Securing the Northern Region of Ghana?
Development Aid and Security Interventions

by
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in
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Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including my final revisions, as accepted by the examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.

Eric Obodai Torto
Acknowledgements

If the timeless aphorism that it takes a village to raise a child is valid, then it’s true that, in my case, it takes an entire department, and other networks, to raise a sociologist. There are, however, specific individuals whose sterling contributions to the successful completion of my doctoral program must be recognized.

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For my father and mother, who have always supported my academic pursuits.
Abstract

This dissertation offers a perspective through which we can explore the processes of joint development and security interventions in conflict-prone regions. In employing the experiences of the Northern Region of Ghana as my case study, this thesis examines the ways that the rationales of both development and security interventions are articulated in the field of practice. The central argument of the thesis is that most analyses of aid interventions, particularly those stemming from mainstream development literature, rarely interrogate the underlying rationales and assumptions behind the ideas, strategies and discourses employed in aid intervention. Notably, these rationales and assumptions tend to reduce the complexity of development and security challenges, and, as an end result, facilitate the implementation of technical solutions. The translation of development and security discourses and strategies into programmable practices as they encounter a local population is characterized by complex processes. Following the central argument of the thesis, the key research question interrogates the way that the rationales behind development aid and security interventions have been articulated in conflict-prone Northern Region and how they have been received by the local population. With the overarching aim of understanding the complexities associated with the joint articulation of development and security programmes, this study provides a unique and critical analysis of international development and security practices. The study also provides deeper understanding of the broad socio-economic and political contexts for the delivery of aid interventions. I scrutinise the rationales behind these interventions through the critical examination of colonial practices and three contemporary interventions: 1) Region-wide interventions, 2) the UN Human Security Programme, and 3) Post-liberal interventions used as a panacea to prevailing implementation challenges. Based on the analysis of archival documents, alongside policy, program, and interview documents, my study reveals the ways that the development-security nexus perpetuates liberal practices in the declared conflict-prone Northern Region of Ghana. I also evaluate the way that the development-security nexus reconstitutes individuals as resilient subjects through practices of empowerment and entrepreneurialism, and demonstrates the contestations, contradictions, and colonial features that characterise interventions in the field of articulation.
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Agricultural Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BWIs</td>
<td>Bretton Wood Institutions</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CLIP</td>
<td>Community Life Improvement Project</td>
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<td>CWSA</td>
<td>Community Water and Sanitation Agency</td>
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<td>DSN</td>
<td>Development-Security Nexus</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organisation</td>
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<td>GHANEP</td>
<td>Ghana Network for Peacebuilding</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German International Development</td>
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<td>GLSS</td>
<td>Ghana Living Standard Survey</td>
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<td>GoG</td>
<td>Government of Ghana</td>
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<td>GSGDA</td>
<td>Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>ISODEC</td>
<td>Integrated Social Development Centre</td>
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<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>KOYA</td>
<td>Konkomba Youth Association</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Food and Agriculture</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBSSI</td>
<td>National Board for Small-Scale Industries</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for African Development</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Liberation Council</td>
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<td>NLM</td>
<td>National Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>NORRIP</td>
<td>Northern Region Integrated Rural Project</td>
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<td>NORYDA</td>
<td>Northern Region Youth Development Association</td>
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<td>NPP</td>
<td>Northern Peoples Party</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Redemption Council</td>
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<td>NRGP</td>
<td>Northern Rural Growth Project</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers</td>
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<td>SADA</td>
<td>Savannah Accelerated Development Authority</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>SMC</td>
<td>Supreme Military Council</td>
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<td>SSA</td>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
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<td>TAMA</td>
<td>Tamale Metropolitan Assembly</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UN FTHS</td>
<td>United Nations Fund Trust for Human Security</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organisation</td>
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<td>UN JHSP</td>
<td>United Nations Joint Human Security Programme</td>
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<td>UNU</td>
<td>United Nations University</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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WTO  World Trade Organisation
Chapter One
Introduction and Methodology

This dissertation focuses on the Northern Region of Ghana in order to critically examine the joint articulation of development and security interventions by development aid actors in a post-conflict region. Critical focal areas of examination are the rationales and assumptions that underpin the strategies and discourses of aid and security interventions. The central argument of the thesis is that most analyses of aid interventions, particularly those stemming from mainstream development literature, rarely interrogate the underlying rationales and assumptions behind the ideas, strategies and discourses of interventions. Notably, these rationales and assumptions tend to reduce the complexity of development and security challenges, and thereby facilitate the institutionalization of technical solutions. Furthermore, the translation of development and security discourses and strategies into programmable practices as they encounter a local population are characterized by complex processes.

Following the central argument of the thesis, the key research question examines the ways that the rationales behind development aid and security interventions are articulated in the conflict-prone Northern Region and received by the local population. The study draws and expands on Duffield’s critical perspective on the development-security nexus as a theoretical framework to examine joint interventions. Furthermore, in relation to the independent concepts of development and security, I again draw on work of scholars, including Ferguson, Mosse, and Chandler.

The empirical analysis is based on case studies of aid programmes articulated predominantly in communities of Tamale, the regional capital, as well as Yendi. The analysis also benefits from discourse analysis, namely in terms of the documents aid agencies have
published relating to the Northern Region. This chapter takes the following format: first, I situate my research, and then examine the scope and significance of my study. A section that recounts my research methodology follows, and finally I summarize the chapters that constitute this thesis.

**Situating My Research**

The international development policy directions and priorities have taken a new path from one that calls for humanitarian assistance through relief aid in conflict-ridden societies toward attempting to secure post-conflict societies. The move to secure post-conflict societies has been configured through the articulation of complementary and coordinated development and security interventions (Heathershaw, 2008). Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah (2010) posit that the need for stabilization has necessitated the integration of both development and security interventions in post-conflict, recovery societies. Following the need to secure post-conflict societies is the shift in the meaning of security that has placed the human being in a central, pivotal role. Mahub-ul Haq redefines human security to reflect a new notion of security and argues that: “the world is entering a new era in which the very concept of security will change-and change dramatically. Security will be interpreted as: security of people, not just territory. Security of individuals, not just nations. Security through development, not through arms. Security of all the people everywhere - in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, in their environment” (Haq, 1995, p. 115). The attempted fusion of security and development interventions is evident in the UNDP’s broad notion of security. Thus, the UNDP’s framing of security encapsulates human development components, specifically in reference to needs. A call for a joint articulation of security and development interventions
within the UN aid system and other bilateral/multilateral institutions led Duffield (2001) to frame the development-security nexus (DSN) as a new intervention lexicon in conflict and post-conflict societies. Conceptually, the DSN is an integrative framework for the articulation of joint development and security interventions, with a goal of securing a conflict-prone region. In my view, it is imperative to examine the underlying logic that translates the DSN into concrete programs and strategies intended to secure conflict-ridden regions. Another issue worthy of consideration is whether or not this reciprocal relationship between development and security exists at the operational and institutional levels. Evidence from this study indicates an overwhelming absence of congruent working interactions between development and security actors. An important conclusion drawn from this study is that the alleged nexus between diverse aid actors in a conflict-prone region is a fiction, and that, in actual practice, this absence perpetrates autonomous ‘business as usual’ practices.

The World Bank, in its World Development Report entitled *Conflict, Security and Development* and published in 2011, describes the reciprocal relationship between security and development, but more importantly, it foregrounds a ‘new’ area of intervention as its core. The central message for the prevention of conflict and the enhancement of security exhibits a desire to begin: “strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice and jobs [as a] crucial to break cycles of violence” (p. 2). From my perspective, such predetermined remedial measures to end violence and insecurity in various forms pose legitimate concerns in regards to the ways in which problems have been framed in the first place. A problematic notion embedded in these kinds of calculated declaratory statements is the presupposition that aid agencies can know the precise causes of security and development problems. The framing of existing international aid interventions as new universal blueprints
for homogenized conflict prone regions tends to foreclose alternative options. This continuous interventionist interest is reflected in the report’s first declared track of international action, that is “preventing repeated cycles of violence by investing in citizen security, jobs and justice” (p. 270). The other declared intervention area relates to administrative reforms that will aid in expediting the pace of delivery. From my perspective, the omission of the rationale and assumptions behind proposed interventions signifies a research gap that must be filled. The report gives the impression that external interventions are objectively neutral, trans-ideological, necessary and desirable for security and development improvements within developing countries.

The 2011 World Development Report (hereafter designated as the ‘2011 Report’), however, did not provide any critical, introspective analysis of the past program failures apart from a reference to administrative reforms and the need for the proper sequencing of interventions. I suggest that the importance given to administrative reforms will serve to simplify the complex security and development problems in order to foist a universally-imagined technical, timeless solution on the region. Further scrutiny suggests that a liberal ideological and positivistic epistemological and ontological perspective heavily influenced the 2011 Report. The dominance of a liberal orientation in the 2011 Report necessitates the interrogation of rationales and assumptions about interventions undertaken in the name of the DSN. Furthermore, these liberal interventions that were prioritized by the 2011 Report are essentially the recycling of old practices that precede conception of the DSN. In this vein, the UNJHSP is an embodiment of the DSN, and, as will be discussed in Chapter five, this DSN is a replication of existing international development frameworks. An analysis, therefore, must be conducted at all levels of the process, from the source of the ideas to the labeling and framing
practices put in use. More importantly, the exploration of the rationales and assumptions that underlie interventions and their reception by the target population in the localities needs to be examined.

The coming into vogue of a conflict prevention notion as a precondition for poverty reduction tends to forge reciprocal linkages between security and development issues by the aid industry. Picciotto claims that “development has always been viewed as dependent on adequate security conditions, but a causal two-way causal connection has not been established” (2006, p.114). The interventionist policy implications are that, notwithstanding the absence of empirical evidential causal relations between security and development, the fusion of the two concepts is deemed to have instrumental relevance. The study’s findings suggest that an attempt to draw causal connections between security and development interventions is a restrictive exercise. Furthermore, the bounded notion of the DSN suggests that it can only be used as an attempt to regulate society. The DSN, however, does not constitute a dependable theoretical and empirical framework to initiate transformational strategies to secure a post-colonial region like the Northern Region.

An acclaimed interest in tackling global poverty and conflicts has led to the adoption of the DSN as an interventionist lexicon within the donor community. The UN Report (2004) from the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, notes that:

Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding-ground for other threats, including civil conflict. Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their governments help
poor countries to defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals. (p. 9)

This UN report aims to attach a reciprocal relationship between security and development, which raises a vital question about the authenticity of the ‘newness’ of these twin phenomena. Significantly, the framing of the ‘newness’ problem has become the established interventionist orthodoxy of the aid industry. The questionable authenticity of the ‘newness’ tag stems from the fact that the dual challenges endemic to security and development are hardly evidenced by their colonial antecedents.

A crucial note here is that the disappointing outcomes of the past development aid interventions continue to re-occur under the rubric of the current DSN. Bain (2007), Richmond (2011), and Denney (2011) attest to the failures associated to the DSN interventions that have been blamed on the instrumental liberal orientation of the joint articulation of the proposed interventions. Denney (2011, p. 290), in her work related to the DFID post-conflict interventions in Sierra Leone, posits that the poverty reduction expected to follow the intensive Security Sector Reforms did not materialize because the country’s PRSP strategies were too broad and not deep enough to address the structural bottlenecks. Particularly, this study suggests that by limiting focus to the outcomes of PRSPs, for instance, and without questioning the technical solutions proffered, the complex relational dynamics that undergird the problems will be obscured. The findings of the study suggest that interventionist rationales and assumptions are factors that ensure the silencing of relational factors used to perpetuate a technocratic orientation of programs. As indicated above, there have been significant instrumental critiques dealing with the DSN, but an area that remains under-researched relates directly to the ideas, rationales and assumptions of security and development interventions as
well as the relational factors the DSN has to contend with. Also under researched is the way interventions play out empirically on the field of practice.

The main task of this study, therefore, is to examine the intervention rationales, assumptions and relational factors that are dearth in the DSN literature. My study is grounded on the position that the site of intervention is not merely an object amenable for perpetual manipulation. International development aid interventions constitute the interplay of an intervener over an intervened population. The term ‘intervened population’ is used to denote the aid agencies prioritization of individuals as the focal point of development and security. The implication of this ‘human’ dimension of interventions is that an examination of external aid interventions must not be limited to the viewpoint of the intervener, a viewpoint that has been the most frequent area of research conducted particularly by international relations scholars such as Bain (2007) and MacGinty (2010). MacGinty (2010, p. 398) argues for aid agencies to move away from ‘best practices,’ and take into consideration the urgent necessity for aid agencies working in conflict regions to embrace hybridization. Further, MacGinty deems hybridization a precondition for the successful implementation of aid interventions. The study findings, however, suggest that the mere recognition of a need for hybridization does not necessarily provide a framework to understanding the complexities inherent in the articulation of aid interventions. A vital discovery elucidated in my research is that the diverse ethnic groups and disparate polities do not lend themselves to smooth instrumental hybridity. The competing, diverse polities of ethnic groups are situated within the broader complex and adverse colonial and post-colonial relational (social and political) context in which the Northern Region is placed.
An important issue to note is that the Northern Region constitutes the epicenter of conflict and insecurity in Ghana. This observation is attested to by the UN FTHS (2009) which states that, for the period 1980-2002, the Northern Region alone accounted for 19 out of 26 of the major conflicts that occurred in the entire three regions in Northern Ghana. Furthermore, Ahorsu and Gebe (2011) note that, since the inception of the 1992 4th republican constitution of Ghana, the Northern Region has remained a security and governance challenge not only to the rest of the nation but also to the entire West African sub-region. Major conflicts in the Northern Region have been predominantly chieftaincy-related, and have involved boundary disputes among different ethnic groups. Since 1994, the year that recorded the highest number of casualties in the history of the region and the country, the thorniest conflict has been the Dagbon crisis.

The Dagbon crisis is an inter-dynasty/intra-ethnic chieftaincy succession dispute between the only two eligible gates, the Abudus and Andanis. The Dagbon conflict also resulted in a regicide in 2002, when the Ya-Na, Yakubu Andani, was murdered alongside many of his supporters by the Abudu faction, as has been reported by the Wuaku Commission (Government of Ghana, 2003). The three day conflict (March 22-25, 2002) occurred in Yendi, which is the traditional capital of the Dagombas, and the location of the Gbewaa Palace. The conflict later extended to Tamale, which is inhabited mainly by the Andani faction, and all in all several villages were destroyed as noted by Seini and Tsikata (2004). The government imposed a state of emergency on Tamale and Yendi in order to mitigate the violence, a situation that finally ended in August 2004. My contention is that the state of emergency fundamentally served as a crisis management option because the state did not pursue long-term structural and institutional measures in order to engage the underlying factors of the conflict.
Moreover, the seriousness of the Dagbon crisis relates to three critical factors. First, the Dagombas, based on the 2010 national census, comprise at least 40% of the entire population of Northern Region. With this high population of Dagombas divided along the two main gates, the security of the nation was compromised. Tamale, the administrative, commercial and financial capital of the study region, and Yendi constitute the region’s development hub. The conflicts, according to McGaffey (2006), have left the two areas at a developmental standstill, resulting in negative implications for the entire region. Thirdly, the Dagbon crisis, more than any other conflict in the country, has captured the national political consciousness. To be more specific, the Andani are perceived to be sympathetic towards the ruling government, the National Democratic Congress. On the other hand, the Abudus are perceived to be aligned with the New Patriotic Party the most dominant opposition political party (Tonah, 2012). The infiltration of national partisan politics has contributed significantly to the unending nature of the Dagbon crisis. The absence of serious security enforcement by the various governments is made worse by their failure to fully and comprehensively implement the various recommendations proposed by the commissions of inquiries as a road-map to find lasting solutions.

Succession disputes are rooted in both pre-colonial and post-colonial history of the various ethnic groups involved. The 2002 regicide, according to the Wuaku Commission, is traced to 1967, following the death of Ya-Na Abdulai. An essential trigger in the conflict is the reinterpretation of succession rules. The 1930 succession format which, according to Ferguson and Wilks (1970), was an integral part of the Dagomba constitution, limited eligibility for the position of Ya-Na to three main dukedoms: Mion, Savelugu and Karaga. With the pursuit of a new colonial policy of election of officers to administer the local councils, however, the Abudu
gate petitioned the Dagbon Council in May 1948 and advocated for an election to the position of Ya-Na by a small committee of elders (MacGaffey, 2006, p. 82). The Andanis, however, rejected this Abudu proposal on the grounds that it was inconsistent with their traditions. Furthermore, the Andanis viewed this election proposal as a way for the Abudus to dominate the Na-ship, because the majority of chiefs that would elect the Ya-Na were aligned with the Abudus. The election proposal bid by the Abudus did not take effect until 1954 following the death of the Ya-Na, Mahama (Abudu). Staniland (1975) notes that, contrary to the procedure in place that required the eligible successor to be a chief of one of the three dukedoms, this time around, this strict rule was side stepped when the regent, Gbonlana Abdulai, was elected as the new Ya-Na. The Andanis felt short-changed by the enskinnment of Abdulai, and this instigated a series of violent conflicts and petitioned the Dagon State Council to reverse the enskinnment. In search of a solution, the Andani leadership, alleged to have close ties with the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) government, appealed to the government to de-skin Ya-Na Abdulai. The CPP government did not approve to this request for de-skinntment, but rather constituted a commission of inquiry chaired by Justice Opoku-Afari to investigate the Andani petition and recommend measures to restore the rotational system between the two gates. The committee established that the Andanis had been denied their turn to occupy the Na-Ship, and therefore recommended that, upon the death of the then Ya-Na Abdulai, the next two Ya-Nas must be enskinned from the Andani gate to atone for the previous anomaly. The government passed Legislative Instrument 59 in 1960 to restore the rotational system between the two gates.

Upon the death of the Ya-Na Abdulai in 1967, the enforcement of Legislative Instrument 59 was met with fierce contestation between the regent, Gbonlana Muhammed, and
the Mion-Lana Andani. In 1968, the Mion-Lana Andani was enskinned as the new Ya-Na, but, as noted by Ferguson and Wilks (1970) and Staniland (1975), the Abudus consistently challenged the legitimacy and authority of Ya-Na Andani. The Abudus ultimately laid their grievances before the new government, the United Progress Party, as a last option to depose Ya-Na Andani. In response to the Abudus’s petition, the government of the United Progress Party instituted an investigative committee, chaired by Mate-Kole, to inquire into their grievances. This Mate-Kole Committee faulted Legislative Instrument 59, and therefore nullified the Na-ship of Andani. In 1974, however, the new military government, the National Redemption Council (NRC), based on series of petitions from the Andanis, established a committee headed by Justice Ollenu to inquire into the issues between the two groups. The Ollenu Committee overturned the findings of the Mate-Kole committee and restored Legislative Instrument 59. With the new ruling, Ya-Na Mahamadu Abdulai was de-skinned and Yakubu Andani was enskinned as the new Ya-Na. But the contestations from the Abudu end continued (MacGaffey, 2006). In 1986, the contestations between the two gates were referred to the Supreme Court, and by a 6-1 decision, judgment was made in favor of the Andanis. The Supreme Court ruling, however, was rejected by the Abudus who felt that the government had influenced the ruling. Abudu dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court ruling rather intensified the tension and violence between the two gates. In the end, the military intervened to quell the hostilities, but the underlying grievances and motivations behind the hostilities were left unaddressed.

The death of the deskinned Ya-Na Mahamadu Abdulai in 1988 exacerbated the tension due to the entrenched positions taken by both gates in the interpretation of their traditions. The Andanis objected to Abdulai’s burial in the Gbewaa palace on the grounds that he died outside
the palace, and his burial was thus against the Dagbon tradition. On the other hand, the Abudus insisted that he died as a Ya-Na, and was hence entitled to a royal burial. As of today, this burial conundrum has yet to be resolved and thus remains a possible source of conflict as suggested by the Wuaku Commission. Furthermore, the challenge to Ya-Na Yakubu Andani’s kingship continued and, by 2002, these contestations had become intense. It has been alleged that the Abudus were energized when the New Patriotic Party government assumed office, because they had made an electoral promise to de-skin Ya-Na Yakubu Andani. In one instance, MacGaffey (2006) notes how the Abudus organized their version of the Bugum festival under the protection of state security in order to undermine the authority of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani. A curfew was imposed in Yendi, but the regional minister, in a unilateral decision, lifted the curfew and violent conflict that ensued for three days began. During the conflict, Ya-Na Yakubu Andani was killed.

The political opportunism of the various governments and the northern political elites has played a significant role in perpetuating the unending conflicts of the Dagbon Crisis. The Wuaku Commission, which was mandated to investigate the regicide, blamed past governments and individuals from both gates who had ties to the government for their complicity in the Dagbon crisis. The Wuaku Commission also identified pervasive poverty and the structural underdevelopment of the Northern Region as major factors that predisposed the Dagbon to. In search for a road map to restore peace, the two gates in Dagbon and the New Patriotic Party government, with technical support from the UNDP, formed a Committee of Eminent Chiefs to work on modalities to achieve peace. This Committee of Eminent Chiefs worked through dialogue and negotiation processes and, in 2006, arrived at five benchmarks for peace and security. These benchmarks are as follows: i) the burial of the late Ya Na Andani
the installation of the regent of the late king; iii) the performance of the funeral of the deposed Ya Na Mahamadu Abdulai IV; iv) the performance of the funeral of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II; and v) the selection and enskinnenment of a new Ya Na for Dagbon (Tonah, 2012, p. 10). In terms of implementation of these benchmarks, only the first two had been implemented as of September 2013.

Because the Committee of Eminent chiefs did not provide an acceptable framework that dealt with the root cause(s) of the Dagbon crisis, implementing the other three benchmarks will be difficult. Mutual mistrust between the two gates has significantly contributed to sustain the tension. In 2011, the Abudu leadership suspected the Andani faction to be stock-piling arms in preparation to appoint new chiefs for the skins, and wrote a petition to the President of Ghana. In that letter, the Abudu leadership states: “This is a recipe for conflict in Dagbon. Neither the Kug-Na nor the Kampakuya-Na has power to authorize any regent to perform his deceased father’s funeral. Any attempt by the Kampakuya-Na or his agents to appoint a chief to skins currently occupied by regents from the Abudu Gate, will be fiercely resisted” (Ghanaian Chronicle, October 21, 2011). The cumulative effect of this situation is that the Dagbon crisis is still raging, notwithstanding numerous interventions.

In the wake of the failure to resolve the Dagbon crisis, and against the backdrop of numerous inter-ethnic conflicts and the endemic poverty in the Northern Region, the UN JHSP has adopted the human security framework as a remedial measure. The human security framework constitutes one of the frameworks of the DSN. The UN JHSP has adopted Tamale and Yendi as sites of intervention, with the expectation that the programs will be extended to other conflict districts in the coming years. The UN JHSP comprises six UN agencies: the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the World Food Program (WFP), United Nations University (UNU) and the United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF). It is worthwhile to note that security interventions by these aid agencies have been on-going in the region since the Konkomba-Nanumba, Dagomba and Gonja War in 1994. An important finding of my study is that the UNJHSP security interventions, as with those development interventions, are very much akin to the 1994 conflict resolution interventions as discussed in chapter four.

The apparent unending insecurity related tensions and poverty conditions, in my judgment, raise questions about how aid interventions were, and are, dispensed. These questions are further buoyed by mainstream literature, such as work by Sachs (2005) and Paris (2010) who view development and security challenges as technical problems that can be solved by silencing the historical, and social-relational dimensions at work in the study region. The likely effect of these liberal-oriented mainstream beliefs is that short-term technical solutions are prescribed and conceptualized, instead of long-term approaches being considered to address the to address a complex set of interlocking problems. It is necessary, therefore, to undertake a critical discourse analysis (which includes relational aspects) of security and development interventions that incorporates the region’s development history. A critical discourse analysis will entail an examination of the pertinent social-relational processes that underpin nascent poverty reduction strategies. The choice of region for the focus of my study is to provide historical context/background and social relations dynamics that are deficient in a joint articulation of development and security interventions. It is my contention that insights into the social relations of the DSN will bridge the ahistorism and depoliticization that have characterized the mainstream development and security literature.
The choice of the Northern Region as the study region provides both conceptual and empirical bases to assess whether the normative DSN functions an appropriate framework to secure the conflict-prone region. A major finding of my study reveals the inability of international aid interventions to transform poverty, conflict and insecurity conditions in the region. This inability on the part of the aid industry to secure the region gives ample justification to seriously engage the rationales and assumptions that underpin international aid practices.

There is a paucity of literature on the region that fully examines the fusion of development and security interventions in the Northern Region. Oelbaum (2010) attempts to draw a reciprocal linkage between spatial poverty and ethnic conflict traps in the region, occasioned by the implementation of SAP. His work provides useful insight about the need for aid agencies to avoid the fallacy of unit universalization in conflict risk assessment. He (2010) further proposes that serious considerations be accorded to politico-institutional issues as well as to prioritizing the political center before embarking on economic reforms. Oelbaum’s (2010) work, however, remains an analytical piece. The absence of empirical research denies us an understanding of the unavoidable complicated processes, contradictions and critical interrogations of programme rationales and assumptions. On methodological grounds, his analytical work relies extensively on policy documents and official data that do not capture the intricate process of intervention. Oelbaum’s (2010, p. 6) suggestion that political reforms are inevitable preconditions for successful economic reforms is suggestive of highly unfounded faith placed in the formal institutionalist logic by instrumentally driven development scholars such as Fukuyama. This institutionalist logic finds expression in the good governance policy prescriptions for SSA countries. But Kelsall et.al (2010), and Grindle (2010) note that the high
expectations on the part of the aid industry for good governance have not translated into projected outcomes in most SSA countries. Grindle (2010) displays a limited theoretical understanding on the part of the aid agencies of the diverse political systems in SSA countries as one of the factors responsible for the failures. I will add that the aid industry’s belief in ‘best practices,’ that are undergirded by the simplistic assumption of the easy transferability of such best practices could also explain program failures.

A questionable inference derived from Oelbaum’s institutionalist logic is the assumption that successful economic reforms are guaranteed by sound institutions, and translate into effective politics. The issue of political settlement has become a crucial area for serious consideration in view of Northern Region’s adverse reaction to incorporation as part of Ghana’s state formation. Political settlements refer to continuous formal and informal institutional processes to create responsive and representative state-society relations.

Based on my research findings, the failure of aid interventions to achieve their stated goals lies with the driving rationales and the assumptions of liberal institutionalism. This liberal institutionalism points to the need for research that will instigate a new kind of thinking that recognizes the complex nature of multiple polities in the region.

In order for my study to critically interrogate numerous aid interventions, it will be necessary to move away from a one-sided analysis of the aid agencies perspectives, and move towards a much more complex view which examines relational practices and reflects upon interactions between an intervener and the intervened in a differentiated population. The people of the Northern Region differ in terms of their ancestral origins, and social and political traditions for rule-making, meaning making and relations building, and also along linguistic and historical lines. From my perspective, the extent to which the differences between the
people of the Northern Region play out as they encounter the aid interventions will provide insights into the shortcomings in the intervention programmes. Studying the way aid interventions are encountered in the social and political systems of the localities is a way to demonstrate the indeterminacy of aid processes involved. More particularly, this kind of interactional study will illuminate the inadequacy of positivistic-oriented liberal logics as they function in a post-colonial Northern Region. Pursuit of this relational-oriented study, in effect, problematizes the calcified apolitical technical solutions that reduce the complexity of the intervention.

To facilitate a critical social relational study, I conceive of the aid industry as a generator of protectorates. A protectorate as defined by Mayall and de Oliveria is a “form of governance shaping the lives, at least in the medium term, of those under their aegis” (2011, p. 3). In my view, this definition of a protectorate as proffered by Mayall and de Oliveria appears neutral and unproblematic. If we consider the historical formation of the Northern Region, I view protectorates as deliberate and contradictory processes of governing communities in line with the priorities of the interveners and against the will of a significant number of the intervened population. The most likely outcome of pursuing these kinds of programs is that interventions will be writ large with irreconcilable contestations with positive outcomes.

It is important to recognize that, for successful creation of protectorates, problems must be framed as new to warrant reformatted forms of intervention. The renewed intervention strategically delinks the historical past from the present. Against the backdrop of the conflict and poverty conditions dating from the colonial era, my study therefore challenges aid industry’s framing of security and development problems in developing countries as new post-cold war problems. The elimination of the historical development policies and practices, in my
thinking, is a credibility enhancement strategy to waive the complicity of the interveners in the production and perpetuation of the problems in the conflict-ridden region. Chapter 3 of this dissertation highlights the long historical processes of the conflict, insecurity and developmental challenges in the region. An attempt to frame these challenges as new and urgent problems ends up simplifying the complex issues involved, with the objective of institutionalizing quick-fix solutions.

In order to create new protectorates, the aid industry deploys spin control mechanisms to justify its practices. As noted by Easterly (2005), the aid industry ignores their own past failed interventions with the likely tendency to replicate old approaches to solve an acclaimed new problem. A confirmation of these recycled interventions is evidenced in the discussions in chapters five and six. Chapter five reveals that the human security strategy of the UN JHSP, touted as a transformational framework, is actually driven primarily by the existing dominant frameworks. These dominant frameworks are the Poverty Reduction Strategic Papers (PRSPs), the frameworks of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and those put forward by the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD). Not only is the human security driven by existing dominant international development frameworks, its practices are articulated through capacity building, and community oriented approaches of empowerment and participation.

Moreover, the aid industry, as a creator and regulator of new protectorates, thrives on the imposition of external ideas that are framed as universal blueprints. This marks aid practices as intentional external interventionist activities. Noticeable on the international aid landscape is the prescription of wide-ranging universal solutions anchored around empowerment, participation, good governance, capacity building and microfinance. Through such predetermined solutions, the aid industry poses as a benign enterprise with a genuine
intention to secure the lives of the disparate poor and vulnerable. I strongly suggest, however, that the aid industry is not a neutral entity, and this fact suggests that any intervention on their part must be scrutinized thoroughly in order to tease out the real interventionist logics.

As an external interventionist practice, my study reveals that the aid industry is imbued with its unique ontological, epistemological and ideological viewpoints which underwrite the policies, programmes and projects that are imposed on framed ‘objects’. My research also demonstrates that the intervened-upon society has its unique and diverse spatio-temporal features. The intervened-upon society and population are far from being mere objects with no history, cultural worldview, meaning making, rule-making or social relational systems. The vitality of the intervened population makes it a legitimate area of investigation regarding its encounter with the international aid interveners.

An interrogation of the mainstream development aid practitioners and development scholars such as Collier (2007) continues to conceive of the aid industry interventions as development assistance or development cooperation. In this respect, I deem that an interrogation of the rationales and assumptions that inform the policies and programmes of the aid industry as critical research pillars of my thesis. In classifying the aid industry as an interventionist enterprise, this thesis adopts a critical development-security nexus perspective to provide insight into the empirical manifestations of aid interventions. Benevolent assumptions about interventionist practices must be subjected to critical scrutiny in order to expose their congenital contradictions. Notable among these ‘benign’ assumptions are the right to intervene, the necessity for intervention and desirability of the region to intervention.

Following the above discussions that underpin the central research argument, the main research question for my study has been formulated. I ask; How are the rationales of
development aid and security interventions articulated by the aid agencies and received by the local population in conflict prone Northern Region? This key research question is vital to expose the actors, processes, imaginations and complex natures of the local setting, which makes direct interventions problematic. Through my key research question, the inevitable imbalances in power relations rife in interventions and the neglected social relational factors that defy interventionist rationales will be laid bare. Power relations and contestations are inevitable between aid institutions and actors, government agencies, and the heterogeneous local population. Secondary to the central research question, another important question is formulated as: How and in what ways are security and poverty framed by development aid practitioners and local actors in Ghana? In policy-oriented literature, interventions are treated as neutral or scientific practices that provide universal solutions as evidenced in the prescriptions embodied in the SAP and the MDGs. My study suggests that framing processes are vital to the understanding of aid interventions. It is necessary to interrogate the framing vectors and avoid the fiction that interventions are neutral or objective practices.

Another set secondary questions examined in this study asks to what extent are the poverty reduction programs addressing the security challenges in the Northern Region of Ghana? And what are the specific operational and institutional challenges associated with the joint implementation of poverty reduction and security programs in Northern Region of Ghana? The essence of the first question is to problematize the interdependent relationship between poverty and security as conceived of by the DSN and thereby illuminate the broader relational factors at play. The second question provides insight into whether the DSN works empirically or just as an idealized imagination. Finally, an examination of the implementation challenges will provide information about the likely policy ramifications.
The ultimate objective of this study is to deepen our understanding of the complexities of development aid that has been geared toward poverty reduction in the conflict-sensitive area of the Northern Region. Notably, the study region has been engulfed in intractable ethnic conflict for at least four centuries and constitutes one of the top three poor regions in the country. The Northern Region is also a hub of international development aid and security interventions in Ghana. It is of the highest importance to conduct this research considering the pertinent contextual factors and my quest for a deeper understanding of the complexities in aid delivery practices in the region.

Scope and Significance of study

Development and security interventions that have been undertaken by the networked aid industry entail diverse practices of conceptualization, imagination and ideologies that are further underpinned by rationales and assumptions. These practices frame the programmes and projects that come face-to-face with post-colonial sites of intervention. Various historical and social relations influence and continue to shape interactions between the interveners and the intervened-upon population.

This study contributes to the critical development and security literature of the aid industry. Stewart (2009) and Kliengebiel (2006), from a progressive standpoint, advocate for the adoption of DSN as an interventionist model for the recovery and transformation of post-conflict regions. Such prescriptive assertions do not provide grounded conceptual and empirical insights into how and what programmes and projects are articulated in the name of development and security on the ground. My study contributes to providing empirical insights into the actual practices and processes of aid interventions. My study also brings the
problematic instrumental mobilization of development and security as a panacea to secure post-conflict and postcolonial society to the forefront of aid discussions. A major finding of my research exposes the contestable processes of the articulation of the interventions under the guise of the constructed DSN. A very important finding of my study is the gross inadequacy of the DSN as model/framework to address the intractable development and security challenges in the Northern Region. The failure of the UN JHSP in particular to secure the localities of intervention and the region as a whole suggests the need to examine the liberal logics that drive the programme.

The significance of my study is the way it exposes the conceptual and empirical weaknesses of interventionist tropes such as capacity building, empowerment and participation approaches that form the core activities of UNJHSP as well as the other aid agencies discussed in chapter four. Another revelation my study highlights is that the employment of the DSN framework to transform a conflict prone region maintains the short-term and narrow interventions in the region, thereby institutionalizing a status quo policy regime. My study is significant because it provides a lens through which to interrogate on-going security considerations, conflicts and development strategies as the underlying framework for post-2015 development agendas by the UN and its aid industry acolytes.

This study’s significance is in the revelation that the pursuit of the DSN is a strategy to promote crisis management practices through the neoliberal-oriented interventions. On the basis of information received during my fieldwork, I posit that the prevailing interventions deliberately seek to produce self-reliant individuals against inevitable threats, rather than focusing on the transformation of people and the society at large. Because this study is informed by critical political economy considerations and historical background, it highlights a
way to move beyond the narrow DSN framework toward an exploration of the social-relational approach and its role in the in the quest for long-term transformational or emancipatory goals. In addition, my research brings a critical relational perspective that is missing in the DSN literature, and provides a more complex formula for solutions than that reinvented by interventionist rationales and assumptions. Significantly, the study provides legitimate groundwork to move away from stylized understandings of the imagined nexus to interrogate the actual discourses and practices of development aid actors.

Another significant intervention in my study is its contribution to the bourgeoning literature on resilience as an integral part of the interventionist rationality of practices in post-conflict societies. Following Lentzos and Rose (2009), resilience is defined as “….a systematic, widespread, organizational, structural and personal strengthening of subjective and material arrangements so as to be better able to anticipate and tolerate disturbances in complex worlds without collapse, to withstand shocks, and to rebuild as necessary” (p. 243). From the context of the development and security literature, Chandler (2012), based on an analytical study of the “Responsibility to Protect’ orientation of human security, suggests that resilience functions as a new DSN framework. However, my empirical findings suggest that resilience is driven by the same failed rationales and assumptions that ground aid interventions. From my perspective, resilience is a tactic to perpetuate the interventionist assumptions and rationales, a fact that certainly calls for critical examination of new aid frameworks. Thus, resilience has become a tactic to re-enact human agency as the main instrument for social change, independent of prevailing structural and institutional conditions. Essentially, the recourse to resilience effectively consolidates the problematization of the local as the source of conflict, thus normalizing the failed assumptions and rationales that ground aid and security
interventions. A vital implication of adoption of a resilience approach is to further add to the complexity reduction mission of the aid industry. This complexity reduction initiative, based on the study’s findings, is precipitated by a negation of historical context, the global political economy, and the structural and domestic factors that shape development and security problems. Furthermore, renewed faith in a resilience framework, based on the findings, indicates that long-term transformational development of post-conflict societies is not a consideration for international development actors. Hence, securing a region through the DSN is highly impossible, and this impossibility has the tendency to institutionalize failure that results in the instigation of a formulation of ‘new’ or recycled approaches. My study confirms that if there is an incipient shift in the meaning of security, individual empowerment will result in a decrease in risks and threats. The new understanding of security is markedly different from the UNDP’s concept of security as ‘freedom from fear and want’. The adoption of this resilience approach is situated within the context of an overwhelming emphasis on the adaptability and flexibility of individuals as precondition for security. My study concludes that the adoption of resilience framework in the wake of colossal failures in securing the region is an attempt to normalize problems and maintain the prevailing unequal and contentious social relational order.

A significant element of this study involves the addition of a regional dimension to the critical development and security literature. The literature on conflict and development indicates that there is an overwhelming emphasis placed on broad conflicts at the state/national level with less emphasis on local and regional or non-state conflicts. This overriding focus on state-level crises, according to Fukudar-Parr, Ashwill, Chiappa and Messineo (2008), might result in a conflagration of existing regional-based conflicts. The lack of attention given to the
framed non-state conflicts can be attributed to the narrow conventional definitions of war, which is primarily centered on contested combat against the state (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2008, p. 2). My study aims to fill this regional gap in both the mainstream and critical literature, especially analyzed from the perspective of a postcolonial region. From my perspective, this study will provide a solid nuanced understanding of conflict at the micro and local levels in terms of how everyday struggles are generated and sustained. This will provide a better prism for interpreting the wider processes of development and security relations toward poverty reduction.

**Methodological Approach- Qualitative Case Study and Field Methods**

In order to capture the inherently complex and contested processes of aid interventions, I adopt a qualitative case study approach. Peck and Theodore (2011, 2012) note that in the mutations of mobile policies in practical economies, “beliefs and behaviours of policy actors are constitutively embedded within networks of knowledge expertise (many of which are trans-local and trans-scalar), as well as within localized socio-institutional milieu. Policy designs, technologies, and frames are likewise regarded as complex and evolving social constructions rather than as concretely fixed objects” (2012, p. 23). The crux of this statement is that international development practices involve policy formulation and programming processes that are reflective of the standpoints of the actors involved, who represent institutional interests and worldviews. It was necessary, therefore, to interview the core actors in the aid industry in order to have a better understanding discourses, ideas and frameworks that drive interventions. My methodological perspective is guided by my belief that a focus on development outcomes
without any sort of corresponding engagement with aid actors to seek clarification of the processes is not productive research.

From my methodological perspective, the intervention site of the Northern Region is an unpredictable, unstable and chaotic region that generates various kinds of negotiated orders, accommodations, oppositions, separations and contradictions. In addition, the field is non-linear, wherein an assumption of discretely interconnected sectors is far from reality. The plausible implication of this factor is that unexpected outcomes are common, rather than rare. The discrepancy in outcomes, in my view, requires the interrogation of the content and sources of the ideas that undergird aid intervention plans, particularly the unstated assumptions or rationales behind these interventions.

In considering the position enunciated above, the empirical methodological approach adopted for this study is a critical interpretivist method, and challenges the pure scientific tradition currently used, because the field of intervention is complex and in constant reconstruction. The scientific tradition, as I understand it, is a methodological and philosophical tradition that postulates that social phenomena can be studied independent of human senses, and makes objectivity one of its vital canons. Furthermore, the scientific tradition is underpinned by a positivistic ethos, which means that it seeks to generate universal rules that can be generalized to different contexts. In this scientific tradition, then, peculiar societal differences (history, political systems, colonialism, etc.) do not matter. The neglect of societal differences in the scientific tradition is attributable to its underlying assumptions of uniformity and regularity in even the most diverse societies. A further objection to a positivist methodological approach is that it dwells on the notion that there exist observable regularities in nature that can be described, and linear patterns that can be established (Moses and Knutsen,
The interpretivist approach recognizes the important roles of the observer and social relations in creating the patterns we study as social scientists. This approach implies that all knowledge is produced and constructed (Stake, 2005, p. 452; Flyvberg, 2011, p. 303). In supporting the interpretive research methodology, Guba and Lincoln (2005, p. 204) and Mabry (2008, p. 216) argue for an ontology of truth and a subjectivist epistemology in which meaning is socially constructed. This ontology of truth that underpins interpretive methodology does not subscribe to foundational truths, because it presupposes that reality is not just out there as foundational reference point. Thus I adopted a different interpretive method for my thesis to enable me examine broader and more core aspects of human life. Vital core issues of human life include institutional power, social relations, insecurity, poverty, conflict and nature of global political economy.

The core issues that my study examines are not given variables that can be abstracted apriori. In following Lash (2009), who suggests that an essential way of knowing is predicated upon the relevance of the experiences of people who live in unpredictable social systems where chaos and uncertainty characterize daily challenges to survival. Chaos, uncertainty and messiness are relevant features of my study region, a fact that makes it prudent for me to adopt a qualitative approach to facilitate a better understanding of the nature of relations among diverse polities. Such a methodological orientation has deepened my understanding of the complexities of development aid and poverty reduction in the conflict prone Northern Region.

The uniqueness of my study region and the pertinent issues examined in my study essentially required me to use this kind of context-specific approach. Berg (2007, p. 285) describes a case study as in-depth qualitative study of one or a few illustrative cases. The outstanding advantage of utilizing the case study method is akin to what Geertz (1973) calls
‘thick description.’ These descriptions are strong motivators to gain a detailed and distinct understanding of the phenomenon under study. This method has also influenced my decision to undertake a qualitative case study research approach.

Qualitative case studies entail investigating particular phenomenon as a complete whole as much as possible, particularly in real-life contexts. Case studies are suitable for research work that has no definite boundary between the context and the phenomenon, which is essential to provide insightful information. A qualitative case study is equally suitable for researching complex phenomena such as conflict, security and development issues that demonstrate the irreducibility of the uncertainty of real life conditions into statistically predictable and generalizable variables. One of the reasons that influenced my decision to adopt a qualitative case study is the complex nature of the phenomena of my research study. This complexity lies in the disparate ethnic groups structured by colonial practices that have endured postcolonial political engagements as well as chronic poverty and insecurity conditions.

Furthermore, Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (2011) utilized a qualitative case study approach extensively in their work *Contesting Development: Participatory Projects and Local Conflict Dynamics in Indonesia*. This work has been situated around the conflict-development nexus used as the framework to examine the World Bank’s Kecamaten Development Program undertaken in selected districts that were badly affected by the 1997 financial crisis in Indonesia. Barron, Diprose and Woolcock justify their use of the qualitative case study because of the process undertaken to trace the orientation of their research. They were interested in the identification of the mechanisms and processes that trigger, sustain or resolve conflict (Barron, Diprose and Woolcock, 2011, p. 272). Through the adoption of a case study
approach, their work brought to the fore symbolic contestations that characterized aid interventions. My study examines the processes of these kinds of interventions. A research endeavor like mine therefore requires the examination of the interplay of institutional power relations and their encounters with local power structures and systems of disparate groups of people. In order to realize this objective, I utilized qualitative data collection methods: in-depth interviews and documentary analysis.

Certainly, my adoption of the qualitative case study approach has brought to the fore the diverse contestations and contradictions associated with the different programmes. Furthermore, Lewis, Bebbington, Batterbury, Shah, Olson, Siddiqi, and Duvall (2003) suggest the need for the use of qualitative case studies in research into development interventions, particularly when the focus is to understand the ways in which aid interventions are constructed and negotiated. They recommend the use of in-depth interviews and documentary analyses as the chosen data collection tools for critical case study work.

My research aversion towards a quantitative approach stems from the static policy recommendations that came from quantitative studies such as Collier, Elliot, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Querol and Sambanis (2003) Breaking the Conflict Trap. Collier et al (2003), with the utilization of econometric models, conclude that resource curses, youth population bulges and low income are the main causes of conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment in difficult regions. The policy effect is the promotion of entrepreneurship based on the assumption that entrepreneurship provides the requisite incentive to avoid conflict by reducing poverty. In fact, the empirical record of conflict-afflicted states such as Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia suggest that this income/market driven pro-poor prescription was a flawed option from the onset. The remedial prescription, however, cannot be delinked from the methodological foundation that
homogenized different contexts with common explanatory variables. In essence, a
decontextualized quantitative approach ignores the historical-political processes of conflict and
underdevelopment in conflict regions. There is a compelling need to depart from such
decontextualized approaches, hence my decision to utilize a qualitative case study approach
that will generate highly context-dependent knowledge and provide insightful information
about a set of phenomena that can be applied to other contexts.

Another reason for my application of this qualitative case study approach is to
challenge the veracity of the DSN framework from a post-colonial regional context. Honke
and Müller (2012, p. 395) suggest that a suitable approach to interrogate the failures inherent in
the DSN is a qualitative case study that reflects an encounter between the fields and practices
of interveners and the intervened-upon local residents. Through such an interface encounter,
they suggest that the contradictions inherent in aid interventions can be exposed to contest the
positivistic methodological persuasion of international relations that tend to give hegemonic
status to external interventions. Honke and Müller further suggest that such a practice-oriented
methodological approach, that utilizes in-depth interviews and participant observation,
provides useful generalizations that are empirically grounded. Thus, they deem qualitative
methods to be better tools for critical-oriented studies than quantitative-driven security studies
based on abstracted formal models and statistical surveys. Although I did not formally utilize
a participant observation method, I made sure that critical observations did not escape me in
the course of conducting my in-depth interviews and informal conversations with residents.
These critical observations enabled me to extract the kinds of meaning that research
participants assign to their socio-economic and political circumstances. In adopting a
The qualitative case study approach, it enabled me to challenge the hegemonic development and security studies which positivistic methods rarely reveal.

The choice of a qualitative case study has given me insights into the historical processes of aid interventions, and has allowed me to develop certain sensitivities to the context of my study and well as some knowledge and understanding of the processes on interventions. As suggested by Guba and Lincoln (1985, 2005), qualitative research is predicated on the view that social phenomena, human dilemmas, and the natures of each case is situational and reveal real happenings of diverse types. According to Mabry (2008, p. 217) and Stake (2005, p.449), the term ‘contextuality’ constitutes an aspect of the dynamism and complexity of a case, which implies that cases are shaped by many contexts, including historical, social, political, ideological, and cultural contexts. My use of ‘contextuality’, here, is not employed from a static deterministic sense. Contextuality is deployed in the sense of having multiple manifestations and diverse influences that make a context fluid and is intended to foster a socially emergent constellation of contingent factors that are worked up and confronted, rather than being ignored in daily interactions.

It is from this definition of contextuality that my study was undertaken in the Northern Region. Like any other region in Ghana, the Northern Region is shaped by many relationships between different groups. By situating my study within the two specific sites in the Northern Region, my research has generated valuable research data. My research has been enriched by revelations that are rarely found in statistically-driven national surveys that increasingly blur pertinent inter- and intra-regional differences. A notable revelation emerging from this work is the deeper historical foundation of development and security challenges in the Northern Region.
The use of case studies help scholars investigate indeterminate real life situations and provide a reliable platform to study processes, events, human agency and struggles. Yin (2009) posits that qualitative case studies are appropriate research methods that are anchored around “how” and “why” questions, which fit well with my study. In addition, a qualitative case study is not bounded by linear and deterministic assumptions and therefore provides open-ended ways to examine multiple interventions by different aid organizations. Furthermore, qualitative case studies enable a researcher to identify relevant patterns outside of the case itself, which help to convey deeper insights into the phenomenon. In as much as statistical generalization is not the aim of a qualitative case study, I suggest that a purposeful, deep examination of real life phenomena is bound to illuminate vital information that will have serious implications on how aid programs are developed, The possible generalization of case study findings explains why Gerring defines a case study as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units” (2004, p. 342). More importantly, using case studies to generalize a position on a theory or framework like the DSN is an effective research method when we adopt Popper’s falsification principle against positivist conclusions. Given that the DSN did not achieve its aid expectations, it should be possible to generalize the ineffectiveness of the DSN when applied to other conflict-prone regions that have similar contexts with that of the Northern Region.

Case selection is always fundamentally critical when employing the case study method. Yin (2009) posits that achieving the greatest understanding of a phenomenon under study depends, to a large extent, on the selection of cases. My study took place in the cities Tamale and Yendi, with more interviews conducted in the former than the latter due to strategic and practical reasons. My own studies and other consultations suggest that these two places have,
over the years, attracted a great number of international development aid and security interventions. Moreover, Tamale, for instance, has remained the pivotal region of both colonial and postcolonial administrative practices and policies. Significantly, the two sites constitute the largest multi-ethnic population in the region and are homes to the largest ethnic group, that is, the Dagbon. Given the majority political status conferred on these areas by the colonial government and maintained by postcolonial governments, they constitute one of the significant development and security hubs of the Northern Region. Currently, they function as the development anchor of the region, which explains why it has become so attractive to development aid interventions. In addition, these two case sites have experienced diverse conflicts and insecurity problems, both intra and inter-ethnic, which have threatened the stability of the region.

The selected study sites in the Northern Region were chosen in order to provide an appropriate litmus test for the application of the DSN, and are helpful in seeking to understand aid interventions. The presence of vital social relational features associated with the selected sites have provided me with insightful information that can be used to address the central and secondary research questions, as well as the overall aim of the study.

With the quest to obtain insightful information on the main focus of my qualitative case study, I ensured that my key participants were officials with sound knowledge and an understanding of their practices. The key participants’ roles in the agencies addressed here include: policy design/formulation, operational programming, project implementation, project/program planning, facilitators of training programs, program/project managers, fund management and performance assessment. In order to interview the right or appropriate research participants, I went through a formal approach and booked book appointments for
each interview. Some of the donor and government institutions were hesitant to negotiate for an interview appointment.

In-depth interviews were utilized for this study and conducted through an interactive process to elicit detailed information. Following the structure of feminist methods, I employed in-depth interviews not only to gather data, but to probe into the construction and meaning-making of the data. Given the highly contestable discursive nature of development and security concepts from both the interveners and intervened-upon populations, it became prudent for me to conduct in-depth interviews in order to obtain a nuanced understanding of the issues at hand. I did not utilize quantitative methods such as longitudinal studies and closed-ended questionnaires or surveys, because I concluded that they would hinder a deeper understanding of how the rationales and assumptions were articulated in aid interventions. More particularly, if the research objective is to understand differential power relations along with contradictions and exclusionary processes of intervention then it was clearly more appropriate to utilize in-depth interviews.

I conducted in-depth interviews across a diverse spectrum of key participants, including officials representing development agencies, such as: DfID, CIDA, JICA, ActionAid, UNDP, FAO, WFP, CARE International, Danish International Development Agency, Netherland Development Organization and Catholic Relief Services that operate in the study area. As part of my interview process, I prepared an appropriate interview guide that highlighted the essential questions relative to the central research question and the subsidiary questions. The questions posed to the key informants of the various development aid agencies included questions about their understanding of aid interventions, how the interventions are determined, and what processes were used to define poverty and security problems.
Conducting fieldwork research has generated this ‘inside-outside’ debate in terms of what the ideal position a researcher should take in order to gain insightful information. I can confirm that being an insider does not necessarily guarantee access to insightful information. In fact, the interactive nature of the research process does not lend itself to such binary or dichotomous designations. Furthermore, as an interactive process, the position occupied by the researcher and participant changes, and an interview may be influenced by the age, marital status, and occupation of the interview subject. When conducting a qualitative case study, therefore, it is important for the researcher to develop an attitude of empathy or caring as suggested by Collins (1991). In fact, my 12 hour journey to the study site gave me a prima facie appreciation of the development challenges manifested in the region, particularly during my journey from Salaga to Tamale. The scenes of disparate women (including those who were pregnant and lactating) enduring the long miles, on foot, required to find firewood and water to meet their daily energy and consumption needs was played out against the backdrop of numerous aid interventions in the area and brought the aid paradox I discuss in this work into sharp focus. This interventionist discrepancy affirmed my zeal to seek out an understanding of the paradoxical conditions under which the locals lived. In addition, this dismal spectacle buoyed me to examine the adverse social-relational processes that have conditioned abject poverty, in addition to the extra-local and supranational policies and programmes.

The adverse relationship between numerous aid interventions and the dire living conditions actually experienced by those on the ground reconsolidated my initial drive to examine how interventionist rationales have been articulated. I therefore concur with Merriam et al (2001) that, in conducting qualitative research, it behooves the researcher to be empathetic to the causes and problems of the research participant. Fine and Weiss (1996) also suggest
that, in undertaking field research, it is incumbent on the researcher to work on the hyphen that exists with the researched. My research certainly prioritized the poor and marginalized people because they constitute research participants whose perspectives, perceptions and ways of interpreting their lived experiences were crucial for my study. I interviewed selected groups of the diverse ‘poor’ people in different localities. While it is essential to develop solidarity with the locals, it is equally necessary for a researcher to be mindful of his or her preconceived ideas and perceptions. It is also imperative for a researcher to constantly question his or her assumptions and values during data analysis.

In dialogical interviews, the relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee is critical to the success of the interview process. Naples (2003) asserts that it is imperative for a researcher to exercise negotiated flexibility during the course of research as a vital tactic to gain access to relevant participants for useful information. To gain a better understanding of an interviewee’s perspectives when pursuing a qualitative case study research, the researcher must strive to combine involvement and observation. More essential is the need to create a reasonable distance in order to enable the effective observation, analysis and description to the outsider. I remained ‘outsider’ on most occasions during the fieldwork. I regularly interacted with my research participants and other community members in order to forge a sense of personal involvement and understanding of their perspectives and perceptions.

I did establish cordial working rapport with the local residents, who initially were suspicious of my presence to the extent that believed me to be an undercover agent for the government. After multiple encounters, however, an effective relationship was fostered between us, particularly with the small-scale farmers. As a cautionary reminder, I was alert to the non-unidirectional power relations inherent in the research interview process, as in the
moment when key participants from the aid and government agencies tried to assert themselves in response to certain questions. I was able, however, to moderate the interview in order to gather adequate and vital data I could use to enhance the study.

An analysis of a qualitative case study has to be detailed enough to reflect the wide gamut of issues that emerged during research. Analyzing a qualitative case study’s research finding obliges the researcher to exercise immense reflexive subjectivity, given that the analysis is filtered through a researcher’s worldviews and interpretations. It is important to note that the analysis of testimony is based on the themes embedded in the responses given by the research participants. According to Gubrium and Holstein (1997), many concerns have been raised about the possibility of silencing the narrator’s voice when conducting such dialogical interviews. My research ensured a balanced representation of the diverse views of respondents as evident in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

As stated earlier, this research also relied extensively on document analysis through the utilization of both policy documents and colonial archival records. Document analysis as a technique used to categorize, investigate, interpret and identify the limitations of physical sources has a long history in sociological studies, and has been used by classical sociologists like Durkheim, Marx, and Weber. A notable example is Durkheim’s use of official government statistics to develop his classic work on suicide. Glaser and Strauss (1967, p. 163) posit that sociological research must regard documents as a source of data or as sociological interviewee or anthropological informant. Anthropologist Jack Goody (1977) also believes that written documents are an insightful yet neglected field for research studies and declares that, without documents, salient information would remain invisible. Latour (1987) also sees documents as forms of action from a distance, whereby decisions written in one context can
carry implications for action in future settings. Documents also have the capacity to construct human identity and characteristics, because they are not objective data sources but actively manipulated sources of information. The relevance of documents in sociological studies spurred my decision to use them in order to gather meaning and define relations between the interveners and local residents.

Documented records, in my view, are not objective or neutral materials, but are social materials that aim to convey a viewpoint or position of the party involved. According to Prior (2008), documents are situated records that take many forms and enter into episodes of social interaction in two pertinent ways. First they enter as receptacles of content and second, they serve as a functioning agent in networks (p. 485; 489). The key consideration, then, is to view documents as objects and actors in a web of social relations. Scott (2006) further identifies two important uses of documents as a research strategy. The first relates to content that focuses on the material lodged within the document, while the second suggests the ways in which documents are used and exchanged in communities. Alternatively, documents can also be used both as resources for data and as topics in their own right (Prior, 2003; Zimmerman and Pollner, 1971). My study employs both uses of documents suggested by Scott, because they offer relevant information to facilitate a critical examination of rationales behind aid interventions as well as provide ways to understand institutional power relations between the aid agencies and local actors.

A cursory assessment of the development landscape shows a consistent trend of discrepancies between aid industry intentions and outcomes, yet little research work has been conducted to question the processes that ferry such rationales and assumptions within the context of Northern Region. My study, therefore, examines the conceptual structure and
fundamental assumptions that led to the production of aid reports and uses these reports as topics in themselves, beyond the material contents that they contain. Additionally, the material contents were thoroughly scrutinized in order to address the core and related research questions helpful in unearthing the rhetorical nature of aid interventions. Archival sources provide significant insight into the historical context of the insecurity, poverty and conflict issues that arise in the study region. The use of archival sources also provides reliable information used to gain a deeper understanding of the complexity of aid and security problems that are not reducible to simplistic assumptions.

The relevance of archival documents to this project involves their use as a resource on which to conduct a critical discourse analysis of the programs. The operational reality is that the external aid institutions work largely through institutional reports, written policies, programmes and operational guidelines that shape the form and content of aid interventions. The intentions, assumptions, and goals of aid interventions are, on most occasions, stated in written terms, which makes the sourcing of relevant documents vital to this study.

I adopted document methods because it provides my study with the accurate and critical background information necessary to complement the in-depth interview and ultimately strengthen the analysis. Given the critical orientation of my study, exploiting documents methods, in my view, is a reasonable tool to obtain information and knowledge germane to colonial and postcolonial development and security interventionist practices. It is for this reason that I gained relevant insightful information from the archival sources about the atrocious colonial practices at the national and regional archival offices’ in both Accra and Tamale. Policy documents from pertinent institutions such as the African Union, World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Government of Ghana (GoG) and Department
for International Development (DfID) were sourced. Without any shred of hesitation, I assert that the use of document sources boosted my understanding of institutional power relations and rationales within the aid interventions. Above all, the document method did provide the vital complement to the in-depth interview in addressing both the research questions and aims.

In respect to the sampling techniques used to facilitate my research, I settled on two non-probability sampling techniques. These are purposive and semi-snowball sampling methods used with the goal of obtaining insightful and deep information to guide this study. With regard to the relevance of purposive sampling, Berg (2007) and Stake (2005) (who calls it judgmental sampling), view it as a technique ideal for a case study research, whereby the researcher uses his judgment regarding which samples would serve his best research interest. An important factor in selecting cases is the requirement on the part of the researcher to have sound knowledge of the actors involved, as suggested by Yin (2009). In preparing for this study, my prior engagement with a number of aid agencies and my familiarity with policy documents gave me reasonable experiential insights about the various organizations that work on development and security issues in the region. Further, the relevance of the agencies in relation to the research area was a key criterion utilized to select agencies whose officials I interviewed. The semi-snowball sampling technique was adopted for some community members who were willing and able to be interviewed. I interacted with the same community residents on a number of occasions in order to establish consistency, variation, and the authenticity of the diverse responses.

My fieldwork was undertaken from July 1 to October 31 2011, and took me to various communities in Tamale and Yendi. From the government sector, seven ministries and agencies were selected for interviews, as well as ten donor agencies (both multilateral and bilateral), 5
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), 10 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (including 5 Community-Based Organizations) and 2 research institutions. In all, a total number of 65 participants were involved in this study.

It is vital to stress at this juncture that this thesis is largely informed by field research, as well as by an evaluation of both relevant primary and secondary literature. Furthermore, this study also benefited from a relevant literature of critical orientation that theorizes the complex relations between the aid industry and the intervened-upon population.

The study was undertaken in full consideration of its ethical implications, particularly when it came to issues related to confidentiality, anonymity, informed consent and harm/risk to participants. Before I embarked on the fieldwork, I applied for ethical clearance to the Research and Ethics Board of the University of Windsor. This ethical clearance was approved and issued REB # 29087, which expired on August 31, 2012. My research was accomplished prior to my transfer to the University of Waterloo. This ethical approval imposed a burden of responsibility on me to ensure that my research followed the highest possible ethical requirements in order to establish and maintain its credibility within the academic community.

In full compliance with ethical requirements, I can vouch that no participant was coerced and/or enticed with monetary incentive to participate in the research interview. Before the interview was conducted, I devoted considerable time to explaining the details of the research outlined on the information letter. I had to thoroughly explain the content of the information letter to make sure that respondents fully understood the details so that they could make an informed judgment as to whether or not to participate in the interview. I devoted ample time to comprehensively explaining their rights as participants (such as voluntary participation and its associating correlates), the potential benefits and inherent risks associated
with the research to respondents who were curious about the study. At the end of each interview, we both signed the consent form. I retained copies of the consent forms while research participants were given the signed copies of the information letter. In observing strict practices of confidentiality, hard copies of information from the research participants as found on tapes, along with transcribed materials are currently under safe lock. The issue of confidentiality in my study has invariably prevented me from divulging some critical information. I am of the view that this emphasis on confidentiality promotes secrecy, especially when it comes to issues related to the public interest. Absolute confidentiality cannot be guaranteed because it is incumbent on researchers to report and analyze their findings. In this case, I confirm van den Hoonard’s thesis, which notes that “promises of confidentiality are easier to make than to keep” (2002, p. 8). In addition, I suggest that to guarantee anonymity in face-to-face interviews was impossible. In fact, to ensure anonymity in a research study that is geared towards social change is counter-productive because the ‘poor’ cannot be studied in detail through deductive methods. Therefore, an attempt to hide the identities of my research participants, especially the poor, beyond hiding their identity with a pseudonym, has the possible effect of introducing a substantial amount of unconfirmed information into the data.
Figure 1: Map of Ghana
Summary of the Chapters

The remainder of this study proceeds with one conceptual chapter, one chapter that provides the necessary historical background to the study, three empirical related chapters, and a concluding chapter. Specifically, chapter two deals with the conceptual framework of the thesis. As I discussed earlier in relation to the critical dispositions of the central research question and the sequel research questions, this thesis adopts a critical development-security
nexus framework. Development and security are viewed as social constructs that entail processes of labeling and framing underpinned by a particular set of imaginations, ideas, institutional power and knowledge. This chapter argues that the created space of interventions is active, characterized by its peculiar historical power relations and constituted by diverse identities, political structures and multiple identities. Therefore, an articulation of mainstream interventions driven by high modernist rationales and assumptions in such an active polity, is characterized by chaotic implementation.

Chapter Three relates to the colonial foundations and post-colonial continuities of the development and security challenges in the Northern Region. The core argument of this chapter is that the current development and security crises did not emerge recently, but is largely rooted in it is adversarial historical formation, which makes the current aid challenges undeniably complex. To substantiate the central argument, this chapter discusses the various colonial policies and practices that led to the under-development in Northern Ghana through the uneven development with Southern Ghana. Also to be discussed is the political reconfiguration of Northern Ghana through the indirect rule policy and its ramifications. Furthermore, the continuities of colonial practices as well as the state formation processes will be discussed. The overall outcome is the contradictory institutionalization of conflict, poverty, insecurity and underdevelopment in the region.

The fourth chapter posits that that the development and security challenges in the Northern Region, due to their historical relational antecedents, constitute an inevitably complex problem. From my perspective, the current challenges cannot be reduced to simplistic problem-solving interventions because the contentious issues are rooted in the adverse social relational practices. The driving argument behind this chapter is that the aid industry, through
its interventionist rationales, has reduced the complexity of the region through simplistic
problem solving or technical solutions. The driving approaches through which the poverty
related interventions were articulated include: empowerment, capacity building, and
participation. To validate this driving argument, the perspectives of the aid agencies for
development and security have been analyzed. In addition, notable programmes related to
agriculture and water services as vital sectors for development focused poverty reduction
interventions and various conflict resolution practices have been expatiated within the ambit of
their rationales and processes. The neglect of vital past and current global policies and its
ramifications on the Northern Region have been given considerable examination.

Chapter Five is devoted to the United Nations Joint Human Security Project (UN JHSP)
as it constitutes the most recent intervention of the DSN. The aim of this chapter is to
challenge the transformational credentials accorded to this human security driven
programme. In addition, the human security framework is deemed to be an improvement of
the existing and past development and security interventions in the region (Newman, 2011;
Mack, 2005). My rejection of this transformational notion, however, is informed by its driving
rationales and assumptions that are overly liberal. Therefore, the central argument of this
chapter is that this alleged transformational capability of the UN JHSP is elusive and rather
tends to perpetuate existing practices. In supporting this central argument, the various
foundational frameworks of the programme have been examined. Also, the core community
and individualistic oriented practices driven by responsibility and autonomy rationales have
been analyzed to provide insights into the contradictions, marginalization and exclusionary
manifestations. Again the driving activities of the human security programs include
empowerment, capacity building, participation and community based conflict prevention programs.

Chapter Six responds to the third secondary research question, which is not independent of the central research question. This chapter discusses the implementation challenges of intervention under the rubric of the DSN. The central argument is the orthodox imputation of implementation failures to technical and administrative constraints is a strategy first to exonerate the interventionist rationales in order to reconstitute post-liberal interventions as a necessary ameliorative measure. Further, this chapter interrogates the veracity of the DSN at the institutional level. The concluding chapter deals with summary of the major findings of the study and its policy ramifications. In addition, complexity of regional interventions, from my perspective, calls for a re-conceptualization of development and security in terms that will accommodate the historical formation and lived socio-economic realities of specific societies. This chapter also discusses the inevitable limitations of the study and suggests plausible areas for future research.
Introduction

In spite of the absence of explicit development and security consideration in the UN’s officially declared MDGs, I suggest that security has been an overarching consideration for development aid practices since the 1945, if not an integral part of colonial interventions. It is, therefore, not surprising that there currently appears to be a prevailing notion within the development aid industry when it comes to the securitization of development. The securitization of development essentially provides conceptual space to endorse a reciprocal relation between development and security. A DfID strategy document for Security and Development states: “security and development are linked. Insecurity, lawlessness, crime and violent conflict are the biggest obstacles to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals; they also destroy development. Poverty, underdevelopment and fragile states create fertile conditions for conflict and the emergence of new security threats” (2005, p. 5). The 2004 UN High level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change supports a similar ideology. From my perspective, however, the DfID’s suggestion for a linear reciprocal relationship between development and security requires critical interrogation that examines the rationales that guide the programmes deployed under the rubric of development and security.

The international aid industry’s declared interest in security and developments have spawned a plethora of diverse imaginations and representations used to identify spaces for intervention. Most SSA countries have been constituted as security threats, as noted by Smith, who attributes Africa’s categorization as a global security threat to discourses that posit them as chaotic and volatile political and socio-economic states (2005, p. 1). The potential problem
in abiding by this discourse is that such a negative designation of Africa invariably delimits ways of perceiving countries in the SSA, a fact significantly informs the technical and simplistic diagnostic interventions. I must add that such delimitation is most likely to elicit a counter-hegemonic response from locales of intervention. The inevitability of counter-hegemonic responses is due to the complex daily struggles and overall practical political economy of localities that defy programmable delimitations.

This security-driven interventionist position has piqued the research attention of critical development and international relations scholars such as Duffield, Pupavac and Willett. Willett (2005), posits that the association of the SSA with conflict and underdevelopment have presented opportunity for donor communities to articulate their development and security interventions (p. 570). The crucial issue is to examine the lens through which the security and development challenges are framed, understood, represented and, most importantly, the rationales and assumptions that underwrite the multiple interventions. Beyond these issues, the interests that underlie aid and security interventions also require examination.

Conceptually, a critical development-security nexus (DSN) has been applied to large-scale conflict-prone regions and countries. My study shows the applicability of this critical DSN in examining interventions in low intense conflict regions and further expands our conceptual understanding of the DSN model. Furthermore, my framework conceives of development and security issues as the embodiment of constructed, complex relational processes and practices that are imposed on a locality. Underlying these relational dynamics are rationales and assumptions that influence the operational content, procedures and form of the interventions imposed on a local setting. Conceptually, the imposition of such rationales and assumptions onto a local setting generates indeterminable complex interactions that result
in contradictory, exclusionary and contestable outcomes. These contradictory, exclusionary and contestable outcomes provide the conceptual basis to challenge the veracity of the nexus as well as the necessity and desirability of development and security as espoused by orthodox development scholars like Collier (2011). My conceptual framework, then, provides grounds to consider alternative options beyond the stylized, ineffectual, orthodox development and security nexus.

The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section provides an in-depth discussion of the conceptual imperatives of independent development and security measures. This is followed by a discussion of the DSN, which constitutes the thrust of the conceptual framework to guide this study. Conceptually, both development and security are viewed as discursive practices rather than normative or instrumental ideals.

The second section discusses the complex conceptual challenges in the articulation of trusteeship-oriented international aid interventions. A key argument of this section is that international development aid entails different practices and processes that are underpinned by rationales that are inconsistent with the complex conditions of the locales of these interventions. This section also examines the inevitability of complex processes of aid interventions, which is vital to explain how rationales are deployed.

The third section briefly deals with the research context of this dissertation with the intention of providing the analytical scope within which the research will be studied. The concluding aspect of this section sums up the adoption of the development security nexus from a critical perspective as the conceptual framework based on a conceptual overview. In addition, plausible approaches used to examine the rationales of the interventions will be highlighted. A brief introduction of the next chapter will be provided.
Conceptualizing the Development and Security Nexus

The conceptual intervention impetus of the aid industry is based on an inheritance of their colonizers policies that framed particular societies in a specific spatial context in negative terms to validate an urgent intervention. Based on their studies, Rist (2008) and Crush (1995) confirms that the current aid practice is a direct successor to colonial practice, an idea that leads to a replication of colonial practices in current aid operations. Crush (1995) notes that decolonization was essentially a shift from settled colonialism to international development that continued the civilizing mission role. Crush’s argument implies that important colonial traits cannot be divorced from the present-day aid industry. More importantly, the perpetuation of the rationales behind colonial practice, including necessity, desirability, and moral duty to intervene, ensures that human progress and security lie behind the ‘developmentalist’ aid industry. This moral duty to intervene is the foundation of the development trusteeship on which aid agencies justify their interventions.

By understanding this structure, I conclude that aid interventions are not neutral schemes, but rather ones guided by a manifold of stated and unstated rationales. These rationales are akin to what Scott (1998) calls ‘high modernist interventions.’ The rationales and assumptions that will form the pivot of my analysis of development and security interventions include the necessity of interventions, societal change as replicable and makeable, reliance on expert knowledge divorced from local contexts, the need to create visibility from the outside, the application of standard models and experimentation on local contexts, and the right to intervene. It is critical, as a result, to examine how these rationales play out in the
development and security interventions put in place by the aid industry given that their current practices are underpinned by colonial ideas, interests and institutional power dynamics.

Development as an interventionist practice is endowed with ideological and cognitive inclinations that foster external interventions in economies framed as ‘poor’. A cardinal feature of development as an interventionist practice is its social engineering orientation, which shapes economies to idealized ends. This kind of social engineering orientation reflects development’s underlying rationale of the possibility of change, which facilitates the trusteeship practices. For analytical purposes, I deem ‘trusteeship’ to be a paternalistic process that aims to manage a population deliberately perceived to be lacking the competence and capability to manage itself unless there is an imposition of external ideas and practices on the intervened population. Escobar (1997, p. 44) and Rist (2008, p. 31) link the formal coordinated international development assistance drive in poor economies to the US Government’s 1949 ‘Point Four’ program outlined in President Truman’s inaugural speech. Truman, working under the rationale of ‘Western’ responsibility for helping ‘poor’ economies, privileged the use of scientific and technological knowledge used in developed ‘Western’ countries to help the ‘poor’ Southern hemisphere countries. This reliance on scientific and technological resources brackets off contentious politics and reduces development challenges to simplistic and transplantable technical solutions. Development practice by aid agencies could be referred to as a deliberate complexity reduction exercise that suits ideological and power interests.

My viewpoint is that ‘development’ as a concept practiced by the aid industry entails complex representational processes. Most critical, here, is that development practice encapsulates problematic rationales and assumptions that serve as its driving software. Nustad (2001) makes the point that an analysis of development in the field exposes the problematic
premises that drive aid interventions. Riddell (2007) and Duffield (2003) allude to the point that, notwithstanding the numerous interventions undertaken by aid agencies ranging from stable economies to conflict-ridden countries, the underlying rationale remains the same. It is my quest to understand how these rationales play out in the field that forms the central research question for this thesis. Development is characteristically buoyed by enormous discursive attempts to frame external interventions that address the poverty and other developmental challenges of developing countries (Escobar, 1995, p. 44-47). Beyond this, it is crucial to investigate the processes in which discursive practices take place in order to understand the underlying rationales of these aid interventions.

The discursive power associated with the development practices used by the aid industry foregrounds reliance on institutional power and expertise that appear to replicate colonial ‘development’ practices, though in diverse forms. Kothari’s (2006) critical postcolonial work alludes to the apparent continuity in the expert-driven framing and labeling practices used by colonial administrators akin to contemporary development practitioners and institutions. The aid industry portrays itself as having the requisite knowledge and capacity to help the ‘poor’ in developing countries. An instructive note in Kothari’s work is that the expertise required for contemporary development practice is sophisticated in its quest to provide complex models to enable the prescription of standardized policies in the name of best practices and blueprints. Specifically, the colonial development practice was underpinned by a brute paternalistic orientation to govern the ‘natives,’ who were deemed to be lacking the capacity to govern themselves (Mamdani, 1996). An essential issue, however, is to question the assumptions and rationales that informed the colonial interventions and the ‘targeted’ people under it.
A critical observation of contemporary development practices show that similar paternalistic orientations have characterized the development aid industry over the past 60 years. This paternalistic orientation provides the basis for the imposition of external solutions. Cooke (2004) and Chhotray and Hulme (2009) explain that this paternalism is perpetrated by the consistent faulting of the internal deficiencies endemic in developing countries. Chhotray and Hulme (2009, p.35) expose how the US government’s Millennium Challenge Account and DFID’s Driver of Change development blueprints have attributed causes of poverty and underdevelopment challenges to weak governance systems in poor countries. The quest to reform the framed neo-patrimonial political systems in SSA countries has become one of the urgent priorities of DfID, as evidenced by interventions in Sierra Leone in particular (Denney, 2011; DfID, 2005). In the meantime, there is no empirical proof that this neo-patrimonialism is the main cause of the underdevelopment, insecurity and poverty crises in SSA countries. Neo-patrimonialism in the international aid domain has many variants. The normative understanding of neo-patrimonialism is of a political system built on personal and networked ties that aim to privilege private interests over the general good through corruption, lack of transparency and patron-client relations.

The ‘neo’ aspect of patrimonialism presupposes that pre-colonial African societies were politically controlled through patrimonial relations in the context of their subsistence economies. This normative view of neo-patrimonialism lacks both a historical and ethnographic understanding of the diverse African political systems. Prescribing good governance, therefore, as the remedy to this alleged neo-patrimonialism has yielded dismal outcomes (Kelsall, 2010). These outcomes suggest a simplistic diagnosis of SSA development malaise was used in order to formulate universal solutions.
Historical reviews of development interventions suggest that development is not an objective or neutral endeavor but rather constitutes a deliberate set of processes used to achieve a particular purpose. From a critical angle, it can be argued that the purpose of development is to regulate the affairs of an intervened society. Cowen and Shenton (1996), in their pathbreaking historical study of development practices spanning various British colonial administrations, view development as an exercise used to forge a ‘trusteeship’ relationship. An integral aspect of trusteeship is that development is an intentional practice in which ‘trustees’ have positioned themselves as capable of solving the problems of developing economies. The three main factors that underpin trusteeship as noted by Easterly (2008) and Chambers (2006) are; 1) the availability of technical skills, 2) knowledge, and 3) financial resources. Alongside these three factors, I suggest that political legitimacy and moral authority are crucial factors that play a significant role in the consolidation of a ‘trusteeship’ hegemonic practice. Thus, the enacting of ‘trusteeship’ must also be seen as a political act in which institutional power politics determine the choice of discourses, strategies, policies and actors that underpin aid interventions. Furthermore, these five factors of ‘trusteeship,’ are crucial in configuring the international development aid apparatus as a problem-solving entity. This problem-solving ethos fundamentally privileges technocratic knowledge and skills in the conceptualization and implementation of these interventions. The crucial issue is to interrogate the conditions that facilitated the creation of trusteeship and the processes through which this ‘trusteeship’ is deployed at particular sites. Examining the empirical manifestations of trusteeship will enhance our understanding of the struggles, negotiations and compromises therein. The next section of this chapter will provide theoretical insights into the complex processes of articulating international aid trusteeship oriented interventions in the real world.
Development as an action-oriented or performance-bias concept in mainstream aid thinking is riddled with a constructed, intentional will to improve the lives of human beings. The means through which development agencies achieve their goals of human progress involve the identification of workable policies, programs and plans irrespective of the social context in which they appear. Further processes of articulating development needs involve the classification and categorization of human beings into calculable objects that would facilitate simple problem-solution analyses. It needs to be recognized that a reliance on such programmatic plans and policies on the part of aid agencies elicit a need for a particular kind of expertise that can quantify and render problems visible and have the ability to homogenize disparate societies. Other specific kinds of expertise needed are in the areas of goal and priority setting, and the prescription of time-bound solutions tied strictly to strict budget cycles. These kinds of diverse fields of expertise provide standardized methods and benchmarks to facilitate performance appraisals, categorizations and the comparability of distinct people.

The results-driven nature of development from the mainstream perspective cannot be dissociated from the interventionist rationales that are averse to complex and complicated thinking. In response to this often-ignored interrogation of rationales by the aid industry, the central research question of this dissertation seeks to examine how the rationales of development aid and security interventions have been articulated in the Northern Region. Cornwall (2007) and Rist (2007), in their studies relating to the history of development aid practice, posit that the word ‘development’ has become a modern shibboleth, with fulsome promises of the possible and connoting a futuristic myth that promises hope even in the wake of incontrovertible failures. These fulsome promises can be seen in the reassurance of human development in the wake of past failures by the evocation of ‘new’ priorities, goals and
programmes. Development practices articulated by the aid industry thrive on making unattainable promises, whereby the failure to realize or achieve a set of promises serves as a window of opportunity for experimentation of new ideas and practices. From an empirical perspective, development must comprise broad and diverse historical processes of economic, political and social sub-systems of a particular society.

Given this background, I conceive of development as consisting of local, regional, national, and international processes of change that involve economic, social and political policies, practices, and programmes to regulate human conduct. Development also entails practices of security that aim to secure human lives and reduce poverty in particular locales, times, and spatial contexts. Development as an interventionist practice involves an indeterminate set of tasks and goals that are enmeshed with constant struggles and negotiating processes. These constant struggles and indeterminate tasks can be attributed to the fluid nature of the field that cannot be pre-determined in any accurate sense, including Long and Ploeg’s (2002, p.245) ideas of the practical political economy. Therefore, privileging technocratic and universal solutions for context-specific solutions is most likely to generate resistance and failure.

The difficulty in controlling spatial and temporal contexts because of their fluidity demonstrates the avowed inadequacy of calcified blueprint interventions. Typically, interventions that are mediated through plans, programmes, policies and techniques hardly reflect the complex, unfolding, nature of the field. Based on the information received during my fieldwork for this study, I suggest that the Northern Region is characterized by unpredictable social, political and economic contestations and is embodied by non-linear, diverse interactions at the local, national and international levels. The presence of
unpredictable contestations raises fundamental questions regarding the articulation of linear and managerial development interventions. One of this study’s core positions is that these interventions are not neutral processes, but reflect the significant interests and ideas of a diverse set of actors with varying asymmetric power relations. It is critical, therefore, for me to examine the rationales behind development and security interventions that have been articulated and employed in the region.

Development as a positivistic practice, in reality, cannot be divorced from the social context in which it operates. Mosse (2005) explains that programs and projects for poverty reduction shape, and are in turn shaped by social, political and economic relations operating in specific areas. The deployment of new resources and the imposition of operational rules associated with interventions are often thought to provide incentives to help shape the structural and relational contexts that make conflict less likely to escalate, or arise in the first place. It is critical, however, to note that development processes with their unavoidable embedded uncertainties are shaped through multiple, uneven, and contested social structures, rules and power relations. As such, these processes are necessarily political and, indeed, can often result in violent conflict (Barron et al, 2007, p. 29-30). It is important to recognize that the nature of these processes and conflicts are predicated upon unique contextual factors. Any attempt, then, to incorporate conflict sensitivity into development programmes must be tailored to meet the political, social and economic realities of particular contexts. In the wake of the uncertainty of development, I deem it appropriate to interrogate the rationales that guide interventions at specific sites, as in the case in the Northern Region.

The constructed nature of development and security has been well noted by scholars of critical development studies. Abrahamsen views development as an intentional constructive
practice that sets out to map the content and boundary of its interventions. According to Abrahamsen, there are three interrelated factors that form the interventionist basis of development: ‘fear,’ ‘absences,’ and ‘hierarchies’ (2000, p. 17). These three factors collectively aim to frame dire conditions in order to justify the necessity of external interventions. The factors identified by Abrahamsen provide room for external actors to justify interventions on the grounds that they have a moral duty to intervene. As I indicated earlier, this moral duty to intervene is intertwined with other rationales like desirability and the necessity for development. Consideration of these three factors leads Abrahamsen to conclude that development is a disciplinary mechanism used to regulate poor societies to conform to the practices, ideas and programmes foisted on them by their ‘benevolent’ interveners.

Using development as a disciplinary mechanism points to the discrepancy between the ‘good intentions’ of aid agencies seeking development and the dismal outcomes of their attempts. It is vital to interrogate how the triple interventionist triggers identified by Abrahamsen play out in the field in order to understand how the failures in established models can be attributed to technical and administrative factors. It is crucial to expose the relational foundation of these triggers because, in my view, they are highly subjective elements undergirded by the unique ontology and ideological orientation of aid strategies.

Security, like many concepts in the social sciences, is difficult to define because it is a social construct with a changing definition. Therefore the UNDP’s position on security as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ denudes the real motivation of regulating a particular group. The disciplinary devices are articulated through the imposition of predetermined decontextualized policies and programmes aimed at addressing an a priori fixed problem. The UNDP’s definition of security seems innocuous because it obscures the entity
that actually defines what constitutes ‘fear’ and ‘want.’ The UNDP definition of security, based on my conceptual understanding, marginalizes the historical-relational dynamics in favor of best practice programmes driven by a liberal ideological persuasion. As will be discussed in chapter five, a similarly limited definition of security was espoused by one of the UN JHSP program managers. Following this narrow definition of security, the deployment of liberal interventions through individualist and community oriented practices as strategies for conflict prevention comes into effect.

I view the discourse of security a power-laden with the capability to imagine naturalized threats with the usually-silenced intention of regulating and disciplining human conduct. The regulatory and disciplinary orientations of security interventions do not, however, translate smoothly to targeted recipients in specific localities. Chapters four and five will demonstrate that a security impasse was more a norm than an exception to the rule of external security-related interventions. Governmental orientation is pursued through the deployment of liberal programmes and projects that consistently fail to address complex dynamics underlying imagined security threats.

An important issue to acknowledge is that the identification of problematized threats depends on the interplay of asymmetric power relations between the intervener and intervened society. This power differential as a determinant of security risks and threats could be found in the way the UNDP and DfID-sponsored expert designed the Early Warning System. The early warning system predetermined what issues or events constituted a security risk, an evaluation that the local collaborator, the Ghana Network for Peacebuilding (GHANEP) was forced to follow independent of their own views and the views of the larger populace.
The concept of security within the field of international development practice has assumed an expansive notion, a fact that necessitates the engagement of a myriad of professionals in problem-solving actions. Bigo (2006) identifies the need for professionals in the areas of risk management, human security and other risk analysis fields to undertake risk assessments of the economic, political, social and environmental costs of conflict in order to determine the overall security and development implications in each region. It is important to note that these expert assessments tend to dwell on broad, disembodied aggregates, such as Collier’s economic costing (which postulates that violent conflicts cost SSA countries 25% of their GDP per annum (Cramer, 2006). This economic costing provides significant support to his greed-based thesis of conflict that continuously informs the liberal pro-poor interventions in many SSA countries. The on-going, numerous, international aid interventions in the Northern Region necessarily emphasize the need for the central research question of this study to interrogate the rationales that drive programmes and projects of development and security in the region.

There have been attempts from both policy and academic perspectives to draw a working linkage between security and development. In fact, Stern and Ojendal (2010, p. 6) use the concept DSN to map a relationship between these two concepts. This mapping exercise, however, creates the impression that the development and security challenges can be mapped onto distinct connections to establish congruent linkages between these two concepts. From my perspective, the attempt to establish a linear relationship between security and development aid issues risks naturalizing the relational dynamics, whereby standardized packages become the preferred solution. My research seeks to transcend this analytical mapping to interrogate
real interventionist practices in order to expose the constructed processes and instrumental logics at play.

The shift towards human-centered development and security plans appear to dominate the mainstream development literature. Alkire (2010, p.47) notes that both security and development are now human-centered in their focus and both complement each other. Alkire states that both security and development practices share common paradigm shifts, with security changing from territorial/national focus towards human. On the other hand, the unit of analysis for development changed from economy and territory to person or human. Implicit in Alkire’s position is an attempt to naturalize the shifts; but my position is that the alleged shifts are reflective of unequal balances of power in knowledge generation patterns that favor the dominant global development governance institutions. These shifts towards human and individual categories do not necessarily mean that the assumptions and the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of these interventions have been transformed. This ‘new’ focus on individuals tends to foreground ‘freedom’ and ‘capabilities’ as the main means and ends of development and security. In sum, Alkire’s (2010, p. 47) postulation mirrors the Commission for Human Security 2005 Report, which views security as the way to protect the vital core of human development (freedom, dignity and livelihood). From my perspective, the ‘innocent’ instrumental linkage between security and development ignores the asymmetrical power relations that drive the processes of these interventions. The assumed linkage between security and development has been formulated with a gross disregard for the effects of the unequal and exploitative nature of capitalism and the wider global political economy.

Alkire’s conceptualization of the reciprocal linkage between development and security is, in my view, a vain attempt to endorse the universal blueprint of liberal interventionist
practices that endlessly problematize poor economies. Thus, the predetermination of the final outcomes of these two contestable discursive and autonomous concepts through this kind of an ex ante conceptualization negates critical questions about the rationales and assumptions behind such interventions. In drawing such instrumental linkages, I contend that the DSN justifies technical solutions to complex indeterminate structural and relational problems. In fact, these pursuits of technocratic solutions are rife in UN-driven conflict resolution programmes in the Northern Region since 1994.

The mainstream instrumental framing of development and security plans has attracted critiques from critical scholarship. Jolly and Ray (2007) argue that human security programmes privileged by the Commission for Human Security, and scholars such as Alkire lack conceptual rigor because they bundle all vulnerabilities into a single concept, thereby blunting their analytical edge and policy impact. From my perspective, the broad framework of human security could lead to a gross homogenization of internal socio-economic challenges in poor economies, with the possible consequence of prescribing ‘one-size fits all’ solutions. The human security, with its focus on internalizing the development and security of local sites, tends to ignore the lopsided, inequitable international political economy that undermines many developing economies. The critical point within the context of my study is to interrogate how the rationales of the UN JHSP unfold in the field of intervention in order to understand the intricate processes that are important to aid development.

As a discursive practice, security within the context of the aid industry has stimulated a plethora of measurement techniques and classifications used to categorize particular countries as fragile, failed, and weak states. The outcome of these categorizations is the institutionalization of liberal economic and political plans, reforms, and programmes as
remedial options for such countries (Richmond, 2011, p. 15). In particular, the study of development and security interventions by Willett (2005, p. 1-3) suggests that the notion of a ‘conflict trap’ that exists in most SSA countries has created an enabling condition to foist liberal peace and development initiatives upon such countries. Notable among these are the elite-oriented democratization processes, rule of law and social protection schemes that disadvantage the poor and render them unable to address the ‘drivers’ and ‘triggers’ of security and development challenges. Denney (2011, p. 285-288) attests to the failure of DfID Security Sector Reforms in Sierra Leone. Additionally, the liberal interventions with simplistic universalistic assumptions lack the epistemological rigor necessary to interrogate the historical foundation the constructed development and security challenges. In the wake of the historical basis of conflict and underdevelopment issues in the study region, it is vital to examine the rationales behind the interventions rolled out to address developmental problems.

Security as a discursive practice with a debatable shift from territorial and regime foci towards people, as conceived by the global development establishment, invariably becomes a bio-political project used to regulate and discipline human life. It is from within this context that bio-politics, according to Miller and Rose (2008), refers to “the deliberations, strategies, tactics and devices deployed by authorities for making up and acting upon a population and its constituents to ensure good or avoid evil” (p.195). The critical point here is to interrogate how conditions arose to make it possible for specific actors to create security images and translate those images into programmes that are then used to regulate others.

This notion of bio-politics, which frames the work of Duffield (2006, 2007, 2010), is being adopted for this study because it foregrounds the governing of contingent risks in conflict prone regions. Governance of risk, therefore, involves the use of expertise to provide
programmable information about the people, policies, and plans devised based on this information. In view of a preference for expert knowledge, information relative to causal determinants of an imagined problem prescribed solutions and implementations under the guidance of universally ‘acclaimed’ performance indicators would be most preferred. The reliance on best practices is an integral component of the articulation of the development and security programmes that are based on universally homogenized problems.

The alteration in the referent object of security from a state to human or people-centered perspective has led to the constitution of the individual as a site of liberal intervention. The other effect of this approach is the securitization of development. Securitization of development entails an attachment of the security connotations of risk and threats to vital socio-economic conditions like poverty, underdevelopment, and local conflict as dangerous phenomena that warrant interventions in order to secure lives. Poverty and conflict are demonized as threats because of the narrow, liberal-inspired view that criminalizes the poor by asserting that violence is the main survival tactic for homogenized populations of poor people.

A cardinal effect of the securitization of development is the reconstitution of poor regions as threats to national and global stability. This liberal viewpoint is reinforced by the position of the World Bank, when Zoelick (2009) posits that “when states are breaking down or overcome by conflict, the consequences can be severe: death and disease, economic stagnation, and environmental degradation…fragile state’s neighbors are also at risk, often suffering hardships caused by refugee flows, warring groups, contagious diseases and transnational criminal networks that traffic arms, drugs and people” (p. 1-2). Duffield (2010, p. 56) affirms that the thrust of the liberal development and security interventions are geared towards the building of individual self-reliance in order to withstand potential risks based upon adaptive
patterns of household and communal individual initiatives. Given the international aid
community’s belief in the liberal political economic worldview, pro-market entrepreneurship
primacy and depoliticized community driven practices would be the prescribed antidote.
Notable approaches of capacity building, empowerment and participation that have been the
main instruments of liberal DSN interventions will be given in-depth assessments in chapters
four and five.

The overall goal of interventions under the DSN is to contain the mobility of the
population. This containment measure is articulated under the guise of ‘stability’ and ‘order’
through the pursuit of the forging of egalitarian and cohesive communities. Containment of the
‘third world’ population, according to Duffield (2010, p. 57), is fostered through individual
agency-oriented sustainable development. A likely consequential effect of this individual
focus on sustainable development is to confine millions of people to barbarous situations of
inhuman existence. Confinement to this barbarous life is due to sustainable development’s
lack of prospects for transformational change. The individualistic focus of development aid
interventions mimics deliberate colonial policies and practices meant to foreclose social
transformation in the Northern Region, and maintain dependence on piecemeal external
assistance. Within the framework articulated by Duffield (2008, 2010), risk becomes
normalized on one hand, while on the other hand, this normalized risk prevents the search for
the fundamental, broad, and complex aetiologies of the insecurities aid actors seek to solve.
The logical implications of this aid strategy is that prioritization of risk will instigate
exceptional short-term interventions, which is likely to provide only ephemeral relief.
Substituting core grievances and risk factors of other situations is most likely to endure or
aggravate pre-existing tension.
Remarkably, the regulatory nature of human circulation can be found in the colonial interventions and are prosaic with the Indirect Rule of the Northern Territories, out which the Northern Region was created. Duffield (2010, p. 56) further argues that the DSN has fostered an assemblage of actors who include development actors, security actors, aid agencies and professional networks. These actors generate fatalistic discourses aimed at formulating grotesque conditions that will justify urgent interventions, for which the aid industry remains the sole incubator of redeemable solutions. The critical issue to examine is how the rationales for security and development actors feed into interventions that have been articulated in a conflict prone region, and this endeavor drives this thesis.

Moreover, securitization of development is, in my view, an institutional process used create a reciprocal linkage between security and development. The converse also holds true in relation to the developmentalization of security. The securitization of development through the coercive creation of mutuality between human development and human security in mainstream aid-industry thinking would require investigation into the processes and practices they engender. Securitization, from Waever’s (1995) perspective relates to speech acts that define what an officially-declared issue constitutes an existential threat. Weaver (1995) posits that, “with the help of language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something real; the utterance itself is the act…By uttering security, a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it” (p. 55). The determination of an existential threat is influenced by a realist orientation that gives authority to political leaders. This realist notion of securitization is problematic in the sense that it tends to silence vital voices, particularly within diverse populations, and only reflects
dominant voices. It also gives a monolithic representation of insecurity as constitutive of danger and threat. An important problem in the equation of insecurity challenges to danger and threat is that this equation stalls the consideration of possible opportunities that insecurity, and that might initiate new grounds for societal transformation. Insecurity and conflict challenges point to the need for long-term measures to correct a defective socio-economic and political system.

In the wake of the high number of donor-agencies in Ghana’s political and economic administrative systems, I suggest that Waever’s absolute sovereignty securitization thesis must be moderated in order to recognize the active role that diverse non-state actors play in security. The heavy influence of the donor community in the economic and political governance of poor regions invalidates Waever’s absolute sovereignty thesis. It is appropriate to examine the aid agencies at the forefront of the security and development interventions in the Northern Region.

An observation of post-Cold War international development areas of interest indicates that the numerous conflicts and insecurity issues in SSA countries has opened up several avenues of political domination by international actors. Diverse international actors are currently actively involved in complex emergency interventions in conflict prone regions in the developing world. Young, in his study of the late postcolonial African State, suggests that “the webs of conflict, violent social patterns and governmental dysfunctionalities in many parts make the state a far less dominating, agenda setting actor than in the first post-independence decades” (2004, p. 24). The implication of Young’s remarks is that the classical Weberian notion of the state as wielding an absolute monopoly on the use of force is not consistent with the political realities in most SSA economies. This can clearly be seen in the evolving history
of the Northern Region, where supra-national actors and domestic non-state actors are particularly involved in the complex web of the conflict and security.

I submit that the existential threat thesis is a static proposition, and it would be more helpful if consideration is given to the processes through which an issue becomes securitized as dangerous for human society in the first place. A vital process for consideration will be a transition from normalcy to existential threats. In support of the critical risk notion of security, Abrahamsen (2005) suggests that security issues vacillate in an indeterminate continuum from normalcy, to worrisome, to troublesome, to risk and to existential threats. Abrahamsen (2005, p.59), in her study of the security policies of the Blair administration that are germane to Africa, affirms the possibility of pursuing dichotomous policy interventions for post-conflict countries as well as those in active conflict. Taking a cue from Abrahamsen’s position on the possibility of dichotomous interventions, my view is that it is not only at the state-centric level that those external security interventions are undertaken. Such interventions are also perpetrated at the regional level, as we can see in the Northern Region.

It is these externally formulated security interventions that inspired me to investigate the rationales that underpin aid practices alongside the poverty-oriented aid program of the UN JHSP in particular. From an instrumental perspective, the UN JHSP is framed as a revolutionary programme that can be used to emancipate the region. A close examination of the foundational underpinnings of the UN JHSP, however, suggests that the program is modeled on normative frameworks. These frameworks seek to privilege individual awareness creation, consensual and formal dialogue and negotiation, and the capacity building of local trainees. The unavoidable discrepancy in the UN JHSP’s expectations and correlating
practices make it imperative for me to examine the way rationales behind similar interventions were articulated in the region.

Security has constituted a vital strategic consideration in aid interventions since the 1940s. Security primacy could be found in the Marshall Plan, Truman’s doctrine, and the 1951 US Congress development policy called the “Mutual Security Program” (Bueger and Vennesson, 2009; Beall et al. 2006). In 1968, the World Bank sought to elevate the saliency of ‘security’ as a vital, but neglected issue related to development’s conceptualization and its wider utility. This possible development–security linkage led McNamara to declare that: “security is development and without development there can be no security […] development means economic, social and political progress. It means a reasonable standard of living, which in this context requires continual redefinition; what is reasonable in an earlier stage of development will become unreasonable at a later stage” (1968, p. 149-150). Given McNamara’s acclaimed goal of ending poverty via the basic needs approach, I suggest that he endeavored to draw a reciprocal linkage between security and poverty reduction. McNamara sought to frame both security and development as preconditions for social and political progress. These positivistic linkages and ideas, however, constitute pillars of the current anti-political liberal interventions. The ultimate effect of localizing development and security problems in SSA economies, as McNamara does, is to gloss over the adverse effects of the global economy and history of the locales of intervention.

The imputation of the deleterious effects of violent conflicts and war on poverty and overall development has been prominent in stimulating the interventionist interests of aid agencies operating in conflict-prone regions. I hold the view that this renewed interest in international aid in difficult regions has contributed immensely to the shift from the state-
centric focus of security towards a human centered notion. Security as a possible
governmental tool has developed expansive aspects that have perceived to be essential for
human wellbeing. Specifically, the broad dimensions of security span from military threats
towards non-military threats that include economic, health, environmental and hunger.
Rothschild (1995) characterizes shifts in security targets as “from national states, including
upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional to local communities or local
governments and sideways to non-governmental organizations, to public opinion and the press,
and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market” (p. 55). The vital question that needs to
be raised and examined in detail, however, is the underlying rationales and assumptions behind
the current expansive notion of security, and how they manifest on the field of practice.

The 9/11 terror attack on New York has brought on increased global security attention.
Beall et al. (2006) suggest that security has become a dominant aid priority for donor countries,
including perceived munificent donors like Canada and Denmark. In addition, the Global War
on Terror has provided the necessary conceptual support for the imagined linkage between
development and security. The US terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 that were allegedly
organized in Afghanistan (which is considered a weak state because of its dire development
and security challenges) tends to support the notion that there is a causal relation between
underdevelopment and terrorism (Buzan & Waever, 2007). The logical policy implication is
that simultaneously addressing security and development challenges in Afghanistan must be an
urgent priority, an idea that is perpetrated under the notion of state reconstruction.
Nevertheless, the critical issue to probe here is whether the merging of security and
development priorities and resources fully address the fundamental problems of the poor in
their particular spatial location. It is important to note also that there is a legitimate concern in
terms of how problems are conceived and whether development gets subordinated to security priorities.

The possibility of subsuming developmental priorities to security objectives might undermine the poverty-reduction goal of the aid industry. Beall et al. (2006) establish that the overwhelming dominance of security considerations over development priorities has seriously ruined the developmental prospects of Iraq and Afghanistan. Chandler (2010) attributes the contradictory development outcomes in the two countries to the disproportionate resource allocation in favor of the security sector against the social, cultural, political and economic sectors. Above all, the misleading rationales behind these aid interventions offer a very minuscule hope of societal transformation. Given the possibility of contradictory relations between development and security interventions in Afghanistan, significant questions arise around the veracity of the shift from state-centric perspectives to human centered normative practices.

The DSN theoretically postulates broader notions beyond the traditional state-centric conceptions. Abrahamsen and Williams (2006, p. 11-17), however, point out the Security Sector Reform’s flagrant restoration of the state monopoly of the security apparatus. It must be noted that insignificant attention is accorded to private security in many SSA countries by aid agencies, with the state security apparatus constituting the largest sector of donor interventions as seen in countries like Ghana, Sierra Leone and Kenya. This disproportionate aid practice is very intriguing given the phenomenal growth in private security industries in these countries. I argue that the state-centered focus of the Security Sector Reforms gives us cause to rethink the influence of state security actors in a new global security regime. Abrahamsen and Williams (2011) suggest consequences for overall security due to the marginalization of private security
in the security sector network. It is necessary to transcend officially-recognized private
security actors and direct serious attention towards informal security actors that are popular in
rural communities. These informal security networks are, in most cases, framed as security
threats or risks as is the prevailing situation in the Northern Region. It is prudent, then, in the
context of my study, to examine the implementation of security and development programmes
in the Northern Region.

From my perspective, the official conceptual understanding of the DSN is that the two
concepts are interdependent and employ joint simultaneous implementation. Given the
significant adversarial social relations and historical forces that have conditioned development
and security challenges in acclaimed conflict prone regions, however, these situations might
render this conceptual DSN empirically indeterminate.

**Complex Processes in the Production of Development Trusteeship**

The crucial point to appreciate is that development and security interventions are conceived of
as practices and processes that are not trans-ideological. Integral parts of the aid articulation
are the practices of labeling and framing the subjects of intervention. Labeling is defined as
interplay of asymmetric power and knowledge processes of classifying and naming people with
the aim of identifying targets and scope of interventions. Wood (2007) suggests that labeling is
an interactional encounter in which policies and designated labels have an impact on resource
allocation. A critical issue according to Wood (2007) is: “not whether we label, but which
labels are created, and whose labels prevail to define a whole situation or a policy area, under
what conditions and with what effects” (p. 20). Relevant points in these processes of labeling
are the predetermined solutions earmarked for specific localities or societies based upon very limited contact.

Labels like ‘primitive’, ‘barbarism’ and ‘savage’ played crucial roles in colonial development and security interventions as related to the Northern Region. Similarly, current problematic labels such as ‘post-conflict’, ‘conflict trap’, ‘conflict-prone’ and ‘difficult regions’ have been generated for countries and regions with history of conflict, violence and insecurity. Accompanying these labels are the illiberal consensus-oriented community driven interventions that will be discussed in great length in Chapters four and five of this thesis. It is crucial, however, to note that such labels equally become the resources for contestation, thereby setting in motion indeterminate struggles in the field of intervention.

The uncertainty of the sites and localities for interventions has also necessitated labeling practices to sanitize the chaotic nature of the field of interventions to establish certainty. It should be noted that the aid industry is a complexity-reducing entity, hence labeling becomes a catalytic resource to simplify complex problems in declared conflict prone regions. Labeling is vital in designing abstracted solutions to imagined sites. To a large extent, I propose that the replication of consensual good governance solutions in conflict plagued regions and or countries must be attributed to this deliberate avoidance of non-quantifiable contextual social relational realities. Pugh’s work on critical approaches to peacebuilding suggests that market competitiveness and liberal peace logic have become the operational orthodoxy for the aid industry in conflict-ridden regions (2005, p. 23-24, 31). The crucial question is to examine how the assumptions behind such interventions are manifest in the study region. Such an insight into the processes of articulation will provide a nuanced
understanding of interventions away from the hegemonic power assigned to liberal policies and practices.

The likely silencing of the social-relational factors in the labeling processes suggests that the derived programmes, plans and projects are unlikely to reverse the poverty and conflict challenges. Goloobo-Mutebi and Hickey (2009, p. 25) demonstrate that the neglect of the historical power relations within conflict plagued Northern Uganda and the mainland has significantly undermined the implementation of the social funds programme. In addition, the rendering of such deep-seated micro, meso, and macro historical socio-economic and political problems as technical issues amendable to calculative rationality, or the resorting to a ‘lack’ or ‘deficit’ mantra is counter-productive.

The essence of this framing is also to provide the necessary visibility to problems before rendering technical, prescribed, and managerialistic solutions. I contend that poverty and security challenges defy technical solutions because of the complex forces that created and still create conditions for their emergence and reproduction from colonial and postcolonial regimes. Another crucial factor to note is that the cause(s) of underdevelopment, poverty and insecurity cannot be limited to internally constrained conditions, but are forcefully determined by the confluence of unfettered, misguided, global capitalist and governance practices.

My framework resolutely affirms the contradictory nature of the development aid industry because of the chasm between abstracted knowledge and the lived realities of the communities within which these interventions are deployed. This contradiction, according to Rist (2008), is due to an excessive reliance on beliefs not grounded in the complex and realistic feasibility of its manifestation. I will further attribute these discrepancies to the individualistic and abstracted methodological tools that inform the policy, programme and the projects of the
bureaucratized aid agencies. It is instructive to note that the acclaimed experts that provide the technical and operational guidance to aid industries cannot be absolved from such a failure. It is from the above-noted drawback that, Kumar and Corbridge’s (2002, p. 93-96) study of the Eastern India Rainfed Farming project conceives that most expert-oriented participatory projects as programmed to fail due to the uncritical faith put into unrealistic, weak and untested assumptions. Inherent in such weak assumptions is a reductive diagnosis and neglect of contentious structural, socio-economic and political imbalanced power relation issues at critical multiple nodal points.

The epistemological lens through which interventions are framed by the international development agencies are not objective or neutral in their nature but are decidedly social constructs. Part of this social construction is ideational power, and an important area of concern is the source of the idea and not what is actually proffered. Ideas espoused by aid agencies or through the epistemic communities and other networks have played vital roles in operational functions, particularly in labeling, framing, classifications, categorizations, diagnosis and evaluative standards. The ideas churned out by the dominant aid agencies tend to be technical and depoliticized (Ferguson, 1990, p. xv; 2006). Depoliticization occurs through the neglect of broad causal historical relational factors from diagnostic considerations, and rather privilege technically-derived uniform factors that can be standardized for universal application. This technical rendering of problems as suggested by Ferguson (2006) is used to fulfill the institutional interests of the aid industry. Technical rendering is a way for the aid agencies to maintain ideologically hegemonic control of solutions to identified problems in the SSA and other developing countries.
These technical and apolitical interventions cannot be delinked from colonial interventions. Mitchell (2002), Kothari (2006), and Kothari and Wilkinson (2010) also attribute this framing of the ‘other’ as emergent from the colonial administration practices in the former colonies. Kothari (2006, p. 238) explains that the assumption of the possession of cultural capital on the part of the colonial officers was a critical factor in framing. This cultural capital reflects in the deployment of scientific knowledge to describe and represent the ‘other’ perceived as inept, lazy and barbaric finds similar thought in contemporary aid industry.

The cumulative effect of such derogatory classifications of the ‘other’ becomes the pretext to colonize the ‘other’ in the name of a “moral or humanitarian assistance” or civilizing mission. This labeling, as Greisler (2012, p. 17-20) notes, is superficial because it relates more to the characteristics of people rather than the history and polities of the people. In my view, such an artificial representation feeds into the thin-veneer interventions that tend to exteriorize problems instead of engaging with their actual complex relational drivers.

Contrary to the orthodox aid industry frameworks that espouse linear and positivistic development and security policy and programmes, the reality is that articulation entails contestations. Various studies undertaken by Long (2004), Jessop (2012) and Peck and Theodore (2012) demonstrate that the process of generating and diffusing the programs, policies and projects entail diverse negotiating processes and compromises. Long (2007, p.15-16), using interface analysis for his study of Peruvian Land reform, frames the intervention arena as a battlefield not of knowledge alone. The site of intervention is active with a consistent struggle over social meanings and practices that have the possibility of altering predefined or pre-programmed plans, intentions and policies. It is necessary to recognize the importance of power, ideational, socio-cultural and historical differences that influence the
direction of articulation processes. Such complex processes should moderate elevated promise of securing regions.

By conceiving of development agencies as transnational networks, I will provide the basis needed to transcend binary classifications of ‘top-down’ versus ‘bottom-up’ and macro versus micro. This demonstrates a need to direct attention to the entire gamut of actors in aid situations in order to improve our understanding of the messy nature of interventions. From my analytical prism, this transnational perspective would provide a better understanding of what kind of knowledge is privileged and the sources of expertise that influence development and security interventions. The indeterminate nature of these processes of intervention, according to Peck and Theodore (2012) and Hall (1993) are symptomatic of their social and institutionalized contexts. Within the purview of the Northern Region, I reiterate that international development interventions, inclusive of security, are not objective practices. Instead, they are actively driven by socially constructed rationales and assumptions that are discursively constituted in line with institutional priorities at multiple sites.

**Research Context**

I posit that the former and current development and security related interventions prioritized by diverse aid agencies in a framed fragile or difficult region like the study region are undertaken in an uncertain structured atmosphere of multiple conditions, constraints, actors and institutions. Most research undertaken from policy perspectives in acclaimed conflict-prone regions have focused more on the effects on potential beneficiaries, which does not fully capture the rationale behind these interventions. In order to better grasp the rationales and assumptions in the processes of interventions, my study places a prime focus on diverse
encounters with multiple actors, including local residents, government officials and consultants.

The study is being placed within the purview of the historical relational formation of the region in order to understand the complex nature of the field and its location within the international political economy. In addition, the nature and pattern of the relationship between actors and institutions and agencies is a critical area that my study will consider.

This research context is being utilized to enable a critical interrogation of the growing literature and aid agency interest in the dual concepts of development and security as witnessed during fieldwork. There is a compelling need to examine the rationales and assumptions underlying the current interventions, especially in a postcolonial region, in order to expose actual practices perpetrated under the guise of the DSN. The overall research context fully recognizes the saliency of broader historical power relational and international political factors and their impact on development and security interventions.

**Concluding remarks**

In summary, I have explained the constructed nature of development and security concepts, and analyzed the intricacies of the DSN. Furthermore, the articulation of development and security interventions is underpinned by rationales and assumptions that privilege technocratic solutions. The development and aid organizations (bilateral, multilateral and INGOs) are driven by an expertise bias in order to invent a problem and devise interventionist measures. I suggest that, far from the perceived seamless articulation of interventions, the field of development practice is messy, non-linear and complex. Given the analyses undertaken for development and security relationships, I will utilize the DSN to form the critical orientation of
my conceptual framework. The focus of this nexus leads to the main research question: how
are the rationales of international development aid and security interventions articulated in
conflict prone Northern Region of Ghana, and received by the local population?

The key interventionist approaches in facilitating critical analyses of these rationales
include: community, participation, empowerment, and capacity building. The next chapter
addresses the colonial development practices and political initiatives that show the historicity
of the development and security challenges. The contradictory and exclusionary outcomes will
be addressed extensively and will ultimately demonstrate the complexity of the current
development and security challenges.
Chapter Three

Historical Development Interventions in the Northern Region

Introduction

The Northern Territories out of which the current Northern Region emerged at the turn of national independence was a colonial creation. For the remainder of this dissertation, I will use Northern Ghana and Northern Territories interchangeably. Northern Ghana was created by an Order-in –Council in 1902, which was preceded by the Anglo- Franco and Anglo-German conventions 1898 and 1899 respectively (Metcalfe, 1964, p.523-524; Gold Coast Annual Report, 1903, p. 59). In addition to these agreements, protection treaties were brokered with the chiefs of Dagomba, Gonja and Mamprusi by George E. Ferguson during his exploratory mission to the North in 1894 (Gold Coast Annual Report, 1897, p.24). For administrative reasons, the NT was divided into three provinces: North Western, North Eastern, and Southern (now Northern Region).

Currently, the Northern Region has innumerable unresolved conflicts, which have created an interventionist opportunity for international development aid organizations. Certainly, efforts to address the unresolved conflicts, contestations and grievances are a laudable effort. The most critical issue in my view, however, is the way in which the conflicts are understood and imagined. In an interview with Dr. Albert Awedoba, of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, he outlined existing salient conflict hotspots in the Northern Region. He asserts that:

The inability to search for long-term solution to the numerous conflicts in the region, due both to institutional weakness and superficial approaches by the development partners puts the relative stability of the region in
jeopardy. Unresolved issues and demands such as; the Mpaha-Kpabuso religious conflict; rumours of impending Gonja-Tampulma conflict; recurrence of the Konkomba-Nanumba conflict; the Buipe Chieftaincy dispute, the Nalogni Chieftaincy turmoil; Dagbon crisis and the Gbintiri quest to be part of the Bunkprugu-Yonyoo District make the region insecure. (A. Awedoba. Interviewed on July 30, 2011).

My scrutiny of the literature and documents in relation to the ethnic conflicts in Northern Region suggests that unresolved conflicts became much intense after the introduction of the Indirect Rule policy. The Indirect Rule was a territorial governance system aimed at governing the colony through its native political and informal institutional structures, beliefs, laws and customs. I will defer further explanation of the Indirect Rule later in this chapter.

Remarkably, most orthodox literature on development and security interventions in acclaimed conflict prone postcolonial regions seems to de-historicize the site of intervention. This de-historicization of the factors that precipitates insecure regions creates the impression that poverty, conflict and insecurity are recent phenomena. In particular, the ‘new war’ thesis by Mary Kaldor (1999, 2007) deems poverty, underdevelopment and conflict in developing countries as post-cold war problems. The policy conclusion of this new war thesis is the unrestrained urgency for international aid interventions with the ultimate goal to prevent global instability and insecurity. Duffield (2007, 2010) makes an attempt to link the liberal peace interventions in fragile states to the colonial native administration practice. The key conclusion that he draws between the two distinct but organically linked interventionist epochs is the unending governing from a distance practice. I do agree with this governing at a distance
thesis, but, within the context of the Northern Region, colonialism cannot be exonerated from charges that it caused insecurity and poverty challenges.

In light of the issues discussed above the key argument of this chapter is that the current security and development challenges of poverty and conflict in the Northern Region are organically linked to the discriminatory colonial development practices. The colonial development policies put into effect were used in order to maintain pre-colonial peasantry in Northern Ghana. Additionally, the labour resources of Northern Ghana were used to promote the capitalists interest in the southern colonies. This anti-developmental objective was to be achieved through strategic articulation of various practices and policies to prevent expansion of the subsistent economic base of Northern Ghana.

In consideration of the key arguments of this chapter, I interrogate the core colonial policies that were deployed to undermine the developmental prospects and institutionalized ethnic conflicts in Northern Ghana. To fully address the key argument, I will rely on colonial documents and secondary literature as my core sources of information.

The first section of this chapter discusses in detail the uneven development policies between Northern Ghana and its Southern counterparts. Specific uneven core policies to be discussed are related to education, land and agriculture, infrastructure investment and labour recruitment. The second section interrogates the reconfiguration of the polity through the Indirect Rule policy. The processes leading to this political configuration will be discussed as well as the contestations and struggles that it ignited will be discussed. The third section deals with the processes for the incorporation of the Northern Region into independent Ghana. This section discusses the adverse incorporation of the Northern Region into the state formation of Ghana.
Colonial Development Policies in Northern Ghana

The development of Northern Ghana from the outset was an afterthought because the territory was politically disconnected from the Gold Coast Colony. There was no pressing political or economic interest to develop Northern Ghana. Grischow (2006) suggests that the potential commercial and trade benefits of the Northern Ghana (by virtue of its proximity to the Sahelian) might have explained its annexation. A careful consideration of the colonial government’s policies suggests that the occupation of Northern Ghana was to serve complex as well as contradictory and complex capitalist/imperialist and mercantilist interest. The contradiction lies in the fact that Ferguson’s economic report about the promising agricultural potential of the Northern Territories did not result in meaningful investment to develop the agrarian resources. Ferguson reports that:

The resources of the country under notice consist of gold in the western districts of Gaman, Lobi and branches of the Kong Mountains; ivory, horses, cattle and slaves brought down by caravans from the Mossi and the region of the Middle Niger; shea butter the producing tree growing abundantly in the plains; gum Arabic, produced in enormous quantity in the plains, but which at present does not form an article of export to any extent. …..Rice, guinea corn, millet and other cereals as well as ground-nut, sweet potato and cassava grow luxuriously in the rich plains…the people cultivate indigo, tobacco and cotton. (Ferguson, 1892, No. 35 in 448. In Arhin, 1974, p.67-68)
This statement suggests the role that mercantilist interests played in the hinterland, providing an added economic impetus to the colonial administration’s political interest in the annexation of the territory. Considering this information, justification for territorial, political and administrative control as a way to protect the inhabitants of Northern Ghana is a blatant farce. The real intent appears to be an enforcement of order and the exploitation of labour resources to support a capitalist export economy in Southern Ghana. For the rest of this chapter, the terms ‘Northern Territories,’ ‘Northern Ghana’ and ‘the North’ will be used interchangeably, likewise with the terms ‘Southern Ghana’, ‘Southern Colonies’ and ‘the South.’

The keen capitalist interest in developing the Southern colonies certainly was the overriding objective, and the NT was used to attain this goal. Thus, Governor Hodgson justified the low budgetary allocation for the NT states by arguing:

The country as far as is known is destitute of mineral wealth, it is destitute of valuable timbers, and does not produce rubber or kola nuts or indeed any product of trade value…….. I therefore cannot too strongly urge the employment of all available resources of the government upon the development of the country to the South of Kintampo leaving the Northern Territories to be dealt with in future years…….. I would not at any present spend upon the northern territories ….. A single penny more than is absolutely necessary for their suitable administration and the encouragement of the transit trade (Gold Coast Confidential Dispatch, From Governor Hodgson to Chamberlain, December 20, 1899, Cited in Kimble, 1961, p. 533-4.)
The above admission underlines the official development policy for Northern Ghana. Essentially, the material development of the North was not a priority for the colonial administration. This implies that the South, richly endowed with exportable products would benefit from immense infrastructural and other productive investments. Considering this, it is critical at this point to interrogate the colonial development policies that institutionalized stagnant agrarian development in Northern Ghana.

The anti-developmental objective of Governor Hodgson against the North stood in sharp contrast to the Secretary of State, Joseph Chamberlain’s developmental objective for the colonies. Chamberlain decreed, in what would become the industrial back-up for the empire, that Britain develop its colonies. The decree states:

It is not enough to occupy great spaces of the world’s surface unless you can make the best of them, unless you are willing to develop them. We are the landlords of a great estate; it is the duty of the landlord to develop the estate.... In my opinion, it would be the wisest course for the Government of this country to use British capital and British credit to create an instrument of trade (i.e. Railways) in all....... new important countries. I firmly believe that not only would they, in so doing, give an immediate impetus to British trade and industry in the manufacture of machinery that is necessary for the purpose, but also in the long run.... they would sooner or later earn a large reward either directly or indirectly. (Cowen and Shenton, 1996, p. 248)

The dictates of this decree are certainly at variance with the peasantry promotion rationale that was the underlying framework for the development of Northern Ghana. The implication is that
the moral responsibility goal of the colonial ‘development’ practices in the North was certainly a ruse to serve other interests. My view is that the moral duty and responsibility to develop the Northern Territories was side-stepped to develop the export economy in the Southern colonies instead.

**Colonial Labour Recruitment Policy**

The youth and able-bodied, while considered an essential element in the material development of any society, was actually used to retard the advancement of the Northern Territories. Recruitment of manpower from the North started from a security angle. In 1897, the government proposed the recruitment of Gonja, Dagomba, Gurunsi and Mossi people for the Gold Coast Regiment of the West Africa Frontier Force (Metcalfe, 1964, p. 494). In subsequent years, and by 1917, close to 90% of the men and officers of the Gold Coast Regiment were from the North. A police escort division was established in 1908 to provide internal security in the colony. Indeed the 1926/27 Annual Gold Coast Report outlines the duties of the escort police and its ethnic composition:

The Escort Police are illiterate and are mainly natives of the Northern Territories. Among their number are many old soldiers of the Gold Coast Regiment and they are generally of a more military type than the educated class. They are available for all duties not requiring reading and writing and are specifically useful on escort duties, guards, patrols and the like. In the event of any unusual disturbance escort police are employed to cope with it (p.32).
This statement attests to the low level jobs reserved for the natives of NT, especially in jobs that Southerners were unwilling to undertake. In sum, this escort police division was established to serve two cardinal security and economic objectives. The massive recruitment of men from the North served the purpose of reducing the conflict propensity in the territory to ensure security in the region. Secondly, the escort division served to provide the necessary security that was vital for capitalist exploitation in the southern colonies. The same report indicates that the general police, who serve as the mainstream police service, are dominated by recruits from the Coastal colony.

Beyond the security-oriented recruitment, the central force behind this labour recruitment drive from the NT was to build capitalist relations and commercial interests in the southern colonies. The capitalist interest in gold, diamond, bauxite manganese, cocoa, palm oil and rubber attracted high capital investment in such resources. Investment in these natural resources was accompanied by capital investment in infrastructure. The growth in gold, for instance, was seen in incremental scale of export value. The period 1898-1902 recorded the value of gold to be £55,000 in export revenue, which rose to £597,000, and, by 1907, to £1,130,000 (Kay, 1971, p.334). The cocoa sector total exports grew exponentially from zero tons in 1891 to 5000 tons by 1900, then to 23,000 by 1910 and to more than 51,300 tons by 1913 (Kay, 1972, p. 336). The phenomenal growth in both gold and cocoa production, amidst other conditions, created high demand for labour beginning in 1905.

One of the pertinent conditions that facilitated the labour shortage that warranted the implementation of this labour policy on Northern Territories was the refusal on the part of southern workers to work in the underground mines. The
Annual Mines Department report of 1916-20 suggests that a daily average of 7900 men worked in the underground at that time. The refusal of southern workers to work in the mines can be attributed to the availability of less tedious jobs in the cocoa, palm-oil and rubber plantations. It is instructive to note that the out-migration of the Nigerian and Liberian workers in the mines following the buoyant rubber industry also accounted for the labour shortage.

Given the possible dire consequences of this labour shortage, the management of the Tarkwa Mines made a request to Chief Commissioner Waterston for a supply of labourers from the Northern Territories. After subsequent negotiations in regard to the terms around working conditions, the deployment of the first batch of labourers commenced in 1906 (Thomas, 1973). 1907 saw an organized recruitment for the mines following the deployment of the first batch with the District Commissioners and chiefs serving as recruitment facilitators. The District Commissioners were paid 5s for every gang they recruited (Thomas, 1973). In the meanwhile, no opportunity was created for the Northern Ghana recruits to develop their innate skills.

The tedious nature of the underground work was enough reason for many of the recruits to return home in 1909, whilst other refused to work and some ran away. Reports suggest that a second batch of recruits made up of 163 Dagomba and Mamprusi men were dispatched on July 1909; five of these men died en route, and several others contracted smallpox. By July 13, 1909, virtually all of the remaining men had vacated their jobs. With this necessary boycott of mine work, an acute labour shortage was declared in mid-1909. Giles Hunt, an attorney for ten mining companies wrote a letter to Governor Rodger, in which he proposed the establishment
of a Native Labour Association for recruitment from the Northern Territories as the solution to the labour shortage in the mines (Thomas, 1973). Hunt further proposed an amendment to the Master and Servant Ordinance in order to tighten the penalties for violation of contracts by the recruits. For example, the rules of the contract were varied to ensure that recruits work for a minimum of a year before they are allowed to return home and must be medically and physically examined (Chamber of Mines to CO. 1912 in Illiasu Papers). Governor Rodger, however, rejected this proposal and, in consultation with the Secretary for Mines and Chief Commissioner, decided that recruitment should be carried out by the Chiefs. They believed that this recruitment would create the impression that men were volunteering for service (Thomas, 1973).

The recruitment from the Northern Territories reached its highest level following the institution of Guggisberg’s 10 year development plan, which ran during his time in office from 1919-1927. A key aspect of Guggisberg’s development plan was massive infrastructural investment in the southern colonies, including road construction, government buildings, the Achimota School, hospitals and railways. Thus by the early part of the 1920s, an average of 3000-4000 men were recruited from the Northern Territories to work in the railway and mining sectors (Mines Departmental Annual Report 1921-23).

The recruitment of men from the North must be placed in the larger context of the retarded educational system in the Northern Territories, which created great number of unskilled graduates. In addition, the confinement of Northern Ghana labour to low-paying jobs in the Southern colonies was part of the strategy to limit the
quantity of remittances available to their kinsfolk. It is interesting to note that the
majority of the Northern indigenes that served in the security services occupied lower
ranks.

Whilst labour from the Northern Territories was being used to develop the
southern colonies, there was no corresponding developmental intervention in the
North. The chiefs further complained about the lack of reciprocal investment in the
Northern Territories, which did nothing to change the neglect. In order to deepen their
protest against exploitation, the chiefs selected weak men to work in the plantations.
This led to rejection of the recruits by the mining companies. In fact, Guggisberg, in
solidarity with the chiefs of Northern Ghana, suggested that labour should be recruited
in localities of the infrastructure, since they are the direct beneficiaries. During a
meeting with the selected chiefs of Northern Ghana in Salaga, in 1921, Guggisberg
reiterated his promise to extend the railway network to the North. This was a gesture
to compensate for the exploitation of Northern Ghana manpower resources.

My contention is that claiming that the ‘natives’ of Northern Ghana were
unruly was a diversionary act to cover the dangerous nature of the work in the
underground mines. The net effect of subjecting these recruits from the Northern
Territories to this kind of work had a debilitating effect on their personal
advancement. This led to the streamlining of the recruitment process to ensure that
the recruits were committed to the work. The recruits were not expected to return
home with skills and knowledge to improve their communities, but rather to stay in
the mines long-term.
The experience of working in the mine was characterized by low wages, endless diseases and infections, as well as psychological and cultural alienation. In particular, there were a great number of deaths from tuberculosis and pulmonary diseases among the NT recruits who worked in the Tarkwa mines beginning in 1918. This phenomenon was noted by Sir William Simpson, a surgeon whose job it was to inspect the mines (Simpson to the CO. 1924). The mining companies, however, blamed the deaths on the poor health conditions of the recruits. Coercive means of ensuring the return of recruits led to staggered payment systems being introduced. Payouts of meager wages of 1s 6d per day were delayed in order to keep the recruits committed to work (Giles Hunt to Colonial Secretary, 1909. Illiasu Papers). A striking negative effect of this labour recruitment has been the inferior status accorded to these migrants by Southerners. This unequal relationship between the comparatively richer southerners and poorer northerners unfortunately did not alter the disproportionate political representation of needs and priorities from the post-independence era. The ensuing social inequality gap between the two sets of people translated into poor state formation, which accounts for the perpetual poverty conditions of the northern region. In the last section of this chapter, I will explain further, the adverse incorporation of the Northern Region into the immediate post-independence state of Ghana.

Labour recruitment practices officially ended in 1927. The unofficial movement to the South did not end. As of the twenty-first century, downward migration remains one of the few livelihood options for residents of the Northern Region. The crucial issue remains the terms of incorporation into the few sprawling
Based on my personal observation in the national capital, I can attest to the dire conditions in which the Northern migrants, particularly young women and girls endure in Accra.

**Colonial Government Land Policy in the Northern Ghana**

The precursor to the appropriation of the land resources in NG was the enactment of the Mineral Rights Ordinance in 1904, after the initial gold prospecting by British mining companies. With the passing of the mineral rights ordinance, regulatory power was given to the colonial administration to regulate mineral prospecting in the Northern Territories. In effect, the colonial administration, in its quest to raise significant money, raised the concession fees, leading to a disincentive for mine prospecting in the territory. Further, no tax incentives were provided to attract prospective mining companies. Subsequent to the passing of the Mineral Rights Ordinance, the enactment of the Northern Territories Land Ordinance began in 1923 (Bening, 1995). The Northern Territories Land Ordinance effectively nationalized the land in the Northern Territories, stripping the chiefs of their power and the *Tendana*, their traditional and spiritual control and ownership of the land. Because of the absolute control of the land by the colonial government, a pittance was paid to the chiefs by mining companies in their concession fees. The colonial government received £40 per sq. km of land and the chiefs were paid £10 (Der, 1975). Furthermore, considering the high concession fees charged by the government, there was no pay consideration given to the chiefs. The consideration fees actually preceded the concession, in which case the southern colony chiefs were paid £50,000.
With the avowed aim of keeping capitalist penetration out of the Northern Territories, and without consultation with the chiefs of the North, the state passed the Land and Native Right Ordinance in 1927. The Land and Native Right Ordinance vested all lands, mineral resources and water bodies to the crown and made them subject to the discretionary of the Governor. Significantly, the passing of the Land and Native Right Ordinance was contested by local legislators in the South, who were members of the Aboriginal Rights Protected Society. The core of their argument - which was upheld - was that the lands of Northern Ghana belong to the natives and are not for the crown to appropriate (Kimble, 1963). The rejection of the 1927 Land and Native Right Ordinance by the Legislative Assembly led to its revision in 1931. The revised 1931 Land and Native Right Ordinance had the following objectives: a) to prevent the natives from disposing of their lands outright, without regard for the requirements of their descendants, for totally inadequate payments; b) to ensure that such profits as are derived from the land are used for the benefit of the community as a whole and not of any particular section or individual member of it; and c) to minimize the possibility of ruinous litigation (Slater Speech, In Metcalfe, p. 634).

These stated objectives denied the chiefs and people of the North their autonomy in the management and utilization of their lands. Secondly, the Land and Native Rights Ordinance deprived the traditional leaders of the right to demand royalties that were necessary to develop their communities. Further, the revised ordinance perpetuated the paternalistic relations between the colonial administration and the people of Northern Ghana. Clearly, this paternalistic relation was a way to manipulate people against any possible revolt against the colonial government. This
revised ordinance reflects contemporary sustainable development discourse that is aimed at containing a particular group of people with no long-term transformational objective.

The effect of the rigid land use was agrarian expansion by both the chiefs and the people. Technically, this Land and Native Rights Ordinance dispossessed the indigenes of the North of their productive asset and rendered them stagnated peasants. The consequential effect was that the institutionalization of peasantry became a further disincentive to investors to develop crops like shea butter, rice and ground-nut in NG. This land use ordinance contributed to the stagnation of peasantry by limiting any expansion potential. In the end, labour recruitment became a major source of employment to support their livelihoods. On the other hand, their southern counterparts exercised a high degree of autonomy over their lands in order to further their economic and social interests.

The minuscule fees paid to the chiefs as concession fees undermined revenue mobilization which Northern Ghana needed for its development. In one instance the Wa Syndicate, a gold prospecting company, was charged £22,000 per annum to mine an area of 450 sq. miles. According to Der (1975, p. 28), the colonial government appropriated £18,000, whilst the Chiefs, Tendanas and Elders were collectively given £4,000. The southern colony chiefs, however, were paid much higher rents and expanded their cocoa, rubber and palm-oil plantations (Kimble, 1963). These plantations contributed to the diverse job opportunities in the Southern Colonies. Land nationalization policies used in the North denied traditional rulers and Tendanas the autonomy necessary to negotiate effectively to extract better rents they could use...
to address their developmental needs. A more serious effect of the land use ordinance is that the ultimate power vested in the Governor for allocation of any land for public use was, on some occasions, used to undermine agrarian development. A typical example is the confiscation of cultivated fertile lands for public buildings such as veterinary station in Tamale in the mid-1920s (Der, 1975, p. 29-30).

Before the enactment of the Land and Native Rights Ordinance, earlier attempts to nationalize the lands and mineral resources in the Southern Ghana had been made on three separate occasions in 1894, 1897 and 1911. The Bills on Land and Forestry were proposed by the colonial administration, and the main thrust of the 1897 Bill focused on land use rights and customary ownership. The merchants, chiefs, clergymen, intellectuals and lawyers from the South, however, fiercely defended their own land use rights (Berry, 1992, p. 341). The lead counsel of the southern business class and chiefs, John Mensah-Sarbah, a Coastal lawyer, argued there was no vacant land to be vested in the colonial government, because all land was fully owned by the community (Kimble, 1963, p. 338). The rejection of these proposed bills enabled the southern merchants to expand their plantations for wealth accumulation.

**Colonial Infrastructural Investment Policy**

One of the most important areas in which the fusion of political and economic interests of the southern colonies worked against the Northern territories was the investment decisions of capital expenditure. In an address to the Legislative Assembly, Governor Hugh justified the decision not to construct any railway infrastructure in the North. The statement reads:
In this matter (railway), however, the Northern Territories must be content to await its turn. At the present time … Many of the richest and most developed districts of the colony and of Ashanti are still without any efficient means of transporting their produce to the coast; and it is not until these districts have been opened up by the railway extensions that the provision of similar facilities for the Northern Territories can be regarded as a question of practical politics. The Government of the Colony must be content for years- it may be for decades- to recognize the Northern Territories as a direct and unremunerative expenditure. (Metcalf, p. 544-548).

This statement underlines the colonial central policy that dictated the use of the Northern Territories to support the capitalist venture in the Southern colonies. Considering that investment decisions tend to be driven by expected returns from colony, this demonstrates a clear lack of appreciation for the labour resources from Northern Ghana that provided manpower needs to the mines and security of the colony. The declaration by the governor about the failure to create a rail infrastructure attests to the lack of interest in the established agricultural resources in Northern Ghana. Therefore, Northern Ghana needed to be confined to stagnant agrarian economy in order to ensure primitive accumulation. The absence of the functional political representation of the Northern Territories in the Legislative Assembly essentially ceded all important decisions to the caprices and whims of the southern-dominated legislators. Furthermore, the mercantilist and imperialist interests in the gold, cocoa, palm-oil and rubber resources available in the south fiercely resisted any attempt to extend productive
infrastructure to the Northern Territories. I will use the railway for explanatory reasons to explain the complex political nature of resource allocation for infrastructural development.

Recommendations for the extension of railway to the Northern Territories were made by Ferguson during his economic feasibility tour in 1896. He remarked that “the contour of the interior offer facilities for animal transport and railway” (cited in Arhin, 1974, p. 99). This recommendation, however, was not considered when the territory was annexed in 1902. Furthermore, the vast mineral resources available in the southern colonies significantly galvanized capitalist interest to convince His Majesty (HM) to invest in railways in the south. A memo sent to His Majesty by a group of London Merchants reads, “the Gold Coast being entirely without beasts of burden or means of water transport, there can be no real or important development of its resources or trade without the formation of a railway”. (Metcalf, p. 413-415). This memo, along with sustained pressure on the colonial administration led to the commitment of resources to a construct rail network in the southern colonies. By 1901, there was railway connection between Accra, Kumasi and Sekondi-Tarkwa. This productive infrastructure benefited a wide array of business actors, ranging from the local merchants to mining companies and to the local administration and the chiefs.

Upon Guggisberg taking office, there was a shift in the colonial administration’s infrastructure investment policy. Guggisberg’s major concern was the inequities in regional development that was to the detriment to NG. In order to correct this inequitable regional development, he proposed an extension of the rail network from Kumasi to the North. Guggisberg categorically stated that “the career of the Northern Territories as the Cinderella of the Gold Coast is nearing its end. As Cinderella she has done good and unobstructive work that. Her reward for that and the gallantry of her soldiers …is in sight.” (Government Gazette,
1919, p.1006). It is vital to note that Guggisberg’s interest in the Northern Ghana was to more easily enact the strategic realization of colonial policy. This policy was guided by the need to diversify the economic base of the colonies, so that the products of the Northern Territories could counter falls in the commodity prices of gold and cocoa. Grischow notes that “the Northern Territories provided Guggisberg with a clean slate for his experiment in development without denationalization” (2006, p.62). This commitment by Guggisberg to develop and diversify the economic potential of the Northern Territories in a broader sense was to fulfill the Chamberlain decree. The vast untapped agricultural resources in the North, to a large degree, influenced Guggisberg’s proposal to extend the railway to the region. He stated unequivocally:

I have absolute evidence that the country is extremely rich ground for the development of huge trade in both groundnut and shea butter. It is also a fine country for rice in the Volta flats, a commodity badly needed here and of which, with a railway, we could export large quantities. I am doubtful if the agricultural poverty of the country was a reason for the desire to postpone the railway. Rather was it due to the policy which has openly obtained... of starving the Northern territories of the means of development. The time is now past”. (ADM. 12/2/32, 1919; p. 15-16).

Guggisberg’s promise of a railway never materialized, however, because political opponents of railway construction in the North rejected the plan on three grounds. Led by Governor Slater, their objections articulated that; a) the railway was estimated to cost 50% more than the most expensive of any previous railway build in the colony; b) the railway was due to pass through areas where the population was only about a third as dense as in the colony and round Kumasi;
and c) the railway would serve an area where cacao could never be grown (Metcalfe, 1963, p. 624-626).

Studies conducted by the United Africa Company, show financial and economic promise for crops such as shea butter and ground-nut. On the basis of the bright prospects of the two products, the Chairman of United Africa Company urged the Colonial Office to extend the railway to the Northern Territories. His proposal was turned down on the grounds that the scattered nature of the shea trees posed a problem for centralization, which even with good output and rail access would be an expensive investment that made the project unfeasible. These objections were raised in relation to ground-nut plantations, and the proposal was rejected after the United African Company lobbied for the rail extension.

The absence of this railway system led to the collapse of the British Cotton Growers Association after nine years in business. Cocoa merchants in the Southern colonies opposed a similarly request by the British Coffee Growers Association for an extension of rail service to the North. Similar requests for railway construction in the Northern Territories was made by the British mining companies that started the gold prospecting, which led to the enactment of the Mineral Rights Ordinance. A vital case in support of the railway was the discovery of the gold deposits in Nangodi in Northern Ghana in 1933. The exploitation of these mines was halted because of the high cost of transporting the imported machinery to the north as well as sending the ore to the port in the south (Dickson, 1976, p. 103-104). Resistance on the part of the mining conglomerates to the extension of the rail network to the north cannot be ignored. According to Brukum, (1998) the European mining companies, in tandem with the southern colonial administrators, succeeded in blocking any rail investment in the North.
Guggisberg’s quest to extend the rail service to the Northern Territories ended when his
time in office ended in 1926. Instead, three main road networks were promised the region
because Governor Slater deemed to be just a fraction of the cost of building a railway. The
official death knell for railway construction in the North was sounded by Lord Passfield in
1929, who emphasized explicitly: “I have read your full and clear view of the case with great
interest and after careful consideration, I cannot but agree with you that circumstances at
present do not justify the construction of such a railway, which must accordingly be postponed
and need no longer be regarded as a project to be taken up in the near future” (Kay, 1972, p.
166). Lord Passfield’s statement reflects the opinion of the colonial government which had
resolved never to expand the economic base of the Northern Territories. Instead, they would
focus on expanding export markets in the southern economies. Notably, the high sunk cost for
rail infrastructure, has been used by all postcolonial governments to deny requests to provide
the region with a rail transport system.

The essence of the railway construction project in the southern communities was to
entice investment by outsiders in the resources of the territory and to reduce transaction costs.
As of 1920, a head porterage system became the main means of transport for goods in the
Northern Territories, and a report has suggested that, each porter walked close to 400 miles per
annum transporting goods (Department of Road, 1908).

**Colonial Agricultural Development Policy**

The colonial administration policy practices for agriculture development in Northern Ghana
reflects a combination of ambivalent opinions and neglected positions. With the exception of

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brief spells of experimentation with capital injections into the agricultural sector, subsistence production was the norm.

The enormous agricultural endowments of the Northern Territories did not stimulate much investment interest in its development when compared to the exportable products in the Southern colonies. From the onset of the annexation of the Northern Territories in 1897, Chief Commissioners assigned experts to study the commercial viability of identified crops such as tobacco, cotton and indigo. Subsequently, Lt. Col. Morris, the Chief Commissioner in 1904, identified the commercial viability of cotton grown in large parts of the North that was already being traded in the Southern colonies. Paradoxically, Morris refused to authorize investment in cotton plantations. He argued that, given the failure of the experimental cotton growing projects in Anum and Labolabo, the administration would not commit to invest funds to develop cotton crops (Acting Governor Bryan, Government House, 26 June 1905 to Mr. Lyttelton. ADM. 56/1/113; NAG, Accra). Again, the clear disinterest in developing these crops cannot be under-estimated: the two southern colonies that hosted the cotton-growing experiments were not successful because they were not known as hubs of cotton production in the south. Traders from Northern Territories, however, had been growing and trading cotton grown in Salaga as far back as 1881 (Kimble, 1963). This cotton was exchanged for cloth in the southern colonies.

The first major attempt at capitalist penetration into the Northern Territories was geared toward the exploitation of the cotton crop and was started by the British Cotton Growers Association in 1906. They conducted all the required commercial and technical feasibility studies that provided promising results leading to the initiation of production. Reports indicate that from an initial bale of cotton purchased in 1909, production increased steadily to boost
exports of 27,882 lbs. in 1916 (Annual Report of the Northern Territories for 1915. ADM. 5/1/24). It is intriguing that this existing commercial link between the north and south was not sustained by the colonial administration. The colonial desire to use the Northern Territories to support their imperialist ventures in the southern colonies could explain this neglect.

In recognition of the steady progress of the British Cotton Growers Association, Watherston travelled to England to woo investors to invest in the crop. He espoused the potential of cotton as follows:

The Cotton is of distinctly promising quality and would be readily saleable in this country. It is similar in character to Improved American Upland but some-what depreciated in value by the presence of stained fiber. If greater care were taken in cultivation and means adopted to combat the ravages of insect pests, the cotton would be much improved and probably equal in value to the better qualities of American cotton grown from selected seed. (Watherston, 1908, p. 365)

A year after Watherston’s promising crusade for cotton’s potential, British Cotton Growers Association complained of severe challenges, especially when it came to labour shortages and high transportation costs. These physical shortages are tied to colonial policies to deny Northern Territories the necessary productive infrastructure and labour recruitment for the mines. Significantly, the cotton project was viewed as an economic distraction to the Southern colonies, as suggested in a letter directed to the Prime Minister of England about the need to discontinue the project.

In an official communication with the Sir Arthur Hutton, the Chairman of British Coffee Growers Association, the Prime Minister relayed the Governor’s message for the
discontinuation of the project. The Prime Minister argued that "having considered the unprofitability of cotton growing being developed on a large scale in the North…the presence of more lucrative agricultural industries, such as the production of cocoa and palm-oil" were to be supported. Another issue highlighted by the Prime Minister was that cotton prospectors would have to compete with the mines for labour, which could lead to a labour shortage (10 Downing Street, 11 May, 1909 to Chairman, B.C.G.A. ADM.56/1/78). This official shift of interest in supporting the product explains the lukewarm reaction to the British CottonGrowers Association project that ended up being confined to its experimental stage. Preferences for the resources found in the southern colonies did not favour the Northern Territories, and cotton was sacrificed for cocoa and palm oil. The Prime Minister’s statement indicated that the government would support the economic interest of three main actors in the metropolitan center. These three actors included local merchants from the southern colonies, the colonial administration and business magnates in the mining sector. In fact, Mr. A. Balstone, the Acting Inspector of Customs, reaction to the Governor’s conclusion about a rail transportation system in the North included a statement in which he indicated that he did not-“think any form of commercial cultivation can be attempted with success, until a proper means of transportation of introduced” (A. Balstone, to the Governor, Accra. ADM 56/1/131). This clarion call, however, was not enough to reverse the colonial administration’s policy directive of non-infrastructural investment in Northern Ghana.

This apathetic attitude towards cotton production prevented the appropriate socio-political incentives from instituting the necessary infrastructure and services to enhance the socio-economic well-being of the indigenes in the North. Unsurprisingly, later events point to the futile outcome of the project. The Annual Gold Coast Report reflects the dismal fortunes
of cotton production. It notes that, “There were no maritime exports during the year, but exports of seed-cotton over the eastern frontier amounted to 2.0 tons. Little interest is taken in the crop in the Northern Territories. A small amount is grown for local use” (Gold Coast Annual Report 1938/39, p. 35). These statements reinforce the deliberate will of the colonial government to under-develop trade in the Northern Territories. In addition, the endowment of the North with valuable agricultural products suggests that the region’s under-development cannot be attributed to a lack of exportable products. Instead, it was a calculated attempt on the part of the colonial government to suppress the territory in order to mitigate any possible anti-colonial resistance and to facilitate the exploitation of labourers in the territory.

There was some experimentation in the North to develop crops such as rice, shea nuts and cattle, despite the recommendation of colonial agricultural officers who believed all three would be of economic benefit. None translated into full scale commercial investment. Indeed, Mr. N.C. McLeod, a Colonial Conservator of Forests, was commissioned to investigate the economic potential for shea nuts. He concluded that 250,000 tons of shea butter could be produced annually to generate the funds necessary to develop the Northern Territories (N. C. McLeod, Conservator of Forests on the shea nuts areas of the Northern Territories; ADM, 56/1/158). This potential to develop shea exports attracted British investors who supported the exportation of the nuts. The lack of a cost-effective transportation system, however, was enough to discourage investors like John Walkden and Company, African Merchants, and W. Bartholomew and Company to invest in shea nuts (Annual Report of the Northern Territories, 1926/1927 p. 7). From the perspective of the colonial administration in the area, the market potential for shea nuts in Europe and America was unknown, and the price for shea nuts was lower than that for palm-oil, and overall yield per tree is low (Ag. Governor, Thomas to
Secretary of State, 1929. In Kay, 1972, p. 218). Low economic interest in exportable crops
grown in the North undermined any commitment on the part of colonial governments towards
the development of the shea nut industry in Northern Ghana.

A modest attempt on the part of the colonial government was made to introduce mixed
farming in Northern Ghana as a way to increase productivity. This policy directive, however,
was a response to an increased demand for products in the southern colonies. The policy was to
focus on peasant farmer and in order to provide credence for the new practice. This move,
despite the lofty potential mixed farming had for peasants was not welcomed by them. The
crux of the matter was that the peasants, having being ignored for decades without introduction
to mechanized farming, were accustomed to reliance on available village and household labour
to meet their manpower needs.

The bullock ploughing system used to facilitate mixed farming could not be sustained,
especially in the Dagomba area of the Northern Territories. In a letter to the Chief
Commissioner, the District Commissioner of Dagomba wrote that:

I agree with…remarks as to the difficulty in persuading the Dagomba
farmer to change their system of farming. The people are very
conservative and view any change with disfavor. Even the fact that the
cultivation with bullocks is less laborious than their own methods of will
hardly appeal to them as majority of them are now in a position to hire
labour to make their farms” (Letter from the District Commissioner to the
Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories. Tamale: National
Archives of Ghana, March 15, 1940).
The peasants had developed (low scale) coping mechanisms in the face of many decades of colonial neglect and were unwilling to change. Furthermore, it must be understood that the peasants can equally determine the prospect of any new technique, before deciding whether to adopt it or not. Therefore, they have every right to view any external technique with doubtful suspicion. The bullock ploughing technique was alien to the peasant farmers, a fact that confirms the complexity of the change in farming practices that has been ignored and misunderstood by other agents.

Another hindrance to the adoption of mixed farming innovation was the cost of doing so. According to Benneh (1972, p. 101), non-adoption of new ploughing techniques was due to the vicious cycle of poverty that the farmers found themselves in. They were unable to secure loan support from co-operative groups and banks, and had no way to increase their production in order to secure credit. We must be careful not to naturalize the poverty of those in Northern Ghana, but rather to be sure to situate this poverty in the context of the neglect of the colonial administration. As events turned out, it was only in the North-East section of the Northern Ghana that the bullock technique was embraced. This move did increase rice and ground nut production but, the monopsony created by southern merchants deprived the farmers their due profit (For details see Plange, 1976).

With the exception of the brief era of mixed farming that gave some peasants support, the rest of the colonial era involved the neglecting of the traditional staples of the Northern Ghana. The traditional staples include; maize, yam, millet, ground-nuts, rice and beans. The cumulative effect of this neglect of traditional staples was to limit the productive capacity and capabilities of the peasants.
The post-war era ushered in a new agricultural policy that I refer to as colonial development *dirigisme* (massive state development). This *dirigisme* approach was very much influenced by the Fabian Socialism orientation towards heavily developing the colonies to serve the economic interest of Great Britain and to maintain and promote the African community. In justifying the need for the extensive development of the African resources, Sir Stafford Cripps, at the Governor’s conference in 1947, stated:

The further development of African resources is of crucial importance to the rehabilitation and strengthening of Western Europe as the restoration of European productive power is to the future progress and property of Africa. Each needs and is needed by the other…We must be prepared to change our outlook and our habits for colonial development and force the pace so that within the next two to five years we can get a really marked increase of production in coal, minerals, timber, raw materials of all kinds, foodstuffs and anything else that will save dollars or will sell in the dollar market (Cabinet Press Release, November 12, 1947).

The policy outcome of this new colonial priority was the investment of £22,500,000 into oilseed and ground-nut plantations to support the British economy in the East and West African colonies. During the post-Second World War era, Unilever conducted prospective studies focused on the commercial viability of ground-nut cultivation in the North. The encouraging findings of these studies largely informed the colonial administration’s decision to invest in the crop.
The Gonja Development Corporation was established by the colonial administration to embark on large-scale commercial cultivation of ground-nuts in 1948. The Gonja Development Corporation was set up after a period of political strife surrounding the selection of the site in Damongo (West Gonja), which was, at that time, an uninhabited area. This was a heavily capitalist project that sought to instate massive mechanized farming, which would involve the peasants as wage-earners in the project. Eighty thousand non-natives were expected to move from Zuarangu, at the time considered to be an over-populated area, to Damongo, where the farms were to be located. The overall project objective of increased productivity was an abject failure, in which output was below the average international level. Also there was no evidence that any produce was sold in commercial quantity, and the intended resettlement of the farmers did not take effect (Quansah, 1972). In view of the noted failure of Gonja Development Corporation, it was officially liquidated in 1956. From a technocratic standpoint, the colonial administrators attributed the failure to “inherent soil infertility, erratic rainfall, remoteness of the area, and the reluctance of people to move and settle permanently on the site” (Quansah, 1972, p. 15-17). Significantly, the failure of the project seemed imminent from the onset because, the sudden introduction of a highly capitalist-oriented agricultural project in a traditional peasant-farming setting is likely to fail because response to market incentives does not develop automatically. The already-identified deliberate policies to ruin communities within the North could offer structural relational explanations for the failure. My interview with an elder in the Tamale metropolis during the fieldwork suggests that deep-seated mistrust by the resettled indigenes regarding the ground-nut production also contributed to the failure.
Colonial Education Policy in Northern Ghana

Education was one of the main areas that generated the developmental differences between the southern colonies and the northern territories. The colonial administration ran diametrically opposed educational systems in Southern Ghana. The southern colonies had a formal European type of education, whereas the Northern Territories had very restricted education. The reason for this differential will be discussed below.

The colonial administration’s preferences to use manpower resources imported from the North hindered the early establishment of a formal educational system in the territory. This policy practice arose in response to a rising educated class in the southern colonies who pursued diverse administrative and or clerical occupations within the colony. The colonial administration devised strict regulations to prevent the White Fathers of the Catholic Church in 1907 from providing European education to the people of Northern Ghana (Ladouceur, 1979, p. 50). I conclude that the underlying colonial policy on education was primarily to produce people who were unwilling to supplant their local and traditional social structures. Guggisberg’s remarks in the next paragraph support my conclusion that education policies in Northern Ghana were intended to produce citizens loyal to their tradition who were unwilling to implement changes.

Prior to Governor Guggisberg’s entering office, there existed a limited educational infrastructure in the North, which was diametrically opposed to that of the southern colonies. Guggisberg, notwithstanding his promise to reverse the developmental deficits in the North, however, envisaged an educational policy that would maintain the traditional social system in the Northern Territories. Guggisberg was influenced by policies that guarded against the
premature westernization of the Northern Territories. Governor Guggisberg (1921) remained influenced by this mantra of guarding against premature westernization for the Northern Territories and emphasized the need for the territory to start on a ‘clean slate’ in terms of educational development amidst the pervasive internal politics itself. To support his policy goal, he asserted that:

> When we give a Dagomba man a European education we do not want him to forget the customs of his own country. We do not want to make him a European. We want to teach him to remain a good Dagomba. If you want good trade and have a fine country, it is necessary that you should all be good Dagombas and stick together and not to try and break up. That is why we are going to be very careful about the European education that we give you (N.A.G.A, ADM. 56/1/258. 1921).

This statement attests to the limited educational opportunities that the colonial administration planned to provide the people of Northern Ghana. Clearly, this educational motive was geared towards maintaining harmony between the educated and their traditional rulers, a move that would be convenient for the colonial administration. The attainment of order and territorial cohesion was prioritized over long-term pragmatic human capability building in Northern Ghana.

The need to prevent anti-colonial resistance was in actual fact stated by Guggisberg as a justification for his decision not to replicate western education in the Northern Ghana. He declared that, “it is obvious that to do anything at the present moment that would extend education system in the Northern Territories would be extremely inadvisable. In the Northern Territories we have a virgin ground on which
to work, as far as education is concerned, guided by the lessons brought to us by the failures in the colony and Ashanti” (File Number ADM/56/1/88, letter Number 30/M.P.2189/24, 1925). In fact, this practice of parallel educational systems within the same country, in the absence of vital political and economic interests that would support Northern Ghana, would hinder its long–term development.

An ascriptive educational policy was instituted to limit the number of northerners who qualified to be trained at Achimota College (former Prince of Wales College). Particularly, sons and relatives of the chiefs who passed the Standard Seven exams were allowed to enroll at Achimota College. They were not, however, allowed to proceed to the secondary school programme (Ladouceur, 1979 p. 52). The reason for this was that the colonial government believed that when sons of the chiefs were educated, there would be no threat to the stability of the territory. The quest for the maintenance of traditional order which was the colonial administration’s overriding objective, inhibited educational expansion in the Northern Territories.

In order to satisfy the restrictive educational polices in the North, the curriculum was geared towards basic vocational training, where the curriculum in the southern colonies was geared more towards diverse skill training. The 1934/35 Gold Coast Annual Report, indicates that the curriculum provided in the Northern Territories at the primary school level included: mat-making, raffia-making, rope making and rough carpentry. At the primary level in the southern colonies, students were taught courses that included: speaking, reading, and writing in vernacular and English, arithmetic, duties and rights of citizens, drawing, nature study, hygiene, handwork and domestic science for girls. Not only was there a significant difference
in the curriculum used in the different colonies, the southern colonies had secondary
schools, technical schools, five teacher training colleges and a university college.
Education flourished to the extent that the building of schools had to be halted in the
early 1920’s so that resources could be devoted to the establishment of Prince of
Wales College (Plange, 1976). The Prince of Wales College provided primary to
university education that was predominantly of benefit to southerners. Prince of
Wales College was affiliated with University of London and offered degrees in arts,
science and engineering.

The exposure of southerners to higher education gave them an advantage when
it came to finding jobs that were rewarding. For example, Ladouceur (1979)
confirms that the southerners, who worked in Northern Ghana, occupied
administrative positions that northerners would not be able to get. Northerners were
limited to menial jobs in the mines, plantations and to low ranked security positions.
In short, the human capital formation differential between the Southern and Northern
Ghana had a significant impact on the overall social inequalities that existed between
the two distinct geographical spaces.

In addition to limiting access to courses and schools, further measures were
deployed to prevent progressive adjustment of the educational system to meet the
future skill needs of the inhabitants of Northern Ghana. In particular, there was a strict
limitation of qualified teachers assigned to teach in the northern schools, especially
during the Guggisberg regime. In fact, this deliberate neglect of the educational
system in the North was highlighted earlier by Capt. Wheeler, the Chief
Commissioner:
To give these primitive children more advanced education would be a doubtful blessing at present. It might tend to make them discontented with their lot. Is our population so large at present that we can afford to educate natives for work on the coast? On the other hand if they, on leaving school, return to their families with advanced education, will this make for peace in the household? Will these educated youth go back to work on the farms? (ADM 56/1/33).

These remarks by Capt. Wheeler reinforce that the colonial administration was using sub-standard education as a way to prevent resistance movements from forming in the North. The result of these educational restrictions hindered the ability of the indigenes of Northern Ghana to develop the skills necessary to rise out of poverty. This deliberate provision of sub-standard education is in tune with the official development policy that restricted investment in Northern Ghana. Such limited education would not provide the necessary incentives to diversify the economic base of the region. From my perspective, the inevitable consequence of limited access to education undermined the political participation of Northerners, especially in the processes that culminated in national independence. The implications of a weak educational system will be discussed in the post independent integration of Northern Ghana.

The next section discusses the processes of exercising political control of the different ethnic groups in Northern Ghana. Primarily, the Indirect Rule was the political strategy devised to ensure political and administrative control in the North.
**Indirect Rule: Empowerment of ‘Native Kingdoms’ and Conflict Implications**

Indirect rule is a form of decentralized territorial governance practice in which the colonial administration used the chieftaincy institution as a permanent structure to enforce fixed rules over their subjects. Within the colonized West African sub-region, Lord Lugard was the first to introduce IR practices in Northern Nigeria in 1908. Lugard used his work on the *Dual Mandate in The British Tropical Africa (1923)* to justify Indirect Rule. He charges that British colonial success could be sustained if they facilitated their rule through the incorporation of native institutions. For effective implementation of Indirect Rule policies, Lugard suggests three functional institutional preconditions: native courts, a native administration, and native treasury.

It is important, however, to suggest that the implementation of Indirect Rule practice in Northern Ghana was precipitated by three aspects of colonial self-interest. The first reason relates to the need to grant fiscal autonomy to the natives. This fiscal autonomy arose as a result of the mismatch between the government’s expenditures in the North and the revenues they collected there. From a fiscal angle, the ensuing budgetary deficit in Northern Ghana imposed a financial burden on the government. By granting fiscal autonomy to Northern Ghana through Indirect Rule, the government could absolve itself of responsibility for North’s growing national deficit. According to Ladouceur (1970, p.45), the revenue that the government collected averaged £13,800 a year from 1904-1908. Revenues then fell to an average of £2,525 during the years 1909-1913. Expenditures in the North were much higher: the military campaign cost borne by the Gold Coast was £48,700 per annum during the years 1904-1908. This expenditure rose to £73,600 per annum from 1909-1913. The abolition of
the caravan tolls in 1908 explains this reduction in revenue. It was not until 1925/26, after the introduction of the cattle tax, that revenue increased from £9201 to £19,027 for the fiscal year 1926/27 (Gold Coast Administrative Reports 1927/28).

In line with Hodgson’s declaratory statement against increased expenditure in the North, the Indirect Rule became the alternative strategy used to mitigate the deficit. In fact, Governor Clifford made a justification for limited expenditure in the Northern Territories. He stated clearly that the “continued direct and unremunerative source of expenditure” (1918, p. 3) granted to the North defied any justification unless it was based on moral grounds. In essence, Clifford was pushing for continued increased expenditure in the southern colonies at the expense of the northern territories.

The second reason for implementing Indirect Rule was related to a quest for administrative efficiency. A vital stumbling block to smooth administrative control of Northern Ghana was the indomitable acephalous group. The pre-colonial political systems could be classified into those with centralized, and those with and non-centralized, polities. More importantly, the pre-colonial contestations between the different polities endured through colonial rule. Staniland (1975) explains that the Dagomba (cephalous) had been fighting the Konkomba (acephalous ethnic group) at least once every decade since the 15\textsuperscript{th} century. The invasions of Konkombaland by the Dagomba occurred, on average, 10 years into the reign of every Dagomba paramount chief since the mid-16\textsuperscript{th} century, beginning with the regime of Na Sitobu (Staniland, 1975, p.4). These periodic conflicts undermined the colonial administration’s conception of harmonious and egalitarian pre-colonial social relations among the diverse groups of people. Apart from the inter-ethnic contestations between the Konkombas and Dagombas, there was intra-tribal fighting among the Konkombas. These
intra-tribal fights among the Konkombas have been attributed to the corporate nature of their clans which thrive on partnership and kithship. Thus, clans of the same tribe are bound by a moral obligation to support fellow clan members in inter-tribal conflicts. Because of this moral obligation to support clan members, Tait suggests that there will be no end to inter-tribal feuds among Konkombas (Tait, 1961). Tait (1961, p. 9) suggests that the threat of fighting also served as a social control mechanism to ensure good behaviour. This propensity for fighting among the Konkombas needs to be given deeper consideration, especially in terms of their value systems ecological circumstances.

The colonial administration’s lack of proper socio-cultural understanding of the constant fighting among the Konkombas underpinned the government’s simplistic containment measures. To end the frequent feuds among the Konkombas, Chief Commissioner C.H. Armitage adopted several strategies. First, the government instituted increased police patrols within Konkomba villages. Secondly, the government banned the possession of bows and arrows (bow and arrow ordinance) in the territory, and finally, it implemented movement restrictions into French Togoland (created after the Milner-Simon Agreement in 1919 after Germany’s defeat in World War One (Talton, 2010, p. 59). These restrictions did not deter the Konkombas social practice of inter-tribal collaboration, and the border restriction was violated with impunity. Thus, Armitage proposed Dagomba imposition on Konkombas as the solution to the problem of the constant fighting among the Konkomba. To fulfill this proposal, Armitage mandated the Ya-Naa to enforce the ban on bows and arrows and exact fines on the culprits. Significantly, this enforcement mandate given to the Ya-Na created a polar-opposite relationship between the Dagombas and Konkombas.
Certainly the resistance to, and confrontations by, the Konkombas undermined the colonial administration by exposing the limited power of the government. Armitage’s attempt to impose the Dagombas as rulers over the Konkombas was an attempt to reconfigure pre-colonial social and political relations into distinct hierarchies. These distinct political hierarchies would then form the basis of law and order enforcement on behalf on the colonial administration. As noted by Kopytoff (1987) such cephalous groups are configured as the organization system on which the architecture of indirect rule would be built. Thus, the patriarchal worldview of the colonizers tends to favour cephalous groups that are perceived to be culturally superior.

The need to rule the Northern Ghana through their chiefs or traditional institutions was first championed by Irvine, the Provincial Commissioner in charge of the South. He noted in 1909 that “as it is impossible to govern the country successfully except through the chiefs, every endeavor should be made to strengthen their hands in their dealings with their people as far as it is compatible with equity and good governance.”(N.A.GA, ADM. 56/1/258, 1909). Clearly, Irvine’s preference for the chiefs to be allowed to exercise administrative and political authority, in my view, lacks any factual or empirical basis apart from the sheer equation of administrative efficiency to an imagined chieftaincy.

In addition, Governor Guggisberg (1921) also supported a proposal for the empowerment of the chiefdoms to build strong native states. Guggisberg’s plan for a strong native state was the foundation of an Indirect Rule practice that created:

A tendency for the bigger states to break up to the detriment of development and trade …our policy must be to maintain any paramount chiefs that exist and gradually absorb under these, any small communities
scattered about. What we should aim at is that someday the Dagombas, 
Gonjas and Mamprusi should become strong native states. Each state must 
have its own public works department, and carry on its own business with 
the Political Officer as a resident and advisor. Each state will be more or 
less self-contained.” (N.A.G.A, ADM. 56/1/258. 1921)

The preconceived ideas embedded in Guggisberg’s statement symbolize the colonial 
administration’s notions of the amalgamation of small communities as unproblematic. 
I submit that this plan for the empowerment of chiefdoms could be explained by the 
inability of the colonial administration to exercise political authority over the natives. 
The limitation of the sphere of colonial influence on the acephalous groups provides a 
understood understanding of colonialism in itself. Responsibility for the crucial 
development of Northern Ghana would be placed on the shoulders of chiefdoms that 
had been neglected in terms of development interventions.

The end of Guggisberg’s term did not terminate the Indirect Rule policy for 
Northern Ghana. His successors continued it. Most significantly, Governor Slater 
took his cue from the framework identified by Lugard to ensure effective 
implementation of an Indirect Rule policy. Slater identified four priority areas that 
would form constituent pillars of his Indirect Rule practice. These are: a) the 
empowerment of chiefs to levy taxes; b) the support of native authority to adjudicate 
non-criminal cases and impose of fines; c) the granting of autonomy to native 
authorities to employ clerks, police, treasurers and court registrars and d) the 
absorption or incorporation of the acephalous communities into the cephalous groups 
(Talton, 2010, p. 81-82). Chief Commissioner A.H. Walker-Leigh, however, rejected
the proposal to form native administration systems around the chiefdoms. He opposed the proposed elevation of the chiefdoms on several grounds. Two of the essential reasons for his rejection were that the chiefs lack effective political authority on their own, and have personal capacity and capability shortcomings because of their illiteracy. Essentially, Walker-Leigh believed that it was premature to introduce these enormous administrative responsibilities to the chiefs because it could result in the abuse of authority the government allowed them.

The rejection by Walker-Leigh did not deter the colonial administration’s plan, as a Special Commissioner for Anthropology was tasked to study the social structure of the different groups of people in NG. This study was led by Capt. Rattray, an anthropologist attached to the colonial office. The study resulted in the production of a two volume report, *The Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland Vol 1 & 2*. In respect to the social structure of the people, Rattray’s report stated:

> Upon these more or less autochthonous peoples, with their primitive institutions, descended small bands of strangers within comparatively recent historical times. They were better armed, clothed, familiar with the idea of kingship or chieftainship in our modern sense, in some case conversant with the rudiments of Mohammedism and accustomed (even if circumstances had not later compelled it) to a patrilineal manner of reckoning descent. These strangers superimposed upon the primitive tribes, among whom they settled, a new and unheard of political conception, namely the idea of territorial and secular leadership in place of
a ruler, who was the high priest of a totemic clan and dealt only in spiritual
sanctions (p. xii).

Rattray’s comments reflect a lack of appreciation on his part for the diversity of traditional
African societies. Specifically, there is no absolute uniformity in the institutional arrangements
of the diverse polities to warrant privileging any single practice over any other practice. To
place a premium on the capacity of a chief to political negotiation as a symbol of political
maturity is an inaccurate measurement.

In fact, subsequent anthropological findings challenged the political classifications
assigned by Rattray. Specifically, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (1940) find that at least two of
the alleged acephalous groups, the Nawuris and Nchumurus, have a chiefly tradition. Brukum
(1992) affirms Fortes and Evans-Pritchard conclusion’s that the Nchumurus have a chiefly
tradition with clear patterns of promotion. Skalnik’s (1987, p. 308, 318) research shows that
there is actually no significant difference between the Nanumba (chiefdom) and Konkomba
(acephalous/non-chiefdom) in the exercise of territorial control. Shilliam (2011) suggests that
the reduction in the complexity of the diverse socio-political world of the colonized to simple
political hierarchies is based on colonial geo-cultural imaginary. The colonial geo-cultural
imaginary that assigned political maturity to cephalous groups framed the IR policy. Given
that the social realities among the different groups were inconsistent with the political
classifications, however, any attempt to give primacy to one over the other was bound to result
in endless contestations.

On the subject of amalgamation of the stateless communities into the existing
kingdoms, Rattray did issue a cautionary note. According to Rattray:
It is always advisable, I think, when speaking or writing about amalgamations as those which comprise for example; the Mampruse, Moshi or Dagomba states to retain a strict sense of proportion and to describe the course of these events in terms of restraint. Under the conditions existing when these states were first founded, a band of a score or less of well-armed and determined fighting men could, and often did, alter the political face of the map. The real significance of such ‘conquests’ is apt to be exaggerated in our eyes. We are over prone to visualize absolute monarchy and autocratic forms of government, in what, in a rather grandiose manner, we describe as these great empires in pagan Africa. As a matter of fact, such amalgamations affected the real inner life of the common people hardly at all (1932, p.549).

Rattray’s findings ultimately stand in contra position to the colonial administration’s desire to amalgamate the ‘framed’ tribes. His findings suggest the ineffectuality of the amalgamation policy that was driven more by racial and Eurocentric ideology than by an informed knowledge of the history and empirical realities of the territories. This submission certainly challenged the preconceived colonial Anglo idea about an African tribes being composed of homogenous and unquestionable loyalty to tradition. Any evidence contrary to the established ideological viewpoint constituted an aberration. Embedded in Rattray’s findings was a clear warning sign of the dire repercussions that would occur should the amalgamation policy be pursued. Certainly, past and current tensions have vindicated Rattray’s beliefs that the amalgamation policy was wrong. Given this information, there is a need to understand pre-colonial societies from a nuanced perspective, instead of relying on preconfigured political representations. As
suggested by Mamdani (1996) in his work on *Citizen and Subject*, at no point was there a centralized juridical institution with exclusive territorial control and the right to demand customary rights and entitlements over a long period of time. The colonial administration had a declared position on amalgamation and ignored Rattray’s warning and established the proposed IR policy directive.

In a further push for the IR policy directive, two commissioners were appointed by the colonial government to oversee the directive. These were H.A Blair, appointed in 1929 to be in-charge of West Dagomba, and A.C. Duncan-Johnstone, appointed in 1930, to be in charge of the Southern Province of NG. It is pertinent to note that Blair organized a constitution conference for Gonja Chiefs and Dagomba Chiefs in 1930, followed by similar conferences held for the Kusasi in 1931, the Mamprusi in 1932 and the Wa in 1933. The conferences were held to codify the constitution of the kingdoms, determine the relative seniority of subordinate chiefs, and to establish the extent of their authority (NAG, Tamale, ADM1/65: Slater to Cunliffe-Lister, 1932, cited in Ladouceur 1979, p. 54-55). These constitutional conferences were largely influenced by British ideas about colonial power which, according to MacGaffey (2006), redefined the rules of succession. The Native Authority Ordinance (NAO) was passed in 1932 to provide legal backing to the formation of the native authorities. As a result, Chief Commissioner W.A. Jones formed the Dagomba and Gonja Native Authorities in 1932 and the authorities of Mamprugu in 1933. Notably, the passing of the NAO placed acephalous groups such as the Vagal, the Nchumuru, the Nawuri and the Mo under the authority of the Gonja Yagbumwura. The Konkombas and Chakossi were placed under the authority of the Dagomba Ya-Naa. With this incorporation, the acephalous groups were accorded minority status as opposed to the majority position of the cephalous groups.
The passing of the Native Authority Ordinance necessitated the legislation of the essential functional components to ensure effective native administration as suggested earlier by Governor Slater. Thus the Native Tribunal Ordinance, Native Treasuries Ordinance, and Native Court Ordinance were passed in 1932, 1932 and 1935 respectively. The Native Authority Ordinance empowered the Chief Commissioners to appoint chiefs as officers of the newly-created native authorities. Further, the Native Authority Ordinance defined the operational scope of the native authorities to enforce rules on wide ranging issues ranging from areas of enforcement to rules governing: “firearms, liquor, markets, sanitation and infectious diseases, and others generally providing for the peace, order and welfare of the natives” (N.A.G.T. ADM. / 479). Staniland (1975) notes that an appointment by the Chief Commissioner was irrevocable, which made the appointees solely accountable to the appointing source. Mamdani (2006) suggests that the use of customary law as the system of rule in the Indirect Rule invariably made the chiefs solely accountable to the colonial office and not to his own people. This lack of accountability led to non-existent customary authority in the pre-colonial area that undergirded the conflicts in Northern Ghana.

The mandate of the Native Court Ordinance was extended to cover the settlement of marital disputes based on the customs and values of the chiefdoms. Certainly, the adjudication of marital disputes within the acephalous groups based on the customs of the cephalous group was an attempt to ensure uniformity of customary practices. According to Mamdani (1996), the emphasis on uniform customary practices was a strategy to hide the non-customary practices to avert contestation. The actual non-customary practice was the unilateral power exercised by the Chief Commissioners in the constituting the Native Authority to advance the interests of the government. The implication is that Indirect Rule was a governing technique
instigated to manage diverse contestations from different groups of people. These contestations were inevitable because the cultural and political marginalization of the minority groups were catalysts to instigate resistance.

The conflation of centralized kingdoms with administrative efficiency and political control resulted in widespread abuse. The resulting abuse invariably sharpened and structured pre-colonial tensions, particularly between the minority and majority groups. This abuse was the result of empowering chiefs with positions of authority that they were unable to exercise. Such an abuse leads to what Mamdani (1996, p. 37) calls ‘decentralized despotism,’ which highlights the incompatible interests between the colonial administration and the chiefs. The incompatibility of interests related to the chiefs desiring to accumulate wealth without necessarily ensuring colonial order as consistent with the community doctrine.

The Konkombas in particular contested the IR practices on the grounds of issues of autonomy (cultural and political) and extortion. The most notable resistance resulted in the 1940 ‘Cow War’ when Konkombas attacked and killed the chief of Jagbel for suspicion of conspiring with British Veterinary Officers to kill cattle owned by Konkombas. According to Talton (2003, 2010) the immediate cause of the war was triggered by the undue fines imposed on the Konkomba cattle owner for failure to have his cattle vaccinated. The extortion came in form of the chief demanding more than a bull for the vaccination violation instead of the mandatory £10. The chief’s demand for a bull was countered by the Konkomba men, and the dispute degenerated into an attack on the village of Jagbel. During the course of the attack, the chief of Jagbel, Zegbeli Na, was killed. At the heart of the Cow War was a rejection of the colonial policy that empowered chiefs without restraining that power. In effect, the Cow War symbolized the Konkomba quest for political autonomy in order to curb arbitrary extortions.
The Cow War helped to consolidate the Konkombas grievances against the Dagombas. Extortionist practices perpetrated by Demon Na Mahama (Dagomba indigene), a divisional chief of the Konkomba villages, were challenged by Konkomba elders. This challenge led to the usurpation of the administrative responsibilities of Demon Na by Djar, a Konkomba elder representative of the Kpalbtiib and Bimokpem clans. Talton (2003, 2010) highlights Djar’s maneuvers to consolidate the Konkomba clans such as Kpalbtiib and Bimokpem in order to form a political authority independent of Demon-Na. Although this request for political autonomy by Djar was not granted, his petition showed the varying strategies deployed by the Konkombas to challenge the colonial policy of Indirect Rule. Another incident of the fierce Konkomba challenge to the Dagomba’s political authority was related to the Fish War in 1946. This war happened when a Konkomba indigene claimed fishing rights over a pond in which a Dagomba man was fishing (NT, A.D.M/5/1).

The resistance was not only limited to resource use and the abuse of authority in the enforcement of vaccination policies. According to Tait (1961), fines imposed by the Chief of Sunson on a group of men who committed adultery also led to the rejection of this authority. A Konkomba man among the culprits questioned the jurisdiction of the Chief in a matter that was within the scope of Konkomba custom. Another example of Konkomba resistance can be seen in the Benafiab (Konkomba tribe) complaint of persistent extortion from one of the sub-chiefs of Sunson, Dzagberi Na (Tait, p. 10). This led to the assassination of Dzagberi Na following an attack on his house. Konkomba resistance against extortionist policies resulted in the chief of Zabzugu being forced to remit 10% of the cattle and poll tax among Konkomba elders. According to Tait (1961) the 10% tax remission in Zabzugu to Konkomba elders was extended to Sunson as well. Therefore, it can be suggested that the Indirect Rule had contestable effects.
The contestations between and within the ethnic groups have been more severe in post-independent Ghana.

**State Formation Processes and Agrarian Strategies in Northern Ghana**

The incorporation of Northern Ghana into the modern nation-state of Ghana was characterized by sharp contrasts between southern and northern political interests and priorities. These polar opposite interests have been shaped by the differing colonial experiences of the two socio-spatial settings. To be specific, southern politicians championed a national independence consciousness. On the contrary, the northern political interest was driven by regional consciousness. This regional orientation of northern political elites can also be attributed to the adversarial colonial development policies that created developmental disparities between the two colonies. The indirect rule policy cannot be exonerated in the inculcation of this regional consciousness. The inward nature of Indirect Rule that privileged native political control virtually disconnected Northern Ghana from the main colony, especially in the fight for citizenship entitlements. This regional consciousness was driven by fear on the part of the northern territories that southern politicians would dominate national governance. A legitimate fear was aptly expressed by Braimah, who was a member of the Northern Territorial Council. Braimah averred that: “if we do not get the necessary education that will qualify us for senior and key posts then it means surely we are going to be politically dominated by people of other regions in no distant future” (NTC, Fifth Session 1949. Cited in Ladouceur, 1979, p. 91). In fact, the prevailing social and political inequalities between the Southern and Northern Ghana confirm Braimah’s prediction.
Moreover, the weak educational background of the few northern politicians that were in powerful positions affected their political mobilization and articulation of national issues. According to Ladouceur (1979), the weak educational background of majority of northern political elites and the overriding regional consciousness kept them from being the main opposition party. In fact, J.B. Danquah, a sympathizer of the Northern cause challenged the preparedness of the northern representatives in the Legislative Assembly. According to Danquah: “well look, gentlemen of the North, we are prepared to wait for you, but how long do you want us to wait?...we are suggesting to you, go back quietly and think of the great responsibility you have placed on your shoulders, that is, you are holding up self-government” (Danquah, 1953, p. 489). These sentiments from an acclaimed political doyen from Southern Ghana points to the inferior recognition accorded to the northern politician by their southern counterparts. In the 1954 national elections, the Northern Peoples Party (NPP) had the second highest number of seats in the Legislative Assembly, enough to constitute leadership of the opposition in the Legislative Assembly. Meanwhile, the Ghana Congress Party won a single seat by its leader rather was appointed as the leader of opposition in parliament (Ladouceur, 1979, p.129).

The long experience of southern political elites in legislative work, as well as their exposure to higher learning and wealth accumulation enhanced their political organization and mobilization. It was not surprising when the Convention People Party (CPP), endowed with strong organizational resources and clear socialist ideological orientation was able to attract the support of the peasant population and the low class in both the Southern and Northern Ghana. This broad based appeal of the CPP certainly dealt a huge blow to the regional orientation of the NPP by its electoral triumphs in the 1951, 1954 and 1956 general elections. Successive
defeats of the NPP led to the diminution of its political influence as the CPP infiltrated its rank and file. The NPP’s leadership, out of mistrust for the southern dominated government, resolved on a petition to be sent to the British government. To be more specific, the essence of this petition was for NG to be granted constitutional concessions that would secure a special development fund after independence. But the leadership of the NPP was overtaken by Dr. Busia’s National Liberation Movement (NLM) and the NLM submitted the petition to the Royal Commission to grant constitutional concessions for three separate regions. This partition request was not at variance with NPP’s request. More significantly, the NLM leadership denied NPP the vital political representation required to articulate their quest to secure development funds that could be used to revamp their region. The final outcome of this petition was the rejection of the partition request.

The Northern Territorial Council capitalized on the visit of the Secretary of State to Tamale in 1957, in order to present a request to the British Government to allocate £3 million per annum for ten years to develop the North. This proposal, however, was cancelled upon the attainment of national independence. The NPP, unlike the NLM, could not sustain their official stance against national independence and ultimately had to capitulate to the independence movement initiated by the CPP. As Brukum (1998) notes, the NPP made two critical requests to the CPP as preconditions for northern support for independence. The first request was for the allocation of funds for the rapid development of Northern Ghana. The second request was to bring legislation forward that would allow the regional assembly to control the development fund. These preconditions, however, were not fulfilled by the CPP. The regionalism that was being used as a political mobilization force for the NPP dissipated after the passing of the Avoidance of Discrimination Bill in 1957. This Bill abolished all
regional organs whose main goals were to advance the interest and benefit of specific communities or religious faiths. A Regional Assembly Bill was passed into law in 1958, with its main thrust being to ensure that members of the government were voted into office in order to avoid the manipulation of chiefs and local officials.

These uneven political processes attest to the weak political integration of the North into the modern state Ghana. This weak integration impacted the policy direction that development was taking in the region. The CPP that was now in government controlled both development decisions and expenditures in Northern Ghana as well. Cooper (1994) suggests that the revolutionary zeal for national independence in most SSA countries did not correspond with the elimination of prevailing colonial economic and political structures, and the case was the same for the developmental situation in Northern Ghana after independence.

A significant issue in relation to the perpetuation of colonial practices that led to the underdevelopment in the Northern Region was the maintenance of the dichotomous land laws in the country by CPP government. According to Konings (1986), the CPP government amended the 1931 Land and Native Rights Ordinance with what became known as the State Property and Contract Act of 1960. The subsequent amendments to that bill resulted in the passing of the 1962 Administration of Land Act. According to Bening (1995), the 1962 Administration of Land Act made the President the official landlord of the North. This act technically rendered all the lands in the Northern Region available for public service, with the resultant limitation on the autonomy of the chiefs and peasants of their own lands. The inhabitants of Southern Ghana, however, exercised full autonomy over their land and its resource endowments. It is important to state here that the post CPP regimes did not
denationalize the Northern Region lands till 1978. I will discuss the circumstances that led to this denationalization lands and the ramifications thereof later in this chapter.

The national development priorities and resource allocation policies did not depart from the inequitable trend set in motion by the colonial administration. In fact, the continuous concentration of development in Southern Ghana accounts for the regional inequalities as suggested by Aryeetey, et al (2009). For explanatory reasons, I will limit myself to the main agricultural policies of the postcolonial governments.

The CPP government supported the prevailing economic export programme and the cocoa and mineral sectors in particular. To further consolidate cocoa as a major crop, the CPP government established the Cocoa Purchasing Company in (1952). As the main buying agent on behalf of the government, the Cocoa Purchasing Company substantially supported pro-CPP small-holder farmers with benign loans with the aim to boost production (Beckman, 1976). In 1953, the CPP established the United Gold Coast Farmers’ Council that metamorphosed into the United Ghana Farmers’ Co-operative Council (hereafter called Farmers’ Co-operative). The main mandate of Farmers’ Co-operative was to serve as the advocacy center for small-hold farmers. The advocacy goals of the Farmers’ Co-operative were essentially protectionist, and their main objective was to insulate small-hold farmers from foreign competition in cocoa marketing. The political representation of cocoa farmers was essential in making the interests of farmers the integral component of national agricultural policy-making. With the absence of cocoa in Northern Ghana, most of the peasants were left with limited political and policy space to articulate their social and developmental interests.

The overwhelming support provided cocoa farming to the detriment of food crops inadvertently created a significant food shortage in Southern Ghana. The severity of the food
shortage resulted in the importation of 60.7% and 72.2% of the national rice requirement for fiscal years 1960 and 1961 respectively (Okoso-Amaa 1975, p. 73). This net food import situation affected the balance of payment positions of a primary export-dependent economy like Ghana. Just like the mixed farming practices of the 1940s that were pursued to address the post-depression food deficit in the southern colonies, so too was the Northern Region chosen to supply the food needs of the south. It is quite intriguing that the CPP, an acclaimed socialist ideologically driven party with a strong rural base did not extend the same support to the peasants in the Northern Region.

The food deficit in the south brought about the Seven Year Development Plan. The driving strategy of the plan was to increase agricultural output was through the promotion of state enterprises in agriculture that would serve as model for peasants. Further, the State Farms Corporation was established in 1961 to embark on large-scale mechanized food farming. I suggest that the optimism in state enterprises for agricultural transformation implied that the CPP government had no faith in the productive capabilities of the peasants in Northern Region. This lack of faith in the peasants resulted in the setting up of production units, such as the Workers’ Brigade, The Young Farmers League and the United Ghana Farmers’ Co-operative Council. Ultimately the Northern Region, which constituted the hub of the new agricultural policy, had 20 state farms, 9 workers brigade farms and 235 cooperative farms (FAO, 1967, p. 30). This state driven agricultural programme featured the limited engagement of peasants was anti-poor rather than pro-poor. The marginalization of the peasants cannot be exonerated as a reason for the enduring poverty situation in the Northern Region, a situation that is firmly rooted in the adverse relational nature of the production system. Shepherd (1979, p. 46-50) also confirms that the peasants in the Northern Region have been heavily marginalized. He
posit that the state farms actually benefited CPP party officials, the urban petty bourgeois, and the pro-CPP chiefs that ultimately created capitalist rice farmers in the Northern Region. Based on my interview with a former farmer in Tamale, suggests that the state farm system rendered most peasants casual labourers.

A vital issue to note is that peasant output on their own farms was higher than the state supported farmers. This dismal effect is captured in a government report in 1965. The report states: “…It is very strange that peasant farmers with 3.5 acres per farm cultivate more than the large-scale farms with 2.8 acres per worker in spite of the heavy outfits of the stations equipped with tractors and all types of machinery” (Statistics of Large-scale Specialized, Institutional, Co-Operative and Young League Farming and Service Stations, 1965, p. 4). This suggests that the peasants in Northern Ghana, regardless of their efforts, were invisible to the state’s policy consideration in terms of institutional, financial and technical support. I suggest that exclusionary politics and unfair political arrangements could be responsible for this discrepancy.

The coup of 1966 brought an end to the state farm programme. That did not, however, halt the marginalization of peasants in Northern Region. The new military government, formed by the National Liberation Council (NLC), a right-wing ideological party, discontinued the state-led CPP agricultural policy system. Its main development policy was based on economic mantras of stabilization and consolidation. On the recommendation of the IMF, the NLC privatized the state farms in order to achieve stabilization. The agricultural policy of the NLC framed by its Two year Development Plan was the commercialization of agriculture. It is worthy to note that the NLC regime, according to Konings (1986), relied on expert advice from the UNDP and FAO to adopt the green revolution orthodoxy. The thrust of this green
revolution orthodoxy was the prioritization of cash crops over staples food. The emphasis on cash crops was to increase export earnings in order to stabilize the economy. The United Progress Party who took over the reins of government beginning in 1969 had compatible ideological persuasions with the NLC, and the continuation of the commercial agricultural policy. In addition, the United Progress Party government adopted a *laissez faire* instrumental approach, whereby privatization was one of the main mechanisms of development. In justification of the privatization objective, the government of the United Progress Party posits itself as trying to ‘to de-emphasize state agriculture; to raise both the status of the peasant producer and his overall productivity; and to encourage full commercialization of agriculture’ (Cited in Koings 1986, p. 170). Notwithstanding the laudable objective to raise the productivity of peasant producers, the real practices did not accommodate the interest of the peasants.

In practice, the policy was essentially geared towards addressing the supply side constraints of the commercial and cash crop farmers. According to an Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) pamphlet, the Bank invested 6.5 million cedis in the North from 1968-1973. This loan investment benefited 661 individual farmers and 226 cooperative farmers. By 1975, the total investment had risen to 12.8 million cedis for rice cultivation in 76, 518 ha in the Northern Region (ADB, 1975, cited in Konings, 1986). In order to attract extension services, a limited asset base for collateral and the presence of a powerful urban-based production sidestepped the peasant farmers because of their low production scales. This urban-based production network, according to Konings (1981), comprises professional agriculturists, civil servants and businessmen who were charged with creating capitalist rice production relations. Rice mills were built in Tamale and other parts of the Northern Region,
but the asymmetric distribution of productive incentives that benefited large-scale farmers meant that the peasant farmers were again isolated by state policy.

The period 1972-79 marked a significant period in the agrarian policy of the new military government. The National Redemption Council/ Supreme Military Council (NRC/SMC) continued the large-scale commercial agricultural policy orthodoxy inherited from its predecessors. As with the CPP, the NRC prioritized the public sector as the fulcrum of commercial agriculture. The NRC/SMC regime adopted a self-reliance development strategy that was articulated through an *Operation Feed Yourself* program. This *Operation Feed Yourself* program targeted the Northern Ghana as the food basket for the country, with rice and maize listed as the main crops for cultivation. The first phase of the programme, which spanned from 1972-74, adopted the public sector as the engine of food production in Northern Ghana. With the NRC/SMC being anti-*laissez-faire* the defunct state farms were revived, and United Ghana Farmers’ Co-operative Council created the food production corporation to constitute the production units.

The government, through the ADB, provided the necessary credit facility to the production units, along with the necessary production plants. Notwithstanding this financial and plant investment and support from the government, the output was not encouraging. According to Girdner, Olorunsola, Froning, and Hansen (1980), the food production in the new state-supported production units was not better than that of the CPP. The poor output was also reflected in the ADB’s decision to terminate loan support to the state sector production units. A critical issue at play was the marginalization of peasants under the first phase of the *Operation Feed Yourself*. The sentiments of the peasant farmers were articulated by Sibidow:
Today in the North, farm implements, machinery, spare-parts and of even more damaging effects, fertilizers, have vanished at the most crucial period of need…The interesting thing about this annoying situation, however, is that it is not that the fertilizer in particular has not been supplied by the government. What is happening is that some privileged class of people has decided to distribute the fertilizers among themselves. (Daily Graphic, 1975, p. 4)

The inequitable distribution of the beneficiaries of state support as depicted in Sibidow’s work reinforces my position in relation to the politics of decision-making and access to resources. Therefore, most peasants with weak links to political authorities more than necessary require active political mobilization to reverse this trend. As will be discussed in chapters four and five, there exist similar trends in terms of the poor representation of the needs and the demands to their entitlements.

The failure of these state agencies in food production shifted attention towards the capitalist rice farmers in NG. Shepherd (1981, p.74) notes that 800 capitalist rice farmers were supported with loans from the ADB and National Investment Bank. The renewed focus of this Operation Feed Yourself in NG led to appreciable investment infrastructure: notably roads were upgraded, irrigation systems were constructed and a regional hospital was built. In addition, three banks (National Investment Bank, ADB and Barclays) benefited from a loan facility of $2.3m from the African Development Bank. Through this loan facility, the Nasia Rice Mill was established with a capacity to process 10,000 ha of rice per annum (See Konings, 1986). This massive investment increased rice production substantially, which led to zero importation of rice for the fiscal years of 1975 and 1976 (see Kranjac-Berisavljevic’,
Blench, and Chapman, 2003, p. 8). A critical issue that we should be concerned about is whether the zero rice importation had any positive effect on the majority poor in Northern Ghana.

Notwithstanding these infrastructural investments, the peasant poor who constituted the majority of the population in Northern Ghana did not materially benefit. I posit that the main reason for this was the non-prioritization of the poor peasant as an essential determinant of agricultural policy. According to MacGaffey (2013), chiefs such Dakpema Alhassan, from the Andani gate, used his strong ties with the officials of the NRC government to embark on capitalist rice farming to the detriment of the Gulkpe Na. Not only was the Dakpema Na the main beneficiaries of the rice project, other Andani sub-chiefs were active beneficiaries from 1974-79 as suggested by MacGaffey (2013). Indeed, Shepherd’s 1981 study suggests that both the state and private production systems benefited mainly indigenes of Tamale, Savelugu and Yendi. A notable feature of these interventions was their concentration in the districts of the majority ethnic groups, rather than in the areas populated by minority groups (Konings, 1986). This discrepancy could be associated with the influence of the chiefs in the kingdoms/chiefdoms on past governments when they determined resource allocation.

This asymmetric distribution of rice project participants reflects the extent to which the internal chieftain contestation in the Northern Region played into the national and regional development practices. With this complex fusion of national politics and chieftain wrangling, the poor peasant becomes invisible to the policy-making apparatus. It is pertinent to note that the peasants, in reaction to their marginalization and the dispossession of their lands, resorted to burning rice farms and the destruction of machinery (Goody, 1980). The poverty condition of the peasants, in my view, is a reflection of the political inequality that has narrowed the
political space for the representation and prioritization of the needs of the poor. The political nature of the poverty in Northern Ghana makes the redemptive/emancipatory faith put into empowerment, capacity building and participatory approaches by the aid agencies intriguing, as I will discuss in chapters four and five.

**State Policies and the Intensification of Ethnic Conflicts**

Prior to 1978, past governments had maintained the colonial nationalization of the lands in Northern Ghana. Political manipulation of the ethnic categories in the Northern Region by the past governments changed the trend in 1978. The SMC administration experienced widespread civil and political unrest after 1977. The protestations were instigated by the rising cost of living in the aftermath of the 1973 Oil crisis and the mismanagement of the economy. Secondly, the military government’s goal of banning political parties from forming a union government exacerbated the protestations that manifested in a plethora of strike actions. In the end, this Union Government proposal was subjected to national referendum. In order to win the referendum, the SMC government lobbied the chiefs of the Northern Region for their votes with a promise of returning the lands to the chiefdoms. This led to the formation of the committee on ownership of land and positions of tenants in Northern and Upper Regions, chaired by I. R. Alhassan.

There was a disproportionate representation in the composition of the Land Vesting committee. According to Pul (2003, p.16), the committee was entirely composed of six members from the four kingdoms in Northern Region, one each from the Upper Region and Lands Secretariat respectively. The remaining four were from Southern Ghana. Significantly, the main 13 minority ethnic groups were denied representation and, in the end, they were
reduced to a position as settlers. The restoration of democratic rule in September 1979 actually gave this land restoration committee the requisite constitutional recognition as reflected in the 3rd Republican constitution in 1979. The constitutional provisions as found in Article 188, Paragraphs 3 and 4 read: “for the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared that all lands in the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana which immediately before the coming into force of this Constitution were vested in the Government of Ghana are not public lands […] all lands […] shall vest in any such person who was the owner of any such land before any such vesting or in the appropriate skin” (Government of Ghana, 1979, p.140). Appropriate skin refers to the eligible royal clan. The effect of this constitutional recognition of the authority of the chiefdoms was to deny minority ethnic groups their autonomous economic, political and social entitlements.

The 1992 4th Republican Constitution from Article 270-276 reaffirms the chieftaincy provisions in the previous constitution. The 1992 constitution empowered the Regional House of Chiefs with adjudicating powers. For example, Article 274, 3d, states that the Regional House of Chiefs “have original jurisdiction in all matters relating to a paramount stool or skin or the occupant of a paramount stool or skin, including a queen mother to a paramount stool or skin” (Government of Ghana, 1992, p. 150). This clause in particular has further empowered the majority in terms of making determinations about which ethnic group can gain paramount status.

Since early 1980’s, there have been many inter/intra ethnic conflicts in the Northern Region, such as the Gonja-Vagla War in 1980 and Konkomba and Bimoba wars in 1984, 1986 and 1989. The Gonja-Vagla war was very much related to landownership conferred by the
1979 constitution (Awedoba, 2011) and independence from the exploitative relations instituted by the indirect rule policy.

The first intense conflict to have erupted after this land restoration to the chiefdoms was in 1981 between the Nanumba and Konkombas, which started in a Pito Bar between natives of the two ethnic groups. In the course of the year, a Konkomba native was stabbed by a Bimbilla attacker, and event that led to the destruction of Bimbilla villages by the Konkomba. The official casualty count recorded was eight, but within a year the Konkombas invaded Wulensi, resulting in the death of several hundred people. All in all, at least 2000 people were killed in the conflict, with the Nanumba bearing the main casualties (Talton, 2003, p 2-3). The critical underpinning of this war was the Konkomba claims of abuse by Nanumba chiefs in terms of tribute demands that were institutionalized by the Indirect Rule policy of 1932. Apart from the traditional tributes to be paid, the Konkombas were expected to sell their produce cheaply to Nanumba women. This extra demand was interpreted as extortion and exploitation. The formation of the Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA) began as a tool for agitation for termination of these colonial stipulated payments to the Bimbilla Naa. The Konkomba quest for political autonomy ties into their relationship to the land was a huge factor in these protests, especially considering that most Konkombas are predominantly farmers. During my interview with Awedoba, he explains that land had been a critical factor of production for Konkombas, who are in constant migration in search of fertile land to secure. Therefore, land ownership, which is tied to chieftaincy, constitutes a major source of the tension.

A committee of inquiry was set up to investigate the conflict by the Government was known as Justice Lamptey Committee. The military coup on December 31st 1981 initiated by the Provisional National Defense Council truncated the committee’s work. The truncation of
the investigations left the causal grievances to a large extent unaddressed, which is reflective of the military government’s unwillingness to find a workable solution to the conflicts. The inability of the government to address the conflict would serve as a precursor to a bigger conflict.

The high intensity conflict between the Konkomba-Nanumba erupted in 1994. This conflict spread into the Dagomba and Gonja kingdoms, which led to the Konkomba-Nanumba, Dagomba and Gonja war. This war remains the most calamitous ethnic conflict in Ghana’s post-independent history by far. It was fought in seven districts: Yendi, Saboba-Chereponi, Gushiegu-Karaga, East Gonja, Nanumba, Zabzugu-Tatale and Tamale Metropolitan Area. The primary cause for this conflict was the Konkomba request for paramountcy, which would grant them their independence from the three kingdoms (Dagomba, Gonja and Nanumba). This quest for paramount chieftain status by Konkombas emerged in response to the saliency of the chieftaincy institution in the regional and national governance system. The implication is that the Konkombas historically acknowledged acephalous polity had become a hindrance to the development of their districts. The constitutional recognition of the chiefs from the cephalous groups enabled them to have better access to political authorities and thereby to lobby for development projects. In fact, Manboah-Rockson (2007) explains that the chiefdoms used their connections to government to ensure that most Nanumba, West Dagomba and Bimbilla areas were connected to the national electricity grid. Konkomba villages such as Saboba, Kpalka and Kpanjan, however, had limited access to electricity. The quest for paramountcy was geared towards political autonomy and space for the articulation of the long-term development interests. The essence of this political autonomy was a strategy to correct the existing asymmetric distribution of resources.
The push for this paramountcy in 1993 was an outcome of a meeting between the Konkomba chiefs, the KOYA and elders. A team of Konkombas leadership presented a petition to the National House of Chiefs, the core of which was for “the creation of a paramount Chief and a traditional council for all Konkombas in Ghana, a right to live in a clearly defined area of their own and finally the grant to them traditional independence” (Pul, 2003, p. 14). The National House of Chiefs could not grant the paramountcy, and referred the request to the Ya-Naa of Dagomba. Given the Ya-Naa’s vested interest as the overlord of the Konkomba lands, such a request was very likely dead on arrival. In the end, the Ya-Naa rejected the paramountcy bid. Two reasons were cited for the rejection of the request by the Ya-Naa. According to Awedoba (2011, p.226), the first reason was that the Ya-Naa did not believe that the Konkombas constituted the second largest ethnic group in the Northern Region. The second reason was that the Ya-Naa believed that the paramountcy plea was an attempt to claim land ownership and not a mere elevation of the chiefs as highlighted by the Konkomba leadership.

The reasons assigned by the Ya-Naa attest to the saliency of the land factor, which has become a highly contestable resource tied to chieftaincy. The implication of the Ya-Naa ruling was that the Dagombas were not willing to cede off their overlord status in exchange for Konkombas self-rule. The 1994 war resulted in estimated death of 2,000- 20,000 people, over 200, 000 residents were displaced, and 10,000 houses were destroyed in 400 locations (Linde & Naylor, 1999, p. 8, 28; Pul, 2003 and Bogner, 2009, p. 2). This nagging problem has not yet been resolved today. A worrying trend is the contrasting narratives espoused by Konkombas and Dagombas, which attests to the fragile peace in the region. Also, the high scale and magnitude of this conflict resulted in the urgent attention of the donor community who sought
for an active security intervention through conflict resolution mechanisms. Chapter four of this thesis discusses the aid industry security related interventions in the aftermath of this conflict.

Another major conflict was the Gonja-Nawuri war in 1991 and 1992. The remote cause of this war has been linked to land ownership and the lack of autonomy on the part of Nawuris. Brukum (1992) notes that the Nawuris have historically claimed to be the original occupants of Kpandai prior to the invasion of the Gonjas led by Ndewura Japka. On the other hand, the Gonjas, as noted by Brukum (1992), also claim to be the rightful owners of this land because they conquered the first settlers. More importantly, the Indirect Rule policy firmly placed the Nawuris under the authority of the Gonja, which institutionalized customary payments and extracted labour services from the Nawuris. The customary payments and unfettered access to land on the part of these two ethnic groups marred their relations. In 1991, there was a fierce contestation in relation to the rightful owner of the Kpandai, the main town in the district. According to Brukum (1992), the Gonjas defeated the Nawuris and forced many of the Nawuris to flee their villages. Those who fled from these villages relocated to communities populated by other minority ethnic groups (Nchumurus, Basares and Konkombas) who harbour extortion grievances against Gonjas. Jönsson (2007, 2009) explains that a Konkomba farmer was mistaken to be a Nawuri man, which led to his violent death perpetrated by Gonja indigenes. This killing incited the Konkomba invasion of Gonja villages in view of the pre-existing grievances. These three minority groups, based on their common set of grievances, mobilized a collective force against the Gonjas. A government committee was set up again to investigate the conflict; this committee, chaired by Justice Ampiah, ultimately had their findings rejected by the Gonjas on the grounds that the government was biased towards the minority groups.
Conflicts have not been limited to the majority-minority binary. Significantly, there have been internal conflicts within the kingdoms. Such conflicts are more related to succession issues. As I indicated in chapter one, the most tense source of insecurity in the Northern Region is currently the succession dispute between Abudus and Andanis. There is also an ongoing Nanumba chieftaincy conflict which is an intra-dynasty competition for the skin by eligible nominees from the Gbomayili gate. This succession dispute arose after the death of Abarka, the last king from the Bangyili gate. The competition is framed by an accusation that each party did not exhaust the promotional requirements that are pre-requisites for enskinment as the Bimbilla Naa. According to Awedoba (2011) six of the nine kingmakers chose Andani Dasana Abdulai for enskinment but the three other kingmakers objected to their choice on the grounds that the nominee had not been a sub-chief as required by customary practice. On the other hand, the three kingmakers nominated Nakpaa Naa, Salifu Dawuni, who they believe has met the requirements. The six kingmakers also rejected the claim that their nominee was ineligible, which resulted in their counter disapproval of Nakpaa Naa, Salifu Dawuni. The reason cited for this rejection is that Dawuni is not the son of a former king. Essentially, these arguments remain anchored in interpretations of the promotional processes that determine eligibility.

It is vital to note that the burial of the King Abarka was followed by the enskinment of the Andani Dasana Abdulai as the new Bimbilla Naa. According to Awedoba (2011), this enskinment was facilitated through collaboration between the supporters of Andani and the keeper of the king’s regalia. As a counter-measure, the Dawuni faction also challenged the legitimacy of Andani’s enskinment. The consequence of this enskinment and the later
challenge is the sustained tension that continues to exist between the supporters of both factions.

A key informant at GHANEP told me of the numerous mediation measures that they have facilitated for the factions to resolve this issue, but none have been effective. Official mediation efforts were organized by the Regional Security Committee as an attempt to convince the factions to mend their differences. In my view, these mediation exercises undertaken by both Regional Security Committee and GHANEP certainly did not address the broader dynamics that undergird the contestations. From my perspective, it is vital to examine the multiple sources of motivations behind the contestation that the mediation exercises failed to address. In the absence of any solution to these contestations, especially when the Regional House Chiefs has yet to adjudicate on the pending case, the tension generated between the supporters of the parties remains active.

Considering all of this information, I posit that the state has both been complicit in the conflicts by only enacting a lukewarm search for constructive management techniques to deal with the contestations. Another critical factor is the weak institutional structures used address the contentious conflict and insecurity challenges. These weak state structures tend to be seen as enduring feature of contemporary governments. In my view, these weak governance systems cannot be divorced from their colonial progenitors. As Moore (2001) suggests, the colonial regimes in most African countries forced disparate territories to constitute nation-states but lacked the capacity to govern them. The long-term political disconnection between the southern and northern regions undermined political interests and commitment towards building cohesive country.
Concluding remarks

From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that the under-development and poverty of Northern Ghana, in addition to the conflict and insecurity, are rooted in the processes of its social formation. The policies practiced by the colonial regime were anti-developmental in their thought and content. This anti-developmental agenda was an integral part of the colonial policy whose development orientation was driven by capitalist and imperialist interests.

In order to ensure administrative and territorial control of the territory, the British colonial administration re-engineered diverse polities. The Indirect Rule policy empowered ‘kingdoms’ of the chiefdoms with mandates they did not exercised in the pre-colonial era. Most critical with respect to the Indirect Rule was the incorporation of the acephalous groups into the empowered kingdoms. This incorporation thus gave the acephalous groups minority status within the empowered kingdoms, which was a complete reversal of their pre-colonial relations. The abuse of the mandate placed on the majority against the minority groups essentially crystallized the hostile/tensed relations between the two groups.

Furthermore, postcolonial governments have not been able to resolve these colonially-created ethnic political identities. In fact, the post-independence governments have used the various kingdoms to their political advantage. In particular, the SMC government’s decision to de-vest the lands in Northern Region to the paramount chiefs reignited the ethnic conflicts from 1979. More importantly, these conflicts are underpinned by salient issues of social inequality and the abuse of authority. Other predisposing factors are the varying constructions of ethnic identity, land ownership and control rights and political autonomy. In a broader sense these issues
relate to social justice claims that cannot be unlinked from the structural and power relations at district, regional and national levels.

On the development front, the postcolonial governments did little to alter the colonially inherited export economic structure. Hence, the immediate post-independent period saw continued concentration of support for the southern peasants in the cocoa sector. It took food shortages in Southern Ghana for the CPP government to institute a state-led capitalist agricultural strategy that targeted the Northern Region for food crop production. Subsequent governments adopted both private and state led capitalist agricultural production practices in the region. These initiatives were appropriated by the Northern elites comprising chiefs with connections to politicians, senior civil servants, military officers and politicians as a whole. Thus the poor peasant was not considered for clear policy and institutional support, and the structural poverty situation constitutes systemic multiple relational deprivations.

An analysis of the historical dynamics of the current situation will provide the contextual basis necessary to understand the complex, enduring, unequal social relations that have created the current situation in Northern Ghana. I posit that the complex historical development processes and conflicts in Northern Ghana reinforce the vitality of the central research question: how are the rationales of joint development and security interventions articulated and received by the local population in a conflict prone Northern Region of Ghana? The analyses in this chapter essentially aim to demonstrate the relational underpinnings of the current conflict, and the insecurity and poverty challenges in the region. It is an approach that is limited in the literature on contemporary development-security discourses and interventions. The next chapter will address at substantial length the contemporary development aid and security interventions ostensibly used to secure and reduce poverty in the region.
Chapter Four
Development and Security Interventions in the Northern Region

Introduction
The unequal development interventions between Southern and Northern Ghana, as well as the inequitable development interventions within the Northern Ghana discussed in chapter three created an interventionist space for donor agencies in the region. The numerous unresolved conflicts caused by the Indirect Rule policy which intensified in the post-colonial era created conflict-triggered insecurity that has attracted diverse external aid interventions. The focus of this chapter is to examine development and security as independent external aid interventions, prior to the adoption of the DSN as new aid lexicon in the region. Examining the region-wide interventions on the part of external aid foundations will provide further contextual basis leading to an examination of the DSN related interventions in chapter five. The basis for this approach is that, in the mainstream literature on development and security, the DSN is framed as new practice and discourse. A comparative analysis, however, reveals that this ‘newly developed’ DSN contains no new approaches.

The first key argument of this chapter is that development and security related challenges in a conflict prone region cannot be substantially addressed by the deployment of liberal-oriented technical solutions. The complexity of the development and security challenges in the Northern Region is the result of the outcome of adverse colonial legacies in the postcolonial era, combined with political and policy neglect by post-colonial governments. In addition, the complexity of the region’s development challenges cannot be decoupled from the territory’s weak incorporation into the global economy. Given the narrow interventionist
rationales of liberal and standardized interventions, the Northern Region will remain adversely affected by its poor incorporation in the global economy.

Besides this poor incorporation in the global marketplace, there is a conceptual-contextual gap in the conception of security as a precondition for stability and poverty reduction in the study region. This gap exists because most of the interventions in the region have yet to meet the contextual realities of the region. Stability does not guarantee that the necessary transformations will occur, an issue that is at the heart of poverty of historically exploited and adversely incorporated regions. The development challenges of ‘chronic’ poverty and insecurity require a broader and deeper approach than the one used by technically-oriented programmes aimed at regional social engineering.

In substantiating the arguments that underpin the central research question of this thesis, this chapter proceeds as follows: the first component involves the conceptual overview of security and development interventions in the region. Discussion of the conceptual perspectives of the aid actors will reveal the liberal foundation of various intervention attempts. The second component is an examination of the region-wide development and security interventions. In respect to these developmental interventions, the agricultural and water sectors will be the main foci of analysis. Within the agricultural sector, the Northern Growth Rural Project (NGRP) will be examined in depth. Secondary to a discussion of the NGRP will be an examination of details that have been neglected in relation to agricultural development for the purposes of poverty reduction. An examination of the neglected details in agricultural development will center on the adverse, international political economic policies and practices that underpin the region, including more domestic considerations. The last component of this
section will focus on an assessment of the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) as a donor-driven water sector intervention for the reduction of poverty.

The third section discusses the various international aid security related interventions that have been used in the area. These interventions have been driven by a liberally-oriented consensus in the sense that these interventions rarely involve in the wider polity and structural factors in the region. This consensus orientation, my research demonstrates, is premised on the formal nature of short-term conflict resolution approaches. The core practices of the liberally oriented conflict resolution strategy are the introduction of a peace accord, reconciliation, negotiation of settlement structures and positions and dialogue. These conflict resolution strategies constitute an integral part of the contemporary expansive component of security.

The section that follows discusses the need for renewed thinking in respect to the instrumental development and security interventions used by leading aid agencies. The concluding section provides a summary of the chapter and introduces the UN JHSP as the subject of the next chapter. As stated in chapter one, the UN JHSP is a constituent programme that encapsulates the DSN framework for interventions in Tamale and Yendi.

**Liberal Development and Security Perspectives of Aid Actors**

The broad development and security interventions used in NG, from their conceptualization to implementation levels, depict pro-market frameworks of individualistic competitiveness and deregulation. These interventions appear to foster an attitude of inclusive liberalism, particularly through the reconfiguration of the role of the state as a regulator and enabler of market competition. Individuals are reconstituted as responsible actors in their future well-being and security. From my viewpoint, this pursuit of inclusive liberalism reflects a
continuation of trusteeship. Furthermore, this kind of trusteeship involves the foregrounding of external tutelage of domestic actors by aid agencies in order to ‘contain’ poor regions. This external tutelage for containment is prioritized at the expense of a broader outlook for societal transformation. These interventions rest on community participation and empowerment approaches that operate in sync with the simplistic and problem-solving nature of external interventions already in progress. This problem-solving orientation of external intervention tends to configure conditions that ignore the historical and relational dynamics of the problem.

For practical and conceptual reasons, I adopt poverty reduction as the pre-eminent development goal in the region, along with conflict prevention as a security objective in the overall quest towards securing the region. The continuous rediscovery of poverty reduction as the foremost priority of international development aid practices is well noted by Hulme (2013) and Duffield (2006). Kaldor (2007) identifies poverty as a vital component of the ‘new war thesis’ that has given an interventionist booster to international aid institutions. The new war thesis suggests that the contemporary development and security challenges that exist in developing countries are the result of unfair globalization practices. I find this causal relation between globalization and conflict and poverty as suggested by the ‘new war thesis’ is a restrictive proposition. Problematizing globalization for the developmental problems of the poor economies invariably absolves exploitative capitalist practices prevalent in colonial and post-colonial eras of responsibility for these situations.

From my analytical angle, I deem it necessary to examine the conceptual meaning of poverty as espoused by the prominent aid agencies working in the region. An engagement with a conceptual understanding of poverty provides a strong analytical lens to assess the prescriptive remedial solutions to the poverty. Official conceptualizations of poverty within
the development policy context of Ghana have been based on technical formulations that create categories such as extreme poverty and relative poor. Almost all of the international aid agencies in the study region rely on the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS). The GLSS is a household survey undertaken by the Ghana Statistical Service that aims to establish a poverty line whereby individuals who fall below the line are classified as poor.

The GLSS surveys provide the benchmarks for poverty acceptable by the IMF and World Bank. A senior official of the MOF confirmed to me during an interview that the poverty and income indicators revealed by the GLSS are vital for the determination of donor support for the country. According to Mr. Arthur, an official of the MOF, the GLSS findings were crucial in Ghana’s application for Highly Indebted Poor Country debt relief and Millennium Challenge Account. Based on my review of the household surveys from 1994-2010, it came to light that by approximating nationwide poverty to an index constituted through aggregated findings rendered the day to day lived realities of individuals and groups invisible. The likely consequence of this aggregated data is the utilization of the derived poverty index to formulate technical solutions to reduce poverty.

Despite recent attempts to broaden the scope of poverty (income and non-income) by aid institutions and development scholars, the primary focus on the individual and income metric remain the norm in the Northern Region. Standardizing and classifying poverty benchmarks based on income per individual is a tactic to render the poor visible. Rendering the poor visible aligns the aid industry’s predisposition for quick-fix universal technical solutions with the country’s poverty situation. This technical rendering of poverty condition tends to isolate the poor from vital societal institutions, structures and systems. Green and Hulme (2005, p. 868) also aver that, notwithstanding the numerous innovations in poverty
measurement, money centric or growth primacy policies still dominate poverty reduction analyses in the Northern Region. Further, Green and Hulme (2005) suggest that household income and expenditure statistics, government statistics, and participatory poverty assessments are used to measure the extent and depth of poverty. I contend that due to limited broad participatory practices to reflect dissenting views, most of these participatory assessments, in the end reflect official predetermined priorities.

This technical rendering of poverty can be seen in the World Bank’s (2007, 2011) daily consumption benchmark of less than $1.50 a day as the proxy of an absolute poor person in Ghana. The donor sponsored Participatory Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment (PPVA, 2011) based on the income criterion categorizes the poor into different sub-groups. These sub-groups are: ‘fluctuating poor,’ near poor, so-called ‘living dead’ (indigent) and ‘survival seeking chronic poor’ which is used to represent someone who lives with institutionalized hunger as a norm (Korboe, Dogbe and Marshall, p. ix). As such, the Participatory Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment categorizations of chronicity of poverty cannot be accurate because the vital structural and institutional foundations of chronic poverty cannot be quantified.

The chronicity of poverty requires a critical examination of poverty from a broader relational perspective to provide a better grounding to search for a complex solution to a complex problem. My numerous encounters with aid agencies in the Northern Region suggest that the search for complex solutions is not part of their agenda. By complex solutions, I suggest interventions that take into account issues related to the political economy, the historical/nature of initial conditions, the social relations, and non-positivistic assumptions.

The steadfastness of a money-centric framing of poverty analysis reflects the dominance of mainstream economic thinking on the ideas, knowledge and practices of the aid
industry. A combination of neoclassical economic thought and institutionalized unequal power relations tend to mute opposing viewpoints. It is necessary to understand the rationales and assumption behind aid industry interventions. An examination of these rationales are crucial given that aid actors are not neutral entities, but are rather aligned to specific ideological, theoretical and ontological perspectives.

I contend that a narrow view of poverty shows a limited characteristic (poverty) of a person but fails to explain why people are ‘poor’. My conceptual understanding of poverty in the Northern Region is based on a defective socio-economic system. This defective socio-economic system has been produced by historical imbalances in structural and power relations at the local, regional, national and global levels. Poverty is not a natural condition that can be solved through depoliticized solutions. In order to understand why these characteristics of poverty are correlated and conflated as causes, and the aid industry serves as a machine that generates solutions to problems of which it only has a limited understanding. In this respect, failure becomes a justification for further intervention.

It is ultimately critical for an aid agency pursuing poverty reduction to painstakingly engage with the ideologies, practices and processes that created the adverse living conditions for ‘poor’ people. This relational position requires a thorough institutional analysis of both formal and informal institutional structures and the unique history of the particular region. I posit that there are critical social institutions within the local economy that must be accorded recognition. These critical social institutions include: kinship structures, network relationships, local politics and ethnic cleavages in addition to state formation and the interplay of international forces. In so doing, aid agencies will have a better grasp of the structure, social processes and practices that shape, produce and reproduce poverty as a core development
challenge in the region. This refocusing may also serve to identify more appropriate and productive ways to intervene.

Aid agencies, however, have been guided by their linear assumptions and obsession with universal quantitative targets, and have thus ignored social relational processes exceptionally important to explain the complex causes of poverty. Ferguson (2006) and Mosse (2007) note that the tendency to avoid the long search for the reasons why poverty occurs is due to the bureaucratization and de-politicization of the development apparatus and processes. This de-politicization, according to Ferguson, is based on the aid industry’s bureaucratic apparatus that relies on technical experts to formulate standardized solutions that are foisted on developing countries. I deem it essential to investigate how these depoliticized interventions interact with the real socio-cultural and political realities in the locality of intervention.

Significantly, Dr. P. Desroches, a Senior Economist of the World Bank office in Ghana accorded physical constraints as the causal reasons for the entrenched poverty condition in the study region. Dr. Desroches identified the following constraints: “the multiple factors accounting for the high level of poverty in Northern Ghana are: erratic rainfall, low quality of seeds, lack of adequate services- education, water, health facilities sanitation, food inaccessibility, human rights abuse, ignorance, weak capacity and lack of entrepreneurial skills, lack of finance, ecological degradation and laziness/apathy.” (Dr. P. Desroches Interviewed on August 5, 2011). These factors objectify chronic poverty in study region in order to facilitate the deployment of technical approaches as the main panacea for poverty. Individuals who are detached from their structural conditions become reconstituted as merely objects of intervention. The identified non-relational factors seek to localize the causes of poverty that invariably exonerate aid agencies of any possible programme failures. Interestingly, Mosse
(2005, 2010) and Pritchett, Woolcock, and Andrews (2010) also suggest that localization of problems is a systematic attempt by the aid industry to push for the deepening of local reforms. I contend that this localization of the causal factors of poverty is a reductionist approach in which the quest for poverty reduction will be an elusive goal. An analysis of implementation failures must shift from the normative problematization of the local to consider a critical examination of the conceptual understanding, rationales and assumptions of interventions.

The UN system relies on participatory approaches to conceptualize poverty. This participatory approach in itself did not interrogate the reasons why people are poor in order to find plausible means to address the problem. Focusing on the characteristics of the framed poor person, whose poverty situation is technically decoupled from his/her society, leads to a failure to address the core reasons for poverty. This focus on the traits of individuals has the tendency to naturalize and de-politicize poverty in the region.

From a national development policy viewpoint, this technical conception appears to be the norm. The Savannah Accelerated Development Authority (SADA), established in 2010 by Government of Ghana (GoG) with the mandate to bridge the north-south developmental gap also reinforces the pursuit of stability as a perquisite for poverty reduction. The main strategic report for SADA indicates that there are two main factors that predispose the Northern Region to high scale vulnerability (GoG, 2010, p. 92-93). These two factors have been identified as ecological devastation and persistent conflicts. The report identifies peace building as fundamentally critical for development of the area and the drive to reduce poverty. A critical assessment of the basis for SADA’S position of conflict and insecurity suggests that a narrow negative effect of conflict on development outcomes appear to be normative thinking. This normative thinking is firmly consistent with the UNDP notion of freedom from ‘fear’ and
‘want’. I further suggest that the narrow focus on negative effects provides an interventionist urgency to pursue short-term technical solutions.

The short-term and technocratic conceptualization of poverty used by aid agencies have resolutely challenged by some local residents who I interviewed for this study. These local residents demonstrate a particularly nuanced understanding of their peculiar poverty and underdevelopment circumstances. Some of the respondents declare:

I do not understand why the people who come to save our social and economic difficulties in this region rather support some and neglect others. Our living conditions are bad, they come and give us cutlasses but they forget farming entails more than cutlasses. They behave like the government who does not care about us, concentrate everything viable in the South, but only come to us when national elections is around the corner and dole gifts as well as make empty promises. I have lost faith in everyone now and only look up to God to determine my faith and when my time is up, I will join Allah. (Mr. Mohammed. Date of Interview: July 30, 2011)

I had wanted to be an engineer so that I can make a decent living because I was very brilliant as a pupil but when I father died I had to farm in order to support my mother. One day I was approached by a gentleman, who I could not recognize, but he introduced himself to me as Agyare, a classmate of mine at primary school, who is a civil engineer now. I could not make him out because I looked too old for such a strong energetic man to be my classmate. I felt ashamed of myself. I have promised myself that
I will try my best to educate one of my seven children to train as an engineer. With this, there will be peace in my heart. My son! We are suffering; please talk for us because no one listens to us. I hope the work that you are doing now will wake the ‘Big men’ in the capital up. May Allah be with you! (Mr. Bukari. Date of Interview: July 30, 2011.)

These responses on the part of my research participants demonstrate a persistent poverty condition and point to the state’s neglect in providing institutional support. They point to the continuity of the state’s preference for the Southern regions is similar that of the colonial administration. An emergent issue for residents is that they are saddled with high cost of farm implements. Their responses are suggestive of a historical trajectory for their poverty. From my perspective, these historical accounts of poverty draw attention to the institutional processes and structures that are responsible for creating poverty in the region. The saliency of the institutional and structural turn as captured in the responses of my interviewees challenge the relevance of the supply side constraints identified by the World Bank and UNDP. These testimonies give significant credence to the fact that the poverty situation in Northern Ghana is not a natural phenomenon. I posit that poverty, as revealed in their testimonies; suggest an adverse incorporation problem, which makes it imperative to examine the broader relational poverty issues.

A female respondent who was interviewed provided a nuanced response that gave further credence to the broad sociality of her poverty circumstance. She declares with deep concern that:

Some officers came to me and my friends to inform us of their intention to help us on condition that we join a producer group that they have formed
so that we can work as a collective team. The second condition is that we need to have some assets such as land and savings account. In the absence of those assets we should not expect any assistance from them. So I told her that if I have assets to be productive, why would I need her company’s support? Since my husband died his family members came for the land he had been farming on and that is the practice of our customary tradition. What can I say? So my daily sustenance is by working on farms of the big men who pay me monthly, sometimes the pay delays and he pays me whenever he has money to pay me, else I will have to work as a cleaner in some villages in exchange for food. (Memuna. Interviewed on August 4, 2011)

Memuna’s response attests to the way a customary rule of inheritance undermines widow’s rights to a sustainable livelihood. Her job as a farm labourer has obviously made her much more vulnerable and unable to address her future needs and priorities because her major concern is how to survive day to day. Ultimately, her submission points to the urgent need to reconsider women’s inheritance rights as an area of worthy of examination. By confronting the cultural norms and practices, aid agencies need to seek equity rather than resorting to failed apolitical technical solutions. In fact, a few other widows that I had informal interaction with attribute their current poverty condition to the discriminatory cultural practice of inheritance of their tribe.

The framing of conflict and economic insecurity and its relation to poverty was undertaken through axiomatic liberal deductive thinking. A liberal orientation is evident in the SADA 2010 Strategy Report. The Report states: “conflict in northern Ghana severely
undermines efforts towards good governance, sustainable development and poverty reduction. Such events have resulted in heavy loss of life, political instability, delays in development activities, and skews development opportunities. In many respects, much of Northern Ghana could be considered as [a] conflict-prone area” (p.92). I must emphasize that this deductive linkage between conflict, under-development and poverty does not capture the broad and complex relational factors in the region. More significant is the silence on the part of aid agencies related to the interplay of historical and contemporary politico-social and economic relations across the regional, along with national and global issues that also impact the region. Therefore, the deliberate stripping of the broader relational dynamics provides an avenue to suggest only a reductive and narrow scope of intervention geared towards crisis management rather than toward seeking sustained processes of transformation.

It is important to stress that these conceptual framings of reciprocal linkage between conflict instigated insecurity and poverty reduction is only intuitively appealing. This method is actually empirically deficient in demonstrating the mechanisms and processes that produce the acclaimed causal relations. The weakness of such a conceptual linkage is compounded by an inadequate income proxy for poverty and an inability to understand the more nuanced effects of conflict. The ultimate policy and practical interventions emanating from such deductive framing of the poverty situation leads to the deployment of time-bound problem-solving approaches to address a much more complex problem. This inflexible programmatic orientation underscores the UN JHSP’s predetermined intended beneficiaries, and identifies the outcomes and outputs expected by collaborating agencies. In my view, this deductive approach de-politicizes the aid process by relying on standardized formal processes of intervention, rather than ones that are specific to the region.
The predisposition toward the short-term problem-solving approaches of the aid industry, makes it possible for aid actors to relieve themselves of the search for transformational long-term approaches. More especially, these short-term approaches, which are conditioned by a results-driven rationale, tend to prioritize project coordination issues over the content of any particular intervention. This co-ordination obsession among the aid agencies was revealed to be an issue during an interview with Mr. Glenn Morgan, Programme Manager of Catholic Relief Services. I asked him to explain the challenges that arise during the implementation of their programmes. He stated: “the main factor that undermined successful implementation of the peace negotiating activity was the inability to coordinate the diverse stakeholders, especially the government officials, traditional leaders and the representatives of the various youth groups. It seems they have their own agenda and not fully committed to the laid down processes.” (G. Morgan, Interviewed on August 10, 2011). This programme manager’s response seeks to normalize the rationales and content of the reconciliation and peace education process which has been deemed a potent remedy to the entrenched tension and insecurity in the area. It also blames the implementation failures on the problem of coordination among aid agencies. I will provide an extensive discussion of this coordination mantra in chapter six of this dissertation, which deals with the various development and security intervention impasses. The UN JHSP will be discussed in detail in the chapter five as it entails virtually all the dictates of the responsibility to protect prescriptions.

The diverse framing of security challenges by the UNDP consistently paints a negative outlook of what? The negative perceptions of the area as advanced by Mr. Aaron Nantongmah, regional programme officer of the UN JHSP include: deleterious impacts and effects of socio-economic development, low investor confidence, and the destruction of
productive infrastructure. Mr. Nantongmah further identified the destruction of social cohesion and capital, regional instability and danger to national stability as some of the deleterious effects of conflict on development in the region. Furthermore, this negative framing requires conflict prevention mechanisms, based on tightly budgeted timelines and engaging with key stakeholders. All the officials of the agencies I interviewed during my fieldwork affirm the deleterious effects of conflict and instability on the persistent poverty conundrum in the region.

An issue of scarcity in the region has been attributed to conflict-generated insecurity in the region. This is evident in responses I received from different officials of German International Development, the World Bank and ActionAid. The German International Development official, Dr. Hesse, stated categorically that employment, financial stability and land scarcity are the main driving causes of the conflict in the Northern Region. Dr. Desroches of the World Bank has also attributed the conflict to the scarcity of market opportunities and a lack of fertile lands for youth to access as fundamental triggers of the conflict and insecurity. These kinds of responses are based on either a rational choice model or the greed hypothesis espoused by Homer-Dixon (1999) and Collier and Heofler (2003). These framings tend to negate the historical roles of the IR and state policies in the structuring and intensification of conflict.

I suggest that the diverse negative framings by aid agencies are symptomatic of their ‘trusteeship’ mentality. This trusteeship orientation is a driving force behind the agencies preference for externally-devised solutions that demonstrate the inability of government officials to address poverty issues.
Development Interventions for Poverty Reduction

The aid industry has featured actively in developmental interventions in the region, with the ultimate goal of poverty reduction since independence in 1957. The two dominant areas of development-focused poverty reduction interventions are in the agricultural and social services (primarily water, health and education). Notable among water interventions are the current Northern Region Small Town program, funded by CIDA, and WaterAid community-driven borehole projects. Other notable agriculture-related interventions include JICA’s Project for Sustainable Development of Rain-fed Lowland Rice Production, which started in 2009, the $20 million Millennium Village Projects funded by the DfID and the German International Development’s Market-Oriented Agricultural Programme (MOAP) that aims to stimulate market-competitive agricultural products. There are also various community-based food security projects undertaken by the Ghana Development Communities Association, United States Agency for International Development, and Danish International Development Agency.

Notwithstanding these past and present interventions outlined above, I will use the NRGP and CWSA as subjects for analysis because of their wide regional scope of intervention. I suggest that these interventions are reflective of both technical supply-side options and community persuasions. Hence, it becomes imperative to examine the rationales for these interventions were articulated in the field.

The Northern Rural Growth Program: Potential for Agrarian Transformation?

The NRGP is a donor funded agricultural sector intervention program, and its overall goal is to promote sustainable agricultural growth, and food security for the rural poor in Northern
Ghana. The targeted beneficiaries of the program are small-scale farmer, and the four-year program is due to cost $150 million. The programme is funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), ADB, European Union (EU) and GIZ in collaboration with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA).

The NRGP was conceived of through the Government of Ghana’s request to IFAD and the European Union concerning the feasibility of transforming agricultural productivity in Northern Ghana. This request was the product of the GoG’s recognition of the funding capabilities and expertise of the two international bodies to support the proposed programme. The first stage of the proposed programme was series of dialogues and negotiations between the European Union & IFAD and GoG representatives, meetings that also included various technocrats from the MOFA. Furthermore, the aim of these meetings was to identify the problems and determine the priorities and operational plans moving forward. According to Mr. Alhassan, a key informant from NRGP, the government initially submitted a proposal for funding to IFAD and ADB. Experts from the aforementioned donor agencies sent to evaluate the proposal and later streamlined the technical and operational details. Mr. Alhassan, who is a senior official, revealed to me that the donor agencies, have, from the start, exercised significant control of the programme. Key areas of control by the donor agencies are expenditure disbursements and the determination of experts. With these areas of control under the influence of the aid agencies, Mr. Alhassan notes that the programme has to rely on foreign experts who had the power to determine which crops to fund.

According to Mr. Alhassan, the rationale behind this top-down program is to reduce conflict in NG. He testified that, “we have noticed over the years an increased level of conflict during the lean season because most farmers become virtually unemployed. The
unemployment then degenerates into violent robbery which escalates the conflict and tension in the region.” To curb the conflict eruption, Mr. Alhassan notes that the government has “introduced this innovative tri-cycle planting season that will keep the farmers productively engaged through-out the year.” (M. Alhassan Interviewed on August 12, 2011). The causal linkage between lean season and conflicts, from my perspective, is not conclusive because, as I discussed in chapter three, the complexity of conflicts in the Northern Region are conditioned by multiple factors. Therefore, the primary focus on economic motives behind the conflicts may possibly defer the conflict but will not address the root causes in a constructive manner.

A scrutiny of the program’s components reveals an overwhelming focus on the narrow supply-side priorities. These include: commodity chain development (another buzzword in the agricultural sector), rural infrastructure, and access to rural finance and programme management and coordination. Largely missing from the program are the demand-side constraints that reflect the intricate priorities of the farmers. Mr. Alhassan reiterated the dominance of technical advisors recruited by the donor agencies in each step of the process: problem definition, concept development, infrastructure prioritization and crop selection. I asked why the notion of the value chain has become a priority aspect of the processes of agricultural sector intervention. Specifically, my curiosity was piqued in the following grey areas: the source of value chain policy discourse, its nature and how it impacts the farmers both individually and collectively to optimize their livelihoods. Mr. Alhassan response is as follows: “the value chain has become an operative strategy which was adopted from the FAO. Through the value chain, farmers will be integrated with all those key actors from retailers, seed companies, agro-processors, the financial industry and export firms to mention a few. We are yet to know the real impact on the farmers.” (M. Alhassan. Interviewed on August 12,
The problem with this view is that most farmers have complained bitterly about these actors in the supply line of tools, equipment and the high interest rates charged by banks. As a result, the farmers are further exposed to poverty and an unregulated value chain. This policy depicts an unyielding faith in the market to solve a complex problem. I suggest that given the weak policy advocacy and state support for these small-hold farmers, further exposure to the market will not transform their lives.

In its concept note, the NRGP affirms that rural communities constitute the poverty hub of the region because of the low level of productivity on the part of the peasants. The NRGP blames the poor savannah vegetation for this low level of productivity. I must stress that their a spatial categorization of poverty farming, defined as holding land between 1ha and 5ha in size, problematizes the vital search for reasons why poverty is chronically persistent in the region. The salient effect of such a categorization has led to the conflation of poverty with the characteristics and correlates of poor person (Harris, 2007, Green and Hulme, 2006). This unacceptable correlation ignores the vital relational causal factors of poverty in the region. In the end technocratic and simplistic approaches become the remedial option.

Technocratic solutions dominated the core activities of the NRGP. The programme provided prioritized areas for inclusion, including: water-pumping machines, the supply of improved seeds and the construction of roads needed to improve productivity and marketing. In view of the prevailing vital policy neglect and land tenure challenges of the peasants, these restrictive input-driven interventions are unlikely to reduce poverty. I would add that the NRGP may succeed in instituting disciplinary and regulatory constraints against targeted farmers. In fact, the regulatory constraints are already in place and are composed of imposed new farming practices and sanctions meted out to farmers who fail to adhere to the guidelines.
An instance of this has occurred when farmers were unable to constitute groups of at least five members to gain further support.

It is critically important to note that output during the initial 2 years of the intervention was not significant, as suggested by Mr. Alhassan. The intriguing issue, however, is the continuous indictment of the poor farmer as the source of challenges to implementation. This example of blame being placed on the poor is part of a scheme on the part of aid agencies to subject peasants to deeper technical reforms and keep them from questioning the rationales and assumptions of these aid interventions. Under the NRGP, Mr. Alhassan attributes the program’s poor outcome to three main factors. He explained that it was difficult to change the mentality of farmers, their poor organizational skills, and a difficulty in coordinating stakeholders. With respect to the mentality of the farmers, Mr. Alhassan’s position is that the long years of subsistence practices have made it difficult for peasants to adapt to change. In my view, this is a reductionist position; my discussion with some of the farmers suggests a contrary opinion. Some of the farmers revealed to me that there was no assurance on the part of the government that there would be a significant yield if they joined the program. In fact, this element of uncertainty – part and parcel of technocratic programs – creates, in my opinion, a disincentive for peasants to join.

A growing trend in the aid industry is an obsession with faith in the formation of groups as a route for poverty reduction. Virtually all the agencies that were interviewed for this study have rolled out schemes that require group formation to benefit from the NRGP. This attraction to group formation as an approach to funding is linked to the entrance of social capital onto the development aid thinking. However, the conditions under which a group functions to the collective benefits to its members are not given thoughtful consideration. Due
consideration, in my thinking has not been given to the macro structural, political and economic conditions of group formation. Also not given critical attention is micro socio-cultural issues involved in the region, including kinship structures, ethnic relations and rule-making systems. Secondly, this consensus-oriented strategy tends to perpetuate donor hegemony, as evidence from my interview did not suggest any effort towards the structural change that is an inevitable factor for poverty reduction. In fact, in similar interviews I conducted with an official of JICA in relation to the Sustainable Development of Rain-fed Low Land Rice project, it was revealed that the program was to focus mainly on technical issues rather than on structural issues. According to Alhaji Tanko (senior official of JICA), the technical packages of the project are land preparation, an extension support system, rice cultivation and post-harvest management. The JICA programme also focuses on group farming, in which Alhaji Tanko identified the formation of cohesive groups as one of the key challenges of the project.

An intriguing issue relates to the assumption behind this notion of group formation and its implications on poverty. The producer groups established by the NRGP within communities are based on an untenable assumption that group consensus is a precondition for group success. This shortcoming confirms Cooke and Kothari’s (2001) and Fine’s (2007) skepticism about the poverty reduction prospects of group formation. In fact, a group of farmers that I interviewed in Tamale expressed their disdain for production groups. The leader of the group, Mr. Abraham Yakubu stated: “we have had bitter experience with this group work because our first time membership of a group formed by one of the aid agencies rather impoverished us. So what is the point in joining groups only to be worse off? We cannot gamble with our future like that.” Mr. Yakubu attributed their impoverishment to the dominance of ‘middle class’
members who drove the group’s collective interests to foster their own personal interest. This shows that little consideration on the part of aid agencies is given to the unequal power relations within such small groups. The multiplicity of interests does not make groups formation an easy all-inclusive strategic framework to boost productivity of peasants.

The possibility of remaking groups to be productive must instruct the administrators of the NRGP who develop working group norms, values and rules to maximize efficiency, but this is not an overnight process. The presence of diverse socio-cultural beliefs, an imbalance in power relations and multiple identities do not allow for the easy formation of a viable group. Further, Thorp, Stewart, and Heyer (2005) and Fine (2007) assert that the values that drive groups to work equitably and efficiently are a politically demanding task. The logical implication here is that it takes time for effective group dynamism to be nurtured and enforced. The axiomatic, seamless, group dynamism thinking of the NRGP demonstrates a limited appreciation of what Eyben (2008) calls the ‘chaotic’ socio-cultural and political economic relations within communities. Hence, smooth formation of cohesive group cannot be taken to be given.

The aversion on the part of the aid agency to diversity and dissent is another reason for their unyielding faith in group formation. A more significant issue is that even a theoretical link between group cohesion and productivity is not firmly established as suggested by Fine (2007, p. 262-265). In the absence of any clear theoretical linkage between group formation and productivity, it becomes crucial to question the basis for such a belief within the aid industry. Based on the findings in relation to the NRGP, I contend that simplistic interventionist assumptions of desirability and possibility of change significantly explain the reasons why aid agencies pursue ‘programed to fail’ interventions.
Another vital issue to consider is that the NRGP’s goal of linking peasants to the financial market to access loans, however, ignores important questions regarding the terms on which the peasants are being linked to the banks. In the absence of any special subsidized interest rates set out for peasant farmers who are accessing loans, especially after the SAP terminated the hitherto subsidy regime, it may be impossible for peasants to secure loans. This is not to suggest that subsidies are the main bane of agricultural productivity but rather to suggest that the removal of loan subsidies compound the complex structural and institutional challenges. In addition to the issue of subsidization, there is only one national bank for agriculture (specifically the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) which, as of June 21, 2013, has a lending base rate of 21.5% per annum. The ADB offers concessionary loans to farmers as part of its core mandate, but this concessionary facility has only been secured by the commercial food and cash crop farmers and a few others operating at a high scale in the animal sector. The sum effect is that the peasants remain crowded out of any access to the state’s financing program because they are invisible not only to the banks, but also to policymakers and politicians. An ironical issue is that the NRGP is unable to advocate for concessionary facility for the peasants, because the dominance of powerful political forces and business elites remains unchanged.

**Limitations of Supply-side Driven Agricultural Interventions**

The pertinent nature and quality of socio-economic and political relations between broad actors within the agricultural sector remains a non-issue to aid agencies operating in the area. In my view, it is essential to engage with the complex and chaotic relationship between actors in the agricultural sector to avoid simplistic interventions that have been proven ineffective. The
complexity in this situation extends beyond merely the set of relations between agrarian classes and highlights unequal relations between different sets of peasant farmers and capital-intensive commercial farmers. There are also other active actors involved in the value chain situation: banks, seed companies, commodity chains, capital circuits, agents of technical change and agro-processing firms all have a stake in the aid situation of the study region. Globalization processes have also had adverse implications for most deprived farmers. I will contend that crises of production and labour evident in capitalist globalization processes constitute a significant factor in the pauperization of the peasants in the Northern Region. This is evidenced by numerous complaints by informants in villages that they have become meager wage earners instead of producers because their lands have been acquired by large-scale farmers. The loss of productive lands demonstrates that securing land tenure for peasants alone is not enough to guarantee them improved livelihood. Thus, the nature of the international and domestic capitalist practices and its implications on the well-being of peasants need to be considered.

A cursory look at the Food and Agricultural Sector Development Policy, a donor-financed report, shows the policy practices that neglect crops from the Northern region:

Crops such as mango, cashew, oil-palm, rubber, plantain and citrus, as well as small ruminants (sheep and goats), poultry and vegetables will be promoted on the basis of the comparative and competitive advantage of agro-ecological zones and availability of markets. Indigenous staple crops and livestock species produced by the poor can be commercialized through linkages to industry. Research on these crops and livestock species to identify genetic material with desired qualities and to improve productivity
along the value chain will contribute to poverty reduction” (FASDEP, p. 34, 2007).

The official preference for selected crops typifies the continuation of the colonial government’s prioritization of exportable crops. The selectivity of crops excludes the products of the poor farmers in the Northern Region. According to the World Bank (2007), the most prominent products of small-hold farmers in the Northern Region are sorghum, millet, rice, and yams. This report is also suggestive of an imbalance in power relations in terms of representation of the needs of the poor, with the scale balanced towards donor priorities. The Food and Agricultural Development Policy predilection for specific crops is based on the international and regional market appeal of particular crops. The primacy of this market appeal is supported by the national Growth Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), an over-arching national development policy framework that promotes export competitiveness as means for poverty reduction. Export promotion, in and of itself, is not a bad practice, but pursuing an export-driven growth strategy to reduce poverty must, however, be attentive to the policy space that would ensure that the products of poor farmers are accommodated. It would also be worthwhile to support the production systems of the poor, not necessarily for export promotion, but to explore domestic opportunities. Given the scale and magnitude of poverty challenges in the study region, impose an urgent need for multi-leveled sustained interventions. These interventions must be broad enough to accommodate the interests, priorities and needs of the poor farmers as a specific group, rather than as an aggregate or homogenized group.

The Northern Region is endowed at with at least four major crops of enormous commercial value that could be the initial catalyst for poverty reduction in the region, which has a single rainy season that lasts from July – October. There has been a failure on the part of
the past governments to invest adequately in the Northern Region to generate sustained livelihoods beyond the agricultural sector. Because of this, there is minimal diversity in the socio-economic base of the region. The implication of the limited rainy season is the need on the part of the government and aid agencies to search for strategies that would create and sustain non-agricultural employment in order to diversify the economic base of the region. Importantly, the piecemeal interventions being rolled out by donor agencies essentially downplay the complexity of poverty reduction. There is also a need for production costs of agriculture to be low in order not to impinge on the return on output, and it is imperative to ensure that fair and guaranteed prices are offered to peasants in exchange for their products. This pricing issue has been raised by the various farmers I interacted with, who blamed the exploitative practices of transport owners, wholesalers and other middlemen from Southern Ghana for offering them low prices of their products.

The privatization of agricultural services has not been in the interest of peasants in Northern Region. According to Owusu-Baah (2008), the privatization of extension services gave disproportionate accessibility to commercial farmers within the forest belt of the southern regions. This privatization of extension services limited most farmers in the savannah belt of the Northern Region to extension support due to financial and geographical reasons. The discriminatory privatization practice reflects a continuation of colonial practices as I explained in chapter three, which denied Northern Region needed state support because the government believed that the region was not endowed with cash-exportable crops.

Indeed, some farmers complained bitterly to me about the agony they undergo attempting to secure farm implements because they lack any kind of financial resources to do so. Many of these farmers outrightly rejected various loan offers from many of the NGOs,
because, according to the group leader, Seidu Mumuni, they have had “dismal experiences with similar NGOs that only make us sign binding contract agreements that we did not understand. They only pursue their interest by demanding a 40% share of our declared output. This 40% entitlement as claimed by the NGO was as exorbitant as the official commercial bank lending rate.” (S. Mumuni, Interviewed on August 28, 2011). Significantly, exploitative practices are still in vogue, especially in relation to role of Northern middlemen who mediate between the farmers and traders from the south. The result of the use of these Northern intermediaries, according to the farmers, is that minuscule prices are offered for their produce. The farmers attributed their weal control of the prices to the lack of government protection since the SAP practice and post Highly Indebted Poor Country era.

**Processes of Community Involvement in Water Privatization**

Water as a resource in a normative sense is deemed to be vital for sustainable livelihood, for poverty reduction, for and overall human development. Given the importance of water for human sustenance, its shortage has created an opportunity for international development intervention. Water scarcity, however, does not invalidate critical questions about the rationales that drive these interventions. In analyzing the formation and practices of CWSA, it is necessary to discuss the broader macro-national political and multilateral institutional processes surrounding water deregulation and privatization that have precipitated its establishment. The CWSA is a donor funded ‘community’-oriented water and sanitation service delivery for small town and rural communities in the Northern Region. Water privatization and deregulation were integral components of the structural reforms that affected essential social services in the late 1990s and still pertinent in the post SAP era. In this
instance, the IMF, and World Bank embarked on fierce policy campaigns towards privatization and deregulation of water services in the name of getting the ‘prices right.’

Apart from the dominant Bretton Wood Institutions that pushed for the privatization of water delivery in Ghana, there are other INGOs that play an intermediary role. WaterAid has provided an immense outreach role in support of the deregulation and privatization of water on behalf of the World Bank and IMF. WaterAid’s function of mobilizing public support for the liberalization of the water sector was confirmed by a key informant during my fieldwork. According to Mr. Illiasu who works with CLIP:

   Indeed, WaterAid facilitated numerous seminars and workshops for water-related organizations including some of the state agencies regarding liberalization of the water sector. Various officials of WaterAid claim that privatization of water services would correct the state’s deficiency and increase physical investment to boost water production and distribution to enhance the capabilities of households. Out of curiosity, I attended a couple of their capacity training workshops since they boast of their expertise to enhance water generation and distribution. In fact, they sounded like World Bank officials who are tried to sell bad commodity to the poor.

This information reveals the state’s technical inefficiency as a reason for water problems, which makes the market a reliable solution through privatization. Limiting the blame for Northern Region’s water problems to state incapacity de-politicizes water accessibility in its entirety. The politicization of water accessibility from the purview of the study region is salient when we take into consideration the role of power and politics in determining who has
access to resources. In light of the fate of the poor in this system, various CSOs mounted resistance against water sector liberalization. Third World Network, the Coalition Against the Privatization of Water and ISODEC utilized diverse platforms for protest, ranging from demonstrations, public workshops and media to campaign against water privatization on the grounds that it is socially and economically irresponsible.

It is crucial to appreciate the processes that enabled conditions for the deregulation and privatization agenda enacted by various aid agencies. The conditions that facilitated this agenda could be linked to the main state actors, to institutional shifts, or the prevailing orthodox political discourse. Notwithstanding the ruinous social effects of structural reforms in Ghana, privatization and deregulation were top policy priority issues that framed the government’s political and economic discourse between 2001 and 2009. This era marked the consolidation, privatization, and deregulation of water delivery, a move that was driven by the ‘Golden Age of Business’ policy expressed by President John Kufuor. It is important to note that this ‘Golden Age for Business’ opened a political space for contestations among a wide array of interest groups. The pro-business policy mantra was subject to different interpretations, particularly on the part of the neoliberal ideologues who endorsed deregulation and privatization possibilities. On the other hand, the Trade Union Congress and other progressive movements indicted the potential concentration of corporate control the Ghanaian economy, especially in reference to the delivery of public goods. I suggest that unequal power relations in the determination of policy priorities weighed heavily in favor of the government for a further push toward water deregulation and privatization.
The vested interest of state officials in deregulation could be assessed in my interview with Ms. Gladys Bappuroh, senior official of ISODEC, Tamale. In support of her claims against state officials’ complicity in the water sector liberalization, Ms. Bappuroh posits that:

Very limited space was granted to the civil society groups in the negotiation processes. To my surprise, senior government officials were very accommodating of the water privatization, because it further strengthened their control in the water sector. It might interest you to know that some of the engineers and management of the state owned Ghana Water &Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) had lucrative jobs with the private water companies that emerged. Some government officials also jumped on this private water delivery services, so certainly we were fought against internal and external enemies of human progress. With all these campaigns that we embarked upon, government did not yield to our demands to ensure that water is affordable and accessible to every household. (Ms. Bappuroh, Interviewed on August 16, 2011).

From this response, it is evident that the reconfiguration of the state as a facilitator of the conditions necessary to allow the market to work in consonance with normative small but effective government orthodoxy. In support of this reconfiguration of the role of the state by international aid industries, Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) reject the demise of the state argument as suggested by liberal-leaning scholars such as Fukuyama (2004) and Bellamy (2009). To Abrahamsen and William, the state is an adaptive system that, notwithstanding the immense structural reforms in most African states, such states were actually reformed to play an enabling or facilitating role. As part of the move to institute enabling conditions according
to Abrahamsen and Williams (2009, 2011), the re-articulation of the public-private divide through de-nationalized processes is necessary. In my view, Abrahamsen and William’s (2011) notion of the evolving role of the state needs further qualification in terms of the nature of the state in question. My position is that taking account of the development history of Northern Region, the state has not ensured an equitable allocation of essential resources. As I discussed in chapter three, the state’s distribution of assets since colonial times has favoured the southern regions. The relative security of the Southern regions in relation to the northern regions reflects a problematic state formation policy whereby questions of political settlements in respect of the Northern Region remain unresolved. Secondly, the changing role of the state does not impact regions of different endowments evenly. The unevenness of different regional endowments and intra-regional inequalities might produce different cataclysmic effects.

The crucial role of domestic actors in the enactment and actualization of state policies attests to the role of politics and personal interests that undergird development interventions. With the establishment of the CWSA, the state’s function has metamorphosed from being the main provider of water towards a new role as facilitator of water services. Mr. David Chirawurah, a convener of one of the workshops organized by the Coalition Against Privatization of Water contends that: “water is too precious a national asset to be left in the hands of multinationals, which are driven by the greed for gain more than anything else.” (Chirawurah, Interviewed on September 5, 2011). The core of Mr. Chirawurah’s position is the crucial issue of an individual’s inalienable right to have unfettered access to water. This unrestrained right I insist is based on the principles of humanity as a living being and is part of citizenship entitlement. The fears that he articulates are valid considering that the stringent privatization of water can possibly shift the universal requirement for unfettered access to
water towards conditional accessibility. With the conditional accessibility, only the privileged can have fluid access to water, because the commodification of water will restrict the poor financially.

A predominant phenomenon in the cause of international development interventions is the tactic of problematizing the State’s performance as both ineffective and inefficient. Dr. Simon Acquah, a water policy consultant, informed me that the defunct GWSC was chastised by the World Bank for covering less than 35% of the national population in its water delivery. Other problems identified include poor revenue recovery, negative balance sheets and under-investment in physical infrastructure. Therefore, the privatization of the water system became the sole option available. In resolving on privatization, however, other plausible options such as organizational reforms, prudent political and administrative changes and the promotion of competition usually necessary to resuscitate struggling public enterprises were ignored. The reliance on discrete economic and financial performances became grounds on which the push to decouple rural water services from urban supply was based. Spatial bifurcation in terms of rural and urban water led to the formation of the CWSA. Information obtained from Ing. Dauda Mahama, my key informant at CWSA, suggests that his organization constitutes part of the structural reforms that took place in the early 1990s. He posits: “the CWSA was established by Act 564 in 1998, which mandates it to deliver potable drinking water to rural communities and small towns. We are to ensure active community involvement in the management of their water services and coordinate all the activities of the diverse stakeholders including the district assemblies and private providers and facilitate the supply of operational materials.” (A. Mahama, Interviewed on August 18, 2011).
The dichotomous spatial concentrations in water supply are also the result of the national decentralization policy. Thus, the CWSA was essentially an agency that facilitated the decentralization of the water supply in rural sectors. In effect, communities are reconstituted as purveyors of water privatization and deregulation and will be reassigned governmental functions. Following Rose, a community is defined as: “a sector is brought into existence whose vectors and forces can be mobilized, enrolled, deployed in novel programmes and techniques which encourage and harness active practices of self-management and identity construction, of personal ethics and collective allegiances” (1999, 33). This definition is appropriate to the Northern Region, whereby heterogeneous communities have been imagined as mobilizing social spaces. Through expert practices, various local actors were trained to exercise responsible agency in the management of shared resources to advance their livelihood.

The Northern Region has been defined by the World Bank as a vast, rural, geographical setting that makes the operation of CWSA vital to sustain the livelihood of the residents. Adoption of pertinent ‘community’ addendums of ‘ownership and management’ has been the main pillars of water supply by CWSA. The CWSA practices engender inclusive liberalism; this liberalism is in the form of private providers who are put in charge of water generation, and communities bear 5% of the capital cost and are responsible for the full expenses related to maintenance and ownership. The 5% payment of the capital investment cost has made the CWSA and donor officials create the impression that rural water is subsidized for beneficiaries. This subsidy is not accurate when it is only one factor in the entire processes of water supply and communities have the ultimate responsibility to pay for both maintenance and ownership to ensure a working the water system.
The World Bank official, Dr. Desroches, chastised the state for being weak, which in his liberal thinking justifies the need for communities to be responsible for their water supply.

Dr. Desroches told me:

Listen Eric! You know the state is over-stretched and weak; therefore, it is important that communities should take over the state’s job. That is why the Bank is pushing for further government from the bottom so that communities will form the mobilizing resource for participatory water supply. Also community as an organizing factor will forge peaceful communal relations and enhance community productivity vital to reduce poverty.” (Dr. Desroches, Interviewed on August 5, 2011).

When I asked him to clarify what he meant when he called Ghana a weak state, he did not answer my question. The sustainability, productivity, poverty and peaceful rationalities as suggested by the Dr. Desroches, are unfounded and based on a misleading consensus-oriented notion about community. The vital issue is that this same development aid water intervention has sparked community tensions in some localities as suggested by Mr. Illiasu and confirmed by research participants that I interviewed in some villages in Tamale.

Furthermore, the deductive claims by Dr. Desroches raise significant questions. To begin with, he did not provide empirically testable strategies and processes through which the expected outcomes could be realized. Moreover, he failed to situate the water crisis within broader structural political economic relations at multiple levels beyond the communities. An important observation that I made during fieldwork is that accessibility to resources in most communities cannot be assumed to be an unproblematic issue. Crucial to the determination of
accessibility to resources is the inevitable nature of the contestable embodiment of social relations, rather than being merely based on individuals’ payment ability.

Also, contestations surrounding tariff payments remain inevitable due to these tariffs being incompatible with the rule- and meaning-making systems of the different ethnic groups in various communities. Indeed, during an interview with a respondent, Mr. Jibril Azeem, from Chereponi, who testified, “Hmmm! You see, I am a Konkomba farmer and we believe that water as a natural resource is governed by our Tendana (earth spirit) therefore, I don’t see why I should pay for this resource that is owned by my spiritual leader. I don’t think the spirit will be ok with me should I pay for something meant for free use by his people.” (J. Azeem. Interviewed on August 18, 2011). Another respondent, Baba Osumanu, from Gushiegu is also in support of the non-compliance with the tariff payment. Osumanu justified his non-compliance on the grounds that the big men in his community have monopolized the use and access of water, which leave him with the sole option of non-tariff payment. These responses suggest the fallacy of using tariffs as a mechanism for both water management and accessibility in a poor region imbued with salient socio-cultural values. Clearly such a tariff regime is being run by ‘big men’ who are consolidating their power base through their authority over water resources.

The responses from my informants also support Mr. Illiasu’s attestation regarding the stimulation of water politics instigated by this new arrangement. This conflicting situation informs Ostrom (1990), Mosse (2003) and Mehta’s (2005) position that water is not a common good because it generates its own politics. Therefore, collective action cannot be assumed to develop naturally, especially in conflict prone region such as Northern Region. However, I disagree with Ostrom’s suggestion that: “the only way to avoid the tragedy of the commons in
natural resources is to end the common-property system by creating a system of private property rights” (p. 145). Ostrom’s remedial proposal supports the consolidation and privatization of commoditized natural resources. This can be seen in the current aid industry lexicon of private-public partnership as a solution to water management and supply problems.

The tariff levying is a mechanism of re-regulating of water accessibility in the region, a practice that is inconsistent with conventional practices in different communities. Tariff as one of the major issues of contestation was confirmed by Ing. Mahama of the CWSA:

We keep receiving increasing reports about the non-compliance of many community members when it comes to payment of water fetched. In fact, this non-payment of water levy is one of the main reasons why the water maintenance is under severe threat in the communities. In lieu of this payment, we have in the interim suggested to the communities through the District Assemblies to adopt non-monetary payment such as voluntary works to defray the cost of water they use. We are yet to receive a feedback as to whether this recommendation is working or not. (D. Mahama. Interviewed on August 18, 2011).

The reality is that the non-payment of tariffs reflects a bigger picture beyond income and needs to be situated within the disparate value and meaning making systems, beliefs, gender and multiple identity features of the community in which it is used.

The unalloyed commitment to use the market approach to address social and relational challenges is rife within the CWSA practice. In an attempt to remedy poor community management issues, the World Bank recommends that: “The private-public partnership in the water sector should regain momentum and CWSA should encourage communities to consider
contracting out the operation, maintenance and management of small towns’ water supply systems especially for schemes serving populations above 10,000 to the private sector” (2008, P.38). Interestingly, Ing. Mahama also indicated his preference for the private-public partnership in the wake of the intractable implementation challenges. He asserts that:

A series of management meetings have been held in discussing and pushing for the adoption of private-public partnership, especially when the communities have demonstrated a weak capacity to manage the water systems. In fact, we have received some proposals from some private agencies…we are carefully scrutinizing them and once we are satisfied with the assessment, the district assemblies will be informed about the way forward. On the other hand, we have given the District Assemblies rights to also source for private ventures that we can assess their technical, financial and economic capacities.

Ironically, Ing. Mahama could not adduce a justifiable reason to support his own faith in the private-public partnership program. This leads us to the impression that interventions under the rubric of development and poverty reduction are a wrong strategy to posit liberal policies as universal solutions to aid issues. What is clear from his response is the clear simplification of a complex problem, which also suggests his antipathy for historical insights. On the other hand, his comments could also reflect his ignorance with respect to Ghana’s abysmal record with privatization.

The unavoidable issue here is that water accessibility in the Northern Region must be situated around social differentiation and power relations. This implies that the common good, a notion which is driven by a neoclassical economic understanding of water as having features
of non-rivalry and non-excludability, is not applicable in real practice. In my view such a simplistic understanding of water accessibility is oblivious to the historical evolution of society and unequal social relations that define and determine resource use. These unequal social relations (materially and discursively) invariably generate hoarding and exploitation possibilities, which ultimately result in resistance and struggles for resource use. Water accessibility is a conflict-ridden process. This unavoidable conflict-ridden water management system points to the need on the part of aid agencies to avoid this pristine community consensus oriented water supply and embrace an approach that reflects reality.

The use of technical experts in the articulation of development interventions is a key part of CWSA plans. From the context of water privatization, the role of experts is prominent in reconstituting the communities as responsible actors for managing their water supply. According to Ing. Mahama, the CWSA relies to a significant extent on experts recommended by the donor agencies, most notable of which are the World Bank, European Union, African Development Bank and CIDA. These experts are responsible for drawing various community maps and baselines, facilitating conceptual designs and procuring requisite/standard materials and the organization of workshops for training participants from the various communities. Ing. Mahama indicates that the CWSA, in tandem with other external experts, constituted the District Water and Sanitation Plan. The District Water and Sanitation Plan is a training programme for officials of the District Assemblies in areas of information collation and community needs assessment. Essentially, this training functions to consolidate both water decentralization and privatization agendas. In my view this is an integral part of the subjectification processes of inclusive liberalism.
As part of ensuring community ‘ownership’ and management of water systems, Ing. Mahama avers that two boards were established to boost the capacity of identified community members. These two bodies, the Water and Sanitation board and the Water board, through expert-driven capacity-building training are tutored in water system maintenance and modalities for tariff setting. I suggest that this belief in technical training as the epitome of capacity-building reduces the complex management of water systems to technical solutions. Technicalization of the problem is facilitated through the silencing of power imbalances and broader structural conditions within communities. Within this managerial prism, implementation issues and challenges are thereby reduced to capability motifs. This reductionist, technical approach is symptomatic of the problematic linear assumptions and rationales that drive interventions.

**Political Dynamics of Community Water Supply and Management**

The selection of communities for siting of boreholes for water supplies in each community entails political contestations. These contestations could be linked to the arbitrary nature of processes of community selection by the district assemblies. An interrogation of the criteria for identifying communities for intervention reveals that the selection process is heavily influenced by local political systems and political party affiliations. A group of residents interviewed in Yendi District indicate that their community has been denied the two boreholes meant for them because the community constitutes one of the strong-holds of the major opposition political party. The logical conclusion here is that accessibility to water is beyond the technical diagnoses, and is rather underpinned by both formal and informal political practices. Mr. A. Illiasu, of CLIP, also confirms that “the district assemblies not only select
sites for the boreholes but actually collect bribes from some communities before being selected. In fact, I have encountered several problems when we go for approval for our boreholes that we earmark for certain communities. They systematically slow you down purposely to induce you to give bribe before your request would be granted.” (A. Illiasu. Interviewed on August 14, 2011). What is evident in Illiasu’s response is the vibrancy of adverse or exclusionary interactional practices in the communities that are given further potency by ignorant, technically-oriented intentions. These exclusionary practices manifest themselves in the abject exploitation of residents and ultimately ensure social closure to those outside the web of the patron-client network.

Residents of the various communities impute the appointment of the District Chief Executive by the President of the Republic as being responsible for these non-accountable marginalization practices. Further, Mr. Azong, who is a local resident in Yendi, suggests that the appointment of the District Chief Executive by the President has foreclosed upon the necessary and vital political space to demand responsive and accountable leadership. In sharing his local governance experience with me, Mr. Azong proclaims that:

I think this district assembly system, which was established to be the savior of the poor residents in the various communities in terms of fostering participatory development and meeting the interests of the people, is just an official mega lie by the government. What I have observed over the years is the continuation of the old style of central planning. The worst situation is that with the return to democratic rule since 1993, the District Assemblies are seen an appendage of which political party is in power. I don’t think the interests of the poor have been considered over the past 2
decades. Therefore, for the government to tell us that the district assembly is a way to bring government to the doorstep of the poor is unacceptable because the poor folks do not have any influence in the management of the assemblies.

What is obvious from Mr. Azong’s comments is the failure of the depoliticized and technical assumption that decentralization, common in mainstream development thinking, is a vital partner to address development challenges of poverty. A further essential point to note is that decentralization is not a substitute for the burdensome structural and relational conditions that have plagued the region. These complex realities in the study region make me wonder why donor agencies keep pushing for a deepening of decentralization.

It is quite striking to note that almost all of the officials of the aid agencies I interviewed unanimously endorse the strengthening of the district assemblies as a prerequisite for poverty reduction. A confirmation is found in the testimony of Dr. Desroches, World Bank Lead Economist, when he posits:

The position of the bank is that the central government is too weak to govern effectively to reduce poverty and promote security in the region. It is for this reason we keep advising the government to marshall the necessary political will to support a successful decentralization system. The Bank over the years has committed significant resources to boost the capacity of the district and metropolitan assemblies. (Dr. Desroches. Interviewed on August 5, 2011).

I suggest, however, that political will is not a main panacea to deep-seated institutional and structural challenges. The contradictory aspect his response is the convenient
designation of the state as weak, but the same weak state is expected to mobilize strong political will. I deem this a deductive assumption that equates political will to capacity-building problematic because the critical poor state formation issues have been negated.

Decentralization is also the instrumental agency preferred by the UN system. A senior economist with the UNDP, Dr. Ndiaye, explained his organization’s position on decentralization and poverty reduction in the study region:

This Northern Region, with its severe poverty and other development problems, needs more decentralization than ever and that is one of the major pieces of advice we have been offering to the government and the region. The region is too remote from central government, and that is why we continue to use our expertise in governance to boost the capacity of staff of the various assemblies. Our target is to enhance their capacities in the areas of planning, statistics, project and policy planning, financial management, monitoring and evaluation. (Dr. Ndiaye. Interviewed on September 21, 2011)

It is important to point out, however, that the exact mechanisms by which the supposed decentralization would accrue benefits to the poor remain largely absent. My position is that this decentralization is a perpetuation of expert-led intervention that lacks the capacity to transform relational deficiencies endemic within and outside the region. I contend that Dr. Ndiaye and Dr. Desroches selectively ignore the adverse ramifications of global capitalist economic practices in order to conceal their complicity. Continuous localization of problems by the aid actors rather obviates a critical examination of the rationales behind the preference
of the district assemblies. These interventionist rationales tend to exclude wider institutional contexts that simultaneously impact districts.

**Conflict Resolution: A Key to unlock the Conflicts of the Northern Region?**

The security interventions that continue to take place in the Northern Region could be classified into two main approaches, namely the traditional approach/‘hard security’ in terms of peace-keeping and peace enforcement, which is undertaken by the Ghana Armed Forces and the Police Service. The other approach which could be classified as ‘soft security’ are related to development aid agencies security related interventions. These ‘soft security’ interventions include conflict resolution, formal peace accords, negotiated settlements and reconciliation. It should be noted that these stated approaches reflect a hyper-conservative model of apolitical formal intervention. The likely effect of these apolitical interventions is ‘negative security,’ because it fails to engage with conflict and insecurity in a constructive manner. I use the term ‘negative security’ to denote the inability to search for long-term approaches to the insecurity challenge, which, in reality, only amount to the deferment of insecurity. The genesis of the active aid agencies security interventions in the Northern Region was instigated by the alleged poor state handling of the 1994 Nanumba -Konkomba War. In fact, the government was blamed by the Catholic Relief Services for its lethargic approach to seeking a lasting solution to the conflict crises, a position reiterated by Mr. Morgan to me.

The other traditional approach undertaken by the state, as noted in chapter three, is the constitution of commission of inquiries. The thrusts of these commissions are to investigate and identify perpetrators for prosecution, and make recommendations to enhance resolution of the problem. It needs to be restated that the perceived mistrust between the ethnic groups and
governments constitutes a major reason for the lack of enforcement of the recommendations past commission of inquiries. So also are the non-functional institutional and administrative structures that hinder implementation of recommendations.

Beyond the weak institutional quality is an issue of state’s unwillingness to implement numerous recommendations. According to Dr. Aning, the Director of Research at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre:

The numerous commissions of inquiries set by the governments over the past decades and recent ones are mere gimmick. In fact, they are sheer impression management ploy to showcase government’s seriousness to the international community in maintaining security and stability in Northern Ghana. The reality is that there are state actors who have stake in the conflict and instability in the region; therefore, full implementation of these numerous recommendations should not be expected.

Clearly the inevitable political nature of the implementation invalidates these recommendations. The search for the implementation of recommendations would require critical social and political analysis. The question of how to manage these entrenched interests should be given considerable priority in the search for long-lasting solution.

Another point to note is that there is no clear linkage between the state security forces and the development and relief agencies. Significantly, an interview with Colonel J. A. Adams, of the MOD confirms this non-working relationship between the two independent actors, which is contrary to what the mainstream development and security literature appears to suggest. Col. Adams supported his claims when he posits that:
The military’s main duty is to foster stability and security of the region, after that we leave. In fact, when we stabilized the situation after the 1994 guinea fowl war, we had to vacate to base for other deployments. We do not have any working relation with the development and humanitarian organizations. In case there is an infrastructural break down like bridges, we deploy the field engineers regiment as part of restoring normal life to the communities. (J. Adams, Interviewed on September 3, 2011)

The absence of working relationships challenges the possibility of forging coordinated relationships among the actors as expressed in the DSN literature. It is this linkage issue among development and security actors that the UN JHSP seeks to foster to prevent conflict and reduce poverty in the region. Col. Adams response implies that the interventions on both the security and development ends are geared towards the short-term. Underlying this short-term horizon of intervention are the problem-solving rationales that do not aim at addressing the root causes of the problem.

Respondents in some of the communities interviewed expressed serious reservations about the state security forces being deployed to intervene in conflicts. They contend that the militant force that the army and police usually apply has created yet another level of tension between some local residents and state security forces. There was reported partiality relative to these peace-keeping operations, which has led to violent clashes between the feuding parties and state security. As a matter of fact, an 80 year-old interviewee disclosed to me that the military patrol was akin to the colonial administration, because in most cases they support the group that the government supports. In support of such a response, Luttwark (1999) and
MacGinty (2010) also notice the tendency of state apparatuses to take sides and are especially biased towards the preferred faction.

As I stated earlier, the 1994/95 gruesome Konkomba-Nanumba War was the main factor that instigated international aid security interventions in the Northern Region. The main security framework was conflict resolution, which was a short-term liberal peace oriented project. Furthermore, the involvement of aid agencies was stimulated by the high levels of destruction to development projects, which I would suggest was an attempt to draw a linkage between development and conflict in the Northern Region. Thus the war, according to Bogner (2000, 2009), was blamed for the ruin of the development fortunes of the region. This led to the formation of the Inter-NGO Consortium (henceforth will be referred to as the Consortium) that works in the areas of humanitarian and development assistance. The members of Consortium were Action Aid Ghana, Action on Disability and Development, Amaschina Self-help Association, Assemblies of God Development and Relief Services, Business Advisory Development and Consultancy Centre, Catholic Relief Services, Catholic Secretariat, Council of Churches, Gub-Katimali Society, Lifeline Denmark, Penorudas, Oxfam, Red Cross, Tiyumba Development Association and World Vision.

Through selective processes of adoption, the expert-led Nairobi Peace Initiative model was adopted. The operating philosophy of the Nairobi Peace Initiative, according to Bogner (2009), was mediation and peace building. The consortium, given its short-term orientation, rejected the peace building aspect. According to Mr. G. Morgan of the Catholic Relief Services, the primary focus of the intervention was reconciliation and mediation through negotiated peace agreements. Pertinent to this decision was the convening of consultative meetings among diverse stakeholders: youth associations, chiefs, religious leaders,
parliamentarians. In my view, this quest to address the complex political contestations through reconciliation sidestepped the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The consultative processes fit into what Cooke and Kothari (2001) and Cleaver (2005) refer to as ‘invited participation,’ whereby the invited parties were to be tutored on the importance of living in peace.

I contend that this kind of invited participation is akin to the colonial ‘civilizing mission’. The civilizing mission as explained by Huntington (1968), declares that colonized African societies lack instrumental institutions and value systems to create conditions for their peaceful co-existence. Huntington (1968) further suggests that external tutelage of civilized societies is the main solution to these ‘primitive’ and ‘barbaric’ modes of existence. North (1981) also reiterates a similar cultural superiority argument when he postulates that the fixity of customs and tradition of African societies are responsible for their poor developmental outcomes. Hence, it is the duty of the international development community to develop autonomous subjects who can exercise rational choices to optimize social and economic outcomes. Thus, the ‘invited participation’ of the residents in Northern Region could be seen as being framed as attempting to involve ‘uncivilized citizens’ by aid agencies. These invited participants are expected to uphold with new values and beliefs that will make them behave as rational subjects and thereby ensure peaceful coexistence.

There was a strong emphasis on peace but one that was devoid of critical engagement with the proximate and structural dynamics of the contestations. A former Nawuri participant in one of the consultations opines:

These NGOs only invited us to come and be taught how to promote brotherly living with our neighbors. But they forget that our ancestors
have lived with each other for centuries, so what is new about this teaching of brotherhood. We are not barbaric to be attacking each other. I can tell you that it is never our wish to fight the other ethnic groups, however, for how long can we be denied our rights due to our minority status created by the British ‘looters’. (Mr. Adamu, Interview date- September 14, 2011)

This response is a counter-response to the normalization of conflict and insecurity, a practice that defies short-term responses. Again, this buttresses my argument that the international development aid security practices constitute an interventionist streak that is incapable of addressing relational problems because its inherent rationales and assumptions are problematic.

Another former participant from the Konkomba ethnic group also faulted the ethnic composition of the various committees formed to promote the reconciliation goal. He states:

We were told that each and every ethnic group would be given equal stake in the negotiating processes. To my shock! The ethnic make-up of the various negotiating committees was dominated by people from the majority groups. I felt alienated and asked myself; who will listen to me? How would these people from the chieftoms accommodate my grievances and how can these NGOs assure me of their neutrality and commitment towards lasting security of our great region (Mr. Abukari, Interviewed on September 7, 2011).

These responses attest to the complexity of conflict-generated insecurity in the region, where social justice claims appear to be salient. Therefore, construing complex problems into simplistic technical diagnostics through reconciliation, in my view, may, at best, provide an ephemeral relief, or what could be termed a fragmented or fragile peace with no long-term
promising future. What is noticeable from above that is the attempt to maintain unequal relations between the majority and minority ethnic groups. The maintenance of the status quo emerges out of the position that the representatives of the chiefdoms came as traditional custodians of the minority groups. The representatives of the chiefdoms as noted by McGaffey (2006) were not to be challenged as for example the Dagbon custom requires from minority groups. Thus, the traditional political weight of the chiefdom’s representation neutralized the mediating role of the Consortium.

Again, this contestable ethnic composition reflects the weakness in a rational choice/liberal reconciliation approach as it enters into a non-western society. The field of articulation is not seamless, but driven by unequal power relations that generate its internal contestations. Furthermore, the chaotic space of articulation depicts the active and unpredictable political forces at play; therefore privileging technical security solutions through reconciliation becomes an illusory project. These complex processes confirm the futility of participation that is framed from the beginning as a supposed ‘egalitarian participatory’ effort. It is no wonder that this peace negotiation did not resolve the fundamental issues of contestation, and thereby sustained the tension in the region. The current tension in the region has been confirmed by an official of the UNU and will be discussed in chapter five. Interestingly, the UN JHSP has adopted similar reconciliation and peace education programmes contrary to its DSN framework aimed at conflict prevention. This creates an impression of perpetuation of business as usual aid practice.

This Consortium was made to work in parallel to the GoG-established Permanent Peace Negotiating Team, which was also a conflict mediation entity mandated to forge peace and security among the contesting factions. In addition to the Permanent Peace Negotiating Team,
the UN was engaged to provide technical assistance to the GoG in mediation efforts. I need to stress the point that, due to institutional disagreements between the State and Consortium, the Consortium was confined to working only at the local level. On the other hand, the Permanent Peace Negotiating Team as part of its formal conflict resolution persuasion worked with official representatives of the feuding parties.

After numerous contestations in the negotiation processes through the Kumasi 1-3 peace building processes, the Kumasi Accord on Peace and Reconciliation was signed on March 30, 1996 by representatives of the majority and minority groups. These peace accords, however, did not translate into improved living conditions, a transformation of political relations, or the improvement of interpersonal relations. The continuous tension among the groups as stated in chapter three attests to the inability of the peace accords to resolve the contestations. Evidently, this expertly-designed peace accord depoliticized the ethnic and other salient identities and failed to address historical relational roots of the conflicts.

The main thrust of the Nairobi Peace Initiative’s reconciliation agenda was to promote peace education and create a trans-ethnic organization to mobilize youth groups to serve as the foundation for enduring peace in the region. Following the signing of the Peace and Reconciliation agreement, the Northern Region Youth and Development Association (NORYDA) was formed to carry out the peace education mission and promote youth development. This primary focus on youth is another form of securitization of disparate groups as the source of insecurity in the Northern Region. In fact, this narrow securitization policy ignores the indeterminate driving motivations and incentives behind conflict-instigated insecurity as well as the broader historical, political, and economic relational forces. Notably, a primacy on youth reflects Collier’s (2003) ‘youth bulge’ dictum as one of the factors that
causes of conflict and insecurity in SSA. Again, I contend that this ‘youth bulge’ factor fails to indicate any comprehensive understanding of the triggers of conflict and insecurity in most SSA countries. As a newly established organization, NORYDA was assigned specific responsibilities, including the formation of peace committees to educate people in the region about tolerance, developing ways to control the inflow of weapons into the region, being involved in the resettlement and reconstruction of the war-ravaged areas by mobilizing resources from NGOs as well as government, and to function as a catalyst for the overall economic development of the Northern Region by galvanizing interest from inside and outside the country (Assefa, 2001, p.177). Thus the formation of NORYDA was an attempt at a joint articulation of security and development, but did not actually manifest in reality. The heavy-loaded responsibilities of NORYDA raised vital questions about the assumptions that informed these ambitious responsibilities. Furthermore, the NORYDA was programmed to fail as an organization because it lacked the fundamental relational resources to address its burdensome responsibilities.

As usual, capacity building was deemed as the catalytic factor in NORYDA’s quest to discharge the stated responsibilities. An official of Ghana Network for Peacebuilding (GHANEP), Mr. Y. Adongo suggested to me that: “GHANEP, through expert training received from the UNDP technical team also facilitated training to the leadership of NORYDA in the areas of forging communal relationships, advocacy against violence and conflict and the settlement of disputes and misunderstandings.” (Y. Adongo. Interviewed on September 9, 2011). Mr. Adongo, however, did not appreciate that there is a limit to what capacity building can influence in terms of structural and institutional rigidities. It should also be acknowledged that the institutional forms do not easily translate into perfect or optimal institutional functions.
Therefore, simply training members of NORYDA did not translate automatically into the achievement of imposed responsibilities.

The complexity of insecurity defies technical rendering. Hence, a neglect of the complex relational underpinnings make such a thinly-veneered intervention doomed to fail. There was much anticipated disintegration of NORYDA’s mandate almost immediately after its formation. A local informant proclaims: ‘NORYDA only exists on paper because it lacks recognition by the various youth groups in the region.’ A further investigation points to the failed functionalist thinking of amalgamating diverse identities into homogenous entity. The distinct politicized differences were too resilient to be ignored by the Consortium. The apparent rejection of the Peace Agreement and NORYDA by minority ethnic groups such as the Konkombas, Nawuris and Nchumuruses was not surprising. The rejection was initiated by the dominant Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA), who felt that their pressing demands were not met by the organization. A former member of the KOYA, who granted me an interview, explained to me as follows, “I knew from day one of the futility of the negotiated settlement and formation of voluntaristic regional youth group that we were not committed to. The organizers did not listen to our views, so we had no choice than to kick against it” (Mr. Baba Musa). These deeply political contestations require deeper processes to engage with the fundamental underpinnings of the poverty problem. It is therefore to be expected that when there is no space for grievances to be addressed, failure is the likely outcome.

There remains an important question relative to the cultural acceptability of this kind of conflict resolution mechanism. Some research participants informed me that they have their own culturally acceptable customs and norms when it comes to addressing feuds. The effect of this cultural rejection has been manifested in some respondents ridiculing activities such as
‘fanfares’ where ammunitions are burnt to signal end of conflict. This failure of the conflict resolution strategy, according to Jönsson (2007; 2009) may be due to gross disregard of the political vibrancy of these ethnic groups. The vibrancy of the Konkombas, for instance, could be linked to the reconstruction of their pre-colonial independent social relations to support their current quest for political autonomy. Further interactions with members of the community suggest that they favour an informal negotiation of grievances over time to this elusive search for peace.

**Implications of Neoliberal Development Policies on Conflict Prone Regions**

Though aid agencies push for further domestic reforms in the Northern Region, without changes in the global economy, there will be no transformation in the development and security conditions of the region. The current development aid agencies operating in the region using Anderson’s (1996) ‘Do No Harm’ maxim only localizes problems and fails to address wider factors. The cumulative effect of this localizing of poverty and insecurity conundrums absolves the aid industry and donor countries, particularly the Anglo-American imperialists, of their global complicity. It must be noted that the Northern Region is adversely integrated into the global economy, a fact that mimics Ferguson’s (2006) suggestion that SSA countries reflect the negative aspects of globalization. These unfavorable terms can be located in the effects of unfair global policies of trade liberalization that impacted negatively on the pricing and production of peasant crops such as rice and tomatoes.

Particularly, the liberal trade regime has caused significant debilitating effects in vulnerable regions, which are missed when problems are analyzed from a state-centric perspective. According to Khor (2006, p. 26), Ghana’s trade liberalization practices of the
SAP era displaced a substantially high number of people, including tomato farmers from their vocation in the Northern Region. Significantly, liberalization has also been a result of the IMF/World Bank policy of the conditionality of subsidy removal. Thus this subsidy removal increased the operational costs of the peasant farmers, whose product prices then became non-competitive with those from highly subsidized economies like the EU and USA. An elderly research participant who had to migrate to the national capital in search of a daily sustenance had this to say: “I was once a prosperous farmer in the 1970s, when the government supported us and we could rely on family members in times of need. I was able to educate my children to the secondary school level. Nowadays things are tough for us so this uncertain migration becomes the only option for survival.”(Mama Abiba. Interviewed on July 31, 2011). The socio-economic displacement of this strong-willed woman cannot be attributed purely to unsupportive domestic factors alone. Certainly, the unfair international political economy cannot be exonerated in predisposing many peasants such as this woman into quagmire circumstances.

The effects of the SAP affect the rice sector to the extent that most farmers in the Northern Region have been impoverished. An attestation to the debilitating effects of trade liberalization as narrated by the Tamale Rice Coalition appears here:

In the 1970’s, Tamale used to be known as the ‘rice city,’ and with good reason. There was every prospect that the northern region could supply the nation’s rice needs within a decade…Rice in the Northern Region is a pale shadow of its previous self… There is still a coalition of rice farmers in Tamale, which meets regularly to deliberate on the state of rice farmers in the region. When they meet these days they bemoan the state of the
industry instead of its prospects, as was the case in the 1970s…the 
coalition believes that it is still possible for the northern region to capture 
its glory days in rice production but for this to happen that government has 
to intervene. This means reversing the trend that began with the 
introduction of the Economic Recovery Programme, which introduced the 
removal of agricultural subsidies (ActionAid, 2005, p.35)

The dismal situation for current rice farmers might not get better, especially considering the 
demand for deepening liberalization of the agricultural sector as seen in the current WTO’s 
Agreement on Agriculture. The ultimate goal of the Agreement on Agriculture is to ensure 
zero tariffs for agricultural imports. Even more disturbing is the loss of legislative autonomy in 
the Northern Region that occurred in 2005 when, at the instance of a directive from the IMF, 
the Parliament of Ghana had to reverse its rice import tariff adjustment bill. This bill increased 
the tariff for imported rice from 20% to 25% in order to protect local production (Oxfam, 2005, 
p. 9). This loss of legislative autonomy leads to a bleak outlook for domestic farmers in 
Northern Region, especially against the backdrop of prevailing domestic, structural, policy and 
institutional bottlenecks.

The problem is compounded even further by pressure being put on the GoG to fully 
ratify the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union. The Economic 
Partnership Agreement is framed on the notion of a partnership, with sole emphasis on market 
access through the elimination of trade restrictions, including further tariff reduction for 
agricultural goods from 2015. From the European Union end, the Economic Partnership 
Agreement is justified as a pact to open wider markets for Ghana’s export base to compensate 
for revenue loss due to the tariff reduction. This European Union’s overriding market
orientation, however, is not sound. Because accessibility to global markets is determined by the productive capacity, infrastructure, standard testing means, effective research and development and sound socio-economic institutions of the country, not by sheer adoption of laissez faire policy as the Economic Partnership Agreement appears to suggest.

Another contentious issue that remains unaddressed as of now is the terms of the pricing of the products grown in the Northern Region. The pricing issue is vital given the historically disproportionate balance of power in price determination by the dominant European Union economies. Furthermore, just as the SAP virtually colonized the policy and governing landscape of the Ghanaian economy, the potential for the European Union to recolonize the country cannot be ignored. The donor community already has significant leverage over the broad governance systems of Ghana and most SSA countries. Thus, the traditional Westphalian notion of absolute sovereignty typifies a mere fantasy or what Ferguson (2006), describes as contingent sovereignty as the existing reality. The likely consequences of these exploitative international and global political and economic relations will aggravate the poverty situation in the Northern Region, a situation that is akin to the colonial era deprivation practice.

Under the interim Economic Partnership Agreement between the GoG and the European Union, there will be an 80% drop in import duty over 15 years dating from 2008, and though essential products such as tomatoes have been eliminated under the interim agreement, it is not clear whether they will be included in the final Economic Partnership Agreement. The FAO (2006, p. 1-3) reports a 70% increase in rice importation for the period 1998-2004 in Ghana, with United States accounting for 33% of the country’s rice imports. Domestic production, however, reduced to the average to 150,000 tons per annum, with the effect that
domestic rice production reduced from 43% in 2000 to 29% in 2003. The dire effects of this reduction on the poor farmers in the Northern Region cannot be underestimated, considering that the region constitutes the rice basket of the economy.

The adverse effects of this liberalized rice import regime become more critical due to the high number of small-scale rice farmers who account for the bulk of the production. According to the World Bank (2007, b), at least 70% of rice production in Northern Region is done by rural-based small hold farmers. The pertinent question, then, is how pro poor these interventions on the part of donor agencies are, when rice production and distribution is constrained by the global policies and international commodity market? The answer stems from the complex neo-colonial unfair global development institutions that have substantially weakened Ghana’s socio-economic prospects with its relations with the developed world. Global development institutions, given their heavy presence in developing countries, seek to regulate and control the policy and political spaces of SSA economies. Underlying the limited policy and political autonomy of SSA economies are the unfair rules of global economic relations in trade, finance, investment and essential services. This relation is further worsened by the laissez faire globalization practice of deepened liberalization that effect finance, trade, investment and services.

I view this global policy push for market access as a catalyst for poverty reduction as a simplistic approach to avoid the unequal global political economy. The market access policy directive is a misplaced priority insofar as the structures and processes that shape, produce and reproduce poverty and insecurity are unaddressed. Critical issues of the nature of state practices and formation, social relations and history are thereby stripped off the diagnostic template. The vital question that remains relates to why the aid agencies are not interested in
addressing the adverse global relations. Noticeable are the monotonous rhetorical statements about global partnership. From my analytical perspective, a regional empirical assessment of the implications of these global policy frameworks and the practices that accompany them would be appropriate. The regional appropriateness lies in the blurring effect of state centric studies.

The pursuit of development-focused poverty reduction and security cannot be reduced to technical solutions. Ferguson’s (2006) suggestions have been that the working principles of the aid community are to de-politicize a complex problem. The essence of this depoliticization is to categorize problems in unproblematic, non-relational terms that allow for technical solutions. I further suggest that these unequal global governance practices continue to shape and produce the unjust and inequitable decision-making processes which have affected the Northern Region. In addressing this lopsidedness, Hettne (2010, p.47) suggests that the focus of aid agencies should be directed at correcting global injustices. Therefore, the emphasis on deepening liberal oriented development and security interventions that rarely address the poverty and conflict challenges require rethinking.

Another crucial factor that is usually glossed over by both the donor countries and international development institutions is the historical trajectory of western-developed economies. I therefore concur with Wade, who argues against the denial of poor countries from practicing protectionist policies:

Almost all now developed countries went through stages of industrial assistance policy before their capacities of their firms reached the point where a policy of (more or less) free trade was declared to be in the national interest. Britain was protectionist when it was trying to catch up
with Holland... The United States was protectionist when trying to catch up with both Britain and Germany, right up to the end of World War II. Japan was protectionist for most of the twentieth century up to the 1970s, Korea and Taiwan to the 1990s. (2003, p. 9)

If protectionism was instrumental in the phenomenal growth and development of now-developed countries, certainly struggling SSA countries must be given the autonomous policy space to protect its local base. In so doing, the poor rice and other farmers at least will not be wiped out by the external forces that continue to invade the local economy as a result of liberal trade regime. Therefore, a call for the restoration of historical justice will be an appropriate option.

A cursory assessment of the development and security interventions suggests to me that they were undertaken by aid agencies to serve other purposes. I deem contemporary interventions are the replication of colonial development practices as a form of a neocolonial ‘civilizing mission.’ The pursuit of these lame interventions in the name of development and security, as the unfolding evidence from my fieldwork suggests, constitutes an unbridled attempt to maintain unequal relations between rich and poor economies.

The analyses advanced thus far in relation to interventions from mainstream aid actors indicate its inability to secure the region. This ongoing tension and fragile stability in the region portends the weakness in the positivistic assumptions and rationales of the interventions. I suggest that the development and security challenges of poverty and insecurity in the region must be examined from a broader lens of dialectical social change. This will entail a critical assessment of the nature of state formation after over a century of colonialism, the past and current adverse incorporation of the region in the national and global economy. Therefore, the
UN JHSP, with its emphasis on the joint articulation of development and security activities cannot secure Northern Region. Chapter five will deal extensively with UN JHSP prospects. I will suggest further that the failure of the past and existing interventions have, to a significant extent, necessitated the formulation of DSN as an emancipatory or transformational approach. Whether the DSN is a new framework or not will be examined thoroughly in chapter five.

The search for the means to address poverty and insecurity challenges from a critical development and security perspective must entail processes beyond the narrow confines of the current liberal project. This will necessitate a significant change in the ideological and normative persuasions of the dominant aid actors in order to appreciate the specific ways in which development and security challenges can be viewed as a necessary catalyst for transformational change. Such transformational changes in both the domestic and international political economies are needed instead of the current myopic, static, ahistorical and apolitical interventions. There is an indispensable need to correct the historical and contemporary injustices meted out to disparate groups within the region. In my thinking, the demand for justice is crucial now. I view emancipatory justice as an integral part of a long search for sustained broad social change. The search for such emancipatory change is necessary for the transformation of the region in the wake of the disappointing outcome of the hollow liberal project.

Transformational change will require a thorough shifting of approach from the apparent failed ‘consensus prone’ governmental approaches towards long-term processes that recognize the politics of difference, the everyday struggles and the politics of the region. This politics of difference, which underlines the dialectical social change, will involve pursuing the diverse strategies aimed at promoting efforts to enhance effective state society relations in the Northern
Region. Essentially, processes towards confronting the unequal power relations within the region and state must be embraced. The current ahistorical and apolitical interventions tend to consolidate the status quo which is inimical to the long quest to secure the region. It is therefore urgent to pursue long-term, sustained approaches that are not reducible to calcified results based indicators.

There will be an urgent need to undertake long-term processes of institutional development that will generate equitable rules and practices to enhance state-society relations. In my view, it is time for aid agencies to abandon standardized toolkits and recognize the complex political projects they were designed to address. Aid agencies must be prepared to pursue unorthodox approaches that will be informed by specific history and grounded realities.

Another area that requires reconsideration is the negative effect of conflict on development (including poverty). Such deductive linkages have been underpinned by a narrow instrumental assumption that external interventions in each sector will necessarily secure the region. Efforts must be directed towards recognition of conflict, insecurity and under-development as reflections of systemic institutional failures that will not benefit from short-term or quick fixes. The logical implication I posit is that it is time to avoid privileging non-relational interventionist catchphrases like ‘conflict trap’, ‘capability trap’ and ‘poverty trap’. In my view, such buzzwords consistently tend to simplify the development and security challenges and ultimately resort to ‘crisis management’ technical solutions. Therefore, it behooves aid agencies to avoid the expert inspired transplantation of best practices and the idealized imaginations.
Concluding remarks

In summary, I have analyzed the broad, liberal-oriented development and security interventions by multiple aid agencies in the Northern Region from the mid-1990s. The reality is that these interventions, from the conceptualization to implementation processes, have been driven by positivistic rationales and assumptions. Security-related interventions from the state were and still appear to be conservative in approach. In addition, the security interventions articulated by the aid agencies, however, were geared towards conflict resolution through peace accords and reconciliation instruments.

The agricultural interventions as managed by the NRGP are heavily supply-side driven and the evidence so far does not suggest appreciable support to peasants. Also, the supply-side interventions have capacity building as one of the vital approaches with market access as the overriding strategy. Comprising the market access biased interventions are group formation, facilitation of commodity chains, supply of inputs and skill training. The water sector intervention was also analyzed. In particular, the essential processes that enabled the water privatization and deregulation were analyzed. It needs to be reiterated that the underlying orientation of this intervention is to reregulate water supply and management through community. An inevitable phenomenon of this intervention is the resistance and contestation that defined the deeply political character of the water resource itself. The effect is that accessibility to water remains conditioned by an unfettered process in which case marginalization of communities is the reality.

A number of neglected domestic factors in regard to the agricultural interventions have been analyzed. Core issues such as neglect of shea-nut crops, structural and institutional
constraints of peasants and the nature of the overall agricultural policy regime were examined. More importantly, external factors vital to the transformation of the Northern Region to address its development and poverty conditions were assessed.

Various security interventions by aid agencies were given critical assessment. These interventions were largely underpinned by a liberal orientation. Hence, conflict resolution was the framework for these interventions. The main instruments of this conflict resolution framework were peace accords and reconciliation. On the basis of the intractable nature of the conflict dynamics in the Northern Region, these approaches failed to resolve the contestations. The crux of my argument is that conflict resolution as a framework lacks critical epistemological orientation and realistic rationales and assumptions to address the conflict dynamics in the Northern Region. More importantly, a failure to address the underlying dynamics of these conflicts was marked by total rejection of the peace accords by minority groups. Also the NORYDA, which was formed to be a conduit for peace education and reconciliation, was dysfunctional in the discharge of its stated duties.

The intractable nature of the development and security challenges in the region could be linked to the interplay of multiple critical factors. Among these factors are capitalist production practices, the nature of state formation, global development policies and internal relational dynamics in the region itself. These factors, from the analyses advanced, significantly contribute to the complexity of the security and development challenges in the region. In view of the complex nature of the problems at hand, I suggest that time-bound and ill-conceived donor interventions cannot address them in a constructive way.

I posit that local contexts are not the bane of interventions; instead it is incumbent on the aid agencies to reconsider their epistemological, ontological and ideological orientations.
From the context of the Northern Region, a recognition that the field of intervention is complex, dynamic and constitutes an open system needs to be made. Therefore, imposing input-output technical interventions will not yield any transformational impact. The quest to address the development and security challenges of the Northern Region will require, as earlier stated, sustained dialectical social change suffused with an indeterminate number of interlocking systems and processes. Hence, the marginal tinkering of the complex challenge by the aid agencies, in my judgment, might exacerbate the problem rather than solving it.

The inability of the diverse aid agencies to prevent conflict and reduce poverty in the region led to formulation of DSN as the potent framework. Thus the next chapter deals with the UN JHSP programme, which exemplifies the DSN as its interventionist framework. A salient point to note is that the UNJHSP is operationalized through Human Security, which is one of the frameworks under the DSN. This chapter five will essentially examine whether this Human Security framework has the knack to transform and secure the region as its proponents suggest.
Chapter Five
Human Security Interventions in the Northern Region

Introduction

The discrete, region-wide development and security interventions that I examined in Chapter four could not secure the Northern Region, especially when it came to conflict prevention and poverty reduction. Furthermore, the UNDP has labeled the current state of Northern Region as a post-conflict society because the last major hostility occurred in 2002. The essence of this post-conflict designation of the Northern Region is that the requisite interventions needed to secure the region must be anchored around DSN. This translates into a joint articulation of conflict prevention and poverty reduction strategies to transform the region. An underlying expectation in conflict prevention, as noted by Uvin (2008), is a focus on the root causes of conflicts and instability. The Human Security framework, which is one of the main components of DSN, has been adopted by the UNDP as an underlying strategy to secure the Northern Region. According to Gasper (2006), the human Security framework places the ‘human’ at the center of interventions to ensure the transformation and emancipation of people and communities. The human security framework constitutes one of the most preferred options for the reconstruction of post-conflict regions with the goal of securing people and communities (Bueger & Vennensson, 2009, p. 16; Duffield, 2007, p. 111). How this human security translates on the ground, however, should constitute an area of investigation.

A significant problem in relation to the normative instrumental claims of the human security framework/approach is a neglect of the underlying assumptions and rationales of practical interventions. Relevant rationales to consider are: the possibility of change through externally conceived frameworks, the localization of problems, the inevitability of external
tutelage, and the desirability of intervention. The underlying assumptions in this framework are beliefs in technical and managerial solutions based on expert knowledge and the unproblematic transfer of technical solutions. Another assumption in this framework is that the empowerment of an individual, independent of the relational structures involved, holds the key to both conflict prevention and poverty reduction.

A second major issue of concern is the limited attention given to empirical investigations into the underlying drivers of the human security framework. I suggest that, to authenticate the transformational attribute of human security, its foundational pillars must be examined. The goals of this chapter, therefore, are to examine the pivotal drivers of the human security framework and the way the rationales and assumptions on which the interventions have been based have been implemented in the Tamale Metropolis and some parts of Yendi of the Northern Region.

A core aspect of the orthodox international intervention literature on human security is the dominance of constructed conflict prevention prospects rather than empirical investigation of those claims. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p. 35) deem human security as a comprehensive development and security framework that would formulate effective policies to reduce poverty and conflict. Within the mainstream literature, Mack (2004 and 2005) frames human security as a smooth amalgamation or coordination of development and security practices to prevent conflict and stimulate poverty reduction. In addition to these instrumental views on human security, the proposal document for the UN JHSP reinforces the imagined integrative nature of the human security framework as an effective merger of development and security. The UN JHSP proposal document states:
The afore-mentioned projects and programs have contributed to tackling various aspects of the human security challenges in Northern Ghana. However, these activities have not strategically linked conflict preventions and livelihoods/capacity development to ensure sustainable peace and development in communities. Thus this will be the first program which addresses multifaceted challenges of Northern Ghana, aiming at conflict prevention, through holistic, community-based, and preventative measures. (UN, 2009, p. 10)

I contend, however, that to ascribe co-ordination problems as the bane of the development and security interventions in Northern Region is a simplistic recognition of the complex problems on hand. I suggest that to make co-ordination a precondition for the successful joint articulation of the development and security interventions is to normalize interventionist rationales and assumptions.

The key argument of this chapter, therefore, on the basis of the information gathered during my fieldwork, is that the human security framework lacks any transformational power whatsoever. Instead, it is a strategy used to perpetuate liberal, economic, and political doctrine in conflict prone regions. To facilitate critical analysis, the UN JHSP will be analyzed within the context of dominant development policy frameworks and the historical social relational underpinnings of Northern Region. The UN JHSP’s main implementation instruments are thin on community driven empowerment, capacity building, empowerment and participatory programs. The adequacy of these approaches to secure the region will be examined critically.

The argument of this chapter proceeds in three parts. Section one examines the orthodox international development orientations of the human security framework. The aim of
this section is to demonstrate that the UN JHSP is essentially an amalgamation of existing liberal development policy frameworks. The human security framework, without any stretch of imagination, lacks any heterodox or new revolutionary policy initiative. Section two discusses specific interventions under the rubric of development and security. The main thrust of this section is to expose the rationales, assumptions, complexities, contestations and contradictions inherent in the deployment of tangible interventions in the real world of the Northern Region. The third section encapsulates the concluding part of the chapter, which weighs in on the implications of the inability on the part of aid agencies to secure the region under the auspices of the acclaimed preventative and transformational UN JHSP. This section also reiterates the need to rethink the interventionist rationale of the UN JHSP. This necessity for rethinking informs the next chapter, which deals with implementation challenges. The operational challenges encountered have been framed by the aid industry as capacity and coordination constraints.

This chapter relies on empirical data obtained in the course of my fieldwork, through in-depth interviews with officials of the UNDP, and UNU, identified local residents in Tamale and officers of TAMA. It also relies on information obtained from my interview with government officials of the MOD and MOF and a reading of relevant policy documents has been utilized when necessary to support the key arguments.

**Drivers of the Human Security Framework**

It is critical to understand the normative meanings that conditioned the programming of UN JHSP as an interventionist framework to secure the Northern Region. A senior official of the program, Mr. Animzoya, suggested to me that the operational understanding of the UN JHSP is

From the 2005 report, Mr. Animzoya offers the following definition of human security:

To protect the vital core of all human life in ways that enhance freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using the processes that build on people strength and aspirations. It means creating political, social and environmental, economic and military and cultural systems that together give people building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity (Mack, 2005, p. 4)

Noticeable in the definition is that the human security framework is predisposed to alter the referent object and dimensions of security. The cardinal change in the referent object of security is the shift from a realist-preferred focus on state or territory toward a focus on individuals and groups, as well as communities. This new turn towards people-centered security syncs with the neo-liberal ideological focus on individuals whose agency is constituted as object of intervention. This definition seeks to broaden threats from military to conflict and non-conflict threats as well as offer a reorientation of development towards enhancement human freedoms.

The crucial issue here is whether realization of human freedom through the market is both feasible and desirable to attain collective security. Shilliam (2012) questions ideas that the market is the source of human freedom on the grounds that the same market, in a contradictory manner, has undermined collective human freedom through the inherent exploitative practices of the market. Shilliam further explicates, from a decolonization angle,
that different colonized people have their own unique understanding and expectations of human freedom. To push for a universal achievement of human freedom without considering the peculiar meaning and understanding of the meaning of colonization is doomed to fail.

Another vital point is that this push for human freedom, from my perspective, negates the broader structural and relational factors that determine and define the conditions of individuals. A reduction of development and security notions to Sen’s idea of the enhancement of human capabilities poses bleak transformational prospects of the region. The importance of boosting human capabilities independent of the existing systems and structures of society, be they formal and informal, make the human security approach an endorsement of the status quo similar to the other practices discussed in chapters three and four.

The transformational prospect of the UN JHSP is in serious doubt because its implementation framework is anchored in existing non-transformational international development frameworks. This notion implies that the UN JHSP has no room to devise heterodox approaches that will deal specifically with the development and security challenges in a particular region. During an interview I conducted with Mr. Ambrose Tsagli, a Program Manager of the UNJHSP national office, I was curious to know the source(s) of ideas and frameworks that underpin the conception and programming of the UN JHSP. The information I received indicated that that the UN JHSP essentially appropriated concepts and frameworks of both global development institutions as well as regional bodies. Mr. Tsagli explained the templates on which the UNJHSP was modeled upon:

The core influential models behind the joint human security program are the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy [GPRS 1&2, 2001-2009], the New Partnership for African Development position on development and
security, relating to conflict prevention, the Millennium Development Goals [MDGs] on poverty reduction, and finally the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda [GSGDA]. Our ultimate goal is to work within those established frameworks in order to bring lasting democratic peace, stability and prosperity to the people of Northern Ghana. As a post-conflict region steps must be taken to focus on communities and individuals to prevent conflict. (A.Tsagli. Interviewed on August 3, 2011)

With this commitment to the liberal pro-growth orientation confirmed by Mr. Tsagli, the UN JHSP is not necessarily an innovative program that can be used to address context-specific issues. Instead the UN JHSP seeks to rebrand conflict and poverty challenges in Northern Region as novelty issues in order to gain the legitimacy for interventions based on existing frameworks. Indeed, the Mr. Tsagli’s narrative is an indication of the labeling of the Northern Region as a post-conflict region. As expected of the aid industry, this labeling of the region as a post-conflict society has invariably endorsed pro-market policy practices as the most effective solutions to development issues. Post-conflict labeling gives a further impetus to the adoption of existing frameworks. Since the UN JHSP lacks transformational character, it stands to reason that it is imbued with piecemeal and technocratic programs used to address complex problems it barely understands. The next section will deal with the technocratically-driven activities of the UN JHSP.

The GPRS 1&2 were the development policy frameworks that the GoG had to adopt as part of the conditions for the Highly Indebted Poor Country relief under the auspices of the IMF and World Bank in 2001. It is a growth-led private sector driven development policy
framework. The country assistance strategy document between the Ghana Government and World Bank highlights the development priorities of the country:

The GPRS II places private sector-led development at the forefront to achieve higher and more broadly based growth. Modernization of agriculture and linkages to industry are seen as central to the structural transformation of the economy that will be needed to sustain higher growth and drive poverty reduction. A broad range of efforts will be needed to remove constraints related to sustainability and shared growth. Strategic priorities across the pillar include: improving the enabling environment for business, including trade and financial services, facilitating stronger regional integration to stimulate productivity and trade links. (World Bank, 2007a, p. 35.)

With the private sector as the preferred driver for poverty reduction, the policy framework strategies identified the promotion of competitive entrepreneurship as the preferred implementation strategy. The instrumental mechanism for entrepreneurship was essentially reduced to capacity building in both production and marketing.

The private sector’s policy endorsement as the medium to generate employment through the promotion of entrepreneurship is a cardinal strategy of the UN JHSP. Prioritization of private-led employment strategies was justified to me by Mr. A. Tsagli, when he stated:

There is truth in the proverb that the devil finds jobs for the idle hand and for that matter job creation is considered as prime policy objective. The World Bank deems employment or job creation as both a solution to the conflict and poverty situation, and in line with all Government’s
development partners’ belief in the private sector as the engine of growth, the UN must not be seen to diverge from established priorities and policies. Therefore, the program has earmarked agro-processing, skill training to the youth, small scale projects for the women, and support to food crop farmers through capacity building to increase production and their overall well-being. (A.Tsagli, Interviewed on August 3, 2011)

Tsagli’s response is a depiction of what William Easterly refers to as the cartel nature of aid agencies that aim at the harmonization of programs (2002). Within this cartel ideology, there is no room for a critical introspective analysis of rationales behind their interventions. In fact, Easterly (2002, p. 26-34), in his description of aid agencies as cartels, makes a point that the agencies strive for convergence of ideas and objectives though the content of their practices differ. The essence of this labeling of aid agencies as cartels is to convey their good intentions to address a framed indigenized problem. With the indigenization of the problem comes with re-composition of the localities as sites of intervention, these localities are constituted as wholly responsible for interventionist failures. From this angle, I view the UN JHSP as a decontextualized program meant to foster effective harmonization and alignment with existing frameworks that seek to perpetuate a trusteeship relationship with the intervened population. The burdensome effect of these unequal relations is that the local population bears the ultimate remedial responsibility. In this hypocritical light, the UN JHSP is a perpetrator of self-exoneration in order to maintain its interventionist hegemony and credibility.

Tsagli points to the de-politicization of both poverty and insecurity, an idea that further casts doubts about the capacity of the human security approach to challenge existing power relation structures. The reliance on best practices points to the decontextualized
implementation orientation of the HS program. From a normative perspective, Alkire (2010, p. 61) views the human security approach as one that protects the vital core of human life through empowerment and becomes a complement to human development. Missing in such an instrumental linkage is what specific practices are pursued in the name of human security in order to achieve an imagined reciprocal linkage. Also missing in Alkire’s submission is an assessment of the specific conditions in which empowerment could protect the vital core of life and complement human development. It is vital to note that the protection of the vital core through exposure to the turbulent and indeterminate market in my view is a counterproductive exercise.

Indeed, Ghana is rated as among the 5 star reformers in SSA by the IMF and World Bank. The UN JHSP, however, in its zeal to create a space of intervention cleverly draws attention to an important contradiction inherent in this kind of glorious praise by its ‘Washington’ counterparts. To be more specific, the UN proposal document states: “between 1980 and 2002, there were at least 23 conflicts in the three Northern regions” (UN, 2009, p. 6). The timeframe of these prolific conflicts, however, can be aligned with the height of liberal reforms that the country arduously implemented. An intriguing issue here is that, as the UN JHSP tends to problematize the structural reforms, it is difficult to reconcile UN JHSP’s attempt to deploy liberal interventions to secure the region. The replication of liberal programs reflects a recycling of failed interventions that are re-packaged as novel instruments to address newly-constituted problems. Duffield notes that the critical issue in intervention application is not whether there is connection between security and development, but what new elements exist within this monotonous relationship (2010, p. 62). In further developing this argument, I deem it essential to reiterate questions about the rationales of the interventions that have been
articulated. Evoking these rationales, in my view, gives further impetus not to take the normative accounts of human security as a given, and to see them instead as highly subjective practices to suit particular ideological interests.

The adoption of the international development frameworks also structured the core objectives of the UN JHSP. A Socio-Economist of the UNU, Dr. K. Shikita, who granted me an interview for this thesis outlined the five core objectives of the UN JHSP. These are: a) the capacity development of local institutions and civil society for good decentralized governance and conflict prevention; b) the enhancement of mechanisms of conflict prevention and peace consolidation in Northern Ghana; c) the support to increase production, productivity and income-generating capacity through micro and medium enterprises; d) the improvement of agricultural productivity and nutritional status for enhanced food security; and e) promoting and mainstreaming the advocating of the Human Security Concept in the Ghanaian development context. These lofty objectives, as my research findings show, are far from realization. There exists a contradiction in that attainment of these lofty objectives will require long-term structural changes and must be guided by critical thought; the reality of the situation is that the liberal development logic underwrites these interventions. The failure of these programs, and the admissions on the part of the program managers, should be expected.

The stated objectives of the program that draw inspiration from already-existing development frameworks make the transformational orientation of the UN JHSP highly infeasible. What these objectives suggest is that the rationale of simplifying a complex problem through liberal-oriented, manageable, time-bound and technical prescribed solutions is implausible. I will discuss this particular point further in chapter six.

A notable continental development and security framework that influenced the UN JHSP
is the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD). The NEPAD framework was developed in 2001 and saliently mutes the historical formation of the postcolonial African states. Significantly, NEPAD ignores the effects of global policies and practices on African states as it imposes the sole burden of development on African governments. The NEPAD policy document has peace and security as one of its 3 prominent priorities. Furthermore, the underlying strategy for peace and security as postulated by NEPAD is through joint development and security practices as a long-term solution to poverty, insecurity and conflict challenges across continental Africa. The NEPAD document declares that:

African leaders will take joint responsibility for the following:

- Strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at the sub-regional and continental levels, and to ensure that these mechanisms are used to restore and maintain peace…Long-term conditions for ensuring peace and security in Africa require policy measures for addressing the political and social vulnerabilities on which conflict is premised. (NEPAD, 2001, p.23)

The responsibilities of African governments, here, amount to vain attempts to absolve the international community of the security and development challenges in SSA. With such ambitious goals against the backdrop of the limited resources, to discharge this herculean mandate rendered most SSA countries susceptible to the caprices and whims of the donor community in exchange for international aid (see Adesina et al, 2005). These goals, therefore, are infused with the rationale of reconsolidating the donor community’s influence on the SSA governments’, especially in relation to the management of its internal affairs. Strikingly, NEPAD pushes for the SSA’s development programs to be aligned with that of the IMF and
World Bank in the search for poverty reduction. The NEPAD policy document has identified the following frameworks as vital for poverty reduction:

- Work with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations (UN) agencies to accelerate implementation and adoption of the Comprehensive Development Framework, the Poverty Reduction Strategy and related approaches. It further recommends:
  - establish a task team to accelerate the adoption of participatory and decentralized processes for the provision on infrastructural and social services. (2001, p. 28)

The recommendation for the need to work in tandem with the IMF and World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework, in my view, is a firm endorsement of the shift from the coercive adjustment program era towards programmatic conditionality. Liberal assumptions and thoughts underpin the new approach.

The need for the UN JHSP to ensure harmonization and alignment with the GPRS 1&2 is problematic given that the GPRS, which is the Ghana version of the IMF and WB poverty conditionality for debt relief, is an economic growth-driven framework. The GPRS is an aggregative or composite development blueprint that could not specifically address Northern Region development-oriented poverty needs. Owusu-Sekyere (2005, p.112) suggests that circumstantial and other non-technical issues in the Northern Region are downplayed by policies made in the South, with the support of donors in relation to the PRSP. The GPRS 2 and GSGDA policy documents respectively state:

Against this background, the GPRS II was adopted and implemented over the period between 2006-2009 with a shift in focus and context to
accelerated growth of the economy towards sustained poverty reduction and the attainment of middle-income status within a measurable planning period. It focused on implementing growth-inducing policies and programs which have the potential to transform the structure of the economy and maximize the benefits of shared accelerated growth. (2005, p.2)

The goal of the medium-term national development policy framework, Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA), 2010-2013, is to achieve and sustain macroeconomic stability while placing the economy on a higher path of shared growth, and poverty reduction to be realized through industrialization especially manufacturing, based on modernized agriculture and sustainable exploitation of Ghana’s natural resources, particularly minerals, oil and gas. (2010, p.10)

These statements show that the GPRS 1&2 and GSGDA are primarily growth-driven development frameworks that are critical in order for a country to be eligible for successive aid support from the BWIs. Further, the GPRS and GSGDA independently aim to achieve macroeconomic stability goals through private sector led growth, which makes their commitment towards poverty reduction very questionable. Even more problematic is the narrow understanding of poverty reduction we can infer from the policy goals and strategies communicated by these policy documents. Poverty, as conceptualized by these development blueprints, is given a non-relational meaning with the attainment of middle-income status. The discriminatory colonial development policies and the complexities of the interventions analyzed in chapters three and four should pragmatically have informed the human security
interventions and urged aid agencies to take a radically different route. The reverse logic of mimicking the prevailing development orthodoxy is the operational reality.

The traveling nature of development goals and targets such as MDGs is indicative of how MDG’s constitute one of the adopted prototypes for the institutionalization of the UN JHSP. Mr. Tsagli lamented about the inability of the three Northern regions to meet the MDG’s core issues: “the three northern regions have not responded appropriately to the MDG goals, and among these regions, the Northern Region appears to be lagging behind in mortality, poverty and education trends.” (A. Tsagli. Interviewed on August 3, 2011). The MDGs are a derivative of the universal statistical average that does not reflect the specific nature of their developmental challenges. Imposing de-contextualized benchmarks on the Northern Region is a faulty solution to adopt because the MDG’s do not account for the historical dimensions of development challenges. It is untenable to blame the Northern Region for not responding positively to hollow and misguided interventions without recourse to the adverse structural and relational determinants of development challenges in the region.

From my perspective, the UN JHSP reflects a confluence of external interests because of its adoption of externally designed frameworks. It is important to note that these frameworks are imposed on Ghana under the rubric of delusory national ownership. Even the GPRS, based on an interview I conducted with Mr. Arthur, of the MOF, confirms this evasive country ownership goal. Mr. Arthur told me about the ruse of country ownership he was made to believe:

All along I was under the impression that the Ghana Government and Ghanaians own the GPRS. However, during a validation workshop in Washington DC, as part of the last stages in drafting the final country
memorandum, most of the social development priorities were slashed down on the grounds that they were anti-growth. From that day I drew the conclusion that as a country we do not own any policy program.

I suggest that more contentious issue, here, is that the international development agencies have a policy preference for country ownership as a way to ensure aid effectiveness, but which rather negates pressing development challenges. Essentially, the country ownership principle works to maintain the adverse global structures and practices that continuously undermine the development prospects of poor economies as a result of its non-commitment for radical change in global relations. The undesirable effect of this imbalance in the international political economy has led to the increasing consolidation of neoliberal policies as the acceptable interventionist option. As I discussed in chapter four, further strengthening of these liberal interventions will dislocate the socio-economic fortunes of the region.

When I interrogated Mr. Arthur, the MOF official, about his information regarding the Human Security Program, he provided the following response:

We are being treated like robots that rely on external controls and directives from the UN bodies in line with what they intend to do and what role they expect us to play alongside. Yes, I have seen and read the concept note regarding the human security project for the three regions in Northern Ghana. The problem is that we are already struggling with the management of this economy. And now they want us to incorporate human security as an integral part of our development framework in the coming years. We have passed the stage of myopic experimentation, as we did with the structural reforms. (S. Arthur. Interviewed on August 19, 2011)
This response points to the disdain accorded by local officials to the UN JHSP. This disdain can be linked to incipient despondent attitudes by domestic policymakers towards the existing development framework. With the UN JHSP failing to bring transformational innovative processes, the cold reception demonstrated by the MOF official is not surprising. Mr. Tsagli, however, complained about national government officials’ lukewarm attitude towards the UNJHSP. Mr. Tsagli confirmed his disappointment with state officials towards the UN JHSP when he stated that: “after some consultations that we had with the government officials from the finance, interior and local government ministries before the inauguration of the program, you could easily tell about their obvious apathy for the program. Our official position is that the novelty of the program might be the reason for this apathetic reaction.” The above-reproach thinking displayed by Mr. Tsagli is unacceptable. The unacceptability of this issue is conditioned by the self-righteous attitudinal disposition of aid actors, which blurs the faulty and misleading assumptions from critical scrutiny. With the domestic officialdom’s apathetic attitude towards the program, complex receptions are accorded to the interventions practiced by officials of Tamale Metropolitan Assembly (TAMA) and other residents.

A more critical issue, here, is the failure to examine the rationales and assumptions behind the various interventions undertaken by the six UN organizations in Tamale and Yendi of the Northern Region. In lieu of this failure to consider the interventionist rationales is the prioritization of coordination as an important factor critical to the success of interventions. But I view such an administrative and programmatic priority as a cover-up for the gross incompetence of aid agencies in unraveling the complexities of development and security challenges. It needs to be recognized that reducing the complexity of conflict and poverty issues to coordination problem amounts to an endorsement of the prevailing development
frameworks. The UN JHSP is an endorsement of the status quo because it does not engage the social-relational reasons why problems persist or whether or not the rationales behind aid interventions are realistic. Chandler (2012) expresses a legitimate fear regarding the utility of the human security framework as a pragmatic, integrated approach, and remarks that it the human security program is meant to perpetuate liberal practices. The next chapter will discuss in the detail how this coordination function has been framed as the source of implementation challenges.

Considering the transformational claims of the human security approach I have analyzed thus far, it is important to examine broad policy discourses and frameworks that support aid programs in order to give empirical weight to my contestations. My critical position stands in sharp opposition to Martin and Owen (2010), Newman (2010), and other policy advocates who frame the human security approach as a catalytic instrument used to mobilize newly prioritized initiatives.

In the context of post-conflict and post-colonial society, the poverty conditions, conflicts, and underdevelopment in the Northern Region have attracted immense security attention. As a matter of fact, an official of UN JHSP alludes to the securitization of development in both Tamale and Yendi as experimental practices that will be extended to many communities in the coming years. Col. J. Adams of the Ministry of Defense briefed me about proposed plans to consolidate military operations in the Yendi:

The current military high command has resolved to establish a military base in Yendi, in addition to the 6th Infantry Battalion of the Kamina Barracks in Tamale. This additional base will boost operations to contain the rising violence perpetrated by the youth and others. Our investigations
show that the high youth unemployment as a result of the 8 months lean season is one of the major causes of the violence in the big and small towns. This intermittent violence jeopardizes the security of the region.

(J. Adams. Interviewed on September 3, 2011).

Col. Adams’s remarks affirm a reciprocal linkage between unemployment and violent conflict, particularly when he attributes the cause of violent conflicts to high youth unemployment rates. Such an attempt to make a deductive linkage between unemployment and violence, however, rather obviates a critical examination of the interlocking structural and institutional factors and policy failures that are responsible for high youth unemployment rates. Furthermore, to blame high youth unemployment for the insecurity in the region eliminates the broad and complex factors that trigger conflicts in the region. The logical corollary of the Col. Adams’s statement is that once unemployment is addressed, the possibility of conflicts ceasing in the region will be higher. Critical issues, including the processes of addressing unemployment, and its underlying rationales, are taken for granted. The outcome of this belief is, the tenuous linkage that is inevitably drawn between unemployment and violent conflict. I will discuss the link between unemployment and violent conflict under the youth skill development section of this chapter. I conclude, however, that the UN JHSP lacks the necessary transformational interest, orientation, and capability to address the security and development challenges of the Northern Region.

The securitization of development as reflected in the Human Security approach labels the entire Northern Region as a post-conflict society, for which there are predetermined programs formulated to address development and security challenges. I sought to understand, from UNDP official Mr. Erasmus Doe, how this organization conceives of development and
security challenges in the Northern Region. Mr. Doe offered the following response in relation to his organization’s perspectives on conflict and development in the study region:

This region is a post-conflict society because there has not been major conflict since the killing of Ya-Naa in 2002; therefore, the ultimate goal is to prevent the eruption of any violent ethnic conflict through the human security program. The human security program will promote the private sector by supporting agriculture and entrepreneurship as well as supporting community conflict prevention committees. (E. Doe, Interviewed on August 21, 2011)

The ill-conceived ameliorative template endemic in Doe’s response is the pursuit of conflict prevention through market-oriented programs. An implicit belief here is that economic incentives and motivations are the main drivers of conflict and insecurity. A reliance on this kind of market approach confirms my position that the UN JHSP program is a patent endorsement of the existing frameworks lacking in transformational capabilities. In labeling the Northern Region as a post-conflict society, the UN JHSP silences the relational and historical contextual factors that exist in the region. The silencing of structural and relations factors in a reconstituted site provides the basis for the deployment of standardized aid packages. The implementation of these predetermined practices manifests themselves in contradictory and contestable outcomes within the intervened-upon population as will be shown in this chapter.

It is important to note that the prevailing conditions of poverty, unemployment and insecurity in both Tamale and Yendi have been used to justify the necessity for aid intervention. These same factors have been framed as a core component of what Kaldor (2007)
calls a ‘new war thesis.’ The crucial issue, however, is that there is nothing new in the insecurity, unemployment and poverty problems in my study sites. Reifying such untoward phenomenon as new, therefore, constitutes an interventionist ploy. The conflict and poverty-ridden nature of the Northern Region has been articulated by Mr. Tsagli:

> Tamale and Yendi were chosen as places of intervention because the cities are seen as currently the most volatile areas in the Northern Region with a high level of poverty as well. Specific problems are the twin problems of insecurity and mobilization for conflict, and a vivid case in point is the current unresolved Dagbon crisis, as you may recollect. Also, our studies have shown that the poverty incidence and conflict propensity are equally rife in other districts in the region, such as Saboba, Bunkpurugu Yunyoo, and Chereponi. (A.Tsagli, August 3, 2011)

The newness of this ‘war’ is highly contestable because the adverse conditions that exist in Tamale and Yendi date back to its colonial annexation. In my opinion, reconstituting an old phenomenon as a new one demonstrates the aid industry’s aversion to examining the complex history of poverty and insecurity phenomena. Ignoring the historical dimensions of the challenges in Northern Region, in my view, is a strategy to enable the deployment of standardized, short-term, technical solutions that have been developed by many policy and development experts.

Implementing the UN JHSP’s plan on the aforementioned international aid frameworks seeks to reinforce the subjective socio-institutional character of program formation. As Hall (1993) and Peck and Theodore (2012) point out, policy adoption is not predicated upon current socio-economic conditions, but is based rather on acclaimed hegemonic policy thinking. Peck
and Theodore (2012, p. 23) postulate that policy diffusion and mutation must not be viewed as an objective practice, but should be examined within a particular social and ideological context. It is from these ideological and social contexts, where the pertinent social constructions of policymaking are constructed as hegemonic tropes, that subsequent policies are developed. The current, dominant liberal ideology of the aid architecture, which underpins the UN JHSP, renders it inconceivable that the new human security framework will adopt a more heterodox approach.

Adoption of policies and programs entail not only the discrete benchmarks, but also the ideas, visions, rationales and values embedded in current, externally induced frameworks. It becomes imperative, then, to assess the human security program in line with its modeled frameworks, and is not viewed as a new interventionist approach, but rather as a ‘business as usual’ framework. I suggest, therefore, that in the course of privileging the identified frameworks, the human security approach has invariably delimited both epistemic and material alternatives. The likely consequence of such a delimitation is the reinforcement of existing institutional power structures that continuously produce the same development and security challenges in the Northern Region.

The consequences of defining the UN JHSP interventions under the notion of ‘novelty’, treats the historical dynamics of the conflict conditions in the Northern Region as episodic issues of no real, programmable significance. The UN program manager to whom I spoke hails from one of the three regions in Northern Ghana, and recounted the adverse colonial practices that contributed to the current development and security challenges in the region. A significant issue to note is the complicity of the colonial administration in the current crisis in the Northern Region. My source declared: “Brother! You are right to ask about the historical
source of the current predicaments. I directly link it to the colonial administration control of Northern Ghana whereby my forebears were reduced to nothing than mere workers in southern plantations, denied of educational infrastructure and essential services required for human development”. Considering his recognition of the historical foundation of the current crisis it is highly inconceivable that aid interventions have not been used to correct existing colonial distortions. He fails to recognize that the complexities of the development and security problems in the Northern Ghana require complex structural and process-based approaches at different scalar levels.

An intriguing factor in the officially declared transformational character of the human security approach is its consistent reliance on existing orthodox frameworks. I pressed Mr. Tsagli to further explain further why the UN JHSP remains anchored or modeled on the ‘failed and misguided’ MDGs, NEPAD, GPRS and GSGDA. He issued the following response to justify UN JHSP’s non-departure from existing frameworks:

I was hired to manage the JHSP, having being appointed after a successful interview at the UN headquarters in New York. I was hired due to my vast, rich experience and expertise associated with conflict resolution, negotiated settlements and Disarmament, Demobilization and reintegration and small arms control programs in Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone. This JHSP framework was designed by various technical committees, having in mind to ensure consistency and congruence with the main working policy frameworks of the country. Our ultimate goal is to foster effective coordination of existing practices into a collective entity. (Tsagli, August 3, 2011)
His statement reveals that the UN JHSP focused on discrete projects guided by expert
knowledge in order to provide a problem-solution approach that can be implemented through a
liberal market policy framework. The interventions, far from being neutral programs and
projects, are heavily driven by liberal oriented frameworks and positivistic rationales. From
the mainstream perspective, development and security aid frameworks are stated as normative
practices; as discursive practices from a critical perspective, however, it is vital to reiterate that
these rationales provide an operational impetus.

Security Driven Interventions: Processes of Community Oriented Conflict Prevention

Under the security interventions with a focus on human agency as a source of solutions for
both prevention and protection problems, numerous community-focused practices have been
deployed. These practices specifically include community-based conflict committees and peace
education.

The UN JHSP, true to its community mantra that runs akin to the colonial development
rationale, prioritized the capacity building of community members with the goal of equipping
individuals with skills for conflict prevention in order to secure the metropolis. My key
argument is that this individual-driven human security approach is bereft of any
transformational prospects because it obviates any serious engagement with the complex
structural and institutional factors. Among the factors at issue are the problematic nature of
institutional weakness, justice, minority rights, systemic distributional challenges, and
defective political systems. Dr. K. Shakita, of the UNU, made an effort to rationalize the
prioritization of communities as a space for instrumental conflict prevention:
Community focus was adopted because of our firm belief in a cohesive community as a source of sustainability of activities to create a harmonious and prosperous region. Our understanding is that when you repose responsibility for ensuring peace and prosperity onto community members they tend to develop the necessary social capital, especially rules to represent their collective interest. (K. Shakita. Interviewed on October 19, 2011)

I deduce that the idealistic understanding of community used here is symbolic of the UNU’s simplistic approach to complex problems. The dominance of this community mantra has led to a futile search for an idealistic consensus-building tactic rather than dealing with the pertinent social justice claims that have been articulated by diverse ethnic groups in the area. The likely consequence of this institutionalization of liberal discriminatory practices is that the insecurity in the region will be sustained indefinitely because of an unwillingness to examine important local contestations.

Another pertinent factor germane to the community-oriented conflict prevention initiative are the processes by which individuals, groups and local government officials are identified for training in conflict prevention objectives. Remarkably noticeable in these objectives is the formalistic nature of the composition of participants. Preference is accorded to officially recognized bodies for selection, which essentially silences officially prohibited groups from participation in security conflicts. According to Dr. Shakita: “government officials, youth groups, chiefs, opinion leaders, women groups, occupational groups, notably butchers and youth groups, and the media were selected for training.” I was curious to know the criteria used for selection and probed for further information. Dr. Shikita explained that:
“since we do not have to go contrary to government recognized bodies, we ultimately denied groups and individuals who are considered illegitimate by the statutory agencies. We wish we could broaden the scope of people trained to discharge this great task.” The implication of this selection process is that essential voices are silenced in order to unleash simplistic practices and meet project timelines. This official silencing of critical voices is similar to the discriminatory conflict resolution practices that I examined in chapter four. On the basis of the state’s role in the conflicts in the Northern Region as discussed in chapter three, this neutrality in the recognition of legitimate groups must be thoroughly reconsidered.

Information from relevant youth groups indicate that political party interference equally manifests itself in the selection process. Regarding the perception of political interference in the selection processes, a youth leader, Sumaila Fuseinu, states that: “our organization and many others were not selected for the so-called bogus training because the metropolitan assembly has strong influence in determining who gets admitted. Our group is perceived to be surrogates of major opposition political party, hence our denial of participation.” Fuseinu’s remarks confirm that the fueling of existing unequal power relations is inherent even in apolitical interventions. Other youth groups expressed similar issues with the partisan nature of the selection processes to explain their non-participation. The turbulent consequences brought about by these kinds of selection processes must be accepted by the program managers as the inevitable outcome of their programs and not as pathological deficiencies associated with the diverse groups of inhabitants of Northern Region.

The mechanisms of conflict prevention to be used in the region were articulated through workshops and training seminars. According to James Gorkeh, a program officer for the UNDP in Tamale, his organization usually recruits and facilitates workshops for some
experts before they are given their assigned roles. Security and conflict prevention experts were utilized particularly for guidance related to developing teaching modules and other content development. Gorkeh notes that: “multiple level training schemes were organized invited groups in areas such as: the mechanisms of trust and confidence building, tolerance, and the identification of symptoms of conflict behaviour and negotiations.” The apparent implication of this emphasis on community-oriented conflict prevention is to deploy depoliticized practices in order to stimulate attitudinal change. I posit that this apolitical approach seeks to render complex relational undertones in technical terms, a move which homogenizes both the problem and the solution to conflict and insecurity in the region. In addition, the primary focus on individual behavioural change denotes a gross denunciation of the value and belief systems of diverse groups by the UN JHSP. The outcome of such a cultural denunciation is the imposition of liberal values as corrective measures on participants who are expected to disseminate these values to their community members.

Another critical issue that instigated resentment among some participants was the attempt on the part of aid agencies to foist liberal values on different ethnic groups. Different groups of local residents participated in the workshops, and the leader of two groups, Abdul Mubarak, told me that:

I deeply regret attending this workshop because it didn’t meet my high expectations. The moderators of the workshop attributed the causes of the conflicts and insecurity to the cultural beliefs and practices of the ethnic groups. These experts, who are not even abreast with your cultural system, do not even appreciate that we have values that implore us to be law-
abiding, promote good neighborliness and love for humanity. (A. Mubarak, Interviewed on August 4, 2011)

Mubarak’s comments are an attestation to the saliency of traditional values in the region, which are critical to their decision-making processes, and integral in shaping their mode of interaction. His comments also confirm the complicated nature of interventions as they inform the worldview of local people. The prevailing rationale within the UN JHSP, and the wider aid industry, that change is possible through external intervention requires urgent and reflexive rethinking. The emphasis placed on training participants to develop sound values for cooperation, I suggest, is a short-term, misguided approach that makes the emancipatory and transformational viability of the human security approach exceedingly unattainable.

The leader of a second youth group, Mr. Ranford Nyamah, made some critical remarks in relation to the broad array of pressing needs that have been neglected by the aid agencies in the area. Mr. Nyamah told me that:

There are pressing economic, social, environmental and political issues that we would like to be addressed instead of this unproductive workshop. Our group members and most youth associations acknowledge the state of hopelessness in which they live. Just see the high unemployment rate in this city and region among the youth population. I am sure ever since you came to this city, you would have noticed the high number of beggars on the street. I am talking of beggars who are able-bodied and sane but cannot find any sustainable means of livelihood to even survive. For how long shall we remain poor and live in tension in a region with so much potential? We are
looking and campaigning for sustained job creation, not those nine-day
wonder jobs. (R. Nyamah, August 4, 2011)

On the basis of the information provided by these group leaders, an attempt to seek simplistic
solutions to complex aid problems leads to the adverse prioritization of critical needs in
disparate communities. In this instance, critical and pervasive issues of hopelessness and
despair that have engulfed the region are yet to be given the consideration they deserve. The
pervasive feeling of hopelessness in these statements implies that there have been systemic,
multiple deprivations created by policies of socio-cultural exclusion, political inequality,
systemic institutional failures and an exploitative global political economy. These are only
some of the contentious issues that the UN JHSP has managed to avoid or has treated as outlier
issues that will undermine time-bound programming. The highly-favored short-term
approaches that avoid interaction with structural and relational deficiencies in the region have
little potential to transform the region.

The relevance of the workshops remains a bone of contention between the UN JHSP
administrators and local groups. Mr. A. Moro, program officer of UNJHSP in Tamale,
highlighted the positive effects of training programs when he declared that: “this community
conflict prevention committee is ideal for the numerous communities scattered all over the
region. Through this initiative some communities have begun to interact with each other.”
The consensus of the UN JHSP is manifest in their response, but contentious issues of
economic and social justice have been relegated to the background. Mr. Badong, an official of
the Northern Regional House of Chiefs, provided a counter-claim to the alleged positive
outcomes of the UNJHSP:
The UNDP did organize workshops and teaching seminars on conflict prevention for us and at the end of the training they donated a photocopier, laptop and printer to us. At least you can see them over there with UNDP boldly inscribed on it. Is that all what is needed to prevent conflict? Conflict prevention is not limited to dialogue, there requires action in the system to effect changes. See my brother! My heart boils when I see these officials of UNDP churn out such ill-informed ideas about conflict prevention for us adopt. In fact, all that they said in the recent workshop were just repetition of the workshops they organized for us in 2002, in the aftermath of the Dagbon crisis. (August 12, 2011)

These counter-claims indicate the recycling of practices or a ‘business as usual’ agenda for the human security framework that has been established to transform the security and development terrain of the region. This recycling of failed practices confirms the extent to which the UNDP’s failure to learn from its historical mistakes. The rationale behind the possibility of solving every locally-identified problem by the UNDP, through the transplantation of best practices independent of the context, needs reconsideration. A necessary logical expectation is that the UNDP would avoid these programmatic pitfalls, particularly the misleading rationales and assumptions. An unfolding reality, however, is that, as a major player in the aid industry with self-acclaimed infallible status, the UNDP consider themselves to be above the kind of reproach that would necessitate changes in their ontological orientation. Ultimately, these ahistorical and depoliticized UN JHSP practices did nothing to address the fundamental factors that underpin the alleged insecurity in the metropolis. In effect, the UN JHSP is a carbon copy of the failed conflict resolution practices used in troubled SSA countries such as Somalia,
Liberia and Sierra Leone (Willett, 2005, p.573). The intriguing issue, here, is that the aid agencies are fixated on the unchanging logic behind their interventions even in the face of their failed outcomes. I suggest that interrogation of the assumptions and rationales behind aid interventions is a viable way to expose the inner flaws of the interventions.

I insist that the quest to impose an externally-derived and an expected code of behavioural conduct on the people in the region necessarily invites non-compliance. In fact, members of a youth group that I interviewed affirm that the JHSP program is alien to their time-tested traditional differentiated conflict resolution mechanisms. They contend that significant effort is made by the Tendana to adjudicate their differences and fines, such as banishment from participation in their customary practices, have important cultural meaning to them to ensure compliance. This apparent discrepancy in conflict resolution methods expose the UN JHSP’s paradoxical harmonious and integrative view of community that has been reconstituted through the programmatic tutelage of external values. Further, Rose argues that the third sector is differently spatialized and temporized, which means that community members are essentially reassembled by the construction of new identities with indoctrination in civic culture (p.172). Considering the information provided by the youth group, conflict prevention groups were not constituted to address the fundamental processes of the current predicament. Instead, an idealized group has been formed that aims to achieve solidarity as a panacea to the complex problems of insecurity, poverty and underdevelopment in the area. Furthermore, the rhetoric used promises the unrealistic expectations that the intervention was supposed to achieve. Accordingly, both Duffield (2010) and Pupavac (2012) conclude that this kind of deception is the hallmark of international development practices. I will add that a
failure to fulfill these empty promises becomes one of the resources the aid industry uses to generate new promises in order to stay relevant.

From my perspective, the absence of a transformation of orientation in the UN JHSP can be attributed to its need to exhibit immediate results in the sectors that have been prioritized by the misguided and narrow rationales. These narrow rationales result in the simplification of complex problems of security and development into short-term fixes that ultimately fail. A likely outcome of the emphasis on short-term solutions is the evasion of the pertinent broad interplay of socio-economic and historical forces at various scales that impact on the study areas and region as a whole.

Selected participants of the UN JHSP community-based program explained the nature and content of how they were handled by the UNDP officials. One of the participants, who chose to remain anonymous, revealed:

We were treated like ignorant people just as the government treats us as if we are backward and in desperate need of training to change our thinking, attitude, behaviour and beliefs. The ‘all knowing’ officials from the UNDP think they can instill in us new values and enlightened thought to help us to develop sound attitude and understanding to avoid conflict tendencies. Also the UNDP officers think that this character molding will ensure the security of the poor and weak members of our cherished society.

This statement directly points to the denigration of non-western values as inimical to human progress. The problematization of non-western values becomes a justification for aid agencies to intervene and attempt to re-engineer social customs and practices. Ultimately this social re-engineering of a particular society is an aspect that mirrors the colonial civilizing mission. The
ineffectuality of this unsolicited civilizing mission is reflected in the abhorrent and non-compliant attitude emitted by the group. Certainly, this social engineering practice, in my view, is counter-productive as long as the vital goal remains the search for transformational means to manage security and development challenges.

The functional relevance of the training modules presented by the UN JHSP can be used in order to concretize my contention that the UN JHSP is essentially an empty bureaucratic program not equipped with the resources to engage with complex relational issues. In response to my question in respect to the usefulness of the training program, Mr. A. Moro told me that:

My group’s members, as well as many of participants, were ashamed that we had to be told what to do in order to avoid and prevent conflict as if we are crude people with crude values. In our view, these UN officials just do not understand the burning issues of contestation in the localities of the region. Some of us attended the workshop because of the participation allowance paid to each participant. (A. Moro. Interviewed on August 11, 2011)

Mr. Moro indicates that these group members participated not because of a deep-seated intention to apply the training modules that certainly lack credibility, but for the monetary incentive attached to it. It is instructive to note that other participants also informed me that their attendance at the workshops was influenced by the monetary enticement offered to them in exchanged for their presence. A logical deduction from this information is the reduction of conflict-generated insecurity to behavioural characteristics. I therefore deem it imperative to challenge the rationale behind preventive approaches that claim that conflict is preventable, and
that prevention can be achieved by altering the attitudinal persuasion of the community members with cosmopolitan values to foster peaceful co-habitation. I further submit that the prevention of conflict is a utopian objective given that the manifestation of the conflict triggers and drivers are not easy to accurately anticipate based on short-term interventions. On the basis of the fieldwork information obtained, I suggest that the persistence of insecurity equally resides in the assumption that liberal values, like natural laws, are superbly expected to fit well in every jurisdiction.

The quest for behavioural change was quite pervasive within the UN JHSP mandate. Mr. A. Moro, outlined the main components of the behavioural change that they are seeking to implement: “socializing community members to inculcate sound liberal behavioural norms of civility, tolerance for one another and preference for building dialogue society are the workable steps to prevent conflict in the region, and create the needed peace and security vital for poverty reduction.” In my perspective, this response reinforces the perpetuation of racial hegemonic colonial practice. The civilizing mission becomes the medium through which the post-colonial subject is indoctrinated with cosmopolitan values and expected to begin behaving rationally. This top-down approach has the potential to weaken internal institutional building. Because the rules of engagement are not internally-generated through viable contestations, struggles, or negotiation they fail to gain the necessary legitimacy of diverse parties. The imposition of externally conceived rules explains, to a large extent, the minimal commitment of disparate community members to these projects. A minimal commitment on the part of participants is akin to the failed Inter-NGO Consortium-brokered peace agreements that I discussed in chapter four. I suggest that the imposition of responsibility for conflict prevention
on the door step of community groups and individuals who are disconnected from wider national institutions is likely to result in futile outcome.

The elusive outcome is supported by the ongoing clashes between the two main gates of Dagbon, in reference to the Andanis and Abudus in Yendi as stated in chapter one. The most recent feud occurred on April 1, 2013, in the aftermath of the installation of Youth Chief of Yendi by the Regent of Dagbon. Indeed, this feud was confirmed by the Yendi Divisional Police Commander, Chief Superintendent Cephas Bediako (Joy News, April 1, 2013). This latest clash between the feuding parties is a reflection of the positive achievement outcomes as declared by Mr. Moro Awudu of the UN JHSP. Awudu outlined the following successes of the UN JHSP:

Through the implementation of this community prevention initiative it for the first time since 2002, brought the two feuding factions to a negotiation table and it is our expectation that this negotiation process will prepare the grounds for sustainable peace in the region. As you know Dagbon constitutes the largest ethnic group in the region and occupies widest territory as well as being the most influential among all the ethnic groups.

(A. Moro. Interviewed on August 12, 2011)

The crucial factor is that Yendi is firmly interconnected to wider institutional influences at the regional and national levels, especially in national politics. Therefore, interventions in Yendi would require a much more critically-extensive focus. In this case, systemic changes in the interlocking sectors of Northern Region will require transformational changes on multiple scales from the local to the global. The human security framework, however, is yet to come to terms with this complex interconnectivity between sites of intervention.
From the discussions advanced thus far, I suggest that the community oriented conflict prevention committee is a pretext to impose responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on community members. The enormous focus on the community as the anchor of conflict prevention suggests to me that the UN JHSP has no real transformational solution for the region. Indeed, Abrahamsen and Williams (2009, 2011) suggest a shift in security governance, particularly in light of the recent surge of private security in most urban settings in SSA, under the guise of the global-local partnership. From the context of the Northern Region, the community oriented conflict prevention committees appear to be the substitute of private security for a predominantly rural spatial setting. In my view, the critical question to ask in this situation is: who is actually being secured? Judging from the intervention in the Tamale metropolis and Yendi municipality, I suggest that the multiple, deprived, heterogeneous poor remain inevitably insecure because of their limited sphere of influence within community groups. Community conflict prevention practices present a weak desire to generate the necessary stability deemed as a prerequisite for poverty reduction. The problem is more prominent especially in the absence of secure future investments into the life of the poor in region.

In considering the individual focus of security interventions, my assertion is that the conflict prevention committee was created as a response to shifts in security governance as indicated in the NEPAD framework. The NEPAD framework is reinforced by the Report on UN High Level Panel for Threats, Challenges and Change and 2011 Report, which favor ‘third way’ or community involvement approaches as possible bottom-up approaches to conflict prevention. The rationale behind a bottom up approach is that, through the constitution of individuals as rational subjects who are empowered through capacity building, conflict
prevention becomes a normal course of practice. Mr. Erasmus Doe suggested some reasons to support the UNDP prioritization of community focused programmes when he suggested that: “it is the UNDP’s operational belief that once the community members are adequately empowered through the numerous capacity workshops, we will mark the commencement of building resilient people. As a change agency we are optimistic that it will provide a long-lasting means to prevent conflict and ensure poverty reduction.” Inherent in his response is the technical rendering and de-politicization of the complex problems of conflict prevention. It is, therefore, not surprising that several community members resisted the intervention, as it ultimately maintained the problematic social and political relations among multiple ethnic groups.

The polarization of unequal power relations among identified groups in different communities has been reported by some residents. The residents that I interviewed in Yendi and Tamale Central are of the view that this unequal relation among participants has discredited the legitimacy of the committees. I therefore suggest that the driving rationale behind community-based conflict prevention initiatives of the UN JHSP is the possibility of reorienting community members on a clean slate as if they do not have unique worldviews and experiences. With such unproblematic possibility orientations, residents are expected to acquire new values they gain through the tutelage of an expert who devised rules of conduct. This reorientation practice in itself portrays the people as inferior in similar manners as the colonial administrations of the past. Thus, the characterization of local people as ‘backward’ becomes the justification for intervention.

The emphasis on external tutelage also reinforces the view that the residents of communities where aid agencies operate lack the capacity to solve their insecurity challenges.
The will to intervene and improve the well-being of the people, as Li (2007) notes, translates into an attempt to govern conduct. Also, the contestations referred to earlier point to the inherent shortcomings adhering to an unproblematic possibility of change. In addition, matching contestations should serve as a warning sign to the aid agencies that are still practicing this interventionist mindset and force them to acknowledge the chaotic nature of the sites of interventions.

A pertinent issue at play is that there appears to be endless tension between the state security agencies and residents of both the minority and majority ethnic groups, notwithstanding UN JHSP interventions. Dr. Shikata of the UNU confirmed the prevailing tension that exists between national security actors and most residents, particularly the youth groups. Shikata explained the intractable nature of the tensions in the region when she states: “there is so much tension in the region due to high level of mistrust between the state security services and the people. This tension between the distinct parties has been tough challenge to our efforts at forging a lasting peace in Dagbon, and the region as a whole”. The problematic nature of this policy is revealed, when Dr. Shikita suggests that “they have organized peace soccer matches with the expectation that it will foster smooth interaction first among the various ethnic groups on one hand and between the variegated ethnic groups and state security actors on the other hand.” In fact, as we were in the middle of our interview, she received a call from a former international footballer who wanted to arrange a prospective match in Tamale as part of activities to foster peace and security in the area.

The unfolding reality of these situations is that an uncritical reliance on external actors has the likelihood of stultifying domestically-generated, multileveled mechanisms that could accommodate the grievances and priorities of contending factions. Multi-leveled mechanisms
include the development of broad national, regional, and district long-term structures and processes to address all facets of ethnic contestations. In my view, external interventions are underpinned by the dominance of simplistic assumptions that render the aid industry ill-equipped to confront complex problems related to: historically spawned identity contestations, traditional autonomy, chieftaincy succession, and justice claims. Also worth noting here are the weak postcolonial state institutions put in place to correct the colonial development policies in the Northern Region, as well as the adverse ramifications of the global economy from which study sites are not exempt.

From my critical perspective, an adoption of a celebrity approach in the use of ex-international soccer players mimics the failed negotiated settlements implemented to resolve the 1994 Guinea Fowl War in Northern Region. In fact, Willett (2005) and Weinstein (2005) advocate for the need to create space for domestically generated mechanisms used to address conflict and insecurity crises because of the legitimacy deficits that external interventions engender. Weinstein (2005, p. 9) posits that the processes of external mediation usually employ methods and practices that are alien to most of the feuding parties. To mitigate these alien processes, efforts must be directed at the development of internally-devised rules and processes, while also avoiding the urge to rely on ‘best practice’ formulation. The critical factor, here, remains whether or not the donor community and the aid industry can create the space for autonomous recovery in conflict prone areas like the region for this study.

During my interview with Dr. Awedoba, he expressed a similar concern in relation to the futility of externally-imposed, negotiated settlements in the Northern Region. He argued that “there have been numerous half-baked negotiated settlements in many of the protracted communities and towns since the 1940’s, however, most collapsed within a short period of
time because the ‘hawks’ in the conflicting groups appeared unsatisfied with the terms of settlement or partial implementation of the settlement pact undermines the process” (Awedoba, July 28, 2011). The crux of this argument is that these negotiated settlements, as I explained in chapter four, rarely address the fundamental critical factors involved in the conflicts. In my view, the violation of agreed terms and conditions with gross impunity invariably exacerbates the tension between groups. The crucial questions related to the abrogation of the peace accord, I suggest, should be related to how just, fair and enforceable the terms of the agreement are/were. Furthermore, a vital issue to consider is the diverse processes of engagement among groups. And given the enormous weight of the grievance-related contestations, the dismal outcomes of negotiated settlements do not come as a surprise.

My critical stance in relation to the potency of UN JHSP interventions has been given further credence following my interview with a senior program manager of the UNDP in relation to the programming of priorities. This senior program manager ‘cleverly’ eliminated the complex historical processes of conflict and poverty from the UN JHSP priorities. According to the Senior Program Manager, history cannot be formulated into an expert designed programmable toolkit. Historical factors are inconsistent with the established ‘best practices’ of international development assistance. In fact, disdain for historical processes raises enormous concerns regarding the transformational prospects of the UN JHSP. Additionally, this transformational impossibility is grounded by the inability of the UN JHSP to engage the complex politics and political economy issues that are crucial to secure the regional capital of Tamale. This shortcoming is necessary to signal the impossibility of the program to secure the entire region as the administrators of UNJHSP intend.
As part of the processes of agenda-setting for committees, the prevailing ethnic conflicts, beliefs and power differences and contestations were taken out of the deliberative agenda of community-based conflict committees. According to Mr. Erasmus Doe of the UNDP, “the technical and steering committees saw the wisdom in allowing the different community groups to address their differences themselves, because our mandate is not to dabble in the contestations but provide a rallying framework for them to engage each other. Once we break ground for the factions to meet, it is our firm conviction that they will be able to find a common ground” (E. Doe. August 21, 2011). The essence of such an elision of controversial issues from the agenda set is to arrive at a rational consensus that betrays the touted transformational persuasion of the UN JHSP. This elision confirms the unwillingness of the human security program to address the unequal power structures and institutions that are critical to dealing with local contestations. It is important to note that, in the wake of minimal recognition and representation of entrenched differences, and the presence of unresponsive institutional processes, the tension and insecurity in the region will endure. The solution to this enduring insecurity is clearly not more of the same interventions, but rather, a serious rethinking of rationales, assumptions, ideas and imaginations.

An attempt to homogenize the problems for practical conveniences has proven to be infeasible, and this notion attests to the fact that historically unique contexts are not amendable to technical rendering. The impossibility of an attempted technical rendering of the study areas can be explained by the salient, inevitable heterogeneity of socio-cultural systems and values. A member of the community- based conflict prevention committee suggested to me, in relation to limited space accorded to ethnic groups, that “the non-inclusiveness of diverse ethnic groups within the community, and in worst circumstance the restricted and formalized modalities of
engagement, are not in harmony with our established practice.” The consensus orientation of
the community-enhanced conflict prevention committee ends up silencing the socio-cultural
differences and structural determinants of poverty, insecurity and underdevelopment among the
people.

The attempted homogenization of the differentiated community members informs
bounded interventions. Such bounded interventions are expected to address a complex
problem, but instead reduces that problem to problem-solving logic or liberal hypo-deductive
ethos. Thus, Long indicates that difference among circumstances is not included in aid plans.
Rather, difference is erased and populations are included in the liberal project insofar as they
are, or are made, the same (2006, p. 219). I further posit that the apparent antipathy toward
critical differences by aid agencies would rather prolong the insecurity of the study sites.

Contestations associated with the community-oriented conflict programs also center on
modalities for identifying threats. A senior member of the butcher’s association made the
following remarks to reveal the imposition of ‘alien’ procedures on the community: “we have
our customary procedures that guide us in engaging other ethnic groups over issues of
importance to all. The way issues for deliberation have been designed by these UNDP
personnel put some of us off, because we do not see our grievances being tabled to see the way
forward.” Moreover, the assumed homogenous and cohesive community groups proved to be a
highly politically contestable exercise.

A leader of one of the youth groups, Samson Abu, informed me of the numerous
occasions on which many of the youth groups rejected the terms of engagement. Abu
described the contestable occurrences in the groups: “there were substantial rejections of the
composition of the leadership of the community groups on the basis that such groups do not
represent their pertinent socio-economic interests. Ethnic composition of the community group’s leadership is one of the main factors which led to the rejection as well as unresolved community issues.” These contestations, in my analytical perspective, point to the absence of the transformational persuasions of the UN JHSP, and with its simplistic thinking, it is possible for diverse polities to be reduced to artificial homogenous groups. Evidently, the UN JHSP has no mechanism to accommodate different contestations and claims. The likely result of this constructed, homogenous group is the endorsement of existing unequal power relations.

**Incorporation of Media Actors in Conflict Prevention**

The focus on individual attitudinal change occasioned the development of an educational and awareness training program for media actors to complement community interventions. Mr. E. Doe explained the rationale behind the UN JHSP incorporation of media actors. He explicates that the rationale is part of the innovative programming and declares that:

> It is important to know that, in most cases, conflict arises out of misinformation and ignorance of the issues at stake, especially as the region has a very high number of illiterate population. Hence, this program is geared towards training journalists of the various media houses or networks, who will be given sound training to better understand the causes, consequences of, and how to, report incidents in order not to exacerbate the prevailing tension. Hopefully, the rural media networks will, in the near future, become our permanent information dissemination ambassadors in the remote villages. We have been training some media operators in Tamale and other big towns as well. Our expectation is that
with a better appreciation of the untoward effects of conflicts in itself will have a preventive effect on the conflict tendencies in the region. (E. Doe. Interviewed on August 21, 2011)

This statement reduces the conflict and insecurity issues to mere misinformation. It is not fully clear the extent to which we can impute misinformation to the historical and relational grievances that the various factions, especially the minority groups, are contesting.

The media, as an essential player in the contestations, was brought to focus by another research participant. Dr. Awedoba expressed some concerns in relation to the abuse of media platforms and conflict in the three northern regions and postulates that: “the high level of ignorance and miscommunication being churned out by the various networks could blamed for the insecurity in the Northern and in other parts of the two Upper regions.” In the wake of the pervasive structural underpinnings of the conflict and security challenges in the study region, calls for the rethinking of the faith placed in educational outreach through the media to effect the requisite behavioural changes. The use of information dissemination to mitigate the complex causes of insecurity and poverty-related conflicts in the region is not a straightforward process. With unresolved contentious claims associated with justice and political autonomy for the diverse population, I do not understand the mechanisms through which behavioural change will transform a relational problem. I suggest that it is only in the ideal world, whereby the structural and institutional foundations are functionally responsive and the international political economy is flawless, that an educational awareness program could possibly help to prevent conflict and insecurity.
As part of the processes of intervention, there has been a significant reliance on experts from academia and the UN to train journalists about reporting on issues of conflict, security and peace. According to Mr. E. Doe, “our organization, in conformity with standard practice within the UN system, hires relevant consultants to deliver the training and other capacity building related activities on our behalf. Some of the consultants teach in the universities and we select them based on their expertise in the areas of conflict and development issues in the region and their ability to facilitate the training of these journalists.” This response indicates that this training symbolizes a technical rendering of development and security challenges in the region. The training seeks to problematize misinformed individuals as the cause of insecurity and poverty. Again, the transformational prospect of this human security approach becomes significantly questionable, as it fails to interrogate the root causes of problems contrary to their normative goals or expectations. Notable root causes for these problems are the contestations for political autonomy, exploitation, and land control and ownership. I suggest that this human security program constitutes the UN’s strategy to burden residents with the task of maintaining their personal security through information dissemination.

The educational program for these journalists seeks to homogenize the communities through generic educational training. My interviews with some senior residents in Tamale suggest that there are significant differences in terms of the triggers and impacts of the conflicts. Furthermore, the conflict dynamics that I explained in chapter three also suggest that conflict prevention cannot be reduced to mere attitudinal change. Even more contentious, according to the elder of a group of residents in Tamale:

I think there is a missing target in this training program. In fact, there is no evidence so far about the significance of media misinformation as the
precursor to the conflicts and tension. Most of the major conflicts cannot
be attributed to any misinformation by a rural radio station; rather, the past
failed resolutions of the conflicts should have been the major concern of
the UNDP if they intend to help create peace, stability for development in
this region.

This response aligns with similar sentiments shared by other residents with whom I had
informal conversations to attest to the tenuous implication of the program. Specifically, Mr.
Setor, an electrical engineer in Tamale, suggests that numerous media workshops organized by
the Catholic Relief Services in Damongo, Tamale and Yendi over the past decade have
illustrated that past governments have not shown interest in addressing the core issues of
conflict. The critical issue, here, is that nothing emerged from those workshops, as evidenced
by the fact that tensions are still rife. The implication of Setor’s suggestion is that the media is
not the cause of this tension; rather, it is the inability of the government to search for serious
long-term processes to address conflicts and insecurity.

The training modules used by the UNDP aim to produce rational subjects, a move that
indirectly pathologises community members as having an irrational mindset. The assumed
irrational mindset, therefore, becomes an area of reformation. This disparaging framing
affirms the position of both Pupavac (2007) and Duffield (2011) that liberal peace has become
the blueprint that aid agencies rely on as a preventive intervention in post-conflict societies.

In summary, the articulation of community-based conflict prevention programs in their
simplistic forms and content creates an imagined tolerant community. The correlating
imaginations elide the complex processes that ensure the attainment of the imagined goal of
order and stability. Apparently, the weaknesses with the human security-driven intervention
are the linear and short-term practices. This idea is contrary to the normative view espoused by Newman (2010, p.23) and Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007, p.157) that human security brings long-term perspectives toward the protection and empowerment of individuals and communities. Significantly missing, therefore, in the intervention components of the UN JHSP for conflict prevention, are efforts geared towards institutional change related to the judicial and distributive systems and the wider polity that are crucial for peaceful co-existence.

**Competitiveness and Entrepreneurialism as Panacea to Poverty**

Market competiveness to reduce poverty remains the pivotal element of the human security framework to reduce poverty. The quest to achieve this apolitical, market-induced poverty reduction depends on the reinvigoration of the innate capabilities of the imagined rational subject through the imposition of the double rationalities of autonomy and responsibilization. From this liberal perspective, capacity-building and empowerment become the central conduits used to promote the idealistic entrepreneurship by which poverty reduction will be anchored. A senior official elucidates the poverty reduction policy orthodoxy of the UN JHSP as follows:

It is well known that poverty is so rife in this region, which in itself accounts for the tensions, conflicts and insecurity. Low productivity and a lack of access to the market have been identified by our team of experts. Another big factor is the absence of productive skills on the part of the youth to embark on viable self-employment has created a large pool of high youth unemployment which is a recipe for future conflict and long-term poverty. Therefore, we have targeted the agricultural sector and instituted youth skill development programs as part of measures to ensure
self-employment generation among the teeming youth entering the labour market.

Implicit in this policy orthodoxy intervention is the prioritization of the agricultural sector, which is tailored around existing policy frameworks, notably of GPRS 1&2, and MDGs priorities, to mention a few. The adopted policy orientation of the UN JHSP favours market competitiveness, which requires the need to shore up productivity and the promotion of entrepreneurship through capacity-building. This suggests that the UN JHSP is a replica of the liberal framework that lacks any transformational outlook or capability to emancipate the Northern Region, contrary to the normative, imagined, and transformative orientation.

What I deduce from the statement of the UN JHSP official is the continuous naming of local deficiencies as the causes of the poverty challenge. Noticeably, poverty itself is represented as an objective phenomenon of analysis in order to facilitate blueprint solutions. Therefore, poverty is understood through the abstraction of people who are independent from the micro and macro social system in which they struggle for their daily survival. I contend that this externalization thinking makes poverty an exceptional case in which neutral interventions become the preferred solution. It is important to recognize that such a neutral framing significantly negates the social-relational processes that produced poverty conditions. Underlying this restrictive understanding of poverty, in my thinking, is the simplistic rationales that render a problem visible and homogenized for a wide range of different people. Such a technical rendering of the poverty phenomenon facilitates deductive diagnostics and prescriptions that are applicable to diverse sites, regardless of their contextual differences. It is in this sense that the study region, deemed a post-conflict society, will require an urgent move to ensure the incorporation of the people into the market system.
Poverty conditions, as I explained in chapter four, are not a natural phenomenon, but an outcome of the processes of adverse social relations at multiple scalar levels. This relational imperative of poverty causation invalidates any intervention that dwells on a problem-solving ethos as undertaken under the UN JHSP. The human security framework employed by the UN JHSP, in my judgment, lacks the potency to search for deep-rooted underlying causes of poverty as an important development challenge. More importantly, the search for deep-rooted causes is a difficult task, especially when the triggers and drivers of poverty evolve overtime. An imperative strategy, therefore, is to adopt a long-term approach that searches for a complex understanding of poverty challenges to address both social-relational processes of marginalization and adverse exclusions. Thus, the wider ramifications of the international political economy need to be considered when interrogating poverty conditions in the study region.

Agricultural sector interventions constitute one of the means to reduce poverty under the UN JHSP. The idea of an agricultural sector as a promising sector for poverty reduction was touted by Mr. Doe of the UNDP, when he informed me that:

There has been gross underutilization of the enormous agricultural resources of the region. Output of most farmers is nothing to boast of, a sore situation that has impoverished many farmers. Our core priority is therefore to boost the productivity of the farmers. One of our strategies for boosting output is through introduction of new crops or products with immense marketing opportunities. The other plan is to boost the capacity of agro-processing, which will create employment for non-farmers. We
have identified promising products to support vigorously and these are:
mango, chili pepper, cotton, guinea fowl and other vegetables.

This evaluation of the low agricultural yield of the farmers is imputed to supply side
constraints identified as capacity inadequacy and absence of market competitive products.
Interviews with select group of farmers, however, provide a much different perspective. The
leader of the vegetable farmers, Mr. Issa Mahamadu, told me of the plight of his colleagues and himself:

Every now and then FAO experts come with training schemes to improve
the quality of our products, especially with the introduction of new
varieties that tried on experimental basis. On some occasion we have seen
modest increment in yield, but in many cases negative output has been
observed. The real problems for us vegetable farmers remain with high
cost of loans, land insecurity, no protection and subsidy by the government
and high cost of farming implements. Many years ago the government
rendered many services to us at very low cost, such as fertilizer supply,
irrigation facilities and extension services. Now we have to dig deep into
pockets to bear the full cost of many services. The market is actually
killing most of us. Look at the high interest rate charged by the banks and
these microfinance companies. This high interest rate is just a put off to
most poor farmers, so most have to rely on friends and family members for
pittance. (I. Mahamadu. Interviewed on September 30, 2011)

This narrative basically suggests that there is nothing new or innovative about the human
security framework in addressing the fundamental challenges of farmers. Instead, following a
private sector policy mantra, integration of farmers into the market is deemed as the ultimate solution.

There is no evidence to support any serious effort to address the adverse effects of the liberal oriented SAP agricultural policies that have significantly contributed to the pauperization of most peasants. In fact, during an interview with three farmers in Gurmani, a suburb of the Tamale metropolis, Suleiman, I heard about the dire conditions farmers found themselves in after the SAP reforms:

Yaro! [Hausa term for a young man] we are fed up with all these organizations that come to us as ‘angels’ to ease our challenges. Ever since the government reduced drastically its support to our agricultural vocation since the mid-1980s, life has never been the same for our families’ well-being. How do you expect us to buy inputs from the same market that the rich farmers also patronize?

Suleiman’s testimony points to the enduring adverse effects of liberal agricultural policies which began in the early 1980s and are now being consolidated by the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture. The Agreement on Agriculture, in its present circumstance, limits intensive state support or subsidies for the agricultural sector. From my perspective, the Agreement on Agriculture, with its emphasis on further liberalization, will undermine the necessary policy space that agrarian regions and economies urgently require to address non-tariff barriers to agriculture. Any intervention worthy of its claim to transform the socio-economic fortunes of the people of the Northern Region cannot be oblivious to the ramifications of international development policy directives.
The transformational claims of the human security approach by the senior officials of the UN JHSP are more wishful thinking than actually helpful. I concur, therefore, with McCormack, who suggests that the human security approach is “less than a transformation in conceptualizing and doing security and development” (2011, p. 255). Given the questionable transformational prospects of the UN JHSP, I suggest that the organization rather reflects a disjunction between the rhetoric of one tale told, but the correlating programs tell significantly different tales.

The poverty-oriented agricultural intervention as a plan to support peasant farmers reveals contradictory targeting in its implementation. The selectivity of the products to be introduced and supported actually do not include crops cultivated by most of the peasant farmers. A research participant from the MOFA attests to this deliberately selective exclusionary practice:

The official records available to us show that most of the peasant farmers are into tomato, yam, rice, beans, shea butter and grains such as millet and sorghum cultivation. Our opinions were sought but the recommendation from us that the crops of the peasants must dominate the interventions virtually fell on deaf ears. With our hands tied we couldn’t change anything. These donor agencies always come to us with their own plans that spell out their priorities. Frankly, I wonder why these so-called development partners pretend to seek our professional advice and insights only to dump our views like garbage.

The response by the MOFA official reflects an imbalance in power relations in favor of the UN JHSP’s determination of the crops to be supported. This exercise of asymmetric power
relations certainly ruins the transformational prospects of the UN JHSP. This asymmetric power relation also has a higher likelihood of marginalizing the peasants, rather than transforming their lives. These exclusionary and contradictory processes are core manifestations of an over-arching market competition rationale that drives the intervention and they ignore principles of equity, justice and fairness.

Another level of discrimination relates to the criteria for selection. In respect to crop selection, Mr. A. Moro of the UN JHSP, revealed the reason behind the choice of particular crops and beneficiary farmers: “in view of the short-term nature of the project, from 2009-2013, we have to be selective with which farmers to support, having in mind the crops whose market viability, especially for exports have been established by the experts. Therefore, we expect the supported farmers to have the requisite resources to adapt to the training and support.” This response appears to be a rendition of the colonial administration policy to support crops of higher export value, as I discuss in chapter three. Also clear from the project officer’s response is that the agricultural intervention is basically a short-term project. In the wake of chronic poverty in the region, enabling such a limited time frame for intervention is in my view not well conditioned to interrogate the long-standing, adverse structural and power relation processes that precipitated poverty conditions in the study region. Moreover, the short-term nature of this project is underpinned by non-transformational rationales of simplification, which lead to depoliticized solutions that are deemed viable options for intervention.

Further problems have been revealed in the highly adverse, selective nature of the UN JHSP agriculture sector, which came to light during an interview with some unemployed farmers in Jisonayili, one of the farming villages of Tamale. A member of a group of
unemployed farmers outlined the following demands as fundamental prerequisites for eligibility for agricultural support: sustained progress, secured land and assets to use as collateral. I did encounter farmers eligible for UN JHSP support, but one of these farmers, Issaka Razak, explained to me why they refused any support from external agencies:

This is not the first time we have seen the introduction of new crops to increase our yield. However, with the past failures being our guide, we did not find it expedient to avail ourselves for support. We will continue with our food crop production that supports us during the lean season due to the little savings we make from it, instead of adopting these vegetables to serve an urban market which does not favour us. (I. Razak. Interviewed on September 30, 2011)

This response reiterates the built-in exclusionary and marginalizing nature of the UN JHSP in its quest to reduce poverty. These contradictory circumstances are symptomatic of liberal practices that are far from being all-inclusive. The true reflection of the failure of agricultural aid programs is in the promotion of an unbridled, uneven selection process that targets specific populations and spaces. The transformational claim of the human security framework, based on these findings, cannot be accurate. The emerging contradictory outcomes instead have a potential effect of straining already tensed inter/intra ethnic relations as a result of selective market-driven practices.

The articulated liberal market interventions appear to display a level of insensitivity toward a region with a long history of conflicts and insecurity. This contradictory practice suggests the need for the UN JHSP to engage in considerably deeper introspective assessments of their interventions. As to whether program managers are willing to exercise this kind of an
internal forensic examination of the ideas, assumptions and rationales behind the interventions, is uncertain.

Skills Development: A Magic Bullet for Youth Employment Creation?
The poverty reduction component of the UN JHSP, as I indicated earlier in this chapter, is aimed at market competitiveness with capacity building and empowerment as its driving instruments. In addition, the problematization of youth is necessary for the UNJHSP program to meet its objectives. I previously quoted the program manager of the UNDP, who identified the high youth unemployment rate as a major cause of conflict, as well as an obstacle for conflict prevention. It is not surprising, therefore, that the youth skills development project is packaged as a mechanism for both poverty reduction and conflict prevention. An official of the UNU, Mr. Raphael Azumah, highlighted some justifications for their focus on the promotion of skills development for youths:

The youth constitute the future of every society. Therefore it becomes the mandate of every government and other stakeholders in the Northern Region to address the future well-being of the youth. With the current high youth unemployment, we see it as a national security threat beyond the region. So we cannot wait any longer. By not addressing this youth unemployment menace as a means for poverty reduction and conflict prevention. As you remember the timeless adage; the devil finds job for idle hands, it is important therefore we equip the youth to direct their energies and skills in tapping into the opportunities offered by the global market. (R. Azumah. Interviewed on October 12, 2011)
Azumah’s response is suggestive of a causal linkage between poverty and violent conflict and insecurity. It also problematizes youth unemployment as the main aetiology of insecurity in the entire Northern Region. This imagined causal linkage is quite problematic because it rests on a simplistic assumption that makes economic motivation a key determinant of violent conflict and insecurity. The policy implication of such an assumption is that addressing unemployment challenges will translate into poverty reduction and ultimately prevent conflict and insecurity. Moreover, there is a relentless attempt by the UNU official to problematize the local terrain, independent of external factors, as responsible for the unemployment situation. By focusing on the economic imperative and remaining silent on the grievance claims of marginalization, injustice and exclusion, the transformational prospect of the UN JHSP is lost.

Furthermore, as part of the problematization of youth as a site of intervention, the homogenized youth were framed as lacking the skills to enter and endure the competitive labour market. Thus, Mr. Erasmus Doe of the UNDP expressed some remarks in relation to the ‘youth’ as a vital demographic category in need of support:

A larger majority of the youth in both the urban and rural communities of the region lack appropriate skills to make a worthy living. Therefore, the UNDP will liaise with the National Board of Small-Scale Industries (NBSSI) as well as United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to develop appropriate skills in ICT, reorient butchers and blacksmiths with skills to venture into rewarding vocations. (E. Doe. Interviewed on August 21, 2011)

The key point in this claim by the UNDP official is the foregrounding of individual responsibility as a precondition for a person’s future progress through skill training. In arguing
for the significance of a broader perspective, I posit that the long-term unemployment rate in
the region is structural in nature, because it is produced and reproduced by the interplay of
dominant systems and processes pervasive within the core economy and external forces. Thus,
a reductive-oriented youth skills development project cannot transform or significantly
improve unemployment rates among youth or prevent conflict in the Northern Region.

Further, and consistent with the belief that the market is the solution for unemployment,
critical factors such as multiple social, economic, and political deprivations have been glossed
over in order to render short-term and technical-oriented training or input-output analysis. On
the basis of this vital omission of relational factors, I object to the transformational claims
proffered by the human security framework. It is interesting to take note of the internal
institutional power wrangling between officials of NBSSI and the UNDP, whose conflicts
ultimately renders any collaborative work futile.

The youth training scheme that has been embraced by youth groups contrary to the
expectations of program managers. A substantial number of butchers were earmarked for
training, but most rejected the offer on the grounds that they are satisfied with their current
vocation, notwithstanding its challenges. Dauda Yakubu, one of the butchers, expressed the
following sentiments: “I am prepared to attend to training programs that I know will transform
my life and impact positively on my family. Bro! The training activities we are being
encouraged to attend are nothing to guarantee us a secure future. Sometimes when they want
to help us, at least they should seek our views and must refrain from thinking of what is best
for us.” Yakubu’s remarks depict the empty nature of the youth skills development program,
which is a replication of colonial practices that provided limited vocational training as a way of
containing the population. Inherent in Yakubu’s response is the perpetuation of top-down
approaches of poverty-oriented development interventions, in which case the ideas and prescriptions of an expert must prevail. It is obvious that a simplistic approach to job creation implies that the official objective is to meet the survival needs of the residents, but not to address their long-term socio-economic priorities. To address the long-term well-being of youth would necessitate processes toward structural and institutional changes. This urgent need for structural and institutional changes is largely absent in the human security framework. Other interviewees expressed similar remarks to those of Yakubu, suggesting the extent of the resentment that youth have for intervention programs.

The youth training program also reveals the simplistic, short-term rationale of attempting to remake individuals into idealized working subjects. The simplicity lies in the thinking that the butchers, for instance, would happily abandon their life-long professions and adopt new ones that are shrouded in a cloud of uncertainty. A possible net effect, here, is that the prosaic conundrum of poverty and insecurity become more entrenched as interventionists repeatedly fail to understand the complexity of the situation. In a way, the expert-driven youth program resonates with ‘program to fail’ intervention plans, especially the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), which was financed by the World Bank in conflict-prone Northern Uganda. The structural and social relational factors in Northern Uganda were ignored in the articulation of the apolitical NUSAF. In the end, the NUSAF did not reverse chronic poverty conditions in Northern Uganda (Gooloba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2009, p. 31). Similarly, the youth skills development program clearly ignores the structural conditions that are fundamental to enhancing its success. The UN JHSP evaluation Report of May 2012 admits the program’s failure to forge a collaborative alliance with NBSSI. The Report states: “collaborations with local partners such as NBSSI…have to date been superficial; and their
potential has not yet been adequately exploited to support key outputs” (UN JHSP, p. 14, 2012). The program is structured around a collaborative orientation, but has no recourse to think clearly about the driving motivations behind aid interventions.

A significant aspect of the processes of establishing an employment skills training program entail the elision of the structural and historical formations of the locale. Continuously silenced from the programming is the adverse incorporation of the locale into the wider polity within the political economy of Ghana. I posit that the chronic nature of poverty in the metropolis cannot be reduced to lack of employment for which an expertly informed employment strategy becomes the panacea. From my perspective, the structural nature of unemployment within both the metropolis and the region reflects systemic historical and contemporary failures within the political, social and economic relations at the regional, national and global scales. The connectivity of the region to both national and global policies suggests that programs for employment generation must factor in the effects of global development and national policies. For instance Khor’s (2006) work on the effects of the liberalization of agriculture as part of SAP indicates the extent to which most farmers in the Northern Region were rendered unemployed. I suggest that the market approach, imbued with short-term and apolitical orientations, cannot address a region that is beset with complex power relational and structural challenges. Therefore, deepening of the reforms after initial failures will not suffice because the driving rationales behind the reforms themselves need to be reexamined in detail.
Concluding remarks

On the basis of the interventions that I have analyzed in this chapter, I suggest that the practice of joint articulation of development and security interventions by the UN JHSP are in full conformity with the frameworks developed by the established international development aid enterprise. With the adoption of the dominant international development frameworks by the human security framework, I suggest that the DSN, in effect, lacks any potency for conflict prevention and poverty reduction. The UNJHSP in its current form and content, then, cannot secure the Northern Region. From the evidence analyzed, I suggest that the UN JHSP interventions also embody colonial community that does not reflect a transformational project.

An important issue within aid interventions is that they are driven by rationales and assumptions that make it impossible to secure the study areas and the region as a whole. Specifically, the inability of the human security framework secure the region can be linked to the technocratic orientation of rationales that endlessly seek to reduce problems to rely on standardized solutions over a short time frame. The failure on the part of the UNJHSP to recognize the relational dynamics that impact the region, creates a disconnect with the macro-institutional foundations that are vital to secure the region. It must be added that the exclusionary and contradictory processes of aid interventions also minimize any prospect of securing the region. This inability to secure the region lies in the fact that the program does not foster a cohesive foundation on which long-term interventions that will be guided by realistic assumptions can be pursued to transform the region.

Securing the study region through the market approach remains an inconceivable elusive goal. The elusiveness associated with the faith placed on the market as the means to
revive post-conflict society renders it difficult to achieve. From my perspective, the market, with its economic profit maximization motivation, distorts the broader relational and institutional conditions critical for securing the region. Under the influence of Sen’s capabilities notion, this UN JHSP represents an attempt to project post-industrial subjectivities fostered by market capitalism onto a traditional economy of a post-colonial region. This attempt to remake or civilize the farmers in order to convince them to respond to market signals is an attempt to promote self-reliance, and poverty-reduction programs. This constitutes an exercise devoid of the broader structural and relational conditions vital to securing the future of the selected farmers. These market empowerment programs endorse conservative practices and have the possible effect of consolidating existing asymmetric power relations.

Market interventions problematically normalize the adverse political representations of the needs of the poor. More specifically, the terms of recognition and political representation of the needs and priorities of the poor are crucial issues to consider. In support of this power-related political representation, Mosse (2010, p. 1172) points out the vitality of examining the relational foundation of poverty. Such an examination of the relational underpinning of poverty, Mosse notes, will foster a better understanding of how groups of people are confined to poverty. Through such relational scrutiny, the diverse institutions and actors that claim to represent the interests of the poor will constitute an arena of contestation for change. Particular issues of contestation will include the social classification, needs and priorities of the poor.

I suggest that addressing the developmental and security challenges of a conflict prone region would require long-term dialectical social change processes, as I explained in chapter four. Thus, a critical issue of state formation and search for long-term approaches must be underwritten by realistic rationales that should drive interventions aimed at securing the
Northern Region. The reality is that voluntaristic capacity building strategies aimed at farmers and other producer groups limits them to a narrow domain of economic vocation. Furthermore, the capacity boosting required must be geared towards effecting transformation in the institutional structures that work towards enhancing the political representation of the disparate poor in the region. As I suggested in chapter four, securing of the region is critically dependent on the nature of relations within the global political economy, and not in the entrenchment of the global power inequalities being endorsed by the current UN JHSP.

On the whole, the nexus between security and development is not a given and thus this imagined DSN may, at best, exist under extreme idealistic conditions. Analyses of the interventions that are influenced by the existing international development frameworks, therefore, suggest that there is nothing new with the DSN. In fact, these interventions, under the notion of DSN, are replications of existing and past interventions. Prima facie empirical observations do not suggest clear functional relations among the diverse institutions. The next chapter, therefore, will examine in detail the institutional relations between the two sectors and discuss at length how the implementation challenges have been framed.
Chapter Six

Post-liberal Interventions: A Solution to the Development and Security Impasse?

Introduction

Chapters four and five of this dissertation palpably demonstrate the colossal failure of the articulation of both development and security interventions put in place to secure the Northern Region. I suggest that these failures provide justifiable grounds from the perspective of aid agencies to re-enact ‘new’ solutions to the problems in the Northern Region. In my view, this impasse has proven to be the result of failures associated with colonial interventions in the period, and urgently reflects a need for a rethinking of the veracity and potency of the DSN. Of utmost significance here is the need to examine the underlying rationales or assumptions about peace in the area that are largely ignored in mainstream literature. This chapter seeks to interrogate whether alleged reciprocal relations between development and security exist or if the tendentious nexus has other motives. A possible reason behind the existence of these other motives might be to perpetuate liberal and technical solutions by the foreclosure of viable alternatives.

A key argument of this chapter is that to perpetuate liberal and technical interventions by the aid agencies, implementation challenges have been scaled down to coordination and capacity constraints. Based on evidence obtained during my fieldwork, I suggest that the assumed reciprocal relationship between development and security is an imagined one that is deficient of empirical evidence. This chapter seeks to provide empirical insights into the problematic rhetorical nexus touted by the aid industry as a panacea for insecurity and poverty phenomena in post-conflict regions.
In terms of the impasse emanating from the articulation of the DSN, Duffield (2010) suggests that the failure of security and development interventions serves to maintain the global life chance divide between developed and developing countries. From my perspective, however, it is absolutely imperative to interrogate the intricate processes through which the dire developmental gap is reproduced as it relates to the study region. The essence of this chapter is to provide empirical insights into how the proposed remedial measures invariably have the highest likelihood of maintaining the status quo liberal interventionist practices in the study region.

Another vital argument here is that the quest to aggregate implementation challenges around coordination failures and capacity constraints reflects the simplistic framing of a complex structural, historical and social challenge. The consequence of the elision of these complex factors is that, when examining the implementation challenges, aid agencies are provided with an avenue to adopt technocratic solutions through the perpetuation of ‘business as usual’ practices in the area. In my view, the rationales and assumptions made about the region are potent vectors that can expose the flaws in localized and indigenized discrete implementation challenges. The central research question of this thesis is vital in investigating how these rationales were articulated in the region. An integral part of the issues these implementation challenges articulated is the unassailable problematization of the local as the bearer of responsibility regarding the challenges of implementation. I posit, however, that these deliberate attempts to problematize the local are calculated tactics used to exonerate aid agencies from their complicity in failures to implement development and security challenges and I reiterate that solutions driven by same rationales are likely to be counterproductive.
In order to address the arguments that I have advanced, this chapter proceeds through several sections. The first section will discuss the operational challenges germane to the joint articulation of development and security related interventions. The officially-identified challenges to stability in the Northern Region primarily center on weak local capability and coordination problems, which tacitly endorse top-down interventions, and thereby instigate deepening interventions in the area through what Duffield calls a shift from containment to resilience measures. Pritchett and Woolcock (2004, p. 201) also suggest that the reduction of complex problems to technical understandings enable the aid industry to resort to intensification, amputation and policy-reform practices. Associated proposed programmes in the area, primarily the DFID program on Making Markets Work and Early Warning System, reflect intensification and policy reforms that will be discussed accordingly. The second section deals with the institutional challenges of the supposed joint/fused interventions by collaborating UN agencies. The essence of this section is to provide insight into the non-seamless nature of the DSN. This section also reveals the institutional power politics and the legitimacy deficits demonstrated by the main local actor – the metropolitan and district assemblies (that is, the decentralized agencies through which most of the interventions are deployed).

The third section concludes the chapter, first with a critical discussion of neglected factors in the articulation of post-liberal interventions remedial options. The essence of this section is to demonstrate the need to embrace complex political economies, politics and other relational factors in order to address the security and development challenges in the area. More particularly, I propose a plausible alternative in calling for a shift in the focus of the aid agencies from multilateral and bilateral-based interventions towards an engagement in state
formation (political context) processes. The call for renewed focus on state formation is, as argued in chapter three, based on the problematic political and economic incorporation of the Northern Region into the nation-state of Ghana. Specifically, this flawed relational integration of the Northern Region has been a neglected factor in both aid interventions, and the proposed remedial options to secure the region. The second component of the third section of this chapter contains my concluding remarks, and also serves as an introduction to the next, and final, chapter.

This chapter employs data gathered through interviews with key respondents. Key research participants were drawn from the various aid agencies operating in the area, the Tamale Municipal Assembly (TAMA), local NGOs, and farmers in several communities in Tamale. In-depth interviews were mainly conducted with key informants from both the aid agencies and TAMA. I adopted more informal conversation methods when interviewing the selected farmers.

**Articulation of the Development-Security Nexus: A Linear or Non-Linear Practice?**

A *prima facie* notion of the aid nexus suggests a mutually compatible conceptual and operational relationship between the two autonomous concepts involved in the discussion. A ‘nexus,’ as defined by Stern and Ojendal (2010, p. 11), is a “network of connections between disparate ideas, processes or objects and alluding to a nexus implies an infinite number of possible linkages and relationship. From an empirical viewpoint, however, a nexus does not portray a linear relationship. In substantiating an argument for the non-linear or incompatible relations between the security and development interventions, the UN JHSP will be the fulcrum of the analysis.
The operational mutuality of poverty, conflict and under-development in the area were issues that the DSN sought to bring to light. In order to establish the mutual relations between these three conditions, I sought the views of Mr. Awudu Tahiru, a national operations manager of the UN JHSP, to clarify the organization’s position on the relationships between all three elements. Mr. Tahiru told me of his conviction that instrumental linkages exist among the conditions:

The underdevelopment and poverty in the 3 Northern Regions have persisted for centuries. In fact, conflict has been the single overriding factor responsible for the development crises that have destroyed the economic opportunities of the people in this part of the country. It also makes the regions unattractive to investors (foreign and domestic) to boost the economy of the regions. Uniquely, the three Northern Regions tend to have similar socio-economic characteristics; therefore we expect the three regions to grow at the same pace. However, poverty incidence appears to be more prone in the Northern Region than the Upper West and East Regions. Preliminary studies undertaken for and by the UNDP indicate that the intractable conflicts in the Northern Region explain the Region’s negative development outcomes. It is our expectation therefore that when we target both development and conflict preventions programmes and other broad initiatives there will be stability in the region to ensure poverty reduction. We deem sustained poverty reduction also a lasting solution to the conflict, tension and insecurity in the regions of operation. That is why we developed this integrated Human Security Program comprising the six
UN agencies to work in Tamale, Yendi, Bawku and Wa. (A. Tahiru, Interviewed on October 4, 2011)

Flowing from this answer is a suggestion of the inevitable, imagined nexus between security and development. Also explicit in Mr. Tahiru’s response is his reiteration of the orthodox dictum of stability being a precondition for poverty reduction and vice versa. It is imperative to question the basis on which those preliminary studies arrived at these compressed causal relations. My investigation into these studies hit a glass ceiling because, according to Mr. Tahiru, such studies are classified reports not meant for the general public. Invoking the nexus as an inevitable intervention to secure the region would necessarily require collaborative efforts among autonomous organizations.

On the contrary, the unfounded enthusiasm and high expectations of the human security program, in terms of delivering effective programmes to maximize collective security and reduce poverty in the region, have been met with bleak outcomes as an unfolding reality. This contradictory outcome in the articulation of development and security interventions is well rooted in the region’s historical formation, as explained in chapter three. Evidence of these bleak outcomes has been outlined by Dr. K. Shakita of the UNU: “There are high levels of tensions, grievances and contestation among feuding parties, whereby there is a tendency of the dominant parties to dictate the issues to be discussed; some opinion leaders have hijacked the meetings which ultimately led to the withdrawal of aggrieved parties from further negotiation.”

As I indicated in earlier chapters, such failures should be expected in view of the simplistic approach employed by the UN JHSP to address a complex problem. It is quite strange that Dr. Shakita did not anticipate this prior failure, a fact that I attribute to the unrealistic rationales behind the interventions.
The vital issue here, however, relates to the denial of responsibility for these failed initiatives on the part of the collaborating agencies, which blame targeted participants in the community-based conflict prevention project for its failure. An important issue here is the silencing of unrealistic assumptions about the possibility of change through pre-programmed interventions. This linear-oriented possibility of change inadvertently provided the interventionist space and scope to perpetuate stove-piped development and security interventions. In the light of the perpetuation of this ‘business as usual’ practice, Dr. Shakita issued this remedial option: “there is a need to deepen the capacity training we have been providing for the people with the hope that over time they will absorb the knowledge and skills imparted to them. With further training I believe the trainees will be able to identify potential threats, conscientize their people about peaceful living and improve the dialogue and negotiations.”

The streak of the disappointing outcomes of the UNJHSP projects was brought up by Ms. Ramatu Abugri, a Project Officer of UNU. Ramatu attributed weak collaboration between the field officers and the program co-ordinating units as responsible for the poor outcomes. According to Ramatu, the poor coordination affected the preparation of the timely reporting that is vital for program implementations. In a similar vein, Mr. Erasmus Doe, a Program Manager of the UNDP, expressed misgivings about the ‘unexpected failed’ outcomes of the UNJHSP. Mr. Doe poured out his frustration with the disappointing outcomes:

We set out to address this difficult problem of insecurity and poverty in the region, however, it seems, the collaborating agencies do not care about the success of this program. Each organization is only interested in the success of their individual priorities. I have emphasized on many occasions to the
expected collaborating agencies about the need to work integrate their activities, which I think is the only way to ensure the success of this laudable programme. (E. Doe, Interviewed on August 21, 2011)

Ramatu and Doe’s responses demonstrate the high premiums placed on instrumental and technical factors in these aid solutions. In addition, the essence of the prioritization of these technical factors is to provide justification for continuous reliance on expert-designed interventions to correct deep-seated, historically adverse social relations within the Northern Region. The point that needs to be forcefully made is the gross ignorance, from an official standpoint, of the implementation challenges and the rationales or assumptions that underpin their own interventions. The absolute silencing of these rationales by the aid agencies reinforces the central research question for this dissertation: one about the way these rationales were articulated. The subsequent subsidiary questions regarding the examination of implementation challenges between development and security practices become vital to an understanding of the way implementation challenges have been framed.

From my critical position, these rationales should be a purposeful guide in interrogating the implementation challenges. I contend that if the rationales for these interventions are considered as critical to implementation challenges, a better understanding of the complexity of these issues will be gained. The plausible explanation that comes to mind is that these technically-diagnosed failures of intervention strategically become justification for continued interventions. In this regard, Pritchett and Woolcock (2004, p. 201-202) reinforce the suggestion that these technical justifications constitute a ruse for the intensification of existing programmes and policy reform. Intensification as a response to interventionist failures, according to Pritchett and Woolcock (2004), “point to proximate, logistical, technical causes
and attempt to remedy the failures directly, but within the same institutional structure, that is with the same patterns of interaction among the agents and hence with the same incentives” (p. 201). Therefore, the implementation challenges in the DSN interventions are placed at the door-step of technical diagnosis. Emerging from these technical diagnoses is the imputation of failure to the weak capacity of the intended beneficiary. The failure to implement the assigned responsibilities regardless of the operational impossibility of a programme becomes theirs.

It is important to note that framing targeted beneficiaries as both the source of problems in the localities and also the solution to those problems appears, from my observation and study of the kind of interventionist practices at work in the Northern Region, to result in an intensification of the programming orientation. This deference for similar intervention, despite their inefficacy, is predicated upon an unyielding faith in capacity-building, through which domestic actors are expected to develop the requisite skills and knowledge to implement the program’s activities. In particular, DfID sponsored an early warning system project in which GHANEP’s failure to meet performance targets set by DFID led to further training of GHANEP personnel in the hope that it would translate into program success. In fact, Mr. A. Sakibu, security analyst with GHANEP, revealed to me his experiences with DfID:

Our organization works for DFID regarding the early warning system to mitigate conflicts and insecurity in the region. DFID set out targets to meet; these are targets imposed on us and we are expected to achieve them after we have been given some training through seminars and other workshops to sharpen our skills. We find the training irrelevant because the targets are unrealistic. Because DfID brings foreign experts who we are supposed to learn from, our views are not accommodated. During the
Dagbon Crisis in March 2002, against all caution, the UNDP did not listen to us, because I, for example, do not have a doctorate degree. With the new early warning system that DFID has initiated in the region, two of my colleagues and I have been scheduled for further training as a precondition to attain the imposed targets. (A. Sakibu. Interviewed on September 19, 2011).

The crucial point here is that DFID did not consider it important to question the working rationales or assumptions behind the early warning system, particularly in terms of its addressing of the structural causes of insecurity within the Tamale and the region as a whole. The early warning system, notwithstanding the much-touted potential to curb insecurity and foster the stability that is vital for poverty reduction, remains an over-hyped practice.

In fact, an assessment of the effectiveness of early warning system as a conflict-prevention mechanism by Col. R. Adotey (retd), a security expert, shows dismal findings. Col. Adotey (retd) exposes the flaws in the early warning system when he notes that:

This insecurity in this regional capital and region as a whole goes beyond using early warning systems. Even more complicated is the translation of the early warning system into development outcomes. The continuous insecurity and conflict propensity should alert these donor agencies to pause, reflect, and begin to look for long-term solutions that will penetrate deep into the political and social core of the region. (Col. Adotey (retd), September 23, 2011)

Col. Adotey’s (retd) information supports my position that the results-driven aid industry appears to remain stuck in their contagious, failed, quick-fix technical solutions. Unless there
is a systemic change in the rationales, ideas, imagination and structures that condition these interventions, I cannot foresee any transformational outcomes. What is more worrying as I indicated in Chapter Five, is that UN JHSP officials are patently aware of the tension and insecurity in the region, despite their conglomeration of intervention practices. None of these officials, however, see the crucial need to think critically about the ideological and ontological foundations of their aid practices. The essential issue, here, is that insofar as the interventionist rationale and assumptions remain ossified along a simplistic and linear instrumental orientation, it is inconceivable that there could be transformational change. The likely consequence of the failure to secure complex aid practices, in my judgment, is the intensification of existing practices which could lead to recommendations for deeper reforms for the invented recipients.

**Institutional Challenges to the articulation of Development-Security Nexus**

From the interviews I conducted with aid officials during my fieldwork, I can surmise that the developmental and security interventions in the Northern Region demonstrate adequate institutional differences to instigate a questioning of the veracity of the DSN. By using the six expected UN collaborating agencies responsible for both development and security interventions, it becomes clear that there is an empirical chasm of nexus at the institutional aid level. Mr. A. Moro, Program Manager of UN JHSP admits to this institutional lacuna, states that: “collaboration between the six agencies so far has remained virtually non-existent. Communication between the organizations to facilitate a smooth exchange of actionable information is also yet to be seen. These organizations seem to be comfortable with their traditional mandate” (A. Moro, Interviewed on August 11, 2011). The implication of this
statement is that it demonstrates the continuous existence of institutional monism, whereby various organizations have maintained their traditional area of focus, despite their lack of success in the region.

Mr. Blaise Trarore and Ms. Ayeshetu Suleiman, both senior officers of the WFP, have confirmed the overwhelming prioritization of the traditional mandate of these UN agencies in this aid situation. They revealed to me that the main programmes of priority of the WFP are at variance with the expectations of the JHSP:

The WFP has its core goals and priority areas of operation and currently we have two main programmes purposely for reduction in the current level of malnutrition in the deprived districts and supply food to Government’s earmarked districts and communities for the School Feeding Project. It is our belief that in providing the school feeding service primary school enrollment will increase. We are worried about conflict and tension in the communities; however, they do not matter in terms of our priorities. (B. Traore and A. Suleiman, Interviewed on September 17, 2011)

Consistent with the normative aid practice, the WFP pursues expert driven problem-solution approaches or supply-side interventions that eventually exclude the fundamental or real causes of poverty and development issues in search of quick-fix solutions. The WFP’s other activities, as disclosed to me by Traore, include expert training capacity training schemes for selected women in the shea sector; this program was designed to be a selective training scheme for women operating plantations at a medium scale. The prioritization of medium-scale operators technically and practically disqualified the subsistence shea producers within the Tamale and Yendi villages as well as other parts of the region from the benefits of aid
practices. The poverty-reducing effect of this intervention ultimately becomes highly questionable given that the WFP’s operations give minuscule attention to the pervasive domestic, global structural, and institutional processes that have contributed to the quagmire state of insecurity and poverty in the region.

Moreover, it is crucial to note that Mr. E. Doe of the UNDP indicates that rare working relations exist between the UNDP and WFP in terms of supporting the community conflict preventions programmes rolled up under the auspices of the UN JHSP. This non-working relationship gives credence to the rhetorical orientation being displayed by the DSN as a new ‘magic bullet’ in the aid industry. The crucial issue in my mind, however, relates to the positivistic rationales that drive the interventions as a whole. Even granted that there has been effective collaboration in the past, I envisage a problem with the content of these interventions, as well as the modalities through which beneficiaries are selected. As stated in chapter five, the contentious politics that characterize the selection of potential beneficiaries and the unaddressed regional, national and global structural deficiencies betray the poverty reduction and security enhancement possibilities in the region.

The prevailing institutional monism that most aid agencies practice reinforce the weak theoretical understanding on the part of these disparate organizations normatively conceived of as instrumental and, more importantly, neutral entities. The reality, however, is that these institutions are driven by internally generated norms, values and administrative procedures, a fact which leads to the inability on the part of each organization to shed its main foci of operations. Further interrogation reveals that these organizations have different funding schemes tied to different programmes, along with different budget cycles, that are not flexible enough to accommodate non-traditional priority activities. Above all, these organizations have
different constituencies that they need to appease, which makes joint collaboration between them a pathetically utopian proposition. To buttress this contention, Mr. Peter Mensah, an official of the FAO explained to me that:

The FAO has limited budgets to even to address the food security problem in the region through its capacity building projects to improve the farming techniques of farmers, training of government extension officers, local NGOs in areas of water conservation, pest control, fertilizer application, post-harvest loss prevention and facilitate agro processing schemes. All these activities are to be undertaken to achieve the set goals within a time-bound limit. (P. Mensah. Interviewed on September 27, 2011).

This limited budget also means that that the FAO, for instance, cannot make extra budgetary provisions to support activities in post-conflict areas, especially ones that compete with their other priorities. A further implication is that the FAO cannot sacrifice its primary organizational responsibilities in the name of working for a nexus that seeks to reorient its activities. This constrained nexus reflects an empty promising machine, typical of an aid industry with limited resources to deliver. In the end, the burden falls on individuals as the bearer of responsibility towards their own personal security and development.

Considering the complex challenges in the agricultural sector in study region, I posit that the core functions as indicated by FAO officials do not imply that the FAO is producing a sustained poverty reducing effect. Beyond this, it is my contention that the top-down farming knowledge that the FAO is disseminating, alongside their top-down training schemes are not in tune with the needs of small-scale farmers. In fact, three local farmers who have experience
with FAO interventions relating to soil management, fertilizer application, crop preservation and yield increment were interviewed, and one had this to say:

These big men who have gone to school think they can teach us something new to improve our yield. Actually, they come and introduce different varieties of yam, rice, millet and sorghum. Master! The new varieties did not improve our yield in any significant way. I and my other fellows in this agriculture business have resolved never to listen to their advice again. They actually cost us money because the fertilizers they recommended for us is expensive. It seems we are working for some people rather but not for ourselves. All they ‘sabe’ [know] be book wey dem no get experience [All they know is book knowledge but do not have experience]. (Moses, Interviewed on October 1, 2011)

Moses’s comments reveal the considerable extent to which external expert assistance has resulted in counter-productive outcomes. This paradoxical situation has instigated a corresponding resentment against external development interventions by some farmers I interviewed. Inherent in this counterproductive outcome is the misleading notion of ‘knowability,’ a factor that the aid agencies have used to justify their interventions. The ‘doctrine of knowability’ is a systematic attempt to eliminate all plausible complex factors responsible for a problem, and deploy a universal blueprint as a solution to particular.

Another small-hold farmer, Hamza Bawa, recounts his bitter experience with external technical support aiming to boost his agricultural productivity. He narrated his dismal story as follows:
I have a bitter experience with these book long people, who come to misinform us about how to increase our harvest. Over 5 years of support from them did not improve my yield, rather it saddled me with debt, because in the past we government used to supply us low cost fertilizer, now with these FAO officers have introduced us to fertilizers that did not improve my economic situation. (H. Bawa, Interviewed on October 1, 2011)

The concerns expressed here raise legitimate questions about the moral responsibility of donor agencies, whose methods, I suggest, have not improved the conditions of the uninsured small-scale farmer. Pertinent to Bawa’s response is that it indicates the extent to which the FAO avoided taking responsibility for the failure of their promises to come to fruition. Through a process of self-exculpation, aid agencies see to subject the farmers to further interventionist practices.

Some farmers that I encountered at the Tamale central market shared their disappointing experiences with experts working for both the aid agencies and government. The leader of these small-scale farmers, Ibrahim Gariba reveals that:

My family members and I do not want to hear anything from the foreign and local officers who think they can teach us anything new to improve our farm yield. They do not listen to our needs. My son! Do you think I am a fool that I do not understand my farming needs? The difference between me and these officers are that they have been to school unlike me, but I have experience they cannot match with their certificates. I do not think
their knowledge is good for my progress. I call on the government to listen to answer our needs. (I. Gariba. Interviewed on October 1, 2011)

This statement reveals the despondency with which small hold farmers view expert-driven interventions. It further indicates that the ‘business as usual’ practice of the FAO that poses as the vanguard of innovative knowledge regarding the stimulation of agricultural productivity for poverty reduction is not effective for small-hold farmers. In view of the FAO’s acclaimed expertise, the concerns, needs and practices of the peasant farmers have been replaced with expert-recommended practices. The inevitable resistance on the part of farmers is expected and understandable in the wake of these abysmal outputs. This poor output leads to questions about the reliability of so-called experts, who I argue are mired in regulatory persuasion, rather than transformation.

Contrary to the goal of seeking the productive wellbeing of farmers, the FAO have exposed these vulnerable farmers to dependence capitalist oriented agro-processing firms for fertilizer supply. This counter-productive practice used by the FAO undermines the economic and social security of the farmers, a practice that could escalate tensions within communities. Duffield’s (2010, p. 63) description of these internalized non-transformational interventions as being essentially ‘containment’ measures is an under-statement. The supposed containment measures in the wake of institutional weakness invariably generate further insecurity and underdevelopment which then leads to conflagrations of the crises over the course of time.

Reducing the implementation challenges to a lack of institutional coordination, aid agencies force us to question their relationship to the rationales and assumptions that underpin interventions. I further submit that reduction of a failed nexus to coordination bottlenecks smack of a grand agenda to maintain the status quo supply-side and ahistorical interventions.
The implication of this preference for a technical solution is that the ‘co-ordination failure’ becomes a strategy to institutionalize post-liberal policy regimes. From the analyses proffered thus far, I suggest that there is an attempt on the part of the FAO to continue to force responsibility onto local farmers, and to impose responsibility for aid onto itself. This self-imposed responsibility will be articulated through international tutelage, a practice that is similar to colonial practices analyzed in chapter three.

Another problematic issue which Mr. A. Moro of the UN JHSP claims undermines the supposed collaborating UN agencies is the different evaluation systems that each use, and their impact on government agencies. Moro offered these technical reasons as inhibiting factors for reciprocal working relations of the UN JHSP:

There is a poor reporting system by the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly in cooperating with the laid down reporting standards expected of them. We spent a considerable amount of money and time to train their schedule officers but nothing significant has come out of it. This poor reporting standard is frustrating our planned activities for the coming year. We may have to contract experts to retrain these metropolitan officers again with the expectation that they will adhere to the standards. (A. Moro. Interviewed on August 27, 2011)

The responsibility for these failures is placed on local actors, who are posited as inhibiting the attainment of targets set by transnational actors. This testimony is also akin to the perpetuation of indirect colonial rule and postcolonial regional interventions such as the NRGP project discussed in chapters three and four respectively. An explicit issue here that is prominent in Moro’s response is his avowed reliance on technical experts who are as being endowed with
potent prescriptive solutions. Whereby the prescription of experts are expected to be easily absorbed by domestic actors through training in order to achieve the set targets, the failure to secure the region can be corrected through re-enactment of formalized discrete variables that will strip the problematic phenomena of its complexity. Significantly, the strangulated power relations that have characterized the metropolis and regional areas of the Northern Region as noted in the chapters three and four have regularly been treated as non-functional variables due to the apolitical orientation of the interventions.

The issue of cross-checking information provided by aid actors and obtained by domestic actors (be it government agencies or peasants) is crucial to get a better understanding of the issues involved in security and development. I sought a counter-response to the submissions by Mr. A. Moro of the UN JHSP from Mr. G. Nantongmah, a developmental planning official in the Tamale Metropolitan Assembly (TAMA). Interestingly, Mr. Nantongmah issued a terse reaction to express his misgivings about the aid agencies:

Please do not get me wrong because we value the essence of peace, stability and development in this metropolis and the entire region. These goals are more pertinent to us, especially with this metropolis being the regional capital. We are the centre that holds the region. However, you should understand that we have our internally developed schemes to address these problems as part of our mandate to ensure the security and development of the area in tandem with the state security apparatus. Therefore, we have our own priorities to follow, therefore, when these donor agencies come to partner us they should understand that we must be treated as equal partners, in that our own internal processes must be
recognized as respected as such. (G. Nantongmah, Interviewed on September 23, 2011)

His comments demonstrate the inevitable realities that domestic officials have their own policy priorities and approaches for addressing their own region are identified and specific needs. The assumption, therefore, that externally-derived solutions can be transplanted into any area requires rethinking. Nantongmah’s response also highlights the disdain with which external solutions inconsistent with the internal conditions and priorities are viewed. It is important to recognize the farcical abuse of ideas of partnership and participation through the attempted imposition of externally derived solutions. By privileging externally programmed solution buttresses, my argument that adoption of the DSN model as a panacea to developmental challenges in a conflict prone region is a tactic to perpetuate old illiberal practices. The continuations of these illiberal practices are perpetrated via the notable centripetal interventionist approaches of ‘participation’ and ‘partnership’. Thus, these interventionist discrepancies legitimize the relevance of key research questions of a study that investigates the how interventionist practices unfold in reality, rather than simply when privileging normative viewpoints of the nexus.

The necessity of rethinking the interventionist strategies is made more compelling especially when the same old practices and reforms have not yielded any appreciable transformation in the well-being of the population. Nantongmah revealed past grievances against aid agencies whose results-driven interventions are yet to result in positive outcomes:

We have had many reporting standards to follow in our engagement with the UN bodies in the past. Ask yourself this question. Are they also accountable to us? How did all those standards we followed in the past
impact on our people? Do they know what it takes to implement their programmes and they sit in their air-conditioned offices only to imagine standards for us to follow? (Nantongmah, Interviewed on September 23, 2011)

The despondency illustrated when local actors discuss imposed operational standards raises a significant question about whether aid agencies actually take historical notice of their failed interventions, which have been guided by the same irrelevant standards. I further argue that such operational standards are part of the scheme to impose responsibility on local actors. More significantly, the imposition of decontextualized operation standards is a vain effort to reduce the complexity of the developmental and security challenges in order to justify the prescribed technical solutions. This subversion is a replication of the colonial practices of indirect rule.

Further credence to the strong reservations that domestic actors have for aid agencies was brought to light. This time around, Mr. D. Adamu, an official of the Ghana Development Communities Association, provided revealing information from the perspective of his fifteen years of engagement with UN agencies. Mr. Adamu revealed this information to me:

Whenever these UN agencies come to work in this region and city, they make the local officers look like their school boys who must report to them. Meanwhile, they do not own up to the outcomes of the projects they mobilize the local people to undertake. It is the local administrators who bear the blame when there is a failure and success is taken by the donors. The nauseating problem is the useless reporting requirements. We have big problems with poverty pervasive all over the region. The poor lack a voice
and most important is the plight of our mothers, sisters and daughters in our various communities. How does timely preparation of reports improve this vulnerable population? We need genuine human centered long term development approaches that will help to reduce the tension in the region. But you do not see these agencies focusing on these problems that undermine the well-being of the poor women and children in our communities. I think these donor agencies have their own agenda, which I believe is not to make our country self-sufficient. (D. Adamu, Interviewed on September 27, 2011)

From my perspective, Adamu's admission raises salient questions regarding the motivations behind these interventions against officially-declared goals that are applicable to the donor agencies responsible for the imagined fusion of development and security interventions. In fact, Mr. Adamu’s response is ample confirmation of the antipathy that some active local actors have developed towards aid industry modalities. Moving beyond Duffield’s ‘containment’ description of DSN, therefore, it is my contention that this acclaimed DSN indirectly approximates an institutionalization of underdevelopment and insecurity. This institutionalization stems from the irresponsibility that interventions under the pseudo-DSN foster by not seeking long-term, transformational structural change in such a conflict-prone region. It should, however, be noted that this misleading institutionalization gives ample reasons for the aid industry to search for more areas to problematize and intervene.

Mr. Adamus’s testimony exposes the ineffectual and fallacious trumpeting of the emphasis placed on reporting requirements as having an instrumental linkage with the material improvement of the poor in Northern Region. The procedural reporting requirement demanded
by the UN JHSP, in my view, obliterates the contentious political nature of the challenges in
security and development as highlighted in chapters three, four and five. This unyielding
obsession with reporting requirements by the aid establishment serves as strategy to provide an
avenue for aid agencies to exonerate themselves from any responsibility for the outcome of
failed aid programs. From a critical perspective, I suggest that the deployment of the DSN is
an avenue to perpetuate an old managerial-oriented style of program and project
conditionalities. In considering information obtained through personal observations and
interviews with research participants, I postulate that both the content of these interventions,
and the way they are rolled out, should be of critical concern to international observers. By
placing emphasis on procedural accountability through formalized standardized reporting
practices, aid agencies fail to capture the complexity of the insecurity and poverty challenges in
the metropolis and especially in the regions.

This potential instigation of insecurity as a result of a technical rendering of the
solutions to an abstracted problem undermines the alleged or imagined nexus between security
and development. It is from this critical nexus position that I concur to a large extent with
Oelbaum (2009, p. 4), who articulates a position that there exists a possible relationship
between Ghana’s economic growth during its SAP era and the high number of conflicts in the
Northern Region from 1983-2000. From my perspective, it is crucially important to explore
the way these conflicts became rife during the adjustment period. More importantly, we must
examine the processes that enabled the pervasive conflicts during a period in which the country
achieved a high, sustained GDP growth of 5% per annum for the first time from 1984-2000
(Aryeetey and Fosu, 2008, p. 301). A valid question remains about the nature and quality of
the growth that possibly predisposed the area to conflict tendencies. I argue from a critical
institutionalist angle that the existing weak state institutional foundations were further overburdened by adjustment reforms implemented after year 2000. With adjustment reforms enervating existing capacity-challenged state institutions, the institutional capability to handle the emergence of conflict predispositions, especially in a region with numerous deep-seated contestations or grievances, became limited.

In the context of this study’s focus on Ghana, I suggest that structural reforms did not open the political space for good or effective contestations to ensure acceptable political settlements among the different ethnic groups in the Northern Region. Pritchett and de Weijer (2010, p.16) argue that the ‘wishful thinking’ nature of state reforms foisted on imagined fragile states weakens the de facto function of the state, and exposes the possibility of making original conditions worse. Discrepancies in the reform outcomes generate a curiosity to interrogate the rationales and assumptions of these interventions, as my study has exhibited. Mkandawire (2005, p. 7) argues that the overwhelming focus on economic stability by the SAP confined social policy to a marginal role in poverty reduction and further neglected other critical areas of social cohesion and equity. The marginal role given to social policy obviated any serious development of responsive institutional (formal and informal) structures and systems for conflict management and transformation. The overall effect of this marginality is the further weakening of the institutional foundation of SSA economies to mask the downside of these adjustments in terms of conflict prevention. I therefore suggest that the imagined DSN does not encapsulate reciprocal relations between the two dominant concepts. An empirical intervention in the study region, supported by the critical literature, leads me to conclude that the DSN depicts both an impasse and contradictory relations.
Another vital challenge in relation to the operational manifestation of the nexus relates to what I call the *knowledge deficit* among aid officials in both the development and security spheres. The invocation of the DSN presupposes a fair understanding of each sector by aid practitioners in the area. In the course of my fieldwork interviews, however, an interesting revelation came to light that suggests that the collaborating institutions have a limited understanding of how each other operate. In a quite frank interview, Mr. Traore of the WFP confirmed his very limited understanding of the critical components of the nexus, when he declared that:

As I told you before, conflict and insecurity are not core priority areas to factor in our programming. I personally do not have any professional or deep knowledge about the security and conflict issues in this region. You should understand that we are already grappling with the core mandate of our organization. Our best bet is to hire a security expert attached to our unit though I doubt whether that will make any difference.

The inflexibility of officials in adapting knowledge to embrace a totally new field in order to broaden the scope of programming demonstrates the less seamless nature of the nexus being framed as a smooth fusion from mainstream literature and practice. In fact, the recent World Bank’s sponsored 2011 Report on *Conflict, Security and Development* reiterates the conventional dictum about the necessity to “accept the links between security and development outcomes” (p.276). The assumed existence of conceptual links between development and security therefore instigated a notion of the smooth fusion of hitherto parallel interventions to address the insecurity and poverty challenges in post-conflict societies. By being cognizant of the adumbrated discussions, we discover that there appears to be a minimal, if not a non-
existent, institutional interest in joint security and development interventions. The unconnected interventions associated with the nexus clearly betray the acclaimed developmentalization of security and vice versa.

In addition to these problems, there is lack of collaboration between UN agencies and those outside the UN system. It is instructive to note that the CIDA was engaged in conflict resolution initiatives in the region between the early 1990’s and 2009. A Deputy Director of CIDA, Mr. Alfred Anderson, confirms the CIDA’s many years of conflict interventions in the Northern Region:

After over 15 years of undertaking various conflict resolution initiatives in the region, and upon detailed impact assessment study that shows that our initiatives were off the target in enhancing the security of the people and the region. So based on the expert-panel recommendations, we are now doing conflict dynamics analysis that we expect to help us achieve better outcomes than the hitherto conflict resolution programs. (A. Anderson. Interviewed on October 12, 2011)

This admission by the CIDA official, in my judgment, is a vivid attestation to the failed strategies of conflict resolution used to resolve the security challenges in the region. Considering CIDA’s new preference for conflict dynamics as their interventionist framework, it is clear that it has institutional memory regarding the failed conflict resolution strategies to share with new interveners in the region.

However, CIDA was ignored by the UNDP in its programming of the JHSP. This revelation of non-consultation was disclosed to me by Anderson, when he stated that:
The UN team leader for the human security project did not consult CIDA before operationalizing the human security project. Let me assure you that we wouldn’t have hesitated to share our experiences with them, after all we are also committed to the promotion of peace, security and development in the three northern regions. However, the onus lies on them to consult us first then we can push from there. (A. Anderson. Interviewed on October 12, 2011)

This revelation can be linked to the institutional competition that exists between aid agencies rather than the convergence of policies, programmes and practices that the nexus is supposed to foster. This kind of contradictory operational outcome, as noted by Bagayoko and Hikler (2009, p.16), is inevitable given the different programme and policy goals of the diverse aid agencies. Notwithstanding the fundamental differences in terms of programming priorities, the obvious issue here is that their common feature as cartel of good intentions remains intact. Certainly, these illusive good intentions pose a great worry to those in the region because they invariably cover-up aid agencies underlying rationales and assumptions of intervention. Thus, pertinent issues that must be examined in detail regarding the promising conflict dynamics mentioned by the CIDA official are the rationales and assumptions that will underwrite strategies and practices to be articulated in the very near future.

**Myth and Neglected Details of Post-liberal Recommendations**

In the wake of the reduction of the implementation challenges, coordination and capacity deficits have stimulated technocratic recommendations. For example, Dr. K. Shakita of the UNU, in her prescription of options in the wake of their implementation challenges states:
It is most unfortunate that our desired outcomes were not achieved. Management has resolved that we institute inquiries about the causes of the undesirable outcomes. Upon receipt of the committee’s report, we will study the findings thoroughly and see how best we can implement the associating recommendations. Personally I think our interventions borders on behavioural change, and this behavioural focus, we are most likely to influence the beliefs, norms and values of the people over a period of time.

(K. Shakita. Interviewed on September 19, 2011)

The localization of implementation rigidities is further reduced to a lack of appropriate behavioural conduct. The problematization of behavioural factors will invariably result in foisting of the subjectivist modern attitudinal values to targeted groups of people in the study region. This move symbolizes the continuation of the colonial civilizing mission. Shakita did not, however, find her illusory thinking about the mechanical pursuit of dialogue and conflict management problematic, nor did she believe they were enough to address a grievance-laden insecurity over a short time frame. Shakita also did not question the embedded rationale behind expert recommendations to solve an assumed static spatial problem.

The intervention challenges further elicited the recommendations of other liberal interventions as viable remedial measures. Awudu Moro of the UN JHSP outlined some remedial measures that his organization has considered:

We will be scaling up the interventions by adding other districts. Notably Gushiegu, Bunkuprungu, Yunyoo, and Buipe and thematic expansion to cover gender inequality and inequities. Our first point of intervention will be to boost the capacity of the district and metropolitan assemblies in order to
boost the knowledge in participatory approaches, planning, monitoring &
evaluation and ownership of the programmes. (A. Moro. Interviewed on
August 11, 2011)

Strategies for capacity enhancement have preoccupied the interventionist agenda of the UN
JHSP by privileging the intensification of the programmes to enlist gender as a new area of
intervention. Remarkably, ownership as an approach to stability is being proposed as a new
focus of intervention as revealed by Moro’s interview. I drew his attention to the fact that,
even at the country level, ownership is only a remote possibility, especially in the wake of the
immediate past national development strategy that is GPRS was configured to meet World
Bank and IMF standards and priorities, leaving regional and community ownership is an
unattainable expectation, and that we can view this as a scheme to hide regulatory
interventions. Moro’s response was that: “we need to experiment at the regional level before
moving to the national level, through gradual progression the people can own their policies,
programs and the rest”. Abrahamsen (2004) defines ‘ownership’ as a disciplinary development
aid practice that aims to perpetuate economic liberalism without fundamentally questioning the
existing power structures. Duffield (2010), also writing from a governmental perspective,
views ‘ownership’ as a means to accelerate the will to govern. I suggest that the intended
pursuit of ownership by the aid industry is a means to exonerate failed assumptions and tacitly
endorse donor priorities, goals, targets and strategies.

Given my dissatisfaction with Moro’s explanation in relation to the ownership agenda, I
probed for further clarification. In particular, I wondered how local people could be trained to
own a process they did not conceptualize, develop and implement. Again Moro answered: “it
is important for the UNDP, with its vast expertise, train the local leaders because of their low
capacity to plan and manager their priority needs.” I need to point out that Moro could not give any firm evidence to support the claim for capacity building and transformation for the well-being of the poor in the Northern Region.

The capacity training for local leaders to function as an intervention was reinforced by a senior economist in the UNDP, whom I interviewed after Moro. Dr. D. Sesay suggested to me that capacity training is the quintessential function of UNDP by professing that: “capacity training is essentially the main work we do in West African sub-region. We train the government officials both at the national, regional and district levels so that they will be equipped with knowledge and skills to manage the policies and strategies we counsel them to undertake. In so doing they will be equipped with the capacity to own the programmes.” The striking deduction from Sesay’s response points to the unchanging idea that the donors wish to foist responsibility for interventions on the people. The duty of the intervened-upon people is to manage the intervention in line with the accountability demands of the UNDP. Therefore, in consonance with donor interventions in SSA countries for instance, Abrahamsen (2004) suggests that the goal of the ownership mantra of the aid industry is to realize the ‘will to govern’ under the guise of democratizing interventions. Thus, the will to govern will require a re-categorization and re-classification of governable subjects (the intervened-upon population). A new set of categories come with newly-imposed responsibilities on individuals who are imbued with cosmopolitan values, ostensibly to alter the faulted traditional identities. Similar to the indirect-rule colonial practice as discussed in chapter three, this proposed ownership trope constitutes an effort to alter the traditional polity of poor regions like the Northern Region to fulfill the caprices and whims of the donor industry.
Whilst emphasizing the need for ownership, we need to understand that this ownership agenda is being pushed within the context of an unchanging exploitative global political economy. I contend that the donor push for ownership is a calculated strategy to continuously problematize the local areas and retain unequal global power relations. In the end, the ultimate effect is to perpetuate this non-transformational external tutelage and maintain UN bodies as the inevitable source of solutions. Li (2007) suggests that the aid agencies prioritization of community-oriented approaches like ownership is ‘unabashedly governmental… as it sets the conditions to reform desires and act on actions” (p. 253). To a large extent I do concur with both Abrahamsen and Li, and I further suggest that in light of the strong political contestations during both the colonial and the on-going postcolonial period, such apolitically and ahistorically informed ownership approaches are most unlikely to succeed in securing the region.

Furthermore, I contend that the push for ownership as a strategy syncs with the nascent risk management and resilience approaches of the aid industry. In my view, this proposed ownership agenda, with its consensus-building orientation, cannot engage with the deep socio-cultural and political contentions and differences in the region. Again, it is impossible for this ownership agenda to effect any transformation of the region and this agenda will most likely perpetuate a neo-trusteeship intention through external tutelage.

The responsibilization of locals in the name of the ownership, I suggest, privileges this deceptive instrumental approach, and will foreclose options against the prevailing narrow and technical framing and representation of the development and security challenges. The consequential implication is the consolidation of the liberal status quo. This ownership agenda of UN JHSP, in my estimation, fails to address negative structural conditions triggered by both
the horrendous historical, and current social, relations on the community, district, regional, national and global levels. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that, given the politically charged environment within the region, an orthodox ownership approach is being proposed as workable solution to ensure security. Doubts relate to the extent to which the ownership agenda can address the adverse effects of colonial and post-colonial economic and political institutions. This community ownership agenda is misleading when juxtaposed alongside the prevailing situation in which the processes of intervention have remained top-down in approach and there is no sign so far to signal any possible change. What is more disturbing is the proposed shift towards private-public partnership, which has the potential to erode the community’s limited voice in the water sector, as discussed in chapter four, especially considering that water is deemed as a crucial infrastructural investment and service to secure the region.

The DFID has launched a new blueprint for a poverty-oriented development programme in the Northern Region, which is anchored around private sector development. A programme officer at DFID, George Blankson, who reluctantly granted me an interview for this study reveals that: “Our research department commissioned studies into the poverty situation in Northern Ghana, because in our assessment there is an urgent responsibility on our part to direct our activities in the next decade to revive the economic potential of the three regions in the north. We have earmarked the private sector as main engine to boost the Northern economy” (G. Blankson. Interviewed on October 19, 2011). The yet to be implemented programme is titled “Making Market work for the Poor” and has three main components. According to Blankson, the components were identified and assessed by a team of experts in finance, agronomy, marketing, economics, commerce and agricultural economics. The first of these components is a financial services and agriculture business. The second
component relates to the establishment of a northern savannah enterprise innovation challenge fund, which according to the concept note is meant to provide the competitive facility to support small and medium enterprise innovation. The third component relates to private sector provision of social services. Under this component, the problematization of the public sector provision of essential services is inefficient and a drain on government budget.

The essential issue to acknowledge is that, in view of the dismal socio-economic effects of the SAP, I am emphatic that the likelihood of the diverse poor residents in the Northern Region benefiting from the proposed shift towards private sector driven service delivery remains minuscule. The reason for this possible denial of the diverse poor households’ access to safe and reliable water service is that the austere ‘getting the price right’ ideology of privatization within a policy regime of constrained social support will inhibit an effective distributive system. Within the broader context of the study region, I contend that the unbridled privatization will worsen the informal politics of the existing crisis in water entitlement in such a rankled ethnic and adverse social relational space.

A cardinal factor to be mindful of is the broader and deeper political contestations that, in reality, determine accessibility to a controversial common good. It seems the DfID has not learnt any lesson from the operational flaws in the World Bank driven CWSA water privatization practice that I discussed in chapter four. Significantly ignored in the DfID’s proposed privatization of water service are the water politics and accessibility problems that could be attributed to the instrumental driving rationales. This creates the impression that development and security interventions essentially thrive on ‘business as usual’ terms. These ‘business as usual’ terms are fostered through the replication or recycling of misleading rationales into new programmes. It is unthinkable that, in a region of immense multiple
deprivations, there is no conscious effort to address salient issues such as redistribution, social justice and genuine equity. Conversely, the institutionalization of full cost-recovery of the water service is the pervasive norm and the water subsidy becomes taboo within the circle of DfID.

Therefore, evoking development as a means to secure a region illustrates the subtle maintenance of inclusive neoliberal policy orthodoxy. The potential threat to social cohesion and stability as a result of the likely exclusion of poor residents also portrays the contradictory relations or non-linearity of development and security.

The deliberate avoidance of the colonial and postcolonial rigidities endemic in the region by the aid actors in this chapter, and similarly raised in chapter four and five, are geared toward full endorsement of the global unequal relations. As Ferguson (1990, 2006) and Harris (2007) note, such technical prescriptions seek to depoliticize the complexity of poverty and insecurity conditions by resorting to calculable rational choice interventions. By undertaking to depoliticize the intractable development and security interventions, room is created to reconstitute an economic imaginary that ends up reifying interventionist orthodoxy. A classic example refers to the on-going and proposed entrepreneurialism by both the UN JHSP and DfID, respectively, in the Northern Region. The inevitable consequence of these failed, rational choice driven interventions is that it delimits alternative options to address the security and development problems.

There appears to be a combination of ideological and ontological attachments to simplistic problem-solving approaches within the aid industry. The crux of this issue is that it is unimaginable that, notwithstanding the numerous political contestations, resistance and contradictions that a significant number of the interventions have engendered, aid agencies still
have unquestionable faith in rational choice programmes. The unquestionable faith in rational-choice motivated programmes is manifested in the earlier identified intensification of existing programmes, the amputation of failed ones and the deepening of policy reforms to correct the failed interventions. Thus, proffered solutions are framed around the expert-identified localized problems. This predisposition to such deductive or abstracted epistemological sources by the UN agencies and DFID could be attributed to their insatiable quest for linear, legible, technical and managerial diagnoses and correlating solutions. It is therefore not surprising that the UN sees itself as a knowledge-generating agency, a position that equally reinforces the messianic thinking that they have the requisite knowledge and capacity to solve difficult problems. Furthermore, the tenuous fusion of development and security interventions geared towards localizing problems smacks of a celebration of international development assistance problem-solving ethos. Young (2007) suggests that such a simplistic assumption reflects a blatant predisposition towards platitudes. It is instructive to note, however, that the active political forces in sites of intervention will render the linear assumptions otiose.

The crux of this situation requires us to question why these donor agencies have intensified their quick-fix calcified expert knowledge approach, with its positivistic logical framework instilled with neatly categorized indicators, goal, output, assumptions to guide it. This linear approach leads me to suggest that such a historically long spanning conflict that resulted in insecurity and poverty require a dialectical structural approach. I am advocating for an approach that places priority, from the onset, on politics and a political economy (broad social relations) of the region as an integral part of a long search for sustained practices not modeled on best practices. From my perspective, the social relational approach must be
historically informed because of the convoluted nature of the regional polity and the adverse political economy transformations of a historical-relational foundation of the region.

**Concluding remarks**

The analyses advanced in this chapter affirm that implementation challenges in the articulation of the DSN have been linked to technical, administrative and behavioural factors. By limiting the intervention failures to technical and administrative constraints, the aid agencies essentially tend to exonerate their unrealistic assumptions and faulty rationales from interrogation. The essence of these narrow conceptions of implementation challenges is to ensure the aid agencies maintain themselves as vanguards of solutions through their acclaimed expertise. Thus the derived prescriptions to ameliorate the poverty and conflict challenges in the study region are still driven by the liberal market logic. Reinforcement of this market logic is proposed at the expense of negating the historical, political and political economy considerations that have impacted on the Northern Region.

Therefore, it needs to be acknowledged that the problems with securing a region with exclusionary and conflicting historical past that keep unfolding in the present would require long term approaches beyond the narrow spheres of the projectized interventions. It is important also to consider political systems, actors and processes that have conditioned the poverty and insecurity among diverse ethnic groups, gender, youth and aged population in the region.

It must be acknowledged that, given the indicated complex processes that underpin the Northern Region’s security and development conundrums, aid agencies must lower their expectations or optimism. The reality is that the poverty and insecurity-prone region
epitomizes a bigger political challenge that aid actors have bypassed or ignored. The emerging issue is the naturalization of problems and appeals to universal solutions in the name of celebrating best practices. Therefore broader historical context, social relations, and political structures of poverty and insecurity in the region should constitute the framing context of aid agencies and the epistemic community (locally and internationally) within development practice.

The above analyzed simplified implementation challenges inherent in the articulation of expert knowledge-driven development and security interventions in my estimation will rather institutionalize an impasse. Furthermore, the material and symbolic development and security of the Northern Region urgently call for a long search towards emancipation in line with the suggestions outlined chapter four, which relate to the need to consider broader and complex social change option. It is imperative to appreciate the transitional nature of the social and political integration of the Northern Region into modern Ghana. This would provide the basis to understand the political context to assess the current insecurity and poverty challenge. While advocating for reforms of the global political economy as suggested in chapter four, it is imperative that the nature of state formation also requires serious engagement. The next chapter will summarize the entire dissertation, reiterate the key points, discuss their ramifications and suggest plausible areas for future research.
Chapter Seven
Summary and Conclusion

This thesis has been a critical examination of the processes of enacting development and security practices undertaken by international development aid institutions in Africa and the global South. Specifically, this study focused on an interrogation of interventionist rationales and assumptions that underpin multiple and diverse aid development and security practices. In focusing on the rationales and assumptions that underpin aid interventions, my study problematizes the interventions of aid industry contradictory subjective processes. These subjective processes are associated with diverse institutional interests, power, ideological and knowledge foundations in relation to the targeted population. Thus the central research question of my study interrogates the rationales behind the security and development interventions articulated by aid agencies, and how those interventions are received by the local population of Northern Region? The essence of the key question has been posed to fill a significant research gap in much of the development-security nexus literature. This research lacuna is in the area of complex interactional encounters between the ‘interveners’ and ‘intervened upon populations’ in mainstream development studies and international relations.

The notable rationales at play here are desirability, necessity and the possibility of development. It is important to note that the rationales behind interventions are conditioned by positivistic assumptions about society and social change. Notable positivistic assumptions of development are that causal factors of societal problems are knowable through linear epistemological frameworks. The other inherent assumption is the smooth transfer of programmes and policies through expert knowledge. It needs to be established that such a deductive approach privileges a quick problem-solving ethos, which further reduces complex
problems to material ‘need’ or ‘lack’ mentality. From the aid agency perspective, there is a significant utilization of abstract thinking. There appears to be an unending reliance on abstract thinking by the aid agencies that has led to a formulation of standardized packages as a timeless solution to be applied universally. My study questioned international development aid actors’ assumption of complementary relations between security and development interventions in the Northern Region. Furthermore, the overall objective of the study is to understand the complexities of aid interventions that will have a promising effect on future research and policy practices. This study, for empirical reasons, focused on the development and security practices in the Northern Region of Ghana.

Chapter Two focused on the conceptual framework of the study. In following Duffield’s (2001, 2007) work on governmental practices of security and development, I relied on a critical development-security nexus as the driving conceptual framework of the study. Duffield (2001) explains that through discursive shifts, underdevelopment from the post-cold war era onward has been securitized as source of multiple conditions of insecurity, conflict and violence. A noted consequence of this securitization of development is the designation of poverty and underdevelopment as a security problem. Hence, conflict prone regions are constituted as urgent spaces of intervention by development aid industry in the name of trusteeship.

Chapter Two discussed at length the complex processes involved in the production of this development trusteeship by aid agencies. In discussing the complex nature of the production of development trusteeship, I drew on Peck’s (2012) work on policy mobility and mutations to conceptualize the socially constructed nature of policies and programmes that are crucial instruments for interventions. In addition, I expanded on some insights from Long’s
(2002, 2007) interface analysis, which suggests the complex processes of engagement between the agents of planned interventions and the targeted beneficiaries of those interventions. The complexity of the field of intervention is conditioned by the underlying social relations and diverse polities that are ignored in search of legible programmable factors. With this insight, I deem the study region to be a complex site of interventions and, as such, planned interventions are bound to be contested, renegotiated, and result in contradictory outcomes.

More importantly, the conceptual framework provided me with the requisite grounding to theorize how societies of the global south are constituted through the diverse framing and labeling processes. Given the socially constructed nature of these interventions, I problematize international aid attempts to conceptualize and solve problems through an objective or neutral lens. An important reality is that the consequence of neoliberal diagnoses of the problems is the imposition of illiberal remedial policies.

Chapter Three focused on the historical interrogation of uneven development policies and practices that under-developed the Northern Region. It is important to know that the uneven development practices were pursued ostensibly to maintain perceived pre-colonial egalitarian social relations. This historical chapter drew on the work of Mamdani (1996) who writes about the differential and contested colonial practices and policies within the same territorial location. The key argument is that the historical foundations of the problems aid agencies seek to address are rarely given any attention. In order to understand the complexity of aid interventions, it is critical to peruse the historical fundamentals of the current development and security challenges of the study region. By situating the contemporary practices within the historical formation of the region, the newness tag placed on conflict prone regions by the aid industry exposes the contrition of events to justify its intervention.
The indirect rule policy was discussed in relation to a reconfiguration of the political and administrative authorities in the diverse ethnic groups inhabiting the region in order to stabilize the area. The net political effect of the political configurations was the installation of juridical power in the created chiefdoms. This power realignment significantly institutionalized the identity and materially driven conflict particularly between the chiefdoms and acephalous groups. The continuities of uneven development policies and practices by the post-colonial government were also discussed. In addition, the specific state policies that contributed to the onset of the conflicts were discussed. I provided insights into some of the pertinent conflicts that remain unresolved, thereby conditioning the insecurity of the region.

Chapter Four examined how the rationales behind interventions were articulated on a regional scale. I argued that the aid industry with its strident zeal to intervene in a defined conflict-prone region ignores the fundamental relational and structural factors. Thus, the pursuit of simplistic diagnoses and their correlating solutions is the driving logic of these interventions. Diverse conceptual perspectives articulated by the aid actors, therefore, were largely infused by simplistic, interventionist rationales and assumptions were analyzed. The overriding interventionist orthodoxy for the agricultural sector was the promotion of market competitiveness discourse. The agricultural and water sectors were the main development interventions analyzed. These findings suggest that the agricultural interventions were selective and exclusionary in respect to the farmers. Critically, the agricultural sector interventions were undertaken without due regard to the vital, broader structural factors and policy regimes that have had a negative impact on agricultural productivity. Conspicuously, missing from aid interventions are the adverse effects of global trade policies that have deepened liberalization and contributed to the pauperization of a majority of peasant farmers.
The water sector, which has attracted both bilateral and multilateral institutional investment, was analyzed. The underlying logic behind water intervention was the institutionalization of privatization and re-regulation of the service through a framed community model. Thus, water was used to reconstitute disparate individual members of heterogeneous communities as governable subjects. This contentious liberal community-driven water intervention program exists with the inevitable formal and informal political contestations that remain an enduring phenomenon. The security interventions were anchored in conflict resolution strategies like negotiated settlements, peace accords and peace education. These consensus-oriented practices sync with the liberal peace orthodoxy and were aimed at short-term solutions, which negate the complex long-term relational nature of the problem.

Chapter Five focused on the UNDP coordinated human security program which, from an official standpoint, is the epitome of the DSN. In this chapter I argued that the UN JHSP is a replication of existing development practices in the Northern Region that are contrary to the transformational approach of the conflict prevention being claimed. The chapter examined the processes in which the underlying rationales of the programme were articulated to prevent conflict and reduce poverty. A major finding is that the UN JHSP wholly adopted existing international frameworks that are essentially are non-transformational, both conceptually and practically. Furthermore, I analyzed various poverty reduction-focused developmental interventions, as well as community-oriented conflict prevention practices. In addition, the youth were constituted as an object for intervention because they were framed as a security threat. Another major role of the program was an attempt to modify individuals’ behavioural and attitudinal dispositions in order to urge them to embrace entrepreneurialism. Again, these
expert-driven programs prioritized behavioural changes were implemented through empowerment and capacity building practices.

On the basis of the policy documents that I reviewed and information obtained through in-depth interviews, I conclude that these ‘novel’ DSN-inspired interventions lack transformational capabilities. The absence of transformational potential is predicated on the fact that the programme was modeled on existing international development frameworks. These prevailing frameworks, including the MDGs and PRSPs, epitomize the ultra-liberal interventionist practices. And these narrow international development frameworks were characterized by ahistorical and apolitical orientations, and maintained power relational imbalances between the global north and south. Remarkably, the conflict prevention element within the UN JHSP, I suggest, is a reflection of the anodyne aspirations of the aid industry that are averse to the appreciation of complex issues. Another major finding of the UN JHSP is that through the conflict prevention program’s goals, individual resilience has become the new interventionist trope. Specifically, individual’s cognitive and adaptive capacities are constituted as solutions to conflict and insecurity challenges. Through the focus on adaptive and cognitive capacities, individuals are reconfigured to embrace risk instead of being protected from conflict and insecurity. Therefore, this human security-induced discursive shift towards embracing risk is a testament to the DSN’s inability to secure a region through conflict prevention.

Chapter Six examined the implementation challenges in the DSN, as well as an assessment of empirical working relations between security and development at the institutional level. A vital finding of this chapter is that the implementation challenges have been reduced to technical and administrative constraints. This reductive notion of
Implementation challenges constitutes a strategy to deepen post liberal interventions. Thus, post-liberal interventionism was prescribed as a panacea to the implementation rigidities. More importantly, this reduction of the implementation complexity to technical and co-ordination constraints denotes an explicit endorsement of the interventionist rationales and assumptions. The logical inference is that challenges such as the apparent rejection and manipulation of interventions by some residents of these communities were treated as outlier issues. The interveners failed to appreciate the diversity of the expectations of individuals vis a vis the programme. This discrepancy implies that international aid interventions cannot thrive on axiomatic or hypo-deductive assumptions any longer. A major finding is that there is an absence of any institutional and operational relations among the six UN agencies that constitute the UN JHSP. I conclude that DSN remains an imagined fiction, which serves ultimately as a strategy to institutionalize liberal interventions, notwithstanding the failure to achieve set goals.

Against the backdrop of the diverse analyses provided in this thesis, I would like to emphasize six major conclusions. First, the development and security interventions deployed in the Northern Region depict a complexity reduction exercise. This reduction is informed by the simplification of insecurity and poverty problems into discrete entities such as behavioural and attitudinal traits. The interventions keep neglecting essential structural and relational factors in favor of individual and homogenous community-driven approaches. In effect, the structural and relational factors have been treated as extraneous variables that would hinder a technical rendering of the problems and solutions. Based on the findings of this study, this complex reduction strategy is pursued through the silencing of adverse colonial practices that have, to a large extent, framed the contemporary challenges of security and development in the Northern Region. The reductive elements of the DSN are articulated through the
administrative factors of coordination, complementarity and coherence as panacea to complex challenges of poverty and conflict.

Secondly, implementation processes follow formal and linear patterns that I attribute to the positivistic rationales aimed to ensure smooth implementation. More importantly, the inflexibility of interventions to accommodate diverse informal processes suggests that the DSN is imbued with exclusionary possibilities. The formalistic patterns of these interventions also confirm a lack of recognition of ‘identity’ differences among the diverse populations. The neglect of ‘identity’ differences is a result of the homogenization of problems and prescription of universal solutions. This homogenization logic serves to achieve short-term goals by sacrificing long-term implications. In addition, the saliency of diverse, informal institutional arrangements proved unyielding to fixed programmatic interventions. The enduring nature of informal institutions reinforces the vital point that contextual factors are critical when intervening in postcolonial settings. The lack of recognition of these significant differences can be attested to by the prescription of standardized solutions with universal reach to solve predictable problems. I suggest that these interventions deny the interlocking nature of development and security challenges that cannot be ameliorated by technical solutions.

The third conclusion relates to the continuous formalistic processes of intervention that have depoliticized the conceptualization and implementation of development aid and security programs. The apolitical nature of the interventions remains ingrained in the calcified approaches of capacity building, empowerment and participation. It is critical to note that an added impetus for the pursuit of these apolitical interventions is a heavy reliance upon technical experts. These experts are deemed to wield unproblematic solutions to the simplified problems of development and security. It is not surprising, therefore, that the translation of the
formalistic practices and processes encounter fierce resistance by both local government officials and residents.

Fourth, the past and prevailing interventions point to the impossibility of securing the region, particularly by addressing the daunting systemic and complex challenges of development (specifically poverty) as well as security (relative to conflict prevention). From my analytical perspective, the impossibility in securing the region lies with the simplistic rationales and assumptions. The rationales and assumptions that undergird the interventions seek to privilege phenomenal wishful thinking. Furthermore, the input-output logic that has underwritten these postcolonial interventions cannot provide theoretical or empirical frameworks to transform the region. Thus, a quest to transform a conflict-prone region requires a critical historical contextual analysis and engagement with broader relational factors. Particularly relevant is the need to seek an understanding of the region as part of the process of state formation. It is also imperative to consider the extra-territorial connectivity of the region and the effects of global policy decisions and practices of the region itself.

Fifth, the evocation of the DSN, in view of the adumbrated interventions, typifies an endless imposition of liberal orthodoxy. This implies that the DSN constitutes a strategy to perpetuate liberal interventions. The nerve center of these liberal interventions is the reconstitution of human agency and an imagined community as conduits for human transformation. In addition, the recalibrated agential autonomy is composed through capacity building and empowerment to contain the risks associated with insecurity and poverty. The DSN endorses the prevailing, unequal global power relations between the global north and south, whereby the Northern Region will remain worse off. This fate is evidenced in the continuous causal linkage in the development and security challenges to weak internal
structures. On the other hand, the imperialist practices in the global economy have been normalized. I contend that the interventions analyzed in my empirical chapters demonstrate that the long-term development of the Northern Region is not a primary goal of donor countries and institutions. Strikingly noticeable in the articulation of the DSN is an attempt by international aid agencies to maintain a policy hegemonic dominance over a poor region.

Finally, my review of the various policy frameworks, projects and programmes leads to the conclusion that application of the DSN limits the policy space of SSA economies. This limitation of the policy space is actively pushed for by relentless efforts to perpetuate an external trusteeship practice. The external trusteeship is perpetrated by the deepening of remedial reforms driven by the same failed rationales. In effect, I suggest that the DSN does not promote recourse to alternative options. Considering the absence of a space for effective alternative aid options makes the push for good governance, rule of law, economic growth and democratic reforms ineffective frameworks for the dissolution of the adversarial colonial legacy. Not until the pertinent historical justice, equity, and redistribution deficiencies, as well as the imperialist practices have been addressed, the goal of securing a conflict prone region will remain a mirage. Niall Ferguson’s (2003) call for the West to be responsible for the development of the global south is, therefore, unacceptable, particularly when the trusteeship ideals remain in vogue. Furthermore, Ferguson’s interventionist responsibilities placed on the ‘West’ tend to ignore the historical facts of Western involvement in the SSA countries through colonialism and imperialism has, and continue to, hinder developmental prospects on the African continent. The appropriate option in my view, therefore, is that attention must be directed towards the correction of colonial injustices and the on-going imperialist practices.
Implications for Future Research and Policy Direction

The shortcomings of interventions as outlined in the summary and the six broad conclusions inevitably pose vital implications for future research. The first implication is the need for a critical interrogation of the ideas, discourses and imaginations that frame existing and future international aid interventions. A critical interrogation of interventionist practices, from an SSA perspective in particular, requires collaboration in notable fields such as African studies, sociology, political science and critical human geography. Such broad interdisciplinary collaborations, when well pursued, will provide counter-conceptual and theoretical responses to the liberal instrumental discourses and ideas that underpin numerous interventions in various sites. I view the need for a broader engagement in critical perspectives of the noted disciplines as crucial in the wake of the complexity of forces that drive the developmental and security challenges in the SSA countries and other ‘poor’ economies.

A critical area in dire demand for collaborative scholarship relates to the thorny issue of state formation, which is fundamental in re-politicizing the apolitical and ahistorical interventionist practices. The complex issue of state formation defies an adequate understanding of any single discipline. Additionally, the dearth of comprehensive knowledge and processes of state formation make it more imperative of Third World oriented scholars from diverse backgrounds to join forces. In addition, a need for a collaborative approach is crucial, given that international development institutions are not trans-ideological, and are driven by rational-scientific epistemological and ontological perspective.

The urgent need for collaborative research is accentuated by significant shortcomings in interventionist practices. In the absence of any counter-hegemonic responses to interventionist
failures, the aid industry will perpetuate a prescription of narrow neoliberal remedial measures. For example, the concept of ‘resilience’ is now the new development aid lexicon conceptualized by the UN and the World Bank as a panacea to the development and security challenges in conflict prone regions. This resilience notion, as my findings in relation to the UNJHSP interventions reveal, constitutes a risk management strategy articulated through the empowerment of individuals to contain risk. Thus, it becomes imperative to challenge this risk management notion that is creeping onto the development aid landscape.

Diverse forms of knowledge production and subjectification are still active in shaping contemporary relations between the global north and south. Shilliam (2011) problematizes the dominance of western thought in international relations. He attributes the dominance of western thought to the discriminatory nature of the Western academy, colonialism and the rise of European power as a universal model (Shilliam, 2011, p.2-3). The implication is that the silencing of non-Western thought has been the normative practice and, when not challenged, Western thought will continue to frame the failed interventions. This perpetuation of Western thought is evidenced by the linear and technocratic ideas that structure reform proposals which have been proffered to correct failed interventions.

In considering the failed Western interventions as reflected in the dismal outcomes of aid interventions makes it necessary to recover non-Western thoughts by critical scholars to serve as credible alternative framework. Shilliam (2011) suggests that the recovery of non-Western thoughts is more crucial because it played a vital part in shaping pro-Western modernity of thought. In the light of Shilliam’s suggestion, it is imperative to examine the resistance and challenges associated with the colonial encounter between Western and non-Western societies. Through such historical analysis of colonial encounters, the role played by
non-Western thinkers in the shaping of Western thought will be appreciated. The logical implication is that the myth that surrounds Western discourses must be broken. The aim of the recovery of non-Western thoughts according to Shilliam is: “to undermine the security of an epistemological cartography that quarantines legitimate knowledge production of modernity to one idealized geo-cultural site” (2011, p. 24). In taking account of my research findings, I reiterate the need to engage non-Western thoughts in development studies and other cognate social sciences as a way to reorient aid thinking and practices. The crucial issue, then, relates to the exploration of the necessary modalities that will ensure a pragmatic collaborative research effort among diverse disciplines to promote and sustain non-Western scholarship.

The first policy implication is that a precondition for securing a conflict-prone region is the abandonment of piecemeal approaches. The problematic politics of representation and agenda setting was brought to the forefront in order to understand the processes of interventions. Thus, the distorted politics of representation and agenda setting should instigate future research. Particularly, prospective research should be directed at: ways to open the policy and political space to ensure equity and justice in the relations between the donor agencies and recipient regions. Further research is needed in processes of enhancing the effective representations of the needs and priorities of diverse citizens of the Northern Region and other regions of similar conditions in SSA. This call for critical policy and socio-political analyses in aid interventions make it vital for the international aid agencies to fully appreciate the need to embrace the ‘rocky’ domestic political landscape. Thus, it is advisable for international aid actors to recognize the adverse political effects of their actions.

The other policy implication is the need for prospective approaches to embrace the complexity of rationales that are devoid of linear, technical and managerial thinking. The
complexity approach, in my view, should gravitate towards an interrogation of wider historical contextual and contemporary relational issues, both internally and externally. From my perspective, an adoption of complexity thinking will not foreground an achievement of non-contextual targets and goals, but will rather seek long-term transformational thinking and practices. I suggest that the quest for transformational possibilities must transcend the prevailing restrictive approaches of individual capacity building and empowerment. Hence, the current pro-poor interventions trumpeted by the aid industry as the key to unlocking the development and security challenges in conflict prone regions, cannot be accurate. The overall dismal outcomes of most of the interventions that I analyzed strongly imply the need for the aid industry to abandon this lofty goal setting practice. It is from this context that I privilege a complexity approach that acknowledges that not all change is possible and predictable. Finally, the complexity orientation rejects an absolute faith in planned interventions and problematic reductionist designs.

This study, akin to similar empirical research, was confronted with some challenges that need to be reiterated. It is my expectation that the teething challenges I encountered would be of relevant guidance to future studies related to development aid interventions. Due to time and other resource constraints I could not interview a wider diversity of residents, including the aged, disabled, orphans or widows as necessary. Secondly, because of socio-cultural restrictions, I was unable to interview as many women as necessary to give my work a more nuanced gender perspective. Given the paucity of gender perspectives in the DSN literature, I strongly recommend that future researchers’ consider it as a vital area of research enquiry. The apparent or inevitable complex political nature of the broad dynamics of the interventions suggests the need to repoliticize issues.
Ultimately, this research has been an exciting aspect of my doctoral studies. The fieldwork exposed me to vital, documented materials and actors that helped interrogate key research and subsidiary questions, as well as main arguments. I found the Northern Region of Ghana an immensely relevant research site to obtain a better understanding of the overall development and security dynamics in the West African sub-region. It has broadened my horizons, reshaped my preconceived perceptions about historically deprived regions and sharpened my critical viewpoints.
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Appendix

Interview Questions Guide

International Development Aid Institutions, Agencies, and INGOs

1. Please provide a brief overview of your organization and your position

2. Kindly explain the underlying assumptions that frame the security and development interventions for poverty reduction in the district by your organization. How relevant are such assumptions in explaining and tackling the poverty challenge of the district?

3. Please provide your organization’s perspective of the nature, aetiology and scale of the poverty situation in the district?

4. How did your organization conceive of the fusion of development and security interventions to tackle the poverty crisis in the district?

5. In what ways did the underlying assumptions for development and security influence your programmes/projects/policies for poverty reduction in the district? If not, what other considerations informed your programmes/projects and policies?

6. What specific development and security programmes/projects/policies did your organization initiate to address the poverty challenge in the district?

7. Please outline the specific procedures and processes that underpin(ned) implementation of the programs?

8. Please explain the tensions/complexities involved in the joint implementation of development and security interventions in the district?

9. How have your organization handled or intend to address the implementation challenges?
10. Overall, what impact did your interventions have on the poverty situation and securing the people in the district?

11. What are the future plans and options?

**Domestic Actors: Officials of Government Ministries and Agencies**

1. What development and security plans and policies do you have for the district geared towards poverty reduction?

2. What would you consider as the security and development priorities for poverty reduction within the district?

3. Please describe the nature of working collaboration between your ministry and the donor agency in formulating, implementing, evaluating the operational plans, programmes and policies for interventions in the district?

4. To what extent did the donor agency programmes/projects/plans align with that of your organization? If yes, kindly explain the similarities; and if no please articulate the differences and its implications in addressing the poverty situation in the district.

5. Kindly explain the specific poverty-focused development intervention in the district?

6. Please explain the challenges germane to the implementation of donor driven poverty focused development interventions in the district?

7. Who would you say own both the development and security interventions in the district in terms of the content and implementation? If the donors, what would you consider as the likely implications for future poverty reduction efforts?

8. What were the specific donors driven security reforms that your ministry had to implement? What specific support did the donor agencies provide for the security sector reform programme?
9. How were those security reforms articulated in the district? What would you consider as the constraints or problems inherent in the implementation of donor driven security reforms?

10. How did the security interventions impact on poverty reduction in the district?

11. What alternative strategies would you propose?

Residents

1. Please explain your understanding of the poverty situation in the district.

2. In what ways have the past conflicts affected the security situation of the district?

3. How has the prevailing security challenge impacted on the poverty situation in your district?

4. Please outline the various donor poverty-focused development initiatives that have been implemented in your district?

5. How has the various development projects/strategies and plans impacted on the peculiar poverty situation in your district?

6. What policing initiatives have you noticed over the years? How has it impacted on the security challenge(s) in your locality?

7. Has there being any noticeable judicial and penal reforms in your district? If yes, what kind of judicial and penal reforms can you notice?

8. How has the judicial and penal reforms impacted on the security and poverty situation in your locality?