The Faking Dilemma:
Examining Competing Motivations in the Decision to Fake
Personality Tests for Personnel Selection

by
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I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

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Abstract

More than 80 years ago, researchers and practitioners first recognized that applicants may be motivated to fake their responses to pre-employment personality tests to improve their chances of securing employment (Zickar & Gibby, 2006). Although we have learned much about faking over the ensuing decades, we still know very little about the situational or individual factors that influence applicants’ motivation to fake. In this dissertation, I evaluated several situational and individual variables to determine the degree to which they work independently and jointly to influence responses to a personality test. Study 1 examined the impact of 12 situational variables on faking intentions. The desirability of the job, warning applicants that their responses would be verified, warning applicants that faking will result in their removal from the applicant pool, and the number of other available job opportunities were found to have strong effects on faking intentions. In Studies 2 and 3, these variables were examined in experiments with a sample of undergraduate students and a sample of job seekers to determine if, and how, these variables interact to influence faking. In both studies, significant higher-order interactions were found among the variables in predicting intentions to fake. It appeared that test takers did take into account the desirability of the job, warnings against faking and the number of other job opportunities in deciding whether faking would be a prudent test-taking strategy, although the results were not entirely consistent across the two studies. Study 3 also utilized expectancy theory to attempt to explain the effects of the situational and individual difference variables on intentions to fake. Expectancy, instrumentality and valence perceptions were significant predictors of intentions to fake, however, job desirability, the perception of negative consequences for faking and the number of job opportunities were not strongly related to expectancy, instrumentality and valence. Studies 2 and 3 also demonstrated that the trait of honesty-humility was negatively related to test takers’ intentions to fake. These three studies provide some empirical support for existing models of faking and enhance the understanding of the antecedents of the motivation to fake on pre-employment personality assessments.
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Dedication

To my father, who encouraged me to seek out the answers to my questions.

To my mother, who taught me that if it’s worth doing, it’s worth doing right.
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Introduction

Personnel selection has played a prominent role in the science and practice of industrial-organizational psychology since the origin of the discipline in the early 1900s (Koppes & Pickren, 2007). During these early years, psychologists developed numerous tests to assess job applicants for the purposes of selection and placement in organizations and the military (Vinchur, 2007). Personality tests became popular in the 1920s and 1930s, when many organizations were concerned about assessing applicants to screen out individuals who may be prone to adjustment problems at work (Gibby & Zickar, 2008). In the 1930s, early personality tests that measured traits explicitly linked to performance were marketed to personnel managers to improve their hiring decisions (Zickar & Gibby, 2006), and the use of these tests grew over the next few decades (Vinchur, 2007). Although criticisms of the usefulness of personality tests during the 1960s (Guion & Gottier, 1965; Mischel, 1968) led to a decline in use, the emergence of the Big Five model of personality (e.g., Digman, 1990) and the publication of meta-analytic research demonstrating that the Big Five personality traits predicted job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett, Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991) revived the popularity of personality testing in the latter part of the 20th century. Research demonstrating that personality tests yield incremental validity over other selection instruments, including cognitive ability, further bolstered the case for their use in hiring (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Recent estimates suggest that personality testing is still popular with organizations today (Blackwell, 2011; Dwyer, 2011).

Concerns about applicants faking their responses on Likert-style personality tests have persisted as long as the tests have been in use, as researchers and practitioners noted that applicants are potentially motivated to select responses that they believe will increase their chances of being hired (Zickar & Gibby, 2006). This motivation, coupled with the fact that it is typically very easy for applicants to identify and choose desirable responses and difficult for organizations to verify responses (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & Levin, 1998; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1998).
1999) led many to be cautious about their use for selecting employees. A sizeable literature has amassed in the past half-century, with a significant portion published in the last twenty years, that has documented the presence of applicant faking on personality tests, analyzed the effect faking has on the validity and utility of these tests, and investigated various methods for mitigating faking (e.g., Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, & Smith, 2006; Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003; Dwight & Donovan, 2003; Heggestad, Morrison, Reeve, & McCloy, 2006; Komar, Brown, Komar, & Robie, 2008; Komar, Komar, Robie, & Taggar, 2010a; McFarland, 2003; Rosse et al., 1998; Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 2001).

This research has predominantly been focused on the prevalence and consequences of faking, and there is currently very little known about the antecedents of faking. Although several researchers have identified variables that may encourage or discourage faking, there have been very few empirical studies that evaluated the impact these variables have on applicant faking. The present research offers a comprehensive evaluation of the factors that motivate faking on pre-employment personality tests. In three studies, several situational and individual variables were examined to determine the degree to which they work independently and jointly to influence honest and faked responding to a personality test. These studies help to fill a gap in the literature on antecedents of faking and expand the current understanding of applicant faking.

In the next sections, I define faking and discuss the impact faking has on the usefulness of non-cognitive selection instruments such as personality tests. I then describe the antecedents of faking with a review of the dispositional and situational variables that are posited to affect the motivation to fake. I then present a view of faking that argues that job applicants are not singly motivated to achieve the highest possible score when responding to a personality test. Rather, they may experience multiple, and often competing, goals as a result of the multiple variables in the selection context that either encourage or discourage faking. These competing goals create a dilemma for test takers, who must weigh each goal (e.g., present an honest representation, create a favourable impression, avoid suspicion) and decide how to respond. I then go on to
describe how expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) may be a useful model for explaining how test takers are likely to weigh the competing goals and make a decision regarding faking. I conclude the Introduction with an overview of the studies comprising the current research.

**Faking: Conceptualization, Consequences and Controversies**

There does not appear to be a widely accepted definition of faking, nor is there agreement on the use of the term “faking” (Griffith, Malm, English, Yoshita, & Gujar, 2006). The terms “impression management,” “socially desirable responding,” “response distortion,” “motivated distortion” and “dissimulation” are used with some frequency, although examining the definitions of these terms reveals considerable overlap (Burns & Christiansen, 2006; Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994; Paulhus, 1991). The common elements of these definitions are captured in McFarland and Ryan’s (2000) definition of faking as an individual’s conscious attempt to distort their responses to be viewed favourably. In addition to conscious faking, Paulhus (1984) has also identified a form of unconscious distortion named self-deception. Although self-deception is important from a measurement perspective, it is conscious faking that researchers and practitioners are most concerned with because it is elicited by the situational cues present in a job application setting whereas self-deception is a stable individual difference that would affect personality test scores across testing situations (McFarland & Ryan, 2000).

In terms of classical test theory, faking is generally considered to be systematic error variance, that along with random error, causes the observed score to deviate from the true score (Griffith et al., 2006; Guion, 1998; Tett et al., 2006). In practice, faking is often operationalized as the difference between test scores obtained from two groups believed to be differentially motivated to fake (e.g., applicants and job incumbents) or from the same individuals under two different conditions (e.g., instructions to respond honestly and instructions to create the most desirable impression). Estimates of the amount that test takers fake generated from both types of research designs suggest that individuals are capable of inflating
their scores when instructed, and will do so when motivated to obtain a job. For example, a meta-analysis by Viswesvaran and Ones (1999) showed that when instructed to “fake good,” test takers raised their Big Five personality scores on average by .78 standard deviations. Tett et al. (2006) summarized the results of four field studies that compared Big Five personality test scores from applicants and incumbents, and found that scores for applicants were on average .35 standard deviations higher than incumbents, with a range of -.01 for openness to experience to 1.33 for agreeableness.

Although there appears to be widespread agreement among researchers, as well as practitioners (Robie, Tuzinski, & Bly, 2006) that applicants inflate their scores on personality tests, the meaning and implication of applicant faking has been the subject of considerable controversy. While some researchers have argued that faking poses a serious threat to criterion-related validity (e.g., Anderson, Warner, & Spencer, 1984; Griffith et al., 2006; Komar et al., 2008; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003; Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, & Powell, 1995; Tett et al., 2006), others have argued that faking does not impact validity (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1996; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996) and a few have suggested that faking might enhance validity by contributing to the prediction of job performance (Johnson & Hogan, 2006; Marcus, 2009).

The conclusion one draws about the impact of faking on validity appears to depend on the conceptualization, measurement, and analysis of faking. For example, many of the studies that report that faking improves criterion-related validity or has no effect used measures of social desirability as indicators of faking (e.g., Foldes, Ones, & Sinangil, 2006; Hough et al., 1990; Ones et al., 1996; Ruch & Ruch, 1967; Viswesvaran, Ones, & Hough, 2001). In these studies, the fact that validity is not reduced when social desirability measures are partialled out of personality scores has been taken as evidence that faking is not a problem for these tests. However, several authors have challenged the use of social desirability measures as proxies for faking, claiming that the construct validity of these scales is unclear (Burns & Christiansen,
2006; Griffith & Peterson, 2008; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999; Stark et al., 2001). Others who have argued that faking does not affect validity have based their claims on results that show that even among applicants, who are expected to fake their responses, personality test scores are still significantly correlated with job performance (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1996; Christiansen et al., 1994). However, Rosse et al. (1998) have pointed out that the correlation coefficient is fairly insensitive to changes in the rank ordering of scores that occurs in only a portion of the distribution, as happens when some respondents inflate their responses to rise to the top, and thus the correlation coefficient is not an accurate gauge of the effect of faking. Mueller-Hanson et al. (2003) underscored this point when they computed the criterion-related validity separately for the lower and upper thirds of the distribution of personality scores in a sample of participants who were motivated to fake with an incentive for high scores. They demonstrated that validity was seriously undermined for those in the upper third compared to the lower third, which has negative implications for top-down selection. Robson, Jones and Abraham (2008) also found that in a sample of participants who were motivated to fake, validity decreased as personality scores increased. Research has also shown that faking has an adverse effect on validity when selection ratios are small, leading to the hiring of less qualified candidates when top-down selection is used (Komar et al., 2008; Rosse et al., 1998).

As noted by Rosse et al. (1998), faking will be detrimental when a portion of the applicant sample raises its scores and moves into the top of the distribution. Zickar, Rosse, Levin and Hulin (1997) found that the proportion of applicants in a sample who faked was one of the most important factors affecting the validity of the personality test. As these authors noted, the impact of faking is minor when only a few individuals fake. The impact of faking is also minor when most, or all, of the applicants fake, which is akin to adding a constant to all of the scores. However, when roughly half of the applicants fake, these individuals cluster at the top of the distribution of personality scores, disrupting the true rank ordering of applicants and lowering validity. In fact, research by Donovan et al. (2003) examined the prevalence of faking among
recent job applicants and found that around 50% of their sample admitted to exaggerating some of the qualities commonly assessed by personality tests. Taken together, the research reviewed here suggests that in a typical selection context, it can be expected that about half of the applicants will inflate their scores on personality tests, resulting in a significantly lower criterion-related validity estimate under small selection ratios.

**Antecedents of Faking**

Donovan et al.’s (2003) research, as well as that of McFarland and Ryan (2000), highlight the fact that not all applicants fake, and indeed, as Zickar et al. (1997) and Komar et al. (2008) demonstrate, this is one of the major reasons why faking is problematic for the criterion-related validity of personality tests. Thus, elucidating the factors influencing applicants to fake is a critical first step in addressing the issue of faking. Unfortunately, not much is known about the factors that influence some applicants to fake while others are motivated to respond truthfully. In an effort to better understand faking, several models have been proposed that map the antecedents of faking and the process underlying the behaviour (e.g., Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; Snell et al., 1999; Tett et al., 2006). Generally speaking, these models hypothesize that faking is the result of both the ability to provide an inflated response and the motivation to do so. Ability to fake refers to respondents’ level of skill in identifying and providing responses to create the desired impression while faking motivation refers to the willingness to exercise this ability (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). The models also suggest that ability and motivation to fake are influenced by a number of dispositional and situational antecedents, as reviewed in the following sections.

**Dispositional Antecedents of Faking**

**Ability to fake.** In terms of dispositional antecedents, ability to fake is thought to be influenced by abilities that facilitate understanding a personality test item and appraising its relevance to the job, such as reading comprehension, familiarity with the job and the test, and cognitive ability (Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006; Snell et al., 1999; Tett et al., 2006). Several
studies have shown that providing test takers with information about the constructs measured by the test results in higher scores (e.g., Cunningham, Wong, & Barbee, 1994; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Robie, Komar, & Brown, 2010). Similarly, Vasilopoulos, Reilly and Leaman (2000) showed that those with higher job familiarity scored higher on a personality test than those with low familiarity. Additionally, several studies have demonstrated a link between cognitive ability and faking (e.g., Christiansen, Burns, & Montgomery, 2005; Komar, Komar, Robie, & Taggar, 2010b; Levashina, Morgeson, & Campion, 2009; Robie et al., 2010; Vasilopoulos, Cucina, & McElreath, 2005; Vasilopoulos, Cucina, Dyomina, Morewitz, & Reilly, 2006). Research reviewed by Vasilopolous and Cucina (2006) suggests that those with higher cognitive ability can distort their personality test scores more effectively than those lower in cognitive ability. The ability to fake is also constrained by the test taker’s true standing on the measured trait, such that individuals who have a high true score on the trait have less opportunity to raise their score through faking than individuals who have a low true score (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Tett et al., 2006; Tett & Christiansen, 2007). This notion is supported by research by McFarland and Ryan (2000), who showed that faking was inversely related to the true standing on the assessed trait.

**Motivation to fake.** Motivation to fake is also believed to be influenced by a large variety of dispositional variables, including morals, personality traits, attitudes, perceptions of norms, expectancy of success, and the value placed on anticipated outcomes of faking (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; 2006; Snell et al., 1999; Tett et al., 2006). Although the majority of these variables hypothesized to affect faking motivation have not been investigated empirically, research has successfully linked some of them with faking. For example, several personality traits have been found to be correlated with faking, including integrity, conscientiousness, neuroticism, Machiavellianism and rule-consciousness (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). Recent research by McFarland and Ryan (2006) that applied the theory of planned behaviour to faking on personality tests demonstrated that attitudes toward faking, perceived norms and expectancy of success were all related to faking.
Situational Antecedents of Faking

From a practical perspective, the situational antecedents of ability and motivation to fake are more useful than dispositional antecedents because they may offer points of leverage for interventions designed to mitigate faking.

Ability to fake. A number of situational variables, such as the format, wording and scoring of the test items have been hypothesized to relate to the ability to fake (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; 2006; Snell et al., 1999; Tett et al., 2006). Many of the existing techniques developed to limit faking target these antecedents to circumvent test takers’ ability to fake. For example, a number of studies have investigated the usefulness of the forced-choice format for personality tests as a method of reducing the ability to fake. The forced-choice format requires respondents to choose between two or more words or statements that are indicative of different traits and matched in their level of social desirability. Efforts by several researchers (Christiansen et al., 2005; Heggestad et al., 2006; Jackson, Wroblewski, & Ashton, 2000) to develop faking-resistant forced-choice scales have yielded mixed results. While Christiansen et al. and Jackson et al.’s results were optimistic about the potential of forced-choice scales to decrease the ability to fake, Heggestad et al. found that faking was still problematic at the individual level of analysis. Additionally, forced-choice scales face other challenges that limit their usefulness in selection. They are labour-intensive to develop, make comparisons between individuals difficult because of their ipsative nature, and may lead to adverse impact due to their correlation with cognitive ability (Converse et al., 2006; Vasilopoulos et al., 2006; Zickar & Gibby, 2006).

Researchers have also tried to prevent faking by using non-transparent wording for test items. This technique has mainly been applied to biodata questionnaires (e.g., Becker & Colquitt, 1992) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (e.g., Weed, Ben-Porath, & Butcher, 1990), again, with mixed results. Zickar and Gibby (2006) suggest that this technique
holds little promise for personality tests, due to practical concerns about face validity, as well as concerns that non-transparent items attenuate, rather than strengthen, validity.

A related technique developed by James (1998), called conditional reasoning, shows greater potential for dealing with faking. Conditional reasoning tests use a format that resembles a logical reasoning problem where test takers are presented with a brief description of a phenomenon and are asked to choose from four possible answers an appropriate inference based on the description. The test is designed to measure implicit reasoning processes or biases associated with different personality traits, such as achievement motivation and aggression (LeBreton, Barksdale, Robin, & James, 2007; Snell & Fluckinger, 2006). For example, people who are aggressive tend to interpret social situations in aggressive terms and reason that an aggressive response is appropriate. The test offers, for example, an aggressive and a non-aggressive response to the phenomenon, and respondents receive a point for every aggressive response they select. Scores on the test have been found to be valid indicators of aggression-related criteria (James, McIntyre, Glisson, Bowler, & Mitchell, 2004). Because conditional reasoning tests are an implicit measure, they should be less susceptible to faking than traditional Likert-type personality tests, and recent research suggests that this type of measure successfully obviates faking by job applicants (LeBreton et al., 2007).

The final method to circumvent the ability to fake is to correct personality scores for faking. This is typically done using scales that assess socially desirable responding that are embedded in the personality questionnaire. Scores on the social desirability scale are used to identify respondents suspected to have inflated their scores, and then these individuals are removed from the applicant pool, or have their personality test scores adjusted by some amount based on their social desirability scores. Although some researchers advocate for this approach (e.g., Hough, 1998), and survey research indicates that it is commonly done in practice (Goffin & Christiansen, 2003), there is little evidence that corrections improve validity or lead to the hiring of superior performers (Christiansen et al., 1994; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006). Furthermore,
as discussed above, the construct validity of some of these measures is unclear (e.g., Burns & Christiansen, 2006), which renders the practice of correcting personality test scores questionable.

Motivation to fake. In contrast to the situational antecedents of ability to fake, much less attention has been devoted to studying the situational variables that influence test takers’ motivation to fake. This is surprising given the prominent role of motivation in the models of faking. These models suggest that the motivation to fake is likely influenced by several situational variables, including warnings against faking, the desirability of the job, the fairness of the selection process, the favourability of the labour market and the selection ratio (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Snell et al., 1999; Tett et al., 2006). The majority of the relatively small number of studies in this area have been on warnings. For example, warning applicants that the personality test contains questions that can detect faking has been found experimentally to reduce the amount respondents are willing to distort their scores (Dwight & Donovan, 2003; McFarland, Ryan, & Kriska, 2003; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Robson et al., 2008). Research has also found that faking can be reduced by warning test takers that faking will negatively affect their chances of being hired (Vasilopoulos et al., 2005). A meta-analysis by Dwight and Donovan (2003) found that warnings do reduce faking by a small, but significant, amount.

Although the research reviewed here on the antecedents of faking has considerably advanced the understanding of faking and the methods to circumvent it, the literature is far from offering a complete view of the variables that affect faking. With the exception of warnings, few of the variables from the models hypothesized to affect motivation have been examined empirically, which has limited the development of new ways to mitigate applicant faking. Thus, research is needed to evaluate the motivational antecedents that have been hypothesized to affect faking and explore new variables that might help shed light on the reasons that applicants are motivated to respond honestly or dishonestly on personality tests. This is particularly
important, given that the preponderance of existing faking interventions target the ability to fake, and the majority of these have not been highly successful. The current research seeks to address this need by examining the effects of a broad range of situational variables on the motivation to fake, with the goal of identifying the most influential antecedents. The present research also explores whether the six factor model of personality (extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness to experience and honesty-humility; Ashton & Lee, 2007) moderates the influence of the situational variables on faking motivation. Several studies suggest that these traits may be related to faking motivation (e.g., Ashton & Lee, 2008; Lee & Ashton, 2005a; McFarland & Ryan, 2000) and it may be useful from both a theoretical and practical perspective to investigate whether there are predictable differences in the way individuals respond to situational motivators of faking.

The Faking Dilemma

In addition to, and possibly as a result of, the lack of research on the situational antecedents of faking motivation, there has been very little consideration of how these variables might interact in a testing situation. This is a significant oversight, as there are likely to be multiple factors present in a given testing situation that may differentially affect faking intentions. For example, a highly desirable job is likely to motivate faking, but the presence of warnings and a competitive job market are also likely to factor into the decision to fake, along with a host of other considerations. As Dilchert, Ones, Viswesvaran and Deller (2006) argue,

“...multiple features influence responses to personality items and...studying socially desirable responding in isolation is an insufficient approach to modelling reality in any assessment context.” (p. 220)

In a real-world selection context, some of these “features” may encourage the test taker to fake, while others may encourage more honest responses. The confluence of these factors in the testing situation creates a dilemma for test takers who must weigh competing factors and decide how to respond. Research by Kuncel and Tellegen (2009) and Robie, Brown and Beaty
have documented the competing motives some test takers face when responding to personality tests in a selection setting. These authors discovered that many respondents are simultaneously motivated by goals of presenting themselves accurately and honestly, portraying themselves in the best possible light to have a better chance at getting the job, and avoiding arousing suspicion with their responses. In Robie et al.’s research, participants were instructed to verbalize their thoughts as they completed a personality test. Those who appeared to be faking indicated that they were trying to discern the ideal response while at the same time appearing honest. They consciously considered how effectively each response option to a particular personality item would serve both goals.

This view, that applicants who consider faking potentially face a dilemma resulting from multiple competing goals, is a departure from the perspective espoused in much of the literature, which has tended to view applicants as singularly motivated to achieve the highest possible score (Griffith et al., 2006). Researchers are beginning to acknowledge that not all applicants fit this picture (e.g., Griffith, Lee, Peterson, & Zickar, 2011; Kuncel & Tellegen, 2009; Levin & Zickar, 2002; Robie et al., 2007; Zickar, Gibby, & Robie, 2004), and recognize that applicants face several considerations in addition to obtaining a socially desirable score (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). Taking such a view permits a more nuanced exploration of the decision to fake as it requires examining the various considerations that may influence test takers’ responses. It also suggests new ways in which individual differences may affect faking behaviour, as different motives may be more or less relevant to different individuals.

The view of faking as a dilemma may also shed light on some of the existing findings in the literature. For example, Vasilopoulos et al. (2005) found that a warning led to longer latencies in responding to personality test items, which may have been because the warning added motives (e.g., responding honestly or avoiding suspicion) that the test taker had to weigh in addition to any other motives they may have already had, or the warning may have made the resolution of competing motives more difficult and therefore time consuming. Additionally, many
researchers have noted the fact that applicants fake less than participants in laboratory studies who are instructed to “fake good” (e.g., Birkeland et al., 2006; Ones & Viswesvaran, 2007; Tett et al., 2006). However, researchers appear to have taken this difference as an indication that laboratory studies are unrealistic, with little consideration to the reasons behind this difference (e.g., Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007). I would argue that participants instructed to “fake good” and real-world applicants likely have different motives; where laboratory participants are motivated only to fake as much as possible, applicants face competing motives to create a good impression and avoid suspicion, among other motives. Instead of relegating the results of lab studies to artifacts of unrealistic situations, the difference in faking seen between lab and field studies sheds light on the complex motivations behind faking that result from the features of the situation.

It is not clear from Robie et al.’s (2007) research how prevalent various motives are likely to be among test takers. The two individuals classified as “slight” fakers in the Robie et al. (2007) study appear to have experienced conflicting motives, while five of the “honest” responders appeared motivated only by a desire to present themselves accurately. Research is needed to examine whether test takers experience a dilemma resulting from competing motives, and if so, how it is resolved. Currently, very little research exists to indicate how much weight is given to features that promote faking (e.g., a highly desirable job) versus features that discourage faking (e.g., warnings). Only one study was identified that considered the effects of two motivating factors on faking (Ramsay, Schmitt, Oswald, Kim, & Gillespie, 2006). These authors provided participants with a monetary incentive for high scores on a biodata inventory and found that warnings reduced, but did not completely eliminate, the motivation to raise scores through faking to obtain the monetary reward. Thus, this research suggests that the reward for faking outweighed the risk of getting caught and losing a chance at the reward. Further research examining multiple situational variables is needed to understand how these motives are likely to play out in a selection context.
Expectancy Theory

The existing models of faking (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson, et al., 2006; Snell, et al., 1999; Tett, et al., 2006) have generally been agnostic about any relationships among the antecedents of faking motivation. A more fine-grained model is needed to guide research aimed at understanding how the competing influences on faking might relate to one another. Recently, Ellingson (2012) and Ellingson and McFarland (2011) proposed that expectancy theory may provide a useful framework for explaining faking and organizing the antecedents of faking behaviour. Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) is concerned with predicting the motivation to choose one act over another and states that the force (motivation) to perform an act is a multiplicative function of three variables: expectancy, instrumentality and valence. Expectancy is defined as the probability that effort will lead to achieving a particular outcome, for example, the probability that trying to fake on a personality test will lead to successful faking. Instrumentality is defined as the probability that the outcome resulting from the particular act will lead to additional outcomes, for example, that faking will lead to getting hired. Valence is defined as the anticipated satisfaction from a particular outcome, such as getting hired. An individual is expected to choose from the various possible acts the one with the highest perceived expectancy, instrumentality and valence.

Expectancy theory has held a major position in the area of work motivation and there is considerable empirical support for the theory (Miner, 2005). Originally applied to occupation choice, job satisfaction and job performance, expectancy theory has also been applied to many different work-related areas (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999) such as leadership (Nebeker & Mitchell, 1974), training motivation (Mathieu, Tannenbaum, & Salas, 1992) and test-taking (Sanchez, Truxillo, & Bauer, 2000). A meta-analysis by Van Eerde and Thierry (1996) of a substantial volume of research has demonstrated that expectancy, instrumentality and valence were significantly related to behavioural intentions and effort expenditure, supporting the validity of the theory.
According to Ellingson and McFarland’s (2011) model, motivation to fake can be predicted by test takers’ expectancy, instrumentality and valence perceptions about faking. They also argue that expectancy, instrumentality and valence perceptions are influenced by individual and situational antecedents and their model highlights a number of such antecedents that they believe will impact expectancy (e.g., familiarity with the assessment), instrumentality (e.g., belief that faking is necessary to be competitive with other applicants) and valence perceptions (e.g., job desirability).

There are several reasons why expectancy theory is appropriate and advantageous for studying faking and the faking dilemma. First, as noted by Ellingson & McFarland (2011), expectancy theory is ideal for studying the choice to fake versus responding honestly because it was designed to explain an individual’s motivation to choose one act over another based on the perceived expectancy, instrumentality and valence of each possible act (Mitchell, 1974). Secondly, expectancy theory presents an opportunity to describe the antecedents of providing honest responses to personality tests, in addition to antecedents of faking. This addresses Ryan and Boyce’s (2006) recommendation that research on personality testing in selection examine situations that encourage applicants to present themselves accurately, in addition to studying how to discourage faking. Third, linking antecedents of faking to the elements of expectancy theory allows us to go beyond the question of what antecedents affect faking motivation, to how they affect it. As Griffith and McDaniel (2006) note, “Part of our lack of success in uncovering the nature and consequences of applicant faking is the lack of tested models of faking, or even a theoretical backbone to support such a structure” (p. 9). Expectancy theory may provide this backbone.

Although Ellingson and McFarland (2011) present compelling theoretical arguments for their model, there is no existing research to support their propositions, and as these authors note, “the positioning of the antecedents within a given proximal factor [i.e., expectancy theory component] is an empirical question” (p. 326). The current research tests Ellingson and
McFarland’s prediction that expectancy, instrumentality and valence are proximal predictors of the motivation to fake, and takes an empirically-driven approach to determining which individual and situational antecedents are related to faking. Where the existing models of faking offer an untested and selective mix of antecedents, the present research takes a systematic and data-driven approach to the study of faking research by mapping the antecedents of faking on to the empirically-supported expectancy theory elements of expectancy, instrumentality and valence.

**Overview of Studies**

The goals of the present research were threefold: 1) to empirically test the effects of several antecedents of faking motivation proposed in existing models (e.g., Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson, et al., 2006; Snell et al., 1999; Tett et al., 2006) on the intention to fake (Study 1); 2) to examine whether these antecedents interact to influence faking intentions (Studies 2 and 3); and 3) to apply expectancy theory to applicant faking (Study 3). Study 1 assessed the extent to which the proposed antecedents, most of which have not been previously subjected to empirical scrutiny, affect motivation to fake. In this study, a wide variety of situational antecedents of faking motivation were identified from the existing models of faking and related research, and participants were asked to imagine that they were applying for a job and estimate how likely they would be to fake on a personality test in the presence of each variable. The most influential antecedents were identified from these judgments.

Study 2 was designed to further examine the most influential variables identified in Study 1 and explore how they interacted to influence faking intentions. Using a policy capturing methodology, participants were presented with multiple antecedents intended to either encourage or discourage faking. Multilevel regression was used to examine the influence of each motivator separately, and all the possible interactions, to determine how the variables are weighted in the decision to fake on a personality test.
Study 3 was performed to replicate the results of the first two studies and to extend them in a number of ways. The variables from Study 2 were included with different operationalizations to further examine their effects on faking intentions. Additionally, Study 3 directly evaluated the usefulness of expectancy theory and the expectancy, instrumentality and valence components for explaining faking. As there may be limitations with the samples of undergraduate students used in Studies 1 and 2, a field sample of job seekers was used for Study 3. This study used a simulated applicant design where participants were given a job advertisement and told to imagine that they were applying for the job. Finally, Study 3 assessed the degree to which participants faked their responses on a personality test in a simulated job application setting.
Study 1

The purpose of Study 1 was to empirically investigate the effects of several situational and individual difference variables on intentions to fake with the goal of identifying the most influential motivators.

Situational Factors

All of the situational variables hypothesized to affect the motivation to fake from the existing models of faking were included in the study, with two exceptions. First, self-deception influences from Tett et al.'s (2006) model were omitted because the present research is concerned with conscious motivators of faking. Second, the investigation focused on situational factors that could be realistically identified and controlled in the selection setting. This condition resulted in the exclusion of one element from Snell et al.'s (1999) model (perception of faking by other applicants). Additionally, the study was not limited to the variables described in existing models, but also included potential variables present in the selection context that may affect applicant faking.

Warnings. Warnings are among the most studied deterrents to faking, and appeared in many of the faking models (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Snell et al., 1999; Tett et al., 2006). A meta-analysis by Dwight and Donovan (2003) found that warnings do tend to reduce the amount of response inflation among applicants (Cohen’s $d = .23$). These authors also found that warning respondents about the negative consequences of faking (consequence warning), warning respondents that faking can be identified (identification warning), and both types of warnings together all appeared to reduce faking compared to a sample who received no warnings. McFarland and Ryan (2000; 2006) suggested that warnings stating that responses on the personality test would be verified (verification warning) may also affect faking behaviour. Although research by Fox and Dinur (1988) did not support this effect, methodological limitations may have been responsible for the non-significant difference between scores of those participants who were warned and those who
were not. Vasilopoulos et al. (2005) examined warnings that told applicants that responses would be verified by people who knew the participant. This warning was paired with a second warning, either that faking would result in negative consequences for employment, or that faking would invalidate their test scores. In both cases, the warnings reduced the applicants’ scores. Pace and Borman (2006) suggest the use of a new type of warning where applicants are told that it is in their best interest to respond honestly (honesty warning), because faking may get them selected for a job which does not fit their skills or interests. They review evidence indicating that this type of warning appeared to result in personality test scores that were similar to those who were not motivated to obtain high scores, suggesting that the honesty warning was successful in counteracting faking. In a field study, Landers, Sackett and Tuzinski (2011) found that a warning that deception was detectable and a reminder to respond honestly reduced a form of extreme faking.

Researchers frequently combine warnings, typically pairing a verification or identification warning with a consequence warning (e.g., McFarland, 2003; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Ramsay et al., 2006; Robie, Taggar, & Brown, 2009; Robson et al., 2008; Vasilopoulos et al., 2005). Although this is a logical combination, it is unclear which warning is driving the results, or whether both are needed to achieve the desired effect. With the exception of Dwight and Donovan (2003), previous research has not examined the independent and combined effects of warnings. The present study extends this research by examining the effects of four different warning types on faking intentions.

**Job desirability.** The desirability or attractiveness of the job the applicant is applying for has been argued by Snell et al. (1999), Goffin and Boyd (2009), Ellingson (2012), Ellingson and McFarland (2011) and McFarland and Ryan (2000) to motivate faking on personality tests, although empirical work could not be located that directly examines this claim. Research by Millar and Millar (1997) demonstrated that individuals expect applicants to be more deceitful
when the position for which they are applying pays very well compared to a position that pays poorly. Whether this expectation translates into increased faking is unknown.

**Applicant pool size.** Perceptions about the number of applicants may also influence faking (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Snell et al., 1999). When applying for jobs that are perceived to be highly competitive, applicants may feel more pressure to stand out with a high score. Kuncel and Klieger (2007) found that individuals applying to law school considered their odds of getting accepted when choosing the schools to which they would send applications. Their research suggests that when applicants are aware of selection ratios and how competitive their applications are likely to be, applicants do appear to do a cost/benefit analysis and direct their energies toward the highest pay-off. Robie (2006) experimentally manipulated the information participants were given about the selection ratio for a fictitious job and examined the effect this information had on faking. The results showed that personality scores did not differ between groups who were told that the selection ratio was small (2/25), medium (10/25) or large (18/25), which seems to suggest that people did not try to fake more when only a small number of applicants would be hired. In a field study, Ones and Viswesvaran (2007) found that applicants facing a very small selection ratio (approximately 1,000 applicants for 30 positions) scored significantly higher than the job applicant norms on the personality test. Given these conflicting results, further research on this variable is warranted.

**Procedural and interactional justice.** Snell et al. (1999) suggest that perceptions of procedural and interactional fairness surrounding personality testing may also influence intentions to fake. Procedural justice refers to the fairness of the procedures used to make a decision, while interactional justice refers to the interpersonal treatment one receives (Colquitt, 2001). There is little research examining faking as a reaction to perceived fairness, however, tests that are not perceived to be job relevant may be viewed as unfair (Bauer et al., 2001), and Snell et al. suggest that applicants may react to this perceived unfairness by retaliating in the form of inflating their responses.
**Number of other opportunities.** Snell et al. (1999) and Goffin and Boyd (2009) hypothesized that the number of alternative job opportunities may influence a respondent’s motivation to fake, such that applicants who perceive few alternatives may be more motivated to fake, although there does not appear to be any published research investigating this claim.

**Personality item transparency.** Item transparency was included in all of the faking models. Although typically cast as related to the ability to fake, the ease with which a respondent believes they can identify the “right” answer is likely to positively influence the motivation to attempt faking (Goffin & Boyd, 2009). The idea of using subtle items on personality tests to make it difficult for applicants to identify desirable responses has been around since the mid-twentieth century, although the research in this domain has not been very profitable in curtailing faking behaviour (Zickar & Gibby, 2006). The present research investigates whether the perception that there is an obvious desirable answer positively influences intentions to fake.

**Number of criteria used in selection decision.** A common recommendation in the literature is for practitioners to use personality tests in conjunction with other assessments during selection to reduce the potential impact of faking (e.g., Ryan & Boyce, 2006). Using multiple criteria may have the added benefit of reducing the amount of faking that an applicant engages in, because the expected utility of inflating personality test scores is reduced. The impact of the number of criteria used in a hiring decision on applicant motivation to fake has not been studied in previous research, although it was expected that the number of criteria should negatively affect intentions to fake.

**Screening on personality questionnaire.** Using a personality test to screen applicants should affect faking intentions in much the same way as the number of criteria used in the selection decision would because using the test for screening increases the importance of the personality test scores. There is no existing research looking at screening with a personality test as an antecedent of faking, but using a personality test to screen out a large number of
applicants should increase intentions to fake, as applicants may feel that inflating one’s score is the only way to ensure advancing in the selection process.

**Individual Differences**

The models by Snell et al. (1999), McFarland & Ryan (2000), Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006), Tett et al. (2006), Goffin & Boyd (2009), and Ellingson & McFarland (2011) suggested a wide variety of individual difference variables that may be related to the motivation to fake. Empirical research on faking, and related literatures (e.g., interview impression management, counterproductive work behaviours, and social psychology research on lying and deception), were also reviewed to identify relevant individual difference variables. The most commonly studied variables, and the ones with the most empirical support, are traits of the Big Five model of personality. McFarland and Ryan (2000) found evidence that conscientiousness and neuroticism predicted faking. Levashina and Campion (2006) suggest that conscientiousness, neuroticism, extraversion and agreeableness are related to faking in employment interviews. Narrative and meta-analytic reviews of the deviance and counterproductive work behavior literatures by Mount, Ilies and Johnson (2006), Berry, Ones and Sackett (2007) and Salgado (2002) identified conscientiousness, neuroticism and agreeableness as predictors of organizational deviance. Kashy and DePaulo (1996) found that extraversion and a measure of socialization that overlaps with conscientiousness were related to lying in everyday life and McLeod and Genereux (2008) found that a measure of kindness similar to agreeableness was negatively related to lying for personal gain. Given the fairly strong support linking conscientiousness, neuroticism, agreeableness and extraversion with faking, they were included in Study 1 to replicate this research and explore whether different traits predict faking intentions in the presence of different situational variables.

**Faking Intentions**

Because the focus of the present research is on the factors that affect the motivation to fake, the appropriate dependent variable is faking intentions. Models of faking by McFarland
and Ryan (2000; 2006) and Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) posit that faking motivation gives rise to intentions to fake. Additionally, all of the models (with the exception of Goffin & Boyd, 2009) argue that faking behaviour is the result of intentions to fake, as well as other variables, such as the ability and opportunity to fake. The determinants of faking behaviour is an important question in its own right, however, the present study is concerned with the antecedents of faking motivation, which are hypothesized to directly influence intentions to fake. Based on the research reviewed above, the following hypotheses were made regarding faking intentions. There were no a priori hypotheses regarding which situational factor(s) would be most influential.

*Hypothesis 1a:* Job desirability, applicant pool size, item transparency, and using the personality test for screening will be positively related to intentions to fake.

*Hypothesis 1b:* Warnings, justice perceptions, opportunities and the number of criteria used in selection will be negatively related to intentions to fake.

*Hypothesis 2a:* Conscientiousness and agreeableness will be negatively related to intentions to fake.

*Hypothesis 2b:* Extraversion and neuroticism will be positively related to intentions to fake.
Method

Participants

Ninety-five undergraduate psychology students participated for course credit. The sample consisted of 50 females and 45 males, and the mean age was 20.79 years (SD = 1.25). Thirty-two participants (34%) were currently employed part-time, 1 (1%) was employed full-time, and 62 (65%) were not employed. Twenty-eight participants (29%) were currently looking for a job. Of those who were not currently looking, 44 (66%) expected to be looking for a job in the next 6 months. Thus, 76% of the participants were current or soon-to-be job seekers.

Procedure

Participants were brought into the lab individually or in groups of two to five people and independently completed the study on a computer. After providing informed consent, they completed a personality questionnaire. Following this, participants’ intentions to fake were measured across twenty situations. Finally, the participants completed a brief demographic questionnaire and were given a feedback letter explaining the study.

Measures

Personality traits. Participants completed the 50-item version of the Big 5 personality scale from the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 2006). Each item was assessed on a 5-point scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Each of the five personality domains were measured with 10 items. Items included “I make friends easily” (extraversion), “I have a good word for everyone” (agreeableness), “I have a vivid imagination” (openness to experience), “I am always prepared” (conscientiousness), and “I often feel blue” (neuroticism). Coefficient alphas for each domain were .86 (extraversion), .77 (agreeableness), .62 (openness to experience), .83 (conscientiousness), .85 (neuroticism). This scale is reprinted in Appendix A.

Situational faking intentions. Twenty situations were written to assess how 12 different situational factors affect participants’ intentions to fake. As reviewed above, the 12 situational
factors were: applicant pool size (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Snell et al., 1999); number of other opportunities (Snell et al., 1999); job desirability (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; McFarland & Ryan, 2006); personality item transparency (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Tett et al., 2006); selection system procedural justice (Snell et al., 1999); selection system interactional justice (Levashina & Campion, 2006; Snell et al., 1999); warnings that faking can be detected (Dwight & Donovan, 2003; McFarland & Ryan, 2000); warnings that faking has negative consequences (Dwight & Donovan, 2003; Kluger & Colella, 1993); warnings that responses will be verified (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Vasilopoulos et al., 2005); and warnings to respond honestly (Pace & Borman, 2006). The number of criteria used in selection decision and screening on a personality questionnaire were also included. All situational factors except for the four warnings cues were presented twice, once worded in a manner that would encourage faking, and once worded in a manner that would discourage faking. A random order was chosen for the situations, with the proviso that one wording of the cues would appear in the first 10 situations, and the second wording would appear in the second 10 situations. All participants received the situations in the same order. The situations are presented in Table 1.

Before reading the situations, participants completed a baseline assessment of intentions to fake on a job application personality questionnaire. Participants were given the following instructions:

Think back to the questionnaire you just completed and the kind of items that you responded to (for example, "I pay attention to details", "I am always prepared", and "I rarely lose my composure"). This type of questionnaire is often given to people to fill out when they are applying for jobs.

For this task, please **imagine that you are applying for a job** and are asked to fill out this type of questionnaire as part of the application process. **Please complete the following questions about how you think you would respond as a job applicant.**
They were then asked five questions to assess their faking intentions: 1) How likely would you be to give responses on the questionnaire that would make you look better than you really are?; 2) To what degree would you overstate or exaggerate your positive qualities in your responses on the questionnaire?; 3) To what degree would you de-emphasize or downplay your negative qualities in your responses on the questionnaire?; 4) To what degree would you say that you have positive qualities that you do not actually have in your responses on the questionnaire?; and 5) To what degree would you make your weaknesses look more positive than they really are in your responses on the questionnaire? The first question was rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Not at all likely) to 7 (Very likely). The other four questions were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (As much as possible).

Following the baseline faking intentions measure, participants’ intentions to fake was assessed in each of the 20 situations. The instructions read:

Now please imagine once again that you are applying for a job and are asked to fill out the type of questionnaire on the previous page, and think about how you might respond to the questionnaire in each of the following situations. Please consider each situation separately.

For each situation, participants responded to the same five questions asked in the baseline measure. Coefficient alphas for the five response questions for each situation were quite high, ranging from .80 to .96, therefore, the five questions were averaged for each situation. The situational faking intentions materials are included in Appendix B.

**Demographic questionnaire.** A short demographic questionnaire asked participants their gender, age, employment status, and job search status.
Results

The means, standard deviations and coefficient alphas are presented in Table 1 for each item on the situational faking intentions measure, including the baseline questions, 20 situations and average situational response. Data missing from the faking intentions measure from a particular situation was replaced with the mean from the remaining four faking intentions questions for that situation (Roth, Switzer & Switzer, 1999). Paired t-tests revealed only one significant gender difference on the 20 situation scores, which was for situation 8 (“The job sounds like your dream job”), \( t(93) = 2.50, p < .05 \), with females scoring higher than males, \( M_{\text{females}} = 4.81, SD = 1.29, M_{\text{males}} = 4.08, SD = 1.56 \). Correlations between the situation scores and the other demographic variable revealed no significant associations.

The mean baseline intention to fake was 3.70 (\( SD = 1.05 \)), which was near the midpoint of the 7-point scale. This result indicated that in general, participants intended to fake a moderate amount. The average intention to fake across the twenty situations was also near the midpoint of the scale, \( M = 3.50, SD = 1.03 \). To determine how each situation influenced faking intentions, I examined the difference between the mean response to each situation and the mean response across situations. The average across situations was chosen as the point of comparison instead of the baseline because the average across situations (comprised of 100 items) is a more reliable assessment (\( \alpha = .99 \)) of participants’ faking intentions than the 5-item baseline (\( \alpha = .79 \)). Although the average across situations is biased by the particular situations chosen for the study, these situations were chosen from a comprehensive review of the literature and careful consideration of all of the factors possibly present in a selection context that could be controlled or identified. It should be noted, however, that the average and the baseline had similar mean scores and were highly correlated, \( r = .69, p < .001 \). Furthermore, a similar group of situations emerged as influential when either the baseline or the average across situations was used as a comparison point (more detail is provided on this point below).
### Table 1

**Study 1: Situational Faking Intentions Means and Standard Deviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Motivator</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
<th>Mean Difference from Intra-individual Average (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.70 (1.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The questionnaire for the job application says that it contains</td>
<td>Warning that faking can be detected</td>
<td>2.90 (1.03)</td>
<td>-.60 (.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>questions that have been designed to identify those who fake their</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>responses.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. You are told that there are a large number of people applying for</td>
<td>Applicant pool size</td>
<td>4.11 (1.34)</td>
<td>.63 (.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>this job.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. It appears that a fair process will be used to make the hiring</td>
<td>Selection process</td>
<td>3.38 (1.11)</td>
<td>-.12 (.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>decisions.</td>
<td>procedural justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. It is pretty obvious what answers the company is probably looking for.</td>
<td>Personality item transparency</td>
<td>4.04 (1.36)</td>
<td>.54 (.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The questionnaire instructions say that dishonest responses may</td>
<td>Warning about negative consequences</td>
<td>2.52 (1.12)</td>
<td>-.98 (.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>invalidate your results, that is, faking may result in you not</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>being considered for the job.¹</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. You are told that the final hiring decision will be made based on</td>
<td>Number of criteria used in selection decision</td>
<td>3.27 (1.30)</td>
<td>-.23 (.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>several factors (e.g., resume, interview, reference check) in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>addition to your responses to the questionnaire.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. There are not a lot of job opportunities out there.¹</td>
<td>Number of other opportunities</td>
<td>4.37 (1.40)</td>
<td>.86 (.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The job sounds like your dream job.¹</td>
<td>Job desirability</td>
<td>4.46 (1.47)</td>
<td>.96 (.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The people in charge of the hiring process have treated you in a fair</td>
<td>Selection system</td>
<td>3.26 (1.23)</td>
<td>-.24 (.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manner.</td>
<td>interactional justice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. You are told that only a smaller number of applicants will proceed to the next phase of the selection process based on how they perform on the questionnaire.</td>
<td>Screening on personality questionnaire</td>
<td>4.22 (1.49)**</td>
<td>.72 (.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. You are told that there are only a few applicants for this job.</td>
<td>Applicant pool size</td>
<td>3.36 (1.41)</td>
<td>-.14 (.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The questionnaire instructions ask you to respond honestly.</td>
<td>Warnings to respond honestly</td>
<td>2.88 (1.27)**</td>
<td>-.62 (.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. It seems that the selection process may be biased.</td>
<td>Selection process procedural justice</td>
<td>4.29 (1.58)**</td>
<td>.79 (.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. There are several other jobs that you can apply for that are similar to this one.</td>
<td>Number of other opportunities</td>
<td>3.07 (1.21)**</td>
<td>-.43 (.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. It is hard to figure out what the best answers would be.</td>
<td>Personality item transparency</td>
<td>3.13 (1.35)**</td>
<td>-.38 (.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. The questionnaire instructions say that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.</td>
<td>Warnings of response verification</td>
<td>2.52 (1.19)**</td>
<td>-.98 (.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. You are told that scores on the questionnaire will be the sole factor in determining who gets hired.</td>
<td>Number of criteria used in selection decision</td>
<td>4.59 (1.56)**</td>
<td>1.09 (1.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. The job is not exactly what you were looking for.</td>
<td>Job desirability</td>
<td>2.22 (1.11)**</td>
<td>-1.28 (.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. The people you have interacted with during the application process have treated you unfairly.</td>
<td>Selection system interactional justice</td>
<td>3.32 (1.87)</td>
<td>-.18 (1.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. You are told that the scores on the questionnaire will be used to remove a large number of applicants who will not move on to the next phase of the hiring process.</td>
<td>Screening on personality questionnaire</td>
<td>4.09 (1.49)**</td>
<td>.59 (.87)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** N = 95 except for Situations 2 and 12, where N = 94.

Indicates item selected as independent variable in Study 2.

In t-tests comparing each situation to the average situation, *p < .01, **p < .001.
For each participant, their average situation response was subtracted from each of their 20 situation scores to obtain a measure of how influential each situation was on faking intentions. A series of paired t-tests revealed that all situation scores differed significantly from the average in the hypothesized direction with the exception of situations 3, 11 and 19, which were non-significant. Thus, hypotheses 1a and 1b were largely supported. Because these comparisons are all within-subjects, any between-subject differences in the degree to which different individuals are inclined to fake are eliminated.

The mean differences between responses to each situation and the average response are presented in the last column of Table 1. These differences were used to determine which situations were most influential in motivating participants’ intentions to fake. The standard deviation of the average situation (1.03) was taken as the criterion for a large difference. Using this criterion, situations 17 (“You are told that scores on the questionnaire will be the sole factor in determining who gets hired”) and 18 (“The job is not exactly what you were looking for”) qualified as influential since they differed from the average by more than 1 standard deviation (1.09 and -1.28, respectively). Situations that were below, but close to, the 1.03 value included situations 5 (“The questionnaire instructions say that dishonest responses may invalidate your results, that is, faking may result in you not being considered for the job”), 16 (“The questionnaire instructions say that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references”) and 8 (“The job sounds like your dream job”).

The IPIP Big 5 domain subscale scores were not significantly correlated with baseline intentions to fake or with intentions to fake in any of the situations (all ps > .05). This was the case both when the relationships were examined between-subjects and when examined within-subjects using the difference scores between each situation and the within-person average across situations. Thus, hypotheses 2a and 2b were not supported.

---

1 Comparisons between each situation and the baseline faking intentions questions suggested a similar list of influential situations. Specifically, situation 18, 5 and 16 produced differences from the baseline that were greater than or equal to 1.18.
Discussion

Study 1 explored the influence of several potential situational motivators of the intentions to fake on job application personality questionnaires. All but a few of the situations appeared to significantly shift participants’ intentions to fake in the predicted direction, suggesting that participants are sensitive to the different cues that may be present in a job application situation and adjust their intentions to fake their responses to a personality test accordingly. The analysis of the mean differences from the average situation response suggest that the most influential motivators were believing that the personality questionnaire would be the sole factor in making hiring decisions and an undesirable job, which both resulted in faking intentions scores that were greater than one standard deviation from the average across situations. Believing that the personality questionnaire would be the sole factor in the hiring decision significantly motivated participants’ intentions to fake, however, it is unlikely that a personality measure would be the sole factor in a real life selection decision. This situation was included in the present study mainly as a counterpoint to situation #6, which stated that the final hiring decision would be made based on several factors. Since it is common practice to consider several factors in personnel selection, and situation #6 had a relatively weak effect on faking, it did not seem worthwhile to investigate this motivator in further studies. Thus, given that the goal of this study was identify more than one motivator, I looked to the situations with the next largest differences from the average, which were warning about negative consequences, warning about response verification and a highly desirable job. These three situations differed from the average by a similar amount.

This research is among the first to empirically examine several of the situational influences believed to influence variability in faking intentions, and supports the underlying assumptions and some of the predictions of existing theories of faking (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Snell et al., 1999; Tett et al., 2006). For example, the present research suggests that researchers were on the right track to focus on
warnings as a driver of faking intentions. The present research also supports the recommendations of several researchers (e.g., Ryan & Boyce, 2006) who suggest using personality tests in conjunction with other selection tools. This recommendation is sound not only because it reduces one’s reliance on faking-susceptible measures and improves clinical judgment, but because using personality tests alone might encourage a great deal of faking.

It would appear that perceptions of justice, which was included in Snell et al.’s (1999) model, have relatively little influence on faking intentions. However, one of the interactional justice perception situations, situation 19 (The people you have interacted with during the application process have treated you unfairly), had a large standard deviation. This suggests that there may be moderator variables that could explain participants’ reaction to this situation. For example, Bobocel and Zdaniuk (2010) argue that individuals with a strong independent self-construal, who view the self as unique and separate from others, are more likely to seek revenge against perpetrators of an injustice than those with a weak independent self-construal. In addition to seeking revenge, people may fake as a response to unfair treatment in a job application setting because they may believe it is the only way to secure a chance at the job in a biased system. On the other hand, people may decide they don’t wish to work for an organization that treats applicants unfairly and feel that it is not worth the effort to try to increase their score through faking (Hausknecht, Day, & Thomas, 2004). Future research on reactions to injustice in selection is needed to explore these potential moderators.

In contrast to predictions, Big Five personality traits were not related to faking intentions in any of the situations. These results are not in line with previous research that has found support for the traits predicting faking, particularly conscientiousness and neuroticism (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). The reason for the discrepancy between the present study and past research is not clear. One possible explanation could be that the situations investigated in this study were sufficiently “strong” to limit the influence of dispositional traits (Mischel, 1977). Previous work by McFarland and Ryan that found support
for personality traits predicting faking used general applicant instructions without reference to any specifics of the selection context. However, in Mueller-Hanson et al.’s study, participants were asked to imagine that they were applying for their dream job, and in this situation, conscientiousness and neuroticism did predict faking intentions. There is little theory to guide predictions about relationships between Big Five personality traits and faking, and thus, it is unclear whether, or how, Big Five traits should predict intentions or faking behavior, and how traits may influence responses to particular situations. Given the supportive findings in previous research, it may be beneficial to continue to examine these potential relationships in future studies.
Study 2

Study 2 was designed to further examine several antecedents of faking that were found to be the most influential motivators of faking intentions in Study 1 and examine how faking intentions are affected when multiple antecedents are simultaneously present that are hypothesized to differentially encourage and discourage faking. The results of Study 1 suggested that the desirability of the job, warnings about negative consequences for faking and warnings of response verification were all highly influential. Given the similarity of the warning variables, and the desire to test an array of motivators that would be expected to differentially affect faking and present test takers with a dilemma, I decided to add one additional variable from Study 1. The situational variable from Study 1 that resulted in the next highest divergence from the average situational response after job desirability and the two warnings was few other opportunities. Examining these four variables extends the results of Study 1, and responds to the calls of Hough and Oswald (2008) and Dilchert et al. (2006) to simultaneously consider several dimensions of the selection context by including the effects of test-taking instructions (warnings), external motivating factors (e.g., labour market), and the desirability of the job on faking intentions. No prior research has examined interrelationships between these four antecedents of faking motivation.

As discussed above in the Introduction, the confluence of these situational variables may create a dilemma for test takers. Research by Kuncel and Tellegen (2009) and Robie et al. (2007) has demonstrated that some test takers face competing motives when responding to personality tests in a selection setting. These authors discovered that respondents may be motivated by a desire to present themselves accurately and to adhere to their moral code, but may also simultaneously motivated by the goal of presenting themselves in the best possible light, and avoiding arousing suspicion with their responses. It is likely that different situational variables will make these goals more or less salient. For example, in Robie et al.’s study, some participants indicated that they would have been more likely to fake if the prize money for high
scores had been greater. A highly desirable job may motivate applicants to present themselves in the best possible light by faking their responses to the personality test, although this goal may be tempered by warnings. There is little existing theory or research to guide predictions about how these variables might interact to affect intentions to fake. In what appears to be the only study in the faking literature to examine interactions among multiple motivators, Ramsay et al. (2006) found that an incentive for high scores on a biodata test motivated respondents to fake, and a warning was only moderately successful in reducing this motivation. Study 2 explored the faking dilemma by presenting respondents with several antecedents that were shown in Study 1 to differentially encourage or discourage faking and examined the impact of these situations on faking intentions.

In addition to examining several dimensions of faking antecedents simultaneously, Hough and Oswald’s (2008) recommendations for advancing research on faking also emphasized the value of considering how test-taker individual differences affect faking. Although Big Five personality traits were not related to faking in Study 1, they were included again in Study 2 because several past studies have found these traits to play a role in faking (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006). Another personality variable, honesty-humility, was included in addition to the Big Five. Research by Ashton and Lee (2007) suggests that honesty-humility may be the sixth dimension of personality. Individuals who score high on honesty-humility tend to avoid manipulating others for personal gain, are not inclined to break rules, are not fixated on material goods and do not have a sense of personal entitlement. In contrast, persons who score low on this trait are motivated by material gain, inclined to manipulate people for personal benefit, and feel self-important. Ashton, Lee and their colleagues have amassed considerable evidence from psycholinguistic studies in multiple languages supporting the existence of the honesty-humility dimension (Ashton et al., 2004; Ashton, Lee, & Goldberg, 2004; Ashton et al., 2006) and have also demonstrated the construct validity of this sixth trait in several studies (e.g., Ashton & Lee, 2005; Lee & Ashton, 2004).
These authors have also conducted research showing that honesty-humility is related to integrity, delinquency and ethical decision making (Ashton & Lee, 2008; Lee, Ashton, & Shin, 2005; Lee, Ashton, & de Vries, 2005; Lee, Ashton, Morrison, Cordery, & Dunlop, 2008), which suggests that it may also relate to intentions to fake a personality questionnaire in a selection setting. Additional research by Gozna, Vrij and Bull (2001) found that Machiavellianism (which is highly correlated with honesty-humility; Ashton, Lee & Son, 2000; Lee & Ashton, 2005) predicted lying in a high-stakes situation. Based on this research, it was expected that honesty-humility would predict intentions to fake. Interactions between honesty-humility and the motivators (job desirability, warnings and opportunities) on intentions were examined in exploratory analyses.

A policy capturing methodology was used to explore the possible synergistic and antagonistic effects of the situational and individual difference variables. In a policy capturing design, participants are presented with a series of scenarios where a set of independent variables are manipulated at two or more levels. For each scenario, participants are asked to read the scenario and then make a decision (dependent variable). Regression analysis is then performed to determine the relative importance of the independent variables and how they interact to influence decisions. In addition to the experimental control and statistical power afforded by a within-subjects experiment, this design is advantageous for studying faking because it reduces participants’ ability to give a socially desirable response, which they may be motivated to do because faking is a mildly deviant behavior (Donovan et al., 2003). A socially desirable response cannot be easily inferred in a policy capturing scenario because participants are presented with several variables simultaneously and their combinations (Karren & Barringer, 2002). Additionally, policy capturing offers a concise method for simultaneously examining multiple independent variables that would quickly make a between-subjects investigation unwieldy.
The following hypotheses were tested in Study 2. Interactions between the motivators and cross-level interactions were explored, however no a priori hypotheses were made regarding the nature of these interactions given the dearth of extant empirical literature on motivations for faking.

*Hypothesis 3:* Job desirability will be positively related to intentions to fake.

*Hypothesis 4:* Opportunities will be positively related to intentions to fake.

*Hypothesis 5:* Warning of negative consequences will be negatively related to intentions to fake.

*Hypothesis 6:* Warning of response verification will be negatively related to intentions to fake.

*Hypothesis 7a:* The Big Five personality traits of conscientiousness and agreeableness will be negatively related to intentions to fake.

*Hypothesis 7b:* The Big Five personality traits of neuroticism and extraversion will be positively related to intentions to fake.

*Hypothesis 8:* Honest-humility will be negatively related to intentions to fake.
Method

Participants

Seventy-five undergraduate psychology students participated for course credit. The sample consisted of 45 females and 30 males, and the mean age was 22.25 years (SD = 2.21). Twenty-two participants (29%) were currently employed part-time, 3 (.04%) were employed full-time, and 50 (67%) were not employed. Eighteen participants (24%) were currently looking for a job. Of the 57 participants who were not currently looking, 27 (47%) expected to be looking for a job in the next 6 months. Thus, 60% of the participants were current or soon-to-be job seekers.

Procedure

Participants were brought into the lab individually or in groups of two or three and independently completed the study on the computer. After providing informed consent, they completed the questionnaire assessing the Big Five personality traits and the honesty-humility scale and then did the policy capturing task. Following this, they completed the demographic questionnaire from Study 1, which assessed the participants’ gender, age, employment status, and whether they were applying for jobs currently or in the next 6 months. Finally, the participants were given a feedback letter explaining the study.

Measures

Big Five personality traits. The 44 item Big Five Inventory from John, Naumann and Soto (2008) was used to measure the Big Five personality traits. The measure consists of a stem that says, “I see myself as someone who...” and has eight neuroticism items (e.g., “is depressed, blue”), eight extraversion items (e.g., “is talkative”), ten openness items (e.g., “is original, comes up with new ideas”), nine agreeableness items (e.g., “is helpful and unselfish with others”) and nine conscientiousness items (e.g., “does a thorough job”). Each item was assessed on a 5-point scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). The coefficient alphas for each trait were: .85 (neuroticism), .86 (extraversion), .74 (openness), .79 (agreeableness) and .81 (conscientiousness). This measure is included in Appendix C.
**Honesty-humility.** The 16 item honesty-humility subscale from the HEXACO-PI-R was used (Ashton & Lee, 2008). Each item was assessed on a 5-point scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). A sample item is, “If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person in order to get it.” The coefficient alpha for the scale was .78. This scale is included in Appendix D.

**Pilot study and policy capturing task.** The cues for the policy capturing task were taken from Study 1. The Study 1 items found to most influence faking intentions were job desirability (both high and low), warning about negative consequences, warning of response verification and number of other opportunities (both high and low). Since only 1 wording of the warning items was included in Study 1, and the policy capturing methodology requires each cue to have at least 2 levels, a pilot study was conducted to test high and low wordings of the two warnings cues. For the pilot study, eight different wordings were written to convey varying levels of probability of warnings being carried through. For example, one pilot study item for warning of response verification read, “In some circumstances your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references,” and another read, “It is very likely that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.” The pilot study questionnaire is reprinted in Appendix E. Psychology graduate students ($n = 42$) were asked to rate each phrase according to the likelihood of the event occurring on an 11-point scale from 0 (0% chance of the event occurring) to 10 (100% chance of the event occurring). The results of the pilot study showed that the “will” wording was assigned the highest probability for both warning of negative consequences ($M = 90.7\%, SD = 12.18\%$) and warning of response verification ($M = 95.5\%, SD = 7.05\%$). On the lower end of the probability scale, the wording “there is a chance that” received the lowest ratings for both warning of negative consequences ($M = 33.3\%, SD = 20.80\%$) and warning of response verification ($M = 24.8\%, SD = 17.00\%$). Additional detail concerning this pilot study is presented in Appendix F.
Policy capturing studies can be limited by low external validity and the presence of demand characteristics and so steps were taken to minimize these issues according to recommendations by Karren and Barringer (2002). First of all, the independent variables were chosen based on a thorough review of the literature, as well as on the empirical evidence from Study 1 and the pilot study described above. Second, the levels of the independent variables were chosen to represent nearly the full range of the variable in the real world (e.g., “few” and “many” opportunities). Additionally, individual difference variables were included as between-subjects factors to examine cross-level interactions, which, if present, would make a case against common method variance and demand characteristics as explanations for main effects at level 1. Only two levels were chosen for each variable to capitalize on the statistical advantages of a full factorial design while keeping the number of scenarios small to minimize possible participant fatigue and boredom.

For the policy capturing task, 16 scenarios were created that completely crossed the 2 levels of the 4 cues. The scenarios consisted simply of 4 statements, 1 from each of the cues. To eliminate any order effects for the cues, each of the 8 cues (4 cues with 2 levels each) appeared twice in each statement position (for example, low job desirability appeared twice as the first statement, twice as the second statement, twice as the third statement and twice as the fourth statement). The order of the 16 scenarios was randomized, and each participant received the scenarios in the same order. Three scenarios chosen at random were repeated at the end of the policy capturing task to assess reliability.

For each scenario, participants completed three response questions taken from the intentions measure used in Study 1. The question stem read, “If you were filling out a job application personality questionnaire in this situation...” and the three response questions were: 1) …how likely would you be to give responses on the questionnaire that would make you look better than you really are?; 2) …to what degree would you overstate or exaggerate your positive qualities in your responses on the questionnaire?; and 3) …to what degree would you
say that you have positive qualities that you do not actually have in your responses on the questionnaire? Response question 1 was rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Not at all likely) to 7 (Very likely). Response questions 2 and 3 were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (As much as possible). Two practice scenarios were given after the task instructions. The practice scenarios had the same format and response questions as the actual scenarios except that they consisted of three cues instead of four, and the cues were not the same as the ones used in the actual task. The policy capturing task is presented in Appendix G.
Results

Preliminary Analyses: Descriptive Statistics, Reliability and Intra-class Correlations

Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 2. The demographic variables were not significantly correlated with either intention to fake variable. Given the lack of bivariate associations, and the fact that no hypotheses regarding the demographic variables were made, they were not included in further analyses.

In testing the hypotheses, separate analyses were performed for each item of the dependent variable- faking likelihood, faking degree, and lying. However, faking likelihood and faking degree produced similar results. Additionally, when averaged across scenarios, faking likelihood and faking degree were highly correlated, \( r = .83, p < .001 \), whereas lying was moderately correlated with likelihood, \( r = .50, p < .001 \), and degree, \( r = .51, p < .001 \). As a result, faking likelihood and faking degree were combined and the results will be discussed separately for this combined variable (“faking likelihood/degree”) and for lying.

The faking likelihood/degree and lying measures were correlated across three repeated scenarios to assess reliability. The faking likelihood/degree average was highly correlated between the first and second presentation of the first repeated scenario, \( r = .86, p < .001 \), and lying was also highly correlated between the first and second presentation of this scenario, \( r = .71, p < .001 \). Faking likelihood/degree was also significantly correlated between the first and second presentation of the second repeated scenario, \( r = .91, p < .001 \), as was lying, \( r = .86, p < .001 \). Finally, both faking likelihood/degree, \( r = .91, p < .001 \), and lying, \( r = .75, p < .001 \), were highly correlated for the third repeated scenario. These results suggest that participants responded to the scenarios in a highly reliable manner and that neither fatigue nor boredom appear to have affected responses to the scenarios.

In a policy capturing study, scenario responses (level 1) are nested within people (level 2), creating dependency among the observations. To assess the degree of dependency, the intraclass correlation (ICC) was calculated for the two dependent variables. The ICC for the
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Gender(^1)</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Age</td>
<td>22.25</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Employment Status(^2)</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.29*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Job Seeker Status(^3)</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Neuroticism</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Extraversion</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Openness</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Agreeableness</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Conscientiousness</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.30**</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Honesty-humility</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Intentions Faking Likelihood/Degree(^4)</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.35**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Intentions Lying(^4)</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.48**</td>
<td>.49**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Based on Ns between 71 and 75 as a result of missing data. 
\(^1\)Coded as 1=female and 2=male. 
\(^2\)Coded as 2=full-time and 1=part-time and 0=not employed. 
\(^3\)Coded as 1=current or future job seeker and 0=non-job seeker. 
\(^4\)Indicates variable aggregated within-person across scenarios. 
\(p < .05; **p < .01.\)
average of faking likelihood/degree was .755 and the ICC for lying was .715. This suggests that 75.5% and 71.5% of the variance in the two dependent measures are attributable to the level 2 grouping variable (person). These ICC values indicate that there is a substantial amount of dependency in these data that requires the use of multilevel regression techniques. The ICC was used to calculate the effective sample sizes, which was 97.36 for faking likelihood/degree and 102.34 for lying.

**Hypothesis Tests**

To test whether the four independent variables affected intentions to fake (hypotheses 3 through 6), the main effects and interactions of the level 1 independent variables (job desirability, opportunities, and the two warnings) were entered into separate regression analyses predicting both of the dependent variables. A model was run with the four effect codes representing the four independent variables entered as random coefficients and all possible interactions entered as fixed coefficients predicting the faking likelihood/degree average. The same model was also run with lying as the dependent variable. Initially, these two models were run with an unstructured covariance type, meaning that the variance around the level 1 error terms and the covariances between the level 1 error terms are free to vary. However, the models did not converge with this covariance structure. A heterogeneous first-order autoregressive (ARH1) was selected instead. This covariance structure implies that the error terms from measurements taken closer together in time will be more similar than error terms from measurements taken further apart in time, and that the error variances are assumed to be heterogeneous across time. When the ARH1 covariance structure was used, the two models did converge and the parameter estimates were identical to that of the models with the unstructured covariance type. Because the ARH1 is a more parsimonious covariance structure, the ARH1 structure was used for the multilevel analyses that follow.

The results of the random coefficient model with the main effects and all interactions predicting faking likelihood/degree revealed that the four-way interaction was not significant.
This term was removed and the resulting model was run. Non-significant terms from this analysis were removed and this process was repeated until a model remained that contained only significant higher order interactions and the lower order terms that supported them. This model was then compared to the original model containing the four-way interaction. A chi-square test of the difference in fit between the original and final models was not significant, \( \chi^2 = 4.538, df = 5, p = .47 \), indicating that the final model did not provide a better fit to the data than the original full model. However, the final model was retained because it was more parsimonious than the original model.

The results of this model are presented in Table 3. It shows that job desirability, warning of negative consequences and warning of response verification were all significant predictors of faking likelihood/degree. Thus, hypotheses 3, 5 and 6 were supported. Hypothesis 4 was not supported, given the non-significant main effect of opportunities. However, there was a significant two-way interaction between job desirability and opportunities (see Figure 1). Post hoc analysis revealed that both of the simple slopes were significant. This suggests that when the job was highly desirable, participants were more likely to intend to fake when there were many opportunities, and when the job was less desirable, participants were more likely to fake when there were few opportunities. The opportunities by warning of response verification interaction was also significant, but was qualified by a significant three-way interaction between opportunities, warning of negative consequences and warning of response verification (see Figures 2a and 2b). The pattern of results indicated that when there are few opportunities and a high chance of negative consequences for faking, people are more likely to fake if the chance of response verification is low than when it is high.

The model testing the effects of all the main effects and interactions on lying indicated that the four-way interaction was not significant and successively smaller models were tested in a manner similar to that described above. A chi-square test of the difference in fit between the original and final models was not significant, \( \chi^2 = 3.252, df = 8, p = .92 \), and so the more
<table>
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<td>.454</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warning Consequences</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<td>.007</td>
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<td>Opportunities x Warning Consequences x Warning Verification</td>
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<td>.017</td>
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Table 3

Study 2: Regression Results for Level 1 Variables Predicting Faking Likelihood/Degree
Figure 1. Two-way interaction between job desirability and opportunities predicting faking likelihood/degree.
Figures 2a and 2b. Three-way interaction between opportunities, warning of negative consequences and warning of response verification predicting faking likelihood/degree.
parsimonious final model was retained. The results are presented in Table 4. The results show that only warning of negative consequences had a significant main effect on lying, suggesting that hypotheses 3, 4 and 6 do not hold for this dependent variable. Additionally, there was a significant two-way interaction between job desirability and opportunities, but this was qualified by a significant three-way interaction between job desirability, opportunities and warning of negative consequences (see Figures 3a and 3b). The pattern of results suggested that when there was a low chance of negative consequences for faking, people were more likely to lie if the job was highly desirable, but only if there were many similar opportunities.

Next, models with level 2 predictors were run to test hypotheses 7 and 8. The level 2 variables (Big Five personality traits and honesty-humility) were grand mean centred before being entered into analyses. The Big Five personality traits were entered into a multilevel analysis predicting faking likelihood/degree. None of the Big Five traits had a significant main effect. A similar result was found with a second analysis run with the same Big Five variables predicting lying. Thus, hypotheses 7a and 7b were not supported.

Honesty-humility was entered into a multilevel analysis predicting faking likelihood/degree. Honesty-humility had a significant negative effect on faking likelihood/degree, supporting hypothesis 8. This result suggests that those higher in honesty-humility intended to fake less than those lower in honesty-humility. To explore whether honesty-humility interacted with any of the situational cues or moderated interactions between the situational cues predicting faking likelihood/degree, a multilevel analysis was run on the final level 1 model predicting faking likelihood/degree with honesty-humility, the two-way interactions between honesty-humility and the independent variables and a three-way interaction between job desirability, opportunities and honesty-humility. The results are presented in Table 5. There was a significant interaction between honesty-humility and opportunities, but this was qualified by the significant three-way interaction between job desirability, opportunities and honesty-humility (see Figures 4a and 4b). These figures show the strong main effect of honesty-humility. The
Table 4

**Study 2: Regression Results for Level 1 Variables Predicting Lying**

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Figures 3a and 3b. Three-way interaction between job desirability, opportunities and warning of negative consequences predicting lying.
Table 5

Study 2: Multilevel Regression Results for Level 1 Variables and Honesty-humility Predicting Faking Likelihood/Degree

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<td>Warning Consequences</td>
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<td>Opportunities x Warning Verification</td>
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<td>Warning Verification x Honesty-humility</td>
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Figures 4a and 4b. Three-way interaction between job desirability, opportunities and honesty-humility predicting faking likelihood/degree.
pattern of the interaction in the figure suggests that among those low in honesty-humility, when there are many opportunities, faking is more likely when the job is highly desirable than when the job is undesirable.

Honesty-humility was then entered into a multilevel analysis predicting lying. Honesty-humility again had a large main effect, providing additional support for hypothesis 8. Honesty-humility, the two-way interactions between honesty-humility and the independent variables and a three-way interaction between job desirability, opportunities and honesty-humility were entered into a multilevel regression with the terms from the final level 1 model predicting lying. The results are presented in Table 6. The three-way interaction between job desirability, opportunities and honesty-humility was again significant (see Figures 5a and 5b). The pattern of this interaction appeared similar to the model with faking likelihood/degree as the criterion.
Table 6

Study 2: Multilevel Regression Results for Level 1 Variables and Honesty-humility Predicting Lying

<table>
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<td>Warning Verification</td>
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<td>Honesty-humility</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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<td>Job Desirability x Opportunities</td>
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<td>.006</td>
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<td>Job Desirability x Warning Consequences</td>
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<td>.018</td>
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<td>Opportunities x Warning Consequences</td>
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<td>.018</td>
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<td>Job Desirability x Honesty-humility</td>
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<td>Opportunities x Honesty-humility</td>
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<td>Warning Consequences x Honesty-humility</td>
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<td>Warning Verification x Honesty-humility</td>
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<td>.599</td>
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<td>Job Desirability x Opportunities x Warning Consequences</td>
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<td>.018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Job Desirability x Opportunities x Honesty-humility</td>
<td>-.074</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.017</td>
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</table>
Figures 5a and 5b. Three-way interaction between job desirability, opportunities and honesty-humility predicting lying.
Discussion

The results of the policy capturing experiment reinforce the results of Study 1 by replicating the main effect of job desirability and warnings on faking intentions. Specifically, participants intended to fake to a greater degree when job desirability was high, when there was a low chance of negative consequences for faking and when there was a low chance of response verification. Additionally, warning of negative consequences decreased the amount participants intended to lie. Opportunities did not have significant main effects on faking degree or lying. This may have been expected since, out of the four independent variables, it had the least influence on faking intentions in Study 1. It was, however, implicated in all of the significant higher order interactions.

The interactions between the independent variables clearly indicated that participants considered the situational motivators in the context of the levels of the other motivators and adjusted their intentions to fake accordingly. It does appear that the situational variables posed a dilemma for participants, who were “pushed” and “pulled” in different directions by the desirability of the job, the number of other opportunities and the warnings. Participants’ intentions to fake reflect tactical decisions to best position themselves for the job given the rewards and threats present in each scenario. Specifically, when the job was highly desirable but there were few opportunities like it, participants did not want to risk getting caught or being punished for faking. When both warnings were high and there were few opportunities, participants were less likely to intend to fake. Participants were more likely to lie on the personality questionnaire for their dream job only if there was a low chance of consequences and there were many opportunities. That is, faking was seen as a risk, likely due to the presence of the warnings, which could result in the loss of a valuable outcome (e.g., a chance at a dream job or a rare job).

Honesty-humility exhibited the hypothesized main effect on faking intentions, with those low in honesty-humility reporting higher intentions to fake. In cross-level analyses, honesty-
Humility was also found to interact with job desirability and opportunities on both of the intentions dependent variables. Significant cross-level interactions revealed that low honesty-humility individuals were more sensitive to the desirability of the job and the available opportunities when deciding whether to fake, while those high on honesty-humility were less likely to intend to fake even in the presence of a dream job and many opportunities. Although the low honesty-humility individuals were more opportunistic than those high in honesty-humility, the low honesty-humility participants still exhibited the same pattern of risk aversion, as they were more willing to fake on the questionnaire when the job was highly desirable and there were many, as opposed to few, other opportunities.

There were no significant effects for the Big Five personality traits. This result mirrors the findings in Study 1 with a different measure of the Big Five. The possible explanation provided for these null results in Study 1 was that strong situational variables limited the influence of traits (Mischel, 1977). However, that explanation doesn’t appear to hold in the case of the Study 2 results, as there was a significant amount of variance in the dependent variables (75.5% and 71.5%) that was attributed to the level 2 grouping variable (i.e., person) and honesty-humility was found to influence faking. Another possible explanation is provided by Tett et al.’s (2006) model of test item responding, which posits that the situation may activate relevant traits that will influence responses in that situation. For example, the situations and questions about the extent to which one might exaggerate their responses or lie to create a favourable impression may have activated the trait of honesty-humility, which is concerned with manipulating others for personal gain. On the contrary, the Big Five traits may have been less relevant for the situations under investigation, and thus would show no relation with faking intentions. This hypothesis is supported by research by Ashton and Lee and their colleagues (2008; Lee et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2008), which demonstrated that honesty-humility was a better predictor of honesty-related criteria than were the Big Five traits.
This study had several advantages, including examining multiple motivators simultaneously and investigating interactions between individual and situational factors. However, the policy capturing methodology has some important limitations. Although some steps were taken to strengthen external validity according to Karren and Barringer's (2002) recommendations, the policy capturing design by its nature is artificial because of the terse nature of the scenarios and the task of responding to a series of similar scenarios, so the question remains whether the results generalize. The final study in my dissertation addresses these limitations with an experiment more analogous to a real life employment selection situation.
Study 3

Study 3 was designed to extend Study 2 in several ways. First of all, it directly assessed the validity of expectancy theory as an explanatory mechanism for the relationship between the motivators (job desirability, warnings and opportunities) and faking intentions. As discussed in the Introduction, expectancy theory is useful for studying the strategy individuals choose when taking pre-employment personality tests because it was designed to predict the motivation to choose one act over the alternatives (Mitchell, 1974; Tubbs, Boehne, & Dahl, 1993). That is, an individual’s perceptions of the expectancy, instrumentality and valence of alternative actions (i.e., to respond honestly or dishonestly) should predict the degree to which they intend fake. Additionally, because expectancy theory takes the view that motivation is the result of a conscious consideration of alternatives and a rational, utility-maximizing decision making process (Miner, 2005), it should be appropriate for the study of competing motives in the conscious decision of how to respond to a high-stakes, pre-employment personality questionnaire.

Furthermore, expectancy theory has the potential to fill the need identified by Griffith and McDaniel (2006) for a “theoretical backbone” for the study of faking. One way in which expectancy theory might operate as a theoretical backbone is if the antecedents of faking supported by empirical research could be mapped onto the expectancy, instrumentality and valence elements of expectancy theory (see also Ellingson & McFarland, 2011). In this way, the components of expectancy theory would essentially function as mediators of the relationship between these antecedents and faking, offering an explanation of why the antecedents affect faking. If such relationships are born out in the present research, expectancy theory would have clear value as a theoretical foundation that could unify disparate research findings on antecedents of faking and guide future investigations (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011). In the present study, relationships between the motivators and the components of expectancy were examined, and the theory was used to predict faking intentions and behaviour.
Study 3 also addressed several methodological limitations of Study 2 and included a number of elements designed to enhance external validity. Study 3 used a more realistic warning manipulation, specifically, whether the warning was present or absent. In Study 2, the warning was always present, but varied at two different levels. The manipulation used in Study 3 is more representative of real life employment selection where organizations are unlikely to use a low chance warning. The warning absent control conditions also allow for a more informative look at whether the presence of a warning influences faking. Study 3 also utilized a field sample of job seekers, and used a specific job instead of the general “dream job” characterization in Study 2. Additionally, it examined whether the within-subjects relationships found in Study 2 would generalize to an experiment where participants are exposed to only one level of the motivators. Finally, Study 3 extended the results found in the previous two studies for faking intentions to faking behaviour on a personality questionnaire in a simulated applicant context. To keep the design of the study manageable, warning of response verification was omitted, since it had the weaker results out of the two warning variables in Study 2. Given the significant results for honesty-humility in Study 2, this personality variable was also included in Study 3.

Expectancy Theory

The present study investigated whether the expectancy, instrumentality and valence components of expectancy theory would predict intentions to fake. The original theory (Vroom, 1964) proposed that the expectancy about one’s ability to successfully carry out an action, beliefs about the instrumentality of that action for achieving higher-order goals and the perceived valence of those goals could be combined in a multiplicative fashion to predict the motivational force toward performing an action. Reviews of the expectancy theory literature by Van Eerde and Thierry (1996) and Ambrose and Kulik (1999) suggest that the expectancy, instrumentality and valence components of the theory are useful for predicting motivation, although these authors found that the multiplicative models proposed by Vroom did not offer better prediction than the individual components themselves. Based on this research, I
hypothesized that the expectancy, instrumentality and valence judgments would be individually related to intentions.²

_Hypothesis 9a:_ Expectancy of faking, instrumentality of faking for being hired, instrumentality of honest responding for being rejected and valence of faking will be positively related to intentions to fake.

_Hypothesis 9b:_ Expectancy of honest responding, instrumentality of responding honestly for being hired, instrumentality of faking for being rejected and valence of responding honestly will be negatively related to intentions to fake.

To help make the case for expectancy theory as a useful theoretical “backbone” for understanding faking motivation, Study 3 sought to demonstrate links between the three independent variables and the theory components. Instrumentality refers to the perceived probability that performance will lead to secondary outcomes, such as successful faking leading to getting hired. A warning that dishonesty will negatively impact an applicant’s chances at getting the job should impact perceptions of the instrumentality of faking and responding honestly. In effect, the warning explicitly states the likely instrumentality of faked responses, specifically, that faking will reduce the chances of being hired. As such, participants who receive a warning should have a more negative perception of the utility of faking for getting the job compared to participants who do not receive a warning. Additionally, the participants who receive a warning should have higher expectations that responding honestly will lead to getting hired compared to those who do not receive the warning. Furthermore, the perceived instrumentality of faking for getting passed over for the job should be higher among participants in the warning condition, and the perceived instrumentality of honest responding for getting passed over should be low, compared to those who do not receive a warning.

² It should be noted that the theory was not meant to predict performance per se, as performance is likely to be affected by ability and other variables outside of motivation (Mitchell, 1974). In line with this notion, Van Eerde and Thierry’s (1996) meta-analysis demonstrated that the components of expectancy theory predicted intentions and preferences better than behaviour. Thus, the present study focused on the relations between expectancy theory components and intentions.
Hypothesis 10a: Warning of negative consequence will be negatively related to the instrumentality of faking for getting hired.

Hypothesis 10b: Warning of negative consequence will be positively related to the instrumentality of faking for getting passed over.

Hypothesis 10c: Warning of negative consequences will be positively related to the instrumentality of honest responding for getting hired.

Hypothesis 10d: Warning of negative consequences will be negatively related to the instrumentality of honest responding for getting passed over.

A warning may also affect the valence of faking or responding honestly on the personality test. Valence refers to the anticipated satisfaction from performing an action or receiving a secondary outcome contingent on the performance. The presence of a warning of negative consequences is likely to decrease the anticipated satisfaction of faking because it introduces a possible negative outcome (i.e., exclusion from consideration for the job) for the action of faking. By the same token, a warning of negative consequences is likely to increase the valence of responding honestly, because the warning suggests that by responding honestly, one can avoid the negative consequence.

Hypothesis 11a: Warning of negative consequences will be negatively related to the valence of faking.

Hypothesis 11b: Warning of negative consequences will be positively related to the valence of responding honestly.

The perceived valence of faking and responding honestly may also be influenced by the test taker’s level of honesty-humility. Research by Lee, Ashton and colleagues (Lee et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2008) has shown that honesty-humility predicts scores on integrity tests, and recent research by de Vries and van Kampen (2010) also suggests that the honesty-humility dimension of the HEXACO model of personality is significantly (negatively) related to egoism, which is measured with items that indicate a permissive attitude toward lying. These associations with
integrity and attitudes toward lying suggest that individuals low in honesty-humility may assign a higher valence to faking than those high in honesty-humility, who are more likely to value honesty.

*Hypothesis 12a*: Honesty-humility will be negatively related to the valence of faking.

*Hypothesis 12b*: Honesty-humility will be positively related to the valence of responding honestly.

The valence of receiving a particular secondary outcome is likely to be influenced by variables that affect the attractiveness of the outcome. For example, the valence of getting hired for the job or getting passed over are likely to be influenced by factors that increase the appeal of the job, in this case job desirability and opportunities (Ellingson, 2012). Test takers who perceive the job to be highly desirable are likely to anticipate receiving more satisfaction from getting the job compared to those who consider the job to be less desirable. By the same token, those who perceive the job to be highly desirable are likely to anticipate feeling greater dissatisfaction if passed over for the job compared to those who thought less of the job.

Ellingson and McFarland (2011) also posited in their expectancy theory model of faking that job desirability should affect valence perceptions. The number of available job opportunities is also expected to affect the valence of getting and not getting the job. If a particular job is in short supply, it may be viewed as more valuable than when the supply is abundant and job applicants are likely to anticipate feeling more satisfied if they are successful in obtaining a rare job opportunity.

*Hypothesis 13a*: Job desirability will be positively related to the valence of getting hired.

*Hypothesis 13b*: Job desirability will be negatively related to the valence of getting passed over.

*Hypothesis 14a*: Opportunities will be negatively related to the valence of getting hired.

*Hypothesis 14b*: Opportunities will be positively related to the valence of getting passed over.
The expectancy component, which relates to the perception that effort can lead to successfully performing a particular behaviour (Ilgen, Nebeker, & Pritchard, 1981), should relate primarily to variables related to the ability to fake. As detailed in the introduction, such variables include the format, wording and scoring of the test items. For example, an applicant who is given a forced-choice personality scale with pairs of items matched for social desirability may have a low expectancy for successfully faking due to difficulty of identifying “ideal” responses. Expectancy may also be influenced by dispositional variables linked to the ability to fake, such as knowledge of the job or test, past attempts at faking personality questionnaires or general impression management and problem solving skills. As the current research is concerned with the motivation to fake and not the ability to fake, no hypothesized antecedents of expectancy were included in this study.

**Faking Behaviour**

McFarland and Ryan’s (2006) model of faking, which is based on the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), posits that intentions to fake directly affect faking behaviour. A significant amount of research has supported the proposition that intentions predict behaviour (Armitage & Conner, 2001), and both McFarland and Ryan (2006) and Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) found that intentions to fake were positively associated with faking behaviour. Based on this research, I predicted:

*Hypothesis 15:* Intentions to fake will positively predict faking on the Big 5 personality questionnaire.

A model summarizing the hypothesized relationships between the variables is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Model of hypothesized relationships tested in Study 3. Numbers on pathways refer to hypothesis numbers.
Method

Participants

A sample of job seekers from across Canada was recruited through a market research company that conducts online surveys. Invitations to participate were emailed to people who had voluntarily registered with the company. Five hundred and two people clicked on the link to take part in the survey. After reading the consent form, 476 people (95%) agreed to participate. Respondents were asked two questions to verify that they were in the eligible age range for the study (25-54 years old) and were currently looking for a new job. The age range was predetermined to capture a sample of people who would be in the workforce and who were in a different age range from the previous two studies. Of the willing participants, 241 people qualified for the study, and 86% completed the survey, giving a final sample of 208 job seekers. The sample was comprised of 103 females, 101 males, and 4 participants who did not indicate their gender. The sample had a mean age of 37.71 years ($SD = 9.26$). Ninety-four (45.2%) were employed full-time, 28.4% were unemployed, 15.4% were employed part-time, 3.4% were students, 2.9% were casual workers, 1.9% were self-employed, 1.4% were homemakers, 1 participant was a volunteer and 2 participants did not indicate their employment status. Twenty-five percent of the sample had completed a four year university degree, 22% completed some university, 17% completed high school, 13% completed a two year university degree, 5% completed graduate school, 2% completed junior high and 8% did not respond to this question.

Design

The study was designed to assess the effects of job desirability, opportunities and warning on faking-related outcomes. Job desirability was measured as a continuous variable, and opportunities and warning were manipulated in a fully crossed $2 \times 2$ between-subjects design. The two levels of opportunities were few and many, as in the previous two studies, and

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3 The market research company was not able to provide the exact number of survey invitations sent to its members.
the two warning conditions were present and absent. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. There were 53 participants in the few opportunities-warning absent condition; 53 participants in the many opportunities-warning absent condition; 53 participants in the many opportunities-warning present condition; and 49 participants in the few opportunities-warning present condition.

**Procedure**

The study was completed online. Participants first completed a measure of the Big Five personality dimensions and the honesty-humility scale from the HEXACO personality inventory. These measures served three purposes: 1) individual difference indicators of faking-related outcomes; 2) a baseline measure of personality; and 3) to familiarize participants with the type of personality questionnaire that they would be answering questions about in the study.

Participants were then presented with the job advertisement and the job desirability measure. Next participants were told to imagine for the purposes of this research that they would like to apply for the advertised job, and they were given the opportunity and warning manipulations.

For the opportunity manipulation, participants were told either that, “The Director of Guest Relations job at the Hilton is a very unique job. There are not a lot of jobs like this one, and opportunities to apply for this kind of job do not come along every day” in the few opportunities condition, or “The Director of Guest Relations job at the Hilton is not a particularly unique job. There are a lot of jobs like this one and opportunities to apply for this kind of job come along fairly often” in the many opportunities condition. They were then told, “As is common in this industry, you would be asked to complete a standard personality questionnaire as part of applying for this job, like the one you completed near the beginning of this survey.” If participants were in the warning present condition, they then read, “When filling out these types of personality questionnaires for a job application, it is important to be aware that dishonest responses will invalidate your results, that is, dishonest responses will result in you not being considered for the job.” In the warning absent condition, they received only the opportunity
manipulation and statement about completing a standard personality questionnaire as part of applying for this job.

Participants then responded to the intentions measure followed by the expectancy theory questionnaire. The Big Five personality questionnaire was presented next as a measure of faking behaviour. The instructions read, “Although the job is not currently being advertised, for the purposes of this research we ask that you please fill out the following personality questionnaire as you would if you were actually applying for the Director of Guest Relations job.” Directly following these instructions, participants were reminded of the opportunity manipulation with the statement, “Recall that there are not a lot of job opportunities like this one,” or, “Recall that there are a lot of job opportunities like this one that you could apply for,” and if they were in the warning present condition, told that “Dishonest responses would result in you not being considered for the job.” After completing the personality questionnaires, participants completed the demographic questionnaire and manipulation checks and were given a feedback letter explaining the study.

**Measures**

**Personality questionnaire.** The personality questionnaire consisted of the 50-item measure of the Big Five personality dimensions from the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 2006) used in Study 1 and the 16-item honesty-humility subscale from the HEXACO-PI-R (Ashton & Lee, 2008) that was used in Study 2. The coefficient alphas were as follows: .83 (neuroticism-baseline); .82 (extraversion-baseline); .71 (openness-baseline); .71 (agreeableness-baseline); .83 (conscientiousness-baseline); .82 (neuroticism-applicant); .82 (extraversion-applicant); .73 (openness-applicant); .79 (agreeableness-applicant); .86 (conscientiousness-applicant); and .77 (honesty-humility). Difference scores were created for each Big Five trait as a gauge of faking behavior, that is, how much participants inflated their responses under conditions to respond as an applicant. As in previous research (Burns & Christiansen, 2011; McFarland & Ryan 2000; 2006) this was done by subtracting the baseline
score from the applicant score, such that larger, positive difference scores represented greater faking. The coefficient alphas for the difference scores were as follows: .70 (neuroticism); .67 (extraversion); .33 (openness); .61 (agreeableness); .64 (conscientiousness).

**Job advertisement.** A pilot study was performed to select a job advertisement that would produce substantial variance in ratings of desirability. For the pilot study, five advertisements were written based on a review of job advertisements that were available from online job boards and company websites. Five different jobs were selected: a travel writer for the Globe and Mail newspaper; a manager at a Chapters bookstore; an associate at Google; an event programming manager at Ticketmaster; and a director of guest relations at Hilton Hotels. The jobs were chosen to be ranging in appeal and not prohibitive in qualifications. For the pilot study, 51 job seekers between the ages of 25 and 54 were recruited from the same market research company used for the focal study. The participants read all five job advertisements and the order of presentation was counterbalanced among participants. For each job they responded to five questions assessing desirability. The materials from the pilot study are presented in Appendix H. Responses to the item, “This sounds like a dream job to me” captured the full range of the 7-point scale and had a mean near the scale mid-point for three of the job advertisements. Of these three, the director of guest relations at Hilton Hotels had the greatest variability in responses ($M = 4.41$, $SD = 1.87$) suggesting that this job varied the most in terms of perceived desirability, so it was chosen for the focal study. The results for the other four jobs are presented in Appendix I.

**Job desirability scale.** The job desirability scale was constructed for the pilot study. It consisted of 5 items rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). The items were: “This is an attractive job,” “This sounds like a dream job to me,” “Based on the qualifications listed above, I believe I would be qualified for this job,” “I would apply for this job,” and “I would do whatever I could to get this job.” The alpha for the scale was .89.
Faking intentions. Intentions were measured with the three items that were used in Study 2. The stem, “If you were filling out the personality questionnaire to apply for the job as Director of Guest Relations for Hilton Hotels...” was included at the beginning of the measure. Unlike in Study 2, where the third faking intention item was less related to the other two items, in Study 3, the three items were similarly related and the coefficient alpha for the scale was high (.83). Thus, the faking intentions score used in Study 3 is an average of the three items.

Expectancy theory questionnaire. A 19-item questionnaire was created to measure expectancy associated with the level 1 outcomes (responding honestly and faking), instrumentality of each of the level 1 outcomes-level 2 outcome (getting hired, getting passed over) connections and valence of the level 1 and the level 2 outcomes. Consistent with recommendations by Ilgen, Nebeker and Pritchard (1981) and Tubbs, Boehne and Paese (1991), expectancy and instrumentality were measured with a probability scale. The scale had five response options: 1 = “No Chance”; 2 = “A Slight Chance”; 3 = “50-50 Chance”; 4 = “A Very Good Chance”; and 5 = “Certain this Will Happen”. A sample expectancy item is, “If you tried, what are the chances that you could successfully sell yourself on the personality questionnaire?” A sample instrumentality item is, “If you sell yourself on the personality questionnaire, what would you guess are your chances of getting hired for the Director of Guest Relations job?” Consistent with recommendations from Tubbs et al., valence was operationalized both in terms of satisfaction with, and attractiveness of, the outcomes. Satisfaction and attractiveness were highly correlated, and so they were averaged. Satisfaction and attractiveness were measured on 7 point scales with anchors at 1 (“Not Satisfying/Very Unattractive”), 4 (“Moderately Satisfying/Neither Attractive nor Unattractive”) and 7 (“Very Satisfying/Very Attractive”). Sample valence items are, “How satisfying would it be to successfully sell yourself on the personality questionnaire?” and “How attractive would it be to get the Director of Guest Relations job?” The expectancy theory questionnaire is presented in Appendix J.
**Manipulation checks and demographic questionnaire.** To verify that participants observed the opportunity manipulation, participants were asked, “According to the information provided in the survey, how rare is the director of guest relations job opportunity?” accompanied by a scale ranging from 1 (“Rare- not a lot of other job opportunities like this one”) to 7 (“Common- lots of other job opportunities like this one”). To assess perceptions of the warning, participants were asked “According to the information provided in the survey, how likely is it that dishonest questionnaire responses will result in not getting the director of guest relations job?” and they answered on a five-point scale with the anchors 1 (“Not at all likely”) and 5 (“Very likely”). Participants also reported their gender, age and employment status. Information about participants’ education level was obtained from the market research company.
Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 7. The demographic variables were generally unrelated to the independent and dependent variables, with the exception of faking intentions, which was significantly correlated with gender, $r = -.18$, $p < .01$, age, $r = -.14$, $p < .05$, and education, $r = .15$, $p < .05$. The regression analyses testing the hypotheses described below were run with these demographic variables entered in the first step. The same terms were significant when the demographic variables were and were not included for almost all of the analyses and the estimates varied little. Because there were no a priori predictions about relationships involving demographic variables, the simpler analyses without these variables are presented.

Manipulation Checks

A 2 (opportunity) x 2 (warning) ANOVA on the opportunity manipulation check item revealed a significant main effect for the opportunities manipulation. Participants who were told that there were few jobs like the Director of Guest Relations position indicated that there were significantly fewer opportunities, $M = 2.32$, $SD = 1.60$, $n = 102$, than those who were told that there were a lot of similar opportunities, $M = 4.00$, $SD = 2.15$, $n = 106$, $F(1, 204) = 40.88$, $p < .001$. As expected, there was no significant main effect for the warning condition, $F(1, 204) = 1.72$, n.s., nor was there an interaction between opportunities and warnings, $F(1, 204) = .10$, n.s., on the opportunity manipulation check question.

A 2 (opportunity) x 2 (warning) ANOVA on the warning manipulation check item failed to show a significant main effect for the warning manipulation. Participants in the warning present, $M = 3.58$, $SD = 1.50$, $n = 102$, and absent, $M = 3.50$, $SD = 1.29$, $n = 106$, conditions did not differ in their perception of the likelihood that dishonest questionnaire responses would result in them failing to get the job, $F(1, 202) = .15$, n.s. As expected, there was no significant main effect for the opportunity condition, $F(1, 202) = 1.00$, n.s., nor was there an interaction between opportunities and warnings, $F(1, 202) = .57$, n.s., on the warning manipulation check question.
Table 7

*Study 3: Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations*

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<td>-.34**</td>
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Note. Ns between 168 and 208 as a result of missing data.

**p < .01; *p < .05.
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<td>16. Instrumentality-Faking-Hired</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Instrumentality-Faking-Passed Over</td>
<td>.55**  .02  .07  -.21**</td>
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<td>18. Valence-Faking</td>
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<td>19. Valence-Hired</td>
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<td>20. Valence-Passed Over</td>
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<td>24. Extraversion-Applicant</td>
<td>-.07  .15*  .24**  .23**  -.12  .01  .25**  -.22**  -.04  -.54**  .50**</td>
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Table 7 continued

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<td>31. Conscientiousness -</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
The fact that the means on the warning manipulation check score were nearly identical for the warning present and warning absent groups suggests that the warning manipulation failed to affect participants’ perceptions that there would be negative consequences for faking. The large standard deviation on the warning manipulation check score for both the warning present and warning absent groups also indicates that there was a lot of variability in the perception of negative consequences for faking, with many participants in the warning present condition believing that it was unlikely that there would be consequences for faking, and many participants in the warning absent condition inferring that there were consequences for faking. Although it is not clear why the warning manipulation was ineffective, some possible explanations are explored in the Discussion section below. In testing hypotheses that included predictions about warnings, the warning manipulation check score was used as an indicator of the perception that there were consequences for faking.

**Main Analyses**

In the sections that follow, I first examine whether the results of Study 2 were replicated in Study 3, and whether the results of Study 2 can be extended to faking behaviour in a simulated applicant context. Then I examine whether incorporating the components of expectancy theory can aid in the prediction and understanding of faking.

**Replication and Extension of Study 2**

I examined whether the main effects and interactions between the independent variables on faking intentions found in Study 2 would replicate with a new design and non-student sample. To examine the impact of job desirability, opportunities, and the warning manipulation check score on faking intentions, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted with the main effects, two- and three-way interactions between these variables entered on successive steps (see Table 8). The continuous variables (job desirability and warning manipulation check score) were centred for this analysis and all subsequent regression analyses.
Table 8

Study 3: Regression Results for Job Desirability, Opportunities and Warning Manipulation Check Score Predicting Faking Intentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.279</td>
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<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Desirability</td>
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<td>.705</td>
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<tr>
<td>Opportunities</td>
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<td>.204</td>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning Manipulation Check Score</td>
<td>-.127</td>
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<td>.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Desirability x Opportunities</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning Manipulation Check x Opportunities</td>
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<td>.616</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warning Manipulation Check x Job Desirability</td>
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<td>.069</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Desirability x Opportunities x Warning Manipulation Check</td>
<td>.184</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.046</td>
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</table>

*Note. Terms are from the final step of the hierarchical regression.*
The main effects were entered on the first step. This step was not significant, $R^2 = .02, p > .05$, suggesting that the main effects of job desirability found in Study 2 did not replicate with the Study 3 sample. The $R^2$ change for the second step with the two-way interactions was also not significant, $\Delta R^2 = .01$, but adding the three-way interaction did produce a significant $R^2$ change, $\Delta R^2 = .02, p < .05$. The three-way interaction was followed up by testing for two-way interactions between opportunities and job desirability at one standard deviation above and below the mean on the warning manipulation check score (see Figures 7a and 7b). There was a significant two-way interaction between job desirability and opportunities evaluated at a standard deviation below the mean warning manipulation check score, $B = -.371, p = .05$, but the two-way interaction evaluated at a standard deviation above the mean was not significant, $B = .142, p > .05$. As can be seen in Figure 7b, in the low warning manipulation check score there was a significant effect of opportunities at high job desirability, $B = -1.012, p < .05$ but not at low job desirability, $B = .116, p > .05$.

This result suggests that when participants believed there was a low likelihood of consequences for faking and the job was considered highly desirable, participants were more likely to intend to fake when there were few opportunities. When the job was less desirable, the number of other job opportunities did not affect intentions to fake. On the other hand, when participants believe there is a high likelihood of negatives consequences for faking, they are not influenced by the desirability of the job or the number of other opportunities; they intend to fake a moderate amount across conditions and are not tempted to fake more for a rare, desirable job. Interestingly, Figure 7b is almost a mirror image to Figure 3b from Study 2, which showed that participants were more likely to intend to fake when warnings were low, job desirability was high, and there were many opportunities. In both Studies 2 and 3, there was no effect of opportunities when job desirability was low and the warning (or warning manipulation check score) was low; however, it is interesting that the effect of opportunities when job desirability was high is reversed between the two studies. This difference could be due to the participant
Figures 7a and 7b. Three-way interaction between job desirability, opportunities, and warning manipulation check score on faking intentions.

*p < .05.
samples or designs used in each study, as discussed in greater detail in the Discussion section below.

To determine whether honesty-humility would have a main effect on faking intentions and interact with the independent variables to impact intentions as it did in Study 2, a hierarchical regression was performed with all four main effects (job desirability, opportunities, warning manipulation check scores and honesty-humility) and higher-order interactions entered on successive steps (see Table 9). The first step with the four main effects was significant, $R^2 = .12$, $p < .001$, but only the honesty-humility term was a significant predictor, $B = -.774$, $p < .001$. The $\Delta R^2$ for the second, third, and fourth steps were not significant ($\Delta R^2 = .02; .04; \text{ and } .00$, respectively), suggesting that, unlike in Study 2, honesty-humility did not interact with job desirability and opportunities to influence faking intentions.

In addition to faking intentions, Study 3 extended Study 2 by also examining faking behaviour on the personality questionnaire in a simulated applicant context. Paired sample $t$-tests between the baseline and applicant personality scores suggested that participants did significantly improve their scores to create a more favourable impression when instructed to respond as an applicant. Applicant scores on the neuroticism scale were significant lower than the baseline scores, $t(187) = 4.67$, $p < .001$, and participants significantly increased their scores on the extraversion, $t(183) = -4.72$, $p < .001$, agreeableness, $t(187) = -5.762$, $p < .001$, and conscientiousness scales, $t(186) = -4.53$, $p < .001$. Scores on the applicant openness scale did not differ from baseline scores, $t(184) = -1.52$, $p > .05$. This finding is consistent with previous research that has found no evidence of faking on the openness trait (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2006). Participants in this study raised their scores by between one-quarter and one-third of a standard deviation. This result is in line with field studies of applicants summarized by Tett et al. (2006), who reported an average score inflation of .35 standard deviations. Additionally, applicant scores on the Big Five traits were more highly correlated than the baseline trait scores, to a similar degree as in previous simulated applicant studies (e.g., McFarland & Ryan,
Table 9

*Study 3: Regression Results for Job Desirability, Opportunities, Warning Manipulation Check Score and Honesty-humility Predicting Faking Intentions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
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<td>.181</td>
<td>.375</td>
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</table>

*Note.* Terms are from the final step of the hierarchical regression.
These results suggest that the instruction to respond as an applicant was successful in eliciting faking behaviour.

Hypothesis 15 stated that intentions would significantly predict faking behaviour. As can be seen by examining the correlations between faking intentions and the Big Five personality difference scores in Table 7, the faking intentions score was significantly correlated with the agreeableness difference score in the expected direction, $r = .20$, $p < .01^4$. Since intentions were not related to the other Big Five traits, hypothesis 15 obtained minimal support.

**Expectancy Theory Results**

As an initial step in evaluating the usefulness of expectancy theory as a predictor of faking, a regression analysis was performed to explore how much variance in faking intentions is explained by the expectancy theory variables. The model included two expectancy variables (expectancy of faking and expectancy of honest responding), four instrumentality variables (instrumentality of faking for getting hired, faking for getting passed over, honest responding for getting hired, and honest responding for getting passed over) and four valence variables (valence of faking, responding honestly, getting hired and getting passed over). The results showed that these independent variables explained 20.6% of the variance in faking intentions, suggesting that the expectancy theory variables are an important predictor of intentions.

Hypothesis 9a and 9b suggested that the components of expectancy theory would significantly predict faking intentions. Three regressions were performed to test the separate effects of expectancy, instrumentality and valence on faking intentions. In the first regression,

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4 Although difference scores represent the most direct measure of faking behaviour (Burns & Christiansen, 2011), one potential limitation of difference scores is they obfuscate relationships between independent variables and the component measures of the difference score (Burns & Christiansen, 2011; Edwards, 1995). Thus, a variable may be correlated with a difference score solely because it is correlated with one of the component measures that comprises the difference score. This could be problematic in the present case if the significant correlation between faking intentions and the agreeableness difference score is being driven by the correlation between faking intentions and the baseline agreeableness score and not in fact by the inflation in scores from baseline to applicant administrations. To avoid this limitation of difference scores, Burns and Christiansen (2011) recommend regressing the faked scores on to honest scores and using the residual scores in place of algebraic difference scores. This was done with the agreeableness scores, and it resulted in the same conclusion as with the difference score.
expectancy for responding honestly and expectancy for faking were entered together as predictors of intentions. The model was significant, $R^2 = .14$, $p < .001$. As expected, expectancy of faking positively predicted intentions to fake, $B = .36$, $p < .005$, and expectancy of responding honestly negatively predicted intentions to fake, $B = -.57$, $p < .001$.

A second regression tested the four instrumentality variables as predictors of intentions. The model was significant, $R^2 = .07$, $p < .01$. As expected, the terms for the instrumentality of faking for getting hired, $B = .302$, $p < .05$, and the instrumentality of responding honestly for getting hired, $B = -.315$, $p < .05$, were both significant in the predicted direction. However, instrumentality of both faking, $B = .082$, $p > .05$, and responding honestly, $B = .234$, $p > .05$, for getting passed over were not significant predictors.

The third regression examined whether valence of responding honestly and the valence of faking explained intentions to fake. The model was significant, $R^2 = .08$, $p < .001$, and both valence of responding honestly, $B = -.26$, $p < .001$, and valence of faking, $B = .18$, $p < .01$, were significant predictors in the expected direction.

In summary, the expectancy theory variables, with the exception of instrumentality of both faking and responding honestly for getting passed over, were significant predictors of intentions to fake, providing a good deal of support for hypotheses 9a and 9b. The variables explained a significant proportion of the variance in intentions and predicted intentions in the expected direction.

**Independent Variables Predicting Expectancy Theory Variables**

Upon demonstrating that expectancy theory is a valid model for predicting intentions to fake, the next step is to establish a link between the independent variables examined in this study (job desirability, opportunities and warning) and the expectancy theory variables. Hypotheses 10a through 10d concerned the influence of the warning on the instrumentality variables. Although these hypotheses cannot be tested directly because the warning manipulation failed, I examined the correlations between the warning manipulation check score
and the instrumentality variables to determine if the perception of consequences for faking related to instrumentality in a manner consistent with the hypotheses. The warning manipulation check score was significantly correlated with the instrumentality of honest responding for getting hired, $r = .19$, $p < .01$, but the correlations with the instrumentalities of honest responding for getting rejected, $r = .05$, faking for getting hired, $r = .06$, and faking for getting rejected, $r = -.02$, were non-significant.

It was also expected that the warning would affect the valence, or anticipated satisfaction, of faking and responding honestly because the warning introduces a possible negative outcome (i.e., exclusion from consideration for the job) for the action of faking. Hypothesis 11a predicted that the warning of negative consequences would be negatively associated with the valence of faking and hypothesis 11b posited that the warning would be positively associated with the valence of responding honestly. Again, these hypotheses cannot be tested because the warning manipulation failed. Instead, I correlated the warning manipulation check score with the valence variables to examine whether the perception of consequences for faking was related to valence judgments in a manner consistent with the hypotheses. The warning manipulation check score was significantly correlated with the valence of responding honestly, $r = .22$, $p < .01$, but not with the valence of faking, $r = .10$, n.s., suggesting that the perception that faking would lead to negative consequences was associated with a greater anticipated satisfaction from responding honestly.

Hypothesis 12a stated that participants low in honesty-humility would anticipate greater satisfaction from faking than those high in honesty-humility, and hypothesis 12b predicted that those high in honesty-humility would anticipate greater satisfaction from responding honestly. The correlation between honesty-humility and the valence of faking was non-significant, $r = -.08$, $p > .05$, failing to support hypothesis 12a. However, honesty-humility was significantly correlated with the valence of honest responding, $r = .33$, $p < .01$, which supports hypothesis 12b.
It was hypothesized that job desirability would be related to the valence of getting hired and the valence of getting passed over, such that higher ratings of job desirability would be associated with higher anticipated satisfaction of getting hired (hypothesis 13a) and lower anticipated satisfaction of getting passed over (hypothesis 13b). Job desirability was significantly positively correlated with the valence of getting hired, \( r = .56, p < .001 \), but was not correlated with the valence of getting passed over, \( r = .08, p > .05 \). It was also hypothesized that opportunities would also be related to the valence of getting hired and the valence of getting passed over, such that fewer opportunities would be associated with greater anticipated satisfaction from getting the job (hypothesis 14a) and lower anticipated satisfaction from getting passed over (hypothesis 14b). However, opportunities was not significantly correlated with either valence of getting hired, \( r = -.03, p > .05 \), or the valence of getting passed over, \( r = -.07, p > .05 \), failing support either hypothesis 14a or 14b.

In summary, there was limited evidence that the independent variables (job desirability, opportunities, perception of consequences for faking and honesty-humility) predicted the instrumentality and valence components of expectancy theory, as only a few of the predicted relationships were supported.
Discussion

The main purpose of Study 3 was to test whether expectancy theory could explain the effects of situational and individual difference variables on intentions to fake. To investigate this notion, regression and correlational analyses were conducted between the independent variables, the expectancy theory components, and faking intentions. The results of the study suggested that expectancy theory showed some promise for predicting faking intentions. Specifically, it was found that expectancy for both faking and honest responding, the instrumentalities for faking and honest responding for getting hired, and the valence of faking and honest responding were significantly related to intentions to fake in the expected direction. This suggests that the degree to which participants intended to fake was partly a product of their perceptions of expectancy of their ability to respond to the personality questionnaire, their perceptions of the instrumentality of their responses for achieving second-level outcomes (i.e., getting hired) and the perceived valence of faking or being honest. However, there were few significant relationships between the expectancy theory components and job desirability, opportunities or the perception of negative consequences for faking. If these variables had had stronger and more consistent relationships with theoretically-related expectancy theory components, it would have made a stronger case for the usefulness of expectancy theory in explaining faking.

There may be several reasons why there wasn’t stronger evidence for these relationships. For example, Ellingson and McFarland (2011) posit several situational and individual difference variables that should be positively and negatively related to faking, suggesting that it could be the case that the three variables considered in the present study count for a small portion of the variance in participants’ expectancy, instrumentality and valence beliefs. Additionally, the argument that expectancy theory explains the relationships between the antecedent variables and faking intentions would ideally be tested with mediation analysis. Although this makes sense theoretically, it was not feasible in the present study. The complex
higher-order interactions predicting faking intentions suggested that mediated moderation was most appropriate, but given the relatively small sample of participants, this analysis was unfeasible.

An additional factor potentially accounting for non-significant relationships between the independent variables and expectancy theory might be the operationalization of some the expectancy theory variables. For example, the fact that job desirability was significantly associated with the valence of getting hired, but not of getting rejected may be due to the wording of the items assessing the valence of getting rejected. These items asked participants how satisfying and attractive it would be to get passed over for the job. This phrasing violates conversational norms, possibly introducing measurement error. In everyday discourse speakers do not normally ask how satisfying a negative outcome would be and people do not naturally evaluate potential negative outcomes in terms of positive emotions. Holbrook, Krosnick, Carson and Mitchell (2000) found that questionnaire items that violate conversational norms resulted in longer response times and an inconsistent pattern of results.

This study provided some support for Ellingson and McFarland's (2011) expectancy theory model of faking in demonstrating that the expectancy theory components predict the motivation to fake. Additionally, their prediction that job desirability would relate to valence was partially supported. The present research tentatively suggests that their framework could be modified to include relationships between warnings and both valence and instrumentality in addition to their hypothesized relationship with expectancy beliefs. However, since the warning manipulation was not success in the present research, further research on this point is needed.

In replicating Study 2, Study 3 provided further evidence that job desirability, the perception of negative consequences for faking, and the quantity of other job opportunities interact to influence test takers’ intentions to fake on a personality questionnaire, although the pattern of the interaction was different than observed in Study 2. Specifically, in Study 3, participants had higher intentions to fake when they did not believe there were consequences
for faking, the job was highly desirable and there were few other job opportunities. In Study 2, intentions to fake were greater when warnings were low, the job was highly desirable and there were many opportunities. It could be that the sample of job seekers in Study 3 may have been more motivated to try to give themselves an advantage for a rare, desirable job while the student sample in Study 2 may have been more cautious when they were told there were fewer opportunities. Participants in Study 2 may have been more cautious in their intentions to fake compared to those in Study 3 because warnings were much more salient in Study 2, as every scenario contained two warnings.

It is not clear why the warning manipulation did not function as intended in Study 3, since it was very similar to what was used in Studies 1 and 2, and was closely modeled after warnings used successfully by other researchers (e.g., Dwight & Donovan, 2003). It appeared that some of the participants who were presented with the warning did not notice it. The study did contain a lot of information about the job and the application context for participants to read and remember, so the warning may not have been salient enough. Perhaps combining the warning of negative consequences with the warning of response verification used in Study 2 would have resulted in a more salient, believable or potent warning. Dwight and Donovan found that the combination of a warning that faking can be identified with a warning that faking will result in the applicant’s removal from the applicant pool had a greater effect on reducing faking than either warning alone. Among those who did not receive the warning, a substantial number indicated that the survey did say that faking would result in negative consequences. It is possible that some of these participants may have read into the expectancy theory questions and took the questions asking about consequences for faking as if it was a warning. Although it is popular for authors to recommend the use of warnings in selection, there is very little research testing the efficacy and boundary conditions of warnings. Given the lack of clear results for the efficacy of the warning manipulation in the present study and the small number of existing studies on warnings, future research on the effectiveness of warnings for reducing faking is needed.
Although participants improved their scores on four of the Big Five personality traits when responding as if they were applying for a job, intentions to fake predicted faking only on the agreeableness questionnaire items. It may be that agreeableness items were seen as most relevant to the job, as the job advertisement indicated that the job required excellent interpersonal skills. Perhaps participants who intended to fake to try to get the job made a point of inflating responses to items that were related to interpersonal skill, which would fall under the agreeableness domain. Research by Furnham (1990) and Tett, Freund, Christiansen, Fox, and Coaster (2012) supports the notion that test takers do engage in this type of strategic faking whereby they inflate responses to create an impression that is tailored for a specific job.

Study 3 had several strengths, including the field sample of job seekers and the between-subjects experimental design. One significant limitation of the study is the fact that the warning manipulation was not successful, which prevents drawing any causal inferences on the effects of warnings and makes it difficult to compare the results of Study 3 with the previous two studies. An additional limitation in what can be learned from Study 3 concerns the use of the warning manipulation check score in place of the manipulated variable. It is unclear whether participants’ perception of negative consequences for faking is the result of an individual difference trait, pre-existing belief about employment selection, or response to some piece of information in the study materials, other than the warning manipulation. It would be interesting for future research to explore what variable or variables might explain individual variance in this perception and whether it is stable across situations to provide insight into how this variable fits with existing theoretical models and empirical research on faking.
General Discussion

I had three goals in carrying out the present research: 1) to empirically test the effects of several situational and individual difference antecedents of faking motivation proposed in the existing models (e.g., Goffin & Boyd, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson, et al., 2006; Snell et al., 1999; Tett et al., 2006) on the intention to fake; 2) to examine how and when the antecedents interacted to predict faking intentions; and 3) to apply expectancy theory to applicant faking. The first goal was achieved with Study 1, which examined the effect of 12 situational variables on intentions to fake. The results of Study 1 demonstrated that there are several variables that affect the motivation to fake, most notably, the desirability of the job, the use of personality questionnaire as the sole factor in making hiring decisions, warnings of negative consequences of faking, warning of response verification and perceptions of the number of other available job opportunities. Although the design of the study was quite basic, it represents an important contribution to the field because previous research on applicant faking has been predominantly focused on analyzing and reducing applicants’ ability to fake, and the extant empirical research on applicants’ motivation to fake was limited to the effects of warnings. Study 1 supported many of the predictions of the existing models of faking, and highlighted several motivational variables that were found to affect intentions to fake that had not previously received any attention in the literature.

Studies 2 and 3 were designed to examine why these variables affect faking intentions, and explore how they work in concert to affect responses to a personality test. As articulated in the second goal of this research, I argued that these variables give rise to distinct motives for how to respond to a personality test, and the confluence of these variables in selection create a dilemma as a result of conflicting motives. The policy capturing methodology used in Study 2 presented participants with four variables (job desirability, warning of negative consequences, warning of response verification and opportunities) that were varied across 16 scenarios. The results showed very clearly that test takers were not uniformly motivated to obtain the highest
possible score in every selection context, as the mean faking intentions (likelihood/degree) score was just below the midpoint of the scale at 3.66 on a 7-point scale ($SD = 1.51$). The results showed that the amount that participants intended to fake varied according to the particular levels of the independent variables such that participants were more likely to fake for a highly desirable job and were less likely to fake when warnings were present.

Beyond these main effects, the results from Studies 2 and 3 support the notion that the independent variables work in concert to affect faking intentions. Depending on the levels of warnings, perceptions of negative consequences for faking, the desirability of the job and the number of other opportunities, applicants may experience multiple conflicting motivations when deciding whether to fake, such as maximizing their score, avoiding arousing suspicion and getting caught for faking, not losing out on a desirable job and avoiding the effort involved in faking. These motives may be more or less pressing in different situations and applicants have to decide the degree of faking that is warranted in each situation. Much of the existing literature on applicant faking paints applicants only as opportunistic (Griffith et al., 2006), and few existing studies have considered the effects of different factors on the motivation to fake.

The present research is the first to demonstrate that the desirability of the job, the number of other opportunities and warning applicants against faking interact to influence the degree to which test takers are motivated to fake and adds to a small number of existing studies demonstrating that applicants may have different types of motives in their decision of how to respond to a personality questionnaire (cf., Kuncel & Tellegen, 2009; Levin & Zickar, 2002; Robie et al., 2007; Zickar, Gibby & Robie, 2004). Although both Study 2 and Study 3 showed evidence that interactions among job desirability, the presence of warnings, the perception of negative consequences for faking and opportunities influence the degree to which test takers intend to fake, because the results were not consistent across the two studies, further research is needed before we can fully understand – and predict – how applicants are likely to resolve the competing motives and respond to a pre-employment personality questionnaire.
The third goal of this research was to investigate expectancy theory as a means of explaining the effect of situational and individual difference variables on faking. Study 3 included a measure of the expectancy, instrumentality and valence components of expectancy theory, and investigated the link between the independent variables, expectancy theory and faking intentions. The results of the study showed few connections between the independent variables and the expectancy theory components, but expectancy, instrumentality and valence perceptions were significantly related to faking intentions. Thus, the results of Study 3 provided some preliminary evidence that expectancy theory is useful for predicting faking intentions, but the question of whether expectancy theory can account for the influence of situational and individual difference variables on faking intentions remains uncertain.

A further novel aspect of the present research was in demonstrating that honesty-humility affects intentions to fake. Studies 2 and 3 showed that high honesty-humility individuals intended to fake less than low honesty-humility individuals. Study 2 found that high honesty-humility individuals were not as sensitive to changes in the desirability of the job or the number of other opportunities, although this interaction was not replicated in Study 3. This research provides some support of the findings from two previous studies (Hilbig & Zettler, 2009; Zettler & Hilbig, 2010) that found that low honesty-humility individuals were more sensitive to situational variables than those high in honesty-humility. However, because there is little existing research and theory in this area, further study is needed.

**Theoretical Implications**

The present research has several implications for the models of applicant faking proposed by Goffin and Boyd (2009), McFarland and Ryan (2000), Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006), Snell et al. (1999) and Tett et al. (2006). First, it provides support for several of the antecedents proposed in some of the existing models of faking, specifically, warnings, job desirability and opportunities. The current research also suggests that adding honesty-humility to models of faking could be useful. One significant limitation of the existing models is that none
propose interactions among situational and individual difference variables. In fact, to my knowledge, there has been only one study that has examined interactions among multiple motivational antecedents of faking intentions (Ramsay et al., 2006). Although the models include several situational and individual difference variables which are not mutually exclusive, and prominent scholars have called for researchers to simultaneously examine several aspects of the selection context (e.g., Hough & Oswald, 2008, Dilchert et al., 2006), there has not been any theoretical discussion of potential interactions among these variables.

Going forward, it would be beneficial for models to include a treatment of such interactions. Furthermore, the current research, together with a few recent publications (e.g., Kuncel & Tellegen, 2009; Levin & Zickar, 2002; Robie et al., 2007; Zickar et al., 2004), suggest that different combinations of situational and individual difference variables will give rise to different degrees of faking. Future theories of applicant faking should describe not only different types of fakers that inflate scores to varying degrees (e.g., slight vs. extreme fakers; Robie et al., 2007; Zickar et al., 2004), but also the different situational inducements that will give rise to varying levels of faking. Researchers should work toward developing a taxonomy based on situational and individual variables that would be able to explain variability in faking. For example, Kelley, Holmes, Kerr, Reis, Rubsult and Van Lange (2003) developed a catalogue of the most common interpersonal situations. A similar effort to describe the common selection situations would be valuable for understanding and predicting of faking.

The present research also provides some support for the model of faking developed by Ellingson (2012) and Ellingson and McFarland (2011) in that it demonstrated that expectancy, instrumentality and valence are related to intentions to fake. Ellingson and McFarland are to be lauded for developing a model of faking motivation based on a well-researched motivational theory in an area of research where theory is lacking. The present research is only the second attempt I am aware of (with McFarland and Ryan, 2006, being the first), to empirically test a formal theory to explain why applicants may be motivated to fake. The lack of theory in this
literature has impeded insight into the nature of applicant faking (Griffith & McDaniel, 2006; Griffith & Peterson, 2011). As the theories that have been tested to date (expectancy theory and the theory of planned behaviour) have received only partial support, more empirical work and theory development is needed.

**Practical Implications**

The most critical implication for practice is that this research showed that faking is a multi-faceted issue and a multiply determined behaviour. The three studies suggest that it is useful to understand the perceived levels of warnings, job desirability and opportunities in order to accurately anticipate the amount of faking that is likely to be present in an applicant sample. In some cases, test takers may be expected to inflate their scores by nearly half a point on a five point scale, while in other cases the score inflation is minimal. Taking these factors into account should enable practitioners to make a more informed decision about applicant faking is likely to undermine the use of personality testing in a given selection context.

Warnings are the variable that practitioners have the most control over, and would seem to provide the most straightforward intervention against faking; however, the results of the present research suggest that there should not be a uniform strategy to their use. The efficacy of a warning appears to depend on the levels of job desirability and opportunities, as well as how salient the warning is to the applicant. As shown in Study 2, when there are many opportunities, the warning carries less weight, particularly when the job is highly desirable. Study 3, which was more similar to a real selection situation than Study 2, showed that it is important to consider whether the warnings will stand out to applicants and come across as believable. It is not presently known what factors influence the salience or efficacy of warnings.

Dwight and Donovan’s (2003) meta-analysis suggested that warnings can have a small but significant effect on reducing faking, but there was quite a range in the effect size estimates of the studies in their sample. This variability suggests that there could be potential moderators of this effect. Although warnings are often recommended as an easy and low-cost option for
deterring faking, warnings are not benign. Vasilopoulos and colleagues (2003) demonstrated that the use of warnings resulted in a significant correlation between some of the Big Five personality scales and intelligence, suggesting that warnings complicate the task of responding to the personality test and increase cognitive load such that the personality scales become an indicator of intelligence as well as personality. Additionally, there are ethical issues associated with the use of warnings. Currently, effective methods for detecting faking do not exist, and so telling applicants that faking can be detected could be construed as a breach of professional ethics (Goffin & Woods, 1995; Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). Thus, the decision about whether to use warnings on pre-employment personality tests is not straightforward, and practitioners must weigh the potential benefits of the warnings for reducing faking, ideally with an understanding of the levels of perceived job desirability and opportunities present in the particular selection context, with the potential costs, including cognitive load and ethical considerations.

A third practical consideration concerns applicants’ other job opportunities. This variable emerged as a potent moderator of the effects of the other variables on faking, and played a role in affecting the particular motive applicants chose to use in responding to the personality test. To anticipate how opportunities may influence test takers’ motivation to fake, it may be useful for practitioners to collect information on the labour market, including applicant perceptions of the labour market, for the particular positions they are trying to fill. Practitioners could also be in a position to influence applicants’ labour market perceptions. In the present research, test takers were informed of the amount of other job opportunities. Practitioners may consider informing applicants about the current labour market, if, considering whether or not warnings will be used and how desirable the job is likely to be, knowledge about other opportunities would be expected to limit faking.

**Strengths and Limitations**

The approach taken in the present research to use Study 1 to identify variables to examine in Studies 2 and 3 has both strengths and limitations. I conducted Study 1 to determine
which of twelve different motivators had the largest affect on faking intentions. Given the dearth of existing research on these variables, this approach was useful, and one could argue necessary, in directing the more involved studies that followed. The fact that all the variables identified in Study 1 were found to relate to faking intentions in the subsequent studies supports the importance of these variables, but there is no way of knowing if some of the other variables examined in Study 1 could have had as strong or stronger direct or indirect effects on faking intentions if they had been included in the subsequent studies. Study 1 served an important role in informing Studies 2 and 3, but it is important for future research to continue to examine the remaining variables from Study 1 using different methodologies to further understand their possible effects on faking.

The interactions examined in Studies 2 and 3 were exploratory, as all possible interactions among the three or four motivators from Study 1 were tested. While necessary because of a lack of existing theory or research to guide specific predictions, this exploratory approach capitalizes on chance. Although a similar pattern of findings emerged in both Studies 2 and 3, future research should attempt to replicate these higher-order interactions.

Another potential limitation is that the job desirability and opportunity variables were not manipulated independently of one another. In Study 2, the “many” level of the opportunity variable was operationalized as “There are several other jobs that you can apply for that are similar to this one.” The reference “to this one” was likely interpreted by test takers in light of the job desirability cue (e.g., dream job or not dream job). That is, the meaning of the “many” opportunities cue varied depending on the level of the job desirability cue in the same scenario. In Study 3, the opportunity manipulation also made specific reference to the Director of Guest Relations job, which was the source of job desirability rating. The implication of this dependence is that opportunities will offer less unique variance over and above job desirability and it is only when interactions are examined that the more nuanced variance in that factor emerges. Thus,
the fact that opportunities had no main effects in either Study 2 or 3 may be due to the specific operationalization of the variable.

Karren and Barringer’s (2002) guidelines for creating policy capturing studies suggest that it is difficult to precisely estimate the importance of each cue in the decision when the cues are not orthogonal. However, these authors also acknowledge that the realism of the cues is an important consideration, and if cues are correlated in the real world, then the policy capturing study should reflect this reality. I would argue that an individual’s evaluation of the desirability of the job and the consideration of other potential job opportunities are concepts that are naturally linked. The number of other opportunities logically has to refer to some type of job, so it can either include the job one is applying for or not, which results in the job desirability and opportunities cues being inevitably conflated. Additionally, job desirability and opportunities may be associated in the real world not only because opportunities has to refer to some type of job, but because applicants may use one cue to make judgments about the other cue. That is, a highly desirable job may appear to be rare and few opportunities could make a job that is mediocre in many respects look very attractive. To the extent that this is an accurate description of applicants’ perceptions, manipulating job desirability and opportunities independently may not be a valid reflection of how these variables would affect faking. The trade-off between internal and external validity is an issue in any experiment, and in this case, I felt that having a realistic set of cues was more important than having a precise estimate of the effect of the opportunities cue.

The use of expectancy theory to explain the effects of the motivators on faking intentions in Study 3 also has its strengths and weaknesses. The theory is well-established as a valid motivational theory, and there were several reasons to think that the components of the theory would be relevant to the domain of applicant faking, as reviewed in the Introduction. The results of Study 3 supported the usefulness of expectancy theory in predicting faking intentions, and this study represented only the second empirical investigation to apply a theory to this domain.
However, the theory itself does have limitations, most notably, that it assumes that individuals make rational decisions, and consciously weigh the various expectancies, instrumentalities and valences of different actions and outcomes. While this assumption is in line with the definition used in the present research of faking as a conscious phenomenon, the assumption may not be a valid one. The theory of bounded rationality (Kahneman, 2003) suggests that individuals are not always as deliberate in their decision making as expectancy theory suggests, and will not necessarily rationally evaluate and weigh several options before making a decision. Research by Robie et al. (2007) that used a verbal protocol analysis where participants verbalized their decision making process as they completed a personality test did suggest that at least some participants consciously weighed the potential costs and benefits of different response options, however, the sample was small, and it is not known if the results generalize to real world job application contexts. It is likely that there are both conscious and unconscious influences on a test taker choosing a response on a personality test. However, since it appears that the current approach in the literature is to treat faking as a conscious phenomenon, and there is research to support this view, the application of expectancy theory is warranted.

A second limitation related to expectancy theory refers to how the theory was operationalized. The theory was developed to describe the choice of one action over another, which is essentially a within-subjects account of motivation (Mitchell, 1974). However, the vast majority of applications of the theory have used between-subjects designs and analyses (Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). Although the expectancy theory questionnaire designed for Study 3 asked participants both about faking and responding honestly, I only looked at intentions to fake and had only one behavioural outcome (responding to the personality questionnaire as an applicant), which precluded a within-subjects analysis. A more accurate application of the theory would have ideally included a measure of participants’ intentions to respond honestly in addition to the measure of faking intentions so that one could examine whether, for example, having stronger expectancy, instrumentality and valence perceptions for responding honestly than for
faking resulted in higher intentions for responding honestly. Although the distinction may seem subtle, the within-subject comparison of expectancy, instrumentality and valence is the basis of the expectancy theory explanation of decision making, and is an important step in validating the application of this theory to applicant faking (Ellingson & McFarland, 2011).

A final limitation relates to the hypothetical nature of the experimental designs. Because participants in all three studies were asked to imagine that they were applying for a job, and simulate how they might respond in that situation, the question remains whether these results would be replicated with applicants in a real selection context where a potential job is at stake. The fact that participants in Study 3 responded to the Big Five personality scale in a similar manner to that of true applicant samples (Tett et al., 2006) lends some credibility to the hypothetical applicant instructions. Although the antecedent variables (job desirability, warning perception and opportunities) had a significant effect on faking intentions, the size of the effects found in Study 3 may be considered small. The antecedent variables explained only a small amount of the variance in faking intentions (5%) and faking intentions in turn explained a small amount of the variance in faking on the agreeableness subscale of the Big Five measure (4%). Recognizing that the models of faking postulate that both faking intentions and faking behaviour may be influenced by several situational and individual difference antecedents, it may be quite reasonable to expect results of this magnitude. Additionally, small effects can have significant implications if accumulated over a large number of individuals (Cortina & Landis, 2009), and so an organization hiring a few hundred applicants may indeed see noticeable fluctuations in personality scores attributable to these antecedents.

The key question is whether applicants' behaviour would be influenced by the situational and individual difference antecedents in the same manner as participants in the present studies. It may be the case that applicants would be more calculating and cautious with an actual job on the line, in which case one would expect more pronounced differences between the conditions. On the other hand, in a real life high-stakes context, applicants might tend to use a simpler
strategy of focusing on one or two cues. At this point, the manner in which applicants respond to the faking dilemma remains an empirical question that is an important next step for future research.

**Directions for Future Research**

The present research underscores the need for researchers to expand the number of studies that focus on the motivation to fake. Although all of the existing models of faking acknowledge that motivation is an important component of faking behaviour, many of the components of these models that were investigated in Study 1 had not been studied previously. There is a significant opportunity for researchers to test the effects of these variables on faking and the interactions among the variables, both in the laboratory and the field.

It is surprising that job desirability has not received more empirical attention. Perhaps there is an assumption that individuals would not apply for a job unless they found the job description to be attractive. While one would expect a certain level of perceived desirability among applicants, there is likely to be variability. This variable is of particular importance in some types of lab studies of faking where participants are given a job description and asked to imagine that they are applying for the job. In this situation, these “applicants” have no choice about the job they are applying for, and their perception of how desirable that job is could have a significant (and very often unmeasured) effect on their intentions to fake. Future studies using this type of research design should include a measure of how desirable the job is perceived to be and include it as a variable in the analyses.

The number of other job opportunities available to an applicant appears to have an important impact on the motivation to fake. The present research manipulated two levels of opportunities (“few” and “many”) and found that it moderated the effects of other variables on faking. It would be interesting for future research to measure applicants’ perceived number of other available job opportunities and determine if a continuous measure of opportunities correlates with faking. It would also be informative to investigate whether the number of other
opportunities is something applicants typically consider, or whether it is only when presented with the information that it is factored in to their decision to fake.

The results of Studies 2 and 3 also suggest that more research is needed on warnings. The results of Study 2 demonstrated that the warning manipulation did not have a straightforward effect on faking intentions, but interacted with opportunities and job desirability. Future research may want to explore other relevant situational and individual difference moderators of the effect of warnings on faking intentions. Additionally, the fact that in Study 3 participants varied in their perception that there would be negative consequences for faking suggests that one interesting avenue for future research would be to explore individual difference variables that may explain the sources of this perception, and explore why certain people may be more likely to acknowledge and respond to the presence of a warning (Goffin & Woods, 1995; cf. Goffin & Boyd, 2009). For example, individuals with a strong prevention focus (Higgins, 1997) may be more sensitive to the warning of negative consequences.

Future research should also continue to explore individual difference variables that affect faking. Honesty-humility was a useful predictor of faking intentions in Studies 2 and 3, and there are likely to be other traits that contribute to faking. The existing models of faking contain a variety of traits hypothesized to affect faking and most have little direct evidence. For example, values and morals are mentioned in several models (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Kim, 2011; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Snell et al., 1999), but there is little research on these variables. There may also be specific traits that moderate the impact of situational cues like opportunities or warnings. For example, individual differences in risk taking may play a role in how applicants respond to warnings. Those who are risk averse will likely heed the warning to a greater degree than those high in risk taking (Tett et al., 2006).

Conclusion

Applicant faking on pre-employment personality tests is a complex problem that has been the focus of considerable research and debate for many decades. Although personality
constructs have been shown to be significant predictors of job performance, concerns about faking limit their usefulness and appeal in practice, and the field is still in search of methods to mitigate the effect of faking. The present research demonstrates that it is important to view applicant faking as a multiply determined behaviour that is affected by the desirability of the job, the number of other available job opportunities, warnings about faking, the perception of negative consequences for faking, and individual differences in honesty-humility. In the presence of different levels of these factors, applicants may face a dilemma about how to best respond to the personality questionnaire, leading to differing levels of faking intentions and behaviour. Although expectancy, instrumentality and valence perceptions may help to predict faking intentions, there was little evidence that they can explain why antecedent variables influence faking, and, as such, a “theoretical backbone” to explain the antecedents of faking remains elusive. The results of this research can be used to expand and refine existing models of applicant faking, as well as Ellingson (2012) and Ellingson and McFarland’s (2011) expectancy theory-based framework, to guide future empirical work and the development of effective practices for employee selection.
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Appendices

Appendix A: Big Five Personality Scale from Studies 1 & 3

Personal Characteristics Questionnaire

Instructions:
Listed below are statements describing people's characteristics. Please use the rating scale options to indicate how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Very Inaccurate</th>
<th>Inaccurate</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Accurate</th>
<th>Very Accurate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I rarely get irritated.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I feel comfortable around people.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I am not interested in abstract ideas.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I have a good word for everyone.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I am always prepared.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I often feel blue.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I have little to say.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. I believe in the importance of art.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I have a sharp tongue.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I waste my time.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. I seldom feel blue.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. I make friends easily.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. I do not like art.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. I believe that others have good intentions.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. I pay attention to details.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. I dislike myself.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. I keep in the background.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. I have a vivid imagination.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. I cut others to pieces.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. I find it difficult to get down to work.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. I feel comfortable with myself.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. I am skilled in handling social situations.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. I avoid philosophical discussions.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. I respect others.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. I get chores done right away.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. I am often down in the dumps.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. I would describe my experience as somewhat dull.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. I tend to vote for liberal political candidates.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. I suspect hidden motives in others.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. I do just enough work to get by.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. I am not easily bothered by things.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. I am the life of the party.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. I do not enjoy going to art museums.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. I accept people as they are.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. I carry out my plans.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. I have frequent mood swings.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. I don't like to draw attention to myself.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. I carry the conversation to another level.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. I get back at others.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. I don't see things through.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. I am very pleased with myself.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. I know how to captivate people.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. I tend to vote for conservative political candidates.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. I make people feel at ease.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. I make plans and stick to them.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. I panic easily.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47. I don't talk a lot.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. I enjoy hearing new ideas.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. I insult people.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. I shirk my duties.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Situational Faking Intention Materials from Study 1

Job Application Situation Task

Part 1

Instructions:

Think back to the questionnaire you just completed and the kind of items that you responded to (for example, "I pay attention to details", "I am always prepared", and "I rarely lose my composure"). This type of questionnaire is often given to people to fill out when they are applying for jobs.

For this task, please imagine that you are applying for a job and are asked to fill out this type of questionnaire as part of the application process. Please complete the following questions about how you think you would respond as a job applicant.

Question 1. Imagine that you are applying for a job and you are asked to fill out a questionnaire similar to one you completed on the previous page. In this situation, how likely would you be to...

(a) ...give responses on the questionnaire that would make yourself look better than you really are?

Not at all Likely | Somewhat Likely | Very Likely
---|---|---
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7

To what degree would you...
(b) ...overstate or exaggerate your positive qualities in your responses on the questionnaire?

Not at all | A moderate amount | As much as possible
---|---|---
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7

(c) ...de-emphasize or downplay your negative qualities in your responses on the questionnaire?

Not at all | A moderate amount | As much as possible
---|---|---
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7

(d) ...say that you have positive qualities that you do not actually have in your responses on the questionnaire?

Not at all | A moderate amount | As much as possible
---|---|---
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7
Part 2

Instructions:

Now please imagine once again that you are applying for a job and are asked to fill out the type of questionnaire on the previous page, and think about how you might respond to the questionnaire in each of the following situations. Please consider each situation separately.

Situation 1: The questionnaire for the job application says that it contains questions that have been designed to identify those who fake their responses. In this situation...

(a) ...give responses on the questionnaire that would make yourself look better than you really are?

To what degree would you...
(b) ...overstate or exaggerate your positive qualities in your responses on the questionnaire?

(c) ...de-emphasize or downplay your negative qualities in your responses on the questionnaire?

(d) ...say that you have positive qualities that you do not actually have in your responses on the questionnaire?

(e) ...make your weaknesses look more positive than they really are in your responses on the questionnaire?
Each of the following Situations had the same five response questions as Situation 1.

Situation 2: You are told that there are a large number of people applying for this job. In this situation...

Situation 3: It appears that a fair process will be used to make the hiring decisions. In this situation...

Situation 4: It is pretty obvious what answers the company is probably looking for. In this situation...

Situation 5: The questionnaire instructions say that dishonest responses may invalidate your results, that is, faking may result in you not being considered for the job. In this situation...

Situation 6: You are told that the final hiring decision will be made based on several factors (e.g., resume, interview, reference check) in addition to your responses to the questionnaire. In this situation...

Situation 7: There are not a lot of job opportunities out there. In this situation...

Situation 8: The job sounds like your dream job. In this situation...

Situation 9: The people in charge of the hiring process have treated you in a fair manner. In this situation...

Situation 10: You are told that only a smaller number of applicants will proceed to the next phase of the selection process based on how they perform on the questionnaire. In this situation...

Situation 11: You are told that there are only a few applicants for this job. In this situation...

Situation 12: The questionnaire instructions ask you to respond honestly. In this situation...

Situation 13: It seems that the selection process may be biased. In this situation...

Situation 14: There are several other jobs that you can apply for that are similar to this one. In this situation...

Situation 15: It is hard to figure out what the best answers would be. In this situation...

Situation 16: The questionnaire instructions say that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references. In this situation...
Situation 17: You are told that scores on the questionnaire will be the sole factor in determining who gets hired. In this situation...

Situation 18: The job is not exactly what you were looking for. In this situation...

Situation 19: The people you have interacted with during the application process have treated you unfairly. In this situation...

Situation 20: You are told that the scores on the questionnaire will be used to remove a large number of applicants who will not move on to the next phase of the hiring process. In this situation...
Appendix C: Big Five Personality Questionnaire from Study 2

Questionnaire #1

Instructions:

Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? For each statement below, please select a response to indicate how much you agree or disagree.

I see myself as someone who...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
<th>Disagree a little</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree a little</th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. is talkative.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. tends to find fault with others.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. does a thorough job.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. is depressed, blue.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. is original, comes up with new ideas.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. is reserved.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. is helpful and unselfish with others.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. can be somewhat careless.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. is relaxed, handles stress well.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. is curious about many different things.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. is full of energy.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. starts quarrels with others.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. is a reliable worker.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. can be tense.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. is ingenious, a deep thinker.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. generates a lot of enthusiasm.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. has a forgiving nature.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. tends to be disorganized.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. worries a lot.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. has an active imagination.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. tends to be quiet.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. is generally trusting.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. tends to be lazy.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. is emotionally stable, not easily upset.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. is inventive.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. has an assertive personality.</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. can be cold and aloof.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. perseveres until the task is finished.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. can be moody.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. values artistic, aesthetic experiences.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. is sometimes shy, inhibited.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. is considerate and kind to almost everyone.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. does things efficiently.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. remains calm in tense situations.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. prefers work that is routine.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. is outgoing, sociable.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. is sometimes rude to others.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. makes plans and follows through with them.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. gets nervous easily.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. likes to reflect, play with ideas.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. has few artistic interests.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. likes to cooperate with others.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. is easily distracted.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. is sophisticated in art, music, or literature.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D: Honesty-humility Scale from Studies 2 & 3

Instructions:

Below you will find a series of statements about you. Please read each statement and decide how much you agree or disagree with that statement. Then select your response next to the statement using the scale provided. Please answer every statement, even if you are not completely sure of your response.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
<th>Disagree a little</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Agree a little</th>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. If I want something from a person I dislike, I will act very nicely toward that person in order to get it.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Having a lot of money is not especially important to me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I am an ordinary person who is no better than others.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I wouldn’t use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would succeed.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I would be tempted to buy stolen property if I were financially tight.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I would like to live in a very expensive, high-class neighborhood.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. I wouldn’t want people to treat me as though I were superior to them.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person’s worst jokes.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. I would like to be seen driving around in a very expensive car.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. I wouldn’t pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. I want people to know that I am an important person of high status.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E: Study 2 Pilot Study Questionnaire

Event Likelihood Assessment

Instructions:

I would like your help evaluating different wordings for a study about faking on a personality questionnaire administered as part of a job application. The sentences below are warnings meant to deter faking. These warnings would appear in the instructions for the personality questionnaire. The sentences use different words or phrases (e.g., “might” or “could”) to suggest that an event is more or less likely to occur. I would like to get your subjective judgments of how likely the event is to happen (expressed as a percentage) based on the wording used in the sentence.

For each sentence below, please use the response scale provided to indicate how likely the event is to occur in the context of a job application. Don’t think too much about it; just give your initial reaction of how likely the event is to occur based on how the sentence is phrased. Questions 1 to 8 are variations of one sentence, and questions 9-16 are variations of a second sentence.

1. In some circumstances your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that responses to the personality questionnaire will be cross-checked?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

2. Your responses might be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that responses to the personality questionnaire will be cross-checked?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

3. Your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that responses to the personality questionnaire will be cross-checked?
4. There is a chance that your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that responses to the personality questionnaire will be cross-checked?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

5. Your responses could be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that responses to the personality questionnaire will be cross-checked?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

6. In some cases your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that responses to the personality questionnaire will be cross-checked?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

7. It is very likely that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that responses to the personality questionnaire will be cross-checked?

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

8. Your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that responses to the personality questionnaire will be cross-checked?
9. Dishonest responses may invalidate your results, that is, faking may result in you not being considered for the job.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that faking on the personality questionnaire will result in the job applicant not being considered for the job?

10. It is very likely that dishonest responses will invalidate your results, that is, it is very likely that faking will result in you not being considered for the job.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that faking on the personality questionnaire will result in the job applicant not being considered for the job?

11. Dishonest responses could invalidate your results, that is, faking could result in you not being considered for the job.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that faking on the personality questionnaire will result in the job applicant not being considered for the job?

12. There is a chance that dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, there is a chance that faking might result in you not being considered for the job.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that faking on the personality questionnaire will result in the job applicant not being considered for the job?

13. In some circumstances dishonest responses may invalidate your results, that is, in some circumstances faking may result in you not being considered for the job.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that faking on the personality questionnaire will result in the job applicant not being considered for the job?
14. Dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, faking might result in you not being considered for the job.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that faking on the personality questionnaire will result in the job applicant not being considered for the job?

0%  10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90%  100%

15. In some cases dishonest responses may invalidate your results, that is, in some cases faking might result in you not being considered for the job.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that faking on the personality questionnaire will result in the job applicant not being considered for the job?

0%  10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90%  100%

16. Dishonest responses will invalidate your results, that is, faking will result in you not being considered for the job.

Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that faking on the personality questionnaire will result in the job applicant not being considered for the job?

0%  10%  20%  30%  40%  50%  60%  70%  80%  90%  100%
Appendix F: Study 2 Pilot Study Method and Results

Method

Participants

Psychology graduate students at the University of Waterloo were recruited to participate in the pilot study. Students were sent an email with a brief description of the pilot study and a link to the questionnaire (see Appendix E). It is not known how many students were sent the email, but it is estimated at around 125. Forty-two students participated.

Measure

For the pilot study, eight different wordings were written to convey varying levels of probability of warnings being carried through. The eight wordings were: in some circumstances, might, may, there is a chance that, could, in some cases, it is very likely, will. The two warning sentences from Study 1 were rewritten with the eight wordings and participants were asked, “Given the wording in this sentence, how likely do you think it is that responses to the personality questionnaire will be cross-checked/ result in the job applicant not being considered for the job?” They rated each of the 16 sentences on an 11-point scale ranging from 0% to 100%.

Results

A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the 8 warning of negative consequence wordings and the 8 warning of response verification wordings to demonstrate that participants responded differently to the wordings. The ANOVA was significant for both the warning of negative consequence wordings, $F(7, 273) = 145.84, p < .001$, and the warning of response verification wordings, $F(7, 287) = 200.07, p < .001$. Examining the means for the individual wordings, the results showed that the “will” wording was assigned the highest probability for both warning of negative consequences, $M = 90.7\%, SD = 12.18\%$, and warning of response verification, $M = 95.5\%, SD = 7.05\%$, suggesting that participants on average believed that there was an over 90% chance that the warnings would be carried out when the
statement read “Dishonest responses will invalidate your results, that is, faking will result in you not being considered for the job,” or “Your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.” The rating for “will” was significantly greater than the rating for the “very likely” wording, which received the next highest rating. The paired-sample t-test was significant for both warnings of negative consequences, \( t(41) = -5.53, p < .001 \) and warnings of response verification, \( t(41) = -8.91, p < .001 \). On the lower end of the probability scale, the wording “there is a chance that” received the lowest ratings for both warning of negative consequences, \( M = 33.3\%, SD = 20.80\% \), and warning of response verification, \( M = 24.8\%, SD = 17.00\% \). For warnings of response verification, the “there is a chance that” wording was rated as significantly lower than the “might” wording, which received the next lowest rating, \( t(41) = 2.80, p < .01 \). For the warning of negative consequences, the “there is a chance that” wording was not significantly different from the lowest four ratings, \( F(3, 120) = .38, n.s. \), suggesting that participants did not see meaningful differences between the probability of the warning of negative consequences being carried out when the “there is a chance that,” “might,” “could,” or “in some cases” wordings were used. The “there is a chance that” wording was rated as significantly less probable than the “will” wording for both warning of negative consequences \( t(41) = -18.48, p < .001 \), and warning of response verification, \( t(41) = -26.70, p < .001 \). In summary, the results of the pilot study strongly supported the use of the “there is a chance” and “will” wordings for the low and high warning policy capturing cues.
Appendix G: Policy Capturing Task from Study 2

Job Application Situation Task

Part 1

Instructions:

When people apply for jobs, they are often asked to fill out a personality questionnaire as part of the application process. These questionnaires typically contain a number of statements, such as "I pay attention to details", "I am always prepared", and "I rarely lose my composure" and people are asked to rate how well each statement describes them using a 1-5 scale.

For this task, please imagine that you are applying for a job and are asked to fill out this type of questionnaire as part of the application process. Please complete the following questions about how you think you would respond as a job applicant.

Imagine that you are applying for a job and you are asked to fill out a questionnaire similar to one you completed on the previous page. In this situation how likely would you be to...

(a) ...give responses on the questionnaire that would make yourself look better than you really are?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all Likely</th>
<th>Somewhat Likely</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To what degree would you...

(b) ...overstate or exaggerate your positive qualities in your responses on the questionnaire?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>A moderate amount</th>
<th>As much as possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) ...say that you have positive qualities that you do not actually have in your responses on the questionnaire?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>A moderate amount</th>
<th>As much as possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part 2

Instructions:

Now please imagine once again that you are applying for a job and are asked to fill out the type of personality questionnaire you completed earlier in this session.

You will be asked to think about how you might respond to the questionnaire in a number of different job application situations. You will be presented with 19 brief situations containing
information related to the job application. Please imagine that you are in the situation, and respond to the questions.

Each situation is different, so please read each one carefully.

To familiarize yourself with the task, first complete the 2 practice questions below.

Practice Situation #1:

The job is for a large corporation.
The job is for an entry-level position.
The job application questionnaire is completed on the Internet.

If you were filling out a job application personality questionnaire in this situation...

(a) ...how likely would you be to give responses on the questionnaire that would make yourself look better than you really are?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all Likely</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(b) ...to what degree would you overstate or exaggerate your positive qualities in your responses on the questionnaire?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(c) ... to what degree would you say that you have positive qualities that you do not actually have in your responses on the questionnaire?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Practice Situation #2:

The job is for an entry-level position.
The job application questionnaire is completed at the company’s office building.
The job is for a small corporation.
If you were filling out a job application personality questionnaire in this situation...

(a) ...how likely would you be to give responses on the questionnaire that would make yourself look better than you really are?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all Likely</th>
<th>Somewhat Likely</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) ...to what degree would you overstate or exaggerate your positive qualities in your responses on the questionnaire?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>A moderate amount</th>
<th>As much as possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) ... to what degree would you say that you have positive qualities that you do not actually have in your responses on the questionnaire?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>A moderate amount</th>
<th>As much as possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Click the Next button to begin the task.

Situation #1:

There are not a lot of job opportunities out there.

The questionnaire instructions say that dishonest responses will invalidate your results, that is, faking will result in you not being considered for the job.

The questionnaire instructions say that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

The job sounds like your dream job.

If you were filling out a job application personality questionnaire in this situation...

(a) ...how likely would you be to give responses on the questionnaire that would make yourself look better than you really are?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all Likely</th>
<th>Somewhat Likely</th>
<th>Very Likely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) ...to what degree would you overstate or exaggerate your positive qualities in your responses on the questionnaire?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>A moderate amount</th>
<th>As much as possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(c) ... to what degree would you say that you have positive qualities that you do not actually have in your responses on the questionnaire?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>amount</th>
<th>possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the following Situations had the same three response questions as Situation 1.

Situation #2:

The questionnaire instructions say that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

The job is not exactly what you were looking for.

The questionnaire instructions say that dishonest responses will invalidate your results, that is, faking will result in you not being considered for the job.

There are several other jobs that you can apply for that are similar to this one.

Situation #3:

The job is not exactly what you were looking for.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, there is a chance that faking might result in you not being considered for the job.

There are not a lot of job opportunities out there.

Situation #4:

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, there is a chance that faking might result in you not being considered for the job.

The questionnaire instructions say that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.
The job sounds like your dream job.

There are several other jobs that you can apply for that are similar to this one.

**Situation #5:**

The job is not exactly what you were looking for.

There are not a lot of job opportunities out there.

The questionnaire instructions say that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, there is a chance that faking might result in you not being considered for the job.

**Situation #6:**

The job sounds like your dream job.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, there is a chance that faking might result in you not being considered for the job.

There are not a lot of job opportunities out there.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

**Situation #7:**

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, there is a chance that faking might result in you not being considered for the job.

There are several other jobs that you can apply for that are similar to this one.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

The job is not exactly what you were looking for.
Situation #8:

The questionnaire instructions say that dishonest responses will invalidate your results, that is, faking will result in you not being considered for the job.

The job is not exactly what you were looking for.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

There are not a lot of job opportunities out there.

Situation #9:

The questionnaire instructions say that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, there is a chance that faking might result in you not being considered for the job.

There are several other jobs that you can apply for that are similar to this one.

The job is not exactly what you were looking for.

Situation #10:

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

The job sounds like your dream job.

There are several other jobs that you can apply for that are similar to this one.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, there is a chance that faking might result in you not being considered for the job.

Situation #11:

There are several other jobs that you can apply for that are similar to this one.

The questionnaire instructions say that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.
The questionnaire instructions say that dishonest responses will invalidate your results, that is, faking will result in you not being considered for the job.

The job sounds like your dream job.

**Situation #12:**

The job sounds like your dream job.

There are not a lot of job opportunities out there.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, there is a chance that faking might result in you not being considered for the job.

The questionnaire instructions say that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

**Situation #13:**

There are several other jobs that you can apply for that are similar to this one.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

The job is not exactly what you were looking for.

The questionnaire instructions say that dishonest responses will invalidate your results, that is, faking will result in you not being considered for the job.

**Situation #14:**

There are not a lot of job opportunities out there.

The questionnaire instructions say that dishonest responses will invalidate your results, that is, faking will result in you not being considered for the job.

The job is not exactly what you were looking for.

The questionnaire instructions say that your responses will be cross-checked with information provided by your references.
Situation #15:

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

There are several other jobs that you can apply for that are similar to this one.

The job sounds like your dream job.

The questionnaire instructions say that dishonest responses will invalidate your results, that is, faking will result in you not being considered for the job.

Situation #16:

The questionnaire instructions say that dishonest responses will invalidate your results, that is, faking will result in you not being considered for the job.

The job sounds like your dream job.

There are not a lot of job opportunities out there.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

Situation #17:

The job is not exactly what you were looking for.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, there is a chance that faking might result in you not being considered for the job.

There are not a lot of job opportunities out there.

Situation #18:

The job sounds like your dream job.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, there is a chance that faking might result in you not being considered for the job.
There are not a lot of job opportunities out there.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

**Situation #19:**

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that your responses may be cross-checked with information provided by your references.

The job sounds like your dream job.

There are several other jobs that you can apply for that are similar to this one.

The questionnaire instructions say that there is a chance that dishonest responses might invalidate your results, that is, there is a chance that faking might result in you not being considered for the job.
Appendix H: Job Advertisement Pilot Study Materials

Please read the following job advertisement and answer the questions that follow. It is important to thoroughly read the advertisement. When answering the questions, please assume that the jobs are located in your area and that all jobs offer similar attractive salaries. As a reminder, these job advertisements are hypothetical and not real advertisements from the companies listed.

Job Title: Associate, Google Creative Labs
Company: Google
Level: Associate (Full-time)

The company: Google

Google has offices around the globe, from Bangalore to Zurich, but regardless of where we are, we nurture an invigorating, positive environment by hiring talented people who share our commitment to creating search perfection and want to have a great time doing it. Googlers thrive in small, focused teams and high-energy environments, believe in the ability of technology to change the world, and are as passionate about their lives as they are about their work.

The area: Creative Labs

The Google Creative Lab is a small team that strives to re-think how people connect with each other across every kind of platform - currently existing or not - with Google as its sole client. Our job is to create, innovate, embody and expand the Google brand, and do work of which we can all be immensely proud.

The role: Associate

Like Google itself, The Creative Lab will come up with new ideas that push the notion of what is possible and what is practical. Our Associates work on team-based projects to conceive and execute breakthrough ideas that will have as much impact on social media, video sharing and social networking as Google’s products have in online search. In this role, you’re expected to help contribute to new innovations in the way people use the Internet to connect with others.

Responsibilities:
- Conceive and execute integrated projects that include large web initiatives.
- Work collaboratively within a cross-functional team environment.
- Communicate technology topics in clear, concise ways to a non-techy audience.
- Embrace social media.
- Support a variety of teams across the company.

Qualifications:
- Experience working on team-based creative-type projects, not necessarily tech-related.
- Teamwork mentality, flexibility and a healthy disrespect for the impossible.
- Organized and able to balance multiple simultaneous projects.
- A strong interest in Google products and the Google brand.
- Self-driven, fearless interest and curiosity in new tech and inventions.
The following five response questions appeared after each job advertisement.

The following statements refer to the job advertised above. Please indicate how much you agree with each statement using the scale provided.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This is an attractive job.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This sounds like a dream job to me.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on the qualifications listed above, I believe I would be qualified for this job.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would apply for this job.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would do whatever I could to get this job.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Please thoroughly read the following job advertisement and answer the questions that follow.

Job Title: Director, Guest Relations  
Company: Hilton Hotels Corporation  
Level: Management (Full-time)

There's never been a better time to be a part of our team! If you're looking for challenging and engaging work, professional growth and development, the chance to contribute ideas and the opportunity to excel ... Hilton Hotels is the place for you.

Here, you'll have the unique opportunity to positively impact the lives of others as part of a global team committed to creating great travel experiences. The unique talent and contributions of every Team Member add to our diversity, and ultimately to our success. Enjoy all the aspects of a rewarding career, work/life balance, great benefits, and growth potential. Create the Hilton Experience for yourself ... become a part of the Hilton Hotels team.

Position Description

As the Director, Guest Relations, you would be responsible for:

- Liaising extensively with our elite clientele including celebrities and public figures, projecting a professional company image.
- Providing customer/concierge services to all guests at one of our luxury hotel, resort or spa properties.
- Committing to a high quality of personalized service designed to meet the needs and expectations of business executives and leisure travelers.
- Planning and promoting special events for our guests.
- Involves some travel, including international trips to other luxury establishments, for research and promotion purposes.
- Managing, supervising, and training of Team Members.

Qualifications:

- Service oriented and a team player with excellent interpersonal and communication skills.
- Able to provide exceptional customer service with impeccable attention to detail and guest recognition.
- Comfortable with problem solving and decision making.
- Possess enthusiasm for Guest Relations training and Management development.
- A driven individual with willingness to both learn and teach others.

About Us

Hilton Hotels Corporation is recognized as the leading global hospitality company. Headquartered in Orlando, Florida, Hilton develops, markets and operates a system of brand-name, high-quality vacation ownership resorts in some of the world's most exciting destinations.
Please thoroughly read the following job advertisement and answer the questions that follow.

Job Title: Customer Experience Manager  
Company: Chapters  
Level: Management (Full-time)

Indigo Books & Music inc., the parent company of Indigo, Chapters, Coles, World's Biggest Book Store and chapters.indigo.ca, is always seeking exceptional, service-oriented people who want to join an outstanding retail organization. Our goal is to provide book lovers, culture makers and entertainment seekers with the most inspiring, richly stocked and inviting retail environment in the world. If this sounds as much like a dream as a job, we would like to hear from you.

As part of the store leadership team, we want you:
- To add joy to our customers' lives by providing leadership to our Customer Experience Representatives (CERs) and ensuring the delivery of an exceptional customer experience in the store at all times.
- To drive sales and service by coaching our CERs to enrich the customer experience through promotion of our products and services.
- To support the store's General Manager in creating the most inspiring retail environment for books and life enriching products by ensuring that the store is well-run, well-merchandised, and well-staffed.

In store you will:
- Lead a team of CERs to engage customers and deliver an exceptional customer experience to drive sales.
- Manage author visits and book signings, including liaising with authors, and plan other special events for our customers.
- Keep up-to-date on product knowledge, services, promotions, events and store layout and pass on your knowledge to CERs.
- Work with your store leadership colleagues to attract, hire, retain and develop talented and passionate CERs.
- Actively solicit ideas and opportunities to continuously improve sales and store operations from your CERs, with an aim to implement best practices.

Qualifications:

You are passionate about reading and appreciate a significant discount on the purchase of books and merchandise. You enjoy working in a team-based retail environment. You have leadership, problem solving and customer service abilities and a willingness to learn our business and practices. You are well-organized with high energy, effective communication skills and, of course, a passion for this business and the principle upon which it is built.
Please thoroughly read the following job advertisement and answer the questions that follow.

Job Title: Travel Writer
Company: The Globe and Mail
Level: Staff Writer (Full-time)

About Us

In print for 165 years, The Globe and Mail has consistently delivered Canada’s best and deepest coverage of national, international and business news. The paper is a daily must-read for Canadians who want to know about the essential issues, facts and opinions that affect our world. With a cumulative six-day readership total of just over 2,800,000, The Globe and Mail enjoys a wide--and a highly loyal--readership.

The Globe and Mail employees are dedicated, creative and have a desire to excel. They are innovators and strategic thinkers who are always ready to take on a new challenge. If you are a vital and dynamic individual who thrives in a fast-paced environment where creativity abounds, The Globe and Mail may have a career opportunity for you.

Responsibilities

The Globe and Mail is looking for a Staff Writer to contribute engaging travel articles to our printed newspaper and Internet site. We’re looking for someone to join our team who shares our dedication to inform and enlighten our readership. If you love to travel and want to bring our audience with you to exotic destinations, historic locales, hidden-away havens and cosmopolitan excursions, then we want to hear from you.

Primary Duties for this position include:
- Available for company-funded travel, including international travel.
- Appreciation of travel destinations, attractions, hotels and restaurants.
- Create, compose and edit written articles.

Qualifications
- Willingness to develop writing skills, including style, technique, spelling, punctuation, etc.
- Analytical, decision-making and problem solving skills and abilities.
- Ability to work well with others.
- Ability to organize and maintain own flexible schedule and meet deadlines.
- Ability to access current, accurate and relevant travel information.
- Able to learn and utilize computer software and web/publishing tools.
- Passion for the topic!

The Globe and Mail values the contribution of all its employees. We recognize their efforts by offering a competitive compensation plan and an array of benefits, including medical, dental, vision, life insurance, and more. The Globe and Mail is an equal opportunity employer.
Please thoroughly read the following job advertisement and answer the questions that follow.

Job Title: Event Programming Manager
Company: Ticketmaster Canada
Level: Management (Full-time)

About the Job

Ticketmaster Canada is part of Ticketmaster, the world’s leading live entertainment ticketing and marketing company. Ticketmaster operates in 20 global markets, providing ticket sales, ticket resale services, marketing and distribution through approximately 7,100 retail outlets, 17 worldwide call centers and www.ticketmaster.com, one of the largest e-commerce sites on the Internet. Established in 1976, Ticketmaster serves more than 10,000 clients worldwide across multiple event categories, providing exclusive ticketing services for leading arenas, stadiums, professional sports franchises and leagues, college sports teams, performing arts venues, museums, and theatres.

As one of our Event Programmer Managers, you will be responsible for creating and scheduling multiple events. As well, you will be responsible for managing the events as they happen, including receiving and supporting performers and ensuring a professional operation.

Responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

- Build and schedule shows using our proprietary ticketing system.
- Must enjoy interacting with celebrities, professional athletes, musicians and performers and attending multiple events and performances.
- Must have organizational, verbal and written communication skills.
- Work with clients to create high-quality events.
- Manage events; keep updated files on all show changes and adjustments.
- Responsible for the distribution of event information to ticketing staff.

Qualifications:

- Perform quality work within deadlines with or without direct supervision.
- Interact professionally with other employees and show representatives.
- Work independently while understanding the necessity for communicating and coordinating work efforts with other employees and organizations.
- Able to properly handle confidential information and records.
- All interested candidates are encouraged to apply; training in event management provided.

Ticketmaster Canada offers an outstanding benefit package including medical and dental insurance coverage, vacation along with career growth with the ability to work in a collaborative, team oriented environment.
## Appendix I: Descriptive Statistics from Study 3 Pilot Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job</th>
<th>$M$</th>
<th>$SD$</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hilton Hotels Director of Guest Relations</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globe and Mail Travel Writer</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>2 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapters Manager</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Google Associate</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1 - 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ticketmaster Event Programming Manager</td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>2 - 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix J: Expectancy Theory Questionnaire from Study 3

Expectancy Theory Questionnaire

When job applicants fill out these types of personality questionnaires, they may want to respond honestly and choose the response option that describes them most accurately, or they may want to sell themselves and choose the response option that will make them look better than they are, in hopes of maximizing their chances of getting the job. The next set of questions refer to your opinions about responding honestly versus trying to sell yourself on the personality questionnaire.

1. If you tried, what are the chances that you could successfully respond honestly to the personality questionnaire by choosing the responses that accurately describe yourself?

   1- No Chance
   2- A Slight Chance
   3- 50-50 Chance
   4- A Very Good Chance
   5- Certain This Will Happen

2. If you respond honestly to the personality questionnaire, what would you guess are your chances of getting hired for the Director of Guest Relations job?

   1- No Chance
   2- A Slight Chance
   3- 50-50 Chance
   4- A Very Good Chance
   5- Certain This Will Happen

3. If you respond honestly to the personality questionnaire, what would you guess is the likelihood that you would be passed over for the Director of Guest Relations job?

   1- No Chance
   2- A Slight Chance
   3- 50-50 Chance
   4- A Very Good Chance
   5- Certain This Will Happen

4. How satisfying would it be to respond honestly to personality questionnaire?

   1- Not Satisfying
   2
   3
   4- Moderately Satisfying
5
6
7- Very Satisfying

5. How attractive would it be to respond honestly to the personality questionnaire?

1- Very Unattractive
2
3
4- Neutral
5
6
7- Very Attractive

The next set of questions refer to selling yourself on the personality questionnaire.

6. If you tried, what are the chances that you could successfully sell yourself on the personality questionnaire?

1- No Chance
2- A Slight Chance
3- 50-50 Chance
4- A Very Good Chance
5- Certain This Will Happen

7. What are the chances that you could sell yourself on the personality questionnaire without it appearing obvious that you’ve exaggerated?

1- No Chance
2- A Slight Chance
3- 50-50 Chance
4- A Very Good Chance
5- Certain This Will Happen

8. If you sell yourself on the personality questionnaire, what would you guess are your chances of getting hired for the Director of Guest Relations job?

1- No Chance
2- A Slight Chance
3- 50-50 Chance
4- A Very Good Chance
5- Certain This Will Happen
9. If you sell yourself on the personality questionnaire without it appearing obvious that you've exaggerated, what are your chances of getting hired for the Director of Guest Relations job?

1- No Chance
2- A Slight Chance
3- 50-50 Chance
4- A Very Good Chance
5- Certain This Will Happen

10. If you sell yourself on the personality questionnaire, what is the likelihood that you would be passed over for the Director of Guest Relations job?

1- No Chance
2- A Slight Chance
3- 50-50 Chance
4- A Very Good Chance
5- Certain This Will Happen

11. If you sell yourself on the personality questionnaire without it appearing obvious that you've exaggerated, what is the likelihood that you would be passed over for the Director of Guest Relations job?

1- No Chance
2- A Slight Chance
3- 50-50 Chance
4- A Very Good Chance
5- Certain This Will Happen

12. How satisfying would it be to successfully sell yourself on the personality questionnaire?

1- Not Satisfying
2
3
4- Moderately Satisfying
5
6
7- Very Satisfying

13. How attractive would it be to successfully sell yourself on the personality questionnaire?

1- Very Unattractive
2
3
4- Neutral
14. How satisfying would it be to successfully sell yourself on the personality questionnaire without it appearing obvious that you've exaggerated?

1- Not Satisfying
2
3
4- Moderately Satisfying
5
6
7- Very Satisfying

15. How attractive would it be to sell yourself on the personality questionnaire without it appearing obvious that you've exaggerated?

1- Very Unattractive
2
3
4- Neutral
5
6
7- Very Attractive

16. How satisfying would it be to get hired for the Director of Guest Relations job?

1- Not Satisfying
2
3
4- Moderately Satisfying
5
6
7- Very Satisfying

17. How attractive would it be to get hired for the Director of Guest Relations job?

1- Very Unattractive
2
3
4- Neutral
5
6
18. How satisfying would it be to get passed over for the Director of Guest Relations job?

1- Not Satisfying
2
3
4- Moderately Satisfying
5
6
7- Very Satisfying

19. How attractive would it be to get passed over for the Director of Guest Relations job?

1- Very Unattractive
2
3
4- Neutral
5
6
7- Very Attractive