. The World Council did not arise spontaneously, but was a product of its era, framed by the ideological and political events experienced by its organizers. The delegates in Georgetown were the early leaders of a new generation of Indigenous peoples. For the most part, their educational backgrounds had equipped them not only with the skills required to organize and lead an international movement, but also the outward-looking viewpoint necessary to make such a movement seem worthwhile. Although the influence of Third-Worldism was the strongest with George Manuel, many of the others had already begun to borrow ideas from the decolonization movement and apply them to their own national settings.

The historical parallels between these leaders and the generation of Third World leaders who had fought for decolonization (and, in some cases, Pan-Africanism) demonstrate that, beyond direct influence, the two groups were forced to grapple with many of the same questions. Both groups looked to find the best way to overcome geographic distance and cultural difference in order to co-operate for a common cause. Both groups sought to reinforce the international norm that guarantees the collective right of peoples to self-determination. Although both groups sought to carve out a space for themselves within the international system, the Third-Worldist leaders fought against imperialism and colonialism, but not the basic nation-state structure of the Westphalian system. The World Council, by contrast, sought the right to self-determination in a way never envisioned by the Western leaders who built the United Nations.
Chapter 4
Striking a Better Balance?
Indigenous Internationalism and the “Anti-Politics Machine”

The delegates at the preparatory meeting in Georgetown recommended that the larger world conference should take place one year later, and that it should be hosted in Canada owing to the resources available to the National Indian Brotherhood.¹ In the meantime, the organizers met for another preparatory meeting from 16-18 June 1975 in Copenhagen, and once again immediately preceding the conference itself (26-31 October 1975).² At the Copenhagen meeting, Marie Smallface-Marule suggested the name for the planned organization—the World Council of Indigenous Peoples—to follow the style of the World Council of Churches.³ The Tseshaha First Nation, centred on a reserve located near Port Alberni, British Columbia, hosted the conference, which was attended by fifty-two delegates from nineteen countries.⁴

² The Copenhagen preparatory meeting was a meeting of the “policy board” mentioned above on page 102, footnote 97. It was attended by Neil Watene (Maori of Aotearoa/New Zealand); Julio Tumiri Apaza (Aymara of Kollasuyu/Bolivia); Trino Morales (Colombia); Charles “Chuck” Trimble and Sam Deloria (Oglala Lakota and Standing Rock Sioux of United States); Aslak Nils Sara (officially representing Norway, Sweden and Finland); Robert Petersen and Angmalortok Olsen (Greenland); and George Manuel. Bent Østergaard (IWGIA and the United Nations Association of Denmark), Hans Pavia Rosing (Greenlandic Committee of International Cooperation), Robert Petersen (Copenhagen University) and Helge Kleiven (Copenhagen University and the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs) also contributed to the arrangements of the meeting. Douglas E. Sanders, The Formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1977), 13-14. Marie Smallface-Marule, Vicky Santana, and Ricardo Contreras attended as National Indian Brotherhood staff members. Peter McFarlane, Brotherhood to Nationhood: George Manuel and the Making of the Modern Indian Movement, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1993), 200. The meeting took place at Christiansborg Castle and guests were formally welcomed by Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen. Robert Petersen, personal correspondence, 14 May 2012 and 20 February 2014.
³ McFarlane, 201.
⁴ The countries represented included Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Finland, Greenland (Denmark), Guatemala, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
The inspiration of the conference delegates was clear. The structure of the poetic Solemn Declaration, adopted at the conference, is unmistakably anti-colonial. It begins with a description of pre-colonial life:

We glory in our proud past:

- when the earth was our nurturing mother,
- when the night sky formed our common roof,
- when the Sun and Moon were our parents,
- when all were brothers and sisters,
- when our great civilizations grew under the sun,
- when our chiefs and elders were great leaders,
- when justice ruled the Law and its execution.\(^5\)

The paragraph, which seeks to unite all those varied peoples represented, uses vaguely spiritual language but naturally leaves out any specific details which might not apply equally, for instance, to the Māori, the Sámi or the Secwepemc with their different customs and beliefs. While the description is perhaps meant to evoke a connection to nature frequently (and often quite correctly) claimed by and ascribed to Indigenous peoples, there is nothing here that could not be proclaimed with equal pride by any civilization on earth, including Europeans. It is rather the succeeding paragraphs that set apart the conference's represented peoples from others around the world with a historically focused “before and after” comparison. They describe the brutal experience of invasion and colonization; their

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determination to maintain their way of life, their culture, and their memory; and finally, their continued marginality despite their resolute assertion of peoplehood:

Then other peoples arrived:

thirsting for blood, for gold, for land and all its wealth,
carrying the cross and the sword, one in each hand,
without knowing or waiting to learn the ways of our worlds,
they considered us to be lower than the animals,
they stole our lands from us and took us from our lands,
they made slaves of the Sons of the sun.

However, they have never been able to eliminate us,
nor to erase our memories of what we were,
because we are the culture of the earth and the sky,
we are of ancient descent and we are millions,
and although our whole universe may be ravaged,
our people will live on
for longer than even the kingdom of death.

Now, we come from the four corners of the earth,
we protest before the concert of nations
that, “we are the Indigenous Peoples, we who have a consciousness of culture and peoplehood
on the edge of each country's borders and marginal to each country's citizenship.”

And rising up after centuries of oppression,
evoking the greatness of our ancestors,
in the memory of our Indigenous martyrs,
and in homage to the counsel of our wise elders:

We vow to control again our own destiny and
recover our complete humanity and
pride in being Indigenous People.⁶

While wrapped in romantic language, the final three paragraphs emphasize the delegates’ collective aspirations. They wish to collaborate with Indigenous Peoples globally (“from the four corners of the earth”) to work not at the level of (sub-)national governments but in the international arena (“before the concert of nations”), to (re-)claim their right to self-determination as peoples (“to control again our own destiny”).

These themes likely originated from statements made in the five workshops scheduled during the conference.⁷ The workshops focused on the formation of a World Council of Indigenous Peoples (global collaboration); representation at the United Nations (international arena); the retention of cultural identity (ongoing maintenance of culture and memory); the retention of land and natural resources (self-determination or at least autonomy); and social, economic and political justice.

The Solemn Declaration is explicitly political. Noticeably missing from its six stanzas are demands for basic improvements in healthcare or standard of living. The “before and after” contrast emphasizes justice rather than development, and although the economic issues were a partial focus of one of the five workshops, they were framed within the category of

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⁷ Guy Lavallée, a Métis priest who helped organized the conference, remembers it involving “a lot of group work... a lot of late night sessions and meetings... until the wee hours of the morning.” Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012.
economic justice not economic development. Demands for “economic justice” implicitly historicize inequality and assign responsibility (to some past injustice), whereas the discourse of “economic development” tends towards an ahistorical and apolitical explanation for the same inequality. When the World Council was established, it clearly espoused the former view, wherein colonial encroachment on Indigenous sovereignty and the economic poverty of Indigenous populations are considered deeply entwined, not the latter, in which those issues are framed as largely unrelated. This emphasis followed the model of those Third World leaders who demanded that the international community “be awake to history” and make changes in its power structures “in the spirit of justice, not charity.”

This chapter will also use the theme of “before and after” (though not in such a stark contrast) to demonstrate how a succession of subtle changes within the World Council shifted the organization's emphasis away from demands for justice and sovereignty towards efforts at technical development, whether economic, health, social, or otherwise. This change reflected the interests of the World Council's primary sources of funding, but was also influenced by global shifts in political discourse surrounding development and by the difficulties the WCIP faced in securing alternate funding as a result of the global political environment created by the Cold War.

4.1 The Anti-Politics Machine

In his 1990 monograph, The Anti-Politics Machine, James Ferguson examines the process of “development” in Lesotho. His study was explicitly designed not to evaluate the successes or failures of the project as defined by the development community, but to cast an

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anthropologist's eye on the institutions and their effects on the country. According to Ferguson, development work was always framed as purely technical, and therefore, the focus of development planners and workers was consistently on what could be done to help in a purely technical capacity. This focus rendered local idiosyncrasies and political dynamics invisible, favouring technical analyses which could be applied universally to push “undeveloped” countries along a single standardized path of modernization. Thus, development workers represented Lesotho as “…a country with a geography, but no history; with people, but no classes; values, but no structure; administrators, but no rulers; bureaucracy, but no politics. Political and structural causes of poverty in Lesotho are systematically erased and replaced with technical ones…” Moreover, this development ethos limited any action or support to that which was technical and apolitical:

An analysis which suggests that the causes of poverty in Lesotho are political and structural (not technical and geographical), that the national government is part of the problem (not a neutral instrument for its solution), and that meaningful change can only come through revolutionary social transformation in South Africa has no place in “development” discourse simply because “development” agencies are not in the business of promoting political realignments or supporting revolutionary struggles.

For Ferguson, the “instrument effect” of development was “the suspension of politics from even the most sensitive political operations” and the creation of an “anti-politics machine.” Although several academics have examined the effect of this “anti-politics

10 Ferguson, 66.
11 Ferguson, 68-69.
12 Ferguson, 256.
machine” in other geographic settings,\textsuperscript{13} this chapter will consider its effects on an international organization, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, with a constituency that was unified only in political (anti-colonial) terms.

4.2 Funding the WCIP: The Growth of Development Funding

Before examining the effects of development funding on the World Council, it is worth tracing the organization's funding sources from its very beginnings to look for trends and patterns that can be mapped onto WCIP policy shifts. Prior to the first World Conference of Indigenous Peoples in 1975, there were two international preparatory meetings in Georgetown, Guyana\textsuperscript{14} (in 1974) and in Copenhagen, Denmark in the spring of 1975. Despite the leadership of George Manuel (head of Canada’s National Indian Brotherhood at the time) in initiating these meetings, neither appears to have received funding from the Canadian government.

The Government of Guyana officially hosted and provided administrative support for the first preparatory meeting\textsuperscript{15} but most of the conference's costs were paid for by the Anglican Church of Canada, the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace (CCODP), Oxfam Canada and the World Council of Churches. These funds were largely the result of work done by Guy Lavallée, a Métis priest (Missionary Oblates of Mary


\textsuperscript{14} This meeting was described in considerable detail in Chapter Three above.

\textsuperscript{15} United Nations Archives (hereafter UNArch), Consultative Arrangements and Relations with the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (hereafter UNWCIP), S-0446-0286-0001, WCIP Questionnaire for ECOSOC Status, 1978.
Immaculate) from St. Laurent, Manitoba. Lavallée studied at the Sacred Heart Scholasticate, a seminary in Lebret, Saskatchewan during the early 1960s, and was deeply influenced by the decisions of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). This renewal of the Catholic Church included the promulgation of “The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World” (Gauidum et Spes) which “challenged Catholics not to divorce religion from their cultural, social, and political engagement with the world, but rather to promote justice as integral to the Church’s mission.”\textsuperscript{16} This pronouncement motivated Lavallée to help improve the lives of Indigenous people: “As a Catholic priest, my motivation was coming from that Vatican II Council, to get involved in the world. The Church has no business being centred on itself. It has to be involved.”\textsuperscript{17} In 1971, he was hired to manage the “Indians of Canada Pavilion” (still functioning after Montreal's Expo '67), where he organized a large celebration attended by several prominent Indigenous leaders from across the country.\textsuperscript{18} George Manuel was evidently impressed with Lavallée's handling of the event, and convinced him to arrange his own secondment from the Oblate mission office to the National Indian Brotherhood, in order to raise funds for the planned Georgetown meeting.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{17} Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. While Lavallée was not involved in its initial design, the “Indians of Canada Pavilion” has a fascinating history of its own. See Myra Rutherdale and Jim Miller, “It’s Our Country’: First Nations’ Participation in the Indian Pavilion at Expo 67,” \textit{Journal of the Canadian Historical Association} 17:2 (2006).
\textsuperscript{19} Lavallée's salary for his fund-raising work at the NIB was paid with a personal donation from a fellow Oblate priest who was teaching at the University of Ottawa and was supportive of the project. The first task Manuel assigned Lavallée was to lead a group of First Nations dancers on a tour of Germany in 1972. The tour was arranged by German-Canadian social clubs based in Kitchener, Ontario. Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012, and personal correspondence, 10 February 2013.
Lavallée contracted the CCODP and arranged a meeting with its director Jacques Champagne, who did not require much convincing to support the initiative: “We hadn't spoken 10 seconds [when] he took out his cheque book and gave us $25,000. That was the beginning. We never looked back.”

The support from the CCODP is not particularly surprising, given that the organization was founded in direct response to *Gaudium et Spes* (a statement crafted with significant input from the Canadian bishops who attended the Second Vatican Council). Although they established the organization with an official intention to pursue economic development, members of CCODP were also influenced by the ideas of “liberation theology” and social justice espoused at the Second General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate that met in Medellin, Colombia in 1968. With this inspiration, the rights of Indigenous peoples eventually became one of the main focuses of the CCODP. For the organization's 1979-80 Share Lent campaign, it even produced an educational kit entitled “The Rights of Indigenous People to Shape their own Destiny.”

Other Christian denominations were also going through a period of renewal and were keen to support the WCIP. The World Council of Churches' (WCC) Fourth Assembly in Uppsala in 1968 had agreed on a statement in opposition to racism, and urging churches to become “actively concerned for the economic and political well-being of exploited groups...” and to “make economic and educational resources available to underprivileged groups for

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20 Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012.
21 “Of the sixteen documents promulgated by Vatican II, none had greater Canadian content that Gaudium et Spes. The Canadian bishops made seventeen interventions during debates on this document, by far the most Canadian comments on any discussion at the council.” Baltutis, 50-51.
22 Ibid., 228-230.
23 Ibid., 223.
their full participation in the social and economic life of their communities.”

The resulting WCC Program to Combat Racism disbursed over four million dollars to liberation movements around the world during the 1970s. As mentioned in a previous chapter, George Manuel had met with their representatives in 1972 and, as promised, the organization served as a major sponsor of the preparatory meeting in Georgetown.

While Lavallée preferred to work behind the scenes rather than as a political spokesperson, he would not divide politics from religion, echoing the sentiment of *Gaudium et Spes*: “People who claim that politics and religion don't work together... don't understand what religion is, let alone politics. Those two are intertwined just like your blood and bones in your body.”

He attended the Georgetown preparatory meeting, after which he was tasked with securing financial support for the planned conference. He made a three-week fund-raising trip to eight European countries in 1974 to solicit funds from various religious and

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25 Among others, these included “UNITA, the MPLA and GRAE in Angola; the PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau; FRELIMO of Mozambique; SWAPO of Namibia; the Luthuli Memorial Foundation of the ANC of South Africa; and ZANU and ZAPU of Zimbabwe.” Welch, 866, 883n59.

26 George Manuel Diaries (hereafter GMD), 19 June 1972. One of those representatives, Dwain Epp, would also chair the press conference George Manuel would give at the UN in New York following his 1979 fact-finding trip to Chile to investigate the situation of Mapuches. GMD, 3-4 July 1980.

27 Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012. Over the life of the World Council, several members of the organization's executive (George Manuel included) had complicated relationships with both Christianity and their particular Indigenous spirituality. It may be partly for this reason that, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, the WCIP defined “Indigeneity” on a strictly political/historic basis rather than on cultural traits—as the Indigenous relationship with religion remained unresolved. No solution to this issue was required in order to move forward on the issue of Indigenous rights.
secular charities, as well as trips to meet with private foundations in the United States. By May 1975, the conference organizers had managed to raise $87,000. The second preparatory meeting in Copenhagen was hosted by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), an association of concerned anthropologists based in Denmark. The IWGIA also made a donation while the conference was being planned, but suggested the organizers hold back the money in reserve in case the meeting led successfully to the creation of a new Indigenous organization, which would need core funding itself. When delegates at Tseshaht formed the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, this seed money was the only real funding the organization had for its first two years.

In addition to religious and private organizations, significant funding for the World Conference of Indigenous Peoples in 1975 came from government ministries, but not from national government development agencies. Hugh Faulkner, the Secretary of State for Canada, decided at the last minute to provide $15,848. Here George Manuel's personal skills were likely of primary importance. Faulkner had experience working with Manuel on “Citizenship Programs... directed at helping First Nation Reserves, etc. to develop leadership” and described him as “the best leader [the National Indian Brotherhood] ever

28 Lavallée would later attend the conference before returning to his work as a parish priest. Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012.
29 McFarlane, 201.
30 IWGIA managed to secure a small grant from the Swedish International Development Agency, which they used to pay for the meeting. Jens Dahl, IWGIA: A History (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2009), 30.
32 Financial figures are listed in Canadian dollars unless otherwise noted. Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), R219 Department of External Affairs fonds (hereafter EAF), 45-13-3-7, Part I, correspondence from External Affairs to Canadian Embassy in Stockholm, 4 November 1975.
33 In 1950, Canada's Indian Affairs Branch and its Citizenship Branch had been united under the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, which provided Citizenship Programs to encourage the assimilation of both immigrants to Canada, and its original inhabitants. In 1966, Indian Affairs was merged into the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Citizenship Branch was moved to the Secretary of State. The Citizenship Branch, however, continued to run programs for Status Indians. See
produced in my years in Ottawa. He advanced the cause with quiet determination, integrity and huge intelligence. I had great respect and complete trust in him...”34 Faulkner was the only non-Indigenous person invited to speak at the 1975 conference, where he delivered a welcome speech.35 An internal memo to the Canadian Embassy in Stockholm acknowledges Canada’s surprise at the size of the Danish and Norwegian contributions (about $18,000 each, in addition to travel grants). The Swedish and Finnish governments also gave travel grants to delegates.36 The precise reason behind the generous support from Denmark and Norway is unclear, but they might have been successfully lobbied by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs' Helge Kleivan, a prominent Norwegian anthropologist working in Denmark. All contributed funds for the conference totalled over $183,000.37

As long as Manuel was the President of both the National Indian Brotherhood and the WCIP, the two organizations could easily share the NIB's office in Ottawa, as well as its resources. He decided, however, not to run for re-election as NIB President in 1976, so the World Council—teetering on bankruptcy by the end of that year—began to look for a new home.38 In March 1977, the WCIP moved its offices to the University of Lethbridge, under the directorship of Marie Smallface-Marule. She had recently taken up a teaching position there, and the University offered to let her run the WCIP out of the newly established Native

34 Hugh Faulkner, personal correspondence, 3 May 2012.
American Studies department. Once again, religious groups provided funds to keep the organization going. The Anglican Church's Primates World Relief and Development Fund and the CCODP both provided some basic funding for operating costs in 1977, enough for Smallface-Marule to hire two students to assist in her work.\footnote{Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs Resource Centre (hereafter UBCICRC), WCIP, Four-Year Report (1977-1981); UNArch, UNWCIP, S-0446-0286-0001, WCIP Financial Statements, 30 Sept 1977.}

The World Council received more substantial support for the Second General Assembly in 1977 in Kiruna, Swedish Sápmi. The Nordic countries made significant contributions, especially Norway. Along with two other bodies of the Canadian state (the Secretary of State and the Department of Indian Affairs), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) made its first donation; each contributed about $20,000 to pay for Canadian and Third World delegations to attend.\footnote{LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, Memorandum from Marantz to Midwinter, 18 Aug 1977.} But in less than a year, the organization was again nearing bankruptcy with $45,000 of debt, most of it left over from the Kiruna conference the previous year. As of 1978, the organization had never had permanent salaried staff – it was run by two short term employees and volunteers. A shortage of permanent translators or Spanish-speaking staff made it difficult to communicate with member organizations in Latin America.\footnote{Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives (hereafter NFAA), 26.8/54 Beskyttelse av innfodte folkeslag (Protection of Indigenous peoples) fonds (hereafter BIF), Binder 5, letter from George Manuel to Thorval Stoltenberg (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 20 January 1978.} This may have helped increase concerns that the organization was being dominated by Canadians, and was not paying enough attention to the Indigenous peoples of Central and South America.\footnote{This concern was first raised at the founding conference in 1975, likely owing in part to the organizing staff and location of the conference. Duquette, 62-3.} Any such concerns seem to have been quieted when delegates at the Third General Assembly (1981) in Canberra passed a

resolution to create two Vice-President positions (with one effectively reserved for a delegate...
from Central or South America) and elected a new president, José Carlos Morales (Boruca from Costa Rica).\textsuperscript{43} Morales later would comment on his own surprise about the small offices and sparse staff of the WCIP Secretariat in Lethbridge. “Member countries often have a different idea of the WCIP headquarters. They think of it as a big place employing many people... Now I can tell member organizations how the secretariat works and the limitations and the problems they face.” He also emphasized, however, that the “stable political climate” in Canada provided the WCIP with a good working environment.\textsuperscript{44}

With help from IWGIA, Smallface-Marule made a tour of Northern Europe in 1978 to solicit financial support for the World Council. She met with a variety of potential funding sources, and with Ole Henrik Magga of the Nordic Sami Council to prepare funding applications to Nordic governments.\textsuperscript{45} In 1979, Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) gave the organization the first substantial support it would receive for core funding: 300,000 NOK (about $66,000) from its emergency fund. That year, the ministry had established a group of senior civil servants from all the Nordic countries to communicate on the issue of Indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{46} At a meeting in December 1979, Knut Sverre (the NMFA's Special Adviser on Human Rights), asserted that his country was committed to working with Indigenous peoples because Norway had its own Indigenous people, and because Indigenous peoples were the international community’s “stepchild” in that they lacked a real advocate at

\textsuperscript{43} This position was made explicit in a formal amendment to the charter in 1984. Duquette, 66. An updated version of the charter, showing the amendments can be found in LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 5.09,
\textsuperscript{44} Lethbridge Herald, 15 September 1981.
the international level. While these civil servants were supportive of the promotion of Indigenous rights in principle, some raised concerns that Nordic state backing might be poorly received by other governments that considered the matter a domestic concern and resented Nordic support for the WCIP (or IWGIA) as interference in their internal affairs. There was, however, general agreement among attendees that, because the World Council was the organization the Sámi had joined, this committed the Nordic countries to the WCIP to some extent.

The money from Norway also came with a promise of renewal the following year if funding from the Canadian government could also be secured. This may have helped convince CIDA, which decided to lend its support, agreeing the following spring to a contribution of $200,000 over two years. CIDA renewed this funding and continued to provide it, although somewhat unevenly, until the end of the organization in 1979. Figure 1 depicts CIDA funding overlaid with the total funding the organization received. CIDA's donations consistently made up the overwhelming majority of the organization's funding, often over 90% but normally in the 75-90% range. The support of religious organizations

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47 This is surprisingly early for Nordic governments to be recognizing the Sámi as an Indigenous people. Official recognition would not come until much later. NFAA, BIF, Binder 6, Minutes of Nordic Council Senior Officials Meeting for the Promotion of Indigenous Peoples' Interests, Oslo, 6 December 1979. Author's translation, with assistance from Terje Lilleeng at the Centre for Sami Studies at the University of Tromsø.

48 Other members of the group were supportive, but somewhat concerned that the promotion of Indigenous rights around the world would not be well received by some countries that considered the matter a domestic concern and might consider Nordic support for the WCIP (or IWGIA) to be interference in their internal affairs. NFAA, BIF, Binder 6, Minutes of Nordic Council Senior Officials Meeting for the Promotion of Indigenous Peoples' Interests, Oslo, 6 December 1979.


50 Duquette provides a table with strikingly different figures for the 1989-1994 period, which suggest that CIDA’s contribution made up as little as 14.73% of the World Council's total budget in 1992 and less than 20% in 1990 and 1992. Her data seems to have been culled, however, from the WCIP's budget proposals to CIDA which depicted the World Council's hopes rather than its financial reality, and encouraged the agency to believe other sources of core funding would be found to minimize long-term dependence. The data in this chapter's graphs are taken from the actual financial records of the WCIP, and the tremendous
did not end in the 1970s. Over the five-year period between 1986 and 1991, the CCODP alone provided the World Council with over $175,000. Through the 1970s and 1980s, WCIP presidents would continue to meet with WCC representatives who would provide occasional funding. Nevertheless, the financial support from those organizations was dwarfed by the contributions from CIDA. It seems only reasonable to assume that this level of government funding, and dependence on that funding, might have had some effect on the World Council and its policies. To explain the degree of its “depoliticizing” effect, however, it is worth first investigating why CIDA provided this funding in the first place.


52 GMD, 19 March 1976 & 18 September 1977; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 32.1, correspondence from Julie Vergara (WCIP) to James Mutambirwa (WCC), 20 May 1988; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 32.2, Cheque from WCC for WCIP, 23 November 1987; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 28.8, letter from Vergara (WCIP) to Reber and Mutambirwa (WCC), 6 January 1988; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 32.1, letter from Vergara (WCIP) to Pityana (WCC) 14 Nov 1988; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 22.8, letter from Vergara (WCIP) to Sindab (WCC), 17 April 1989. The WCC's focus on Indigenous peoples would continue to grow. At its Sixth Assembly in Vancouver, Canada in 1983 (attended by WCIP Vice-President Melillan Painemal), it would make a formal statement on land rights for Indigenous people. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 29.21, WCIP Newsletter 4, Feb. 1984. Its Seventh Assembly in Canberra was greatly influenced by the issues of Indigenous peoples in Australia. Welch, 907. The WCC and the associated US National Council of Churches (NCC) were supportive of the International Indian Treaty Council as well. The IITC was provided with a very affordable rental arrangement for its first New York offices, subletting from the NCC in the Church Center For the United Nations, directly across from the UN Headquarters. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 September 2010. This positive relationship may have deteriorated, however, after Jimmie Durham's departure from the organization in 1979. In 1981, AIM denounced all Christian churches as “an arm of colonization and imperialism” and claimed that they “extort over $60,000 a year in rent alone from [AIM], the [IITC], and the Survival Schools located in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota. University of New Mexico Center for South West Research (hereafter UNMCSWR), Tonantzin Land Institute Records, MSS 666, Box 21, Folder 2, American Indian Movement Press Release Information Package, 10 December 1981.
WCIP End of Year Financial Statements have been collected from UNArch, UNWCIP, S-0446-0286-0001, (1977, 1979); NFAA, BIF, Binder 5 (1978), Binder 9 (1980-81), Binder 12 (1983); LAC, WCIPF, Volumes 10.17 (1986), 34.9 (1987), 34.6 (1988-89), 33.3 (1990), 34.10 (1991-96). Financial statements for the fiscal years of 1975, 1976, 1982, 1984, 1985 have not been located. For the former two, levels of total income are estimates based on my interview with Guy Lavallée. Complete data for 1985 was included in the 1986 Financial Statement for perspective. In 1981, the WCIP was awarded a two-year promise of $452,666, and likely received $210,618 in the first year (1982). This is reflected in the graph, but the total budget or spending for that year is unknown. For 1984, the graph has been left blank due to lack of information. It is clear that the WCIP received $50,000 from CIDA in January 1984 as a temporary measure until a larger contract was finalized. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.11, letter from Smallface-Marule (WCIP) to Leger (CIDA), 20 February 1984.
4.3 Was CIDA an Anti-Politics Machine?

If, as James Ferguson suggests, the Canadian International Development Agency was (or was part of) an “anti-politics machine,” why did they fund an overtly political organization like the World Council which had shown little or no interest in economic development? CIDA rejected Marie Smallface-Marule's request for funding for the 1975 conference. The agency's NGO division asserted that the application had “received very careful consideration here and in the Department of External Affairs” and claimed to be “most sympathetic to the aims and objectives of the Conference” but rejected it nonetheless. The rejection letter included a copy of CIDA guidelines, suggesting it might be useful if the National Indian Brotherhood decided to undertake a “development project” in the future, which would fall “within the mandate of CIDA which could form the basis of cooperation.”

While the specific reasons for the rejection are not addressed, this seems to imply that CIDA would not support the World Conference because it was purely political in nature, and so the letter encouraged a turn towards international development work which was apolitical and could therefore qualify for funding under CIDA's mandate.

But this stand contradicted the announcement made by External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp just a year earlier, in October 1974, that CIDA “would receive requests for funds for freedom groups in Namibia, Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories and South Africa” and that their aid policies would demonstrate “where we stand on the issues of racist and colonialist injustices.” Sharp explicitly rejected the idea that this kind of aid should be

54 LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, letter from Bateman (CIDA) to Marule (WCIP), 4 Nov 1975. Possibly because the conference was being organized by the National Indian Brotherhood, a Canadian Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), correspondence occurred with CIDA's NGO branch, not the agency's newly formed (1972) International NGO branch.
avoided out of concern that it might be considered “interference in other countries' affairs.”

Apparently, the Canadian government was happy to provide aid to political opposition groups when a state's policies were in fundamental disagreement with those of Canada, and even adopt the rhetoric of anti-colonialism when doing so. CIDA's mandate, it seems, was able to expand significantly given the right political conditions.

The right political conditions to secure CIDA funding arrived for the World Council, as mentioned above, in 1979. This shift was likely due to the influence of Canada's new Secretary of State for External Affairs, Flora McDonald. As a Conservative Member of Parliament, McDonald had served as the opposition critic for Indian Affairs and built up a good relationship with George Manuel. When she came to power with Joe Clark's new minority government, she wrote a determined letter prodding CIDA to provide financial support to the World Council and pointing out the fact that Scandinavian governments already had begun to do so. The agency jumped into action, sending John McRae, the head of its International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO) division, to Lethbridge to assist Smallface-Marule with the paperwork, and an agreement was settled a few months later in early 1980.

How could an international development organization like CIDA justify providing $200,000 of support for a political organization based in Canada? Judith Moses (External

55 Montreal Gazette, March 20, 1974; Windsor Star, March 20, 1974
56 While McDonald mentioned funding from “several Scandinavian countries,” to my knowledge, the WCIP had only received core funding from Norway. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, letter from Flora MacDonald to Martial Asselin (Minister of State for CIDA), 26 Sept. 1979. David Morrison notes that MacDonald generally “voiced strong support for the work of NGOs and a desire to increase their funding.” David R. Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance (Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1998), 158.
Affairs, Development and Export Financing Policy Division) advocated in support of the contribution, and provided a long list of reasons.\textsuperscript{58} She emphasized a desire to allow cross-fertilization between domestic development and development in Third World nations: “As purveyors of foreign aid with technical domestic experience we are in a position to portray our experiences in a '...world laboratory...' context abroad and contribute to development experience domestically.”\textsuperscript{59} She also stated that

Canadian indigenous people can be regarded as ambassadors for Canada's domestic and international intention to address human rights issues in concrete terms. Canada's domestic human rights record with indigenous people, while by no means perfect, is perhaps unparalleled in world terms...\textsuperscript{60}

This, she contrasted with allegations of cultural genocide in other countries. So in this case, CIDA funding would hardly be anti-political. Rather, it would be quite the opposite; the agency was using Canadian-Indigenous relations to promote political change elsewhere.

Moses also argued that “[m]ore radical North American Indian groups are competing for international attention” and that Canada had “a responsibility to support moderate indigenous groups willing to work with governments rather than pass the responsibility by default to more radical groups to dominate world development of indigenous groups.” And furthermore, “[t]he political, economic and social alienation of indigenous people in some countries makes them particularly vulnerable to extreme solutions of the sort proposed by more radical groups.”\textsuperscript{61} This seems to be a clear reference to the (militant) American Indian Movement's international wing, the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC). The Treaty

\textsuperscript{58} LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, letter from Moses to Morden, 28 Nov 1979.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
Council had received ECOSOC consultative NGO status in 1977 and hosted a major United Nations Conference on Indians in the Americas the same year in Geneva. Moses was suggesting that the Canadian government should try to undercut the IITC's global prominence, even if that wasn't the World Council's intention. Incidentally, members of the IITC suspected as much or even worse. An article in the Treaty Council's newsletter entitled “Our Enemies Are Trying to Confuse Us” accused the American government of trying to undermine their organization by intentionally setting up “parallel organizations” (including the WCIP) “which look good, and always have lots of money.” Finally, Moses argues at the same time, that the WCIP could potentially reach some of the most oppressed people in the world, but she tellingly uses the terms “NGO projects” and “NGO operations” without explicit reference to economic or technical development. All of these points suggest that, whatever mandate External Affairs set out for CIDA, the ministry could and did support political organizations when Canada's political interests were served.

Moses, however, was born on the Six Nations reserve, and her family ties may have coloured her approach to Indigenous internationalism. Not everyone at External Affairs was so keen to support the World Council. The following year, Verona Edelstein (Director of United Nations Social and Humanitarian Affairs Division of External Affairs) informed CIDA that the WCIP

...appears to undergoing an evolution of particular interest to the Government of Canada. Should the current WCIP leadership persist in its pursuit of an international campaign against the Constitutional Proposals of the Government as an over-riding priority, we might

wish to re-assess the degree of support, or indeed the appropriateness of continued support for this organization.  

The WCIP had supported the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs’ attempt to take its complaints about the aforementioned Canadian constitutional proposals to the United Nations where its representatives met with Issoufou Saidou-Djermakoye, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization.  

Perhaps in response, an Ad-Hoc Working Group on Indigenous Peoples was formed early in 1981 by twelve members of External Affairs Canada, CIDA, the Department of Indian and Northern Development to discuss Canadian support for the WCIP. There was particular concern about a press report issued by the WCIP in New York that “identified self-determination as a WCIP objective (in the decolonization sense)” and “included comments to the effect that Canada has no right to question Soviet or other abuses of human rights internationally.” Such comments, argued Edelstein, were a threat to Canadian interests abroad. She noted that the WCIP was “a valuable NGO” so long as it remained “primarily interested in North-South questions,” but suggested that efforts should be made to discourage *politicized* debate about Indigenous peoples at the United Nations. Apparently CIDA funds
could legitimately be used to fund political organizations, so long as the politics benefited Canada. If and when these organizations started to criticize or embarrass the Canadian government, the recipients of CIDA funds were suddenly expected to avoid the political and focus on economic development.

CIDA administrators defended the World Council in that meeting and attendees eventually agreed that it was premature to contemplate interrupting funding to the WCIP (which would, in any case, serve to greatly antagonize the organization). It was noted, however, that if the Canadian government ever became “totally disenchanted” with the World Council, the best course of action would be to communicate that assertion to other friendly governments who also provided financial support to the organization.67 In other words, Canada would not simply cease to provide funding, but would work to ensure that other governments did likewise. The financial and diplomatic support provided by CIDA was not threatened by the World Council's nature as a political organization per se, but that support could be threatened depending on which particular political positions its leadership chose to adopt.

CIDA grew more supportive of the WCIP in the early 1980s, after Ronald Leger became head of the INGO division. As CIDA was concerned with international development and the INGO division was set up to support international organizations, the mix of delegates elected to the WCIP's Executive Council appears to have helped the World Council's chances. Leger asserts that the WCIP was helped not only by the fact that it had “a broad southern membership, but in addition it was initiated and headquartered in Canada as was

Thus World Council's combination of Canadian and “Third World” membership helped make it appealing to CIDA. Moreover, there were changes at the INGO division in the early 1980s that made the WCIP a good fit. According to Leger, “CIDA became more welcoming to the World Council following a greater focus of the INGO division's mandate on institutional building...in four priority areas: 1) Population and basic health 2) the environment and human settlements; 3) Basic education and Training; 4) Human Rights, community and social communication and Policy Dialogue and Third World exchange.” WCIP's main goals must have been close enough to a match, particularly to this final priority area, to help convince CIDA to provide funding. The synchronicity between the WCIP's need and CIDA's decision to support these kinds of INGOs was no coincidence. The tremendous growth of NGOs during this decade (from 2,795 in 1972 to 12,686 in 1984, according to the Union of International Associations) included a great flowering of civil society organizations that focused on the very same issues that CIDA was prioritizing. During the 1970s, numerous prominent NGOs were founded to focus on human rights (Human Rights Watch, 1978), the environment (Greenpeace, 1970-72), international exchange (International Student Exchange Program, 1979), health (Médecins Sans Frontières, 1971) and population issues (Centre for Development and Population Activities, 1975). The WCIP's interest in all of these topics not only allowed it to attend and make

68 Ibid. Nevertheless, part of CIDA's support for international organizations was their ability to “offer a link with Third World NGOs that have no Canadian affiliates.” Sarah Kambites Mukebezi, “Non-Governmental Organizations as partnering agencies: A Case Study of the Relationship between Canadian NGOs with CIDA and Kenyan Local Groups,” (Ph.D. Thesis, McGill University, 1995), 95.
69 Ronald Leger, personal interview, 10 July 2013 and personal correspondence, 20 February 2013.
71 In his chapter on this period of growth for NGOs, Akira Iriye provides nearly the exact same list of issues as the most important ones for new organizations. Iriye, 126-156.
72 Ibid.
presentations at an array of conferences, but also made it an ideal organization for CIDA to support. While other development agencies may have made grants to international organizations, “CIDA took a more comprehensive approach to the issue, and was one of the few agencies with a specific mechanism accessible to an international NGO.” The new focus provided, therefore, a fairly unique opportunity for the World Council to gain consistent core funding as a civil society organization (and for its member organizations), rather than for one-off technical development projects.

In early 1983, after the end of its 1980-82 grant to the World Council, CIDA was again debating future funding for the WCIP. At CIDA's Project Review Committee, “several concerns were raised about continued CIDA support. WCIP's objectives were seen as more international than developmental and therefore not under CIDA's mandate. Other questions were raised about political sensitivity...” A memo from CIDA President Margaret Catley-Carlson in November 1983 sought cabinet approval for a substantial increase in funding for the WCIP. The memo states that from 1979 to 1983 (~4 years), CIDA had contributed a total of $735,166 “towards general institutional support and their regional activities in Central and


74 LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part 1, letter from Rivington (CIDA) to Cowie (Indian and Northern Affairs), 18 Aug. 1983. The source of these concerns is not mentioned in the Rivington's letter. Notably, a response from Indian and Northern Affairs supported the view of Moses, mentioned above, that the WCIP was boosting the image of the Canadian government: “while it lies within the mandate of the WCIP to criticize the implementation of Canadian policy regarding indigenous peoples, the WCIP will be more likely to use Canada's achievements in this area as an example for evaluation by the rest of the world. The Council, in its dealings with Third World indigenous groups, will probably promote their development following the lines of the Canadian model and may encourage them to lobby their governments for CIDA assistance.” LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part 1, letter from McDowell (Indian and Northern Affairs) to Rivington (CIDA), 12 September 1983.
South America.”

WCIP had further support from the Nordic Council and Australia, and requested $1.1M over two years, which was described as about 25% of WCIP's total budget. Catley-Carlson acknowledged that the WCIP's activities to that point had been “mainly international workshops, conferences and networking” and that certain WCIP activities might be outside acceptable parameters “especially as they relate to the promotion of their general objective in international fora.” As well as several WCIP executive council meetings and general assemblies, representatives of the World Council had attended numerous other international events related to Indigenous culture, Indigenous rights, anti-racism, women's rights, human rights and various other topics. Yet Catley-Carlson also

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75 LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, Memo to Minister from Catley-Carlson, “CIDA seeking cabinet approval to negotiate an approval-in-principle to fund WCIP to provide money to member organizations for the purpose of development in Latin America,” 18 Nov. 1983.
76 Ibid. The Australian government provided approximately AUD $90,000 to the planning committee of the third WCIP General Assembly in Canberra. LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, correspondence from Canadian High Commission in Canberra to External Affairs Canada, 5 Dec. 1980. The World Council staff may have not disclosed the precise nature of the financial support, as CIDA did encourage organizations to seek alternative sources of core funding. The Australian funding was not mentioned in the WCIP's annual financial statement of March 1981. NFAA, BIF, Binder 9, WCIP Financial Statement, 31 March 1981. Unfortunately, the annual statement for 1982 is missing from the WCIP funds at Library and Archives Canada, so it is difficult to know how the Australian funding was formally reported to CIDA.
77 LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, Memo to Minister from Catley-Carlson, “CIDA seeking cabinet approval to negotiate an approval-in-principle to fund WCIP to provide money to member organizations for the purpose of development in Latin America,” 18 Nov. 1983.
78 Between 1977 and 1981, the World Council had organized eight meetings of its executive council, two general assemblies (Kiruna in 1977 and Canberra in 1981), a cultural exchange between Canada and Argentina (1978), and a four-day workshop for the Congress of Americanists (Vancouver, 1979). Its representatives had attended, among other events, the first two CORPI general assemblies (Panama, 1977 and Mexico, 1981), the first two Inuit Circumpolar Conferences (Alaska, 1977 and Greenland, 1980), the Second Barbados Conference (1977), the-first National Congress of Indians of Ecuador (Sucua, 1977), the International NGO Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in the Americas (Geneva, 1977), the UN Conference Racism and Racial Discrimination (Geneva, 1978), the Northwestern Regional Conference on the Emerging New International Economic Order (Seattle, 1979), the Davvi Súvva Festival (Gárasavvon, 1979), the founding CISA conference (Ollantaytambo, 1980), the World Conference on the UN Decade for Women (Copenhagen, 1980), an NGO conference during the UN Special Session on Development (New York, 1980), an International NGO Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the Land (Geneva, 1981), and several other UN meetings. In 1979, George Manuel had represented the World Council on the Ad-Hoc Committee of the Canadian Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America’s fact-finding mission to Chile. UBCICRC, WCIP Four-Year Report (1977-1981). In 1982, the organization had been represented at the 38th Session of UN Commission on Human Rights (Geneva), the World Assembly of First Nations (Regina), and the first UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (Geneva). LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 29.21, WCIP Newsletter, December 1982.
pointed out that the increased level of funding would allow the World Council to develop its institutional capacities so as to enable the organization to “strike a better balance between its development objectives and its advocacy role.” In other words, increasing the level of funding would allow (or encourage?) the World Council to make economic development a larger priority.

It could be that Catley-Carlson was simply “selling” the increase in funding to her political superiors with the idea that it would push the World Council toward a greater focus on economic development, but she does specify that the increase would

...require special efforts [from the WCIP] over the next two years to strengthen its development programming capabilities at headquarters and at the regional levels in the Americas. (...) [an evaluation will be carried out in [Fiscal Year] 1984/85; satisfactory progress to meet the development objectives...will be a pre-requisite to further CIDA funding.

In fact, much of CIDA's funding to the WCIP did go toward to development in South and Central America. In 1977, Indigenous delegates in Panama formed a regional branch organization of the World Council for Central America, CORPI. Indigenous peoples of

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79 LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, Memo to Minister from Catley-Carlson, “CIDA seeking cabinet approval to negotiate an approval-in-principle to fund WCIP to provide money to member organizations for the purpose of development in Latin America,” 18 Nov. 1983.
80 Ibid.
81 The organization, founded during a Panama City conference between 24-28 January 1977, was initially known as the Consejo Regional de Pueblos Indígenas (México, Centro-América y Panama). LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 3.12, Calendario Del I Congreso Internacional Indígena de Mexico, Centroamérica y Panama, 24-28 de Enero de 1977; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 3.12, Summary of CORPI Executive Council meeting, 5 April 1977. Armando Rojas Smith (Miskitu, Nicaragua) would serve as its first president, with José Carlos Morales (Boruca, Costa Rica) as secretary general, and Eleazar López Hernández (Zapoteca, Mexico) as treasurer. Morales would go on to serve as President of the WCIP (1981-1984), and then Vice-President under Clément Chartier. In 1981, the organization began to use the name Coordinadora Regional De Pueblos Indios instead. This decision was likely made at the second CORPI General Assembly 4-7 March 1981 in the P’urhépecha community of Cherán Atzicurin in Michoacán, Mexico. See LAC, WCIPF, Folder 3.13 (CORPI Second General Assembly, 4-7 March 1981).
South America followed in 1980, meeting in Peru to form their own branch organization, CISA.\(^{82}\) A substantial amount of the financial support the WCIP received was simply transferred to these Central and South American branches. A memo from External Affairs Canada in 1985 explicitly stated that, while Canada did support the World Council through CIDA,

...[the] major part of CIDA's contribution is simply rechanneled by WCIP to Indigenous organizations which have undertaken development projects in [the Latin American] region. Funding for administrative elements of WCIP work is written into agreement with CIDA only to the extent that these are related to development activities in Latin America.\(^{83}\)

Because the INGO division's mandate had always been focused on funding programs in the Third World, Ronald Leger asserts that it was the very existence of these regional branches that encouraged CIDA funding for the WCIP.\(^{84}\)

The Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) took a slightly different approach. It considered supporting the World Council with core funding in 1978, but backed away, with a statement that it could only be involved in supporting development. In the early 1980s, NORAD signed contracts to provide funding to CISA and CORPI directly, rather than allowing the World Council or (and this would become a source of tension) the Nordic Sami Council to be involved. The decision to focus on these branch organizations in “developing” regions enabled NORAD to restrict its funds, at least in theory, to specifically development-

\(^{82}\) The *Consejo Indio de Sud America* was formed at a meeting in Ollantaytambo, Peru from 27 February-3 March 1980. NFAA, BIF, Binder 7, *Primer Congreso Indio Sudamericano, 27 de Febrero al 3 de Marzo 1980*. The meeting received $30,500 in matching funds from CIDA. LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, correspondence from External Affairs Canada to Canadian Embassy in Lima, 14 Dec. 1979.

\(^{83}\) LAC, RG22, 45-D140-W1 Part I, correspondence from External Affairs Canada to Canadian High Commission in Canberra, 3 December 1985.

\(^{84}\) Ronald Leger, personal interview, 10 July 2013 and personal correspondence, 20 February 2013.
related projects.\footnote{Oddly, however, NORAD did provide substantial financial support for a Geneva office of the World Council to interact with UN activities there. According to the contract, however, this office was to be organized and staffed by the Nordic Sámi Council. As Henry Minde points out, Sámi delegates rarely used the World Council as a platform to criticize their own national governments. Henry Minde, “The International Movement of Indigenous Peoples: an Historical Perspective,” in \textit{Becoming Visible: Indigenous Politics and Self-Government}, eds. Terje Brantenberg, Janne Hansen, and Henry Minde (Tromsø: Centre for Sámi Studies, 1995), 24. The Geneva office, however, was short-lived. It was set up in August 1984, under the control of Aslak Nils Sara’s sister Gunhild Sara for a few months until Leif Dunfjeld was appointed as its director. It was closed down in late 1986. NFAA, BIF, Binder 20, Leif Dunfjeld, “Rapport til Nordisk Samerad Fra World Council of Indigenous Peoples Liasonkontor i Geneve” (Report to Sámi Council from WCIP Geneva Office), 24 July 1986; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.20, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 2-4 September 1987} In January 1984, NORAD transferred NOK 509,700 (approximately US $68,880) to CISA to disburse to local organizations for three development projects: a cultural centre in Argentina (Centro Kolla); a cultural and leader training program for Aymara and Quechua in Peru (\textit{Asociacion Civil TEA}) and a leader training program in Chile (\textit{El Surco/Ad-Mapu}).\footnote{Norwegian Agency for Development Archives (hereafter NORADA), 443.1 Private Organizations Fonds (hereafter POF), DUH 1364, 83-3474 \textit{Støtte til kulture sentra og lederopplæring, fase I} (Support for cultural centers and leadership training, phase I), Contract between The Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD) and Consejo Indio de Sud America (CISA), 2 January 1984.} The “leadership training” was intended to include “technical, economical and social aspects” in order to develop “agriculture, stock raising and industrial sectors” at the local level. Later that year, NORAD provided funding for additional projects in South America, including the publication of a book on traditional medicine, and the creation and strengthening of agricultural co-operatives (in Peru and Bolivia).\footnote{NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, 83-5201 \textit{Pakke II, div. prosjekter, Peru, Bolivia} (Package II, div. Projects, Peru, Bolivia), letter from Johannessen and Eie (NORAD) to CISA, 1 Oct 1984.}

Members of the World Council and its regional branches, however, were hardly unaware of this push from NORAD and CIDA away from critical political statements and towards “apolitical” economic development. On the contrary, there is evidence, detailed below, that many recipients of this financial support knew exactly what the aid agencies had in mind, and did their best to evade it.
4.4 Resistance to the Anti-Politics Machine

Indigenous leaders were quite conscious of the threat of intrusion by funding agencies and the risks that influence posed to the “Fourth World” movement. As George Manuel noted, “most funding agencies prefer to impose their own aid programs and fail to recognize the fundamental need of the poor to control their own development and the impossibility of such control without their own organizational development and means.”88 The retention of Indigenous political control and an emphasis on Indigenous sovereignty were key elements in the World Council's mandate. As such, the World Council and other Indigenous leaders found strategic “wrenches” to toss into the “anti-politics machine.” These included alternative sources of funding to, direct confrontation with, and creative subversion of governmental development agencies.

4.4.1 Resistance: Alternative Funding

The implications of financial support from different actors were discussed by delegates at the preparatory meetings in Georgetown and Copenhagen. Lavallée remembers that, initially, there was serious reticence to accepting any direct government support which, it was feared, might limit the organization's independence.89 Sam Deloria also recalls concern at the Georgetown preparatory meeting over his suggestion that money might be secured from the Ford Foundation and other corporate foundations. The Canadian delegates in particular were worried about accepting money from, in Deloria's words, the “corporate monster.”90 He recalls, however, that a delegate from Colombia (likely Trino Morales) responded defiantly: “I feel confident that I'm going to do what my job is, what my mission

89 Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012.
90 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
is, and in so doing, I would take money from the Devil himself. But if you guys can't trust
yourselves then, by all means don't take money from the Ford Foundation."91 That seemed to
resolve the issue, and the Ford Foundation did eventually provide a grant of $4000 in 1976
which enabled seven WCIP representatives to attend the annual United Nations NGO
conference in Geneva Switzerland that year.92

The World Council did, however, make an effort to search for alternate and more
politically acceptable sources of financial assistance. As mentioned above, Manuel sent Guy
Lavallée on a fund-raising tour through continental Europe, including the Vatican.93 Manuel
approached the ILO in Geneva in 1972 and met personally with a staff member, Cedric
Hennis, to request support both for his bid for ECOSOC observer status and for the first
World Conference of Indigenous Peoples.94 He was told that the organization was “not
interested in embarrassing the Canadian government.”95 In 1975, Manuel sought advice on
funding from Kalman Kaplansky, Canadian delegate to the International Labour Organization
and requested help from James Wilson of the Minority Rights Group in the United
Kingdom.96 Marie Smallface-Marule and George Manuel also sought funding from newly
independent African states with anti-colonial ideologies. Their close contacts with senior
diplomats in Ottawa from Tanzania, Cuba and Barbados and other anti-colonial countries

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91 Ibid. This conversation must have occurred in hotel, in the days previous to the conference, if Trino
Morales was present, as he was deported before the formal conference started. See Chapter 2, page 80.
92 Ford Foundation Archive, Central Index cards. Thanks to Lucas Buresch of the Rockefeller Archive Center
for sending me this information. Sami Archives (hereafter SA), Nordic Sami Institute Fonds (hereafter
NSIF), Series Db (Organization) 043, 4 (Ark 2.10.1), George Manuel, Report on the WCIP, 20 January
1977.
93 GMD, 4 June 1974; Guy Lavallée, personal interview, 15 July 2012. This trip was followed up by George
94 GMD 21-22 June 1972
95 McFarlane, 170.
96 GMD, 7 November 1975 and 20 June 1975.
seemed a reasonable place to start. In 1973, they had already put forward a vague effort to seek funding from Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan ruler and fervent anti-imperialist. In March 1976, Manuel and Smallface-Marule met with one Mr. Mohammed Maharume who promised to “put us in contact with Arab funding representatives.” In 1978, Manuel travelled to Havana with Marie Smallface-Marule's husband Jacob Marule to solicit support from the Cuban government. In Manuel's own words,

> I am here to seek financial aide for the WCIP because the so-called free world (Imperialists) is not willing to financially assist me develop an organization tool for the world Indigenous oppressed, deprived, starving and being murdered people that I want to help through a peaceful leadership organization development program through which they, Indigenous peoples, can help themselves. [sic]

None of these efforts led directly to financial support for the World Council. George Manuel seemed particularly disappointed that the Cubans would not be convinced, but at the same time, he does not seem totally surprised:

> They want to dig deep into our past and into our motives for the future and assess whether we are friends or foes, before they decide, whether they should or should not give us support. But then all the political camps we have visited have taken this same response to our appeal for help from them.

Governments around the world—even those of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)—were deeply influenced by Cold War politics. Most members of the NAM did have close ties with one side of the American-Soviet conflict, and many held an ideological view of global politics. The World Council fit poorly within that framework, particularly in the Latin America.

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97 Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 13 June 2012
98 GMD, 20 December 1973
99 GMD, 6 March 1976.
100 GMD, 15 January 1978.
American theatre. The organization could not be trusted to support left-wing or right-wing governments in Central or South America, because its role was to stand between those governments (regardless of their political orientation) and Indigenous peoples. Although Third World internationalism in Africa might have been, as Vijay Prashad suggests, “internationalist nationalism” distinct from European nationalism and uninterested in forcing the cultural assimilation of Indigenous peoples and other ethnic minorities, Latin American nationalism was much more of the European sort. Nor were Indigenous peoples generally supportive of the kinds of modernization and industrialization proposed by Third World leaders, Indigenous people's lack of statehood made them not just non-aligned, but unalignable, at least not over the long term. This outsider quality made the WCIP a risky bet for any government during the polarized environment of the Cold War.

The World Council maintained some contact with the Non-Aligned Movement through a Tanzanian diplomat. Mwinamila (Michael) Lukumbuzya was High Commissioner in Sweden when George Manuel first met him in 1972 while attending the UN Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. At that first meeting—again arranged by Jacob Marule, who was also in Stockholm at the time—they discussed “the possibility of our International Indigenous peoples conference” and “the political development of the 3rd world.” Lukumbuzya later became High Commissioner to Canada, maintained contact with Manuel, and even paid a visit to the WCIP Secretariat in Lethbridge, but with his death from

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103 See the World Council's reaction the proposals for the New International Economic Order below.

104 GMD, 6 and 11 June 1972.
cancer in 1981, the Fourth World lost its strongest ally in the Third World.\textsuperscript{105} While the World Council's connections in the Third World never provided any substantial funding for the organization, they did provide (as detailed below) a source for ideological inspiration and vocal criticism of both imperialism and “neo-imperialism.”

Efforts at raising funds from the American government or private American funding agencies were not particularly successful either, though attempts were made on several occasions. The NIB and World Council made several fund-raising trips to the United States, and tried to enlist the help of Kanien'kehá:ka Chemical Engineer Andy Anderson, founder of the American Indian Science & Engineering Society. George Manuel was convinced that AIM and the International Indian Treaty Council were more successful at securing funding than the more liberal private agencies because of their political profile.\textsuperscript{106} Deloria, likewise, points out that both the scholarly and international communities were dismissive of federally-recognized and elected Indigenous leaders (represented by the NCAI in the United States, and the NIB in Canada) whom AIM had successfully framed as “sell-outs.” Prominent “progressive” actors were convinced that “the real Indians, the good Indians, were the Treaty Council, and AIM, and anybody with feathers on.”\textsuperscript{107} The World Council's basic membership structure might not have met left-wing and liberal expectations for Indigenous radicalism either. The WCIP allocated membership to national organizations representing Indigenous peoples in each nation state, rather than to “traditional” tribal units which appear more pure, less tainted by colonialism. Deloria implies that this critique impacted the World Council's

\textsuperscript{106} GMD, 18 May 1978.
\textsuperscript{107} Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
general level of acceptance at the United Nations. Certainly, the fact that the WCIP only
gained “Category II” consultative status at ECOSOC in 1981 (whereas the IITC had had it
since 1977) would not have helped convince early potential donors of the organization's
global significance. It might be for this reason that the World Council, with its more
conservative image, failed to gain more support in the United States, but the ultimate source
of this deficiency remains unclear. The Inter-American Foundation, an agency of the US
government, initially promised $150,000 of core funding. When the funds failed to arrive,
Manuel wrote and called until finally receiving an answer: the people the organization would
be funding were too politically involved to receive funding, so the application was rejected.\textsuperscript{108}
Another application to the Ford Foundation around the same time was rejected on similar
grounds: “[t]hey said there was too much political groups [sic] in South and Central America
and we can't fund them.”\textsuperscript{109} Perhaps the reputation of the WCIP was too radical for some
private donors, and not radical enough for others. Moreover, Ronald Leger (CIDA) suspects
that the World Council “never had sufficiently enthusiastic support from USA Native
American organizations (like the National Congress of American Indians) to garner funding
from US government agencies” which, as he recalls, “rarely supported any organization
unless it had a strong American component or support.”\textsuperscript{110} And so the organization came to
depend heavily on the one aid agency that was willing to take the chance of providing regular
core funding: CIDA. In 1984, a proposal by Ossie Cruse, a member of the WCIP Executive
Council representing Australia's National Aboriginal Congress, suggested that the World

\textsuperscript{108} LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.7, Transcript of WCIP Executive Council Meeting, Lethbridge, Alberta, 9-13
December 1983.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Ronald Leger, personal correspondence, 20 February 2013.
Council should consider moving its headquarters to Geneva to encourage financial contributions from outside Canada.\footnote{Duquette, 89.} The World Council did set up a small office in Geneva, but perhaps a formal relocation would have placed their CIDA funding at risk.\footnote{Ibid., 89.} At any rate, the organization's headquarters remained in Canada throughout its life.

\section*{4.4.2 Resistance: Critique and Confrontation}

While the World Council did grow to include certain elements of traditional “development” in its plans and programs, the initial steps in that direction were taken in ways that either implied a critique or openly criticized the “anti-politics machine.” The World Council’s goals always consisted of both economic and political elements. George Manuel asserted that “[s]elf-government, even on its grandest level, without an economic base simply creates the economic colonialism we are witnessing throughout much of Asia and Africa.”\footnote{George Manuel and Michael Posluns, \textit{The Fourth World: An Indian Reality} (Don Mills, Ont.: Collier-Macmillan, 1974), 204.} He and Smallface-Marule sought an alternative route that would allow true independence, and they believed that such a route had been followed in Tanzania.

Manuel and Smallface-Marule had been deeply influenced by the philosophy of Julius Nyerere, whose concept of “\textit{Ujamaa}” (or “African Socialism”) offered one of the most cohesive alternatives to the industry-focused, aid-dependent conceptions of development.\footnote{Gilbert Rist, \textit{The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith}, 3rd Edition (New York: Zed Books, 2008), 123-139.} After his 1971 trip to Tanzania, Manuel had read from Nyerere's \textit{Uhuru na Ujamaa} (\textit{Freedom and Socialism}) which contains Nyerere's formal statement on economic
development, the 1967 Arusha Declaration. Nyerere's concept of “self-reliance” or “auto-centred development” was that an alternative to capitalism or state-centred socialism could be based in traditional communal life rather than on Rostowian or Marxist modernization theory, both of which assumed that all societies should (or would inevitably, in the case of Marxism) progress through the same linear economic stages that European societies had. It criticized these plans for development as too reliant on foreign aid (“Gifts and loans will endanger our independence”) and industrialization (“We have put too much emphasis on industries”). Just as the Third-Worldist Movement favoured cooperation between its members, Nyerere favoured “concentric circles” of self-reliance to promote African unity. It is therefore unsurprising, given Manuel's interest in maintaining Indigenous cultural and political sovereignty and building worldwide cooperation, that he was drawn to Ujamaa and critical of Western-led economic development.

George Manuel's diary shows the degree to which he adopted Nyerere's language and adapted the latter’s ideas to the circumstances and cultures of Indigenous peoples in North America and around the world. Sometimes the references are more overt, like Manuel's confident assertion that his formulation of an “ideology for North American Indian Socialism

116 Bonny Ibawoh and J.I. Dibua suggest that, in practice, Ujamaa had much in common with Fabian and Marxist socialism, and suffered from the same weakness as other Western development initiatives (a paternal attitude toward peasantry and the acceptance of Western standards of living as a goal. Bonny Ibawoh and J. I. Dibua, “Deconstructing Ujamaa: The Legacy of Julius Nyerere in the Quest for Social and Economic Development in Africa,” African Journal of Political Science 8:1 (2003) 61-63. For more on Nyerere's broader political vision, see the introduction to this dissertation. Gilbert Rist's chapter “Self Reliance: The Communal Past as a Model for the Future” in The History of Development might present an overly rosy depiction of Nyerere's actions, but it provides an excellent summary of his basic concepts. Rist, 123-139.
118 Rist, 83-85, 127.
will thrive and progress, regardless of the struggle in Indian generations yet to come into
being. This idea will survive and weather the attack of Europeans.” 119 Other times, it is more
subtle, like a public lecture about “developing Indian unity on the basis of Indian philosophy
of the spirit of sharing. The White Man’s colonial philosophy breeds greed and hate amongst
mankind.” 120 Describing the work of writing his book, “The Fourth World,” he states “I am
interested that my political theories develop a political, social and economical and cultural
philosophy that will incite a united direction and objective of the Indian people towards
cultural, political and economic independence.” 121 While Manuel may have hoped that his
book would offer such a philosophy, the completed work is primarily a historical account of
colonialism in North America and the contemporary relationship between Indigenous peoples
and the Canadian government. The book offers very little concrete description of the future
Manuel would like to see, but he does describe his visit to Africa and state that “Tanzania is
the closest example to my understanding of the way that Indian people want to develop
[with]a structure and style and economic organization that allows the whole community to
share in...good things, and to decide which are the higher priorities in moving” forward. 122 He
emphasizes, however, that Nyerere had, after achieving formal political independence, used
“the tools of sovereignty...to begin to build their nation.” In Tanzania, he saw the hope that
“there were ways modern technology can be adapted to traditional values.” 123 For instance,
Manuel points out that Tanzania’s “decision to postpone the development of a national

119 This is a clear adaptation of Nyerere's goal of culturally appropriate African Socialism. GMD, 14 July
1974. My emphasis.
120 Manuel's description of his speech at the National Canadian Indian Women’s Conference in Saskatoon.
GMD, 24 March 1972.
121 GMD, 19 October 1972.
122 Manuel and Posluns, 246.
123 Ibid., 244.
television network had been made in order to leave the limited funds available free to
develop eight local radio networks that could accommodate all the local languages.”\(^{124}\) Thus, Manuel's experiences in Tanzania encouraged him to believe that sovereign Indigenous-led
development, guided by the right philosophy, could benefit society without creating a
disparity of wealth and power, and without promoting cultural assimilation. In contrast to
Tanzanian development, Manuel expresses his criticism of economic development by the
Canadian state: “I attended Economic Development group for a short while and found the
discussions were on the [Indian Affairs Bureau's] Economic Development Policy frame
work, which is a farce. The Indians' will to develop their own framework, which will meet
their criteria and needs.”\(^{125}\) But he feels Nyerere's concept of self-reliance would benefit
Indigenous peoples elsewhere as well: “We must help the Indians of Mexico and Guatemala
implement and achieve their desire for self-determination. Self-reliance through self-help
actions collective [sic].”\(^{126}\)

George Manuel's references to Nyerere and Third-Worldism are perhaps more
common in the year after his return from Tanzania, but they continue to appear throughout
his political career. In 1978, speaking to students at the University of British Columbia, he
declared that the Canadian government and the Canadian people were forcing Indigenous
peoples to align “more and more with the Third World Community. I told them we would
alliance [sic] ourselves with the Third World Nations if we did not get satisfactory co-
operation from you as white Canadians and your governments.”\(^{127}\) While Manuel rarely

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124 Ibid., 244-5
125 GMD, 12 April 1972. Later that year, he again criticizes the IAB Economic Development Program,
describing it as “designed from the top in isolation from any philosophy.” GMD, 14 November 1972.
126 GMD, 19 October 1982.
127 GMD, 10 May 1978. According to his diary, Manuel received a standing ovation for this lecture.
commented on international news in his diaries, in an entry from May 1980, Manuel remarks on the death of Josip Broz Tito, who “introduced the Non-Aligned Nations Organization by founding the first meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.” As late as 1982, a decade after his meeting with Nyerere and reading of *Uhuru na Ujamaa*, Manuel still stresses in his diary the importance of “self-reliance within the framework of the ideology of socialism and the Indian beliefs of communalism.” This tremendous influence clearly left Manuel believing that economic development for Indigenous peoples would only be sustainable it was included in a larger package of political change, led by Indigenous peoples themselves, and orchestrated in harmony with traditional culture.

Delegates at the Second General Assembly of the World Council (Kiruna, Swedish *Sápmi*, 1977) recognized Indigenous peoples' need for technical and scientific information, but did not request it in the form of “technical development” programs organized by state governments, but rather, in the form of *exchange* between the Indigenous populations of different countries. They equally expressed a need for economic assistance, but attendees requested “funds for Indigenous Peoples...to be used for agrarian and natural resources development” and “subsidies from governmental or international economic institutions through the granting of long term [sic] credit at low interest.” The World Council was opposed neither to the use of natural resources nor to economic change; on the contrary, it opposed the use of natural resources and opposed economic change; on the contrary, it

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128 GMD, 3 May 1980. Tito actually died the following day, so Manuel must have recorded this entry later and confused the date. Another rare example includes this comment from 5 November 1976: “I am very interested in the racist armed political struggle that is taking place in Rhodesia between the racist Prime Minister Ian Smith and the Black people who are the majority and own the country of Rhodesia.”

129 GMD, 10 March and 2 August 1982. In the later case, he makes these (quoted) comments in a discussion with Chen Yongling, a visiting Chinese scholar from Beijing's Central University of Nationalities. Manuel may have continued to reference Nyerere and other Third-World leaders after 1982, but if he continued to record diaries after that year, I do not have access to them.

supported both with the condition that Indigenous peoples were in control of the use of their own resources and economies. These are demands for support for greater economic sovereignty, not state or external intervention. In the early 1980s, the WCIP Charter's requirements for membership were amended to emphasize the importance of self-determination to the organization and the link between political sovereignty. Whereas in 1975, the charter had only required “a national organization... representative of Indigenous peoples of any given country”\textsuperscript{131} the new charter required that members be national organizations “representative of Indigenous Peoples of the county whose objectives are to further their economic self-sufficiency and to attain self-determination.”\textsuperscript{132}

The 1979 WCIP application for CIDA funding states that the project's specific objective is to help establish and strengthen regional offices of the World Council. These branches would thereafter have the strength to publicize their regional problems to the international community “especially in the context of [the] New International Economic Order,” to negotiate directly with their governments for control over land and resources, and to contact international agencies for assistance with development projects.\textsuperscript{133} That the New International Economic Order (NIEO) is referenced is telling. The highly politicized approach to global economic disparity was proposed in 1974 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), a body dominated by the Non-Aligned-Movement countries. The main tenets of the NIEO supported economic growth in the Third

\textsuperscript{132} This change seems to have been made at the Third General Assembly (1981) in Canberra, but archival documents and secondary sources make no mention of when the change was made. LAC, WCIPF, 5.09, Charter of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Amended 1987.
\textsuperscript{133} NFAC, BIF, Binder 7, “WCIP Project Number 337-60/W24-2, Regional Councils Development, Supplementary Information,” 1979/80.
World both through the expansion of international trade and through increased financial aid from the First World, but at the same time, they accused foreign investment and First-World-led development projects of undermining state sovereignty in the Third World.\textsuperscript{134} At the time, many observers considered the NIEO to be expressing the “revolt of the Third World” but Gilbert Rist suggests it was just the opposite: “In reality...its aim was to realize a long-standing dream of world capitalism: that is, to ensure continuing growth of the system as a whole by better integrating the peripheral countries.”\textsuperscript{135} The WCIP's formal comment on the NIEO, also from 1979, seems to echo this critique, depicting the promotion of increased industrial development within the proposal as a combined threat to Indigenous peoples and their lands.

Developing countries, once colonies of the technological and industrial powers, have become the consumers of the future and seek to institute a second industrial revolution by ravaging tribal areas... The last frontier on earth is now the last home and territories of Indigenous peoples. For indigenous peoples throughout the world, the U.N. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order could mean their ultimate and final destruction...\textsuperscript{136}

At the same time, as the NIEO seemingly presented a window of opportunity in which the international economic system be renegotiated and reshaped, the WCIP also suggested it could be a sign of hope if Indigenous peoples' rights to sovereignty were respected:

\textsuperscript{134} Rist, 149.
\textsuperscript{135} Rist, 150. Vijay Prashad, however, continues to insist that the 1973 United Nations General Assembly resolution on the New International Economic Order was “the highest point of the Third World Project” and charts the decline of Third-Worldism from that point onward. Vijay Prashad, \textit{The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South}, (London: Verso, 2012), 3.
Indigenous populations must become a part of the global dialogue on the new international economic order, with guarantees for their protection and right of self-determination. Each state must be willing to recognize indigenous territories and the separate and distinct rights of tribal populations. (...) The World Council of Indigenous Peoples must be recognized as the official international organ representing the voice of indigenous peoples worldwide, and a formal governmental seat within the United Nations must be established to provide indigenous representation by appointment of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples.\textsuperscript{137}

Given this critical yet somewhat hopeful view of the NIEO, the World Council was requesting funds from CIDA in order to strengthen its regional branches so that they would be better able to fight against the programs for economic development which failed to recognize their sovereignty.

In March 1983, while CIDA was deciding whether to review the World Council's funding, Marie Smallface-Marule decided to confront the agency more directly with her views on the interconnected nature of political empowerment and economic development. She was teaching at the University of Lethbridge at the time, and had assigned her students readings from *Perpetuating Poverty*, a book by Roger Carty, Virginia Smith and the Latin American Working Group (LAWG) that was deeply critical of CIDA, the Bretton Woods institutions, and international development programs generally. She decided to include the work's explicit critique, quoting it verbatim, in her request for funding. Her letter emphasized the need to promote North-South Solidarity, but also to encourage aid which does not remove political aspects of work:

\textit{...the new goal for aid giving—and other criterion for selecting aid partners—should be the advancement not merely of 'basic needs', but the more encompassing fulfillment of 'basic rights'...political content...} \textsuperscript{137} Ibid.

147
cannot be eliminated from aid giving because authentic development is always a political process as much as an economic and social one... (We would like to see that) the politics which guide Canadian aid would be those of solidarity with oppressed people and their struggles for political and economic liberation.\textsuperscript{138}

Smallface-Marule's decision to launch this head-on attack against the “anti-politics machine” may well have contributed to the year-long delay before CIDA renewed their contract, but she made it clear that the World Council would not simply abandon its political ideals in exchange for annual funding. By the time the next round of funding arrived in the spring of 1984, however, the World Council had moved its headquarters to Ottawa and Smallface-Marule was no longer involved. There is some evidence, however, that this critique by the WCIP (and presumably, by other organizations) might have had an effect on CIDA in the long term. In the mid-1990s, WCIP administrator Ricardo Contreras reported that the push for the removal of politics from developmental work had weakened “with greater understanding on the part of agencies such as CIDA that democratic and human rights development is tied to economic and social development.”\textsuperscript{139}

4.4.3 Resistance: Subversion and Circumvention

The requirements of CIDA funding placed significant demands on the World Council's administration. In addition to the detailed proposal, WCIP staff were required to


\textsuperscript{139} Duquette, 96.
provide CIDA with regular progress reports, audited annual financial statements, and other
documentation.\textsuperscript{140} There was consistent pressure from CIDA to seek funding elsewhere (so
that the WCIP would not be overly reliant on Canadian funds) and to apply funding to
development projects, yet NORAD steadfastly insisted on funding only the World Council's
regional branch organizations for development programs. In the end, one of these problems
was used creatively to solve the other. In a World Council executive meeting, Smallface-
Marule acknowledged that in her applications to CIDA, she was including development-
project funding from NORAD and other organizations designated solely for CORPI and
CISA in the World Council's sources of income.\textsuperscript{141} This made CIDA's contribution look like a
smaller percentage of the total WCIP budget, even if CIDA's budget made up the
overwhelming majority of the World Council's core funds, and made development projects
look like a much larger percentage of the World Council's total budget. The funds from
NORAD never passed through the WCIP headquarters at all, yet the South and Central
American organizations were technically branches of the World Council.

Indigenous peoples in Central and South America also tried to subvert and circumvent
the “anti-politics machine.” Among the South American development projects NORAD
sponsored in 1984 was a cultural centre in Argentina (Centro Kolla). Centro Kolla's contract
described planned training in “music, song, language, history and of agricultural and
handicraft products, arrangements of traditional feasts and ceremonies, etc.”\textsuperscript{142} This seems

\begin{footnotes}
\item[140] In return, however, they could hardly be depended upon to deliver funding on schedule. Since they needed
to review financial reports from one quarter before providing funding for the following quarter, cash flow
problems were endemic. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.7, Transcript of WCIP Executive Council Meeting,
\item[141] Ibid.
\item[142] NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, 83-3474 \textit{Støtte til kulture sentra og lederopplæring, fase I} (Support for
cultural centers and leadership training, phase I), Contract between The Norwegian Agency for
\end{footnotes}
rather apolitical and therefore acceptable to NORAD. Yet Centro Kolla's year-end report reveals interests that go far beyond the merely cultural: “This year, Centro Kolla...established new strategies to project indianny as a political alternative, capable to re-structure our existence of colonized people by rebuilding our history...and replevy our personality and dignity of being autonomous people, sovereign and true owners of the land we stand on [sic].” The Centre organized a conference focused on “the reality of the present indian nations, with their history development, and the effects over their development, a millenary peoples, of the western colonization[sic].” It launched “an indianist campaign together with CISA’s advisor, Salvador Palomino, through the Toba communities... and through Pilagás and Mantacas communities...” It commemorated the death of Tupaj Amaru—leader of an eighteenth century Indigenous uprising against the Spanish in Peru— with a “replevin march” through the main streets of Buenos Aires. Possibly under the guidance of CISA leaders, Centro Kolla's project proposal had consciously avoided the political, yet once NORAD had transferred the funds, the Indigenous organization had shifted its emphasis towards land rights and sovereignty. In Chile, the NORAD-funded Ad-Mapu leadership training program was likely proposed with the best of intentions, but as their final report states, the received funds were diverted to more pressing political concerns:

International Development (NORAD) and Consejo Indio de Sud America (CISA), 2 January 1984. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. Tupaj Amaru is more commonly known as Túpac Amaru II (1742 – 1781). The WCIP does not seem to have made much use of historical Indigenous rebellions in its own advocacy work, perhaps lacking events or figures with significance to all Indigenous peoples around the world. It did, however, invest a great deal of effort in commemorations of the 500th anniversary of Columbus' landing, and as early as 1988, criticized any planned celebrations of the anniversary. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 13.12, Nordic Sami Council, Report on International Conference and VI General Assembly of WCIP; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 29.22, WCIP Newsletter 1 (1988).
...other more demanding needs arose which altered the original plan... the current government decreed, with law No. 2568, the creation of administrative machine with the express purpose of taking a census of indigenous communities of Chile for their immediate division, so putting an end to the communitarian way of life of the Mapuches... It was therefore of vital importance to direct available financial resources, which until then had been in the Mapuche coffers for training, to tackle the legal problem.\textsuperscript{146}

Similarly, CIDA- or NORAD-sponsored budgets for the World Council and its branch organizations included terminology and technical jargon under the heading of “development” that suggest clever semantic evasion of the “anti-politics machine.” Significant allocation areas with titles like “organizational strengthening,” “human resources development,” and “regional evaluation” look innocent enough, but could just as easily be spent on political work as anything technical or economic without any actual clear breaches of contract.\textsuperscript{147}

From Leger's description, the INGO Division's policies seem somewhat ambiguous. He asserts that CIDA “emphatically did not fund political work, but it did provide funds for the 'institutional strengthening' of civil society organizations that engaged, among other things, in public awareness of their organisations [sic] mission.”\textsuperscript{148} Apparently, this could include organizations that were quite explicitly political in nature. This loop-hole provided the World Council and its regional branches with the possibility to channel funds to overtly political uses. Moreover, because the bulk of the funding that the World Council received from other agencies could not be used for core funding, it often went to pay for the organization's regular General Assemblies, which were largely if not exclusively political meetings. CIDA,

\textsuperscript{146} NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, 86-1882 Ad-Mapu kultur sentra, Chile, Mapuche Cultural Centres' Financial Report on the Project “Training Mapuche leaders of Chile,” February 1986.
\textsuperscript{148} Ronald Leger, personal interview, 10 July 2013.
by contrast, preferred not to fund General Assemblies, and according to Donald Rojas, this was because CIDA was “afraid that their funds will go towards political activities in countries of which Canada has friendly relations.”\textsuperscript{149} Since the alternative core funding was not available, the WCIP administration did its best to spend the money it received from CIDA on the true goals of the organization whenever possible.\textsuperscript{150}

### 4.5 The Effects of Effects Development Aid Agency Funding

#### 4.5.1 Effects: The Growth of Development Work

Whether or not it was really CIDA's goal to encourage the World Council to strike a “better” balance between economic development and political work, this was the end result. During its first years, the WCIP spent very little time or money on anything that would be considered development work. One notable exception might be the funds it helped raise to contribute to an emergency fund for victims of the February 1976 earthquake in Guatemala.\textsuperscript{151} Even then George Manuel's attitude about the purpose of development came through in his report:

> At the time the money was turned over...no concrete plans had been made to expend the funds, but the indigenous people plan action when they have the resources... However, several ideas were already being voiced – for example, a communal house that would serve to unite the people and facilitate consciousness-raising and awareness of

\textsuperscript{149} LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.17, WCIP Executive Meeting Minutes, 3 October 1986.
\textsuperscript{150} At the 1979 Nordic meeting of senior officials, there were mixed feelings about advent of Canadian support for the WCIP. While it seemed to lend the organization credibility and sustainability, attendees also worried that the World Council might become “Canada-dominated.” NFAA, BIF, Binder 6, Minutes of Nordic Council Senior Officials Meeting for the Promotion of Indigenous Peoples' Interests, Oslo, 6 December 1979.
\textsuperscript{151} In one of the WCIP's poorest years, it managed to donate $8,257 to the Kaqchikel community of Tecpán. SA, NSIF, Db 043, 4 (Ark 2.10.1), George Manuel, Report on the WCIP, 20 January 1977.
present day situations. The indigenous language could be taught there to the children.  

In her analysis of the World Council, Deidre Duquette notes that in the mid-1980s “the WCIP began...to look seriously at development activities.” The following graph indicates that once CIDA sponsorship started, official development spending (including all transfers to CORPI and CISA) averaged 30-50% of the annual budget. From 1979 until at least 1983, much of this money may well have gone to “organizational strengthening.” After all, the World Council had political reasons to support the growth of these regional branches as well. But there is evidence that CIDA's funding influenced the WCIP to adopt development as a fundamental part of its work.

153 Duquette, 93.
Fig 2: Financial support for the WCIP and CIDA spending on “development”\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{154} For sources, please refer above to the footnote 53 (below Fig. 1) on page 121.
A Tri-Annual report presented at the WCIP Fourth General Assembly in 1984 initially describes the organization's objectives as being split between political and economic objectives, neither section mentioning the issue of “self-determination” or “sovereignty.”

Later in the document, it is asserted that “the focus of the indigenous people of the world must be firmly fixed on the goal of self-determination” but that the WCIP must work toward this goal through “practical and realistic endeavors” and “must allow pragmatization and not rhetoric [sic] to guide its activities.” George Manuel's espoused hope for an Indigenous ideology or philosophy was slowly being rejected. In 1987, the World Council's Five Year Plan of Action split a description of the organization's “areas of work” equally between “Socio-Economic Development” and “Intergovernmental Relations and Human Rights.”

While not wholly divorced from claims to sovereignty, the plan's stated goal for socio-economic development is that it should “lead to self-determination in the long term.” At its founding, the WCIP had demanded international recognition of Indigenous peoples' inherent right to self-determination on the basis of history and justice (and perhaps economic development as a basis for future self-sufficiency). It now prized economic development as its immediate goal, believing it would eventually create an environment which could enable self-determination.

A special workshop, entitled “The Indian Peoples Facing Development,” was organized immediately prior to the Fifth WCIP General Assembly in July 1987. The

156 At one point, the report even describes self-determination as an “unfolding process,” an unclear and rather moderate characterization of the organization's end goal. Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 The workshop was organized in the community of Ollantaytambo from 4-9 July 1987, while the General Assembly took place from the 11-17 July, in Lima, Peru. LAC, WCIP, Vol. 34.6, Report on The
participants were primarily delegates or Indian leaders of the base organizations of CORPI and CISA, but also included consultants from CIDA and other technical teams who implemented development projects. The reports from the meeting demonstrates a complicated view of development. Delegates specifically emphasized the rejection of “Western models imposed by the Nation-States in development projects for Indian Peoples,” and asserted that the “Western system of development does not offer humanity concrete models. With its merchantilist [sic] and warfaring technologies, it leads Man to immediate and/or gradual self-destruction, because of its disrespect for the close relationship between Man and Nature.” Yet the General Assembly formally accepted that it was “necessary...to admit at the same time that such values as their communitarian and collective nature, must be adapted to the demands of the modern economy and the institutional influence of the bureaucratic apparatus of the Nation-State.” Economic development was again a means to promote self-sufficiency with Indigenous self-determination, hopefully, as an end result. The assembly acknowledged that "this political goal requires a material base" and recommended "the establishment of working relations with financial organisms [sic], economic entities of the Nation-State and financial institutions in general." The members organizations of the World Council International were still determined to demand their right to self-determination, but financial and development assistance was now explicitly accepted as a necessary step to achieving that right.

Development Program: Coordination, Administration and Implementation of the V General Assembly of the WCIP (August 1987).

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.
In 1986/7, former WCIP Vice-President Melillan Painemal and former CISA Treasurer Juan Lincopi Contreras made formal allegations of financial mismanagement and even corruption in CISA, prompting a series of audits by NORAD and CIDA. The auditors had difficulty giving complete reports because the financial documentation by CISA and its member organizations was so poor. They did not suggest personal embezzlement, but they did state that the member organizations had not followed standard accounting practices, and in at least a few cases, they had spent money on projects not included in their contracts. NORAD temporarily suspended any further applications from CISA, and eventually terminated the contracts for seven of twenty-three projects (demanding the full or partial repayment of funds by CISA), and threatened to terminate an additional four unless certain contract demands were met. Additionally, CISA was denied indefinitely the right to manage any third-party-operated projects sponsored by the agency. In its official statement on the audits, NORAD further argued that

...the building and consolidations of organizations...has received too much attention...NORAD wishes to minimise the risk of seeing itself involved in politics....The principle objectives will be poverty alleviation... NORAD, as a development agency neither can nor will participate in politics as such, whether this refers to the internal

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164 Painemal and Lincopi were both members of the Mapuche Cultural Centre (Ad-Mapu) in Temuco, Chile. By request from the World Council, CIDA launched an express and limited audit of CISA. NORAD hired Arthur Anderson and Co, Chartered Accountants, to undertake a more extensive audit, which was actually carried out by Coleridge y Asociados, which represented Arthur Anderson in Lima. NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, CISA Folder, correspondence from Bredde (NORAD) to CISA, 22 April 1987; NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, CISA Folder, correspondence from CISA to Toreng (NORAD), 10 March 1987; NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, CISA Folder, correspondence from CISA to Toreng (NORAD), 10 March 1987; NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, CISA Folder, letter from Sørensen (NORAD) to CISA, 13 May 1988; NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, CISA Folder, letter from Sørensen (NORAD) to CISA, 13 May 1988; NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, CISA Folder, letter from Sørensen (NORAD) to CISA, 13 May 1988.

165 NFAA, BIF, Binder 23, correspondence from Cooper (Arthur Andersen & Co Auditors, Lima) to Drake (Arthur Andersen & Co Auditors, Oslo), 20 April 1987.

166 NORADA, POF, DUH 1364, CISA Folder, letter from Sørensen (NORAD) to CISA, 13 May 1988.
politics of indigenous organisations or politics at the national level in the respective nation-states.\textsuperscript{167}

The same year, CIDA funding for the World Council dropped dramatically (visible in Fig. 2 between 1987 and 88) for reasons poorly explained by WCIP documentation. Before the funding for 1987 had been announced, President Donald Rojas was already pessimistic. At an Executive Council meeting in September/October 1986, he stated that

CIDA will fund less than last time – probably $300,000 for CORPI and CISA with 15\% for Secretariat. CIDA cannot justify more for administration in Ottawa. CIDA does not want to deal with General Assemblies...CIDA is now development only; support from External Affairs and Indian Affairs will be requested.\textsuperscript{168}

More substantial funding resumed in 1989 and 1990. The most noticeable difference between the annual financial audits before and after the drop is an explicit statement on the transferring of funding to the regional branches. Prior to 1989, each year's budget listed an amount allocated to the regional branches, and published auditor's reports of amounts that were “committed to affiliated organizations in Central and South America in accordance with the World Council's agreement with CIDA.”\textsuperscript{169} From 1989 onwards, this note no longer appears in the audit reports and the annual budget no longer allocates funds directly to CISA or CORPI. In 1989, however, a substantial sum (33\% of the World Council's total budget) was being designated to a totally new category: “socio-economic development.”\textsuperscript{170} For the rest of the organization's life, between a third and half of the total budget would go toward

\textsuperscript{167} LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 6.14, letter from Sørensen (NORAD) to various parties, 13 May 1988.
\textsuperscript{168} LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.17, World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Executive Meeting, 3 October 1986.
\textsuperscript{169} LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.17, WCIP Financial Statements, 31 March 1986; LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 34.9, WCIP Financial Statements, 31 March 1987. This seemingly formal requirement to transfer funds to CISA and CORPI is sharply at odds with Ronald Leger's recollection of CIDA's relationship with the World Council. Ronald Leger, personal interview, 10 July 2013.
\textsuperscript{170} LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 34.6, WCIP Financial Statements, 31 March 1989.
this category. It appears as though CISA and CORPI were cut out, and the World Council leadership began to spend funds directly on development. Whether through momentum or by direction from CIDA, the WCIP continued to fund development projects for the rest of its existence. Throughout the 1980s, there was a substantial increase in international non-governmental organizations focused on economic development.\textsuperscript{171} To some degree, the World Council may simply have been following this broader trend in civil society.

Through the 1990s, funding for socio-economic development remained steady, but projects related to economic, educational and health development took a greater share of the World Council's attention, relative to political issues like the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In February 1990, the World Council set up a Regional Technical Office (OFITER) in San Jose, Costa Rica to “provide technical assistance to indigenous communities and organizations in the region for the elaboration, financing and monitoring of development projects.”\textsuperscript{172} The World Council's report on program support from CIDA in 1990 lists development projects in Mexico (cattle husbandry), Guatemala (handicrafts), Nicaragua (transportation), and Costa Rica (commercialization project for basic grains, and a water system project).\textsuperscript{173} A proposal for a WCIP Development Program made in 1990 allocated the largest part of its budget to Socio-Economic development, with nearly half a million US dollars to be spent on agriculture, and another two hundred thousand on cattle-raising, fishing, mining work and artisanal work.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{171} Iriye, 172-174.
\textsuperscript{172} LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 31.1, WCIP Interim Report to CIDA for Programme Support, November 1990. Plans were made to open additional offices of a similar nature in other regions, but were never carried out. The WCIP ended its support for OFITER in 1995. Duquette, 95-96.
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.
93, provides an overview of the organization's activities under the categories of Environment, Cultural/Intellectual Property (mostly focused on opposition to the Human Genome Project), Education, Socio-Economic Development (including consultation with the World Bank and European Economic Community), Health (in co-operation with the Pan-American Health Organization, Human Rights and Peace Processes. The organization's interests had broadened dramatically. In the mid-1990s, the World Council became increasingly involved with Wayne Dunn's “Apikan Network,” a Canadian organization specializing in economic development partnerships for Indigenous peoples around the world. Certainly, the World Council continued to defend Indigenous rights in international fora. Its representatives participated in the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples' efforts to develop a UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; in consultations with the International Labour Organization on its Convention 169; in support for the Organization of American States' efforts to write a juridical document on Indigenous rights; and in events related to the 500th Anniversary of Columbus' arrival in the Americas, and the 1993 International Year of Indigenous Peoples. These efforts led to substantial results but economic development projects, health promotion, and other less overtly political activities took up an increasing amount of the WCIP's energy. In 1995, the WCIP went so far as to describe itself in at least one document as an “international indigenous run development agency.”

177 Duquette, 106. Emphasis added.
4.5.2 Effects: Anti-politics and internal conflict

As well as encouraging development work, consistent funding from these aid agencies affected World Council delegates as they planned political actions. As mentioned above, George Manuel and Marie Smallface-Marule were aware of this influence, and their concerns came out in executive meetings when formulating policy as well. During a meeting in Lethbridge, George Manuel lamented the situation in Central American countries, where a substantial majority of the population was Indigenous, but they faced harsh government violence nonetheless. Guatemala should be, said Manuel, “a number one priority for all Indian people of the world...they've been murdered by the thousands every day...they have only one alternative...and that one alternative is for self-determination.” Everyone at the meeting agreed, but Ossie Cruz of Australia worried that if the WCIP really “took a stand in Bolivia [or] Guatemala” the organization's budget would surely be cut.  

This conflict between strong political action and secure funding was particularly well illustrated after World Council President Clément Chartier's controversial clandestine trip into Nicaragua in January 1986, aided by militant Miskitu guerillas fighting the Sandinistas, the left-wing government already besieged by the US-backed CONTRAS. When Chartier returned to Canada, he was stripped of his powers by fellow members of the WCIP executive. The executive was upset with Chartier for a variety of reasons, but Vice-President Donald Rojas pointed specifically to the fact that many funding agencies in North America and Europe were supporters of (or at least sympathetic to) the Sandinistas—the same

179 Ibid.
180 These events are explained in much greater detail in Chapter Six of this dissertation.
agencies that were funding Indigenous organizations in Central and South America. Rojas Maroto “had information” that these agencies were “questioning the continued financial support” of these organizations because the position of the WCIP suggested it was merely “another instrument of the U.S.”181 As Nicaragua was only one of many countries where Indigenous people were in very serious danger of violence, it was “necessary to review where our actions... seriously jeopardize the financial security of our organizations.”182 At a later meeting of the Executive Council in February 1987, Donald Rojas asserted that “CIDA cut its program to the WCIP after more than $50,000 was allocated to the Nicaragua situation (more than was originally agreed to by CIDA).”183

Immediately following the ouster of Chartier, the Vice-Presidents divided their responsibilities for the organization, with Donald Rojas focussing on “Economic and Social Development,” while Pōkā Laenui would be in charge of “Advocacy.”184 They hired an independent consulting company to examine the World Council's organizational structure and make recommendations based upon feedback from member organizations and CIDA's assessments of the WCIP, CORPI and CISA. Among the proposed changes was the suggestion to split the World Council into two largely separate institutions: an advocacy program and a development foundation. The interim report’s authors reasoned this would “minimize the conflict between fundraising for development activities and engaging in what are considered 'political' activities. Both programs would concentrate in fundraising with

182 Ibid.
183 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 3.6, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Summary, 17 February 1987. If Rojas is correct, this may help explain the sharp drop in CIDA funding between 1987/88 mentioned above.
institutions which favour their programs without risk of being seen to collaborate with other institutions that are not like-minded.”\textsuperscript{185} Another report, presented two years later, also suggested that a structural “separation of economic activities and functions from political ones” should be implemented in the short term.\textsuperscript{186} These kinds of proposals, while never adopted, could suggest an interest in suppressing the political aspects of the organization to ensure funding, but they could equally demonstrate a desire to ensure the survival of political aspects despite the growth in development activities. Yet, it stands to reason that if executive members were so conscious that their sources of funding could be affected by their political activity, this issue must have subconsciously affected their range of action as well. There is little evidence that members of the World Council were actually altering their political beliefs (i.e. their commitment to decolonization and self-determination) but these conflicts and proposed structural changes suggest that there was a certain willingness to balance the organization's political basis against an apolitical public image more acceptable to international development agencies.

Even before Chartier's removal from power, the conflict over funds also caused a great deal of tension within the leadership of the organization. In the spring of 1984, the WCIP offices were moved from Lethbridge to Ottawa and the Secretariat staff from Lethbridge were let go. The decision had been a struggle; first made at an Executive Committee meeting in August 1983, it was hotly debated again at another Executive Committee meeting in Lethbridge the following December. Aslak Nils Sara complained that


the Secretariat was not as good as it needed to be to support the growing work of the WCIP. George Manuel insisted that any problems with the Secretariat were a result of poor funding, not of incompetence. Sara denied that he was criticizing the Secretariat, but suggested the decision-making procedure was unclear. He questioned the level of power the Secretariat had to determine WCIP policy and focus, rather than the actual decisions of the Executive Council. José Carlos Morales went further, stating that he had

...heard criticisms from other organizations and from our organization about the Secretariat...Our member organizations are demanding...that the Secretariat or the Executive Council should be doing more...[There] has been a general consensus of the other member organizations that Lethbridge is not the best location for the Secretariat...we have to think of a better place where the office can function and respond better to the demands of the member organizations.187

Whatever the source of these concerns, the Secretariat countered with its own complaints, focused largely on the politics of fund-raising. In March 1984, the WCIP Secretariat submitted a list of recommended financial policies which chastised President José Carlos Morales and Vice-President Melillan Painemal for “raising funds for their national organizations or what appears to be personal projects under the name of the WCIP without providing any information about the projects, funding sources approached, funds received and financial reports and without prior Executive Council approval.”188 The same document alleges that “grants from the Norwegian Foreign Office to the WCIP Secretariat and channelled through the Nordic Sami Council have not been received in full and no information has been provided about the use of the amounts withheld, nor the authority under

which expenditures were made.”

Less directly, but more sharply, George Manuel lent his support to Marule when he provided a news release to a native newspaper in Norway which directly criticized the growing influence of development funds on the organization's leadership. He accused “selfish Indians” of serving as “willing puppets of the very governments and multi-national corporations who most want to neutralise and re-direct the emerging energies of the Fourth World.” The press release targeted those who “dangle beads and mirrors before the impoverished delegates from Central and South America,” baiting them with “international conferences, international travel, scholarships and small grants supplied by unsuspecting charitable organizations or by state governments who want to gain influence on the WCIP.” Manuel warned these alleged conspirators that the WCIP “is not for sale. In the next six months it will return to its original spirit and intent. It will return to a leadership dedicated to the liberation of indigenous peoples everywhere.” It is unclear at whom exactly George Manuel was aiming these barbs—he might have been critical of the Nordic Sami Council or of the Central and South American council members or both—but he clearly worried the involvement of financial aid was weakening the ideological roots of the organization.

4.6 Global Shifts: Third World in Decline, Institutionalization of NGOs in Ascent

Manuel was certainly exaggerating the threat to the World Council. Indigenous sovereignty rights, the most contentious of the World Council's goals, continued to preoccupy

189 Ibid.
191 Ibid. At the first Executive Council Meeting after the office had moved to Ottawa, the council members made a resolution to “send a letter to George Manuel asking for clarification of the press release.” LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.10, WCIP Executive Council Meeting (26-30 March 1984) Resolutions.

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the organization's leadership throughout its existence. Manuel's prophecy of a change within six months proved correct: Métis leader Clément Chartier was elected World Council President at the September 1984 General Assembly in Panama. Chartier was an associate of Manuel and at least as politically driven. His youth and his past involvement in the Native Youth Association of Canada may explain his more rebellious traits. Yet as will be shown in a subsequent chapter, Chartier's presidency was relatively short lived. Once Smallface-Marule and Manuel had left the organization, the World Council lost its most important sources of philosophy or ideology to guide its activities. Perhaps it made little difference, though, since Manuel's “Fourth World” philosophy had itself lost its most important inspiration: a strong Third-Worldist movement.

The World Council came into being during the last great push of the anti-colonial Third World during the 20th century. In the 1970s, Third-Worldist leadership was buoyed with substantial international investment. The Cold War had long encouraged international development assistance in the Third World “often described alongside the arms race and the space race as part of a Cold War trifecta.” Following the 1973 oil crisis, substantial OPEC profits were invested in Western banks, creating a surplus of funds that was reinvested elsewhere, particularly in Africa. Third World leaders used this wealth to continue demands for an end to imperialism and a correlative respect for the sovereignty of smaller nations, and for economic justice: a redistribution of global wealth along more equitable lines. “This political militancy,” states Rist, “went together with a critique of Westernization as an ethnocidal project responsible for the failures of 'development' – hence the hopes placed in

192 Nick Cullather, “The Third Race,” *Diplomatic History* 33:3 (June 2009), 511.
novel initiatives of 'autocentred development' and the defence of indigenous populations, especially in Latin America and Australia.”\textsuperscript{193} Yet this movement crested and declined while the World Council was in its earliest days. Although the New International Economic Order had been viewed with real suspicion by Indigenous leaders, its challenge to the existing international order provided some space for them to add their own Indigenous critique. This opportunity was washed away during the 1980s, under the culture of conservatism and structural adjustments promoted by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{194} Neo-liberals skillfully used the Bretton Woods institutions as its “sharp rapiers” to kill the “Third World Project.”\textsuperscript{195} Without Third World allies, and by the 1980s, lacking even a source of ideological strength to root itself in, the World Council of Indigenous peoples had little choice but to accept the terms CIDA laid out.

The World Council was not the only NGO to feel the effects of financial dependence on CIDA. In his historical analysis of the agency, David Morrison notes that the growth of core program funding to organizations resulted in a shift in the relationship between government and the voluntary sector.\textsuperscript{196} Government agencies were being influenced by the demands of NGOs to focus on human resource development over industrial projects, but “NGOs have subjected themselves to the discipline of the project format...[and] have become more institutionalized.”\textsuperscript{197} The shift did not need to be a stark or sudden one to make an impact. The “anti-politics machine” did its work slowly but steadily, with changes arising

\textsuperscript{193} Rist, 174
\textsuperscript{194} Cullather, 512; Rist, 171-73.
\textsuperscript{195} Prashad, \textit{The Poorer Nations}, 47.
\textsuperscript{196} Morrison, 164-5.
\textsuperscript{197} Tim Broadhead and Brent Herbert-Coley, \textit{Bridges of Hope: Canadian Voluntary Agencies and the Third World} (Ottawa: North South Institute, 1988), 70, quoted in Morrison, 265.
more from the basic structures of CIDA and NORAD than from any wilful effort to influence the World Council.

4.7 Conclusion

If CIDA staff were seriously intent on deterring the WCIP from taking an active political role, they failed miserably at their task. The World Council never abandoned its political direction to become a primarily development-focused organization. But to look for a complete reversal of ideology is to over-simplify the “anti-politics machine.” The Canadian government used its foreign development funds, in part, as a soft-power means to achieve realist aims, and where those aims overlapped with WCIP activities, there was no need to discourage a political focus. It is quite possible, on the contrary, that a great number of CIDA employees did indeed sympathize with the World Council's anti-colonial vision, but were restricted from supporting it by the mandate and structure of the agency. Only by encouraging the World Council to do some amount of development work could they justify funding the organization at all.

It would not be difficult for the World Council and its regional branches to justify the acceptance of such requirements to their members, the vast majority of whom did indeed grow up facing poor health, a lack of quality sanitation or other infrastructure, and few economic opportunities. Owing to the organizational structure of the WCIP, where delegations were divided up by country, Indigenous peoples of Central and South America quickly came to dominate the membership numerically speaking. It should not be surprising that these members would be more interested in development projects than Indigenous peoples in Canada, the United States, or Nordic countries. Additionally, their direct conflicts
with Third World leaders may have made them less keen on Third-Worldist philosophies. Certainly, the Miskitu-Sandinista conflict belied any illusion that a sovereign left-leaning government would treat Indigenous peoples with respect.

Once the World Council incorporated elements of technical development activities into its program, it came to depend on funding from governmental aid agencies. Development work would therefore sustain the organization, and while the results delivered might be piecemeal, they would be more immediate and demonstrable than a political struggle for sovereignty at the United Nations. The “anti-politics machine,” therefore, was not so much a conscious effort to discourage anti-colonial politics. It was, and is, a structural by-product of development theory which holds that quality of life can be achieved solely through technical improvements without political change.
Chapter 5
“Indigenous Peoples Can Have Foreign Policy”
Niillas Somby and Indigenous Internationalism in Practice

Throughout its existence, but especially during the 1980s, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples made significant contributions to new international legal standards. At the WCIP’s Second General Assembly in 1977, delegates condemned the International Labour Organization's (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention 107 (1957). They resolved that the convention “did not involve Indigenous peoples and in fact would continue oppression of Indigenous People wherever concerned” and demanded that the WCIP “be totally involved at all levels when International instruments are to be drafted.”¹ In response to this and other similar criticisms from other Indigenous groups, the ILO's governing body called for a Meeting of Experts to discuss the revision of the convention. Although the ILO traditionally works as a tripartite organization (involving governments, employers and labour leaders), the meeting of experts that occurred in September 1986 took the innovated step of inviting one Indigenous organization to participate in its discussions: the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. Pōkā Laenui of Hawaii, Vice-President of the WCIP, was sent as the organization's representative.² A resolution at the fifth WCIP General Assembly (July 1987) urged the ILO to make significant revisions to the convention,³ and the

¹ Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs Resource Centre (herafter UBCICRC), World Council of Indigenous Peoples Assembly, Second General Assembly, Kiruna, Sweden, 24-27 September 1977, Resolutions
³ LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 42.11, letter from Lee Swepston (ILO) to Donald Rojas Maroto (WCIP), 24 September 1987.

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World Council organized multiple consultation workshops throughout Central and South America in 1989, before the revisions were finally completed as ILO Convention 169.

At the WCIP Third General Assembly (May 1981), there was substantial discussion of the creation of international law regarding Indigenous rights, with the circulation of both a concept paper and a Draft International Covenant. Through consistent participation in the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (since its establishment in 1982), WCIP delegates encouraged the formal settings of international standards for Indigenous rights. The Working Group's Chairperson-Rapporteur, Erica-Irene Daes, attended the WCIP Fourth General Assembly (September 1984) where she participated in a thorough consultation on Indigenous rights, resulting in the World Council's 17-point Declaration of Principles. This document, along with another draft declaration of principles proposed by the Indian Law Resource Center, the Four Directions Council, the National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Service, the National Indian Youth Council, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference

4 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 42.25, Report on Consultation Workshops Convened by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples Regarding Convention 107 of the International Labour Office [sic], 1989. Lee Swepston (Assistant to Director of the ILO's International Labour Standards Department) would later thank the leadership of the WCIP “for helping us translate an ideal of indigenous participation in international standard-setting into at least a partial reality.” LAC WCIPF, Vol.13.12, VI WCIP General Assembly, Comments by ILO, August 1990
7 Erica-Irene Daes, “The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations to the Genesis and Evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, eds., Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs), 49. Daes notes that the Sámi in particular, “under the very able leadership of the late [Aslak Nils] Sara from Kautokeino, insisted that a declaration, or even a convention should be proposed for adoption by the UN.”
and the International Indian Treaty Council, would form the basis of the later United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.⁸

Despite the importance of these international legal contributions, the World Council also helped bring about other more subtle changes. This chapter, therefore, will use one particular story—Niillas Somby's adoption by Indigenous nations in North America—to demonstrate the ways the World Council worked as a personal network rather than just as a formal organization. It will focus on the personal changes among Indigenous activists created by these global connections rather than on the general changes in government policies demanded by the World Council. It will describe the ways in which Indigenous cultures and spiritualities could intersect and overlap with politics at the level of the individual through this personal network, even when the World Council's unity was based primarily on a respectful but secular understanding of Indigeneity. The official role of the WCIP is almost peripheral to this particular story, but it highlights the ways in which the World Council was important beyond its most overt actions, because it promoted a new global understanding of Indigenous solidarity. Indigenous activists “on the ground” were willing to take up this understanding and cooperate innovatively for their mutual benefit.

5.1 It All Started with a Joik

To understand Niillas Somby's transnational story requires substantial context, even for a Sámi audience more familiar with his history, and it begins at the 1975 World Conference of Indigenous Peoples. Among the many delegates at the conference was a Sámi

man named Nils-Aslak Valkeapää. Valkeapää, who went by the professional name of Áillohaš, was a prominent artist, writer and singer of *joiks*, a traditional form of *Sámi* song, and he would come to serve as an important cultural ambassador for the *Sámi* people. At the 1975 conference, there was some skepticism about the presence of *Sámi* delegates. As Sam Deloria remembers it, a murmur went around the room asking, “Why are they here? They're white people.” For those delegates from places where the subjugation of Indigenous people was made apparent, on a day to day basis, by the different skin tones of those in power and those not, the light skin and even blond hair of members of the *Sámi* delegation immediately called their Indigeneity into question. Attempts were made to explain their presence, but according to *Sámi* delegates, the matter was fully resolved only when Áillohaš rose and presented a *joik*, which convinced everyone that the *Sámi* were indeed Indigenous.\footnote{Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.} The anecdote demonstrates the importance of cultural exchange to the political alliance being formed by the World Council, but the forum also provided important contacts for future cultural exchange which helped form a larger international network of Indigenous artists and activists supportive of each other's work.

After the 1977 WCIP General Assembly, when Valkeapää was elected the organization's first cultural coordinator, he worked with others to organize the first

\footnote{Helge Kleivan, a Norwegian anthropologist from the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, also helped by explaining the similar historical experience of *Sámi* people. Henry Minde, “The Challenge of Indigenism: The Struggle for Sami Land Rights and Self-Government in Norway, 1960-1990” in *Indigenous Peoples: Resource Management and Global Rights*, eds., Svein Jentoft, Henry Minde and Ragnar Nilsen (Delft: Eburon, 2003), 85. Jukka Nyyssönen, “‘Everybody recognized that we were not white’: Sami Identity Politics in Finland, 1945-1990” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Tromsø, 2007), 214-217. Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview, 5 April 2013. According to Sam Deloria, when a *Sámi* delegate explained that he was not an Indian, but that his people also had a history of oppression, their general social status was poor, and their land was threatened by the Alta hydroelectric dam, a Peruvian guest waited for the translation to finish and then exclaimed, “Well, then... you're Indians!” Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.}
international Indigenous cultural festival.\textsuperscript{11} The Davvi Šuvva festival (literally, Breeze from
the North) of 1979 was very well attended, with thousands of participants from across Sápmi
gathering in Gárasavvon for six days.\textsuperscript{12} The editor of Samefolket magazine asserted that,
“without WCIP and the contacts that were made, this festival could not have been possible.”\textsuperscript{13}

It presented Indigenous performers from North and South America alongside Sámi ones, as
well as a certain number of other groups that would more likely be cast as “ethnic
minorities.” During the opening ceremony, Hans Pavia Rosing (WCIP Executive Council
member from Greenland and soon to be first president of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference),
declared his hope “that this festival will prove to be a means in our struggle through the
Council of Indigenous People [sic]. I sincerely hope that we will gain much from this festival
in our future work for indigenous peoples all around the world.”\textsuperscript{14} Certainly, the festival
allowed for a proud reclamation of disparaged and even prohibited elements of Indigenous
cultures from around the world, a strong political statement against the assimilationist logic

\textsuperscript{11} Kathleen Osgood Dana, “Áillohaš the Shaman-Poet and his Govadas-Image Drum: A Literary Ecology of
Nils-Aslak Valkeapää,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oulu, 2003), 69. Valkeapää had previous
experience organizing festivals, as he had helped begin an annual music concert in Guovdageidnu, inviting
Sámi musicians and joikers to perform which would grow into the annual Sámi Easter Festival, including
the Sámi Grand Prix song contest. Synneve Angell, “Davvi Šuvva 1979: Being Sámi, Becoming
of Tromsø, 2009), 4. Sami Archives (hereafter SA), Nordic Sami Institute Fonds (hereafter NSIF), Series
Db (Organization) 003, Sámiráđđi (Ark2.2), Box 62, Folder 17, letter from George Manuel to Nordic Sami

\textsuperscript{12} Angell, 7. Sápmi (sometimes translated as Samiland) refers to the totality of Sámi lands, spanning across
Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. Because the subjects of this chapter insist on the Indigenous
sovereignty of their lands in opposition to the “occupying” nation states, the author respectfully uses their
Indigenous terms and avoids using the names of those nation states to describe Indigenous lands whenever
possible.

\textsuperscript{13} N. G. Labba, “Davvi Šuvva – urbefolkningarnas kulturfestival En fest for folkets brödskap” Samefolket 8
(1979), translated and quoted in Angell, 7. George Manuel sent Dave Monture of the National Indian
Brotherhood to the festival as the designated WCIP representative. George Manuel Diaries (hereafter
GMD), 22 June 1979.

\textsuperscript{14} Angell, 56-57. At the 1977 General Assembly in Kiruna, delegates decided that, for the purposes of the
WCIP, Kalaallit Nunaat (Greenland) and Sápmi should form a single region and alternate representatives
on the Executive Council. Rosing was elected the first such representative. Robert Petersen, personal
correspondence, 14 May 2012.
of colonialism. Events promoting Indigenous cultural exchange heightened feelings of a shared identity among Indigenous peoples and encouraged international solidarity in the long term. As will be seen, such sentiment was integral to the Niillas Somby's international adoption, but the Davvi Šuvva festival also contributed to his story in at least two other small but specific ways; initially, it helped inspire him and other Sámi activists with a new protest strategy, and later, it was the starting point in a series of personal connections that began Somby's transatlantic journey.

5.2 The Hunger Strike

The audience at Davvi Šuvva included two Sámi brothers from the Deatnu area of Finnmark in Norwegian Sápmi, Niillas and Ánde Somby. Both had participated in large protests against the planned Alta Hydroelectric Project, which had, in less than two years, escalated from the first ever use of banners by Sámi activists to the point of a blockade of construction crews at the narrowest point between the river and the mountain. The elder brother, Niillas, attended a presentation by ethnic Kurds (visiting from Sweden) who compared their people to the Sámi, as both groups had their populations split between four countries. Somby was interested to learn that Kurds in Stockholm were using a hunger

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16 Harald Eidheim, “Ethno-Political Development among the Sami after World War II: The Invention of Selfhood,” in *Sami Culture in a New Era: The Norwegian Sami Experience*, ed. Harald Gaski (Karasjohka: Davvi Girji OS, 1997), 48. This blockade and the protest encampment came to be known as nullpunktet or Zero Point. For more on the Hydroelectric Project and the reasons for opposition, see Robert Paine, *Dam a River, Damn A People? Saami (Lapp) Livelihood and the Alta-Kautokeino Hydro-electric Project and the Norwegian Parliament* (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 1982).

17 Kurds do not generally identify as Indigenous but they were still invited to attend the festival. Angell, 57, 94.
strike to protest against the attacks on Kurds in both Iraq and Iran. After the Alta protesters were subjected to mass arrests in mid-September, Niillas and a number of other frustrated Sámi activists decided to borrow the idea they had learned from the Kurds at Davvi Šuvva. In October, a group of them (including Niillas Somby) travelled to Oslo and formally announced that they were starting their own hunger strike, the first in Norwegian history,19 camped out at Eidsvolls Plass next to the Parliament buildings.20 The hunger strikers were taking quite a radical step by the standards of both Sámi and Norwegian societies,21 and at first, they received little if any formal support from any Sámi organization. Even Niillas' brother Ánde, in Oslo for school, initially voted with the Oslo Sami Association (Oslo Samiid Searvi) not to support the hunger strike, fearing that Norwegians would respond negatively and simply allow the participants to starve to death.22 Niillas Somby recalls that one of the main figures of the Nordic Sami Council (a WCIP member organization) sent out a negative press release that accused the hunger strikers of casting shame upon all of Sápmi.23 An important boost came from across the Atlantic. According to Somby, “the strongest support, morally, was [Cree musician] Buffy Sainte-Marie. She came here and she was already then a very famous singer. When she turned up outside our door... Of course, it gave

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18 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013; Angell, 72. Unfortunately, I have been able to find almost any information on the delegates or this protest and its precise purposes.
20 The number of hunger strikers is commonly given as seven, but Somby insists there were actually more participating. Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
21 The Alta protests, generally, have been described as “one of the most dramatic political confrontations in Norway in the post-war period” and the hunger strike was a particularly dramatic moment within the larger protests. Svein S. Andersen and Atle Midttun, “Conflict and Local Mobilization: The Alta Hydropower Project I,” Acta Sociologica 28:4 (1985), 320.
22 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013. He eventually changed his mind and supported the protestors in various ways, including serving as an editor of Charta 79, a supportive newsletter inspired by “Charter 77,” the public statement of civil and human rights circulated by Czechoslovak dissidents. Ánde Somby, Curriculum Vitae, http://www.jus.uit.no/ansatte/somby/cvandeENG.htm
23 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
us lots of power, but it also woke up society. So that was very good support.”

Afterwards, they began to get letters of support from other Indigenous organizations around the world, but Norway's national Sámi organizations never officially supported the hunger strike. The Sámi rights movement was largely united in their opposition to the hydroelectric project, but was increasingly divided on protest tactics. Nevertheless, on October 15, the Norwegian government agreed to postpone construction of the dam and investigate the matter further.

The hunger strike had lasted less than a week, yet it achieved significant results.

In January 1980, however, the government decided to proceed with development, and protests resumed. The conflict continued through 1981, when police began another (and much larger) series of mass arrests, protesters began another hunger strike in Oslo, and a group of Sámi women occupied the office of the newly elected Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. In the face of the government's continued hostility toward protestors, the encampments at the site were disassembled in January 1982. On February 26, a unanimous Supreme Court decision upheld the right of the state to build the dam: “The Court did not consider the Saami living in the area affected by the project to be an indigenous people under the terms of International Common Law, for it was clear that the regulation area in Alta was under Norwegian jurisdiction.” For Niillas Somby, the decision was a slap in the face:

“I was young and also naive and I thought justice is justice, and has to be, because this land always had belonged to us and Norwegians haven't even used that land. It's been used for reindeer herding...from

24 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
time immemorial. How can they just say that, “Okay, it's over, we'll do whatever we want with it because it's under our state?”

Although the movement against the dam project seemed to be collapsing, Somby's accumulated frustration pushed him toward a new level of determination. He would challenge the Norwegian power apparatus, and not allow the government to have the last word.

5.3 A Hard Statement

Having experimented with different forms of theatrical demonstrations with minimal results, some Sámi activists formed what Somby calls a “hard group” and decided to make a “hard statement.” If the hunger strike had not won Somby many friends within the established Sámi organizations, his next action would place him even further beyond the pale. Not long after the Supreme Court decision, Somby and a radical Sámi activist named John-Reier Martinsen chose a bridge over the Fallijohk (Tverrelva) River, part of the service road to the planned power plant, which would be the focal point for their demonstration. On the night of 19 March, they were scheduled to travel there by snowmobile with two sticks of dynamite and some flares. While there is some debate about their intentions, Somby insists that it was never in their minds to actually blow up the bridge with such a small amount of dynamite. They wanted to make a show with loud explosions and flashes of light, to signal to the government where the protests might go “if you take it further.” Somby knew they did

27 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
29 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
30 Hjorthol, 159; Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013. More details from Martinsen's perspective can be found in his published book: *Brua: et fengselsdagbok* (Deatnu: Jårgalaeddji, 1983).
31 Hjorthol, 160; Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
not have the resources to fight the Norwegian state in actual combat. On the other hand, he knew that members of the Storting (the Parliament of Norway) were preoccupied with Cold War fears of Soviet intervention (owing especially to their shared border) and worried that the Sámi might have allies behind the Iron Curtain. As Somby recalled, “they could easily arrest us, the whole of Sápmi if they wanted, but they were very scared if there were other bigger groups behind, that were supporting us. And that string we played on.”

Somby was able and willing to exploit those concerns without needing any actual Soviet allies for the work, although Martinsen had a history of involvement with Norway's Marxist-Leninist Workers' Communist Party (AKP). Indeed, the chief of the Police Surveillance Agency for northern Norway, Helge Claussen, was quite convinced (at least for a time) that the KGB had assisted Martinsen and Somby in their plans.

The demonstration did not go as planned. First, the old snowmobile arranged for Somby and Martinsen would not start on the night in question. After some time, another uninvolved young man was convinced to drive the two activists to the bridge on his own snowmobile. When they arrived, the driver waited at a distance to indicate that he was not involved. Somby and Martinsen placed the explosives under the bridge, having already connected them to alarm clocks so they would explode at 5 A.M. The middle of March in Finnmark, however, is very cold and Martinsen noticed the battery for one of the clocks had frozen. Somby had a fresh, warm AA battery in his pocket to use as a substitute, but when he

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32 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
33 Hjorthol, 162. The willingness of Indigenous actors to either ignore Cold War concerns, or even make practical use from them, is further examined in the following chapter.
34 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
35 Hjorthol, 160; Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.

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removed the old battery from the clock, it detonated the explosives right in front of him.\textsuperscript{36} Somby felt a hard kick and flew through the air and remembers thinking “Oh, that was the end of my life.”\textsuperscript{37} He landed in the snow, and experienced what he describes as...

...the nicest moment in my life so far. There were lots of different and very nice colours, very nice smells, and all relaxed. And there was a... I don't know if it was a human or what it was, but it was something there, beside me. This being was just waving very very good waves. And I remember, I was lying there and thinking, “And people are so scared of death!”

Before long, however, Martinsen intruded into this beautiful experience, shaking Somby to see if he was still alive. He used Somby's scarf to stop the substantial bleeding from the wound to his upper arm, then with help from the driver, loaded him onto the snowmobile's sled and drove full speed toward Alta.\textsuperscript{38} Somby recalls feeling fear at the speed at which they were travelling and the fishtailing motion of the sled. Eventually, they reached a hut beside the road, and roused a drunken man inside. Martinsen yelled to the driver to leave for his own safety, and managed to convince the man from the hut to drive them to the hospital in his car, despite his state of intoxication. On the way, Martinsen reassured Somby that the staff members at Alta's health centre were legally obliged to maintain confidentiality, though as he learned later, the police were called immediately upon their arrival. The men were taken by air to the hospital Tromsø. Doctors there amputated half of Somby's left arm, and spent five hours trying, unsuccessfully, to save the vision in his left eye.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{36} Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.  
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{38} Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.  
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
5.4 Investigations and Tricks

When Somby awoke in the hospital, he was surrounded by police. His communication with the outside world was greatly restricted, and even doctors were closely monitored. The room was full of flowers, but the police had seized all the attached cards. The police had quickly realized what Martinsen and Somby had done, and now they wanted the whole story. Most importantly, says his brother Ánde who visited him in the hospital, they wanted to know the name of the snowmobile driver who got away:

The police were there and it was the big question that everybody was asking...Niillas and John-Reier they had been caught, but there were three people...and they were very curious who the third person was. I sort of joked there. I said to Niillas that he has to teach the police the Third Man song, from the [Carol Reed] movie: Dat de doo de doo, de doo!

While his brother recovered, Ánde travelled to Kárášjohka where he discovered that the members of the Police Surveillance Agency had already searched Niillas' home. Realizing he and others were likely under surveillance, he hatched a plot to photograph and discover the identities of five undercover police officers, who he believed were sitting in the lounge at the local hotel. With the help of friends, a picture was taken, and after some minor argument with the men who were upset at being photographed, the camera and film was secured without much conflict. Ánde realized that these officers had failed to recognize him either from his political activities in Oslo or as the brother of the man whose home they had just searched: “Thereby, I knew that their systems are not efficient at all. It's possible to beat them. And that piece of information became very important later on in the story...”

40 Ibid. A young leftist doctor, Mads Gilbert, made a brief appearance to reassure Somby.
41 Hjorthol, 160-161.
43 Ibid.
Niillas was transferred to prison where he was charged with section 148 of the Norwegian Penal Code for those who cause “fire, collapse, explosion, flood... which may easily result in loss of human life or extensive destruction of another person's property.”\footnote{44}{“General Civil Penal Code,” <www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-19020522-010-eng.pdf>} It carries a maximum sentence of twenty-one years of imprisonment. Terrified of spending the next two decades in prison, convinced the courts would not treat him fairly, and not being granted bail in the mean time, Somby looked for an escape: “I had to trick them to get out from jail before the court case.”\footnote{45}{Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.}

First, Somby stopped eating the meals provided to him. There was fruit available from a sort of kiosk, so he purchased and ate one orange per day and drank only water. He was unsure if anyone had even noticed, until one day, the prison director came for a chat. Their conversation was friendly at first, but then by a stroke of good luck for Somby, someone began working on the water pipes connected to the drain in his cell. He reacted, asking the director what was going on: “What are these guys doing? Do I have to stop drinking water?”\footnote{46}{Ibid.} Somby remembers that the director became angry, upset that his prisoner would accuse him of attempting murder. Yet Somby had heard from another prisoner that two men had escaped from the jail and had never been found. He used this information to back up his case, theatrically musing that the two men had not actually escaped, but were perhaps dead and hidden somewhere, implying that the prison staff had killed them. The director stormed out, and Somby suspected he was making some progress in convincing his captors that he was going insane.\footnote{47}{Ibid.}
Soon Somby was met by a psychologist who wanted to talk about his refusal to eat. He accused her of working with the authorities to trick him, rather than trying to help him, and at any rate, he insisted (more out of principle than necessity) that he should be afforded help by someone who could speak his Sámi language. The Sámi community is small enough, however, that the authorities must have had difficulty finding a Sámi-speaking doctor that he did not know personally. The psychologist was followed the next day, to Somby's surprise, by a Sámi friend from a village near to his own, who was now working as a doctor in Tromsø. According to Somby, the doctor suspected the inmate's clever tactic and encouraged him. He suggested that Somby claim the guards were trying to poison him, and specifically to indicate hallucinations; to tell them he saw someone injecting poison into his oranges while they thought he was sleeping, and then to give up eating all together. He warned Somby to be careful, however, not to start believing his own stories. The following day, Somby took the next step. During a brief period while his cell door left open, he threw his oranges out into the corridor. The guard arrived and insisted he pick up the oranges.

I went out to the corridor, and then I kicked the orange there and it exploded on the roof. And I am not a very aggressive person, but then I had to play that... I am shouting and saying, “Pick up your poisoned oranges yourself! Don't you think I saw you guys were spurtng poison in them?! [laughter] And then they took me into the cell and locked the door. I didn't hear anything about oranges again.

Before long, a man from the Åsgård Psychiatric Hospital in Tromsø arrived and took Somby to the hospital every day for lunch at the canteen, encouraging him to eat. Eventually,

48 Ibid.
49 This doctor had even participated in the hydroelectric dam protests. Norwegian authorities were apparently unaware, unconcerned, or simply unable to find a Sámi-speaking doctor who did not oppose the construction of the dam. Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
Somby was told that the psychiatric hospital had been corresponding with the Minister of Justice, who had decided to let him out until the court case out of concern for his mental and physical health. They had, recalls Somby, considered moving him to the mental hospital but feared his paranoia would simply follow to the new location. He was shown the letter containing the decision, then returned to the prison to await his release.\(^{52}\)

When he arrived at the prison, there were two police officers waiting for him, one of them Sámi. Not realizing Somby had already been informed of his impending release, they offered him a deal: Tell us the name of this third person who was with you in the action, and we will let you go home. Somby feigned gratefulness for their help and agreed to the arrangement. The officer took out a tape-recorder and some paper so that a signed statement could be made. But when formally asked the name of the snowmobile driver, Somby dramatically announced that the man in question was Leif Halonen, a member of the Nordic Sami Council and who had long criticized the hunger strike and other radical actions. Halonen was surely not the driver; the officer had been fooled. The man responded by suggesting another name, hoping he might get lucky with a stab in the dark. Somby laughed and they both ended up laughing. Somby said, “Okay, we're both liars. I tried to lie to you, and you tried to lie next. So I just have to be here in that jail.”\(^{53}\) Ten minutes later, a guard arrived at his cell to release him from the prison.

This final interaction highlights the political tensions within the Sámi community.

Established Sámi organizations like Norwegian Sami Association (Norgga Sámiid Riikasearvi - NSR) had originally “focused their demands...on cultural matters [as well as

\(^{52}\) Ibid.
\(^{53}\) Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
social and economic improvements], in preference to land and water rights.” Following the successful Oslo hunger strike, such organizations, which had previously been ignored and or written-off as political extremists, were suddenly praised for their moderation and encouraged to voice their advice, even if their advice was not actually followed. The increasing politicization throughout Sápmi had even led to the 1979 creation of a new National Association of the Sami (Samenes Landsforbund) in Norway who insisted that Sámi people “should have respect and esteem for Norwegian authorities” and “rejected all actions in connection with the Alta affair.” Others, including men like Ole Henrik Magga, were inspired by slogan of “Show Sámi Spirit” (Čájehehkot Sámi Vuoiŋŋa – ČSV) to reclaim their language and culture with pride, and to fight against the Hydroelectric project primarily with words through established Sámi organizations. Others still, like Niillas Somby, had interpreted the same phrase to entail more drastic action if necessary to prevent the flooding of Sámi lands. While a great many Sámi people did not approve of Somby's actions, he would soon find more sympathy from Indigenous activists elsewhere in the world. George Manual had, in June 1976, shown his willingness to challenge the more moderate elements within the Nordic Sami Council. Following his speech to the Ninth Nordic Sami Conference in Anár, he ended with a declaration of “ČSV” which, according to Manuel, was “met with cheers from the young and the very old, but met with stoney faced coldness from the middle-age Sami generation of conservatives.” Although the WCIP was not particularly radical in its protest

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54 Minde, “The Challenge of Indigenism,” 84n13, 86.
55 Ibid., 91.
57 According to Magga, ČSV was coined by Anders Guttormsen in 1972, who challenged his audience to fill the acronym with meaning, and over time it “became an absolute success” and was “used as a greeting and "words of struggle"... a symbol of Sámi willpower. Angell, 44.
58 GMD, 14 June 1976.
tactics, Indigenous internationalism as a movement created a broad network where one might find like-minded allies outside one's own community.

5.5 A Plan of Escape

Somby's trial still loomed. He feared the maximum sentence and was convinced that if he stood trial, he would spend at least the next ten to twelve years in prison.\textsuperscript{59} If he was to escape the trial, he would need to escape the reach of the Norwegian police; that meant finding a place to go, someone to host him, and most importantly, a means of escape.

Somby's ultimate destination was at least partly the result of another personal connection made at Davvi Šuvva by his younger brother Ánde, as mentioned, had also attended the festival as both a participant and an audience member.\textsuperscript{60} He had been greatly impressed by the hoop dances of Bill Brittain, a Cree man visiting from Canada, and it seems that Brittain was equally impressed with the younger Somby brother.\textsuperscript{61} In July 1982, Sol Sanderson (Cree), Chief of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, hosted a major international event called the World Assembly of First Nations in conjunction with the WCIP.\textsuperscript{62} Brittain was appointed to organize the cultural program for the event and, remembering him from Davvi Šuvva in 1979, invited Ánde Somby to \textit{joik}.\textsuperscript{63} While he did not participate much in the conference part of the assembly, Somby learned more about the

\textsuperscript{59} Hjorthol, 161.
\textsuperscript{60} Both Ánde Somby and his sister Marry Somby performed at Davvi Šuvva. Angell, 56, 61.
\textsuperscript{61} Angell, 70.
\textsuperscript{62} The WAFN was estimated to have been attended by at least 20,000 people. “The WAFN Gamble,” \textit{Saskatchewan Indian} 12:6 (August 1982).
\textsuperscript{63} Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
situation of Indigenous peoples in Canada, and gained enormous respect for Tłı̨chǫ leader James Wah-Shee who was also in attendance.\textsuperscript{64}

When Ánde returned to Norway, he was happy to learn that his brother had been released, but Niillas seemed nevertheless morose: “He was so depressed because he felt that he didn’t get the support from our own people for the sacrifice that he had done for the cause. As a little brother, I wanted to cheer up my sad big brother, so I said to him, ‘Canada is a very good place to go to.’” Niillas agreed, but doubted whether he—someone with little knowledge of escape or evasion techniques—could really trick the Norwegian police who were undoubtedly keeping him under close watch after his release. Ánde, however, was confident; he recounted the story of the five secret police officers in the hotel lounge, and how they had not recognized him despite having searched his brother's house. “The Norwegian secret service,” he insisted, “they are not smart at all.”\textsuperscript{65}

The two brothers met with their sister Marry, and friend Bjarne Store-Jakobsen. Marry Ailonieida Somby had demonstrated her interest in Indigenous internationalism by applying to attend the 1981 WCIP General Assembly in Canberra, Australia.\textsuperscript{66} Bjarne Store-Jakobsen was the editor of Sámi Áigi, a transnational Sámi newspaper where Niillas Somby had worked as a photographer. He had been personally involved with the second hunger strike in 1981, and had developed a romantic relationship with a Blackfoot woman in

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65} Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
\textsuperscript{66} Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives (hereafter NFAA), 26.8/54 Beskyttelse av innfodde folkeslag (Protection of indigenous peoples) fonds (hereafter BIF), Binder 7, Sandvik (Norwegian Writers’ Association) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 April 1981.
Canada.\textsuperscript{67} It seemed that Canada was a logical place to go, and \textipa{Ánde} suggested James Wah-Shee as a potential host:

\begin{quote}
He was the person whom I trusted because I thought that he knew how the system was working and he seemed to be an honest character. So I thought that I could trust him, even though my notion was that he was not the most radical person that I could think of, but he was a very trustworthy person, so I decided to ask him for help.\textsuperscript{68}
\end{quote}

Wah-Shee was far from a radical—he had, in fact, successfully run for election in the Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories—but he had demonstrated his commitment to the idea of Indigenous internationalism (in part through his participation in the 1973 Arctic Peoples' Conference).\textsuperscript{69} The choice of Wah-Shee as a potential host for Niillas Somby, therefore, suggests that a sense of international Indigenous solidarity was more important than support for Somby and Martinsen's methods.

If the destination had been picked, the escape itself remained to be planned. As \textipa{Ánde} recalls, Niillas exclaimed that they did not even have a passport to get him beyond the Norwegian border. At that point, \textipa{Ánde} reached into his backpack and pulled out a passport, the result of “a very strange story.”\textsuperscript{70} After news of explosion and arrest had calmed down, \textipa{Ánde} had returned to his law studies in Oslo. One night, \textipa{Ánde} was enjoying a party in his dormitory at Kringsjå, when he noticed a young man throw a passport over his shoulder. He

\textsuperscript{67} Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Indeed, Wah-Shee is credited as the primary inspiration behind the 1973 conference. He worked with Joe Jacquot, Robert Petersen and Angmalortok Olsen to organize the meeting. Inge Kleivan, “The Arctic Peoples' Conference in Copenhagen, November 22-25, 1973,” Études/Inuit/Studies 16:1-2 (1992), 228. It is possible that James Wah-Shee was already known to Ánde's relatives and friends. Wah-Shee's opening speech at the 1973 Arctic People's Conference so impressed the Sámi delegates that it was quoted at length in the Sámi newspaper Ságat. Minde, “The Challenge of Indigenism,” 83.
\textsuperscript{70} Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013. Niillas recalls that it was his sister Marry who found the passport. Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
took little notice of it, except to comment to the girl sitting next to him that some people will go to great lengths to gain attention at a party. He had forgotten all about the incident by that summer, but when cleaning up before heading north to meet his brother, he had found the passport: “I thought, what shall I do about that? One can't trash a passport. And then I just put it in my bag and didn't think anything about that passport.” He had not even bothered to look closely at the passport when he pulled it out to show his brother, and to their surprise, the true owner of the passport had the same age as Niillas, and even a similar height and face. The most noticeable difference was that man in passport had blond hair, whereas Niillas had dark brown hair. There was no need to make any difficult alternations to the passport; they only required the help of a hairdresser, not a counterfeiter. Thus, the last obstacle to Niillas' escape was easily overcome. Ánde has long pondered the significance of this remarkable coincidence:

I have been thinking a lot about the sacred dimensions on the whole thing (...) who was the person who came to my party and threw this passport? Was he a real person or was he a spirit from the other side that came to this party? Because this passport turned to be so important, like it was made for the situation.

For Niillas Somby, the escape also had a strong spiritual dimension. Not long before he was to leave, he travelled to meet Knuvtt Ovlla, “a traditional spiritual man” in the coastal village of Stuorravuonna. They had met before, but when Somby arrived, the Ovlla was very surprised to see him, having heard of his recent activities in the news. They sat down to talk, and Ovlla was troubled by a vision of a yellow knife. Somby was filled with a sense of

72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013; Hjorthol, 161.
hope, and answered that he had a ticket to a place called Yellowknife. Ovlla laughed at this revelation, and promised that Somby would not be caught during the escape: “I know they're looking for you everywhere but they will not see you. You can just travel. I will close their eyes for them.” His prophecy would prove correct.

With some assistance from trusted friends, the plan moved ahead in early September, once the 24-hour daylight of the arctic summer had passed and darkness could conceal his night-time departure from police surveillance. His hair was bleached in Kárášjohka, where he also donned a dress suit. He travelled across the Finnish border, covertly switching cars in case he was being followed by police. Somby caught a night train to Helsinki, then a Trans-Atlantic flight to Canada, and then another flight to Yellowknife. Believing their phones were likely tapped, friends and family called each other and discussed short fictional accounts of Somby's days (going fishing and so on) to mask his absence.

Somby arrived in Yellowknife with a letter addressed to James Wah-Shee, in which Ánde thanked him for his pleasant company at a party in Regina a few months earlier, then introduced his brother Niillas and asked the Tłı̨chǫ leader to take care of him. Somby spent a few weeks in Yellowknife and even managed to meet some third-generation Sámi-Canadians, whose grandparents had immigrated to herd reindeer in the Mackenzie Delta.

While these ethnic Sámi no longer spoke the Sámi language, Somby was able to

75 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
76 Ánde Somby, personal interview, 25 February 2013. Finnish passport control was slightly suspicious of his identity, but Somby quickly reassured them. When he arrived in Canada, border guards only asked if he was attempting to import any meat into the country. Nillas recalls that James Wah-Shee was his sister Marry's contact. Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
78 Ibid.
communicate with them, suggesting he had at least some grasp of the English language which would only improve over time. Apparently, however, Wah-Shee felt he did not have the resources to support his surprise guest, so he reached out to the most logical source of assistance: The World Council of Indigenous Peoples. Were it not for the World Council, Somby's hopes for asylum might have been quickly dashed.

5.6 An Adoption

Wah-Shee arranged to send Somby to Marie Smallface-Marule at the WCIP headquarters in Lethbridge, Alberta in early October. Smallface-Marule organized an unofficial planning meeting, which included George Manuel and others, to decide how best to support the Sámi fugitive. First, they purchased him some “cowboy clothes,” as Somby had been wearing his traditional Sámi gákti around which attracted attention. Next, they flew him to Vancouver where he was met by George Manuel's son Arthur and others. In Vancouver, the entourage briefly worried when several police arrived to the apartment building where Somby was staying, though it turned out they were responding to a call regarding other tenants. While there was no indication that Canadian police knew of Somby's presence in the country, both he and his hosts were clearly concerned for his security. Soon, he was transported to Vancouver Island and the Tsartlip reserve on Brentwood Bay. There Somby stayed in the longhouse of Philip Paul, a close friend and advisor of George Manuel's, and a founding member of the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs (of

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80 Niillas Somby, personal interview; Lethbridge Herald, 26 November 1982.
81 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
82 The exact date of this trip is unclear, but when Bjarne Store-Jakobsen travelled to Lethbridge to meet Somby in early November, he had already left for British Columbia. Lethbridge Herald, 26 November 1982.
83 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
which Manuel had recently been the President).\textsuperscript{84} As representatives of the World Council, Marie Smallface-Marule and George Manuel were wary of becoming too directly involved in Somby's case. This was largely the result of legal concerns, but partly out of respect for the Sami Council. Aslak Nils Sarah, who had been elected WCIP Vice-President in May 1981, formally disassociated himself from Somby's actions and other members of the Sami Council (who had not been particularly supportive of the hunger strike) likely felt similarly.\textsuperscript{85} To support Somby indirectly, Smallface-Marule, Manuel and others relied on their personal network of contacts within the Indigenous community to take care of him. Despite their concerns, the World Council's staff and supporters did risk legal repercussions to assist a man they had never met before, solely on the basis of Indigenous solidarity.

Somby found the time he lived in that longhouse very rewarding. Every evening, Paul would visit and they would have “long talks about spirituality.”\textsuperscript{86} Somby was a relatively rare individual among his people to have such an interest, since the vast majority of Sámi were Christian. He credits his beliefs with a summer he spent at his grandfather's side nearby Buolbmat, and the conversations they shared. The knowledge he gained from his grandfather allowed him to speak on the same level with Paul.\textsuperscript{87} The rejection of Christianity is not inherent to the adoption of “decolonization” as a framework to approach Sámi politics.

Although the main Sámi political organizations in Norway (members of the WCIP, via the Nordic Sami Council) were not officially Christian, many of their members were, which

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. Somby also spent some time living with the Lil’wat Nation near Mount Currie, BC, hosted by people who were closer to his own age and quite radical in their politics, but his recollection of the dates or length of his stay are fuzzy after so many years have passed.

\textsuperscript{85} Veli-Pekka Lehtola, \textit{The Sámi People: Traditions in Transition} (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 2004), 77.

\textsuperscript{86} Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
undoubtedly contributed to Somby's distrust of those organizations and their leadership. A notable exception among prominent Sámi activists was Nils-Aslak Valkeapää, an enthusiastic spokesman for international Indigenous cooperation, who was also critical of the colonizing influence of Christianity. In *Greetings from Lappland*, he quotes an adage from Africa: “The whites came to Africa with the Bible in their hands, when the blacks controlled the land. After a while, the blacks had the Bible in their hands and the whites had the land.” The same sort of thing can be said of Samiland and the Samis.”

To a large degree, Somby shared this understanding of history, and it made him appreciate these conversations with Paul. He came away feeling much stronger spiritually and considered his time with Paul a great education. Only later did he come to realize that the conversations were partly an examination of his character and beliefs. Evidently, Somby passed the test and a special ceremony was later arranged for his adoption by several Indigenous nations.

When it came time for Somby to be transported for his adoption ceremony, he travelled with five armed men in the back of a truck. As Somby recalls: “[I]f the police were going to stop us, they were going to shoot. So I was really really hoping we would not meet any police.” The ceremony was conducted on 27 November on the Secwepemc “Sugar Cane” reserve near Williams Lake, British Columbia, and attended by approximately 300 people. Somby was formally adopted by the Nuxálk, the Haisla, the Mowachaht and the Tsilhqot’in peoples, but the ceremonial adoption was conducted by a hereditary Nuxálk chief.

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89 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
90 Ibid.
Nuximlayc (Lawrence Pootlass).\textsuperscript{92} It was no coincidence that Nuximlayc was a hereditary chief rather than an elected, state-recognized band-council chief. Robert Manuel, son of George Manuel and head of the Union of BC Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) at the time, stated that that his organization and band councils were “fearful of a backlash from the Canadian government if directly connected with helping the fugitive... [H]ereditary chiefs are in a better position to help Somby than elected tribal leaders, since hereditary chiefs are shielded from political and financial persuasion of the federal government.”\textsuperscript{93} At the ceremony, one of the elders in attendance gave Somby the adopted name of Pinquid, which roughly translates to “mountain goat warrior.”\textsuperscript{94} According to a later news report, his adoptive nations “pledged to treat him like a brother, to help him under all circumstances.”\textsuperscript{95}

Members of Somby's broader support network were forced to weigh the need to ensure his security against a developing desire to use his adoption as a statement of Indigenous sovereignty (and solidarity) and a challenge to the authority of the Canadian state. This required a delicate balance between promoting the story to the media on the one hand, and, on the other hand, limiting the exposure of precise details as to Somby's whereabouts and his support network, and keeping control of the media attention so as not to draw unwanted police attention. The story was well covered by reporters at the Lethbridge Herald even after he had left the region, because Marie Smallface-Marule maintained a good

\textsuperscript{92} Lethbridge Herald, 4 October 1984. Lethbridge Herald, 29 November 1982. The latter source reports that two Indigenous nations from Vancouver Island had already adopted Somby through band council resolutions passed in advance, but of the four nations listed later, only the Mowachaht are from Vancouver Island, so it is possible a fifth nations was also involved. Although Smallface-Marule's Kainai Nation did not formally adopt Somby, its council did make a formal resolution of “full support to the bands and tribes which have offered [him] political refuge and Indian status.” Lethbridge Herald, 26 November 1982.

\textsuperscript{93} Lethbridge Herald, 29 November 1982.

\textsuperscript{94} Lethbridge Herald, 30 November 1982. The name is elsewhere spelled Penquit, Punqwid and other variations. The Indigenous language the word belongs to is unclear.

\textsuperscript{95} “Native Son,” W5 [Television News Series], CTV (October 1984)
relationship with the staff there and disclosed important information to them. In early interviews, she insisted on anonymity but the description of the informant as a female member of the *Kainai* nation leaves little doubt as to her identity.\(^{96}\) While no Canadian journalists were invited to attend the adoption ceremony, it was attended by Arvid Bryne, the New York correspondent for the Norwegian *Dagbladet* newspaper, and Sulo Lemet Aikio, with the Finnish Broadcasting Company, who filmed the proceedings.\(^{97}\) Nevertheless, the UBCIC was surprised that the story did not receive more national attention, given the advanced public announcement before the ceremony, which produced only a single small article in the *Globe and Mail*.\(^{98}\)

Doug Sanders, long-time legal advisor to the National Indian Brotherhood and WCIP, offered his thoughts on the adoption to a journalist from the *Lethbridge Herald* in November 1982. Sanders argued the adoption was a clear assertion of Indigenous rights, since the Canadian government was not asked to participate, nor was Canada's official Indian Act taken into account. He mentioned that previously, when local tribes had adopted Indigenous people with American citizenship, the Canadian government had not forced them to return to the United States.\(^{99}\) Sanders later added that (to his knowledge) Somby had “so far not broken any laws by being in Canada” since no visa was required of Norwegian citizens to

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\(^{96}\) *Lethbridge Herald*, 26 November 1982


enter Canada, and Somby still had time left in his six months of visitor status. Nonetheless, the immigration and passport section of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Calgary did begin a formal investigation of the matter. Just days after the adoption ceremony, Shane Houston (a *Gangulu* man from Australia who spent a year working for the World Council of Indigenous Peoples) was questioned by the police after he mentioned to a clerk, while submitting his application to extend his visa, that he was staying at the home of Marie Smallface-Marule. Although Houston had not personally seen Somby, he told them that he supported the right of Indigenous peoples to adopt whomever they wanted, and he later provided the local newspaper with a telexed pledge of support for Somby from an Australian Indigenous organization.

In early December, Somby's wife Dagny travelled to Lethbridge with their children Anja (age eight) and Risten (age six) “in the hope [of] a Christmas reunion.” Upon her arrival at the nearby Calgary airport, she was questioned for more than six hours by immigration officials. According to Dagny, officials became suspicious when they found out where she was planning to stay while in Canada. She “gave them Marie's [Smallface-Marule] name and at once there were problems.” Smallface-Marule had been aware of their arrival

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100 *Lethbridge Herald*, 29 November 1982. It seems that both Sanders and the Canadian government were unaware that Somby had entered Canada using a false passport. At a later legal hearing, Somby reported that his passport had been stolen, along with other possessions, in Vancouver in December 1982. *Lethbridge Herald*, 15 November 1984.


102 *Lethbridge Herald*, 2 December 1982. Shane Houston went on to become the Deputy Vice-Chancellor at the University of Sydney. Of his brief time working at the WCIP, Houston says: “I saw the common bonds between the lives of the 400 million Indigenous people around the world, and that cultural, spiritual and social values are shared by this international Indigenous family.” Chris Rodley, “Shane Houston Inside the Tent,” *Sydney Alumni Magazine*, July 2011 <http://sydney.edu.au/alumni/sam/july2011/shane-houston.shtml>


and helped secure a $1,500 bond from a friend which, together with a $500 bond from Dagny and a promise not to outstay her visitor's status, convinced authorities to let the family stay in Canada. A reunion was organized, and in early January, the family was happy to learn that the Norwegian government had made a formal statement that it would not request Somby's extradition to Norway.\textsuperscript{105} Moreover, the government's charges against him had been drastically reduced the previous November; instead of facing a maximum of 21 years in prison for arson, Somby was now charged with destroying government property which carried a maximum sentence of two years.\textsuperscript{106} John-Reier Martinsen had been convicted in court at Hammarfest, but received only a very minimal sentence and no actual time in prison, proving that Somby no longer needed to fear long-term incarceration.\textsuperscript{107}

5.7 Indigenous International Co-operation

Despite the reduced charges by the Norwegian government, and the mounting investigation by Canadian officials, the Sombys opted not to return to Sásåmi. Eventually, the family was relocated again, this time to the reserve of the Dakelh nation of Lhoosk’uz.\textsuperscript{108} Located directly south of Fort Fraser and west of Quesnel, British Columbia, at the southern end of the Nechako mountain range, the Lhoosk’uz made up a small, isolated community determined to maintain its independence. At that time, there was no road in whatsoever; access was by horse, foot, or air, or by snowmobile during the winter. There were only a

\textsuperscript{105} Lethbridge Herald, 4 January 1982.
\textsuperscript{106} Lethbridge Herald, 26 November 1982; Kainai News 2 (October 1984)
\textsuperscript{107} Somby recalls that Martinsen was only sentenced to five months, time served. An article in the Lethbridge Herald states that Martinsen had pled guilty and been given a fourteen-month suspended sentence. Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013. Lethbridge Herald, 7 November 1984.
\textsuperscript{108} Doreen Patrick, “Footprints in Stone: Kluskus Today” at Quesnel & District Museum and Archives <http://www.quesnelmuseum.ca/footprintsinstone/History/Kluskus.html>
handful of houses on the reserve, and at the point that Somby and his family arrived, the community was deeply reliant on their environment for their survival:

In the 1980s, the [Lhoosk’uz] became so frustrated with government policies and funding programmes that they gave back all funds except welfare payments for the elderly. They survived from 1980 to 1986 without government funding before they rejoined the programmes.\(^9\)

The Somby family lived in a home, outside the main village, with an older man and his teenage daughter. Without much money, they lived primarily on moose and fish, which Somby hunted and caught himself.\(^10\) He helped trap mink and other small fur-bearing animals to sell, which provided their only real source of monetary income for basic necessities.\(^11\)

Such a drastic change in environment for the family surely proved challenging, yet Somby still refused to return to face Norwegian courts. The explanation for this difficult decision lies in Indigenous international co-operation. The Nuxálk and other nations had agreed to adopt and protect Somby, a rare honour. Now, these Indigenous nations were determined to use the case to demonstrate their sovereignty to the Canadian government. In Somby's own words, the Nuxálk people “claimed that they had the right to give asylum to whomever, because it's their land. And that became, then, the issue, to have a fight about that, because my fight was already over.”\(^12\) He felt that, if he had given up and gone home, it...
would have undermined those efforts. The thin international linkages which originated with the WCIP had provided an option for Somby in the summer of 1982, but his personal relationships strengthened these ties enormously, creating a united effort to defend Indigenous sovereignty.

Through 1983, attention to Somby's presence had cooled. The Norwegian government had never made much comment about the case, likely hoping to avoid further negative international attention to the Alta Hydroelectric Project. The Canadian government seemed to lose interest as well. While media coverage had been scarce in 1982, it dropped off completely the following year. Somby asserts that Bob Manuel (Head of the Union of BC Indian Chiefs, and son of George Manuel), had struck a gentleman's agreement with External Affairs minister Allan MacEachern: so long as Somby was keeping a low profile, immigration officials were happy to avoid conflict.113

The situation changed when Somby's sister became ill and his parents were having difficulties, which gave him increased reason to return home.114 Around the same time, W5, a Canadian television news magazine, requested an interview about Somby's presence in Canada. Before agreeing, Somby arranged a meeting with Nuxálk elders, and explained the situation. Some media attention would allow a public statement of Nuxálk sovereignty and a challenge to Canadian laws. If it came to Canadian courts, they might lose the case to grant asylum, but since Somby wanted to return to Sápmi anyway, it seemed worth the risk. The Sombys' moved from their home with the Lhoos'uz to Nuxálk territory on the coast in the

113 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013; Lethbridge Herald, 6 November 1984.
114 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
spring of 1984. There, Dagny, Anja and Risten were also adopted in a second ceremony and given Nuxálk names.

Somby's whereabouts were voluntarily made public, and immigration authorities were effectively dared to take action. The authorities responded to the challenge, asking Somby to report to an immigration office in Kamloops or Prince George for an interview. He again consulted the Nuxálk leadership, who asked him to stay; they would request a meeting with Immigration Minister John Roberts and proclaim, once again, their sovereign status. In a newspaper interview, Elected Chief Qwatsinas (Edward Moody) was explicit about the Nuxálk challenge to Canadian immigration laws: “The question is whether he, as one of our adopted people, can be deported.” For his part, Somby asserted his loyalty to his adopted nation, "I would be undermining the tribal authority if I asked for a Canadian passport. If I need one, I'll ask for a Nuxálk passport." Roberts took until the end of July to reply with a letter, again asking Somby to report for an immigration hearing, and in mid-August, Chief Nuximlayc announced that the Nuxálk nation refused to turn Somby over and “warned the federal Government not to interfere in its tribal customs.” The statement emphasized that the Nuxálk people had declared their position on citizenship “to the International World Community” in July in a statement to the United Nations Working group on Indigenous Populations.

115 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013; “Native Son.”
117 Though the specifics of the occasion are somewhat unclear, several article mention that the Nuxálk nation had proclaimed their sovereignty in 1975, in response to the failure of the federal government to recognize their rights. They had made a similar proclamation at a potlatch ceremony in December 1981, a year before Somby's adoption. The Globe and Mail, 31 May 1984.
119 Ibid.
120 Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs Update, 7 (September, 1984); The Globe and Mail, 16 August 1984.
121 Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs Update, 7 (September, 1984);
Late that summer, the W5 crew arrived for two days of filming, a tremendous opportunity not only for Somby to explain his case and the protests of the Sámi, but also for his hosts to publicly assert their own sovereignty. The show's anchor, Dennis Macintosh, introduces the story by acknowledging the global interest in Indigenous rights: “The struggle for Native rights is not an exclusively Canadian issue. Native people worldwide are fighting for self-government and financial independence. Sometimes that struggle crosses international boundaries.”

W5 reporters interviewed Niillas and Dagny, Bjarne Store-Jakobsen who was also visiting, and members of the Nuxálk nation, including Chief Nuximlayc. Much of Somby's interview relates more to the local struggle for Indigenous rights than his own actions in Norway. When asked, “Why Canada?” he answered, “Because it's Indian land... I respect Indian law.”

The story featured video from his adoption ceremony with local Indigenous drummers singing, “We don't need your constitution! You will never steal all of our freedom.” It referenced the Nuxálk nation's declaration of sovereignty in 1975, their assertion of ownership of surrounding lands, and described the Sombys' adoption as a demonstration of their sovereign right to grant citizenship. In his interview, Bill Tallio of the Nuxálk Nation Council states that, “It's a way of demonstrating that we are going ahead with what we want to do for our people... to make sure our people survive. If a little act of adopting some people from another country is gonna help then we'll

122 “Native Son.”
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid. Known as “The Constitution Song,” it was written in 1980 by participants in the “Constitution Express” who opposed elements of the patriation of the Canadian constitution. George Manuel described it as “a War Cry for our nations.” UBCIC, Constitution Express Digital Collection, Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs, 13th Annual General Assembly (28-30 October 1981) <http://constitution.ubcic.bc.ca/node/138> It continues to be sung in protest to this day. See “Idle No More - Constitution Song.” YouTube video, 4:09, posted by “Brandon Morrison” 12 January 2013, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gOwxD0YPNeo>
have to do it.”126 Louise Mandell, a lawyer representing the Nuxálk nation, also asserts that Somby was given citizenship “as an exercise of [Nuxálk] sovereignty.”127 In this way, a Sámi man, theoretically uninvolved in the conflict between local Indigenous peoples and the Canadian states, was able to help draw attention to that conflict.

The W5 interview also enabled Somby to explain and encourage international interest in the Sámi fight for Indigenous rights. Somby only briefly describes the event that cost him his arm, the sight in one eye, and the hearing in one ear, but much of the story focuses on the Sámi people more generally. The reporter himself characterizes the history of Sámi/Norwegian relations as one of “colonization” and Bjarne Store-Jakobsen reinforces the comparison with Indigenous peoples from the Americas: “In the beginning, the Norwegians looked on us as savages and as people they would like to civilize. They tried to take away our culture and our language and our way of living... and tried to assimilate us into the Norwegian system.”128 Certainly, this history would have sounded very similar to anyone familiar with Canadian state policies towards Indigenous people. Somby's determination to protect Sámi culture and language is compared with the Nuxálk language schools set up for local children. Somby was explicit in the comparison: “I know people here are working for the very same thing that we are doing at home. They are struggling about having self-determination here. And with me being here, it's just a part of that self-determination.”129 Chief Nuximlayc seemed unworried by the potential for the Sombys' deportation, stating that the Sámi adoptee would always be Nuxálk, and “they can't take that away even if they put

126 “Native Son.”
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
him in jail... or send him back to his homeland in Samiland.”

In just a fourteen-minute news story, Somby and his network of allies were able to publicize the fight of both the Sámi and Nuxálk people, and to demonstrate that, owing to their similar histories as colonized people, they were willing to collaborate in their struggles as part of a movement of Indigenous internationalism. According to Somby, after the television crew arrived, the local police also made an appearance and headed for his home. They were met by “at least a hundred people sitting around our house and that was a sign to police that they would not get Niillas for free.”

Because Store-Jakobsen was there with a truck, Somby and his family left soon after the film crew, and made their way to Fort MacLeod, Alberta. There they stayed in Store-Jakobsen's mobile home, but also travelled to the nearby city of Lethbridge in their Sámi gákti. Much as Manuel and Marule had worried years earlier when they had encouraged the newly arrived Somby to dress in “cowboy” clothes, the traditional Sámi attire likely raised the attention of local police. In 1984, however, the attention was perhaps not altogether unwanted. While the trip to Fort MacLeod was intended to be a three-week vacation, Somby learned in late September that immigration officials were investigating his presence, and decided nevertheless to remain in town. On 1 October 1984, the police arrived and arrested Niillas and Dagny Somby. Dagny was quickly released on bail and she returned to the Nuxálk nation with her children, but Niillas was kept in prison and refused bail, despite the promises of Chief Nuximlayc that Somby would return for his hearing.

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130 Ibid.
131 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
132 Ibid.
133 Louise Mandell, personal interview, 24 September 2013.
134 Lethbridge Herald, 5 October 1984
135 Lethbridge Herald, 10 October 1984
was charged for not possessing a passport; for overstaying his visitor's status; for not declaring, upon entering the country, that he had an impaired driving charge in Norway at the age of eighteen; and for being “a political subversive.”  

The hearing itself was delayed, ostensibly in the search for a Sámi-speaking interpreter (originally requested by Somby), until 14 November. When Somby asserted that he would prefer to continue in English than prolong his time in prison awaiting the hearing, the adjudicator refused, suggesting that Somby might attempt to overturn a legal defeat by claiming that he had not understood the proceedings owing to the lack of an interpreter.

Somby and his allies brought as much media attention to the hearing as they could. Just like the W5 news story, the court case provided them with an opportunity to promote Indigenous sovereignty (on both sides of the Atlantic ocean) in the media, and to illustrate the similar political circumstances that defined Indigeneity. The support Somby received from around the world demonstrated the global solidarity of Indigenous peoples. Somby’s legal counsel Louise Mandell (the Union of BC Indian Chiefs’ in-house lawyer) fought to ensure the hearing would be conducted in the open so that more people, including journalists could attend. Chief Nuximlayc commented publicly that Sir Alexander Mackenzie was adopted by the Nuxálk people who helped him complete his famous trans-continental trek in 1793. Traditional Kainai Chief Shot Both Sides added that “Canada's first Indian senator,” James

136 Kainai News, November 1984 (No. 2).
137 Kainai News, November 1984 (No. 1).
138 Kainai News, November 1984 (No. 1). At any rate, a translator was found, but was rarely used during the hearing as Somby testified almost entirely in English. Lethbridge Herald, 15 November 1984
139 Lethbridge Herald, 12 October 1984. While Louise Mandell was being paid as the full-time counsel of the Union of BC Indian Chiefs, Somby’s legal costs were being paid for by the Nuxálk nation. Lethbridge Herald, 6 November 1984.
140 Lethbridge Herald, 12 October 1984.
Gladstone, “wasn't born an Indian but was adopted... by Crop Eared Wolf” of the Kainai nation. Clem Chartier, the recently elected President of the WCIP, announced that he had sent a telex to Immigration Minister Flora MacDonald, requesting Somby's release on bail while some kind of deal was negotiated. George Manuel's Secwepemc nation formally declared its support for Somby. Hans Pavia Rosing, an Inuit former member of the WCIP Executive Council, requested that the Government of Greenland grant Somby asylum.

While the hearing was being arranged, Somby asked the adjudicator to consider if he himself was truly a legal immigrant to the lands in which he lived. Somby also began another hunger strike, ostensibly to protest his being held without bail, but he also declared that it was largely to bring attention to the abuses of Indigenous people: “I'm trying to expose the colonizers and the treatment put on the indigenous people. It's very much the same as in other countries.” Despite limited access to Somby and the hearing, the Lethbridge Herald responded with news coverage and numerous editorials, one even comparing Somby to Poland's Lech Wałęsa and civil rights leader Martin Luther King.

When the hearing was finally arranged, Mandell attempted to make the case that the

142 Lethbridge Herald, 13 October 1984. It may be worth reminding the reader that Flora MacDonald had a positive relationship with George Manuel and had helped ensure CIDA's financial support for the World Council when she was Secretary of State for External Affairs. See previous chapter. A scathing editorial in the Lethbridge Herald later accused MacDonald of hypocrisy for her previous critiques of Liberal party policies towards Indigenous peoples, in comparison with her current refusal to comment on Somby's case. Lethbridge Herald, 1 November 1984.
143 Lethbridge Herald, 19 October 1984.
144 Lethbridge Herald, 22 October 1984.
145 Lethbridge Herald, 10 October 1984.
146 The hunger strike lasted from 16 to 23 October, at which point Chief Nuximlayc asked Somby to end it so that the adjudicator would “have a free hand and not make a decision under pressure.” Lethbridge Herald, 17 & 23 October 1984.
Canadian government's wish to deport Somby was “in violation of fundamental principles of constitutional and international law.”\(^{148}\) There were precedents, including the 1867 Quebec Supreme Court decision in \textit{Connolly v. Woolrich}, to show that “Indigenous laws and legal orders pre-existed and survived the assertion of crown sovereignty, affirming customary international law.”\(^{149}\) She called seven witnesses, including Somby, Bjarne Store-Jakobsen, George Manuel and Marie Smallface-Marule.\(^{150}\) Somby's testimony emphasized that the oppression of Indigenous people was similar around the globe, and called into question the legitimacy of the courts: “The Colonials are always trying to kill the indigenous peoples' way of living – that is our religions, our economics, our laws, our languages and our self-respect. There [sic] killing tools have always been the colonial churches, their war machines, their courts and legal systems – or rather their illegal court systems.”\(^{151}\) Manuel “reaffirmed Somby's statements about oppression of Indigenous peoples throughout the world” and described the history of Secwepemc interactions with Europeans.\(^{152}\) Piikani elder and researcher Albert Yellowhorn, also called to testify, used the opportunity to stress that Indigenous sovereignty had never been relinquished to the Canadian state, and to raise various doubts about the legitimacy of the Treaty 7 which dealt with the lands upon which the hearing itself was being conducted.\(^{153}\) In short, the hearing afforded Indigenous activists

\(^{148}\) Kainai News, November 1984 (No. 2).
\(^{150}\) Kainai News, November 1984 (No. 2).
\(^{151}\) Ibid.
\(^{152}\) Ibid.
\(^{153}\) Lethbridge Herald, 16 November 1984.
not only media attention for Somby's immediate case, but an opportunity to publicly assert their sovereignty, and to demonstrate their shared experience of invasion and colonization, the basis of Indigenous internationalism.

Legal arguments were completed on 19 November, and the adjudicator delivered his decision, against Somby, one week later.\(^{154}\) Somby and his family were deported to Norway in early December. According to Mandell, the adjudicator did recognize the legitimacy of Nuxálk law, but argued Somby was also required to obey Canadian law: “He did not deal with the question of what happens when Nuxálk law and Canadian law move in conflict. (...) The Nuxálk Nation and Indian law were strengthened by its exercise and by the recognition of it by the adjudicator. But the Canadian institutions would not respect Indian law when it conflicted with Canadian law.”\(^{155}\) Mandell travelled to testify on Somby's behalf at the Norwegian trial but was not called as a witness. The prosecutor managed to convict Somby, but he was only sentenced to six months (time served) so he was not required to return to prison.\(^{156}\)

5.8 Impact

The impact of Somby's legal case on Canadian aboriginal case law seems limited at best. According to Mandell, the case was never seriously intended to be organized as a test case to set legal precedent about the right of Indigenous Nations to use and assert traditional adoption laws to defend against deportation orders issued by Canada.\(^{157}\) There was no time or

\(^{154}\) Kainai News, November 1984 (No. 2); Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs Update, January 1985.
\(^{155}\) Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs Update, January 1985.
\(^{156}\) Louise Mandell, personal interview, 24 September 2013; Niillas Somby, personal interview, 15 October 2013. Somby believes that the only reason he was convicted at all was because the head of the jury was the wife of a secret police officer.
\(^{157}\) Louise Mandell, personal interview, 24 September 2013, and personal correspondence, 14 February 2013.
money to mount that kind of case, nor was a deportation hearing the appropriate venue, as the judge would not have been appropriately versed in constitutional principles. The point of the trial was to demonstrate that Indigenous peoples still demanded the right to exercise their own laws, asserting their own jurisdiction in a conscious way.\footnote{158} While there was no expectation the judge would respond by granting a remedy, those involved felt it was worth formally presenting that idea in court.

Other impacts are, of course, manifold but hard to measure. For Somby himself, it was, as mentioned above, a deeply spiritual journey that left him feeling stronger and more committed to his cause. In a documentary film made later, Somby recalls of his time as a refugee: “It was a good time and I learned what is the most important thing in my life: that one must honour his ancestors.”\footnote{159} Over the course of the protests, he had become more interested in an older historical case that he felt represented the oppression of the Sámí fighting for their rights. Over a century earlier, his relative, Mons Somby, had been convicted of leading a small insurrection against increased Norwegian government, church and business intrusions into Sámí society.\footnote{160} Mons Aslaksen Somby and his co-accused, Aslak Jacobsen Hætta were executed by beheading in 1854, and while their bodies were buried near Alta, their skulls were shipped to Oslo and added to the collection of the Anatomical Institute at the Royal Frederick University (now the University of Oslo).\footnote{161} Niillas Somby had known he was related to Mons Somby, but was surprised to learn that one of the elderly Sámí women who had participated in the occupation of the Prime Minister's office was descended

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{158}{Ibid.}
\footnotetext{159}{Paul Anders Simma, Oaitveskaldjut / Give Us Our Skeletons! Author's translation.}
\footnotetext{160}{Niillas Somby himself is unclear on his precise relationship to Mons Somby, but the Somby family is quite small. Niillas Somby, personal interview, 15 October 2013.}
\footnotetext{161}{Paul Anders Simma, Oaitveskaldjut / Give Us Our Skeletons!}
\end{footnotes}
from Aslak Hætta. “I didn't know it when I started that process that it was the same people
behind that revolution also as it was in this... I mean, it was the same families.”  

Niillas' sympathy for the dismemberment of his relative had grown since 1982; the Norwegian police had retained his severed arm as criminal evidence for his entire time abroad. Ánde Somby still remembers his brother's return to Sápmi, and waiting with journalists from the Nordic press as the plane landed:

And then he's on the stairs, because that was still the time when people when they came out of aeroplanes were walking down the stairs. So he comes down the stairs, and the press shouts, “Mr. Somby, what now?” And I was also very excited... what is he going to say now? (...) He held up his arm (...) and he said, “I lost an arm. Mons Somby lost his head. We were in the same fight. I want my arm back and I want Mons Somby's head back.”

Rather than giving up after a failed battle with Canadian Immigration, Somby had renewed his resolve and moved on to a new fight. Inspired perhaps by the size and determination of the broad network of Indigenous peoples that had tried to protect him, the relatively small size of the Sámi people must not have felt like such a weakness anymore. Even if the established Sámi organizations did not approve of his actions, he knew he had allies that supported him around the world. Certainly, he was no longer the depressed older brother that Ánde had once worried about. His new fight would prove more successful than his opposition to the hydroelectric project; the skulls of Mons Somby and Aslak Hætta were eventually returned by the University of Oslo and reburied with their bodies in 1997.

For the Nuxàlk and the other adoptive Indigenous nations, Somby's presence had

162 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
164 Ibid. Somby's severed arm was eventually returned by police after his return to Sápmi.
165 Paul Anders Simma, Oaivveskaldjut / Give Us Our Skeletons!
given them an opportunity to present their case for sovereignty and challenge the Canadian government. Although they lost the case, they can rightly claim to have successfully defied the Canadian immigration authorities and protected an adopted member of their Nation and his family for close to two years. Like Somby, the Nuxálk nation refused to give up easily. In May 1985, Nuxálk representatives described the case before United Nations Human Rights committees, claiming that Somby had been illegally deported. 166

*Sámi* opinions on Somby's actions are unsurprisingly mixed. More conservative members of the *Sámi* political sphere had not been supportive of the hunger-strike, let alone the use of explosives. They had even been reticent to use their power on the World Council to draw international attention to the opposition to the Alta Hydroelectric Project. When “the question arose of tabling a resolution about the Alta affair at the WCIP General Assembly in Canberra in 1981,” Leif Halonen (of the Nordic Sami Council) had opposed the idea, suggesting that their problems were insignificant compared to those of Indigenous peoples in Central and South America: “[W]hen you look at everything as a whole, Alta seems like a little branch in the Brazilian jungle.”167 Somby's flight may have successfully drawn international attention to the *Sámi* protests, but it failed to actually stop the development; the power station was running by 1987.168 Yet as Ánde Somby sees it, his brother's story was important for the *Sámi* because it managed to “in such a practical way, prove the point that,

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168 Much later and much too late, former Prime Ministers Brundtland and Nordli who were responsible for the project would publicly acknowledge that it had been unnecessary. Gunnar Grendstad, Per Selle, Kristin Strømsnes, and Øystein Bortne, *Unique Environmentalism: A Comparative Perspective* (New York : Springer, 2006), 40n50.
yes, also Indigenous peoples can have foreign policy.” 169 Sámi activists have continued to be involved in Indigenous internationalism (both within and outside the Sami Council) long after the collapse of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. In June 2013, Sámi delegates hosted a preparatory meeting in Alta to plan a 2014 World Conference of Indigenous Peoples. 170

Even the more personal international links established by Somby remained after he was deported. Over two decades later, Arthur Manuel was visiting Sápmi, and when he met Somby, asked why his friend had not returned to North America for a visit. Somby informed him that, as part of the deportation ruling, he had been given a lifetime ban by Canadian immigration. Manuel and those with him pointed out that “a lifetime in Canada in the justice system of Canada doesn't really mean lifetime.” 171 Two weeks later, Somby was informed that not only had his mandatory exile lapsed long ago, but funding had been arranged for him and guests to visit as part of a government-run Indigenous artist exchange program; the Canadian state paid for his return trip. 172

5.9 Conclusions

While most of this dissertation is focused on the formal political connections established by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Niillas Somby's story demonstrates that that the informal, personal, and cultural connections created through organized Indigenous internationalism were also capable of having a very real and practical effect on peoples' lives. Whatever the cultural or spiritual connection Somby may have developed with

171 Niillas Somby, personal interview, 3 April 2013.
172 Ibid.
Philip Paul or the *Nuxálk* people, this encounter was made possible through channels of communication established by Indigenous internationalists like Marie Smallface-Marule, George Manuel, and Nils-Aslak Valkeapää. The World Council never became formally involved in Somby's case until after he was arrested—its leadership feigned ignorance to preserve an air of legality and possibly to maintain relations with the more moderate Nordic Sami Council—but it took what action was necessary to help facilitate the collaboration of others. As an organization, it was able to include a great range of Indigenous peoples, including the politically radical and the politically conservative, and both Christians and Indigenous spiritual traditionalists. While this openness must have presented challenges at times, in this case, it clearly the World Council to assist Indigenous people in more immediate and practical ways than at the level of international legal instruments.

As a case study, it is easier to use this episode to illustrate the significant impact of Indigenous internationalism rather than to the episode's own impact on the world. Somby's story has not been detailed in great depth by any publication, and possibly as a result, it is not widely known among Indigenous people in North America or Europe. Yet those who, in the mid-1980s, became aware of Somby's claim of asylum would certainly have had to rethink their understanding of Indigenous peoples. At the time, the television news program covering the story needed to explain to its viewers that Indigenous rights were not only a “Canadian issue,” and certainly, much of the population in Nordic countries might have balked at comparisons between the *Sámi* and the Indigenous peoples of the Americas. A few decades earlier, this type of solidarity between small groups of unconnected peoples would have been unlikely, to say the least. Cases like this challenge our expectations of simple dualistic
relationships between native and newcomer, colonizer and colonized, within a geographic boundary. Indigenous internationalism has complicated that dynamic by introducing a network of other “natives” who can contribute to the critique of the legitimacy of state power. Somby's hosts were able to support the Sámi struggle against the Alta Hydroelectric project by shielding him from severe prosecution by the Norwegian state. Since the international system often relies on states to protect not only their own citizens but also their nationals who make up minority groups abroad, Indigenous peoples have usually been left without strong allies beyond their borders. Had any nation state (like the Soviet Union) attempted to give Somby political asylum, Norway might easily have labelled such action cynical and illegitimate interference in its domestic affairs. Yet the solidarity expressed by the Nuxálk nation could hardly have been dismissed as such; their motivation was clearly based in a spirit of Indigenous internationalism. That Somby was able to support the Nuxálk assertion of sovereignty shows the sentiment ran both ways. Each party was able to see the similarity in their circumstance, and was willing to make sacrifices for the benefit of the other out of faith in their connection as Indigenous peoples. The World Council of Indigenous People, therefore, yielded results reaching beyond the international legal instruments it helped draft; it also helped construct a larger sense of global connectedness on the basis of political (and in some cases, a spiritual) Indigeneity.
Chapter 6
Colonial and Cold War Contexts:
Indigenous International Organizations
on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast

Early in January 1986, a group of Indigenous men, including Russell Means of the International Indian Treaty Council¹ and Clément Chartier of the World Council of Indigenous peoples, boarded canoes in Puerto Limon on the Atlantic coast of Costa Rica.² With a number of Miskitu guerillas as their guides, their intention was to sneak across the border into Nicaragua to investigate and document the circumstances of the local Indigenous populations—the Miskitu, Mayangna (Sumu), and Rama peoples.³ Much of that population was embroiled in a complex conflict which pitted the Nicaraguan government—under the leadership of the left-wing Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)—against a diverse array of adversaries, including supporters of the ousted Somoza dictatorship, various other local political factions, and the United States government. The Sandinistas' response to the growing Miskitu expressions of a distinct Indigenous identity (and the associated demands for Indigenous rights) ranged over time from grudging consent to outright hostility. Several

¹ Russell Means, an Oglala Lakota man, had helped the American Indian Movement's occupation of Wounded Knee. From 27 February to 5 May 1973 members of AIM seized control of the town of Wounded Knee, South Dakota (within the Oglala Pine Ridge Indian Reservation) and faced off with the United States Marshals Service. AIM gained great prominence from the well-publicized incident, as well as support from a variety of activists and celebrities.

² Clément Chartier, Witness to resistance: Under Fire in Nicaragua (Ottawa: Baico Pub., 2010). Chartier's book contains an introduction and conclusion that are essentially memoir, along with a reprinting of his journal entries from the trip and transcribed interviews he conducted while in Nicaragua.

³ Although estimates varied greatly, the Miskitu were (and remain) the largest Indigenous group in Nicaragua by far, totalling well over 100,000. The Mayangna made up a fairly small minority of a few thousand, and the Rama number perhaps as few as one thousand. Bernard Nietschmann, The Unknown War: the Miskito Nation, Nicaragua, and the United States (New York: Freedom House, 1989), 15.
local Indigenous organizations had taken up arms to defend themselves against increased intervention (both violent and otherwise) by the state, leading to allegations that they had allied with the US-supported “Contras” in opposition to the Sandinista government. The conflict was complex for several reasons. First, it involved a great number of involved parties: the FSLN; multiple Contra groups; multiple Indigenous peoples and organizations; the American government; and numerous international observers and volunteers. Second, it was very much framed by the polarizing effects of the Cold War. Third, the Miskitu people adopted the view of Indigenous self-determination espoused by the World Council, which (as described earlier) challenged the concept of nation-state sovereignty, but which could easily be confused as a simple demand of secession from Nicaragua. For these reasons, the struggle between the Sandinistas and local Indigenous peoples could represent a range of broader political conflicts depending on one's point of view. International observers (particularly those who crossed the line into participation) were deeply affected, though not necessarily blinded, by their preconceptions of the Sandinistas and of Indigenous peoples.

The clandestine trip was subject to a great deal of criticism within the international Indigenous movement, and this chapter will explain the source and the results of the controversy. Some, particularly on the Left, asserted these activists were being manipulated by the United States government as part of its Cold War effort to oust the Sandinistas, or at least, risked appearing so. Means and Chartier acknowledged that the conflict was a complicated one, but they argued that it proved the Cold War was largely irrelevant to the fight for Indigenous rights. Contrary to Lenin's claim that imperialism is merely “the highest
stage of capitalism,” they asserted that capitalists and communists were equally capable of colonial violence and the suppression of Indigenous peoples. As proud Indigenous internationalists, they believed their loyalty to Indigenous peoples (resisting internal colonization by the Nicaraguan state) took primacy over any Cold War concerns.

This chapter will begin with some background history on the political mobilization of the Miskitu, Mayangna, and Rama peoples, and the multiple points of contact between them and the Sandinistas, the World Council and the Treaty Council. An examination of the history of international Indigenous involvement on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast can be shown to have had an effect on the local Indigenous population, not only encouraging broad political organization but also helping to provide a specific discourse of inherent Indigenous rights to self-determination and sovereignty. The effect of this particular case of Indigenous international involvement, overlapping as it did with the geopolitical concerns of major world powers was perhaps more profound on the WCIP and the IITC themselves, and threatened to tear these organizations apart. As will be shown, the clandestine trip and its after effects demonstrate that the ideological divide created by the Cold War could not simply be ignored. The good offices provided by the World Council were one its greatest assets, but only so long as it was able to maintain an image of neutrality. The adherence of the WCIP and the IITC to anti-imperialism, however, did not guarantee neutrality, and the clandestine trip described in more detail below would undermine the best of intentions and even divide brothers.

6.1 Indigenous Peoples in Nicaragua

The WCIP and AIM both had connections in Nicaragua long before 1986, even before the Sandinistas had come to power in 1979. The Alianza para el Progresso del Pueblo Miskito y Sumu (ALPROMISU) was founded in Bilwaskarma in 1973 following the collapse of its precursor, the Association of Agricultural Clubs of the Rio Coco (ACARIC).5 ALPROMISU received a great deal of support from Miskitu pastors within the Nicaraguan Moravian Church, including Wycliff Diego. While Catholicism was also present on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, a significant majority of Miskitu were practising Moravians. Their Moravian faith may have disconnected the Miskitu people, to some degree, from the rest of Latin American's Indigenous movement, which was more apt to be either Catholic or non-Christian.6 It is unclear how ALPROMISU began to make international contacts, but the organization did send delegates to the 1975 World Conference of Indigenous Peoples,


6 Hale, 125-7. For more on the role the Moravian church during the conflict, see Susan Hawley, “Protestantism and Indigenous Mobilisation: the Moravian Church Among the Miskitu Indians of Nicaragua,” Journal of Latin American Studies 29:1 (Feb 1997).
cementing its relationship with the World Council. One of the delegates, Mildred Levy later recalled “a feeling that you were among brothers” and was impressed that other Indigenous peoples had managed to preserve their traditions with such success. During the summer of 1976, the World Council's President, George Manuel, and secretary, Rodrigo Contreras, went on a short tour of Latin America, including Nicaragua. In July, they met with ALPROMISU members in Managua and some Miskitu university students who asked about the possibility of independence and violent revolution for the country's Indigenous peoples. The visitors then proceeded to the Atlantic Coast where “their reception was astounding.” The roads were lined with people waiting to see Manuel. He later recalled that “it was very impressive to see the people waiting for our arrival along the roadside, not only adults but children as well.” When asked why they were so anxious to see him, they responded that Manuel was “the leader of the Indians of the world.” Contreras remembers their answer clearly: “George Manuel is our President. We are Indigenous.” The following spring, the first meeting of the WCIP regional committee for Central America and Mexico, Consejo Regional de Pueblos

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8 Bryan, “Map or be Mapped,” 92.
10 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
12 He also described an afternoon in Bilwi with three meeting with “from 140 to 200 persons in each.” SA, NSIF, Db 043, 4 (Ark 2.10.1), George Manuel, Report on the WCIP, 20 January 1977.
13 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010. By contrast, one Indigenous organizer, Amalia Dixon felt she had struggled to convince the local Indigenous population that the World Council meetings were valuable, “in spite of the numerous parallels she observed” between her people and other Indigenous peoples. Bryan, “Map or Be Mapped,” 92.
Indígenas (CORPI), elected ALPROMISU member Armando Rojas as president. Miskitu activists would also appear at the second WCIP General Assembly in Kiruna, Sweden in August 1977. In May and June 1977, the World Council helped arrange for Rojas to travel to Canada for a fundraising tour, meeting with numerous funding agencies and Indigenous organizations.\textsuperscript{14} The following March, Marie Smallface-Marule submitted two successful grant applications to the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace (CCODP) on behalf of ALPROMISU for two of their projects.\textsuperscript{15} With the recommendation of the WCIP, Mildred Levy (by then, bearing the title External Affairs Secretary of ALPROMISU) was invited to a conference in Eastern Canada hosted by a local NGO in April 1979. Afterwards, she travelled to visit the WCIP Secretariat and informed them about the unfolding Nicaraguan revolution.\textsuperscript{16} ALPROMISU did not limit its activities to the World Council. The following September, Rojas and another Miskitu man, Armstrong Wiggins, attended the United Nations NGO conference on “Discrimination Against the Indigenous Populations of the Americas” in Geneva, Switzerland, organized by the International Indian Treaty Council.\textsuperscript{17}

The Sandinistas' seizure of power from dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979, however,

\textsuperscript{14} Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs Resource Centre (hereafter UBCICRC), WCIP Four-Year Report (1977-1981).
\textsuperscript{15} Details of these projects are not mentioned, though Smallface-Marule also gained a grant for Nilo Cayuqueo to travel through South America in preparation for the founding conference of a South American regional branch of the WCIP. UBCICRC, WCIP Four-Year Report (1977-1981).
\textsuperscript{16} UBCICRC, WCIP Four-Year Report (1977-1981). Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz asserts that, during the 1980 UN Special Session on Development in New York, she attended a meeting in the UN auditorium organized by the National Indian Brotherhood with assistance from the Canadian government, to denounce the alleged “Sandinista genocide.” The WCIP Four-Year Report, published the following year, confirms that George Manuel and Smallface-Marule were indeed in New York at that time, but it makes no mention of them arranging a meeting, nor does it mention any attacks on Indigenous peoples in Nicaragua during this period. On the contrary, all sources indicate that the Sandinista-Miskitu relationship was relatively calm during the summer of 1980. UBCICRC, WCIP Four-Year Report (1977-1981). Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, \textit{Blood on the Border: a Memoir of the Contra War} (Cambridge, MA.: South End, 2005), 55.
\textsuperscript{17} Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, \textit{Blood on the Border}, 37-38.
left ALPROMISU in a precarious position. Although its leaders had demanded improvements on the Atlantic Coast, Somoza had recognized them as legitimate representatives, met with them, and even appointed some of them to minor government positions.\(^{18}\) Perhaps feeling ALPROMISU had made some headway with the government, or perhaps defending their new privileges, these figures had opted against open support for the FSLN or even for the less radical opposition organization, *Frente Amplio*.\(^{19}\) After the Nicaraguan Revolution, their connections with Somoza left ALPROMISU members open to criticism from Sandinistas and their supporters, as well as a new generation of *Miskitu* activists who were studying in universities on the Pacific Coast.

Along with the nationalization of industry and land reform, one of the earliest projects of the Sandinistas was the establishment of mass organizations throughout the country, following the Cuban model. Organizations like the Workers' Federation and the Farmers' Union were intended to unite the population along occupational lines rather than regional or ethnic ones. After some debate, they agreed to the formation of a separate organization, albeit one with minimal responsibility or authority, to represent the three Indigenous groups of the Atlantic Coast: the *Miskitu*, the *Mayangna (Sumu)*, and the *Rama*.\(^{20}\) Some Indigenous students from Managua (especially Steadman Fagoth, Brooklyn Rivera, and Hazel Lau) mobilized against the leaders of ALPROMISU, whom the Sandinistas distrusted anyway because of their history of co-operation with Somoza. Thus, at a large assembly in Bilwi (Puerto Cabezas) in November 1979, the Sandinistas approved the creation of

\(^{18}\) Meringer, 17.
\(^{19}\) Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua”, 82.
\(^{20}\) Although MISURASATA was to represent all three groups, the meeting was dominated by Miskitu and there were no Rama present at all. Philippe Bourgois, “Class, Ethnicity, and the State among the Miskitu Amerindians of Northeastern Nicaragua,” *Latin American Perspectives* 8:2 (Spring, 1981), 33n9 [22-39]
MISURASATA, Miskitu, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista, Asla Takanka (all together), with Fagoth as its General Coordinator.\(^{21}\) As the Sandinistas strengthened and expanded their new government, MISURASATA achieved a number of successes. In April 1980, the FSLN allotted one seat of the Council of State\(^{22}\) to Fagoth so that his organization might be represented; another Miskitu, Brooklyn Rivera filled the role of General Coordinator, and other members, Armstrong Wiggins (formerly of ALPROMISU) and Hazel Lau, were assigned relatively prominent government positions as well.\(^{23}\)

Perhaps more important was MISURASATA's impact on what was arguably the Sandinistas' most successful project: the Literacy Crusade. The massive project of literacy promotion was launched in March 1980, sent out over 90,000 *brigadistas* to teach in the countryside, and drastically reduced the country's illiteracy rate.\(^{24}\) Census data for the Atlantic coast suggested a regional illiteracy rate of 75%, but although Spanish literacy training some of the major urban centres (Bluefields, Bilwi, and Rama Cay) had already reduced these rates, members of the *Miskitu* population resented being taught Spanish.\(^{25}\)

According to anthropologist Charles Hale, the people of the Atlantic coast felt a longstanding distrust towards the Spanish-speaking population of the Pacific, resulting from their historic

\(^{21}\) Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua”, 83.
\(^{22}\) Nietschmann, *The Unknown War*, 28. Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua”, 83-84. The Nicaraguan government was formally headed by a five member council, the Junta of the National Reconstruction Government (JGRN). The Council of State was initially set up with 33 seats, 12 of which were designated to the FSLN, but it was later increased to 47 seats.
\(^{23}\) Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua”, 83.
relationship.\textsuperscript{26}

Because of their geographic isolation from the Pacific coast and their proximity to the Caribbean, the people of the Atlantic had, historically, fit within the British sphere of influence. In the 1680s, the British recognized Jeremy I as the King of the Miskitu and lawful ruler of Mosquitia. When Spain convinced the British to withdraw their presence from the coast in 1787, the Spanish made an unsuccessful bid to colonize the region, fought off by fierce Miskitu resistance. For the next three decades, the local Miskitu leadership maintained nearly complete political autonomy.\textsuperscript{27} Britain maintained its trade practices with the region and in the 1930s, would declare the Mosquito Coast a British protectorate.

The newly independent nation of Nicaragua and the United States denounced any assertion to Miskitu autonomy, historical or otherwise, as a sham to maintain a British presence on the Coast. In 1860, the British again renounced any claim to Nicaragua, but insisted in the Treaty of Managua, that an autonomous Mosquito Reserve be set up, and broadly ruled by the same lineage of Miskitu kings. This arrangement lasted for several decades until Nicaraguan President José Santos Zelaya launched a military occupation of the region (which he creatively termed a “reincorporation”) in 1894 and removed the Miskitu King from power. Although petitioned by Mosquito Chief Robert Henry Clarence, the British refused to intervene.\textsuperscript{28} Despite the formal reincorporation of the Atlantic Coast into Nicaragua, its isolation from the rest of the country’s population on the Pacific Coast

\textsuperscript{26} Hale, 83-86.
\textsuperscript{27} Hale, 39.
\textsuperscript{28} Hale, 41. It remains unclear to what degree the Miskitu leadership of the 1980s was aware of and influenced by this historical precedent for their leveraging of international connections against the Nicaraguan government.
remained, and by 1905, many Indigenous communities did formalize their titles to local land.29 Throughout the twentieth century, the United States gained a prominent role in the economic and political life of the country (notwithstanding Augusto César Sandino's nationalist war against the US Marines in the 1920s) and dominated the economy of the Atlantic coast. Periods of American investment on the Atlantic Coast led to significant financial booms. Despite the regular downturns in the economic cycle, and the significant deforestation and other environmental damage resulting from extractive industry, Charles Hale demonstrates that many Miskitu would continue to look back on the “company times” as a golden age.30 It was quite common for those Miskitu involved in these industries to learn English as a second language, rather than Spanish. This history of English-speaking collaboration (or at least, co-optation) and Spanish-speaking occupation, suggests Hale, produced an “Anglo-American affinity” among the Miskitu, and a deeply felt fear of domination by Nicaragua's Spanish-speaking majority.31 Unlike the FSLN, who located “imperialism” in the United States, the Miskitu were likely to locate it in the Nicaraguan state.32

Because the Spanish-language literacy crusade could be taken as a harbinger of forced assimilation, MISURASATA was critical of the program. They successfully pushed instead for literacy training in Miskitu and English, and such a project began in the summer of 1980. Because Pacific-coast-based Sandinistas could not generally speak English, never mind

Indigenous languages, the training was done by educated Miskitu, many of them Moravian

30 Hale, 69-70.
31 Ibid., 83-86.
32 Baracco, 640.
clergy. According to Luciano Baracco, it was the effectively local control over the program which allowed MISURASATA to politically mobilize its support base.

Amongst the Miskitu, this project appears to have acted as a catalyst in the revitalization of the Miskitu collective memories of the Kingdom of Mosquitia and autonomy from mestizos. With the dissemination of such an alternative national myth, the Miskitu were transformed from the acquiescent group that they had been during the Somocista period into...a “proto-nationalist” group with aspirant ideas of nationhood of its own.33

The honeymoon period between Sandinistas and MISURASATA did not last long. During the summer of 1980, former members of Somoza's National Guard34 launched guerrilla attacks against the Sandinistas from their bases across the northern border in Honduras. These “Contras” were joined by a variety of the FSLN's political opponents and gained increased attention from the United States government following the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980. Members of MISURASATA worked to prepare a proposal for a more prominent role for the organization. Dubbed “Plan 81,” the document suggested that MISURASATA should annex youth and women's groups on the coast, and that a National Indigenous Confederation should be set up as an umbrella organization to represent both MISURASATA and the few Indigenous peoples of the Pacific coast.35 Moreover, there were the demands that a Council of Elders be set up as an advisory or legislative body, that MISURASATA should have more general control over the Atlantic coast, and that there be an “Indigenous seat” on the five-person National Council or junta.

33 Baracco, 145-6
34 The Nicaraguan National Guard was set up during the U.S. Occupation of Nicaragua (1912-1933) and served to keep all three generations of the Somoza dynasty in power. Dennis suggests the Miskitu may have been heavily recruited for the Guard, but has only anecdotal evidence. Dennis, “The Costenos and the Revolution in Nicaragua,” 291.
35 A complete version of Plan 81 is available in Ohland and Schneider, National Revolution and Indigenous Identity.
Perhaps most threatening to the Sandinistas, the plan was set to be published along with a
detailed map of “Indigenous territory” which included roughly 80% of the Atlantic coast region.\(^{36}\) MISURASATA intended to unveil both the plan and the map at a major celebration of the completion of the Atlantic Literary Campaign at the end of February 1981, but it was not to be.

The Sandinistas, already on the defensive because of Contra attacks, were concerned that MISURASATA demands for Indigenous autonomy over such a vast territory were part of a larger plan for complete secession.\(^{37}\) If the plan were to be announced at such a large gathering of *Miskitu*, the FSLN leadership worried that the demands could not be easily rejected. Instead, they launched a preemptive attack on MISURASATA, arresting Steadman Fagoth and thirty-two other members of the organization's leadership in mid-February.\(^{38}\) After the attempted arrest of leader Elmer Prado in Prinzapolka led to a firefight, many young *Miskitu* men began to gather weapons. Some would follow Fagoth when he was released and fled across the border to Honduras, and join his new paramilitary organization MISURA.\(^{39}\) By the summer of 1981, Brooklyn Rivera had fled to Costa Rica, Hazel Lau had denounced the Sandinistas, and Armstrong Wiggins had joined the Washington-based Indian


\(^{37}\) Luis Carrion, “Our Challenge is to Integrate Without Destroying (Barricada, 2 Sept 1981),” in *National Revolution and Indigenous Identity*, 200. *Barricada* was the official party newspaper of the FSLN.

\(^{38}\) Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua”, 86.

\(^{39}\) While other leaders were soon released, Fagoth was formally charged with spying for Somoza as a university student. When he was eventually released on bail, he fled to Honduras. Douglas Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua,” 86-88.
Law Resource Centre to publicize the wrongdoings of the Nicaraguan government. In November 1981, President Reagan cleared $19 million for the CIA to conduct anti-Sandinista work, including hiring members of the Argentinian military to train anti-Sandinista guerillas. From then on, the Contra war took on a much larger form.

In late December, a group of Miskitu guerrillas called Los Astros crossed the Wangki River (which serves as the eastern border between Nicaragua and Honduras, a region densely populated with Indigenous people) and launched the violent attacks in the frontier village of San Carlos, killing an entire squadron of Sandinista soldiers. In response to these “Red Christmas” attacks, the FSLN began the forced evacuation/relocation of at least 8000 Miskitu from communities along the river. They were moved to five new settlements known as Tasba Pri (Free Land) some 120 km from the border, and Sandinista soldiers attempted to hasten the removal by burning homes and killing cattle. The plan backfired; thousands of Miskitu

40 Hale, 152-3.
41 On December 12, a bomb planted by Contra forces exploded on-board Nicaragua's Aeronica jet while it was parked at the Mexico City airport. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, as well as the World Council's Lix Lopez and Ralph Eluska, were in the airport at the time and had been scheduled to take that plane to Managua for a UN Conference on Racism. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 119-122. Marie Smallface-Marule, personal interview, 26 May 2011.
42 In Spanish, the river is known as the Rio Coco. In 1960, the International Court of Justice ended a territorial dispute between Honduras and Nicaraguan by firmly setting the border on Wangki/Rio Coco, dividing in half the large Miskitu based around the river. Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 25.
43 Hale asserts that Los Astros were a group of “about 60 young men who had become alienated from Steadman Fagoth's authoritarian practices” whereas Dunbar-Ortiz asserts the attack was carried out by “several thousand CIA-trained guerillas—mostly Miskitu Indians, followers of Steadman Fagoth.” Hale, 241n2; Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 117-8. For more on Los Astros, see Bryan, 176-178 and Hawley, 127. For an account of the Red Christmas attacks, see Reynaldo Reyes and J.K. Wilson, Rafaga: The Life Story of a Nicaraguan Miskito Comandante (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 43-44.
44 The Sandinistas asserted that this was done for the protection of the Miskitu population and to facilitate border security, but it was generally perceived by the Miskitu as an act of collective punishment. Diskin gives an estimate of 8,500 people relocated to camps while Bernard Nietschmann suggests it was more than twice that many. Diskin et al, 11-12; Center for World Indigenous Studies, Chief George Manuel Library and Fourth World Documentation Project (hereafter CWIS), Bernard Nietschmann, “Nicaragua and the Indian Revolution,” (Center for World Indigenous Studies, 1986); Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 117-118.
opted instead to flee across the border into Honduras, and the international response to the Sandinistas' action was largely negative. Several prominent members of the Reagan administration (including US ambassador to the UN, Jeanne Kirkpatrick; Secretary of State, Alexander Haig; and President Reagan himself) accused the Nicaraguan government of atrocities and even attempted genocide, and Steadman Fagoth began a tour of the United States in February to raise international support.45 Throughout 1982, rumours of the Sandinista attacks on the Miskitu spread along the Atlantic coast, buoying the popularity of MISURASATA (under the command of Brooklyn Rivera in Costa Rica) and MISURA (under the command of Steadman Fagoth in Honduras).46 These Indigenous guerrilla forces steadily increased in numbers and in weaponry, aided, no doubt, by substantial aid from the CIA.47

With hindsight, it seems doubtful that the Miskitu and other Indigenous peoples of the Atlantic Coast truly faced genocidal violence from the Sandinista government. Investigations by the OAS's Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and Americas Watch both denied any “policy of mass abuse or genocide.”48 Yet the Sandinista rhetoric did suggest an unwillingness to accept cultural diversity within the country, when they insisted that (at least


46  Hale, 145, 241.

47  Following the 1982 Falkland War, training and supplies could no longer be provided via the Argentinian military, so the CIA provided support directly to the Contras. Fagoth's MISURA was allied with the US-backed Somocist Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense (FDN). Rivera's MISURASATA allied itself with the Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática (ARDE) Contra force in 1983, which also received substantial aid from the CIA; however, this alliance was broken off in 1984. Hale, 147.

48  Diskin et al, 13.
since the revolution) there were no Indigenous peoples in Nicaragua, only Nicaraguans.\textsuperscript{49} Whether the logic was one of nationalist determination of homogenous ethnic unity from coast to coast, or a Marxist-necessity to frame the revolution in terms of “mestizo proletarianism,” the suggestion that Indigenous peoples simply did not exist does seem to be reasonable cause for alarm on behalf of Indigenous Internationalists.\textsuperscript{50} Ironically, the statement by the left-wing Sandinistas mirrors the statement by the right-wing Minister of Agriculture in Pinochet's Chile, quoted in a 1980 report by George Manuel: “In Chile there are no Indians, only Chileans.”\textsuperscript{51} The support or hostility of Latin American governments toward Indigenous culture did not map neatly onto the Left-Right political spectrum. This disjuncture encouraged some Indigenous internationalists to believe they could fight for Indigenous rights without regard for Cold War sensitivities even when, like in the case of Nicaragua, major powers considered those sensitivities paramount.

6.2 International Indigenous Involvement in Nicaragua: WCIP

As mentioned, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples had developed connections within Nicaragua prior to the Sandinista revolution, and these connections continued after the formation of MISURASATA as well. While it might not have been MISURASATA's primary concern when it requested the creation of a National Indigenous Confederation in its “Plan 81,” it may well have been prompted in part by the fact that the WCIP preferred to grant membership to national rather than sub-national organizations. Brooklyn Rivera was one of

\textsuperscript{49} Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz heard this explanation from Julio López, head of the FSLN’s International Relations department in 1980. Dunbar-Ortiz, \textit{Blood on the Border}, 64. Tomás Borge, FSNL Minister of the Interior, continued with this argument as late as 1985. Nietschmann, \textit{The Unknown War}, 28.

\textsuperscript{50} For more on Sandinista mestizo nationalism, see Juliet Hooker, “‘Beloved Enemies’: Race and Official Mestizo Nationalism in Nicaragua,” \textit{Latin American Research Review}, 40:3 (2005).

two delegates from Nicaragua at the Third WCIP General Assembly in May 1981 (after the arrest of Fagoth, but before the Indigenous/Sandinista fighting had gotten underway) and a position paper put out by MISURASATA the following July quotes directly from a draft covenant of Indigenous rights circulated at the Assembly.\footnote{MISURASATA “Proposal on Land-Holding in the Indigenous and Creole Communities of the Atlantic Coast,” in \textit{National Revolution and Indigenous Identity}, 163. Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua,” 88. SA, NSIF, Db 043, 16 (Ark 2.10.2.2), Report by the Nordic Sami Council on the Third WCIP General Assembly in Canberra, April/May 1981 (Ohcejohka: Sámiråddi, 1982).} Anthropologist Martin Diskin argues that many of MISURASATA's assertions and demands (their claims of original occupation and communal subsistence, and their proposal for a Council of Elders) were more the product of international Indigenous advocacy groups than accurate representations of \textit{Miskitu} history and culture.\footnote{Martin Diskin, “Revolution and Ethnic Identity: The Nicaraguan Case” in \textit{Conflict, Migration and the Expression of Ethnicity}, eds. Nancie L. Gonzalez and Carolyn S. McCommon (Boulder : Westview Press, 1989) and “Ethnic Discourse and the Challenge to Anthropology: The Nicaraguan Case.” in \textit{Nation-states and Indians in Latin America}, eds. Greg Urban and Joel Sherzer (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), both quoted in Baron L. Pineda, \textit{Shipwrecked Identities Navigating Race on Nicaragua's Mosquito Coast} (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2006), 210-211. In his analysis of Diskin's work, Pineda does not challenge the assertion that these ideas may have been the result of international influence, but argues that Diskin “implicity assumed that there existed a more authentic Miskito ethnic identity prior to the 1980s that became polluted and distorted by outside interference” rather than analyzing the ethnic discourse “on its own terms in order to understand how it worked within [the] society.”} Although \textit{Miskitu} delegates participated in the WCIP since its founding, the World Council's level of involvement with \textit{Miskitu} politics increased dramatically after 1981.

When the forced relocations near the Wangki River began, the WCIP immediately took special interest but its investigation yielded few concrete details, let alone a firm position. In its 1982 bulletin, CORPI suggested a clear link between European colonialism and modern liberal capitalism, and expressed its support for the victory of the Sandinistas' liberation struggle. It suggested that the “manipulation by counterrevolutionaries and mistakes committed by the revolutionary process” left the Indigenous communities of the
Atlantic Coast with “very difficult situations.... The counterrevolutionaries and the U.S. Government (...) have used the Indian brothers as cannon fodder to undermine the revolutionary process of the Nicaraguan people.”

At the same time, the organization stated its support for

...the real struggle of our Indian brothers of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua for their historical and cultural rights within a popular revolutionary process. In the meantime CORPI calls upon the Nicaraguan Government to start a true dialogue with the Indian communities in order to inspire their trust in the revolution and to find effective mechanisms of participation for Indian people in the construction of a just and equal society for everybody.

Throughout his travels in 1983, WCIP President José Carlos Morales discussed the issue of Nicaragua with organizations like the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (part of the Organization of American States). CORPI began an official investigation into the conflict in November of 1982, had trouble completing the report in a timely manner.

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55 Ibid. Emphasis added.

56 At their meeting, Reynold Norton at the WOLA described Armstrong Wiggins and the Indian Law Resource Centre as taking the “intransigent” position that “there can be no political solution for Nicaragua and that by implication the only solution can be by arm [sic] struggle.” LAC, WCIPF, 9.22, “Executive Council Meeting Minutes,” (1-4 March 1983), 15-16.

57 At the WCIP Executive meeting in March 1983, the issue of Nicaragua was deferred until the report could be completed. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 9.22, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes (1-4 March 1983), 50. In July, Diaz Gomez and Carlos Morales sent a telegram to the FSLN expressing the WCIP and CORPI's solidarity with the Nicaraguan revolution, and condemning the U.S. Intervention. While Nicaragua's Indigenous people were mentioned, their telegram contained no criticism of Sandinista actions. At the Executive council meeting the following August, CORPI Representative Foriberto Diaz Gomez reported that his organization had found it very difficult to send an investigator to Nicaragua. He reported that Morales and two others were supposed to meet with Nicaraguan government officials in August “to submit part of the report” but this meeting had been postponed until September. Diaz Gomez insisted that CORPI's final report would be ready in September 1983. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 9.27, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes (11-16 August 1983), 17. At the Executive Meeting in December, Carlos Morales claimed it was almost ready but insisted that CORPI needed to be “very careful in the elaboration of the final draft” because it could be “manipulated.” LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 1.7, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes (9-
At the September 1984 WCIP General Assembly in Panama, delegates made a decision that would have a substantial impact on the organization's relationship with Nicaragua. A young Métis man named Clément Chartier was elected President. At the time, Chartier was in his late thirties, full of energy and looking to a place to channel it. The previous year, he had acted as a national representative of Canada's diffuse Métis Nation for negotiations with the federal government, and then pushed unsuccessfully for the consolidation of the newly-formed Métis National Council (MNC) into a stronger, more cohesive body with a single national leader. Not only was his initiative rejected by the first MNC annual assembly (November 1983) but his position as the national representative was eliminated entirely. He continued to work within the MNC, and helped represent the organization at Canada's First Ministers' conference in 1984, but his interests were not limited to the national level. He had volunteered for the WCIP as early as 1978, attended the 1981 General Assembly in Australia as a volunteer, joined a WCIP delegation to a Human Rights seminar in Managua, Nicaragua in 1981, and represented the World Council at the first meeting of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UN-WGIP) in 1982. Chartier had been unhappy with his inability to communicate easily with Indigenous delegates from Latin America at a 1976 Habitat Forum (an adjunct to the UN Conference on Human Settlements) in Vancouver and at the Fourth Russell Tribunal in Rotterdam in 1979. He spent two months learning Spanish in Costa Rica following the 1984 First Ministers' 13 December 1983), 116.

58 John Weinstein, *Quiet Revolution West: the Rebirth of Métis Nationalism* (Calgary: Fifth House Publishers, 2007), 94-95. The Métis were formally recognized as one of Canada's aboriginal peoples in the country's 1982 Constitution.

59 Weinstein, 95-96.

60 Chartier, *Witness to Resistance*, 4-6.
Conference, without any particular career goal in mind, but it became useful almost immediately.\textsuperscript{61}

At the 1984 WCIP General Assembly, South American delegates were unhappy with the Central American leadership and sought a Canadian to replace Costa Rican José Carlos Morales as WCIP president. Georges Erasmus, past president of the Dene Nation in Canada's Northwest Territories, was encouraged to run but declined to but his name forward.\textsuperscript{62} Chartier stepped forward, negotiated support from the North and South Americans and the Sámi, and easily won the vote.\textsuperscript{63}

It was at the General Assembly that Chartier became more supportive of MISURSATA's struggle, but not through the scheduled public discussions. In 1984, the organization's position as Nicaragua's delegate to the WCIP was temporarily usurped.\textsuperscript{64} Earlier that year, a non-militarized organization, MISATAN (Miskitu Asla Takanka) was established by Miskitu leaders critical of those accepting CIA funds and sympathetic to the Sandinista government. Leading members included Oscar Hodgson and Dr. Mirna Cunningham. Hodgson quickly became the General Director of CORPI and refused to allow MISURASATA to attend the Central American organization's meeting in June 1984 “on the grounds that they are instruments of the CIA.”\textsuperscript{65}

More importantly, Chartier recalls that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} Clément Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010. David Ahenakew may have encouraged Erasmus to seek the position to remove any threat to his leadership of the Assembly of First Nations.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010. Contreras reports that the outgoing president, Jose Carlos Morales, was particularly bitter following the election and became quite critical of the WCIP thereafter.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Clément Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{65} “Miskitos to work with Sandinista Government,” \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 29 June 1984. Although part-Miskitu herself, Cunningham was kidnapped and assaulted by Miskitu guerrillas during the Red Christmas attacks of December 1981 because she was working (as a doctor) for the Nicaraguan government. After her release, she worked more closely with the Sandinistas and was appointed government minister for Northern Zelaya (the Northern Atlantic Coast district) in 1984. She was elected to the UN Permanent
\end{itemize}
MISURASATA was removed from the WCIP because of a rule which barred any armed groups from membership.\textsuperscript{66} Yet while MISATAN delegates were Nicaragua's official representatives at the 1984 WCIP General Assembly, a four-person MISURASATA delegation did attend as observers, and approached Chartier after his election. They explained that MISURASATA had begun early negotiations towards a peace process with the FSLN, and that the first meeting would be in Bogota, Colombia in December later that year. Several countries had agreed to serve as observer-guarantors at the peace talks, and these delegates requested, on behalf of Brooklyn Rivera, that the WCIP serve as an observer-guarantor representing the world's Indigenous community.\textsuperscript{67}

Chartier's growing affinity toward MISURASATA should not be mistaken for an ideological opposition towards the FSLN. Even today, Chartier can still recall his elation upon hearing the announcement, very early in the morning in July 1979, that the Sandinistas had successfully overthrown Somoza. Yet, his experiences since then caused his sympathy for the FSLN to steadily give way to skepticism. In May 1981, he met Rivera at the WCIP General Assembly (Canberra), but it was only the following December at the UN Conference on Racism in Managua, that he began to hear stories about growing conflict between Indigenous peoples and the Sandinistas. He asked a trusted Miskitu elder and former ALPROMISU member, Mildred Levy, who told him in confidence that, “there was repression happening to the Indian peoples on the Atlantic coast, particularly along the

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{66} Clement Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010.\
\textsuperscript{67} Observer governments included Colombia (the host), Canada, France, the Netherlands, Mexico and Sweden. Clement Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010. Chartier, \textit{Witness to Resistance}, 11.}
[Wangki River].” With the Red Christmas attacks later that month and the ensuing relocation of Wangki River communities, the conflict became far more violent. Chartier felt the WCIP needed “to defend Indian rights.... you can't sacrifice them at any cost.”

Conflicting reports from the region made it difficult for the Council to adopt a firm position, so MISATAN delegates proposed a motion, supported by CORPI, to create a sub-committee to examine the situation on Nicaragua's Atlantic coast. The General Assembly approved and charged the Committee on the Re-Unification of the Miskitu Family (CRMF) with the duties of supporting the Miskitu people's struggle for reunification; visiting Nicaragua, Honduras and Costa Rica to investigate the reality of the situation more thoroughly; and encouraging other international organizations (such as the Red Cross, as well as human rights and religious organizations) to support efforts at peace negotiations. The MISURSATA delegates informed Chartier that Brooklyn Rivera would soon be in Washington, D.C., and suggested they meet at the offices of the Indian Law Resource Center, which, as mentioned above, was hosting Miskitu exile Armstrong Wiggins. Chartier agreed, and at the meeting, committed to Rivera that the WCIP would indeed serve as an observer-guarantor to the peace process. When the CRMF met for the first time in Ottawa in 1984, its members (Asuncion Ontiveros of CISA; Alejandro Rodriguez Swaby of CORPI; WCIP President Chartier and Vice-President Donald Rojas Maroto) learned of the invitation extended to Chartier for World Council members to participate as observers and they agreed

68 Clément Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
69 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Donald Rojas (Maroto), “La situation de Nicaragua y la comision de reunification de la familia misquitia,” (1986), 2. Funding of USD $7,500 was received from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NFAA, BIF, Binder 10, Letter from Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to WCIP, 8 November 1982.
70 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
to do so. There was no objection by the Government of Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{71} Committee members attended all peace negotiation sessions. The committee met privately with members of both the Nicaraguan government and MISURASATA, as well as with members of the Colombian Government, including President Belisario Betancur, and Foreign Minister Augusto Ramírez Ocampo.\textsuperscript{72}

The first session of peace talks (8-9 December 1984, Bogota) produced few results. The Sandinista negotiator, Luis Carrion, opposed even the use of the term “Indigenous people” to describe the Miskitu, Mayagna and Rama (preferring “ethnic groups,” which would have eliminated any claim to special Indigenous rights).\textsuperscript{73} While the Sandinistas proposed an investigation of autonomy for the coastal region, it was not to be framed within the concept of Indigenous rights. Yet the government did eventually agree to adopt the term “Indigenous” and to meet again in the new year. A second session planned for 19-20 January was cancelled. Rivera had returned to the coast that month and claimed that the government had undertaken the aerial bombardment of villages. He himself was injured in one of the attacks and refused to attend any talks until the attacks stopped and government forces were withdrawn.\textsuperscript{74}

A second round of negotiations did occur, however, on 26-27 March 1985, again in Bogota. The government again proposed to give MISURASATA a seat on its National Autonomy Commission but wanted a declaration that the conflict with Indigenous peoples “was an internal one, and would be resolved by Nicaraguans without external interference,

\textsuperscript{71} LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Rojas, 3.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Chartier, \textit{Witness to Resistance}, 11.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
thereby excluding the government and WCIP observers as part of the process.”

MISURASATA countered by suggesting the creation of parallel government and Indigenous autonomy commissions which could attempt to find a compromise once their separate studies were complete. Both sides requested ceasefires, but Indigenous negotiators wanted the government to withdraw its forces, allowing MISURASATA to take responsibility for local security, while the government insisted instead on the registration of all armed combatants.

The WCIP Executive followed the negotiations with a formal statement, the Bogota Declaration, which lent

...their decided aid to the organization MISURASATA in its requests to the Nicaraguan authorities to reach a just recognition of the inalienable natural rights characteristic of the Miskito, Sumu, and Rama Peoples who have inhabited the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua from time immemorial.

Although the Bogota Declaration is primarily worded to support the peace negotiations, it seems clear that said peace must include Indigenous rights. Moreover, the statement suggested, at least in the eyes of Clem Chartier, the explicit recognition of MISURASATA as a legitimate Indigenous organization—a substantial shift from the World Council's earlier policy of refusing the group WCIP membership on the basis of its military nature.

75 Ibid. Two members of ALPROMISU, Armando Rojas Smith and Amalia Dixon, would play important roles on the Autonomy Commission. Meringer, 13.
76 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 13.
77 CWIS, WCIP, “Bogota Declaration” (Bogota, 27 March 1985).
78 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 69. This seems to have been prompted as a reaction to the work of Oscar Hodgson of MISATAN and CORPI. In early March 1985, Hodgson joined a Sandinista delegation to the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, and made a statement “in the name of the WCIP...without the knowledge or consent of the WCIP.” When the WCIP responded in the Bogota Declaration, Hodgson “was instrumental in convincing the members of CORPI representing Mexico, Panama and Guatemala to join Misatan in issuing a Declaration of Santa Fe de la Laguna, which rejected the WCIP Bogota Declaration’ and affirmed that MISATAN was the true representative of Nicaragua's Indigenous peoples. University of Manitoba Archives (hereafter UMANA) Walter Rudnicki Papers (hereafter WRP), Section V, Box 184, Folder 3, “Interim Report of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples' Commission on the Reunification of the Miskitu Family” (18 July 1985).
The third session (20–21 April in Mexico City) finally produced clear results. The government put forward a more substantial proposal, recognizing the right of Indigenous communities to use the land and enjoy its resources (though not to own it outright). More immediately, both parties agreed to a joint communiqué which included the suspension of armed offensives and the release of several prisoners. Members of the CRMF would observe the prisoner exchange later that month in Bilwi.

Before the next round of negotiations, however, a number of military incidents erupted between MISURASATA and the government, with both sides accusing the other of instigating the attacks and breaking the agreement. Talks broke down at the fourth round (25–26 May 1985 in Bogota) because the government insisted on a cease-fire before the negotiation of Indigenous rights, whereas MISURASATA insisted on the reverse. Again, the Sandinistas pushed to remove any outside observers from the talks. The government refused the suggestion of mediation, resulting in the indefinite suspension of diplomatic contact between the two groups.79

For their part, the Sandinistas were less interested in negotiating with MISURASATA because they had begun negotiating with the more numerous and well-armed guerillas in the north, whose organization and resolve were faltering. On 17 May 1985, MISURA commander Eduardo Pantin negotiated a preliminary cease fire in Yulu on the northern Atlantic Coast, and the men under his command came to be known as MISURA Pro-Diálogo. In June, the inhabitants at Tasba Pri were allowed to return to the Rio Coco.80 In September, MISURA was renamed KISAN (Kus Indian Sut Asla Nicaragua Ra – Indians of

79 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 15.
80 State Department, Dispossessed, 1.
Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast), and Steadman Fagoth was removed from control and replaced by Wycliff Diego. The guerrilla leaders, however, were no more impressed with Diego than they had been with Fagoth, and further peace negotiations occurred, now under the name “KISAN Por la Paz.”

As other Indigenous guerrilla groups negotiated for peace, the Sandinistas increasingly portrayed Rivera and MISURASATA as insignificant players whose demands to negotiate without a cease-fire could be safely ignored.

In order to shore up international support and the perceived importance of MISURASATA, Brooklyn Rivera made a trip to Canada, followed by a tour of Europe with Chartier in the summer of 1985, with the support of the WCIP. Despite his friendship with Rivera, Contreras describes the problems created by the World Council's support for MISURASATA's leader: “I lost friends. I lost credibility. [The Canadian Catholic Organization for] Development and Peace didn't want to meet with us. They said we can meet them at the train station but not in our office.” Because a Nicaraguan delegation was also in Ottawa, Contreras encouraged a dialogue, but both Mirna Cunningham (MISATAN) and Rivera refused to even meet. In early June 1985, the CRMF met with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and the Minister of the Interior, Comandante Tomás Borge to discuss the situation and tried unsuccessfully to encourage the resumption of dialogue.

At the July meeting of the WCIP executive in Saskatoon, the CMRF presented its interim report. The analysis contained within demonstrates the difficult line committee members were trying to walk. First, it describes the conflicts throughout Latin America as the

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81 Reyes and Wilson, 148-168.
82 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
83 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
84 Ibid.
result of the “economic-political power-struggles of the developed countries” in which Indigenous peoples were “[c]aught between these two ideological poles” and “essentially forced to live under the presence of military and political systems foreign to Indigenous identity.” Nevertheless, the report acknowledged that non-Indigenous peoples in South and Central America had also been deeply exploited and that “in many ways their aspirations coincide with those of the Indigenous peoples. Their revolutionary objectives and the objectives of the Indian Peoples are capable of co-existing within a harmonious partnership.”

It was essential, therefore, to demonstrate that “Indian movements are not a threat to liberationist struggles.” The report emphasized that the committee's goal was the reunification of Miskitu families would not be fully possible until hostilities ceased, which required a “just and peaceful solution to the conflict.” It suggested that MISURASATA had much broader support from the Indigenous peoples of Nicaragua than MISATAN, and that the Sandinistas had an obligation to negotiate with the former, but also recommended that CORPI should not formally recognize the membership of any Indigenous organization from Nicaragua until after peace negotiations were complete.

The WCIP Executive agreed that the committee should increase its involvement in the efforts to resume peace talks, though members would later state that the possibility of funding Chartier and Rivera's European tour was never discussed.

86 Ibid.
87 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10, Rojas, 3. At this same meeting, the Executive accepted the CRMF's recommendation that MISATAN should no longer be recognized as a legitimate representative organization. Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 69.
In accordance with this mandate, members of the CMRF met with Comandante Borge in Managua in July, August, October, and November, as well as with Comandante Campbell in Santa Fe. Finally, another round of talks was scheduled for December 1985. Chartier suggests that the Sandinistas refused to send a high level negotiator to the meeting as part of a strategy to “regionalize the conflict as one among Indian peoples themselves and not one between the Indian peoples and the State.”

6.3 International Indigenous Involvement in Nicaragua: IITC

Because the Somoza regime received support from the United States government, the International Indian Treaty Council and the FSLN shared a common enemy and quickly established friendly relations. Before the FSLN had come to power, one of its co-founders, Carlos Fonseca, wrote a letter of support for AIM during the 1973 siege at Wounded Knee. This gesture left a positive impression on most of the AIM leadership, who were apt to side with the Sandinistas, with whom formal contact was established at a conference of liberation organizations in Havana, Cuba. In 1978, Russell Means described anti-Somoza forces, presumably including the Sandinistas, as “Nicaraguan Indians...fighting for their freedom,” Following the overthrow of Somoza, a number of IITC members accepted an invitation to visit Nicaragua in 1981, including its Atlantic coast, as “special guests of the Sandinista government” and publicly supported the FSLN upon their return to the United States. An

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88 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Rojas, 4.
89 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 17.
90 Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border, 56.
91 Sanders, “Mosquitia and Nicaragua”, 81.
92 He further forecast that in the 1980s, South America would “erupt in violence that will make South Africa look like a weekend skirmish.” Gallup Independent, 14 April 1978.
article in the IITC's Treaty Council News from July 1981 celebrated the FSLN triumph, and points out the many similarities between the Treaty Council and the Sandinistas, not least that “they, too, were fighting the most powerful country on earth—the US government of which Somoza was a puppet.” 94 The article further asserted that the “Sandinistas are promoting the revival of their Indian heritage” (in part, by planting corn instead of importing wheat) and congratulates the Sandinista literacy campaign for empowering the Indigenous peoples of the Atlantic coast, ostensibly against religious domination:

Now the Miskitus have many books in their own language. Undoubtedly the various ethnic groups are now looking at their own history and heritage and will reawaken many “underground” and nearly extinct ceremonies and ideas. This has not made the hierarchy of the Moravian Church happy, nor the missionaries, who had virtually total power over the minds of the people for nearly two centuries. 95

Considering the growing conflict between Sandinista nationalist ideology and the “reawoken” Indigenous identity of the Miskitu (owing both to the literacy program and to Moravian support for ALPROMISU), such a claim is rather ironic. The article's message fits, nonetheless, with the some of the key viewpoints espoused by the IITC and AIM, namely opposition to the US government, international alliance-building with left and non-aligned governments, and criticism of Christianity. 96

Throughout the 1980s, Bill Means (Russell Mean's brother) and other members of the International Indian Treaty Council maintained their support for the Sandinistas but became
skeptical of MISURASATA, at least once the conflict began on the Atlantic Coast. In September 1981, Bill Means acknowledged that the IITC's relationship with the FSLN was “built years before the victory over the corrupt and brutal Somoza regime” and stated that members of the Treaty Council “knew and trusted the new Sandinista Government to look at Indian issues differently than the former Somoza Government.”

From his point of view, the Indigenous peoples on the country's Atlantic Coast had been “isolated and totally colonized,” and were now “being used as pawns in the continued interventionist policies” of American corporate interests, and “manipulated” by the CIA, the Honduran military, and Somoza's former National Guard.

At the UN Conference on Racism in Managua in December 1981, the IITC went so far as to refer to the WCIP (which apparently took a somewhat less supportive view of the Sandinistas) “as a tool of North American imperialism designed to destabilize [sic] progressive governments in Latin America.”

“For years,” claims Russell Means in his autobiography, “the International Indian Treaty Council had been building up a status of most favored organization with the Sandinistas. Council leaders got free plane trips to Managua, where they were feted at receptions and treated like heads of state.” Means further asserts that his brother Bill followed the Nicaraguan government's dismissive attitude toward the veracity of Miskitu claims to Indigeneity because of a history of mixing with African slaves, whereas Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz suggests the AIM leadership discounted them as “a few hundred Christianized Indians.”

98 Ibid.
99 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 1.6 Douglas Sanders, “Another Step: The UN Seminar on Relations Between Indigenous Peoples and States” (20 February 1989)
100 Russell Means, Where White Men Fear to Tread (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 463-464
Indian communities controlled by missionaries.”¹⁰¹ The Treaty Council News notably described the Moravian church as being “more integrated with the Miskitus than is the case of any tribe in North America.”¹⁰² Such a close religious affiliation apparently cast them as highly suspect in the eyes of the IITC leadership.

In November 1984, Russell Means accepted an invitation from Indigenous lawyer Jim Anaya to attend the second round of negotiations in Bogota, Columbia as an observer, despite the objections of at least one IITC member, Clyde Bellecourt.¹⁰³ At the talks, Means quickly developed great respect for Brooklyn Rivera. He was disappointed, however, that of Rivera's multitude of advisers only one, Armstrong Wiggins of the Indian Law Resource Centre, was Indigenous.¹⁰⁴ The negotiations were unfruitful, and Means followed the talks with a press conference in San Jose, Costa Rica, along with Rivera and activists Glenn T. Morris and Hank Adams.¹⁰⁵ Rivera announced that these men had “decided to support the struggle that Misurasata is waging in Nicaragua...to provide spiritual, material, political and physical help, and to give themselves to the Indian cause in Nicaragua, which is also the cause of other indigenous people in this hemisphere.”¹⁰⁶ Means concurred that this would “begin the process of uniting red people of the Western Hemisphere” and called the conflict in Nicaragua “the foremost struggle for indigenous sovereignty in the world.” He equated the

¹⁰³ Means, 461-2.
¹⁰⁴ Means, 462.
¹⁰⁵ Hank Adams, a Nakota activist, had been a prominent member of both the National Indian Youth Council and the National Congress of American Indians. He had helped to organize protests over Indigenous fishing rights in Washington State's Puget Sound during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Washington Post, 25 November 1972; Chartier, Witness to resistance, 261. For more on Williams, see David Eugene Wilkins (ed.), The Hank Adams Reader: An Exemplary Native Activist and the Unleashing of Indigenous Sovereignty (Golden, Colo: Fulcrum, 2011).
policies of his country to that of the Sandinistas: “I do not support the racist policies of the United States of America, the same as I do not support the racist policies of Nicaragua (...) I have a record of fighting against the imperialist monster my people live within.”

Glenn Morris suggested that their support “should be considered pro-Indian rather than anti-Sandinista” but in a written statement by the men, Sandinista rule was described as an “unconscionably racist, soulless Marxist experiment.” Perhaps most provocatively, Means assured the public that he would recruit between ninety to one hundred AIM warriors from North America and return to Nicaragua “with a shovel in one hand, a rife in the other and a pipe of peace in [his] heart, and it would depend on the Sandinistas what would be used.”

The reactions of other AIM leaders to his comments surprised Means, particularly that of his brother. “Bill went bananas over that,” writes Means. “Worse, he wouldn't talk to me or return my calls.” In his autobiography, Means explains the “maelstrom of hatred” that awaited him in the United States by suggesting that the IITC had been seduced by the power and the glamour of their past relationship with the Sandinistas. He also provides another explanation, that AIM had traditionally been “on the far left of whatever white man's movement was most popular” and that any critique against the Sandinistas the “‘darlings' of the left” conflicted with that position. Believing his compatriots had “sided with a government against Indian people,” Means opted to break off contact with those who were critical of his position on Nicaragua. Yet, despite his angry rhetoric, Means insists in his autobiography that as he returned home that November, he “still had faith in the purity of the

107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.

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Nicaraguan revolution... still believed that it was the revolution, the turning point for this hemisphere. Everyone in AIM believed it would be the first government to deal with us as human beings” but in hindsight, he sees this belief as shamefully “naive and stupid.”

6.4 The Clandestine Trip

The following December (1985), Clem Chartier and other members of the WCIP accepted an invitation from the Nicaraguan government to visit the Atlantic Coast region. According to Chartier, the Sandinistas intended to demonstrate that “things weren't so bad” and counteract the negative publicity they were receiving. Unfortunately, the small plane which had been selected to fly them had repeated mechanical problems, making the flight impossible. The rest of the WCIP delegation returned home, but Chartier stayed on, and eventually accepted a ride on a chartered plane with Dr. Mirna Cunningham. He spent ten days in Bilwi, from December 20-30, but had little opportunity to leave the village owning to the perceived danger by the Sandinistas. Chartier was able to make only one day trip to a couple of nearby small villages accompanying Cunningham, but they were escorted by “about 200 troops” and he found the local elders unwilling to speak to him, presumably because of the military presence. Informed that his planned meeting with Comandante Borge on December 31 had been cancelled, Chartier flew to San Jose, Costa Rica to meet with WCIP Vice-President Donald Rojas Maroto and Brooklyn Rivera. The latter invited him

112 Means, 466. Means appeared on the Larry King show on 26 December 1985 and discussed the issue of Nicaragua, explaining his intentions to return to the country.
113 Clément Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
114 Cunningham, a prominent Miskitu member of MISATAN, was made the Sandinista government's top official on the Atlantic Coast in June 1984. The Globe and Mail, 29 June 1984.
115 Ibid.
on a clandestine trip into Nicaragua: “If you want to see what the Sandinistas don't want you to see, I'm heading in there in a couple of days and you're welcome to come along.”

Chartier's situation was reminiscent of one faced by George Manuel, years earlier, when he was still WCIP President. In May 1978, following a meeting of the World Council executive in Buenos Aires, delegates and other guests (including the First Secretary of the Canadian Embassy to Argentina\textsuperscript{117}) took a four-day bus tour in the Northern Provinces of Chaco and Formosa. When the group arrived in Resistencia (capital of Chaco Province), their accommodation arrangements had been changed\textsuperscript{118} and their host told them that the chief of police had visited him and discouraged the visit to the Qom (Toba) community on the grounds that it “might give rise to subversive activities.”\textsuperscript{119} WCIP delegates were unable to convince the Colonel Zucconi, in charge of the area, to allow them entry. Manuel considered an attempt to evade police and military surveillance and reach the Indigenous community.

Marie Smallface-Marule discouraged such a plan:

She kept telling me if I defy the military people, I would not be the one to suffer, but after we left the country, the local people would face the consequences of torture and perhaps murder as a result of my actions. This was the only reason I did not defy the Army and sneak into the Indian community to meet their Indian leaders.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} There were approximately 40 people on the bus tour, including Michael Vechsler (First Secretary of the Canadian Embassy to Argentina), Harry Daniels, and Hans Pavia Rosing, Gordon Tootoosis, Anita Gordon, Marie Smallface-Marule, Jean Goodwill, Doug Sanders, Nilo Cayuqueo, Bill Brittain, and numerous other North and South American Indigenous dancers. George Manuel Diaries (hereafter GMD), 26 May 1978.
\textsuperscript{118} Apparently, their new accommodations were in a home run by a politician, Francisco Manrique, who had held a political meeting on the reserve a few weeks earlier. LAC, R219 Department of External Affairs fonds (hereafter EAF), 45-13-3-7, Part I, Correspondence from Canadian Embassy in Buenos Aires to External Affairs Canada, 31 May 1978.
\textsuperscript{119} LAC, EAF, 45-13-3-7, Part I, Correspondence from Canadian Embassy in Buenos Aires to External Affairs Canada, 31 May 1978.
\textsuperscript{120} GMD, 27 May 1978.
Chartier, however, received no such advice. Perhaps he felt his visit would be worth any risk it might post to local Indigenous people. Perhaps he felt that the violent conflict was already underway, and his presence posed no additional risk to the local population at all. He considered Rivera's proposal, and a little after midnight at a New Year's Eve party, told the Miskitu leader that he had decided to join the expedition.\footnote{121}

It was only when Chartier arrived on the coast of Costa Rica that he found out he would be joined by Russell Means, Hank Adams and Bob Martin, a free-lance journalist from Albuquerque, New Mexico.\footnote{122} Russell Means had attempted to make the same trip into Nicaragua the previous November along with Adams, Martin and others, but was forced back by foul weather.\footnote{123} This new group attempted to set out on 5 January but found that their boat engine was broken. In his trip diary, Chartier noted that “finally after a lot of hassle, we were able to make the necessary financial transactions and purchased a motor” but did not give details as to the nature of this “hassle.”\footnote{124} That night, WCIP Vice-President Donald Rojas Maroto received a phone call from Rivera who asked, on behalf of Chartier, that the WCIP wire them $3,000 and instructed Rojas to wait for a call from Rodrigo Contreras (of the WCIP Secretariat in Ottawa) to arrange the transfer. When Rojas spoke with Contreras, the Vice-President indicated his concern that that any money transferred might be supporting MISURASATA and advised Contreras not to transfer the requested funds. The following day, Rojas met with Alejandro Swaby (CORPI sub-coordinator and member of the CRMF) and

\footnote{121} Clément Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
\footnote{123} Russell Means, 464. The small group of MISURASATA supporters that had attempted to cross in November 1985 on a fact-finding mission included Means, Glenn Morris, Long Soldier, Hank Adams, Chaney Witworth, and Bob Martin.
\footnote{124} Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 26.
Domingo Lopez (CORPI Secretary) at the CORPI office, and the three agreed that no WCIP money should be transferred and that they should meet with Chartier at the earliest possible moment. Rojas communicated this message to Rivera later that day, demanding that Chartier present himself to the CORPI offices in San Jose. Chartier never arrived.\(^{125}\) For his part, Contreras remembers his discomfort with being “put in a terrible situation.”\(^{126}\) After receiving the first phone call requesting the transfer of funds for the boat engine from the WCIP offices in Ottawa by that afternoon, he spoke with both vice-presidents, Hayden Burgess in Hawaii and Donald Rojas in Costa Rica, asking their advice. Both opposed the transfer. When Chartier called the next day to ask why he had not received the transfer, Contreras explained that the banks had been closed, and Chartier demanded the transfer be sent immediately. Contreras went to the bank and transferred the funds. Rojas was angry, but Burgess was more understanding, recognizing Contreras’ position as an employee responding to the request of an elected president.\(^{127}\) Chartier's unwillingness to consult with his fellow sub-committee members or with the rest of the WCIP executive created intense feelings of frustration in the organization that would not easily be forgiven.\(^{128}\)

After the “hassle” with the engine, the first two days of the trip were spent in the village of Kwamwatla, then the group travelled north to Ariswatla for a day, then past Prinzapolka to Wounta for a day, then inland to visit Layasiksa and Kukalaya on 12 January. The next morning they made the long trip (by boat, by foot, and by horse) north to Lapan, followed by a walk up to the mountain village of Sukupin, and then still further north to Yulu.

\(^{125}\) LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Rojas, 10.
\(^{126}\) Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
\(^{127}\) Ibid.
\(^{128}\) Pōkā Laenui, personal correspondence, 18 Feb 2011.
This put them close to Bilwi, three-quarters of the way of the coast of Nicaragua, and well over 400km from their starting point. The group then made the long trip back to Kukalaya on 17 January, and on to Layasiksa the next day. On 20 January, they received information that their next destination, Wounta, was now guarded with over 100 Sandinistas and heavy artillery. This sudden build-up prevented the group’s planned return to the coast, but encouraged them to leave Layasiksa, as their presence (escorted, as they were, by a unit of guerillas) was “endangering the village.”

At each of these villages, Bob Martin, who had some amount of training as an Emergency Medical Technician, gave some basic first aid to those in need, and catalogued their injuries and illnesses. Chartier recorded interviews with locals, as well as representatives of other communities who arrived to meet them. Those willing to speak with Chartier gave details of the violence and abuse that the Sandinistas had inflicted upon them, the food and other property destroyed, the difficulties of life during war time, and lists of community members who were dead and missing.

The impression these men took from their meetings with the Miskitu contrasts sharply with those seen elsewhere. Notably, the Sandinistas attempted to deny that the peoples of the Atlantic Coast were Indigenous at all, but even those, like Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, who did consider the Miskitu to be Indigenous saw them as a very different group than the Indigenous peoples of North America:

The Miskitus were mixed culturally and by skin color and did not identify as tribes or clans, and nearly every one was a devout

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130 According to Means, they managed to visit nine villages and met with representatives of nineteen others. Means, 467-8.
Christian, many identifying first with the Moravian Church. They were a people, a nation, but not a tribe that desired Indian reservations such as those in the United States...\footnote{Dunbar-Ortiz, \textit{Blood on the Border}, 260.}

Yet Means' description of his encounters is quite the opposite:

We saw a prosperous region that offers a peaceful, comfortable lifestyle in which to cultivate Indian values. We found no evidence that the Miskito people had traded their heritage for pie-in-the-sky promises from the Moravian Church. Instead, we saw that even those who professed belief in Christianity had adapted that European doctrine to their own traditional values. The church had been “Indianized” far more than the people had been Christianized.\footnote{Means, 468.}

The different perceptions may be considered the result of differences in emphasis and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They illustrate, however, the way in which ideologies were influencing the way international observers saw the local population. Dunbar-Ortiz balanced her support for Indigenous rights and her support for the Sandinista revolution by finding ways to explain why Nicaragua's situation was different from other Indigenous conflicts and could therefore be handled differently. Means, on the other hand, was committed to a staunch Indigenist perspective that minimized any differences between Indigenous peoples, and privileged Indigenous rights far above any other political concerns. Both sides were undoubtedly committed to Indigenous rights, but here, it seems either that their perceptions of the \textit{Miskitu} were being influenced by their ideological concerns, or that they were adapting (consciously or unconsciously) their definitions of “Indigeneity” to fit with their beliefs about the Sandinistas.

Chartier's interviews confirm the importance some of the \textit{Miskitu} placed on the WCIP's role. On 12 January, he spoke with two men who had paddled four hours from...
Haulover to meet Brooklyn in Kukalaya. Chartier notes that the elder of the two “said he had been a leader in ALPROMISU and then with MISURASATA...Next morning, while seeing us off, the elder said 'Goodbye, you're our chief' acknowledging the WCIP.” According to Chartier's journal, an Indigenous combatant in Yulu nicknamed “Condor” said, “unsolicited, that I was most important to the resistance, as I was President of WCIP, i.e. their international president.” Most they met were enthusiastically happy for outside support—certainly, they must have seen that any international attention would likely aid their cause—though several were critical of Means' assertions that he would bring warriors from North America. There were plenty of local Indigenous people that wanted to fight, but they lacked arms and other supplies. One of the combatants mentioned that any actual soldiers from outside the country could enable accusations about the use of mercenaries, “and thus detract from their original legitimate war of resistance against the Sandinista invasion and repression of their communities and people.”

On Thursday January 23, as Martin and Chartier played Frisbee at Layasiksa, they saw two planes circling overhead. The villagers, the fighters and their guests all fled the village to hide in the trees, and Chartier's diary mentions that they were ordered not to fire. Nevertheless, the planes (now joined by a third) began to dive and fire at those on the ground. The men managed to hide out in the woods until the planes were gone from sight, after which they took their remaining boat across the lagoon. Before they reached the opposite shore, the planes returned to drop bombs and strafe their boat. Chartier and Means manage to swim to shore, and pulled two of the injured men to safety as well. After the

133 Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 103.
134 Ibid., 157.
135 Ibid., 157, 159, 206.
planes left again, villagers came by in canoes and helped the group flee down river. The next
day they tended to their wounded and travelled to a MISURASATA troop encampment,
Yahbra Bila, to plan their escape.¹³⁶ Regrouping again, they managed to evade the
Nicaraguan army for over two weeks.

Meanwhile, Rodrigo Contreras, Georges Erasmus (National Chief of Canada's
Assembly of First Nations) and Louis "Smokey" Bruyère (National Chief of the Native
Council of Canada) made contact with the Nicaraguan embassy to request security for their
fellow Canadian and leader.¹³⁷ The Ambassador contacted his government through the
Minister of the Interior, headed by Comandante Tomás Borge, and gained assurances that
Chartier would be kept safe, although these assurances were not to be made public.¹³⁸ The
Nicaraguan Embassy publicly announced that, if caught in Nicaragua without permission, the
men would be deported as illegal aliens, but warned that, if they were found to be involved in
military operations as Means has threatened, “it would be another thing” and those involved
would “suffer the consequences.”¹³⁹

After days hiding in the jungle, the group finally found a plan of escape: a shallow

¹³⁶ Means, 470. Armstrong Wiggins reported that two civilians, Florentin Conrado and Julio Serapio, had died
in the bombing. In a later article, locals asserted that only one local civilian, a 14-year-old boy, had died
that two others died during the bombing. The boy, a “young warrior” named “Small Pico” whom Chartier
had pulled from the water, suffered a “shattered left elbow and forearm, (hit twice), shattered left hip and
gouged out left thigh.” They transported him downriver but then sent him back to a village so they had
could be taken to the Red Cross “as a civilian casualty”. It seems he later succumbed to his injuries. Means
himself sustained a “superficial flesh wound in the abdomen.” Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 177, 199,
206, 230. One of the seriously injured men was another Miskitu, David Rodríguez, who had attended a
1985 international Indigenous youth conference in Batoche, organized by Chartier for the 100th anniversary
of the North West Rebellion. Rodríguez would later lose his leg as a result of his injuries. Weinstein, 108-9.
¹³⁷ Bob Martin had managed to relay details of their situation, via radio, to the Associated Press. Chartier,
Witness to Resistance, 222-231.
¹³⁸ Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010 and personal correspondence, 22 February 2014.
¹³⁹ Omaha World-Herald, 28 January 1986
channel connected to a larger river that emptied into the Caribbean Sea.\footnote{The number of wounded and the distances involved made escape by land particularly difficult. KISAN offered aid to facilitate an escape by land, “but the political implications for MISURASATA are too high, as KISAN would take full credit and publicity.” Chartier, \textit{Witness to Resistance}, 234.} The channel, however, passed by a \textit{Miskitu} village garrisoned with Sandinista troops. The locals provided a solution in the form of “an instant and noisy church service...while fishermen in their dugout canoes added to their own clatter to the singing.”\footnote{Weinstein, 108.} With the noises of their movement masked by this larger racket, they made their way down the channel and out the mouth of the river where they could safely start their motor. The sight of a Nicaraguan naval vessel encouraged them to travel out into international waters instead of along the coastline. Twenty-two hours later, with little fuel remaining, they reached the Colombian island of San Andres. The wounded were quickly taken to the hospital by the police, while the others were taken to the police station for questioning. Eventually, the policed transferred the bedraggled men (some still barefoot) to the Cacique Tone luxury resort, full of Canadian tourists.\footnote{Ibid., 251.} After some food and rest, they returned to San Jose, Costa Rica to deliver a press conference on 10 February.

\textbf{6.5 Repercussions}

Following the escape, Chartier returned home to Saskatchewan, then travelled to Ottawa where he met with World Council Vice-Presidents Hayden Burgess and Donald Rojas Maroto. He gave them an account of his trip, and they asked him not to share further information with the press or make any statement on behalf of the Council. “Under pressure, he could give an account of his tour, but should not give political opinions” which could do...
“further damage” to the organization. They reached a tentative agreement to have an emergency executive meeting from 24-28 February, later moved to 6-8 March so that more regional representatives could attend.

Chartier travelled to Geneva to make an intervention at the UN Commission on Human Rights on behalf of the WCIP, but when he went to register, he was told that the WCIP office had made a formal request that he not be allowed to speak. Nevertheless, he was still the elected WCIP president, so he did manage to register and make a statement before the Commission which restated the Bogota Declaration and its support for peace negotiations. In his speech, he compared the violence of the socialist Sandinistas with the violence being perpetrated against the Indigenous peoples of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor by the US-backed Indonesian government, and stated his support for the efforts of the Kanak peoples of New Caledonia to push France for decolonization. Chartier suggested that these examples showed that right and left ideologies were unhelpful: “We cannot, and never will, fit into the current non-Indigenous ideologies and values which at this time are tending to polarize the world community.”

Chartier's argument does not seem to have convinced his fellow members of the WCIP. On 6 March, the emergency Executive Council meeting was convened at the Hotel Le Grenil in Geneva, with Chartier presiding. The attending executive members included Vice-Presidents Donald Rojas Maroto and Hayden Burgess; Nordic Sami Council delegate, Aslak Nils Sara; North American Delegate for the Native Council of Canada, Louis "Smokey"

Bruyère; North American delegate for the Métis National Council, Sam Sinclair; South American Indigenous Council (CISA) delegates, Tomas Condori and Asuncion Ontiveros; CORPI delegate, Domingo Lopez; and WCIP coordinator and translator Rodrigo Contreras. The Nordic Sami Council sent three additional representatives, and three other Canadians also attended.  

Donald Rojas Maroto presented his report on behalf of the Nicaraguan sub-Committee, which expressed their concerns about Chartier's trip. The report acknowledged the desperate situation in Nicaragua and a need for the WCIP to be aggressive, but insisted that the council, in order to be “a force of diplomatic pressure”, must maintain dialogue with governments. It argued that Chartier's trip has caused the organization “serious problems of international credibility—if we propose mechanisms for dialogue at official levels, it cannot be understood why we use other unofficial channels.” Rojas Maroto was concerned about newspaper reports that the WCIP was “directly or indirectly, supporting or seeking military support to fight against the Government of Nicaragua.” Statements comparing the Sandinistas to the Pinochet Regime in Chile or to Garcia in Guatemala were inflammatory and unhelpful: “...we cannot insult or say certain words against a government even if it is true, and on the other hand, say we want to talk to them. That is totally contradictory and puts us in difficult situations for the continued work of the commission.” This criticism, however, was based in the belief that the Sandinistas were negotiating in good faith, a postulate that Chartier was not willing to accept.

145 The Nordic Sami Council members were Lars Anders Baers, Oleff Smok and Helvi Nourgam. The Canadians were Yvon Dumont (Métis National Council), Rod Miller, and Charles Daniels. LAC, WCIPF, Volumes 10.14 and 10.15, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 6-8 March 1986.
146 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, Rojas, 14.
147 Ibid., 15.
Rojas Maroto also pointed to the fact that many funding agencies in North America and Europe were supporters of (or at least sympathetic to) the Sandinistas—the same agencies that were funding Indigenous organizations in Central and South America. He “had information” that these agencies were “questioning the continued financial support” of these organizations because the position of the WCIP suggested it was merely “another instrument of the U.S.” As Nicaragua was only one of many countries where Indigenous people were in very serious danger of violence, it was “necessary to review where our actions not only seriously jeopardize the financial security of our organizations but also the personal safety of our fellow leaders.”

Domingo Lopez gave his own report of CORPI's meetings (1-3 March) and stated that CORPI no longer recognized Chartier's presidency. Ontiveros explained that CISA considered Chartier's trip “an irrational act because the WCIP [was] not a guerrilla organization but a diplomatic one.” The South American organization had decided unanimously to request Chartier's resignation. Bruyère shared the concerns of the South and Central Americans, and “believed that the only honourable thing for Clem would be to remove himself as President.” Chartier was not without supporters; Sinclair stated his commitment to “his brother Metis” and the MNC, while accepting that Chartier had made a mistake that required “some action” by the Council, did not think his removal was justified. Chartier further submitted a letter from the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) which, at the urging of Hank Adams, commended him for his efforts in

150 Ibid.,
151 Ibid.,
Nicaragua. Aslak Nils Sara was worried about the unity of the World Council if some regions refused to recognize Chartier's presidency, and asked to hear the president's response.

Despite the urgings of his fellow executive members, Chartier refused to resign, arguing that "the General Assembly had elected him and only that assembly [could] remove him." He asserted that no one's argument had convinced him to resign and that the WCIP Constitution did not allow for his removal by the executive. A recess until the following day did nothing to change his mind, nor did the continued pleas during the next morning's session. That afternoon, Aslak Nils Sara introduced a resolution that acknowledged the president could not be impeached, but which removed all duties and responsibilities from his office, effectively ordering him not to take any action unless approved by the Executive Council. The resolution was supported by all members of the executive (including Ossie Cruse via telex message) except Sinclair and Chartier himself. They then took time to express "their personal thanks to Clem Chartier for the personal sacrifices he [had] given to the WCIP...advocating on behalf of Indigenous peoples for Indigenous rights." Contreras seems somewhat sympathetic to the president's motivations for the trip, but critical of the way in which he went. Chartier "didn't consult with anybody from his executive, and was

152 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.16, letter from Reuben A. Snake (President) and Suzan Shown Harjo (Executive Director) of the NCAI to Clem Chartier, 12 February 1986. It is unclear what effect these events had on the relationship between the NCAI and the WCIP, but a letter sent by the World Council to the Congress in May 1989 suggests contact had died off for a number of years, LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 5.5, letter from Carlos Johnson (WCIP) to Gail Chehak (NCAI). Sometime later, Chartier also received a letter from WCIP founder George Manuel who commended him for his decision to visit Nicaragua, comparing it to his own willingness to defy authorities while visiting Chile, Argentina, and Guatemala to promote Indigenous rights. Chartier, *Witness to Resistance*, 270.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
perceived to be acting in an authoritarian way.”\textsuperscript{156} It was bad enough that Contreras felt caught between left and right on the issue of Nicaragua, but feeling caught between the WCIP President and Vice-Presidents was too much for him. Although he attended the meeting in Geneva to translate (“...it was so amazingly painful. It was terrible!”), he resigned from his job with the Council afterwards.\textsuperscript{157}

On 27 February 1986, Russell Means held a special meeting with most of the AIM/IITC leadership in Oglala, South Dakota. Bill Means “delivered a scathing denunciation” of his brother and anyone else who opposed the Sandinistas. Those present eventually agreed not to criticize each other in the media, yet Vernon Bellecourt, absent from the meeting, held a press conference in Denver to denounce Hank Adams, Russell Means and others critical of the Sandinistas as “CIA agents and contras.”\textsuperscript{158} In September, Glenn Morris and Ward Churchill (two of Russell Means' most prominent supporters) were formally expelled from AIM and the IITC, though they continued to maintain their own independent Colorado AIM chapter. Bellecourt and Means continued to denounce each other publicly throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. Means himself briefly became involved with Sun Myung Moon's conservative and “rabidly pro-Contra” Unification Church, who sponsored a speaking tour so that he could share his experiences in Nicaragua. He became associated for a time with the American Libertarian party.\textsuperscript{159} On the contrary, Vernon Bellecourt maintained friendly relations with international leaders such as Daniel Ortega, Muammar Gaddafi and

\textsuperscript{156} Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010, and personal correspondence, 22 February 2914.  
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{158} Means, 477. Pōkā Laenui (Hayden Burgess) also asserts that sometime later, he learned that the “CIA had secured appointments with Mr. Hank Adams, prior to his travel to Nicaragua, for a meeting after he was to return to the U.S.” Pōkā Laenui, personal correspondence, 18 Feb 2011.  
\textsuperscript{159} Means, 477-482.
As for the situation in Nicaragua, the immediate repercussions of the clandestine trip are unclear. Reynaldo Reyes, one of the more prominent generals of KISAN Por La Paz, argued that the government's aerial attacks near Layasiksa and other villages were “a serious violation” of their cease-fire that “endangered the truce.” It is unclear if Reyes was critical of the trip, but Miskitu lawyer Armando Rojas (formerly of ALPROMISU) was quite direct in his disapproval. Speaking in Saskatoon in late March, he told the crowd that the “military response only took place because Chartier was heading with rebels to take over a village” and any deaths were the responsibility of MISURASATA guerillas and their guests.

The events did not, however, undermine the peace process with KISAN Por la Paz, which continued until more stable truce was achieved. In June 1987, the leaders of MISURASATA and KISAN came together in Rus Rus, Honduras to form a new united organization known as YATAMA (Yapti Tasba Masraka Nani Aslatakanka – Organization of the Children of Mother Earth). YATAMA continued to demand a willingness to accept Indigenous rights as a precondition for peace but entered into negotiations with the Sandinistas in October 1987. Despite intense pressure from the Honduran and American governments not to negotiate unilaterally with the Sandinistas, Indigenous leaders continued their talks through 1988. Meanwhile the government had slowly eased away from its hard-

162 Armando Rojas also insisted that the Sandinistas would not have fired unless fired upon, but Chartier's audio recordings suggest this was not the case. Gary Taljit, “Chartier blamed for death of Nicaraguan Miskito Indian,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 25 March 1986, in Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 218.
163 YATAMA's leadership was made up of Brooklyn Rivera, Wycliff Diego, Steadman Fagoth, and Charley Morales, a Mayagna man. Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 40.
164 Chartier attended these talks, independent of the WCIP, as did James Anaya, Glenn Morris, and representatives of the ILRC. Chartier, Witness to Resistance, 271-278. CWIS, Indian Law Resource Centre, “Report on the Nicaraguan Indian Peace Initiative: A Search for Indian Rights Within the Arias Peace
line position, and tried to come up with a peaceful solution to the conflict. The Sandinistas passed Law 28 (a statute giving some degree of political autonomy to the Atlantic Coast region, though not explicitly to Indigenous peoples themselves) and amended the Constitution to acknowledge the existence of Indigenous peoples and their languages (Articles 5, 8, 11 and 121), and to recognize collective forms of land ownership (Article 89).

The Sandinistas were defeated by the National Opposition Union (UNO) in the 1990 national election, and the new President Violeta Chamorro continued to work with YATAMA, negotiating the recognition of communal property. When the UNO approached these negotiations conservatively, it was actually the FSLN (as the primary opposition party) that helped push through legislation supportive of Indigenous lands. In advance of the 2006 national election, YATAMA entered into an alliance with the Sandinistas and together they managed to secure a victory. The new government passed the Communal Property Regime Law (No. 445) which recognized the pre-existing right of Indigenous communities to land title and natural resources, and put local territorial government in the hands of community leaders.

6.6 Conclusion

It is difficult to measure precisely the impact of organized Indigenous internationalism on Nicaragua, but it seems clear that it had an effect in at least two ways.

The participation of ALPROMISU members as founders of the WCIP and attendees of a variety of international conferences may well have encouraged the organization to continue its political movement beyond strictly economic goals. The warm welcome George Manuel received on the Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast as early as 1976 suggests that the Miskitu had already begun to see themselves, beyond their local ethnic identity, as part of a larger Indigenous “Fourth World.” The mobilization of MISURASATA as a more broadly Pan-Indigenous organization seems to have taken inspiration from the organizations its leaders would have encountered at international Indigenous conferences. MISURASATA's decision to expand its claim on lands from standard notions of property and occupancy to a broader claim on traditional territory and resource rights resulted from its adoption of concepts of Indigenous rights espoused by the WCIP and IITC.\textsuperscript{167} Similarly, demands for autonomy and self-determination were undoubtedly based in the history of local Indigenous peoples, but they were expressed through the new discourse of international Indigenous rights as inherent and inalienable. The adoption of this discourse, sometimes referencing WCIP documents directly, came as a surprise to the FSLN leadership, and their negative reaction appears to have resulted in part from an inability (or unwillingness) to understand its logic. Although many state governments have had difficulty understanding the assertion of the Indigenous right to sovereignty without succession as promoted by the World Council, this is likely the most catastrophic example.

Much of the lessons from this episode, however, are related to the Cold War environment in which it took place. Setting aside the conflicting actions of the IITC and

\textsuperscript{167} Diskin et al, 10.
WCIP, the writings of academics with personal and academic affinity towards the Miskitu people demonstrate the impact of their ideological leanings. Martin Diskin, Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz and even Charles Hale espouse sympathy for the Sandinistas; their descriptions sometimes downplay grave human rights abuses by the Sandinista troops and they were perhaps too often willing to give the Nicaraguan government the benefit of the doubt when it apologized for its “mistakes.”168 Bernard Nietschmann, a professor of geography at UC Berkeley, studied the Miskitu prior to the revolution, and served as an adviser to Brooklyn Rivera throughout his negotiations with the Sandinistas. A proponent of the “Fourth World,” Nietschmann became increasingly hostile to the Nicaraguan government and did his best to seek US military support for the MISURASATA guerillas. In the early 80s, he was openly critical of his own government's hypocrisy, suggesting that the Reagan Administration had “no interest in backing—politically or militarily—a movement that seeks self-determination and liberation for indigenous peoples.”169 Yet by 1989, his book “The Unknown War” attempted to prove that Cuba had geopolitical aspirations in Nicaragua, which would be aided by the Sandinista government. He suggested the “Firebreak Nation Theory”: that “central state communism and indigenous nations are fundamentally incompatible” and therefore, Indigenous nations formed a “territorial and cultural firebreak to the spread of communism... In Latin America, communism has taken hold where there are no indigenous nations (Cuba and Grenada), and communism has been confronted and stymied where there are indigenous nations (Bolivia and Nicaragua).”170 The Sandinista conflict could represent

170 Nietschmann, The Unknown War, 52-53. See also: Pineda, 197-198.
different things to different people, depending on their ideological leanings, and this proved just as true for Indigenous internationalists as anyone else. The ideological divide of the Cold War clearly had a greater impact on the Treaty Council than on the World Council. While working for the WCIP, Contreras did his best to discourage this kind of rhetoric among NGOs, encouraging them to issue statements that were supportive of Indigenous rights and peace negotiations (i.e. without hawkishly demonizing the Sandinistas.)\textsuperscript{171} The IITC, on the other hand, was already deeply divided on the issue of Marxism. As early as the 1980, Russell Means had grown quite hostile to Marxism, influenced in part by his friend Ward Churchill, who was working on his edited volume critiquing the use of Marxism by Indigenous activists.\textsuperscript{172} Other members of the IITC, in contrast, had longstanding connections with revolutionary leftist liberation organizations from around the world.

Although there certainly were attempts (by both the Left and the Right) to manipulate the international Indigenous movement, it should not be assumed that these efforts were successful. Those Indigenous activists who supported the Sandinistas were, for the most part, not un-critical of the FSLN's policies on the Atlantic coast. Dunbar-Ortiz insists that members of the Left were “all very critical. We felt like we had the right to be. We had supported the Sandinistas. They were right here among us in the [San Francisco] Bay Area. (...) We knew them personally. It wasn't like a foreign country that... we would be much more cautious about criticizing...”\textsuperscript{173} Similarly, the majority of Indigenous activists like Chartier and Means who supported MISURASATA were not unaware (or supportive) of the CIA's

\textsuperscript{171} Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
\textsuperscript{173} Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, personal interview, 24 Sept 2010.
ideological reasons for funding the Contras to overthrow the Sandinistas. For the most part, they remained critical of American foreign policy in South America, but felt the defence of Indigenous peoples should come first, before broader Cold War concerns. Ultimately, both the Left and Right of the international Indigenous movement remained determinedly anti-colonial at their root, but they differed on who to accuse of colonialism; the Left emphasized the international imperialism/colonialism of the United States, whereas the right emphasized the internal colonialism of the FSLN. Whether either side balanced these interests properly may remain in dispute, but they were not oblivious to their conflicted interests—rather, they made conscious decisions to act in one way or another despite the conflict.

On the other hand, the Cold War environment may well have increased the political influence of Indigenous international organizations. The Sandinistas were—due both to their political and economic weakness and to their socialist ideology—quite concerned about their image around the world, which left them open-minded to criticism, particularly from the Left. The FSLN's ties with the IITC and other international Indigenous activists like Dunbar-Ortiz may well have discouraged the Nicaraguan government from acting more violently towards the Miskitu than they did; it seems likely that these “insiders” may well have helped shape the significant policy reversal towards the country's Indigenous peoples in 1984. For the Indigenous people of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast, it may well have benefited their cause to have critical international attention (encouraging the Sandinistas to accept Indigenous rights) both from the FSLN's supporters and from those, like the US government, who were hostile to the revolution. At the same time, the WCIP filled an important role as a truly non-aligned third party. The World Council sought to advocate for Indigenous rights without choosing a
side in the Cold War, and this gave the organization international credibility. Chartier agrees with Dunbar-Ortiz that the Sandinistas were concerned about their international reputation, which made criticism from credible sources like the WCIP that much more powerful. At the press conference following the narrow escape from Nicaragua in 1986, journalists approached Chartier and “basically said, 'If we were just hearing this from Russell Means we'd take it with a grain of salt' but with the information coming from myself and this Hank Adams who was also there, gave it credibility so they believed what we were saying.”

When word spread that Chartier was accompanying MISURASATA in Nicaragua, the government of Nicaragua threatened to request to have the WCIP stripped of its ECOSOC status. Ricardo Contreras and others pointed out to the country's ambassador that such action would only “further deteriorate [Nicaragua's] image... even requesting that.” They reminded him that the World Council was the “only organization willing to talk to you guys” while people like Russell Means were “saying they want to put bombs in your shorts.” By remaining open to discussion with all governments, members of the World Council felt they could carve out a niche for themselves where real progress for Indigenous peoples could be made. It was that position that they felt was at risk when Chartier joined Russell Means in Nicaragua. For the IITC, the ideological polarization that peaked among its members during the conflict in Nicaragua proved disastrous, but the Cold War affected the World Council in a different way. The WCIP had elected to be politically neutral in an international area which precluded neutrality. Just a few years earlier, George Manuel had toured Mexico's southern border, visiting Indigenous refugees from the conflict in Guatemala. His trip was not

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174 Clément Chartier, personal interview, personal interview, 23 September 2010.
175 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
officially sanctioned by either government and, in his words, his presence was “barely even
tolerated.” He publicly described Guatemala as a “brutal military dictatorship” and accused
the Mexican Immigration Service of “collaborating with the Guatemalan army”, destroying
refugee encampments and deporting refugees to Guatemala where they faced “certain
death.”¹⁷⁶ Like Clem Chartier, George Manuel believed the suffering he witnessed there was
evidence that the “struggle of the Indian” is North against South, not “the East against the
West.”¹⁷⁷ Yet the circumstances were different. Manuel's criticism was directed primarily at
the right-wing regime of Rios Montt, and more importantly, his visit did not connect him
with the Guatemalan guerrilla groups which might have altered the image of the World
Council. Chartier did not feel his trip into Nicaragua compromised the organization's political
neutrality, but the specific politics of the conflict, the paramilitary nature of his hosts, and
with his decision to act without consultation all made his choice suspect. It was a harsh
warning that while internationalism might yield positive results for Indigenous peoples, it
provided new challenges of its own.
¹⁷⁷ GMD, 28 October 1982.
Chapter 7 Conclusions

7.1 The Conclusion of the World Council

Following the Seventh WCIP General Assembly in December 1993, the organization appeared to have a bright future. In May 1995, CIDA agreed to provide the WCIP with $990,000 for the following three years (1995-1998) of program support. The World Council organized a large conference in Arequipa, Peru in October 1995 to provide broad input on the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). But the organization's finances were not particularly secure. In June 1995, the new WCIP President, Conrado Jorge Valiente (Kolla, founder of Asociación Indígena de la República Argentina), acknowledged that the World Council's financial structure “shows a dependency on CIDA, increasing the risk [to] the continuity of...operations.” Concerned about the financial viability of the organization, he asserted that administrative costs had been reduced. The Arequipa conference may have helped contribute to a substantial deficit for the World Council that year, despite the decrease in administrative costs. A routine financial risk assessment completed by CIDA in September 1996 described the World Council as being “in a relatively stable financial position” despite being “heavily dependent on CIDA funding.”

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2 Norwegian Agency for Development Archives (hereafter NORADA), 443.1 Private Organizations Fonds (hereafter POF), DUH 1364, 83-3474 Støtte til kulture sentra og lederopplæring, fase I (Support for cultural centers and leadership training, phase I), Official Nomination of the Alternant Coordinator as Advisor of Indian Cultures at the Centro Cultural General San Martin, n.d.
Nonetheless, the organization was operating with a deficit of nearly $50,000 and “only had minimal reserves... for future operations.” Given this concern, the assessment suggested an in-depth review of the WCIP. In October 1996, CIDA requested an audit of the organization. In January 1997, the WCIP announced it had lost $10,000 to a Nigerian inheritance scam.

Early in 1997, CIDA announced it was cutting its funding, and the World Council was left in disarray. The previous June, Rodrigo Contreras, the WCIP Secretariat's Executive Director, had resigned from his position, asserting that “recent administrative measures” had forced him out. There was conflict on the Executive Council between President Valiente and Vice-President Clément Chartier, who did not trust each other. Lacking funds, a stable and experienced staff, or a harmonious Executive Council, the organization had little chance to survive. Although the WCIP head office in Ottawa was closed in the spring of 1997, an attempt was made, through the involvement of Wayne Kines (a non-Indigenous journalist and former Director of Communications at the United Nations Environment Programme) and Elijah Harper, to organize another meeting for the Executive Council in Norway. Harper, an

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7 Ibid.
9 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 31.22, letter from Peggy Florida (CIDA) to Conrado Valiente (WCIP), 9 October 1996.
12 Clément Chartier, personal interview, 23 September 2010; Wayne Kines, personal interview, 28 October 2013;
13 NORADA, Utenriksdepartementet, Folder 822.9, letter from Seurujarvi-Kari to Hugette Labelle (President, CIDA), 22 May 1997.
Anishinini leader who had only recently lost his seat as a Canadian Member of Parliament still had solid connections in the governing Liberal Party and it was hoped that his involvement could help secure the restoration of CIDA funding.\textsuperscript{15} The NORAD and CIDA agreed to cover the costs of the conference and the delegates' travel to Norway.\textsuperscript{16} After the members of the Executive had their meeting in Norway, they travelled to meet government representatives in Sweden, Finland and Denmark. From there, they continued onwards to New York to visit representatives at the United Nations headquarters, the United Nations Development Programme and UNICEF, and then to the offices of the World Bank in Washington.\textsuperscript{17} Ultimately, however, they were unable to regain the support of CIDA or any other organization, and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples ceased to exist.

\subsection*{7.1.1 Regional Imbalances}

It seems unlikely, however, that the WCIP could have perished so easily had it retained the support of the world's wealthiest and strongest Indigenous organizations. This sudden end to the organization in 1997 was partly the result of its over-reliance on funding from CIDA leaving it financially vulnerable, but its collapse is better understood as a slow demise, the result of the fading interest and involvement of Indigenous groups from the “First World” or “Global North.” Despite the establishment of strong regional branches in Central and South America (CORPI and CISA, respectively) and the ongoing collaboration between Sámi peoples in Northern Europe, neither Australia and Aotearoa nor the United States and Canada ever managed to effectively coordinate their participation in the WCIP. Australia's

\textsuperscript{15} Wayne Kines, personal interview, 28 October 2013;
\textsuperscript{16} Wayne Kines, personal interview, 28 October 2013 and personal correspondence, 11 February 2014;
NORADA, Utenriksdepartementet, Folder 822.9, letter from Peggy Florida (CIDA) to Roy Eriksson (Embassy of Finland) and Alex Winter (Embassy of Norway), 12 June 1997.
\textsuperscript{17} Wayne Kines, personal correspondence, 11 February 2014.
participation was limited by the weakness of its national Indigenous organizations. North American participation was perhaps limited by the strength of its organizations nationally, compared with their power within the WCIP. This imbalance left the World Council weak, since these regions failed to become fully integrated into its basic structure. When the Sami Council began to lose interest in the WCIP, the World Council's basic purpose of international solidarity faltered. At the same time, a new centre of Indigenous internationalism was rising at the UN which avoided some of the structural issues that challenged the World Council.

7.1.1.1 Australia and Asia

In Chapter 3, we saw that Australia's representative at the Georgetown preparatory meeting (Gary Williams) was enthusiastic, but the youngest by far. At the time, the country's first nationwide Indigenous organization, the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee (NACC), had only recently been established by the government of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam.\(^\text{18}\) Although its members—and the Indigenous people it was intended to represent—had high hopes for the organization, the NACC was not afforded much in the way of funding and was not particularly successful at making its voice heard.\(^\text{19}\) The organization was re-organized by the succeeding government of Malcolm Fraser and renamed the National Aboriginal Conference (NAC). Ross Moore, a representative for the NAC, attended the Second General Assembly (Kiruna, 1977) and, following the organization's formal affiliation


with the WCIP in 1979, he organized the Third General Assembly (Canberra, April/May 1981).\textsuperscript{20} It seems possible that increased NAC involvement with the World Council may have encouraged the Indigenous Australians to adopt a more radical stance, reminiscent of George Manuel's "Fourth World" philosophy. At the conference, the NAC presented a position paper which "stood in marked contrast to [its] previous ambiguous and moderate statements," insisting that the Makarrata (treaty/agreement) being negotiated with the Australian government, "would only be signed if the... government recognised Indigenous sovereignty."\textsuperscript{21} According to historian Julie Fenley, the NAC believed "that Indigenous sovereignty would be recognized in international law in the future," and insisted that "it should negotiate ‘as an international entity’—that is, as a distinct, internationally recognised people—or ‘reserve in the makarrata the issue of our international status.’"\textsuperscript{22} Adam Shoemaker notes that the following September, Indigenous leaders who were denied access to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Melbourne "endeavoured to make private contact with Third World Commonwealth government officials."\textsuperscript{23} In 1982, Ossie Cruse, a member of the NAC's Makarrata sub-committee and later a member of the WCIP Executive Council, joined Michael Anderson and former Prime Minister Gough Whitlam for a tour of Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{24} The purposes of the trip were}

\textsuperscript{22} Fenley, 387.
...to make these former British colonies aware of our negotiations for a Treaty; secondly, to learn of their own experiences during the process of decolonisation; thirdly, to learn of all social, political and economic pitfalls associated with liberation; and fourthly, to win their support should we have any trouble from the Australian Government...\(^{25}\)

The NAC was not only adopting an international view of Indigenous rights, it was also connecting its own demands with the decolonization process and with the Third-Worldist movement. In March 1984, the WCIP Executive Council passed a resolution authorizing the National Aboriginal Conference to raise funds for a South Pacific Regional organization. Furthermore, José Carlos Morales promised to participate in meetings with the Australian government to develop the regional organization.\(^{26}\)

In the fall of 1984, when Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Clyde Holding, suggested that Indigenous people should not become involved in sensitive international issues, NAC President Rob Riley responded that, on the contrary, “Indigenous populations have a community of interest which transcends their national affiliations.”\(^{27}\) Despite this growing radicalism, or perhaps because of it, the NAC collapsed in 1985 in a mess of internal struggle and external pressure by the Australian government. As the member elected to represent the Pacific Region, Ossie Cruse remained on the WCIP’s Executive Council, but since the NAC had been formally disbanded, he had no organization behind him and could rarely attend

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\(^{25}\) In addition to private meetings with Julius Nyerere and Robert Mugabe, the group met with Indian and Saudi officials while they were en route, and capped off the trip with a visit to the World Council of Churches and the International Labour Organization in Geneva. Michael Anderson, “‘That Word’ Treaty.”

\(^{26}\) LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.10, Executive Council Meeting Resolutions, 26-30 March 1984

\(^{27}\) Beresford, 200.
meetings. At an Executive Council meeting in September 1986, however, delegates were worried if their organization's legitimacy might be called into question if there was no means for information to “filter down” from the international level to the grassroots Indigenous Australians. Another group—the National Federation of Land Councils—would later join the WCIP but it was surely a loss to the World Council for a committed member organization like the NAC, their main point of contact in Australia, to suddenly disappear. The process of integration of the Pacific Region “suffered greatly” as a result of NAC's demise.

At the Fifth WCIP General Assembly (1987), the planned “Pacific Region” was formally reorganized as the Pacific and Asia Council of Indigenous Peoples (PACIP) under the leadership of Pōkā Laenui of Hawaii. Since Laenui was also elected to the post of Vice-President, Ossie Cruse continued to hold the post of PACIP representative on the Executive Council. Pōkā Laenui's continued participation was challenged by the apparent lack of commitment from the Executive Council to the Pacific and Asian region. He recalls that no funding was provided for eager Asian delegates to attend the 1990 General Assembly, whereas funding was provided to delegates from South and Central America. In response, Laenui boycotted the assembly altogether, submitting instead a strong worded statement which insisted that

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31 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.20, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes (2-4 September 1987).
32 Pōkā Laenui, personal correspondence, 18 Feb 2011.
the indigenous world is not limited to North, Central and South America, the Saami of Scandinavia, and a few folkloric specimens of the Pacific and Asia. The world is covered with indigenous peoples in dire need of support. Yet, this General Assembly has been planned as if only the indigenous peoples of Central and South America are deserving of assistance. The scarcity of indigenous representatives from the Pacific and Asia to the General Assembly is not an accident, but a direct result of the failure of those regions with the ability to assist, to do so.33

Laenui believes that the executive showed little desire “to truly develop the WCIP as a World Council. Instead, it would remain an 'international council' of indigenous peoples.”34

7.1.1.2 North America

George Manuel was unable to attend the Third WCIP General Assembly (1981) in Canberra, owing to his poor health. The election of José Carlos Morales as the new WCIP president was not the only change for Canadian Indigenous representation on the Executive Council; the conflict between Delbert Riley (Anishinaabe, President of the National Indian Brotherhood) and Harry Daniels (Métis, President of the Native Council of Canada) at the assembly helped ensure that neither of these organizations secured a seat on the WCIP Executive.35 Canadian participation continued, nonetheless through George Manuel's specially created role as an official WCIP ambassador, and through Mary Smallface-Marule's control of the WCIP Secretariat in Lethbridge. But following the move of the WCIP headquarters to Ottawa early in 1984, Marie Smallface-Marule had virtually nothing to do

34 Pōkā Laenui, personal correspondence, 18 Feb 2011.
with the organization. Moreover, the lack of a formal regional body to coordinate North American Indigenous organizations decreased the effectiveness of participation, relative to the Central and South American regions with strong branch organizations (CORPI and CISA, respectively).

At the 1982 World Assembly of First Nations, a large event organized by Sol Sanderson in cooperation with the WCIP, guests drafted a proposed charter for a North American Regional Council, but little action followed. In 1983, it was a CORPI representative, Floriberto Diaz Gomez, who voiced concerns about the lack of cooperation in the North American region: “We... feel that in North America, it is more difficult to get... unity.. It was in Canada where the idea of forming the WCIP started, but we see up to now... North America [has not] formed its own regional council, and this is something very important to us.” Because Mexico was officially represented by CORPI, the Central American Regional Council, the WCIP’s North American region consisted of just two countries. Nevertheless, the creation of a regional organization did not come easily.

36 The only exception was her role in organizing the Second International Indigenous Women's Conference (August 5 - 9, 1990) which received some assistance from the World Council and overlapped to some degree with the WCIP General Assembly in Tromso. Very little has been written about this conference. The Chair was Maret Sara of the Sami Women's Association, but the committee included Priscilla Settee, Winona La Duke, Dorothy Davey and Victoria Tauli Corpuz. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 11.22. The previous (first) conference was took place in Adelaide, Australia in July 1989. See Joanne Willmot (ed.), Finding Common Ground: First Indigenous Women's Conference, 7-18 July 1989, Conference Report (Adelaide, n.p., 1989). <http://www.samemory.sa.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/zpamb11771665ocr.pdf>

37 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 29.21, WCIP Newsletter (December 1982). Sol Sanderson (Chakastaypasin Anishinabe) was Chief of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations from 1979 to 1986.

Sol Sanderson, leader of the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians (FSIN), replied to Gomez that he was also concerned about the lack of the regional organization. According to Sanderson, the Canadian Assembly of First Nations' David Ahenakew had delegated the responsibility for its establishment to him and Dave Monture. Among the challenges to coordination, Monture asserted that “the leaders are so busy that they do not even have time to meet...to cross the border and to shake hands.” Ahenakew himself would later acknowledge that a regional organization was “long overdue” and that the AFN shared “responsibility for not directing more time and effort to organizing a strong Regional Council.”

Participation from Canada was likely encouraged by the election of the Métis National Council's Clément Chartier as president of the WCIP at the Fourth General Assembly (September 1984). Another draft charter for a North American Regional Council of Indigenous Peoples from the same month proposes an organization representing the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), the Métis National Council (MNC), the Native Council of Canada (NCC), and the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI). Each member would receive one vote within the organization (giving Canadian organizations a much

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39 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 9.27, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 11-16 August 1983. Dave Monture (Six Nations of the Grand River) had worked as a private contractor for both the WCIP and the National Indian Brotherhood under the leadership of George Manuel. The National Indian Brotherhood renamed itself the Assembly of First Nations in 1982 under the leadership of David Ahenakew (Nēhiyaw).

40 Ibid.


42 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 4.14, Draft, Charter, North American Regional Council of Indigenous Peoples, September 1984. The LAC fonds contain at least three drafts for such an organization, but this is the only one that is dated. The Assembly of First Nations represents is open to membership by all elected chiefs of First Nations bands recognized by the Canadian government, and so it exclusively represents “Status Indians,” those Indigenous people subject to Canada's Indian Act. The Native Council of Canada (and its successor, the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples), claims to represent First Nations people who do not have status (possible for a variety of reasons), and “Status Indians” living off reserve and are therefore may be poorly represented by elected band chiefs living on reserve.
greater share of the power) but the organization would have two chairpersons, one Canadian and one American. At a planning meeting in July 1985, however, delegates representing six organizations were highly critical of this draft regional charter and of the WCIP charter. Instead they agreed on a draft “Protocol for Organizing the North American Region” in which they expressed solidarity for one another and agreed to convene meetings as required. An addendum to the protocol, established a Technical Working Group to facilitate the exchange of information among the signatories. It is unclear what action the Technical Working Group ever took.

Representatives of the Canadian organizations participated in several WCIP Executive Council meetings during 1986, and in May 1987, the WCIP newsletter announced the establishment of a North American Regional Council (NARC) by the Assembly of First Nations, the Native Council of Canada and the Métis National Council. The NCC’s Louis “Smokey” Bruyère was elected the first chairperson, joined on NARC’s executive committee by Georges Erasmus (AFN) and Sam Sinclair (MNC). The notable absence of the National

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43 Likely in preparation for this structure, George Manuel successfully passed a resolution to adapt the World Council’s charter to allow for two regional representatives from North America (one from each country) at a WCIP Executive Council meeting in December 1983. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.6, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Resolutions, 9-13 December 1983.
44 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 4.14, North American Regional Council Meeting Minutes, 9 July 1985. Representatives of the AFN, NCC, NCAI, FSIN, the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) and the Prairie Treaty Nations Alliance (PTNA) were all in attendance, along with Chief Mike Leach of the Lillooet Nation. A representative of the Métis National Council were unable to attend. The Prairie Treaty Alliance was formed, as its name suggests, by Indigenous nations from the Canadian prairies who held treaties with the Crown, largely in protest against the structure of the National Indian Brotherhood/AFN and its interaction with Canadian First Ministers Conferences organized following the 1982 Constitution Act.
46 Ibid. The membership of the Technical Working Group included Rudy Ryser (NCAI), Dave Monture (AFN), Marc Leclair (MNC), Anita Gordon Murdoch (PTNA), and Robert Groves (NCC).
47 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 29.22, WCIP Newsletter (May 1987). The Newsletter actually refers to the organization as the North American Regional Chapter but all further references describe it as a “Council.”
48 Ibid.
Congress of American Indians from the organization was addressed at the Executive Committee meeting of the WCIP in July. The delegates adopted a motion accepting the structuring of NARC with only three members because “the National Council of American Indians...has not been at all active in the work of the WCIP over these last three years and... has not been in communication with the WCIP although many attempts have been made to maintain such communication.”

During their time in control of the NCAI, President Joe DeLaCruz (1981-1984) and Vice-President Ralph Eluska (1981-1983) had shown considerable interest in the World Council and served as American representative at Executive Council meetings. DeLaCruz's successor, Reuben Snake, appears to have shown little interest in the WCIP. Perhaps his past-involvement with the American Indian Movement encouraged him to be skeptical of the WCIP. Snake's only notable appearance in the WCIP fonds is a letter expressing support for Chartier's actions in Nicaragua (based on a report that Hank Adams delivered to the NCAI) and expressing regret that he could not attend the emergency session of the WCIP Executive Council meetings in Geneva. It is possible the World Council's handling of that situation disappointed him to the point that he rejected the

49 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.19, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 10 July 1987. The minutes of a prior Executive Council meeting also note the NCAI's “limited communication and apparent disinterest... to relate to the WCIP.” LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.18, Record of WCIP Executive Council Meeting, 16-18 March 1987.

50 DeLaCruz's Quinault origins in the Pacific Northwest may have given him added sense of connection with George Manuel, who spent much of his adult life in Vancouver. DeLaCruz was also a board member of the American Indian Law Center (1977) alongside WCIP Secretary-General Sam Deloria. Philip S. Deloria, “The American Indian Law Center: An Informal History,” *New Mexico Law Review* 24:2 (Spring 1994), 297-299. For more on DeLaCruz, see his obituary, *Seattle Times*, 18 April 2000. *Tundra Times*, 19 October 198.


52 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 5.5, letter Reuben Snake (NCAI, President) to Clem Chartier (WCIP), 12 February 1986.
organization altogether. The WCIP made at least one attempt to renew relations with the
NCAI in May 1989, once Snake had left office, but it appears to have been unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{53}
Pōkā Laenui, who served two terms as WCIP Vice-President, was perhaps technically an
American citizen, but it was an identity he categorically rejected.\textsuperscript{54} As such, there was no
elected Executive Council member representing the NCAI after 1984.

World Council documents provide no clear evidence as to why the NCAI stopped
participating. It seems understandable that involvement in the North American Regional
Council—where their organization would have been greatly outnumbered by multiple
Canadian organizations—might not have been appealing. Moreover, the organizational
structure of the World Council provided Indigenous groups from Latin American countries an
overwhelming majority of votes, which must have felt problematic to many delegates from
outside that area. As a delegate from Australia warned at the Sixth General Assembly, “[a]t
present the representation of delegates is 54 to central and South America and 24 delegates
for the rest of the world. This imbalance has to be addressed if we are to further participate in
this forum.”\textsuperscript{55} Even for Canadian Indigenous organizations, it seems participation in the

\textsuperscript{53} LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 5.5, letter from Carlos Johnson (WCIP) to Gail E. Chehak (NCAI), 25 May 1989.
\textsuperscript{54} Following a controversial trial in 1977 in which Laenui, a lawyer, asserted that the U.S. occupation of
Hawaii was illegal, he declared before a Federal District Court that he was not a U.S. citizen. Poke Laenui,
personal interview. Laenui's position points out the flexibility of the World Council, in that, unlike many
other Indigenous peoples, he did seek complete independence for Hawaii (though expressly on the basis of
territory, not ethnicity.) Indigenous Hawaiians were also not subject to “internal colonization” like most
other Indigenous peoples. Hawaii was quite obviously “geographically separate... from the country
administering it,” the requirement for inclusion as a colony according to the “UN General Assembly
Resolution Defining the Three Options for Self-determination General Assembly Resolution 1541,"
A/RES/1541(XV). For more on Laenui's historical argument, see Bradford W. Morse and Kazi A. Hamid,
International Law}, 5 (1989-1990), which relies extensively on the writing of Pōkā Laenui (refered to in the
article by his English name, Hayden Burgess).
WCIP Sixth General Assembly, 8-12 August 1990.
World Council became more struggle than it was worth. The Assembly of First Nations continued to send delegates to WCIP Executive Council meetings into the early 1990s, but then their participation appears to taper off. Executive Council meetings in January 1991 and June 1992 included multiple representatives from Canadian's national Indigenous organizations, but meetings in September 1993 and October 1995 each included only a single representative of the Native Council of Canada (in the latter case, its successor organization, the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples). A letter from the AFN in April 1992 raised non-specific administrative concerns about the WCIP without much detail and threatened to withdraw from the World Council altogether. According to Contreras, North Americans “lost interest because the Council was not really necessary for them. They were doing very well on their own….They really didn't need the Council.” While the North American and Pacific regions had never formed solid umbrella organizations, this was not true of the Nordic region. Sámi political organizations had formed a regional body, the Nordic Sami Council, in 1956. Their participation in the World Council had, therefore, always been a coordinated effort, but their willingness to support the organization was also fading.

7.1.1.3 Sami Council

The Sixth WCIP General Assembly in 1990 was a turning point for Sámi involvement in the World Council. A number of conflicts within the Sámi community came to a head at that meeting in Tromsø. One division was between two prominent delegates. Leif Halonen, a

57 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 4.22, letter from Ovide Mercredi (AFN, National Chief) to Donald Rojas (WCIP, President), 16 April 1992.
58 Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.

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long-time member of the Nordic Sami Council, disagreed with Aslak Nils Sara (who had long represented the NSC on the WCIP Executive) over the leadership and direction of the World Council. Halonen was distrustful of the motives of most WCIP presidents after George Manuel, suspicious that personal status or even financial corruption had become dominant motivations for candidates. In March 1987, he apparently made critical comments to a Costa Rican Indigenous newspaper about the presidency of Donald Rojas. Later that year, there were rumours circulating that the Nordic Sami Council might quit the WCIP altogether. Halonen was similarly concerned about corruption within the development work the WCIP was doing in Central and South America. He wanted to get elected as WCIP President and either sort the organization out, or shut it down. There was also disagreement about the direction of the NSC, particularly its commitment to the WCIP. Halonen had encouraged the NSC to seek its own NGO credentials at the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) as other Indigenous groups had, whereas Sara believed it should continue to work through the World Council. Halonen felt ECOSOC status would help the NSC assert its influence directly, whereas Sara apparently felt like such a move would amount to a betrayal of the WCIP. Halonen's side won out, and the NSC attained ECOSOC

59 Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
60 Leif Halonen, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
61 LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 3.06, Voz del Indio: Organio Oficial de Los Pueblos Indios de Costa Rica, No. 10 (Feb-Mar 1987)
62 At an Executive Council meeting in Ottawa, Lars Anders Baer made it clear that the rumours were not true. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 10.20, WCIP Executive Council Meeting Minutes, 2-4 September 1987.
63 Leif Halonen, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
64 Doug Sanders noted that, despite the nine Indigenous NGOs invited to participate at the United Nations Seminar on the Effects of Racism and Racial Discrimination on the Social and Economic Relations Between Indigenous Peoples and States (Geneva, 16-20 January 1989), the Sámi were effectively unrepresented. This may help account for the NSC's decision to seek its own NGO status. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 1.16, Douglas Sanders, “Another Step: The UN Seminar on Relations Between Indigenous Peoples and States,” 20 February 1989.
roster status in 1989. Because Sara represented the NSC internationally but was not actually a member, he may have had less pull in that organization, but his long term involvement with the World Council seems to have made him more popular with its members. Another member of the NSC, Lars Anders Baer, had run for WCIP President at the Fifth General Assembly (1987) in Lima, Peru, but lost to Donald Rojas (*Boruca* from Costa Rica). At the General Assembly in Tromsø, Halonen announced his candidacy despite his rift with Sara.

The other internal *Sámi* conflict that became apparent in Tromsø was more general but no less hostile. The divisions between more conservative and more radical factions that developed during the Alta affair lingered on, and the latter groups were sharply critical of the Norwegian Sami Association (*Norgga Sámiid Riikasearvi* – NSR) and its relationship with the Norwegian government. As Ole Henrik Magga recalls, a government minister was asked a question about the level of *Sámi* representation within the WCIP and whether that would make a difference for Norway's financial support. When the minister answered in the affirmative, critics accused both the NSR and the Norwegian government of trying to buy votes from “poor Indians from South America” for *Sámi* representation on the WCIP Executive Council, or rather, threatening to withdraw funding if *Sámi* delegates were not elected. Magga does not believe that was the case, but acknowledges that *Sámi* involvement would logically have influenced Nordic support for the World Council. This is undoubtedly true. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the Nordic Council senior officials that met in 1979 had

67 Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
68 Ibid.
agreed to support the WCIP largely because it was the international organization to which Sámi groups had connected themselves.\textsuperscript{69} If Sámi participation weakened, so would the Nordic commitment to provide funding. Magga recalls that the hostilities created a particularly bad climate at the assembly, and afterwards, “work from the Sámi side was not so enthusiastic anymore.”\textsuperscript{70} He confesses that after the embarrassing conflict of the General Assembly and following his election as the first president of the newly created Sámediggi (the Sami Parliament of Norway), he no longer had “the energy to follow the World Council.”\textsuperscript{71} He did not realize how weak the WCIP was until after it had collapsed. Halonen lost the election, despite the promised support of Australian delegates. Aslak Nils Sara continued to represent the Nordic Sami Council—which became simply the Sami Council (Sámiráddi) after the inclusion of Russian organizations in the early 1990s—and did not give up his commitment to the WCIP. In a report to the 1992 international Sami Conference in Helsinki, he lists the many successes of the WCIP and offers what sounds like a desperate plea for continued Sámi involvement in the World Council: “a coordinated action is imperative as opposed to independent personalized criterias [sic] which only end up confusing the process... Other Indigenous peoples need Saami solidarity!”\textsuperscript{72} After his retirement from the World Council that year, Irja Seurujärvi-Kari took over as the Sami Council representative. According to Leif Halonen, she continued Sara’s determined support

\textsuperscript{69} Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives (hereafter NFAA), 26.8/54 Beskyttelse av innfodte folkeslag (Protection of indigenous peoples) fonds (hereafter BIF), Binder 6, Minutes of Nordic Council Senior Officials Meeting for the Promotion of Indigenous Peoples' Interests, Oslo, 6 December 1979.
\textsuperscript{70} Ole Henrik Magga, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
for the WCIP, but her enthusiasm does not seem to have been shared by all members of the Sami Council.\textsuperscript{73}

\section*{7.1.2 United Nations}

As North American and Sámi organizations lost interest in the World Council, the organization became increasingly associated with just the Central and South American regions, and its international presence waned. At the Seventh General Assembly (Guatemala City, December 1993), the WCIP greatly expanded its number of regional branches to include the Andes, the Amazon, the Southern Cone, Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, Sápmi, North America, Australia, and Aotearoa.\textsuperscript{74} Even if a North American branch organization had grown into a solid body like the Sami Council, this new structure would have effectively strengthened the power of Central and South American delegates over the World Council. In 1994, Douglas Sanders, a law professor associated with the World Council in its early days, asserted that in the 1990s, the WCIP’s “activity has been confined largely to Central America and parts of South America. It has not been very active at the [United Nations] Working Group in recent years.”\textsuperscript{75} Although the WCIP had long been focused primarily on the Central and South American regions, partly explained by the “chronic abuse of human rights” suffered by Indigenous peoples there, the collapse of participation from the wealthiest and, arguably, strongest member organizations did not bode well for the World Council.\textsuperscript{76} Rodrigo Contreras, the staff member who was employed by the World Council for

\begin{footnotes}
\item[73] Leif Halonen, personal interview, 5 April 2013.
\item[74] Duquette, 78. LAC, WCIPF, Vol. 2.8, letter from Contreras to Seurujarvi-Kari, 2 February 1994.
\item[76] Rodrigo Contreras, personal interview, 3 June 2010.
\end{footnotes}
the greatest span of time, describes this faltering involvement from North America, the
Pacific and Sápmi as “the real demise” of the WCIP.77

There is, however, a slightly more optimistic explanation for the decreasing level of
interest in the WCIP from Indigenous peoples and organizations: the creation of the United
Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UN-WGIP). The apparent drift away
from the World Council might be seen instead as a drift toward the UN-WGIP, created by the
UN Economic and Social Council in 1982 under the supervision of the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The UN-WGIP's five members
(each a member of the Sub-Commission, each representing one region of the world) were
expected to meet for as much as five days prior to the Sub-Commissions sessions to examine
issues related to Indigenous peoples and help bring about new standards for Indigenous
rights.78 In the Working Group's initial sessions, Indigenous peoples' access was limited to
those few Indigenous international organizations with ECOSOC consultative status (like the
WCIP), a standard requirement for all UN organizations and bodies. As groups both with and
without consultative status found this rule restrictive, a motion was passed by UN-WGIP
members to allow far broader participation from Indigenous peoples and organizations.79 The
growth of participation was enormous, from just a handful to nearly 1,000 representatives
attending the UN-WGIP meetings.80 This expansion was greatly aided by the establishment

77 Ibid.
78 Augusto Willemsen-Diaz, “How Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Reached the UN,” in Making the Declaration
Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, eds. Claire Charters and
79 Willemsen-Diaz, 26-27; Asbjørn Eide, “The Indigenous Peoples, the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations and the Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” in Making the
Declaration Work, 34.
80 Willemsen-Diaz, 28.
of a special voluntary fund created by the United Nations General Assembly in 1985. Contributions to the fund from various national governments made it possible for hundreds of Indigenous peoples without other sources of income to attend the annual sessions of the Working Group.\textsuperscript{81}

The WCIP itself was very supportive of the UN-WGIP. The World Council sought financial support from the UN Voluntary Fund for individuals otherwise unable to afford the costs of attending the Working Group.\textsuperscript{82} Leif Dunfjeld of the WCIP’s Geneva Office helped run training sessions for Indigenous delegates to prepare them in advance of the Working Group sessions.\textsuperscript{83} In 1986, when the United Nations' financial problems required the cancellation of the meeting of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (and the Working Group along with it), the World Council co-sponsored an alternative workshop for Indigenous peoples (and the official members of the Working Group) so that the important discussions could continue.\textsuperscript{84}

The slow “defection” of Indigenous peoples toward the Working Group is only logical. The meetings were more regular and supported by the substantial resources of the UN, and even the costs of attendance were relatively secure. Without the funding requirements from CIDA or other state-backed development agencies, the participants were free to focus on political topics rather than economic development issues. The involvement of the United Nations created, at least in theory, greater potential to draft real international

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{82} Duquette, 100.
law rather than simply make pronouncements like an NGO. Moreover, because of the openness to participation, Indigenous peoples did not need to join national or regional organizations in order to participate; they could represent themselves directly. Asian and even African peoples attended the meetings in far greater numbers than had ever attended the World Council's General Assemblies. The creation of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII, 2000-Present), and the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP, 2007-Present) has further encouraged direct participation by Indigenous peoples at the United Nations. Both the Assembly of First Nations and the National Congress of American Indians have attained Special Consultative Status to allow them greater access to UN bodies. Two of the eight Indigenous experts appointed to the first session of the UNPFII had previously represented their regions on the World Council.85

A transition from the World Council to various UN bodies suggests the failure of George Manuel's dream for the WCIP to gain the special “permanent non-member observer” status of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Vatican, but such an aspiration was hardly realistic. Unlike the International Indian Treaty Council, the WCIP was never intended to represent a single people the way the PLO does. The Vatican represents a single global spiritual community and holds sovereignty over the Vatican City, whereas the WCIP represented a diverse category of peoples and claimed no sovereignty at all. Structurally, the WCIP had more in common with the United Nations itself than it did with any UN member.

Sam Deloria attended the CORPI founding meeting in January 1977, but soon became dispirited with the WCIP and did not “see much hope for a truly representative organization coming out of it...”\(^{86}\) Deloria “saw what it would take to do what we aspired to do and realized that it was not going to happen.”\(^{87}\)

If, however, the primary goal of the WCIP was to publicly challenge the concept of absolute sovereignty for nation states vis-a-vis the rights of Indigenous people to self-determination, then it did achieve at least some success, partly through its support for UN bodies. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples may not be enforceable, but its endorsement by states around the world does indicate recognition of specific rights of Indigenous peoples, including the right to self-determination. Despite his early disappointment, Deloria is willing to give the World Council credit for its contribution to some positive changes within international forums. He believes that, “by goading the international community and the Treaty Council to get moving” and “showing that Indigenous peoples were not lacking in organizational skills,” the WCIP “started something that other people finished.”\(^{88}\) In a similar vein, Pōkā Laenui believes that the WCIP “was probably the most significant voice in the early development of the [UNDRIP]” not only because of the World Council's participation in the sessions of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, “but also because of the influence that we had at the ILO in bringing forward the ILO Convention 169, which pushed the UN in the right direction.”\(^{89}\) The World Council cannot be credited alone with the creation of the UN Working Group on Indigenous

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86 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012.
87 Ibid.
88 Sam Deloria, personal interview, 23 March 2012, and personal correspondence, 29 January 2013.
89 Pōkā Laenui, personal correspondence, 18 Feb 2011.
Populations, much less the completed UNDRIP, but it advanced the development of both though its direct participation, and perhaps more importantly, as a source of motivation. The WCIP provided evidence that Indigenous peoples had the will and the ability to participate at the international level, and it encouraged Indigenous peoples to actively demand the continuation of the process of decolonization through the recognition of their right to self determination.

7.2 Conclusion

7.2.1 Globalization

The question of whether Indigenous internationalism and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples are emblematic of the process of globalization naturally depends on the definition of globalization in use. Returning to Jan Aarte Scholte's summary of definitions from the introduction, Indigenous internationalism clearly fits within some and not others. Undoubtedly, the WCIP was an international organization, encouraging local and national Indigenous organizations to cross state borders and connect with others. This was true both for the members themselves (attending General Assemblies and establishing regional organizations) and for non-members like Niillas Somby or participants in Indigenous cultural exchanges. Indigenous internationalism has little to do with “globalization as liberalization” except as a hostile reaction to the actions of multinational corporations within Indigenous territories.

The issue of “universalization” or homogenization is a more difficult one to address. Organizations like the WCIP fought for the rights of Indigenous peoples to preserve their distinct languages and cultures, and to reject efforts at forced assimilation by the state. At the same time, Indigenous internationalism does run the risk of ignoring substantial social and historical differences between different peoples and overemphasizing their similarities under the category of Indigenous peoples. Chadwick Allen points out that the WCIP’s “narrative tactics,” including the construction of the “Indigenous People” identity might be considered part of Gayatri Spivak's conception of “strategic essentialism,” a temporary tactic used to fight oppression. Allen further notes Frantz Fanon’s suggestion that “that the construction of essentialist forms of ‘native’ identity is a legitimate, indeed necessary stage in the emergence from the process of ‘assimilation’ imposed by colonial regimes to a fully decolonized national culture.” Yet, while the WCIP and its members certainly did use this tactic on occasion—emphasizing the overlap in Indigenous spiritualities or their relationship with nature—the organization's primary definition was always strictly political. It is hard to imagine how an organization which derived its policy from large general assemblies of Indigenous peoples from all over the world could have achieved a uniform definition of Indigenous peoples based on cultural or social characteristics. Even within one country, the variety of communities, cultures, and lifestyles is frequently too great to find a definition of Indigeneity that pleases everyone. The primary aims of the WCIP, accordingly, were to

93 Bart Moore-Gilbert, as quoted in Chadwick Allen, 198. Moore-Gilbert further quotes Chinua Achebe, who insists anti-colonial ideas like nègritude, “African personality,” and “the African way to socialism” are “props we have fashioned at different times to help us get on our feet again.” Bart Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory: Context, Practices, Politics (New York: Verso, 1997), 178.
94 For the example of the United States, for instance, see Eva Marie Garroutte, Real Indians: Identity and Survival of Native America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003)
ensure the rights of Indigenous peoples to practice their cultures and spiritualities regardless of their content. The World Council had little need for homogenizing cultural universalism either in theory or in practice.

Similarly, whether Indigenous internationalism and the World Council fit within the category of “globalization as modernization/westernization” is also problematic. All of the prominent members of the WCIP and the IITC had adopted at least some elements of modern western culture. All spoke at least one European language. Many had not just a western education, but a high-level of western post-secondary education. At the same time, both organizations were ideologically opposed to the basic tenets of globalization as modernism, which Scholte describes as the spread of capitalism, rationalism, industrialism, bureaucratism, individualism around the world.95 Certainly, there was some degree of “Calibanism” (using the tools of the West against the West) employed by Indigenous internationalist organizations but how much of this tactic was acceptable and how much would erode the strength of the movement was a matter of debate.96 From the use of nations states for its membership structure to the use of Robert's Rules of Order in its meetings, the World Council chose not to “reinvent the wheel” in organizing itself. At general assemblies, delegates formally represented secular voluntary political organizations (many of them state-recognized and even state-funded), not Indigenous nations or peoples directly. Adopting these “modern” Western structures allowed the WCIP to work efficiently in its opposition to modernization and colonialism. Nor was the World Council's membership restricted to a “traditional” or cultural understanding of Indigeneity. Peoples that had embraced Christianity,

96 For more on “Calibanism,” see footnote 27 on page 82 above.
peoples that now spoke only Western languages, peoples that had intermarried with
Europeans, and peoples that no longer lived exclusively from the resources of their own
lands could all be accepted as Indigenous, according to the strictly political definition set out
by the World Council. Some Indigenous activists—particularly but not exclusively the young
and radical—were skeptical about this degree of “westernization” within an organization
which purported to be Indigenous. 97 Even Sam Deloria's emphasis on the representativeness
of formal organizations with democratic elections versus “grassroots” organizations with
self-appointed “representatives” might indicate an acceptance of Western rational and
democratic values. 98 Nevertheless, the goals of the World Council remained not just anti-
colonial in the sense of national liberation and the creation of new independent states, but
anti-colonial in opposition to the basic system of sovereign nation states. Although Scholte
argues that “‘Tribes', 'ethnic groups', 'indigenous peoples' and 'minorities' only redraw the
map of nations: they do not contradict the nationality principle as such,” in the case the
WCIP, this is clearly untrue. 99 The World Council did not simply challenge the lines drawn on
the map by colonial powers, it challenged the inherent meaning behind those lines. In this
way, its challenge to the international community was, despite its use of Western tools, even
more radical than the initial aim of the IITC for Sioux nationhood.

Finally, the World Council's place within Scholte's accepted definition of
“globalization as deterritorialization or the spread of suprateritoriality” is equally
contradictory. One the one hand, the World Council encouraged international (rather than

97 For more on this tension, see page 99-100 above.
98 On the contrary, however, it would be arrogantly Eurocentric to suggest that the West has a monopoly on
either rationality or democracy.
global) cooperation between Indigenous peoples so that each could secure their own self-determination over their own territory. As an organization, it hardly rejected territorialism, since all the members identified themselves strongly with a particular territory. On the other hand, the WCIP was supraterritorial, not just in its use of teleconferencing for Executive Council meetings, but in the supraterritorial nature of the movement. Much like the women's movement or the Third World solidarity movement, the World Council connected different peoples based not on their proximate location but on their common history of oppression. By refusing a region-specific definition of Indigeneity (like a limit, for instance, to the Western Hemisphere) the World Council disconnected that word from any geographic connotations. In this sense, it fostered a sense of global Indigeneity that transcended space. Thus, ironically, the WCIP used a word whose basic meaning is “connected to a place” to describe a category of people without reference to space. Indigenous internationalism promotes the supraterritoriality of a certain kind of territorialism.

This mix of local and global elements required proponents of Indigenous internationalism to straddle both their own communities and the international forums in which they participated. The collapse of the World Council might be partly attributable to the difficulty of that challenge. Demonstrating the importance of regional and global solidarity to one's people or national organization was not easy for World Council delegates. When regional bodies failed to solidify (as was the case for North America or the Pacific), the participation of even strong national organizations was placed at risk. Although the logic of international representation might be apparent to peoples seeking respite from violence or extreme poverty, those in (relatively) more comfortable conditions may have needed more
convincing. Participation in local, national and international organizations leaves one vulnerable when any one of these organizations collapses, as Australia's Ossie Cruse learned. Scholte notes that “[G]lobalization has contributed to a growth of hybrid identities and overlapping communities in contemporary world politics... The resultant hybridization compels a person to negotiate several national and/or nonterritorial affiliations within the self.”

This holds especially true for Indigenous internationalist leaders like George Manuel who had to balance his Secwepemc ethnicity, his political role within the Neskonlith Indian Band, his leadership of the provincial Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs organization and the federal National Indian Brotherhood, his efforts at establishing a North American regional branch organization, and his involvement in the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. It is no less true, however, for a man like Niillas Somby who could simultaneously consider himself Sámi, Nuxálk and Indigenous. Indigenous internationalism, therefore, not only created an additional category of identity (Indigenous) it also helped enable Indigenous people to adopt additional overlapping and parallel identities. At the same time, the point should not be overstated, particularly when talking about the consciousness of individuals. On a personal level, Indigenous internationalism became an important part of life for a relatively small number of Indigenous people, and even they likely placed their own particular cultural/ethnic/national identities ahead of any global Indigenous identity. As some scholars of globalization have already noted, “some people see the world as their village” but “most see their village as the world.”

7.2.2 The World Council of Indigenous Peoples and the Movement of Indigenous Internationalism

7.2.2.1 The WCIP and the Politics of Indigenous Rights

The history of the WCIP sheds light on Indigenous politics and Indigenous rights, on the process of decolonization, and on the nature of international organizations. Those men and women who led the World Council conceived of Indigenous politics and Indigenous rights as a complex set of issues, all of which were grounded in their right to self-determination but leaving space for a variety of interpretations of that right. The focus on self-determination was intrinsic to their identification as Indigenous because they defined Indigeneity as the situation of those peoples who were denied the right to self-determination. Many of the peoples represented had other social, cultural, and spiritual characteristics in common, but the basic quality shared by all peoples represented by the WCIP was explicitly political: a history of invasion and oppression. This definition was largely inspired by the decolonization of Africa and Asia. Key individuals like Marie Smallface-Marule and Jimmie Durham recognized that that same process, or at least a variation on that process, could continue elsewhere around the world.

Although the personal histories of every WCIP representative and executive council member cannot be accounted for, there are nevertheless clear similarities between many of the individuals involved that separated them both from the rest of their communities and from the past leaders of their communities. As Chapter Three showed, this (loosely defined) generation of Indigenous activists was particularly influenced by life in the metropole and access to post-secondary education. These experiences helped inspire people from small
communities to see their situation in a broader context, both geographically and politically. This growing level of national (and increasingly international) awareness and political consciousness helped create the opportunity to organize a global movement of Indigenous peoples which had never existed previously. The establishment of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples helped to organize that movement and effectively mobilize the numerical advantages, the intellectual strengths, and the political commitment of the world's Indigenous peoples. Those that became involved were generally excited about the chance to advance the cause of their own people and to lend support to others. Like the cooperation between Clem Chartier and Brooklyn Rivera, the movement of Indigenous internationalism could make its supporters feel like they were part of a larger fight and more powerful than they might have previously imagined. With a World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the oppression and violence that Indigenous peoples faced might not be fully eradicated, but at least it would not go unnoticed. As mentioned above, the multiple overlapping identities required balancing for those involved, but also created a variety of new opportunities for interaction and support. Despite not being a member of the WCIP, Niillas Somby was able to rely on the network of Indigenous activists that the organization had helped create, and to contribute, in his own way, to the struggles of other Indigenous peoples. Moreover, the World Council's efforts in political negotiations and its contributions to the development of international Indigenous law helped, and will continue to help, Indigenous peoples.

7.2.2.2 The WCIP as an International Organization

The structure of the World Council was a source of debate throughout the life of the organization. Owing partly to the prominent role of Canada's National Indian Brotherhood
during the formation of the World Council and the affiliations of the other delegates at the Georgetown preparatory meeting, the organization opted to allot memberships based on nation-state of origin. This was done for the sake of simplicity; to follow the logical progression from national organizations to an international one; to encourage the representation of all Indigenous peoples; and to recognize the *de facto* framework of international law. Moreover, the majority of Indigenous peoples represented by the World Council were not seeking to secede entirely from the nation states within which they resided. The organization was more concerned with challenging the basic concept of complete sovereignty for nation states rather than challenging any individual state's claim to that sovereignty. Therefore, the use of existing nation-states as an organizing structure was not deemed especially problematic. It was, however, subject to later criticism both from outside the organization and from within. It undoubtedly influenced the organization's actions in that it created a vastly greater number of votes for Indigenous peoples in Central and South America. Likewise, the creation of regional sub-branches produced particularly strong organizations in Central and South America that were unmatched in North America, the Pacific, or Asia. Although the World Council might have focused its attention on these regions anyway because of the oppression of Indigenous peoples there, the organization's membership structure likely ensured that it would.

As described in Chapter Four, the WCIP's funding sources did affect its actions, particularly because the overwhelming majority of its funding came from a single source, the Canadian International Development Agency. The early leadership and staff of the World Council and its branch organizations did their best to resist CIDA's push to balance political
advocacy with greater amounts of development work, but over time, the latter became a large part of the WCIP's focus. This work included not just economic development but health promotion, education partnerships, and other projects. The World Council's more political work continued, nonetheless, though it occasionally faced substantial challenges, particularly during the polarized Cold War era, which it was ill-prepared to overcome. The disputes within the WCIP that followed Clem Chartier's clandestine trip across the Nicaraguan border demonstrate that although Indigenous internationalism encouraged people to view the world outside the lens of the US-Soviet conflict, Cold War ideological divisions were strong enough to make that perspective difficult, if not impossible. Nonetheless, the organization did contribute to substantial political accomplishments. From its very founding, the WCIP helped create a sense of global Indigeneity and an associated movement of international Indigenous solidarity. The WCIP directly contributed to this movement through projects and meetings, but its effects extend beyond the organization itself into the network of international Indigenous activists that came to see themselves as linked by a common identity. The World Council raised general awareness about Indigenous peoples' rights, but also helped draw important International attention to specific cases of oppression, such as those in Chile, Argentina, Guatemala and Nicaragua. It also helped achieve a number of more tangible successes for Indigenous peoples, including the revised International Labour Organization's convention on Indigenous peoples, and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In some ways, the increased presence and power of Indigenous peoples at the United Nations was responsible for the collapse of the World Council, but it could also be seen as one of the World Council's greatest legacies.
7.2.3 Final Thoughts

The movement of Indigenous internationalism as conceived by the WCIP should change the way we think about Indigenous peoples and the way we think about internationalism. Indigenous peoples are influenced by their ancestral cultures, their languages and their lands, but they are also cognisant of and take inspiration from broader historical and political shifts like the process of decolonization. Moreover, they not only take inspiration from that process, they can and should be framed as part of the global process of decolonization. Especially when leaders and protests invoke the conception of Indigeneity or Indigenous rights, they are no less global figures or events simply because they demand rights over specific and limited territories. All global shifts are comprised of countless local yet interconnected people and actions, and the movement of Indigenous internationalism is no different. Indigenous history, particularly in the 20th century, must recognize this bigger picture.

Similarly (or perhaps conversely), the history of decolonization and internationalism must not leave out the Indigenous peoples movement and organizations like the WCIP. Not only can the World Council be considered a legacy of African decolonization, it is also a rejoinder to it. Indigenous internationalism challenged any assertion that colonization was something that happened only from overseas, or that decolonization was complete when these transoceanic links were severed. Moreover, it argued that true decolonization does not come about when the colours on the map change, but when the very meaning of the colours is questioned. The World Council of Indigenous Peoples encourages us to think differently not only about the relationship between peoples and states, but also about the relationship
between peoples and international organizations—two areas of history that are rarely combined. International organizations are commonly divided between international governmental organizations (organizations of nation-states, like the United Nations) and non-governmental organizations (organizations of individuals, like Amnesty International), but in which category does an organization of peoples or nations without states belong? And how do nations without states interact with international organizations like the United Nations? These questions merit further research.
Appendix A
List of Acronyms

AIM (American Indian Movement)
AFN (Assembly of First Nations)
ALPROMISU (Alianza para el Progresso del Pueblo Miskito y Sumu)
CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency)
CISA (Consejo Indio de Sud America)
CORPI (Consejo Regional de Pueblos Indígenas / Coordinadora Regional De Pueblos Indios)
ECOSOC (United Nations Economic and Social Council)
FSLN (Frente Sandinista de la Liberación Nacional)
IIITC (International Indian Treaty Council)
INGO (International Non-Governmental Organization)
IWGIA (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs)
KISAN (Kus Indian Sut Asla Nicaragua Ra)
NAC (National Aboriginal Conference)
NAIB (North American Indian Brotherhood)
NARC (North American Regional Council)
NCAI (National Congress of American Indians)
NCC (Native Council of Canada)

NGO (Non-Governmental Organization)

NIB (National Indian Brotherhood)

NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development)

NSC (Nordic Sami Council)

MISATAN (*Miskitu Asla Takanka*)

MISURA (*Miskitu, Sumu, Rama*)

MISURASATA (*Miskitu, Sumu, Rama, Sandinista, Asla Takanka*)

MNC (Métis National Council)

PACIP (Pacific and Asia Council of Indigenous Peoples)

TANU (Tanganyika African National Union)

UBCIC (Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs)

UN-WGIP (United Nations Work Group on Indigenous Populations)

WCIP (World Council of Indigenous Peoples)

YATAMA (*Yapti Tasba Masraka Nani Aslatakanka*)
# Appendix B

## List of WCIP General Assemblies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>President and VPs Elected</th>
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| 1st  | October 27-31 | Tseshaht First Nation (near Port Alberni, Canada) | President: George Manuel  
Secretary General: Sam Deloria                  |
| 2nd  | August 27-28 | Kiruna, Swedish Sápmi                         | President: George Manuel                      |
| 3rd  | April 22-May 2 | Canberra, Australia                           | President: José Carlos Morales Morales  
VP: Melillan Painemal  
VP: Aslak Nils Sara                             |
| 4th  | September 23-30 | Panama City, Panama                           | President: Clem Chartier  
VP: Donald Rojas Maroto  
VP: Pōkā Laenui                                   |
| 5th  | July 11-16 | Lima, Peru                                     | President: Donald Rojas Maroto  
VP: Conrado Jorge Valiente  
VP: Pōkā Laenui                                   |
| 6th  | August 8-12  | Tromsø, Norwegian Sápmi                        | President: Donald Rojas Maroto  
VP: Conrado Jorge Valiente  
VP: John Christopherson                           |
| 7th  | Dec 6-10     | Xelajú (Quetzaltenango), Guatemala            | President: Conrado Jorge Valiente  
VP: Noeli Pocaterra  
VP: Clem Chartier                                  |
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