

**CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF HIERARCHIC AND ANARCHIC SYSTEMS**

by
Korhan Yazgan

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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on change and persistence of the structure of the international system. It attempts to address the question why hierarchic structures prevailed during the Ancient and Classical eras (3000 B.C. – 1500 A.D.). The thesis compares and contrasts the Roman Empire (the Pax Romana period 1st century B.C.-3rd century A.D.) and the Chinese Empire (the T'ang Dynasty 618-907 A.D.) as hierarchic structures and the multi-state system of ancient Greece (8th-4th century B.C.) and the multi-state system of ancient China (The Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Period 722-221 B.C.) as anarchic structures. The thesis suggests that the moral purpose of the state, the competitive security environment, the desire for benefits and geopolitical and strategic advantages played the major role in the immediate transformation from anarchy to hierarchy. The thesis asserts that the generation of common goods, the decline in transaction costs and the success in securing the commitment of the members and the legitimacy of the system enabled and encouraged the persistence of hierarchic structures. It also re-emphasizes that whereas the persistence of hierarchic systems depends on the existence of several factors, only one factor can promote the persistence of anarchic structures e.g. the moral purpose of the state.

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INTRODUCTION

Robert Gilpin suggests that in order to understand system change, a change in the nature of the actors that compose system, demands a truly comparative study of international relations and systems (1981:41). Gilpin argues that the general question of why one or another type of entity predominates a particular historical period has been inadequately addressed (1981:41). Then, he indicates a very important and challenging question:

What this question asks is why, at various times and in differing contexts, individuals and groups believe one political form rather than another is best suited to advance their interests (Gilpin, 1981:41).

Several forms of political organization such as city-states, empires, city-leagues, nation-states in certain periods of history coexisted, disappeared and reappeared again in different forms up until the late nineteenth century. When the first global political system had taken the form of a system of states Bull points out that:

World order could in principle be achieved by other forms of universal political organization, and a standing question is whether world order might not better be served by such other forms...indeed, the form of the states system has been the exception rather than the rule (1977:20-1).

Hendrik Spruyt, using methods of new institutional history and historical sociology, answered the question why sovereign territorial state displaced with city-states and city-leagues by the middle of the seventieth century (1994). Similar studies have not been applied to forms of political organizations other than sovereign territorial states and it is worth while to explore why in ancient times different forms of political organizations shaped the political life and why not others.

During the Ancient and Classical eras (3000 B.C. to 1500 A.D.) particular hierarchical forms have co-existed with other hierarchies as well as with anarchic multi-state systems such as the Roman Empire and the Warring States of China and ancient Greece, the Imperial China, the Mongol Empire and ancient India; the Habsburg Empire and the Italian city state system. Nevertheless, Gilpin suggests that the hierarchical types of system or empires have been most prevalent, at least until modern times (1981:29). Moreover, Buzan and Little argue that during the Ancient and Classical eras multi-actor systems of independent units certainly existed but were not stable and were transformed into hierarchic structures (2000: 232). In South Asia, the East Asia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, anarchic systems regularly and repeatedly collapsed into empires or suzerain systems. In this context, the question why hierarchic structures prevailed during the Ancient and Classical eras (3000 B.C. to 1500 A.D.) remains to be answered.

In order to understand why hierarchical forms of organization prevailed, I analyzed four case studies: the Roman Empire (the Pax Romana period 1st century B.C.-3rd century A.D.), the Chinese Empire (the T'ang Dynasty 618-907 A.D.), the multi-state system of ancient Greece (8th-4th century B.C.) and the multi-state system of ancient China (The Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Period 722-221 B.C.). Whereas the Roman Empire and the Chinese Empire are considered as hierarchic structures, the multi-state system of ancient Greece and China are considered as exceptional or alternative anarchic structures.

Anarchy and Hierarchy

Systems are regularized patterns of relations among political units (Lieber, 1972:121; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1971:102; Rosecrance, 1963:220-1; Yost, 1979:152; Holsti, 1974:29; Aron, 1966:94; Hoffman, 1961:207; Modelski, 1961:121; Gilpin, 1981:26; Kaplan, 1957:14). “A system is composed of a structure and of interacting units” and “the structure is the system wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole” (Waltz, 1979:79). Waltz defines political structure on the basis of the principle according to which they are organized or ordered, the character of the units – the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions – and the distribution of capabilities across them (1979:88).

According to first principle, structure is defined on the basis of how units stand in relation to one another, namely how they are arranged or positioned. Hierarchic structures are centralized systems in which the units stand in relations of super- and subordination (Waltz, 1979:88). On the contrary, anarchic structures are decentralized systems in which the units stand as equal parts (Waltz, 1979:88). Structure also depends on the functions performed by differentiated or undifferentiated units (Waltz, 1979:93). The relations of super- and subordination among the units in hierarchic structures imply their differentiation and thereby their functions. On the contrary, as long as anarchy prevails states remain like units, because in anarchic structures they have relations of coordination which implies their sameness (Waltz, 1979:93). Finally, the units of a system are distinguished by their greater or lesser capabilities which determine their relations to one another (Waltz, 1979:97). Since the units are functionally undifferentiated and perform similar tasks in anarchic systems, they are distinguished by their greater or lesser capabilities (Waltz, 1979:97). In hierarchic systems

units are related to one another by the extent of their capabilities and their functional differentiation.

On the basis of this conceptual framework, anarchic and hierarchic structures are two forms of political organization that existed during the Ancient and Classical eras. The Roman and the Chinese Empires are examples of hierarchic structures and the multi-state systems of Greece and China are examples of anarchic structures. However, on the basis of the dominant view of structure, it is not possible to view empires as hierarchic structures. According to Waltz's conceptualization of structure, all empires exist within the same structural form (Little, 1993:91). There is no structural distinction between the British or the Roman Empire because both of them existed in an anarchical setting. Empires extend their territories in the context of broader anarchic systems so that no systemic transformation occurs through the establishment of empires whether in the ancient or modern world because no single authority can dominate the entire political units. Therefore the world system is considered as a continuous anarchic system (Little, 1993:91-2).

Nevertheless, Wallerstein argues that there is a sharp distinction between the Roman and the British Empire because the Roman Empire eliminated the other power centers in its broader system so that it became a world empire (Little, 1993:92). On the contrary, the British Empire always acted in an anarchic system with other competing states. Therefore, there is a distinction between empires that exist within an anarchic system and those that transform the system and alter the anarchic structure (Little, 1993:92). Obviously, Wallerstein's arguments are based on the idea that empires are closed systems. Wallerstein suggests that world systems

are largely self-contained systems and the dynamics of development in these systems are largely internal (1974:347). The world systems coexisted and they were not parts of larger social systems. Although there might be contact between systems these contacts did not have sufficient material effect (Little, 1993:93). However, Bozeman argues that it is difficult to consider these empires as self-contained autonomous units, in fact although they pretend to be unique and undisputed powers within the frontiers of their empires, they were actually aware of each other's existence and they maintained contact indirectly by means of trade (Little, 1993:94). Therefore, Bozeman challenges the idea that empires were self-sufficient, largely contained and autonomous units.

Furthermore, Little argues that it is difficult to interpret the Roman Empire as a closed autonomous system (1993:96). Little suggests that world system can be analyzed as a system which is divided into several subsystems. In this sense the expansion of Rome can be considered as a process of expansion of subsystems. Initially, Rome expanded through its subsystem and then her subsystem coexisted with others and she eventually conquered them all (Little, 1993:97). Little says, "The agents of these units perceived themselves to be operating within an international subsystem that was relatively autonomous" (1993:97). The multi-state system of Greece and the Persian Empire were two examples of subsystems that the Romans took over. Nevertheless, the concept of subsystem is quite difficult to sustain because it presupposes the existence of an international system that comprised of the entire political units at that period. In this sense, the Roman Empire and the Chinese Empire might be considered as units of regional systems which were not parts of a larger system. To a certain extent these regional systems were self-contained which developed their own dynamics although they

cannot be considered as completely isolated from each other. They demonstrated significant characteristics of a system and it is difficult to consider them as part of a broader anarchic system because there was not a general system that characterized the entire political units at that era. In this sense, the structure of these regional systems can be considered as hierarchic or anarchic within their boundaries. Therefore, the expansion of Rome and China can be considered as structural transformations within their regional systems. These systems were transformed into hierarchic structures through the conquest of all units in the system and hierarchic structures prevailed for long time.

In addition to hierarchic case studies the study will examine multi state-systems of Greece and China as anarchic examples. A multi-state system or “A system of states or international system is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole” (Bull, 1995:9). Two or more states or even several systems of states may exist at the same time without forming an international system. They may have direct or indirect interaction, and interactions may take a form between conflicts through cooperation.

Wight asserts that for states to form a system of states, “not only must each claim independence of any political superior for itself, but each must recognize the validity of the same claim by all the others” (1977:23). He labels the Western, the Hellenistic, the Chinese system (771 BC – 221 AD) and the South India as clear examples (Wight, 1977:22). It is obvious that ancient Greece and China were system of states that consisted of independent states. These systems were truly anarchic structures as states stand equal to each other.

The Hierarchic Structures

The research question is examined as a process of transformation from anarchy to hierarchy and hierarchy to anarchy. The reasons of predominance of hierarchic structures will be analyzed on the basis of three stages. The first stage is the emergence of the hierarchic structure or the collapse of anarchic structure. In this stage the actual shift from hierarchy to anarchy occurs, such as the establishment of an empire. The duree of the stage depends on the circumstances. The second stage is the maintenance of the hierarchic structure. The reasons why a system shifted to a hierarchic structure and why it remains as such may be different because after the first stage certain dynamics emerge and create incentives to the actors of the system (both center and parts) to sustain the hierarchic structure. In other words, an anarchic structure can be conceived as a totality, which is the sum of the parts. Whereas, a hierarchic structure is more than the mere sum of parts, it has certain properties that arise from the process of integration and these properties might turn out to be forces that encourage actors to maintain it. In the third stage, the hierarchic structure dissolves into an anarchic structure again. Although all of these stages are interrelated there are certain factors that affect each of them separately. Nevertheless, the particular interest of this project will be the first and second stages.

“Most states-systems have ended in a universal empire, which has swallowed all the states-system” (Wight, 1977:43). The first and second chapters deal with two universal empires: the Roman and the Chinese. This analysis demonstrates that the major reason of the transformation from hierarchy to anarchy (the first stage) was the unification of the system through conquest in order to achieve peace. Rome and the state of Qin pursued similar policies

and their conception of security was based on domination of their enemies. Both of these states were in a competitive security environment in which states identify each other's security negatively and see the others as enemies. One of the major implications of this type of self-other identification is that states will act like deep revisionists and may try to destroy or conquer others (Wendt, 1999:262).

These characteristics were clear for the Roman Empire. Garnsey and Whittaker suggest that the very existence of a truly independent power was viewed by Rome as a potential threat to her own security (1978:170) and "right from the start there was the determination to dominate whatever was within reach and to build up strength to extend that reach" (Badian, 1968:5-6). "For every new gain, every increase in power – whether by extension of influence or territorial control – required and created a new security zone, and every new neighbor, especially a powerful one, became – or was perceived as – a threat, regardless of earlier alliances" (Raaflub, 1996:300). Furthermore, the major security policy of the state of Qin was "the more states were suppressed the wider the area of unity and order would become, until only one state existed and there would be no more war" (Watson, 1992:91). In this context, the main reason of the transformation from anarchy to hierarchy stemmed from the policies of these states, which sought peace through conquest and unification under a single authority. Obviously, their efforts were supported by other several features such as geopolitical position, rich natural resources, strong aristocratic warrior traditions and values, the size of their territory, the impact of outside pressure and most significantly the military capabilities and inability of their neighbors to prevent their domination. Doyle mentions that the neighboring societies of Rome were either too weak to threaten Roman security, once overrun, or their pro-

Roman factions and patrimonial rulers found positive incentives to collaborate with Rome (1986:91). In respect of the Chinese Empire, Rodzinski claims that the unification was particularly a result of the aggressiveness and the failure of the other states to oppose Qin effectively (1979:32). However, without the fear of others and the desire to achieve peace through conquest, all these factors remain secondary.

After the establishment of the unification and the hierarchic structure, certain dynamics emerge within the system and they turn out to be incentives for both the center and the parts to sustain the hierarchic relationship. First of all, the generation of common goods such as security, economic prosperity, effective mobilization of resources, and facilities for transportation and communication encourages hierarchic structures. The Roman Empire during the Augustus period did so. Peace was enduring, dependent not on Augustus but on Rome, so that it was called *Pax Romana*, which stood for peace and order (Last, 1975:445; Watson, 1992:99). Similarly, the T'ang dynasty was able to secure peace during his reign. As Rodzinski notes, "there had been few eras in world history when a civilized area existed in peace for such a long time. The remark is, unfortunately, true enough and a very bitter comment on the history of the human race" (1979:131). The military capabilities and military strategy, the national fidelity of people, the strength of balanced government, the political stability, the social and cultural forces of honor and religion, the conditions of its neighbors, the continuous waging of war were some of the factors that contributed to the military success of these Empires (Luttwak, 1976; Mann, 1986:274; Doyle, 1986:85-91; Brunt, 1990:102-114; Ferrill, 1986:25-8; Blainey, 1988; Somers, 1986:973; Wechsler, 1979:160-1; Rodzinski, 1979:131; Li, 1978:176).

Although not guaranteed, peace and security promote economic prosperity. Peace and security are the major conditions of the realization of economic activities and implementation of economic policies. Becoming part of a peaceful Empire can secure opportunities for economic growth. *The Pax Romana* and the T'ang dynasty were remarkable examples of these peaceful periods, which resulted in the availability of economic benefits as a common good. Hopkins very clearly summarizes: "The Roman empire provided conditions for modest economic growth...by extending the area of cultivated land...by increasing the size of agricultural units to achieve economies of scale...by using systematic accounting methods...by allowing and encouraging the growth or persistence of towns...by effecting economies of scale...by achieving significant increases in productivity" (2000:11-2). Adshead and Eberhard suggest that the period of T'ang dynasty was wealthier and more populous than the Han had ever been (Adshead, 1995:56, 68; Eberhard, 1977:180). Several years of internal peace, good harvests and effective administrative policies, the equal-field system, state monopolies, government owned manufactories, development of the crafts, improved communications, significant amount of sea trade, the Buddhist monasticism and spread of capitalism were some of the factors that encouraged the economic growth (Wechsler, 1979:209; Rodzinski, 1979:120-2; Adshead, 1995:56-8; Latourette, 1967:153). As mentioned above, the realization of these secondary factors depends on peace as a primary factor. Furthermore, the Rome and the T'ang dynasty were also able to provide the effective mobilization of resources and equal distribution of burdens and benefits as other common goods that promoted the maintenance of hierarchic structures.

Another dynamic of the hierarchic structures is the reduction in transactions costs in various types of interactions. Transaction costs emerge when two or more actors coordinate or cooperate to perform certain tasks and achieve mutual goals in various spheres of social life. Transaction costs may involve in gathering, evaluating and exchange information, in preparing for, negotiating and concluding verbal or written agreements, producing, transporting and trade of commercial products, and so on. Weber argues that cooperated efforts are more efficient than individual efforts so that actors facing high transaction costs could benefit from joining political entities with well developed cooperative organizational structures (Weber, 2000:17). If a central administration is able to provide and implement standardized regulations and procedures evenly throughout its entire system, this might reduce transaction costs and create a significant incentive for both the center and the parts to sustain the hierarchic form. The major fields in which transaction costs were decreased are security, economy, transportation and law. Both the Roman Empire and the Chinese Empire pursued very successful policies that there was a high level of uniformity and standardization within the Empire. The reduction in transaction costs in the Roman Empire can be observed in the economic sphere through the standardization of administrative law and procedures, the standardization of coinage, and weights and measures (Mann, 1986:271-2; Starr, 1982:26; Hopkins, 1980; Bozeman, 1960:187-211; Garnsey and Saller, 1987:55; Edmondson, 1993:184). Furthermore, the technical and practical capacities of the legions of Rome and the projects that were realized reduced transaction costs in transportation and communication (Mann, 1986:274-6). Watson says, "The advantages of empire were plain to see. Law, currency, weights and measures were standardized. Commerce and industry thrived under Pax Romana, with goods moving largely by sea over a Mediterranean now at last substantially free of pirates" (1992:101). Furthermore,

the T'ang Empire was able to reduce the transaction costs in several spheres such as administrative procedures and written language, coinage, measure and weights, and a standard application of codified law (Li, 1978:101-2; MacNair, 1951:73-4; Fairbank, 1978:7; Wechsler, 1979:177-8; McKnight, 1995:410-20; Wechsler and Twitchett, 1979:273-7; Twitchett, 1970:66-78; Eisenstadt, 1969:48).

Finally, the ability to provide commitment and the legitimacy of the system is an important factor that promoted the dominance of hierarchic structures. The belief in the moral purpose of the state deeply affects the legitimacy of particular forms of political organizations and legitimacy is directly connected to commitment.¹ The more legitimacy the authority has, the more likely it sustains commitment. Furthermore, there are other factors that encourage the commitment of members to the system. Easier assimilation and integration and the high mobility of elites in the system will provide easier access to the benefits. This in turn will increase the commitment of members to the system because if the members share the benefits of the system they will favor and defend the maintenance of the system.

The Roman Empire was very successful in securing the commitment of states and individuals to the center and to the system as a whole. Besides the use of force, the gradual development of ideological, political and cultural integration among all provincial elites (the Romanization of the provincial elites), the extension of citizenship, the diffusion of Senate membership and Rome's process of interaction between the center and periphery are the major factors that provide commitment and legitimacy throughout the Empire (Lendon, 1997:7;

¹ The moral purpose of the state can be defined as a conception of the individual or social good that historical agents hold for organizing their political life (Reus-Smit, 1999:31).

Mann, 1986:254,260-7; Doyle, 1986:91; Dise, 1991:7-8; Edmondson, 1993:181; Brunt, 1990:127; Sherwin-White, 1973:222; Garnsey and Saller, 1987:123-4). Especially the notion of citizenship was very crucial as Mann suggests: “Greek style citizenship of Rome itself to produce what was probably the widest extent of collective commitment yet mobilized” (1986:254). Furthermore, the Roman society and economy were imperialized by pursuing the welfare of its parts. The Emperor aimed to distribute the burden of taxation equally and secured the fair collection and expansion of revenues of the State (Doyle, 1986:87). In this sense the equal distribution of benefits and burdens was another factor that contributed to the commitment of the citizens.

The T’ang dynasty was also able to provide elite commitment through political, cultural and ideological integration, by using ideological, coercive and remunerative measures, and through the legitimacy of the concept of Sino-centrism (Somers, 1986:981; Fairbank, 1992:84-5; Latourette, 1967:143; Li, 1978:179-180; Pye, 1984:67-8). Particularly the concept of Sino-centrism and the examination system were vitally effective to provide the commitment of Chinese. However, the T’ang dynasty had difficulties to sustain the commitment of the non-Chinese population and the relation of the Empire with non-Chinese societies was not stable (Fairbank, 1968:2-11; Zhang, 2001:52-8; Wechsler, 1979:286-7; Rodzinski, 1979:122-3; Eberhard, 1977:180-1; Cranmer-Byng, 1973:68; Schwartz, 1968:276-8; Ng-Quinn, 1983; Yang, 1968:24-31).

The Anarchic Structures

The multi-state systems of Greece (8th – 4th century B.C.) and the multi-state system of ancient China (The Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Period 722 – 221 B.C.) were truly anarchic structures that consisted of small independent states. The third and fourth chapters of the study focus on why these multi-state systems remained anarchic in an era, which was remarked by hierarchical structures. The analysis of the multi-states system of Greece reveals that, although several conditions to maintain a hierarchic structure existed, the moral purpose of the state seems to be the major factor that led these states to remain independent.

Initially, the study shall consider whether the dynamics that emerge in hierarchic structures emerged in the anarchic structures as well. Anarchic structures are less likely to provide security as a common good. Throughout the Archaic and Classical periods, although peace was seen as the primary goal of Greek way of life and there were methods for peaceful settlements of disputes, the Greeks fought for various reasons such as power and aggrandizement, material enrichment, border disputes, honor and respect, fear, etc. (Finley, 1963:56-7; Osborne, 2000:82-3; Watson, 1992:50). Bozeman suggests that the chief reason for war was the city-state itself because “[t]he polis was to secure a good life for the people in terms of individual development, and since the realization of this aim was deemed to be possible only if a city did not exceed a certain size...peace through political unification was actually inconsistent with the primary purpose of political association as understood by the Greeks” (Bozeman, 1960:77-8). In the economic sphere, the Greek city-states managed to increase their welfare during the Archaic and Classical period and the system already

maintained several conditions for further economic growth. However, the lack of a hierarchic structure like the Roman Empire impeded further economic rise because of the lack of security especially in sea-borne trade, numerous media of exchanges and methods, difficulties in transportation among states, lack of standardized economic regulations, lack of legal security and property, etc. (Starr, 1982:428, 1991:315; Hammond, 1986). Moreover, the Greek city-states system consisted of several elements that reduced the transaction costs within the city-states, such as standardized language and alphabets, codification of law and standardized administrative procedures (Bengtson, 1988:63; Mann, 1986:204-6; Rollo, 1937:135-6; Van Sickle, 1974:269-70; Graham, 1982; Freeman, 1999:104; Wight, 1977:52; Kokaz, 2001:95; Ober, 1996:56). Nevertheless, due to the importance given to the independence and autonomy of the city-states, these factors were mostly limited to the boundaries of individual city-states.

The major factor that led to the maintenance of the anarchic structure was the commitment of the citizens to the polis. The main political form of Hellas, the *poleis*, unlike other contemporary forms of organizations, sustained the commitment of elites and the loyalty and active participation of all male adults. First of all, geographical fragmentation and isolation contributed to the development of polis (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:50; Finley, 1963:21; Sealey, 1976:10). Second, the moral basis of the polis, the moral values and philosophical assumptions of Greeks led them to form a community life based on the form of polis (Bozeman, 1960:70-1; Holsti, 1974:46; Reus-Smit, 1999:46; Kokaz, 2001:101). Third, the development of citizenship, which was based on mutual responsibility for the administration of the city, was another factor (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:54; Freeman, 1999:90; Finley, 1963:23). Fourth, the emergence of hoplite warfare and phalanx was an important factor that

promoted the emergence of community consciousness and commitment to the polis (Freeman, 1999:91-3).

The analysis of the Spring and Autumn Period (SAP) 722-481 B.C. and the Warring States period (WSP) 403-221 B.C. demonstrates first of all that there is clear evidence of the sovereignty of the states that comprised the system (Holsti, 1974:33; Walker, 1953:24; Watson, 1992:85). In this anarchic structure, although peace and security were two major goals of these states, they chose war as a means to achieve peace and war became a normal part of life (Li, 1978:40-53; Walker, 1953:76-88; Holsti, 1974:43; Lewis, 1999:616, 632). The fundamental aim of these wars was to control the central area of China, the Honan province, plunder and increase in territory (Rodzinski, 1979:26, 28). In the economic sphere, Ancient China witnessed a rudimental growth during the SAP and the WSP. The great improvement in the means of production and distribution, the introduction of iron, the efficient farming, the land tenure system and land taxation, a large number of extensive transportation and irrigation projects, specialization in manufacture, the rise in influence and activities of merchants and state policies brought about greater welfare to the states (Hsu, 1999:577-80; Rodzinski, 1979:24; Walker, 1953:17-8; Li, 1978:60-2; Eberhard, 1960:55). During these periods, substantial reduction in transaction costs was realized within the individual states. The states standardized their administrative procedures by the replacement of older internal rules and forms by a systematic code of laws (Walker, 1953:34). Although the rise in economy resulted in the growth of a money economy and the emergence of minted coins, at the systemic level there was no uniformity in medium of exchange (Eberhard, 1960:55; Lewis, 1999:607). Regarding the weights and measures, it could be argued that although there was a standard

within the individual state, there were various measures of units in different states (Lewis, 1999:610).

The commitment and loyalty of the people also played a very important role in the emergence, maintenance and collapse of the anarchic structure. Initially, the multi-state system of China transformed from the feudal system of the Zhou dynasty. Since the vassals were given land by the Emperor they were directly committed to the Emperor. However, the increase in power of individual feudal lords at the expense of the Zhou dynasty resulted in the emergence of the anarchic system. The acquisition of further territory, the isolation of feudal lords, the aggrandizement among the vassals, the establishment of local administration and the development of central bureaucracies within the individual states, the organization and maintenance of armed forces and its extension into the countryside, the extension of tax liability, the recognition of the property, large-scale irrigation and construction projects, collection and storage of grains, construction of walled cities resulted in the increase of the power and independence of feudal lords at the expense of the central authority (Eberhard, 1950:34; Holsti, 1974:35; Lewis, 1999:611; Walker, 1953:35). Meanwhile, the commitment and loyalty of the people shifted from the dynasty to the prince of the state and the state itself (Walker, 1953:36). The increase in awareness of broad differences in dialect, customs, religion, legends, and cults among the various regions and the growth of rudimentary forms of nationalism promoted this process.

These were the major reasons why the system transformed and remained anarchic during these periods. Nevertheless, a major characteristic of these periods reveals the fact that

the moral purpose of the state did not fit with the form of the political organization of the system. There were 1773 states in the Zhou dynasty. Throughout the beginning of the SAP, these states were consolidated and allied with each other and their number decreased to 170 and then 14. At the beginning of the SAP in 722 B.C., there were seven major states. Therefore, there was a clear-cut period of consolidation and absorption. This consolidation continued during the SAP and WSP and the multi-state system collapsed with the ultimate triumph of state of Ch'in (Qin) and its establishment of rule over all of China in 221 B.C. The major factor behind this consolidation was the moral purpose of the state. The moral purpose of the state was based on the philosophical assumptions of the Legalist school and the concept of Sino-centrism. The central assumption of Sino-centric world order was that China was the civilization and the Chinese emperor as Son of Heaven had the mandate of Heaven to rule. The major dictum of the Legalist school was that subjugation of all hostile states would lead realistically to peace. "because the more states were suppressed the wider the area of unity and order would become, until only one state existed and there would be no more war" (Watson, 1992:91). The state of Qin was the pioneer of the Legalist school and the unity of all under Heaven. Furthermore, Watson and Rubin suggest that the legalist ideas on organizing the state for war and achieving peace through universal conquest reflect the policies actually pursued by those states (Watson, 1992:91; Rubin, 1976:55). On the basis of these assumptions the existence of multiple states that were independent of and not subordinate to Heaven was an unacceptable idea to Chinese political thought. Obviously, the moral purpose of the state cannot solely be attributed to the success of the state of Qin. However it was the major stimulating force behind its policy.

The final chapter concludes that the desire to achieve peace accompanied with natural, social and institutional advantages led to the transformation from anarchy to hierarchy. The generation of common goods such as security, economic prosperity, effective mobilization of resources, the decline in transaction costs in security, economy, transformation and law and the success of Rome and T'ang dynasty to sustain the commitment of members of the system and the legitimacy of it as a whole were the major factors that led to the persistence of hierarchic structures. The Greek's belief in the moral purpose of the state promoted by the geographical, moral and strategic factors encouraged the persistence of an anarchic system in the multi-state system of Greece. Although the multi-state system of China remained anarchic as a result of the dissolution of the feudal system of Zhou dynasty, the moral purpose of the state and the philosophical and moral values of the system promoted the emergence of the hierarchic structure.

CHAPTER I

THE ROMAN EMPIRE

THE PAX ROMANA PERIOD (1ST cc B.C. – 3RD cc A.D.)

The history of the Roman Empire is classified by historians as the Kingdom (until the 5th century B.C.), the Republic (5th – 1st century B.C.), and the Empire (1st century B.C. – 3rd century A.D.). Although during the Republican period, the Roman city-state acquired a vast empire, the emergence of a system of government controlled by an emperor marked the beginning of the Roman Empire (Ward, Heichelheim and Yeo, 1999:246). The first three hundred years of the Empire is identified, as the Principate because of one of the chief titles of the emperor was the princeps, the first among equals within the Roman nobility. After 282 A.D., the empire is identified as the Dominate because the princeps abandoned and the title dominus, lord and master adopted. This chapter examines the reasons of persistence of the Roman hierarchic structure during the Pax Romana Period (The Principate – 1st century B.C. – 3rd century A.D.) In order to understand why a hierarchical structure developed and maintained, initially, I shall focus on the immediate transformation of the structure from anarchy to hierarchy.

The Transformation from Anarchy to Hierarchy

The Roman Empire was established through conquest of Rome. Therefore, the motivations of this annexation might reveal the factors that led to the formation of the hierarchic structure. There are several factors that encouraged Rome for annexation such as Rome's identification of self and other and its implication on their foreign policy, the lack of

any impediment against the rise of Rome such as rivalry of other states, the fear of powerful neighbors, the strength of the Roman army, the habituation to war and record of success, the benefits of this success, and the continuing demand for more benefits (Rich, 2004:61).

The self other identification is an important element that determines foreign policies of states. The conception of security at that period was definitely different from others. Understanding the context of the era is vital, because certain periods of history can be classified according to their specific circumstances. It is possible that we could make an analogy between the security environment of the Roman Empire and the hypothetical construction of Wendt's security systems. Wendt argues that concept of security changes according to how the self is identified cognitively with the other (1992:399). He presents three security systems according to different identifications of the self and other. One of these systems is a competitive security system that has a Hobbesian culture of security (Wendt, 1992:400, 1999:259). In this type of system states identify each other's security negatively and see the others as enemies. This kind of representing the other as an enemy has at least four implications for a state's foreign policy posture and behavior (Wendt, 1999:262). Under these systems (a) states will act like deep revisionists and may try to destroy or conquer them (b) their decisions will discount the future and may be oriented toward the worst case (c) the relative military capabilities will be seen as crucial (d) states will fight on the enemy's terms, namely, observing no limits on their own violence. The logic of this kind of systems is clear: the war of all against all in which actors operate on the principle of kill or be killed. It is truly a self-help system where nobody can account on each other for help. Security is seen as a deeply competitive zero-sum affair and security dilemmas are particularly acute. Finally, these types

of structures may generate four types of tendencies at the macro level (Wendt, 1999:265): (a) endemic or unlimited warfare (b) elimination of unfit actors (c) balancing among powerful states (d) difficult neutrality or non-alignment.

Obviously, the security environment of the Roman Empire and Wendt's competitive security system with a Hobbesian anarchy is not perfect matches. However, there are certain elements that can be identified in the period of the Roman Empire that are similar to Wendt's hypothetical construction. When we look at the Roman history we see continuous fighting till the period of Pax Romana. During the period of Kingdom and early Republic Rome was in a struggle for survival with the Etruscans (sixth century), Latin city-states (sixth to fifth centuries), with its immediate neighbors such as Veii, Sabin, Aequ and Volsc (fifth century), with Gauls (fifth to fourth centuries), Samnites (fourth century), and with Carthage (fourth century). During these centuries, similar to a competitive security system, we observe intense fighting among units threatening the very existence of one another. Raaflaub clearly emphasizes the external threat against Roman Empire and its consequences on politics and culture of the society. Raaflaub says that one of the reasons that made Rome an imperialist state was

... outside pressure. The decisive fact is that there was such pressure but that it was intense, threatening the very existence of the city, and that it continued, almost without interruption, for a very long time: one hundred fifty years, six generations....Rome, too, I suggest, was only able to overcome its difficulties by adjusting its value system, behavior patterns, and social as well as communal structures. It did so in various ways (1996:290-1).

Rich points out

The Romans were not always successful in their wars and some enemies – the Gauls, Pyrrhus, Hannibal – threatened the very survival of the Republic.

Memories of these dangers were real enough, and in my judgement the fear of powerful neighbors, although not, as used to be supposed, the key to Roman imperialism, must remain an important factor in accounting it (2004:61).

According to Raaflaub, the Latin wars in 338 B.C. were a turning point for Rome where she gained a decisive victory. From that moment on Rome was transformed into an imperial city-state from a hegemonic city-state and followed a clear imperialist policy (1996:289). After consolidating its power from these successive wars we see the great expansion of Rome towards Italy, Western Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, Africa and more. Obviously, the effect of this security environment deeply influenced the foreign policy behavior of Rome. During this imperialistic phase the main element of the Roman conception of security is based on domination of the enemy. Badian suggests

Roman policy, from almost as far as back as we can trace it, was different [from that of the Hellenistic powers]. Of course, for a long time Rome had to recognize the equality of some other powers. ...But right from the start there was the determination to dominate whatever was within reach and to build up strength to extend that reach. Equality was conceded only beyond the range of effective power, and every attempt was made to build up power where it had shown itself deficient (1968:5-6).

Raaflaub says “For every new gain, every increase in power – whether by extension of influence or territorial control- required and created a new security zone, and every new neighbor, especially a powerful one, became-or was perceived as – a threat, regardless of earlier alliances” (1996:300). The limits of territory that Rome claimed dominion were continually advancing. The expansion did not cease as long as any independent people remained. The very existence of a truly independent power was viewed by Rome as a potential threat to her own security (Garnsey and Whittaker, 1978:170). The internal pacification was the main strategy of Rome during this phase. In this context, we may argue that Rome’s policy

was based on the idea of conquering the enemy, and it tends to account on the worst scenario. The long years of war between small city-states created an enemy based self-other identification. The struggles for survival for long years made war an evitable part of life and led to emergence of shared knowledge about the identities, roles and identifications of self and other as enemies.

Obviously, security was not the only factor that encouraged Rome for further expansion and warfare. Rome's expansion was not a continuous process sustained at a stable rate, therefore, there is no single determining factor behind the expansion. In fact, there were many and complex determining factors. The Roman imperialism and security through domination for the *Populus Imperium Romanum* was intertwined. Romans waged war for expansionism and for several benefits of this expansion and exploitation such as land, booty, glory and tribute (Brunt, 1990:267; Raaflaub, 1996:279; Rich, 2004:62; Doyle, 1986:125). Harris suggests that apart from defensive considerations, the habituation to continuous warfare and desire for glory and economic benefits, which were conferred by successful wars, there were some other factors that promoted Rome's desire for further expansion (1979:234-40; 1989:153-6; 2004:18). Glory was an important factor. Romans believed that all good men should seek *otium cum dignitate* (Garnsey and Whittaker, 1978:161). *Otuim* stands for security from external attack and *dignitas* suggests the glory of the whole state. Raaflub suggests that achievement in political and military leadership played a very important role in the political ethos and value system of Roman aristocracy (1996:278-9). Glory and dignity can only be achieved through public service and great achievements in war. "Once it was in place, it must have had a profound effect on foreign policy decisions" (Raaflub, 1996:279). Rich points out

that in several cases, the Roman commanders decided to wage war at their own discretion for their desire to win glory (2004:57). Furthermore, Rich asserts that land and booty were two major benefits that most Roman citizens got from war and after major wars confiscated land was distributed among them in land allotments until the fifth century (2004:53). Land and booty were two major needs and benefits that encouraged Rome to wage wars. A growing population, the growth of large landholders, the growing demand of landless urban proletariat, the need for colonization and the change in the character of the army were the major factors that pressured Rome to fight more wars (Doyle, 1986:87-8).

The Political Structure of the Roman Empire

After the transformation, the hierarchical structure of the Roman Empire began to be established. During the Kingdom, for many years, Rome fought several wars with its immediate neighbors and traces of the imperial structure of Rome appeared after the Roman dominance in Italy. Rome was able to achieve unity in three centuries and during this period the administrative structure of the Roman system was continuously changing (Homo, 1996:321). When the Republic was abolished, Rome was composed of Rome and Italy, protectorates and provinces. The establishment of Empire increased this variety by the division of provinces into distinct categories and by the possession of Egypt as a completely different category. I shall focus on the period of Principate when the foundations of the hierarchical structure were established.

The Central and Provincial Administration

The Center

Initially, Roman society was organized like a confederation of communities called *Populus Romanus* who were citizens consisted of three *tribus* (communities). Every *tribus* consists of ten *curias* and every curia has ten *gens* (clans). The head of *populus* was a king who holds the right of *imperium* (execution). He was also the chief of priests, chief of justice and the general commander. There were two assemblies ranking below the King: *the comitia curiata* and the Senate. *The comitia curiata* was composed of *curias* of citizens and perform the function of legislation. The Senate was an advisory organ composed of head of *gens*. Because of the despotic administration of kings, Rome transformed to a Republican regime in the fifth century B.C. (Agaogullari, 1998:18). Under this regime, *centurias*, a new unit of societal division, formed a new assembly, *comitia centuriata*. *The comitia centuriata* was important because it chose two consuls who possessed *the imperium* for a year. Among these three assemblies, the Senate was the main and dominant administrative unit of the Republic that concentrated the real power (Grant, 1997:1, Agaogullari, 1998:19).

Under this Republican regime as Roman rule was gradually built up, the machinery of the Republic was not able to govern these vast and varied territories. Eventually, the crisis of the Republic led to a civil war that ended with the victory of Octavian. After the victory, Octavian became the head of Rome as the continuous consul. Then, he was honored *the princeps senatus* (first man of the state) by the Senate and was given the name Augustus as an honor to the restorer. The administrative system of the Augustian period was a matter of dispute because it seems that the old system of the Republic had been restored and the Senate,

the magistrates, and people continued to perform many of their old functions in a familiar way. However, many authors argue that Augustus was the dominant force and the Principate was a monarchy (Heichelheim, Ward and Yeo, 1999:252, Le Glay, Voisin and Le Bohec, 2001:177). The power of Augustus and his successors were based on laws passed by the senate and the people and the system was similar to a constitutional monarchy. Nevertheless, the power of the Emperor gradually increased at the expense of the other sources and given the emperor's constitutional powers, financial resources and raw military force, the later emperors became absolute monarchs (Heichelheim, Ward and Yeo, 1999:252). Augustus had powers that formed the three pillars of the regime: *imperium* (executive function), *auctoritas* (authority in a divine sense, supreme prestige) and *tribunicia potestas* (inviolability, veto over magistrates, the right to convene the senate, the right to propose laws and more) (Le Glay, Voisin and Le Bohec, 2001:177). In this context, the center of the Roman system gradually transformed to a hierarchical system beginning with the Principate. However, in order to understand the structure of the whole system clearly it will be helpful to consider the position of the center vis-à-vis the provinces.

Italy

Through the end of the Republican period, Italy was considered as an integral part of the City (Rome and its close neighborhood). It was directly governed by the Comitia, Senate and magistracies and had considerable privileges in administration, justice, citizenship, military and taxing (Homo, 1996:337). However, the establishment of the Principate gave rise to an opposition between the Senate and the magistracies and the Emperor. As a result, the power of the Emperor and new institutions increased at the expense of the Senate and the magistracies

(Homo, 1996:325). The administration and legal issues began to be exercised by the representatives of the Emperor and Italy lost its privileges. Therefore, through the Late Empire, due to political causes and administrative necessities Italy became like other regions and divided into provinces (Homo, 1996:327-8).

Provinces

At the beginning of the Empire, territory outside Italy under the Roman rule was composed of three distinct elements: protectorates, provinces and Egypt. The areas that were directly administered by the Romans were called *provincia* (province). The notion of *provincia* was used in three senses: (a) a sphere of operations assigned to a magistrate; (b) an existing territorial division of Roman administration and (c) a new territory added to the others (Lintott, 1993:23). The administration of the provinces consisted of three main aspects: the maintenance of law and order, command of the provincial garrison and internal and external security, the financial administration, and the administration of provincial communities themselves. Rome relied on native elites for the performance of the daily business of imperial administration (Dise, 1991:3). Those elites were rewarded by Roman support for their position, power and prerogatives. Some of them might have citizenship or immunity from taxation.

The basic structure of provincial administration under the Principate was clear (27 B.C. – A.D. 284). The head was the emperor, the princeps, who had the control of most of provinces and almost all of its army. The other provinces were under the control of the Senate; therefore the provinces were categorized as imperial provinces and senatorial provinces. However, since these provinces were ungarrisoned, and since the Emperor controlled admission to the Senate

and promotion within its ranks, the Senate's authority was neither exclusive nor absolute. Eventually, the Senatorial provinces were transferred into Imperial one (Dise, 1991:1; Garnsey, 1987:21; Stevenson, 1976: 211; Le Glay, Voisin and Bohec, 2001:201; Homo, 1996:340-1).

The Roman administrative policy was accustomed according to the local circumstances of a province. The Romans did not change the provinces whose inhabitants belonged to cities possessing institutions of a type with which they were familiar (Stevenson, 1976:208). They only impose their municipal system on regions that were organized in a different way. In some cases, old tribal institutions were recognized and left to operate as long as their authorities were willing to cooperate with the Roman representatives, especially in the matter of taxation (Stevenson, 1976:208).

Protectorates (Allied Kings)

The protectorates were vassal states, usually kingdoms, which maintained their native institutions. Rome had the sovereign control of their foreign policy and of their internal affairs. This arrangement was generally found in the East, Europe, and Asia and exceptionally in the West. Some of them were in the form of client-kings, were free in their internal administration and some of them were immune from taxation, but they might be required to provide troops and their foreign policy was determined by the Emperor. All these protectorates were gradually absorbed into the provincial system as a process from the reign of Augustus to the early second century (Stevenson, 1976:215; Lintott, 1993:34; Ward, Heichelheim and Yeo, 1999:270). In this context, during the Principate the hierarchical structure of the Roman Empire was firmly established and remained the major form of political organization.

The Persistence of the Roman Hierarchical System

The Generation of Common Goods

Security

Orders have certain primary or elementary goals and security is the first and foremost of these goals (Bull, 1995:4). Likewise, security was always the primary concern of the Romans. Rome's success in providing security through a hierarchic structure was one of the reasons that explain the endurance of it. During the development and the persistence of the Empire, security lies behind all other purposes. By committing themselves to this whole, the provinces, protectorates and allied kingdoms both benefit from and contribute to this security.

The Augustus period mark the end of the Civil Wars which were precipitated by the failures of the Republic and it brought peace to a world where war had been normal since the end of Greek and Roman history (Last, 1975:445). The peace created by Augustus lasted for over two centuries and signified the full magnitude of the Rome's achievement. Peace was enduring, dependent not on Augustus but on Rome, so that it was called *Pax Romana* (Last, 1975:445). Romans conceived peace as World Empire with security from outside interference, law and order within it (Starr, 1982:16). Adcock very well summarizes what does peace meant for the Romans:

Granted all this, there is something to be said in conclusion on what the Empire and the emperors now came to stand for among ordinary people under the Principate. They stood, above all, for Peace. When Napoleon III said "The Empire is Peace", he said, with less grounds, what Augustus might have said....Once the frontiers had been defensively advanced and made secure, there were either very few wars or only distant ones. But peace under the Principate received a positive content, something more than the absence of military operations. Peace came to mean more than that. It was not only freedom from the fear of war, it was the confident belief that men could live side by side in ordered security...The *pax Augusta* which had shielded the Empire from

external wars is reinforced by the *providential Augusta* which makes peace a boon to all subjects and seeks to protect them from that fear of civil war which was so potent an influence making the Principate welcome (1964:102-3).

Then the question is what these reciprocal elements that were brought about security. First of all, the military capabilities and military strategy of the Roman Empire was a very important factor. The legions of Rome can be considered as specific assets because they were different than most of the troops of other empires and city-states (Mann, 1986:275-6). The equipment and technical capabilities of legions made them unique. Roman legions did not possess only battlefield equipment but they had several logistical equipments such as a saw, a basket, a pickaxe, an axe, a thong of leather, a hook and etc. (Mann, 1986:274-5). These tools were carried by footmen themselves and were used for civil-engineering projects. Legions could construct their roads, canals, and walls and could harvest the agricultural surplus. Therefore, they were more self-sufficient than any other military troops. They did not depend on enormous transportation facilities or local labor to build their roads or to supply food. They were more mobile, easily deployed, well equipped with technical knowledge. Easier transportation reduced transportation and communication costs, their specific equipment presented physical assets that other states cannot found by other means and their trained and skillful human capital that had technical capabilities cannot be substituted easily. These factors induced other states to commit themselves to the Roman structure. Otherwise they have to invest in highly trained men, specialized equipment or technical capabilities.

In addition to the military strength, the grand strategy of the Roman Empire had unprecedented success in its period. There were two major phases of the Roman strategy (Luttwak, 1976). During the first phase lasting to around 100 A.D., the empire had no clear

outer limits and no border fortifications. The main strategy of the legions of the army was internal pacification (Mann, 1986:274). In this period, Augustus adopted a fundamentally defensive policy and made annexations only when it was necessary for security (Brunt, 1990:96). In the zone of direct control, legions found ways to penetrate hostile territories to capture major population centers and political capitals, and then spread out that penetration without losing the military advantage (Mann, 1986:274).

When the increasing internal pacification reached a certain degree, the legions began to be deployed around the frontiers of the empire. This demonstrated the second phase of the strategy. In this phase, the major threat was the outsiders threatening the provinces. Rome chose containment as a strategy because these groups were nomadic and had no settlement (Mann, 1986:277; Brunt, 1990:102). Roman emperors pursued a strategy based on preclusive security that is the establishment of a linear barrier of perimeter defense around the empire (Ferrill, 1986:25). Accompanied with the tradition of military discipline and tactical organization, the Roman defense strategy was the most effective in the history up until that time (Ferrill, 1986:28). Both the internal and external pacification aimed to provide a secure and stable environment.

In addition, the national fidelity of its people, the strength of its balanced government, the political stability, the social and cultural forces of honor and religion were some of the factors that contributed to military success (Doyle, 1986:85). The collectivity of resources from its provinces in the forms of manpower, tributes and equipment strengthened Rome's military superiority (Brunt, 1990:114). Furthermore, Rome's success in providing security also depends

on the conditions of its neighbors. In the west, Rome's neighbors were tribal societies and barbarians who were unable to cooperate with each other. They were incapable to repel a common danger and fought in separate groups, therefore, they were all defeated easily by Rome. Their lack of social differentiation and small scale contributed to their weakness (Doyle, 1986:89). In the east, there were patrimonial monarchies and fractioned republics and towards the east the Romans employed a different strategy to provide peace that was based on informal control and fiction of alliances (Doyle, 1986:90). Some of these societies had political societies that could collaborate with Rome as they depended on Rome to secure their political position. In this context, these societies were either too weak to threaten Roman security once overrun or their pro-Roman factions and patrimonial rulers found positive incentives to collaborate with Rome (Doyle, 1986:91).

Economic Prosperity

The Roman Empire during the Principate was “unquestionably rich and, in comparison with other periods, prosperous” (Rostovtzeff, 1972:176). The economic prosperity of the Empire was an important factor that promoted the dominance of a hierarchic structure by attracting provinces to the whole. The economic prosperity stemmed from several factors. First, the Empire was able to control immense material resources in the richest parts of Europe, Africa and Asia (Rostovtzeff, 1972:176). The Empire benefited from fertile lands for cultivation, extensive pastures for stock-raising on a large scale, forests, mines, rivers and seas. Romans were successful in finding these resources and effectively made use of them (Rostovtzeff, 1972:177). Second, the growth in agriculture and stock-raising stimulated the economic rise. The Empire greatly extended the area of cultivation and produced vast

quantities of cultivation produced vast amounts of grain for export. Third, there was an increase in the number of mines and quarries. Fourth, the economic growth can be observed in development of trade by land and sea and manufacture. Manufacture spread around through the Empire and local manufacturing centers grew at the expense of large ones. The trade within the Empire grew significantly from the period 200 B.C. to A.D. 200 (Rostovtzeff, 1972:181; Hopkins, 1980:105). Better system of roads and safety from pirates at sea promoted the rise of trade. Transportation was relatively easy over the Mediterranean and along the rivers and highways to the remotest corners of the Empire. Moreover, the standardization of tariffs at the end of the third century eased the flow of commercial goods. Rostovtzeff emphasizes that trade was helped by the moderate amount of the customs levied at the frontier of the each province. This was a great improvement at that time when each Greek city collected duties from every merchant that entered its territory (Rostovtzeff, 1972:181).

The effectiveness of the Roman economy can be observed in Hopkins comparison of the Empire and the regions before the conquest by the Romans. Hopkins suggests that “there was a significant increase in agricultural production, an increase in the division of labor, growth in the number of artisans, in the size of towns where many of them lived, development of local markets and of long-distance commerce” and “these changes were most dramatic in regions which were economically primitive before their conquest by the Romans” (1980:102). Hopkins very clearly summarizes the common goods that the Roman Empire brought about in the economic sphere: “The Roman empire provided conditions for modest economic growth...by extending the area of cultivated land...by increasing the size of agricultural units to achieve economies of scale...by using systematic accounting methods...by allowing and

encouraging the growth or persistence of towns...by effecting economies of scale...by achieving significant increases in productivity” (2000:11-2).

The Decline in Transaction Costs

Transactions costs incurring to actors in a society can be considered within different spheres of life. Economy was one of these important spheres. The nature of economic activities demands security and certainty in transactions. Security provides protection against infringement of property rights, violation of contracts, or predation by robbers or outsiders. Moreover, certitude in market environment is necessary in order to reduce the transaction costs by providing stability in means of exchange, particular weights and measures and the amount of customs and tariffs. Historically, security and certainty in market activities have been either provided by traders themselves or the political authorities, which they were bound to. As Spruyt mentions, historically, there is a relation between economic interaction and political authority (1994:534). The geographical extension of political authority may correspond with the spatial extension of the primary market, economic and political boundaries may coincide, economic interaction tends to take place within the boundaries of the empires and sometimes economically integrated zones may be transferred into empires (Spruyt, 1994:534). In this context, it seems that economic activities might be performed easily and successfully under hierarchical authorities. Therefore, hierarchical structures might be a solution to the problem of secure and efficient economic interactions due to low transaction costs (Weber, 2000:14).

The Roman Empire was a clear example of this correspondence. The accession of Augustus resulted in an era of stable government, the basic condition for economic recovery

and expansion. The regime of Augustus was dedicated to the cause of civil peace and the pacification of Rome's enemies. The success of this policy intensified internal economic development, and, as long as "It expanded the territory under Roman control, extended the economic horizons of the empire" (Garnsey and Saller, 1987:51). In this sense, the Roman Empire can be considered as a successful hierarchical organization that provides low costs of transportation and economic benefits for all parties, the ruler and the subjects. By providing security and certainty the structure of the Roman Empire reduced the transaction costs of economic and social activities. As Watson perfectly summarizes:

The advantages of empire were plain to see. Law, currency, weights and measures were standardized. Commerce and industry thrived under Pax Romana, with goods moving largely by sea over a Mediterranean now at last substantially free of pirates (1992:101).

The reduction in transaction costs can be observed mainly in three areas: the standardization of coinage, the standardization of legal customs, safe transportation and the Roman law itself.

The Standardization of Coinage

Rome, after the Republic, was able to maintain a sound and stable currency which act as an exceptional stimulus in the entire field of economic life (Oertel, 1975:387). Augustus supported economic activity by providing a stable, abundant coinage in gold, silver, orichalcum and copper (Starr, 1982:26). During the earlier period of his reign, gold and silver coins were employed in Asia and Spain and for a few years in Rome itself. In 15-14 B.C., he introduced an imperial mint which was the only source of the gold and silver coinage of the Empire. This was a remarkable turning point for the coinage of the Roman history and it lasted in the remaining period of Augustus. Coins were extensively used as a means of collective

revenue, paying expenses and storing reserves (Mann, 1986:272). The state's own administrative needs to use coinage indirectly promoted trade and urban life (Mann, 1986:272). For instance, the copper issues were designed to pay the troops on the frontiers encouraged the growth of trade and industry outward from the interior parts (Starr, 1982:26).

The evidence of standardization and unity in coinage could be found in the study of Keith Hopkins (1980). Hopkins compared hoards of coins found in seven different provinces in the period 40-260 A.D. and made deductions about the uniformity of the money supply across the empire as a whole. Hopkins observes similar trends for all provinces until just AD 200 (Mann, 1986:271). Mann suggests that the empire was a single monetary economy during that period and there was a systemic nature of economic interaction within the boundaries of Empire (1986:271). He strongly emphasized the remarkable achievement of unity in Rome.

The Standardization of Roman Law

Another factor that facilitated the decrease in transaction costs and provided a suitable environment to the functioning of economic market was the law. An idea of natural or universal law dominated the Stoic philosophy of Rome. The universal law is universally applicable, unchanging and everlasting. The civil law, which held together a community, was subordinate to the universal law (Bozeman, 1960:187). There was also the private law in Rome and this law developed from 450 B.C. to 529 A.D. The law was developed by the opinions of individual lawyers who depended on traditions, reason and insight. These lawyers abstracted the concepts that would seem generally applicable (Bozeman, 1960:193). This approach also resulted in the distinction between the public law of the state and the private rights of

individuals. Both laws were accepted extensively throughout the Roman society. The evolution of these legal principles within the sphere of the empire revolutionized the conduct of human relations.

For instance, the Romans from earlier times were aware that commerce could not be performed based on the inherited social customs or imperative commands. The performance of commerce requires safety of clearly determined particular interests and obligations so that they developed the notion of contract. The Romans had a general legal form to bind any sort of personal engagement. One of the most important types of these obligations of contracts was the consensual contract. The consensual contract was a device for the implementation of all contracts of sale, hiring, agency and partnership. It replaced the old forms and customs of local communities and created a unity and standardization.

Romans viewed law as an agreement between equals and a collective obligation. Bozeman argues “No such constitutional framework of contractual security as the Roman was evolved by any other people in the ancient world” (1960:201). Romans were very successful in achieving a system of individual and collective security and they promoted it in their provinces. For instance, a Roman citizen who violated a treaty with another nation was surrendered to other nation because of the fact that he had impeached an obligation that rested on him personally (Bozeman, 1960:203). There were multiple functions of the Roman law. On the one hand, the employment of legal principles provided a kind of security against the ruder aspects of imperial government (Bozeman, 1960:211). On the other hand, it gave way to

development of distinction between political, religious and legal norms, which promoted the unity and standardization of transactions.

Furthermore, the law was considered as a regulating force in relations between states and foreigners (Bozeman, 1960:195). When foreign trade reached certain levels, Romans developed a kind of law to regulate relations between Romans and non-Roman citizens. A special set of rules was employed in legal disputes between Romans and foreigners, which were later developed into a new branch of law: *the ius gentium*. These relations and set of rules were depersonalized and institutionalized. Important parts of this law were the official treaties to determine the rights of trade. The commercial law identified and formulated the universal elements shared by the positive laws of all nations. International agreements of sale, partnership, or charter parties were used as internationally applicable standards in commercial relations of the Empire. Many important aspects of commercial law were adjusted in the Principate in order to promote the operation of business and trade (Garnsey and Saller, 1987:55). These achievements in law of partnership and agency had important implications for the history of commerce. Through this law contracts began to bind their co-partners and the institution of agency had a clear economic significance. The existence of professional middlemen to administer commercial operations facilitated the speed and volume of economic exchange. The legal rules guaranteed the emergence of such a class and provided a secure environment.

Finally, the Roman law was the chief informing principle in the administration of a community of various races during the period of Principate (Bozeman, 1960:208). The Roman

legal procedure made a considerable impact on the subject communities of the Roman Empire due to sophisticated legal procedures that were used to settle local disputes (Edmondson, 1993:184). These procedures provided models for future legal proceedings and dispute settlement. The adoption of Roman legal forms, for instance in the Celtic West, substantially contributed to the general Romanization of provinces and made Rome an effective moral judicial authority. The Roman contract law achieved a great international appeal throughout the Mediterranean world because the Roman lawyers were very successful in abstracting its essence from local traditions and in adjusting its requirements to the customs generally observed in the commercial intercourse of neighboring people (Bozeman, 1960:210). These are important examples that demonstrate how the function of law facilitates the transaction costs through providing means for drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding agreements, information, and communication. Thereby it secures commitments and prevents free riding, increases level of certainty and security and promoted a desirable environment.

The Commitment of the Members and the Legitimacy of the System

One of the reasons that a hierarchical structure prevailed during the Pax Augusta was the success of Rome in assuring the commitment of its members to Rome. Lendon mentions “It is certainly true, then, that the Roman empire could not be ruled without force and the fear that force inspired, but the modest provision of force available makes it unlikely that it was the sole operative principle of Roman imperial government” (1997:7). Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore how the Romans were able to maintain the commitment of particular states and citizens during these two hundred peaceful years. One of the important reasons of the high level of commitment of provinces was the gradual development of ideological, political and cultural

integration among the provincial elites or the Romanization of the provincial elites. In Rome, political unity among the upper classes gradually developed during the Principate. Beginning with Italy, Greece and Asia Minor, Rome was able to link the upper strata together. Mann suggests that Rome incorporated into its own ruling class all the native elites of the empire and imposed the next intensive and extensive form of compulsory cooperation (1986:260).

The power of the upper class originated through the state and they depended on Rome to stay in power (Mann, 1986:267). The more they depended the more they committed themselves to the Empire. These cases are clearly evident for some Greek states (Doyle, 1986:91). Moreover, we can identify the same kind of relation in patrimonial kingdoms of the East. These kingdoms lacked substantial political integration because they were either not mobilized politically or they were ethnically divided. Therefore, in order to secure their power against domestic strife and external threats and to provide more financial resources, they devote themselves as clients of Rome (Doyle, 1986:91). Dio suggests that since the days of the Republic, Rome aimed to nurture pro-Roman elements within subject communities, mainly by offering Roman support for their position in return for their support of Rome's authority (1991:7). Edmondson mentions that because Rome did not develop a large bureaucracy to run the Empire, she relied on the works of local aristocrats. In return, Rome supported these leaders who defended Rome's interests (1993:181). In addition, there was no evidence of nationalist tendencies in these communities. Brunt suggests that the tendency of Roman policy aimed to unite its subjects not divide and govern. It was easier for Rome to do so, in part, because few of her subjects had a history of independence (1990:127). Namely, there was not nationalism in the modern sense.

Another aspect of this political integration was the extension of citizenship. The Romans invented and gradually developed an extensive territorial citizenship. The spread of citizenship followed new methods under the Principate. The connection of citizenship with Italian birth or origin and its connection with Latin culture are gradually loosened (Sherwin-White, 1973:222). Moreover, the meaning of the franchise changed and it becomes a passive citizenship. People began to seek citizenship not because of political significance but because of honor and sentiment (Sherwin-White, 1973:222). The extension of the citizenship becomes the sign of the unification of the Empire within a single system of law. Mann asserts that such kind of collective commitment never mobilized before (1986:254).

Another aspect of the political integration was the diffusion of Senate membership and imperial succession to all over the Empire. The local elite were highly mobile and found several chances to acquire rank and status. The scale of movement among the elite orders of the Empire was remarkable. Senatorial families disappeared at an average rate of 75 percent per generation due to unknown reasons (Garnsey and Saller, 1987:123). This failure of senatorial families to maintain the rank and status gave chances in each generation for the wealthiest and most prominent members of the elites to move up. The new members were increasingly come from outside Italy (Garnsey and Saller, 1987:123). There was access not only to the Senate but access to other orders was also available. For instance, access to equestrian order was even more open than the Senate (Garnsey and Saller, 1987:123).

There were two groups in Rome that had a greater chance to acquire rank and status: soldiers and a category of slaves. Each year tens or thousands of people were recruited into the army and if they succeed to survive their term of service, they were rewarded a discharge payment and able to possess land which means they had the chance to qualify for the local councils. In addition, those who could become officers had better means for more spectacular climbs in the hierarchy (Garnsey and Saller, 1987:124). Nevertheless, we need to emphasize that the entry to upper class was strictly controlled, especially during the term of Augustus, but the high level of mobility among the upper class was a crucial factor that promoted commitment.

When we look at the ideological and cultural integration of the local elite we see that Romanization encouraged the native elites to identify themselves more closely with Rome. The cultural and ideological Romanization was realized through teaching language and literacy, building theatres and amphi-theatres and integrating local cults into Roman ones (Mann, 1986:269). Literacy among the empire provided an infrastructure for ideological integration but this integration was full upper class literacy and predominantly took an oral form (Mann, 1986:269). Therefore, the cultural solidarity was largely confined to the upper-class. The logistical infrastructure of ideological power kept the extensive ruling class together which had happened in China as well. The process took different shapes in West and East due to the already well-established culture of the East. However, both had a high degree of cultural integration among elites.

The political integrity of the Empire was also evident in the outward forms of native political life. Romans encouraged the creation of administrative centers in provinces where governmental, religious and commercial activities might be focused (Dise, 1991:8). This concentration of native communities encouraged the beginning of urban life on the Mediterranean pattern and in some places permanently altered the structure of native life so that tribal centers become towns and cities. These political centers eventually adopted the Roman municipal-colonial constitution with its magistracies, aristocratic councils and weak popular assemblies. The administrative and legal regulations of Rome provided the subject communities with models of Roman administrative, judicial and legal practices to imitate (Edmondson, 1993:158). Many of these regulations sent by Rome to provinces were requested by the provincials themselves and they were not imposed.

Furthermore, Rome's process of interaction between centre and periphery had an important unifying effect. The regular act of writing up regulations promoted the development of a formulaic language of administration (Edmondson, 1993:181). The linguistic and administrative formulae gradually led to a more standard and uniform style of Roman rule in various parts of the Empire. Especially, Greek states developed standardized forms of expressing their relations with Rome and these standard practices encouraged a greater homogeneity, unity and commitment.

In sum, Rome was able to transform its regional system by conquering major centers of power. The desire of Romans to achieve peace, the need for land and booty, the demand for glory and tribute and the Roman superiority in strategy, military, economy and administration

encouraged this process. The establishment of hierarchical structure enabled Rome to provide peace, economic prosperity, transportation and efficient use of resources as common goods. Furthermore, under the security and certainty of the system, transaction costs were reduced substantially. Finally, the Roman Empire was very successful in securing the commitment and legitimacy of its system through ideological, economical, cultural and political means. The next chapter focuses on the Chinese Empire under which similar processes can be identified.

CHAPTER II
THE MULTI-STATE SYSTEM OF ANCIENT CHINA
THE SPRING AND AUTUMN PERIOD (722-481 B.C.) &
THE WARRING STATES PERIOD (403-221 B.C.)

A distinctive center of civilization developed in the valley of Yellow River around 2000 B.C., which was called as the Shang or Yin culture. In 1122 B.C. the Zhou dynasty conquered the Shang state and established a feudal system of supremacy. This feudal system, the Western Zhou period, continued successfully until the 771 B.C. The Eastern Zhou period followed the Western Zhou and it extends from the transfer of the capital to Loyang to the ultimate triumph of Ch'in (Qin) and its establishment of rule over all of China (771-221 B.C.). In Chinese historical writings the period is sub-divided into two periods: *Ch'un ch'iu* (Spring and Autumn 722-481) and *Chan kuo* (The Warring States 403-221) and they represent different phases of the transition from the Western Zhou feudalism toward the unified empires of Qin and Han dynasties (Hsu, 1999:550). In fact, Walker believes that this division is misleading because The Spring and Autumn period (SAP) and the Warring States period (WSP) as a whole is actually a homogeneous period of political development. The SAP and the WSP present us an outstanding example of an anarchic structure that prevailed for a long period in the ancient and classical eras. Therefore, consideration of these two periods is very useful to understand the persistence of an anarchic structure and why an anarchic rather than a hierarchic structure prevailed among the Chinese states. Furthermore, another aim of this chapter is to consider the reasons for immediate transformation from anarchy to hierarchy in the ancient Chinese system. Initially, I shall consider the political structure of the multi-state system of ancient China and

then further consideration of the system will reveal the major factors of the emergence of the hierarchic system. The next chapter shall focus on the persistence of the hierarchic system of the Chinese Empire.

The Political Structure of the Multi-State System of Ancient China

The SAP followed the Western Zhou (Chou) period, in which the Zhou dynasty was the supreme ruler of ancient China. The political administration of the Zhou dynasty was a clear monarchy and the era is considered to have been as feudal. The head of the Zhou dynasty granted fiefs to the various generals who had helped him to overthrow the Shang dynasty. These small feudal domains existed in comparative isolation from each other and the control was maintained through a system of ceremonial functions. The Zhou kings granted segments of lands to feudal lords and, in return, received payments. Vassals were also obligated to supply manpower for wars, guarding the frontiers of Zhou lands and following the king in wars.

By the beginning of the eighth century B.C., there was a deconcentration of king's power and by the beginning of the fourth century; the centralization of power in the hands of the individual states had been completed. During the early periods of the SAP (771 – 483 B.C.), the power and independence of feudal lords grew rapidly at the expense of the central authority and these vassals created regular governmental organizations. Both processes promoted the decline of feudalism. Furthermore, the expansion of state functions, large-scale irrigation and construction projects, collection and storage of grains, construction of walled cities, and organization and maintenance of armed forces led them to build up coherent administrative structures and they became independent and self-sufficient states (Holsti, 1974:33). All these

developments led to eliminate divided control and to centralize state power in the person or symbol of the ruler of the individual states.

In this context, a system of independent states developed and replaced the small, hierarchical feudal order of the Western Zhou period. After the eighth century, the Zhou dominance was nominal and local states became essentially independent states. The Zhou Dynasty consisted of 1773 states. These states consolidated and allied with and against one another and their number decreased to 170. By 722 B.C., there were seven important states: Lu, Cheng, Wei, Sung, Chi, Ch'en, Ts'ao, Ts'ai, Ch'i (Qi) and Chou (Zhou). Almost unanimously authors agree that during the SAP there existed a system of sovereign states and there is clear evidence of the sovereignty of the various states (Holsti, 1974:33; Walker, 1953:24-5; Watson, 1992:85).

Those states that maintained their sovereignty were treated as equals no matter what their size or nature. They fought with each other, changed allies and made treaties, while treating each other as independent units. For instance, it was customary that a state's envoy asks for permission for passage through the states, which lay in the path of their missions. Zhang claims that the states were sovereign since they held the exclusive capacity to conclude international treaties, declare war and have diplomatic representation and he says "To the extent that these states were territorialized, sovereignty involves territoriality, too" (2001:47-8). Moreover, political organization was an important indication of sovereignty because a territory was considered as a state if only it had an effective political organization.

The leagues and alliances of states played an important role among the states during the SAP. The first league was the Zhou league. The state of Ch'i became the first leader of the Zhou League, an alliance of a number of Zhou states formed in 680 B.C. to serve as a common defense alliance against the most important enemy, the state of Ch'u. There were mainly two groups of leagues, the Zhou league and the alliance of Ch'u. However, there were other leagues built up by the Qin in the West and by the Wu in the southeast. The primary function of these leagues was collective security (Walker, 1953:87). They also played a significant role in peaceful settlements of disputes between their members. The system of leagues was widespread for over two centuries and demonstrates the fall of political power of the Zhou dynasty (Rodzinski, 1979:28). The heads of the states assembled according to strict protocols and heavy tributes were paid to the hegemony by the smaller states.

The states consisted of a capital city and a number of fortified towns. The population was divided into two: the people of the state or city and the people in the field. The people of the state included the garrison soldiers and their descendants who were directly ruled by the ruler and the elite. They had civil and military obligations as well as right to consult to state affairs. The people in the field had a certain degree of autonomy while paying taxes and serving to the corvee duties.

The political and administrative organization of most of the states in early SAP, could clearly be seen in the organization of the state of Sung (Walker, 1953:32). The ruler was the head of the state and the government consisted of six main officials who were members of noble families within the state. The ruler's control over these officials was relatively weak and

the roles of these officials and the ruler himself were not clearly defined. Moreover, apart from their specialized duties, each member was charged with a section of the country as vassals. In this sense, there was not a centralized system of administration at the beginning. Nevertheless, throughout the SAP, this de-centralized system was transformed into a more strong centralized administrative organization especially in the spheres of politics and military.

During the WSP, the system of league of cities was replaced with a system of territorial states, which were ruled by monarchs and a large number of officials (Lewis, 1999:587). Lewis suggests that there were an expansion and a contraction of states' power in the WSP (1999:597). The power of the states expanded because the city-based state of the Zhou world altered with a full-blown territorial state and the entire power of the state was concentrated in the court of the single monarch. The new state was centered on the unique person of the ruler and his single capital.

The foundations of these changes were laid in the SAP and as the competition among states increased, state structures began to be adjusted to the changing circumstances. In order to increase the effective mobilization of resources, some states were restructured into hierarchical units that had administrative and military functions (Hsu, 1999:573). For instance, the state of Ch'i, divided the population into 21 divisions for administrative purposes (Walker, 1953:32). Each of these divisions was subdivided so as to establish a direct line of responsibility to the top. The leaders of these divisions reported to the central administration once a year and they were encouraged to choose the leaders of subdivisions on the basis of merit and they were also controlled by a system of inspectors.

This concentration of power in the person of the ruler occurred throughout the WSP by the middle of the fourth century and resulted in the extension of state control into the rural hinterlands (Lewis, 1999:602-3). The pressures of war led both rulers and ministerial households to increase their armies through the recruitment of the rural populace. The introduction of the dependent official enabled this extension. The establishment of a territorial state depends on the ability to appoint officials, dispatch them to remote cities, maintain remote control over them and remove them when necessary.

The military was organized according to a militia system. Each family in the state had to supply one soldier and these soldiers were grouped in the same divisions and subdivisions. Thus, people have a certain pride in the militia of their division and also a pride in their state (Walker, 1953:33). The result of this system was a combination of divided authority under a centralized administration and a new power. The system, initially developed by the state of Ch'i, and was later adopted by the other states. These great changes in the state Ch'i were one of the most important developments in the history of Chinese government (Walker, 1953:34). Walker believes that all these developments had decisive impacts on the later unification of China. He says "Indeed, it can safely be maintained that without this background of development in the Ch'un ch'iu period² the unification of China under Ch'in Shih Huang in 221 B.C. could have never taken place" (1953:35). This administrative experience and new political patterns enabled to govern whole of what was to become China.

² The Spring and Autumn Period.

Comparison of Anarchic and Hierarchic Systems

The Generation of Common Goods

Security

“The conquest is always the love of peace”
St. Augustine

As discussed above one of the reasons of persistence of Roman hierarchic system was the emergence of common goods such as security, economic prosperity, transportation and effective mobilization of resources. However, the analysis of the multi-state system of ancient China had different characteristics. Peace and security were two major goals of the ancient Chinese states. Nevertheless, ironically they chose war as a means to achieve peace; therefore, war became a normal part of life during the SAP and the WSP. Although war was supposed to be between the barbarians and the Chinese who shared the same culture, most of the wars occurred between these states and resulted in a decrease in their number, which was ended with the expansion of the state of Qin throughout ancient China.

The Zhou dynasty ruled China from the twelfth century to the eighth century. Li says that “Generally speaking, the first four centuries of the Zhou dynasty was an era of peace and prosperity. The last five centuries witnessed a decline of central authority, the rise of local states, and the prevalence of anarchy and interstate warfare” (1978:45). War was a frequent form of interaction between states during the SAP and the WSP. For instance the state of Qin went to war 28 times within a period of 43 years (Li, 1965:40). During these periods, all the units used organized violence as a method of achieving objectives, such as territory, slaves, honor or allies. The disintegration of the Zhou dynasty and the emergence of the anarchy

resulted in increase in number of wars in both periods. Li argues, “The central authority weakened, then became nominal, and finally ceased to exist. The weakening of central authority was accompanied by increasing frequency of foreign and domestic wars” (1978:50). However, the SAP was relatively more peaceful than the WSP.

During the early SAP, major concerns of the states were the internal consolidation and the elimination of the power of the hereditary families within states (Walker, 1953:76). Later on, the anarchy in the system led states to be more concerned about the conduct of external affairs and the establishment of an external policy for security (Walker, 1953:77). At the same time, they realized that external alliances also significantly determine the strength and position of states therefore leagues of states and diplomacy became more important. The first league was established in 680 B.C. and other leagues followed. The major concern of these leagues was common security through alliance and they also facilitated the peaceful settlement of the conflict among members. The system of leagues was observed for two centuries and it was an important mechanism that reduced the number of wars compared to the WSP. Nevertheless, whatever methods were employed by the Chinese states during the SAP was quickly dissolved in the WSP and conflicts were resolved almost entirely by the use of force (Holsti, 1974:43; Li, 1965:53; Walker, 1953:88).

The Chinese states developed new patterns of interaction during the political history of the WSP. The period from 481 to middle of the fourth century was the formative period of these patterns of interaction, which were forged in war. The Warring States world was dominated by seven great powers, which pursued an independent foreign policy and

maintained a balance of power (Lewis, 1999:632). The era was marked by shifting alliances, which were designed to prevent any state to become the dominant power. The WSP was a cruel and brutal struggle with continuous conquests and aggression in which only the fittest could survive.

During the WSP, due to developments of warfare technology and change of states' attitudes, the number of casualties increased tremendously and wars became more brutal. The peasant-based armies and retinues of personal retainers expanded the scale of warfare and the large-scale participation of men heightened its savagery. Casualties were measured in thousands and people were often slaughtered en masse. Cavalry and infantry introduced in battles and military strategy became a specialized science. Rodzinski suggests that the fundamental aim of these wars was to control the central area of China, the current Honan province (1979:26, 28). Moreover, they fought for plunder and increase in territory. These wars had two consequences. First, the absorption of small states into expanding powers. The large states invaded and conquered the small states and the number of states, which was about two hundred in the eighth century, decreased steadily to seven major states towards the end of the fifth century (Li, 1978:50). Second, the formation of a balance of power in which each state used diplomacy and warfare to further its own interests (Lewis, 1999:616). In sum, the anarchic system of ancient China lacked any mechanism to produce security as a common good.

Economic Prosperity

Ancient China witnessed a substantial economic growth during the SAP and the WSP. In almost all spheres of economic and social life the Chinese experienced great developments. Various innovations and projects stimulated and facilitated the rise in overall economy. The main reason for the increasing prosperity was the great improvement in the means of production and distribution (Walker, 1953:17). The most important change was the introduction of iron approximately from the seventh century onwards (Rodzinski, 1979:24). People began to utilize iron extensively both in warfare and agriculture. The introduction of ox-drawn plow was a great advance in agriculture. Iron was used for the manufacture of agricultural tools as well. The introduction of iron resulted in greater yields of crops and introduction of animal-drawn plough. The use of iron implements and the rotation of crops substantially facilitated the efficient farming (Hsu, 1999:578).

Furthermore, the notions of land tenure system and land taxation were introduced. The peasants were obliged to pay tax in kind from their production. A tax based on production presumes that the farmer was entitled to use the particular piece of land, namely, it entailed tenure of land. Once released from the servitude system of the feudal era, peasants began to be more productive (Hsu, 1999:577). These developments accompanied the extension of system of irrigation and water control, which in turn enabled a large number of extensive projects. The building of roads facilitated the transport of supplies for great armies. The rivers were used extensively and we observed the first important construction of canals and a development of communications. The irrigation through canals and drainage system facilitated and promoted the agricultural production. The construction of large-scale waterworks and projects for

irrigation and flood control greatly enhanced state power and economic rise such as the great irrigation project in Szechuan region. Giant dykes and canals were constructed by some of the most powerful states and these projects promoted the increase in agricultural production (Walker, 1953:18).

In addition, the growth of agricultural production and trade promoted an increase in population and cities (Rodzinski, 1979:24; Li, 1978:62; Eberhard, 1960:55). The growth in economy led to an increase in the number and size of the towns and by the end of the period many large cities was to be found in various parts of China. Many cities, especially the ones on trade routes and capital cities, became larger and more numerous. There is also evidence of establishment of new buildings and elaborate palaces.

Growth was not restricted to the agricultural sector. The geographical specialization in production challenged the self-sufficient economy of feudal system. Though basic crops were grown all over China, different sections were specialized in producing different products such as lumber, bamboo, gemstones, fish, salt, silk, musical instruments, fruits, cooper or iron (Li, 1978:60; Walker, 1953:17). The growing demand among the society and especially among the nobility for luxury goods that were produced in other regions stimulated inter-regional exchange of surplus production. The crafts became more specialized and better silk and luxury goods were produced. The appearance of minted coins reflects an active exchange of material wealth. Eberhard suggests that the increased use of metal and the invention of coins greatly stimulated trade (1960:55). The leagues also encouraged trade, communications and cultural interchange among the states. The members of the leagues met frequently and most of the time

the delegations consist of merchants who discuss commercial issues with each other. The frequent passage of these delegations also promoted road building and the improvement of the means of communication.

Developments in agriculture and basic industries were accompanied by the rise of an active market economy (Hsu, 1999:580). Frequent wars, court visits and conferences among the states, facilitated inter-regional transportation and made it commonplace. Furthermore, the exchange of gifts introduced products of different regions to each other. Hence, trading developed in order to secure materials from far away. Hsu emphasizes that land and river transportation were significantly developed and used for the purpose of commerce. The ever-increasing contacts between states facilitated rising trade and spreading prosperity. Wealth became transportable and a wealthy class emerged.

The rise in influence and activities of merchants accompanied the increase in wealth (Hsu, 1999:582; Li, 1978:60). Although China was politically divided, there were no obstacles for movement across states. Merchants could freely move from one state to another and governments had no discriminative policies regarding the merchants of other states (Li, 1978:61-2). Therefore, these benevolent conditions promoted the rise of powerful and wealthy merchants. Some merchants became so powerful that they challenged the influence of feudal lords and princes and exercise influence over domestic and interstate affairs. Private ownership increased constantly in most of the countries by the middle of this period (Walker, 1953:16). In some states, merchants were protected by the state and informed the courts of any problems in their profession.

State policies and actions played a crucial role in the growth of economy and there were large state monopolies of iron, salt and liquor. For instance the state of Ch'i reformed its economic policies and began to control prices, to correct the system of measures and weights, to encourage commerce, to accumulate wealth and enrich the country (Walker, 1953:33). They aimed to maximize the production, especially the production in farming and cloth making and they tried to utilize every man and every acre of land (Li, 1978:57). The central government to accumulate wealth and controlled the arms and the masses through a monopoly on salt and iron was introduced. Hsu says

Economic growth in ancient China picked up momentum in the Warring States period, with private ownership of land and new manufacturing and commercial activities. When coupled with demographic growth, all of this culminated in urbanization and commercialization. But the initial stage marking a tremendous transformation took place in the Spring and Autumn period (1999:582).

Walker presents us further evidence of the growing prosperity. The number of clothing and carriage ornaments increased significantly through the end of the period. Bronze began to be used for decorating homes and became household vessels. Paintings on walls and silk increased. All these resulted in the formation of the famous artistic crafts and of Chinese art itself. An ever-increasing number of chariots became available for the public. Members of richer families began to employ more and more servants and slaves. Nevertheless, in spite of all developments made in this period, most of China was still in conditions of natural economy and the self-sufficiency of the villages was still the dominant aspect (Rodzinski, 1979:25).

The Decline in Transaction Costs

The Standardization of Administrative Law

As mentioned before, the SAP and the WSP were periods of reforms. Many Chinese states introduced several reforms in order to sustain effective administration and control over people. One of the important reforms was the replacement of older internal rules and forms by a systematic code of laws (Walker, 1953:34). The daily-life of society was regulated by laws and first codes are mentioned in 536 B.C. By the end of the fourth century B.C. a large body of criminal law existed. The change was stimulated by the growth in complexity of social organization, the changing class structure and the increasing wealth that needed new forms of protection (Walker, 1953:34). Walker presents several evidences of this change. Lewis also observes the evolving use of laws within the individual states. The laws initially regulated the conduct of war among states. However, later on these codes were extended to penal measures to control the people (Lewis, 1999:606). The legal codes were also used to regulate and constrain the actions of officials (Lewis, 1999:610).

This use of laws to control the action of the populace at large was developed in the Qin legal code. The Qin Statues was an outstanding example of these codes that governed various aspects of the official conducts. The content of the Statutes consisted of rules for official conduct, guidelines for keeping accounts, procedures for the inspection of officials, the maintenance of official records and stores, and terms and stipulates to ensure that the officials interpret and execute items of the code in the manner intended by the Qin code (Lewis, 1999:610). In this sense, the primary aim of these actual Warring States documents was the control of the actions of local officials charged with overseeing the people. In addition to the

centralized administration, legal codes and collective oaths began to be used as recognition of private ownership of land in exchange of taxes (Lewis, 1999:600).

When we consider the laws that govern relations among states certain patterns emerged during the SAP. These regular patterns created certain uniformities, which in turn constituted a system of state behavior expectations. Later on, these uniformities in patterns of interstate relations form a rudimentary form of interstate law. Walker asserts, "...there is little reason for us to doubt that the patterns of interstate intercourse which developed did constitute a rudimentary system of interstate law" (1953:74).

These patterns of conducts partially originated from the feudal era of Zhou dynasty. In addition, these laws were derived from a growing body of custom, which developed as contacts and commerce increased. They derived from the increasing number of treaties that were signed during the period and there were some patterns and rules formed by the league of states. Most of these laws dealt with diplomacy and the diplomatic activities such as a court visit paid by one ruler to another, meetings of officials of different states, missions of friendly inquires, emissaries sent from one state to another and etc. Zhang argues that there were certain codified norms and codes, which were honored and observed by the members of the system and there were important extra-territorial institutions and practices that regulated the relations among them (2001:47). The most important of these institutions and practices were sovereignty, diplomacy, balance of power and rituals. However, despite all these developments there was no system of law among all states that provided standardization of administrative and societal

interactions, which in turn reduces the transaction costs among the whole system similar to the Roman Empire or the T'ang dynasty.

The Standardization of Coinage and Weights and Measures

The Chinese witnessed the emergence of a money economy and use of coinage during the SAP and the WSP. The rise in economy resulted in the growth of a money economy throughout the fifth and fourth century, namely the emergence of minted coins (Eberhard, 1960:55). Initially, string cowries, precious metals, gold, and silver began to be used for exchange purposes. The increase in commerce and transactions stimulated the greater use of money and brought about the transition of use of precious metals to copper coinage (Rodzinski, 1979:25). Whereas, the princes used money as rewards or bribes for the bureaucrats, the merchants employed them as a medium of exchange. Finally, a copper cash began to be used which remained valid for the following two thousand years.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that this rudimentary form of money economy did not bring about a standardization of coinage in these periods. Despite the growth of the economy and the emergence of coinage, ordinary people relied on bartering materials in kind in their daily life. Although, there was an increase in use of money in society, “it would be easy to exaggerate the role of cash in what was still primarily a barter economy” (Lewis, 1999:607).

Regarding the weights and measures, it could be argued that although there was a standard within the individual state, there were various measures of units in different states (Lewis, 1999:610). Lewis points out that the use of nonstandard weights, volumes or measures

by an official is to be punished by the payment of substantial fines. Nevertheless, various units of measure employed in different states are mentioned in several literary sources (Lewis, 1999:610). The exact amounts of the units employed in several states were identified by the archeological finds.

The Commitment of the Members and the Legitimacy of the System

The administrative system of the Zhou dynasty is characterized as a feudal system. Under this system, the vassals were committed and loyal to the Zhou dynasty, since the emperor granted lands to the feudal lords in return of payments, manpower, security and support. Therefore, the loyalty of the lords was provided through a direct link between the lords and the emperor. Furthermore, the rule of Zhou dynasty overlapped with the cultural area of the Chinese. There was a common culture, which was underpinned by shared recent past and shared legends. The Chinese all shared common descent as they all derived from the aristocracies of the Zhou dynasty and these factors reinforced their common identity and common morality. Finally, the common language played a dual role to enhance the cultural basis of the ancient Chinese. On the one hand, it enhanced the common identity of the states against the non-Chinese speaking barbarians and on the other hand, it facilitated the bilateral and multi-lateral inter-state communication and diplomacy and mutual understanding among peoples (Zhang, 2001:47).

Nevertheless, by the beginning of the SAP, many of these vassals had acquired or conquered enough territory so that they were no longer dependent on the Zhou dynasty. The relative isolation of many feudal units from the central authority and their aggrandizement at

each other's expense led to acquisition of territory (Eberhard, 1950:34). As the number of wars and conquests increased, the territories of feudal lords began to be controlled by central bureaucracies under the individual states. A state, large or small, controlled its territory as the supreme and sovereign power. Furthermore, the establishment of local administrations made the political units more self-sufficient (Holsti, 1974:35). Lewis suggests that the transformation of the Zhou dynasty into a group of competing territorial states was achieved through the extension of military service and tax liability into the countryside, the recognition of the property, which was held and worked by the individual peasant households (Lewis, 1999:611). As a result, the rulers of these territories began to derive their authority from inheritance rather than from the central monarchy and the system turned out to be a small number of independent states.

Hence, the multi-state system of China was established with the collapse of the authority of the Zhou dynasty and the system of states sustained international relations of Ancient China for over five centuries. Obviously, the emergence of the multi-state system altered the loyalty and the commitment of the people. The process of state expansion and centralization coincided with the development of patterns of increasing loyalty to the state or patriotism (Walker, 1953:35). Walker claims that whereas the peasants were loyal to feudal lords previously, later they became loyal to the person of the prince of the state and the state itself (Walker, 1953:36). As the feudal ties with the reigning Zhou king decreased, the allegiance of individual states to the dynasty became nominal.

The new patriotism stemmed from original localism. Prior to the SAP, there were broad differences in dialect, customs, religion, legends, and cults among the various regions. Particularly, there was a great cultural difference between the state of Ch'u in the south and the northern states for example, the Ch'u people were proud of their distinctive music, ceremonies and traditions. During the SAP, there was a growing awareness of these differences due to increase in contacts and also the development of pride in local origins and distinctions (Walker, 1953:35). Holsti mentions that "after 771 B.C. ordinary people began to recognize and emphasize the differences in dialects, customs, religion, and cults among the states as their contacts with others began to proliferate, and the position of the Zhou monarch-the symbol of unity-eroded" (1974:33). Therefore, the wide cultural differences and the patterns of patriotism were firmly established by the end of the SAP.

Furthermore, the sovereignty of the states and their insistence on maintaining sovereignty promoted the local pride. Holsti emphasizes the growth of rudimentary forms of nationalism as an important indication of the independence of the feudal states (1974:33). The struggles among states, their efforts and battles to maintain their existence, and their efforts to prevent the expansion of other states enforced the sense of loyalty to the state. Through the end of the SAP, pride in local distinctions and loyalty to the prince of the state became more important. As a result, in the WSP, the princes could easily organize ordinary people to fight wars for them, since they believed that they were fighting for the independence, sovereignty and honor of their own state (Holsti, 1974:33).

When there was conflict between loyalties the expression of loyalty to the state came first. Li claims “the people within the feudal fiefs owed absolute loyalty to the prince as subjects rather than to the feudal lords as peasants. When there was a conflict between the two loyalties, the loyalty to the prince prevailed, as the feudal lord himself owed allegiance to the prince” (1978:60). Walker points out several examples of loyalties of people to their states in which the Chinese preferred death to be alive if its in the benefit of their states (1953:37). The trend toward increasing patriotism reached its highest levels after the end of the SAP, when the ruler of states proclaimed themselves as kings and the real battles for the domination of whole China began among states. During the WSP, the loyalty to state reached its ultimate levels.

Besides all these factors the core of the issue (commitment and legitimacy) lies in the relation between state and individual, the moral purpose of the state and their implications to the foreign policies of the individual states. Especially, the philosophical ideas had a deep impact on external affairs of the states. Russell suggests that the philosophers in ancient China were not given pure speculation and “Chinese philosophy was essentially practical in that it was designed to further the art of social adjustment...The prince not only sought, but also frequently followed, the advice of the philosopher both in internal and external affairs” (Russell, 1972:17). Therefore, it might be helpful to consider the dominant currents of political thought in the SAP and the WSP in order to understand the legitimacy and the moral purpose of the states and its implications on foreign policy.

Due to intensive warfare, political anarchy and moral degradation all the philosophical schools in ancient China tended to think in terms of an ideal society. Main currents of political

thought at that period focused on the issues of legitimacy of power, the goals of statecraft and remedies for the increasingly violent wars (Watson, 1992:89). Therefore, their idealized version of good governments might help to understand the moral purpose of the state. There were several traditions of thought, however four of them had the greatest impact: Confucianism, Taoism, Mohism and Legalism (Watson, 1992:89; Rubin, 1976; Eberhard, 1960:57-61; Russell, 1972:19).

Confucianism

Confucius conceives the state as a large family, in which the father is the ruler, and the children are subjects. The relation between the ruler and his subjects are characterized by submissiveness and obedience, however if the ruler's conduct was immoral the subjects have the right to resist (Rubin, 1976:17, 26). The law had no importance for the improvement of the society; rather the moral qualities of the ruler and ritual were emphasized as the most important elements of good governance. Furthermore, good government consists of sufficient food, adequate defense, and faith but faith or moral values is the most important because without faith no nation can survive (Li, 1978:75). The loyalty must be provided through proper conduct of the ruler. "Only when the ruler was wise and virtuous could the people be expected to be loyal and obedient" (Li, 1978:75). Confucians believed that the social ills and political anarchy in the SAP and the WSP stemmed from the disruption of authority, so that they advocated return to the early form of Zhou feudalism (Li, 1978:75; Eberhard, 1960:58). Peace and order can only be achieved when authority is firmly established and carefully observed. All states should be under one kingly family, which had the mandate of heaven to rule the world and the

restoration of virtue and imperial unity would end strife among the warring states (Watson, 1992:90).

Taoism

The Taoists rejected the view that man is a social being. Man should take a negative attitude towards the entire world and should resort to drawing whatever comfort from the miserable conditions of the world. They defended that society is evil and man should break loose from society and return to nature and merge with the simple and genuine life of universe (Rubin, 1976:89). The world of nature is beautiful and true, whereas the world of society is rotten, artificial and false. The natural order could best be achieved through non-violence and all active government was interference in the natural order. They condemned war, rulers, government and laws (Li, 1978:85). A simple primitive society is much better than an advanced one. An ideal society was economically self-sufficient and should produce only the basic needs of the community so that wars among states can be prevented.

Mohism

Similar to Confucians they believed that the monarchy was the best type of government. However, the ruler must set rules for his subjects and must be virtuous, practical and utilitarian (Li, 1978:91). Mohists believed that the principles of family love must be extended to the whole people and they emphasized a universal love for all men under Heaven (Eberhard, 1960:58). If one loves another member of the upper class just as he loves his father then the friction between the individual and states would cease. The universal love must be implemented by the ruler and by using rewards or punishment the ruler will compel those who

do not believe in universal love. In this sense, the main themes of the Mohists were universal love and non-militarism. States must deny aggressive policies and turn toward universal love. The greatest goal of the human action is the satisfaction of the elementary needs of the largest number and the welfare of the whole society (Li, 1978:90; Rubin, 1976:35).

The state was a machine to be used for the general welfare. Government was like a primitive machine, the identical parts of which were set into motion at the command of the ruler (Rubin, 1976:43). Rewards and punishment were the means of governing and all the instructions of the Son of Heaven were instructions on how to operate the levers of the machine. The ruling mechanism was integrated in an ascending order from the town head to the ruler of the kingdom to the Son of Heaven (Rubin, 1976:43). The utopia was the ideal unified state when the Great unity reigned, all under Heaven was communal property and it was governed by the most skillful and the ablest men (Rubin, 1976:44). Part of the utility of the universal love was its contribution to inter-state peace. However, in the short run, peace must be sought through discouraging aggressors. Defensive war is the key to peace among states. A state, which renounced offensive war, could be so proficient in defense that no other state would dare to attack. If all states followed this policy all would become invulnerable to attack and live in amity and peace (Watson, 1992:90).

Legalism

The most important school of this period were the Legalists. They emphasized the necessity of law, which should be just and fair. Law must be equally enforced upon all, including members of the royal house. Law should be exact and clear and supported by

punishment and rewards. The observance of law was not only an end in itself; the real goal was to channel each individual's energy to the service of the state. The enforcement of law necessitates a strong government and government must be strengthened at all costs. They defended creation of a centralized and all-powerful state by any means regardless of moral or ethical considerations (Li, 1978:92). What makes a state powerful is not traditional culture and allegiance to moral norms but "The sovereign who wished to build a powerful and efficient army needed, in the first place, to centralize power, and concentrate all resources into his own hands. This implied a reorientation of the entire social structure from its economy through its culture so that everything could be subordinated to the single goal of acquiring control over all-under-Heaven" (Rubin, 1976:57). An ideal society was "a society composed of well-organized farmer-soldiers governed and controlled by an all-powerful state headed by an omnipotent prince" (Li, 1978:93). People's duty was to live and work for the ruler and carry out orders (Eberhard, 1960:59). The Legalists rejected the idea that the state exists to serve the people; rather the ruler is in need of the state. The ruler needs above all to subordinate the people himself and then to use it for the conquest of hegemony in all-under-Heaven (Rubin, 1976:62).

The Legalist arguments were first adopted by the state of Qin. Shang Yang, the most representative and the founder of the Legalist school, was the organizer of the state of Qin (Eberhard, 1960:59; Rubin, 1976:56). In the middle of the fourth century Shang Yang was able to establish a system on the basis of legalist doctrines which in the course of a little over a hundred years would enable the ruler of the state of Qin to unify the entire country (Rubin, 1976:55). The general aim of the reforms of Shang Yang were centralization of government, strengthening the power of the ruler over the people, expansion of the resources of the country

and their concentration in the hands of the government (Rubin, 1976:59). Legalists interpreted the SAP and the WSP as follows:

A life and death struggle between them became unavoidable. In this world which lacked the notion that equal states might coexist, there was no possibility of independence as such. Each ruler had a choice between dominance and subordination. In the Warring States era, the latter meant destruction of the ruling dynasty and absorption of its national territory by its conqueror. Under such conditions the only alternative to ruin was a struggle for supremacy over one's neighbors (Rubin, 1976:57).

The legalist ideas on organizing the state for war and achieving peace through universal conquest reflect the policies actually pursued by those states (Watson, 1992:91). Rubin also suggests "Historians who are accustomed to identifying Confucianism as the state ideology of China often forget that the first real official ideology was the doctrine of Legalism..." (Rubin, 1976:55). The legalist believed that subjugation of all hostile states would lead realistically to peace. "because the more states were suppressed the wider the area of unity and order would become, until only one state existed and there would be no more war" (Watson, 1992:91). The Legalist arguments were compatible with the Confucian ideas, which also advocated imperial unity for all China under the mandate of heaven. The major philosophical tradition during the Zhou dynasty assumed that the Zhou king bore the title of Son of Heaven enjoyed authority not power. "He performed ritual functions like a holy person to whom Heaven had entrusted the rule of "all-under-Heaven" that is, the states of China which the ancient Chinese viewed as the center of civilization in general" (Rubin, 1976:2). Rubin suggests that "The concept that all of China was a single all-under-Heaven ruled by a single person, the Son of Heaven, had the effect of making political fragmentation seem an anomaly, a falling away from the proper order of things, consequently temporary and transitional, representing a step toward a new unity" (1976:2). The existence of multiple states that were independent of and not subordinate to

Heaven was an unacceptable idea to Chinese political thought (Rubin, 1976:2). Watson claims that this common ground provided the traditional legitimacy of the Chinese warring states (Watson, 1992:91). It might be argued that the Chinese states followed a combination of all ideas from major political thoughts as Li suggests “A Chinese was a follower of the entire Chinese heritage rather than a particular school of philosophy” (Li, 1978:84), though it is obvious that the Legalist arguments seemed to have the greatest impact. The state of Qin followed the policies and unified China, which were based on legalist arguments.

In sum, the comparison of anarchic Chinese system and hierarchic systems demonstrates that the security was one of the major problems of the system and similar to the Roman foreign policy vision, the Chinese believed that peace can be achieved through conquest of all enemies under a single authority which was manifest in the Legalist doctrine and the Sino-centric world view. This vision appears to be the major factor that stimulated the immediate transformation from anarchy to hierarchy. Furthermore, similar to hierarchic systems there existed economic growth and decline in transaction costs through standardization of law, administrative procedures, weights and measures and coinage. However, all these developments were limited to the boundaries of individual states, therefore the systemic dynamics of a hierarchic structure cannot be observed in the multi-state system of ancient China. These dynamics can be clearly seen in the next chapter, which shall focus on the Chinese Empire.

CHAPTER III
THE CHINESE EMPIRE
THE T'ANG DYNASTY (618-907 A.D.)

Chinese history could be analyzed in three forms of international order: a multi-state system, a unified and universalist empire and a world order associated with it, and a state among states in the Westphalian system (Zhang, 2001:45). The multi-state system of China dates back to the collapse of the Zhou dynasty in 770 B.C. (including the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period) until the establishment of the first universal Chinese empire by the Qin in 221 B.C. After a long period, the Chinese Empire transformed into a nation state after the arrival of the European international society in East Asia in seventeenth century, though the transformation took place until mid twentieth century. My consideration of hierarchical structures regarding the Chinese history focuses on the Chinese Empire. Generally, the history of the Chinese Empire were divided and analyzed in terms of dynasties, therefore, my study shall focus on the T`ang dynasty (618-907 A.D.), which was truly a hierarchical period.

The T`ang dynasty followed the Sui dynasty and the three centuries of the rule of Sui and Tang dynasties (589-907 A.D.) reestablished the Chinese ideal of unity that had developed under the Han dynasty. The formal beginning of the T`ang dynasty was 618 B.C. (Somers, 1986:972). During the T`ang period, China was the largest, the most populous, the best governed, and more than probably the most civilized country in the world (MacNair, 1951:81, 88). During this period, especially the Golden T`ang from 618 to the great rebellion of An Lu-

Shan in 755, the separate worlds of classical antiquity were transformed into a new unity thanks to magnetic pre-eminence of T`ang China in political, social, economical and ideological spheres and to the ‘acquisitive cosmopolitanism’ of the T`ang court (Adshead, 1995:54). It was under the T`ang that Sino-centric view of the world, which will be dealt with below, most corresponded with reality (Adshead, 1995:103). The Empire was extended through Korea, south into northern Vietnam, into Central Asia and through the west of the Pamirs (Fairbank, 1992:78). The rule of T`ang dynasty was a remarkable period and presents us significant amount of data to consider why a hierarchic structure persisted. Why and how the T`ang Empire persisted and why alternative institutions failed to replace the Pax Sinica is the main subject of this chapter.

The Political Structure of the T`ang Dynasty

The Central Administration

The T`ang central government was partially inherited from the system of the three central ministries used by the Sui dynasty and partially from the Han dynasty (Rodzinski, 1979:118). The dynasty ruled the entire country as one state and empire. The dynasty built up an elaborate bureaucracy and centralized state machinery to fulfill basic functions such as collecting the revenue, undertaking public works, preserving the social system and defending the country. This administrative system of the T`ang dynasty basically continued up to the twentieth century.

The structure of the government resembled a pyramid (Rodzinski, 1979:118). All basic decisions emanated from the capital and the emperor, who has absolute power, was at the top.

All officials were appointed directly from the capital so that centralization was the main characteristics of the system (Latourette, 1967:143). Somers characterizes the Chinese system as absolutist because, first of all, the emperor claimed formal status at the head of a hierarchical order, in which all subjects were encompassed, and second, the emperor had an unlimited power by having the greatest power in the land in his own hands (1986:973). Furthermore, the government was centered on the Sun of Heaven in his person (Fairbank, 1978:7). Namely, his personality was the concrete object of loyalty rather than any impersonal concept of state, people or nation and his rule was personal. The Chinese doctrines suggested that the emperor represents the benevolence of heaven and rules according to the Mandate of Heaven. The misbehaviors of the Emperor turn out to be natural disasters as signs that heaven is withdrawing its mandate to the current ruler. Therefore, this doctrine also justified the overthrow of a dynasty and replacement of a new one without requiring any structural or organizational arrangement (Pye, 1984:60). This was the basis of transition of power in the Chinese empire.

The three basic elements of the government were the emperor and his court, civil bureaucracy and the military. The civil bureaucracy composed of the Three Secretariats, Six Ministries and a Board of Censors. The three secretariats that formed the central government were: (a) The Imperial Chancellery (b) the Imperial Secretariat (c) the Department of State Affairs. The Chancellery and the Secretariat performed the function of policy formulating and advisory organs and the Department of State Affairs was the chief organ of the executive (Wechsler, 1979:169). When the system began to function firmly, the Secretariat acted as a legislative organ and participated with the emperor in the formulation of laws or decrees and

drafted edicts (Li, 1978:177-8). The Chancellery reviewed these drafts and commented on them and the Department of State Affairs with its six subordinate boards put them into effect.

The Chancellery or the court of Emperor was generally staffed from close friends, veterans of uprising wars and relatives (Wechsler, 1979:170-1). The central civil bureaucracy consisted of people who had prior experience from early dynasties, or were sons or grandsons of officials, or descended from former imperial houses. The composition of the bureaucracy was a source of strength for T'ang dynasty because its members were highly experienced in government and had close relationships and affiliations with the dynasty, which facilitated the control of the empire (Wechsler, 1979:174).

The Department of State Affairs consisted of six sub-boards or ministries. These boards were administration or officials, finances, rites, army, justice and public works. These ministries formed the backbone of the central administration. Furthermore, there were nine Offices and five Bureaus controlling special administrative fields and the Imperial Court. In 657, the T'ang government was using 13.500 officials to rule a population of probably 50 million (Fairbank, 1992:82).

Finally, there was the court of Censors, which performed the duty of controlling and reporting on actions of the officials. The court was headed by a Grand Censor and was responsible for the examination and scrutiny of the personal as well as official life of all officials under active tenure (Li, 1978:178). For inspectional purposes of the censorate, the Empire was divided into ten provinces each of which was headed by a censor, known as the

inspector general. Traditionally, the censorate was a completely independent organ of the government (Walker, 1947:5). Throughout the dynasties it was considered as a power apart from the Emperor. Main characteristics of the censorate were its independence, freedom, honesty, zeal and stability during all dynasties (Walker, 1947:12-15).

The Provincial Administration

The provincial administration of T'ang dynasty was designed on the bases of provinces (10), prefectures (over 350), counties (1500) and districts (16000) (Wechsler, 1979:174). The provinces were simply units for periodical inspection and they had no permanent governor, nor administration and no intermediary functions (Twitchett, 1970:105). Prefects administered the prefectures and beneath them there were county magistrates. The counties were under the jurisdiction of the prefectures and they were appointed directly from the capital. Similar to the Han period, there was a dual administration in the prefectures: a civil and a military administration. The latter was independent of the former. Therefore, the same area was governed by a particular administrative prefecture and at the same time by a particular military prefecture (Eberhard, 1977:177). The heads of civil administration, which were in charge of these units, were appointed by the emperor. The districts inhabited by non-Chinese people were ruled by their own princes, but the princes were given Chinese titles (Latourette, 1967:143). The staff members of these head-officials were locally hired and eligible to move up into regular bureaucratic offices (Dull, 1990:71).

The administration system was governed by a centralized system of statute law, in which authority and responsibility of each office were carefully restricted and defined. The

military and financial system of provinces were so devised that there was minimum direct intervention of the central administration. The main tasks of these provincial officials, the prefects and county magistrates, were the maintenance of order, military matters and the administration of land, financial business, tax system and collection, registration of population, and official markets. (Twitchett and Wechsler, 1979:273).

Considering the military administration, the T'ang dynasty had twelve large standing armies and local regional commands (Wechsler, 1979:174). Later on, the regional commands replaced with the higher-level governments-general. These government-generals controlled the frontier areas and strategic areas of the interior and they established over 272 prefectures of the Empire's 358 prefectures (Wechsler, 1979:205). These regional commands were placed over the civilian administration and had full authority over all military affairs in that region. Although the prefectures were subordinate to government-generals, their subordination was nominal. In peacetime, their powers become a dead letter and they possessed same powers with the prefectures (Wechsler, 1979:205).

There were also mobile administrative units located at strategic points and they were established to coordinate local administration and implement government policies temporarily. The T'ang dynasty also established local units to provide reliable locally based source of manpower for the military (Wechsler, 1979:175). These forces were under the direct control of the capital and registered on the civilian registers. The local units sent soldiers on a rotating basis for military service to ensure their control by the capital. During the T'ang period, the

emperor could rely on these local, self-sufficient units as a source of manpower, which were individually too small to pose any threat to the dynasty.

Nevertheless, the An Lu-Shan rebellion was a turning period for the T'ang dynasty and its administration system. Twitchett argues that it was the beginning of a totally new administrative period (Twitchett, 1970:109). The central government lost a substantial amount of power to local authorities and the disintegration of the old land, registration and tax systems, which had depended on close supervision of central administration, altered the entire system. In place of direct control over all members of hierarchy, a resident commissioner or governor was appointed for each province with the duty of overseeing the officials within his jurisdiction.

These governors both had the titles of military governor and civil governor and they had many subordinates. Although, at that time this seemed a wise method to supervise the empire, later it turned out to be a step toward disintegration because it led to reestablishment of local states (Latourette, 1967:148). The control of outer regions declined and the regime had to cede power to the military. They challenged the military power of the central government and exerted greater influence in civilian matters than before. The regime could no longer govern from the center with uniform laws and institutions. The elite bureaucracy was unable to maintain countrywide procedures and during the period from 756 A.D. to the end of dynasty, localism and particularism prevailed. There was a general decentralization of local authority from center to the provinces (Fairbank, 1992:83; Twitchett, 1970:123).

The Persistence of the Chinese Hierarchical System

The Generation of Common Goods

The generation of common goods is important to the persistence of hierarchic structures because, while these common goods serve the interest of the center, they also provide incentives for the periphery to become attached to it. Therefore, common goods such as security, economic prosperity, facilities for transportation and communication and the effective mobilization of resources both serve interests of the center and the periphery. In case of the T'ang dynasty, internal pacification and the economic prosperity that arose from this peace, and the effective mobility of resources through the tax-land system, the grand-canal system and the examination system shall be noted in order to comprehend their role in generation of common goods. Finally, the equal distribution of burdens in the generation of common goods and the distribution of outcomes shall be addressed in order to clarify the role of T'ang dynasty in generating common goods.

Security

The peace and security within the Empire was the first and foremost objective of the T'ang dynasty. The initial period of the T'ang rule, the first decade, was a period of internal pacification (Wechsler, 1979:160-1). During this period the major task was not to strengthen its own power but to defeat the military potential of major rivals (Somers, 1986:973). Major rivals of the T'ang dynasty held considerable armies, especially in the North China region, and several battles were fought to substantiate the T'ang dynasty's claims to preeminence. Somers summarized the initial objectives of the T'ang dynasty as: (a) crush the military power of

prominent rivals. (b) demilitarize the areas of heaviest fighting. (c) co-opt the regional power holders into T'ang system through appointment as governor-generals (1986:973).

When the T'ang dynasty occupied the Sui capital (the former dynasty) and some provinces, they were only one of many regional regimes. The other provinces were under the control of rebel organizations, of the former Sui civil and military officials or of local gentry who opposed banditry and civil strife. The T'ang dynasty was able to secure the support of many petty rebels, Sui officials and gentry leaders by implementing policies of amnesty, appointment, and reward (Wechsler, 1979:161). Furthermore, in order to destroy the power of major rivals they skillfully deployed their ever-increasing military strength. From then on, the T'ang Empire remained peaceful till the rebellion of An Lu-Shan in 755-63. Rodzinski points out:

The T'ang dynasty remained on the throne for over a full century before a great peasant rebellion finally sent it tumbling to its doom. During this period relative prosperity and peace still prevailed, as it had done for a longer period in the southern period of the country. This has caused one author to remark that there had been few eras in world history when a civilized area existed in peace for such a long time. The remark is, unfortunately, true enough and a very bitter comment on the history of the human race (1979:131).

The importance of security might better be understood when we consider the dynasty after the An Lu-Shan rebellion. In the late T'ang period, with the increase of internal rebellions, governor-generals were given extraordinary powers to achieve more efficient military campaigns (Li, 1978:176). Therefore, they became too powerful for the imperial government to control after the rebellions had been suppressed. They collected their own taxes, appointed their own officials and maintained their own armies. Li argues that they were like independent kingdoms (Li, 1978:176). They appointed their successors and they were

hereditary rulers. Even they fought with other governor-generals and annexed territory. The Emperor had to depend on other governor-generals to suppress them. The institution of governors-general promoted decentralization among the empire (Eberhard, 1977:180). They surrounded themselves with little courts of their own drawn from the local gentry and local intelligentsia. It may be assumed that, as the capability of the center to provide security among the provinces decreases, the provincial authorities became more self-reliant for their security. Therefore, the center could not perform one of its main functions and the ties between center and provinces began to loosen.

Economic Prosperity

Through the seventh and mid-eight centuries, the Chinese experienced high levels of economic prosperity. Under the rule of Hsuan Tsung, the empire reached the pinnacle of its glory. The Empire was wealthier and more populous than the Han had ever been. The annual budget of the state reached so high levels that were much more than the Han period (Eberhard, 1977:180). Adshead argues that, once united, the Empire brought about peace over wide areas, security from foreign invasion, an open structure of society and a high level of consumer spending (1995:56). The extent of restoration was great (Adshead, 1995:68). The empire for a certain period included all the provinces of the Han Empire, except for North Korea, as well as new provinces in the south. Its population was at least 50 million and its revenue was 60 million cwt of grain equivalent. The economic prosperity arose from several factors. Obviously, the first and foremost factor was long-during peace among the empire. In addition, good harvests and effective agricultural policies reinforced peace and growth. Furthermore, the Empire used its resources remarkably well, which substantially contributed to the overall

prosperity. As a result of all these factors commerce, wealth and population increased (Wechsler, 1979:209). Furthermore, the T'ang dynasty introduced several effective policies to distribute the benefits of this economic growth among its subjects. In this context, the overall economic prosperity turned out to be a common good that both serve the interest of the capital and the provinces.

The Economic Development of the T'ang Dynasty

The developments in agricultural production had implications over all other aspects of economy. The economy was mainly state-controlled and an agricultural type economy. The equal-field system resulted in a great increase of agricultural production and vast amounts of land brought under cultivation (Rodzinski, 1979:120). Furthermore, the T'ang government reintroduced the state monopolies for salt, wine and tea. All of these were important source of additional revenue. The government also owned large manufactories that produced for the state itself.

The general success in agricultural production and the rise of prosperity also brought about a further development of crafts (Rodzinski, 1979:122). There was a significant development of the manufacture of silk, paper and porcelain in large scale. These were important developments because in late antiquity, the chief commodities traded were textiles, minerals and species. All these led to an increase in domestic trade, which was promoted by improved communications, including a new postal system on the main roads from the capital. With the general stabilization and improvement of the economy the state grew prosperous and began to build up large reserves.

Foreign trade appears to reach greater proportions under the T`ang than at any previous time. By the eight century, there was a significant amount of sea trade with the Persians, Arabs and merchants from India and a special office was created in the city for the registry of ships, the control of exports and the collection of duties (Latourette, 1967:153). The leading commodities of the trade were silk, spices and porcelain and the Chinese bought such goods as ivory, incense, copper, tortoise shell, and rhinoceros horn. The T`ang China was by far the greatest producer of silk and its role increased with the abolition of Alexandrian line production by Arabs and China became the sole exporter of silk.

Another indicator of security and growing prosperity was the progress of capitalism (Adshead, 1995:56). The Buddhist monasticism had a very important role in the spread of capitalism in China (Adshead, 1995:57). Buddhist monks came from states that were more commercialized than China and although they were prohibited to possess property they brought China certain capitalist institutions such as the prototype of the permanent, non-kinship association; the specific practices of the auction, compound interest, equitable mortgage and the money club (Adshead, 1995:57). In addition to capitalist institutions, Buddhist monasticism implanted the notion of capital itself. The multiplication of wealth by investment and circulation was introduced by some sects of Buddhist monastery. Finally, both by their teaching and by their own outlay on lavish buildings, temple furnishing, incense, precious ornaments and books, the Buddhist monasteries promoted spending and circulation (Adshead, 1995:58). The stability of institution of the Empire, the greater skill and institutional creativity of the dynasties, the geographical isolation of China, strong cultural framework and the

stimulus of Buddhism provided China the right environment and climate for the progress of capitalism (Adshead, 1995:56-8).

The increase in population also demonstrates the growing prosperity and security. At that time, The T`ang Empire was certainly the largest and most populous state in the world (Cotterell and Morgan, 1975:96). Latourette claims that nearly three centuries of the T`ang rule was, with the exception of some later years and times of turmoil, among the most prosperous and culturally brilliant in the history of China (1967:152).

The Effective Mobilization of Resources

The T`ang dynasty was very successful in mobilization of its resources in various spheres. The development of transportation by the T`ang greatly facilitated the mobility and use of resources, which indirectly secured the economic growth. The T`ang period experienced a tremendous increase in maritime activity. Particularly with the use of the Grand Canal, a higher percentage of China`s commerce began to be exercised waterborne and a higher percentage of China`s production was commercialized than anywhere else in the world of late antiquity (Adshead, 1995:71). The establishment of the Grand Canal enabled the flow of grain surplus of the south at the disposal of the north. The number of Chinese ships increased substantially and the Chinese were able to built larger ships. The use of Grand Canal was also vitally important for the integration of the fertile Yangtze Valley, which was extensively developed by the T`ang and had an important role in economy. Braudel mentions that, thanks to the south, China could live above its means and could invest beyond its savings and this was an important reason of China`s superiority (in Adshead, 1995:60). The southern kingdoms

enriched China by their Buddhism, maritime trade and more sophisticated legal systems, and contributed to the T`ang synthesis (Adshead, 1995:60).

The T`ang was also successful in the rationalization of civil bureaucracy that facilitated the use of human resources. The Empire was ruled through an expert civil bureaucracy and a new articulation of law. The T`ang bureaucracy was rationalized through recruitment by competitive examinations and control by superior personnel management techniques and the T`ang state achieved higher levels of law and order, more power over its subjects. “T`ang government was more meritocratic, more intelligent, more effective than any other in its world” (Adshead, 1995:68). Cotterell and Morgan asserts that a strong civil service that was recruited by examination was the foundation of the hundred and fifty years of peace and prosperity that the reign of Emperor T`ai Tsung inaugurated (1975:95).

The financial and agricultural policies of the T`ang dynasty significantly altered the use of resources. The new articulation of rural life, the equal field system with its periodical allocation and redistribution of land, its coordination of landholding and tax responsibility were radical regulations that were less decentralizing and more beneficial to the state (Adshead, 1995:70). This policy solved the problem of aristocratic exception, peasant commendation, tax evasion and consequent fiscal problems, which had led to fall of the Han Empire. The system provided an assured basis of taxation through the allocation of land to farmers and by its periodic revisions. The system maximized the advantages China already enjoyed in the field of agricultural technology and provided the framework for others such as bigger farms, the substitution of wheat for millet, the plough for the hoe, water mills and closer integration of

arable farming and silk production (Adshead, 1995:70). Rodzinski believes that the equal-field and taxation policies accompanied with the development of agricultural methods resulted in a great increase in agricultural production (1979:120). More lands became available for cultivation. Due to these developments the revenues of the Tang government reached larger amounts than the Han dynasty acquired and this financial stability lasted for over a century and promoted the political stability (Rodzinski, 1979:120).

The Equal Distribution of Burdens and Benefits

One of the major concerns of the Empire was even distribution of burdens in forms of land and taxes. In order to realize this goal, they reestablished the policy of land equalization, which was inherited from the previous dynasties and applied on a large scale. In this respect, every adult male received a certain amount of abandoned land from the previous dynasty. According to this law, as far as possible all peasants should own the same amount of land and the formation of large estates should be prevented (Eberhard, 1977:176). The law also aimed to protect farmers against loss of land. This policy served to ease the social tensions, to assure steady revenue for the government and made peasants available for military conscription. However, the system broke down and was abolished officially in AD 780. It is obvious that the maintenance of such a system in eight century was not easy with the means available.

Moreover, Twitchett argues that the whole system assumed a uniform, identical tax-load on all taxpayers, irrespective of their actual circumstances or the region in which they lived (Twitchett, 1979:24-8 in Wechsler, 1979: 177). In fact, the Tang dynasty introduced a system of progressive taxation based on assessment of property on the one hand, and of land

levies based on the areas under cultivation on the other (Twitchett, 1970:24). The system comprised four basic liabilities: a tax in grain and a tax in kind paid in terms of cloth, and there were two types of labor service, the regular annual *corvee* and miscellaneous labor service. Since the system assumed that each tax-payer received an equal amount of land from the state, the amount due to each taxable individual were fixed and took no account of his personal circumstances (Twitchett, 1970:25). This system remained the fundamental tax system of the empire till sixteenth century. In this sense, the system aimed to provide equitable amount of taxes among the individuals.

The Decline in Transaction Costs

Compared to anarchical structures, in hierarchical structures it is easier to reduce the transaction costs among the units. Reduction in transaction costs facilitates any type of interactions and therefore turns out to be an incentive for both capital and provinces to sustain the hierarchic structure. The T'ang Empire was able to reduce the transaction costs in several spheres. Obviously, these developments were partially a result of inheritance from previous dynasties. Nevertheless, the T'ang dynasty either developed the existing forms or demonstrated a remarkable success in inventing new forms for the organization of society, thus, it became a center of attraction. Particularly, the standardization of administrative procedures and written language, standardization of coinage, measure and weights, and a standard application of codified law enabled the Chinese Empire to reduce the transaction costs and to preserve its hierarchic structure.

The Standardization of Written Language

It should be noted that the T'ang dynasty inherited a standardized written language that facilitated all other forms of interactions. The Chinese Empire was able to integrate and standardize the variant forms of writing in one system, which turned out to be the universal system throughout the Empire during the Qin dynasty (221-247 B.C.) (MacNair, 1951:73). Before the unification (221 B.C.) different scripts of the Chinese language had existed side by side. In that year, the government announced that the Small script, which had been the official script in the Qin state prior to the unification, became the standard form of writing and the use of other scripts would be punished by law (Li, 1978:102). This measure no doubt facilitated communication within the empire and also prevented the last excuse for misunderstanding and misinterpreting the law. Despite the various dialects and the political disunity of China, the written language remained the same since the days of Qin. MacNair believes that the universality and continuity of the written language have contributed substantially to the longevity and unity of the Chinese culture (1951:73).

The Standardization of Administrative Procedures and the Codified Law

The bureaucratic-administrative structure of the Chinese Empire was introduced by the Qin and early Han dynasties. It was developed by legalists who were professionally qualified administrators, given definite territorial jurisdictions, paid fixed salaries, controlled by written correspondence and replaced in regular periods (Fairbank, 1978:7). Similar to the Roman system, they developed impersonal regulations. In this context, the T'ang administrative system was governed by a centralized system of statute law in which the authority and responsibility of each office were restricted and defined by law and the dynasty was ruled

under a comprehensive code of penal and administrative law (Wechsler, 1979:178). The code was completed in 629 and was composed of five hundred articles and modeled on the codes of previous dynasties. In addition, the imperial high commission presented a new set of administrative Statutes in thirty chapters and detailed administrative Ordinances in fourteen chapters. The code provided useful procedural guidelines to Chinese magistrates. These codes empowered the new types of governments and institutions with legal force and a standard codified form.

One of the striking similarities between Rome and China is that, like the Roman compilations that preceded them, the Chinese codes laid down the substance of the law and also implicitly specified its procedures. The codes thus provided the appropriate responses, principles and procedures by which these problems were to be resolved (McKnight, 1995:420). For instance the principle of allocation of accountability is a good example. The assignment of accountability was accompanied by the pervasive idea that men are chiefly punishable for acts for which they were responsible (McKnight, 1995:410).

All the categories of codified law such as the Code, Statutes, Regulations and Ordinances and administrative procedures were revised frequently and updated according to changing circumstances and remained a major preoccupation of the T`ang rule (Wechsler and Twitchett, 1979:273-4). The Code that was developed by the T`ang dynasty remained authoritative until the fourteenth century and provided a model for the first legal Codes in Vietnam, Korea and Japan (Wechsler, 1979:178, McKnight, 1995:410). Due to this highly

developed and updated legal system the direct intervention of the capital was kept to a minimum (Wechsler and Twitchett, 1979:273).

The Standardization of Coinage

The expansion of trade during the T`ang dynasty called for a stable and sufficient currency and the administration attempted to supply this demand and maintain its monopoly of coinage (Twitchett, 1970:66). The manufacture of coinage was reserved for the government and the principle that ‘currency is the privilege of the ruler’ was always maintained (Twitchett, 1970:66). Manipulating currency was one of the major concerns of the government (Eisenstadt, 1969:48). The government’s privilege was protected by heavy legal sanctions such as death penalty and enslavement.

Twitchett asserts that in 621 the emperor began minting a new coinage of a uniform size, weight and metal content and the new money remained the standard coin throughout the T`ang dynasty (Twitchett, 1970:66-70 in Wechsler, 1979:174). Twitchett says that “The *K`ai-yuan t`ung-pao* coins which were produced from 621 onwards to provide a stable medium of currency remained the standard coin throughout the dynasty” (Twitchett, 1970:69).

Obviously, the system of coinage did not function as effectively as today’s systems. The organization of minting coin was very loose (Twitchett, 1970:68) and the monetary system was backward, complex and inefficient (Eisenstadt, 1969:48). In mid-T`ang period, the manufacturing was mainly made in provincial mints and the unit of account varied locally and between merchants and government agencies. This confusion of currency units and exchange

mechanisms was a serious problem for the merchants (Eisenstadt, 1969:48). After this period several measures were taken to alleviate the problems, and in 845, the organization was changed and the manufacture of local mints was set up under the control of the civil governors of the provinces (Twitchett, 1970:69). In spite of all these problems, it is clear that during the T`ang dynasty a general money economy continue rapidly to develop (Twitchett, 1970:83).

Twitchett also emphasizes the development of a credit system in T`ang times. The first and best known was the flying money or convenient exchange (Twitchett, 1970:72). In this system, the merchants from the provinces paid money, which they had made from the sale of their goods at the capital, to the agents of provincial governors in the capital. In return they received a certificate. When they returned back to their provinces, they presented these certificates to the provincial authorities and the provincial authorities in turn paid them the equivalent of sum of money. By this method, the risk and troubles of carrying money were reduced and the provincial authorities were saved the trouble of transporting their tax money to the capital. During the ninth century, this system was widespread (Twitchett, 1970:72).

The Standardization of Weights and Measures

The standardization of weights and measures in Chinese social life derives back to the Qin period (MacNair, 1951:74). Before the unification, legal codes and economic systems were altogether different in different parts of China. Since differences in weights and measures impeded the movement of trade and variances in statutes caused confusion in law enforcement, the Qin regime ordered the adoption on a nation-wide scale of a new system of weights and measures as promulgated by the imperial government (Li, 1978:101). During the T`ang

dynasty there was an official market director who was in charge of controlling the markets in the capital and large towns in the provinces. He was responsible for keeping the order, registering all market shops, inspecting weights and measures, fixing approved schedules of prices, and ensuring the quality of goods (Wechsler, 1979:177). Therefore, we see that the standardization of weights and measures was one of the major concerns of the administration. The standard T'ang weights and measures were:

Table 3.1 Weights and Measures in T'ang Dynasty

Length
10 tsun = 1 ch'ih (slightly less than 1 English foot)
5 ch'ih = 1 pu (double pace)
10 ch'ih = 1 chang
1800 ch'ih = 1 li (app. 1/3 English mile)
Area
1 mou = a strip (app. 0.14 acre)
100 mou = 1 ch'ing (app. 14 acres)
Capacity
3 sheng = 1 ta-sheng
10 ta-sheng = 1 tou
10 tou = 1 hu
1 hu = 1 shih (app. 7/4 bushels)
Weight
3 liang = 1 ta-liang (a standard ounce)
16 ta-liang = 1 chin (app. 1.5 English libra)
Cloth
1 p'i of silk = a length 1.8 ch'ih in width, 40 ch'ih long
1 tuan of hemp = a length 1.8 ch'ih in width, 50 ch'ih long

The Commitment of the Members and the Legitimacy of the System

It is difficult to sustain any form of social organization without securing commitment of members. Obviously, the lack of mass participation in political life in Ancient and Classical eras made elite commitment vital for the maintenance of any form of order. In this respect, the T'ang dynasty was able to provide elite commitment through political, cultural and ideological integration, and by using ideological, coercive and remunerative measures. In addition, these various methods were underpinned by the legitimacy of the concept of Sino-centrism.

One of the methods that the T'ang dynasty received commitment was through imperial ritual. Somers, in his study on the consolidation of power of T'ang Empire, suggests that imperial rituals such as Feng and Shan sacrifices in seventh century were part of the efforts to extend imperial power. These kinds of rituals had been made during the Han period to consolidate more power. Somers demonstrates that the Shan and Feng sacrifices increased the number of people who were registered to imperial records, which was an indirect indication of people's commitment to the Empire (1986:981).

Furthermore, the coercive methods were used by the T'ang dynasty to provide commitment. Many imperial military campaigns were undertaken between A.D. 598 and 668 that went out from the capital region in northwest China as far as central Manchuria and the Korean peninsula (Somers, 1986:981). In addition, the regular provincial recruitment of officials through an elaborate examination system was vitally important for the commitment of the elite.

The Examination System

From the Han dynasty to the T'ang, the clan members' holding high office in the government were from aristocratic clans that had high status. These aristocratic clans of the northwest were mainly non-Chinese in origin, but they were sinicized and the Sui and T'ang dynastic founders had intermarried with these nomadic tribal families. In this period, appointments to office were made by recommendation (Fairbank, 1992:84). Through this system the elite perpetuated itself, especially the elites of northwest aristocratic clans (Fairbank, 1992:84). Nevertheless, this system obstructed the mobility of talent and turned against it and the newly arisen Sino-barbarian families of the northwest struck a blow at the great Chinese families (Fairbank, 1992:84). Therefore, the T'ang altered the system of rule by aristocratic families with a new system of a rule by a trained bureaucracy selected by merit through the examinations (Fairbank, 1992:85). Although the recommendation system continued to exist, the examination system gradually became the major form and helped to break the power of the old aristocratic families and to provide the T'ang a substantial source of power (Latourette, 1967:143).

The examination system and the support of scholarship were initiated by the Han dynasty and they were further developed by the T'ang. The examination began at the provincial level and candidates were examined every three years by officials that came from the capital. The successful candidates were designated lower ranks in provincial administration and their scholarly progress continued for higher posts. There were also ultimate imperial examinations held every three years at the capital. Those who became successful were admitted to the higher service and could hope to reach the topmost positions such as ministers or grand

counselors. To underpin the examination system, the dynasty built-up a system of state schools in order to provide training for candidates. In 628, there were five schools and more than 2000 students that were educated in them (Wechsler, 1979:214). The students were taught classical Confucian education, such as classics and literature, but they were also given degrees in history, law, mathematics, poetry, calligraphy and Taoist philosophy (Latourette, 1967:143). Later on, the number of people recruited through examination increased gradually and the system was reorganized to function effectively.

The examination system and bureaucracy gave rise to one of the greatest achievements of Chinese civilization: the civil service. The civil service, which was based on this body of shared knowledge and ethics (Confucianism), was a significant achievement. The system was highly competitive and it impressed people that they were under the rule of intellectual and cultural superiors (Pye, 1984:67). Furthermore, officials were regularly transferred from place to place and never to serve in their own home districts.

Li believes that the adoption of civil service examination provided efficiency for the T'ang bureaucracy (1978:179). It emphasized written examinations as a means to measure the qualifications of a candidate to governmental posts. The concept of professional civil service, competitive entrance examinations, regularized evaluations and systematic promotions substantially contributed to the smooth functioning of the system. The T'ang government attempted to cultivate a national purpose of solidarity so as to prevent localism that had been blamed for the division of China after 220 A.D. by emphasizing talent and ability in a prospective official's qualifications. The examination system did not depend on any

consideration of family or local background; therefore the government would be the sole dispenser of power, fame and wealth. Through this system the government obtained the undivided loyalty of a most powerful group and those who had been rewarded after passing the examinations could be trusted to support the status quo (Li, 1978:180). The examination system with modifications and interruptions continued to function during the next twelve centuries.

Moreover, the examination system, by promoting the mobility of provincial elite secured the commitment of them to the center for a long time. Pye suggests that it is difficult to determine whether the examination system either facilitated or impeded elite mobility, however, he mentions that a significant portion of officials who succeeded in examinations were members of different families and few families had more than two generations in office (Pye, 1984:67-8). He says that “On the whole, it would seem that there was more mobility throughout most of Chinese history than in even eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England” (Pye, 1984:68). An important evidence of this mobility was that non-Chinese rulers could also become actual emperors of China, especially in eras of Chinese weakness (Fairbank, 1978:9). They could take over the imperial functions of Son of Heaven at the zenith of structure.

The Legitimacy of the Chinese Empire

The legitimacy of the Chinese Empire was underlined by two fundamental bases: the concept of Sino-centrism and the tributary system. Sino-centrism is the assumption of Chinese superiority (Fairbank, 1968:2). The central assumption of the Sino-centric world order was that China was the civilization and the Chinese emperor as Son of Heaven had the mandate of

Heaven to rule. The Son of Heaven, who was at the top of the order, was omni-competent, and functions as military leader, administrator, judge, high priest, philosophical sage, arbiter of taste and patron of arts and letters (Fairbank, 1968:6). He remained superior to ordinary people because of his unique function in maintaining order among mankind and maintaining harmony between human society and the rest of cosmos. Two implications of this rule were (a) the institutional structure of the Chinese world order had to be hierarchical. (b) China as the superior moral power was responsible for maintaining and harmonizing this order with the moral examples, institutional innovations and force if necessary (Zhang, 2001:53). The Chinese tended to consider their foreign relations as an expression of this internal order and the tributary system was the embodiment of the Sino-centric world order.

The tribute system was a political mechanism that provided coexistence among China and non-Chinese states (Zhang, 2001:52). It embodied the political submission of barbarians and Imperial China's sense of superiority reinforced this submission. The tribute system provided the institutional mechanism of coexistence of the Chinese Empire and barbarian tribes, kingdoms, and peripheral communities. The tribute system witnessed its most aggressive and rapid expansion and institutionalization during the T'ang period. The system extended to include many non-Chinese states and polities from Central, South and Southeast Asia and it is argued that the T'ang dynasty had as many as seventy-two tributaries (Zhang, 2001:52).

Nevertheless, the crucial question is how this Sino-centric world order and the tributary system were viewed by non-Chinese states and whether the Chinese Empire were successful to

fit the theory of Sino-centrism and the practice of tributary system. Fairbank claims that all these non-Chinese states and people were expected in theory to be tributary to the Son of Heaven in central China, but the theory generally did not fit the facts (Fairbank, 1968:2-3). The basic reason of this contradiction was that Chinese cultural area did not overlap with the Sino-centric world order (Fairbank, 1968:3). Chinese superiority must be understood as a cultural superiority because to sinicize the barbarians was one of the main thrusts of imperial expansion (Zhang, 2001:55). Non-Chinese groups could be sinicized and ruled by the Empire if they accepted Chinese customs, Confucian ideology and proper rituals. Therefore, the most important means of the Chinese were Confucianism and their culture. The inner zone and the Sinic zone was culturally tied to China but the outer zone of China was composed of people who possessed distinctly non-Chinese culture such as Manchus, Mongols, Uighur Turks, Tibetans, and others. The problem was that these people had to be included in the Chinese world order because they provided the dominant military force in the East Asia. In this context, there was a mismatch between the Chinese culture-based theory, superiority of Son of Heaven, and the geographic fact of nomadic inner Asian fighting power. Chinese needed the striking power of these Inner Asian people, but their cultural and economical superiority was not always sufficient to control them (Fairbank, 1968:3).

Zhang also suggests that the Sino-centric Chinese worldview was not accepted by others (Zhang, 2001:54). There were many cases when Chinese emperors explicitly acknowledged the equality of barbarians (Zhang, 2001:54). Therefore, the legitimacy through Sino-centric worldview could only be sustained domestically:

The hypocrisy embodied in the organizing principles, norms and practices of the Chinese world order is embedded as an intended institutional feature. It may be indeed argued that it is precisely such purposive institutional ambiguities in the actual operation of the tribute system that made it a flexible system for the conduct of Imperial China's foreign relations. The myth of Chinese superiority had to be maintained, however, for domestic purposes (Zhang, 2001:54).

We could better understand the non-Chinese view of Chinese world order by considering relations between these populations and the T'ang Empire.

The Foreign Relations of the T'ang Empire: The Tribute System in Fact

Fairbank conceptualizes the Chinese world as three main zones (1968:2). First, the Sinic zone involves the most nearby and culturally similar states such as Korea, Vietnam, and Ryukyu Islands. Second, the Inner Asian Zone consists of nomadic and semi-nomadic people who were non-Chinese. Third zone is the Outer zone, consisting of outer barbarians including Japan and other states of Southeast and South Asia and Europe. The major neighbors of the T'ang dynasty were the Eastern Turks, the Western Turks, the Indo-European-speaking peoples of the Tarim basin, The Korean kingdom and the Tibetans.

The Eastern Turks were the greatest threat and rival for the T'ang dynasty from the beginning (Wechsler, 1979:181; Rodzinski, 1979:122; Eberhard, 1977:181). Due to the nature of nomad feudalism, the structure of the states of the northern nomads was always unstable and impermanent and broken up with relative ease by the rise to power of new tribes which would lead to new alliances, confederations or empires (Rodzinski, 1979:122). The Chinese had great difficulties to establish a firm control over the Turks. Although, the T'ang dynasty came to power with the aid of Eastern Turks, shortly Eastern Turks turned against the dynasty. Initially,

the Chinese were able to defeat and built-up suzerainty over the Eastern Turks, but they could not guaranteed a long-lasting domination over them (Eberhard, 1977:180, Wechsler, 1979:181-2).

The Chinese struggled with the Western Turks mainly for the control of Central Asia for commercial concerns and to prevent a union between the Turks and Tibetans (Eberhard, 1977:182). The third emperor of the dynasty divided the Western Turks and built up two federations, which were under the control of Chinese protectorates-general in late 650s (Wechsler, 1979:280). However, in mid 660s the tribal federations allied and regained their independence from the Chinese. Even some sinicized Turks, who served the T`ang dynasty and received a Chinese education, rebelled against the Chinese authorities (Wechsler, 1979:287).

The T`ang also formed suzerainty over the Oasis kingdoms, the Indo-European-speaking peoples of the Tarim basin. However, the relation between the dynasty and these old-kingdoms was similar to Turks. These tributaries rebelled against the Chinese and allied with other tributaries and rejected the Chinese authority whenever they consolidated their power (Wechsler, 1979:226). The Korean kingdom turned out to be a protectorate in late 670s. However, while Korea was recognized as a Chinese suzerainty, in fact, it was an independent country (Rodzinski, 1979:124). In a short period of time, the Chinese had to withdraw from the region after a defeat (Wechsler, 1979:284). Similarly, we could not observe any stability for the tributaries of the Tarim kingdoms and Tibetans (Wechsler, 1979:286). Throughout the seventh century, the Tibetans were a considerable military force and a strong rival of the Chinese for the control of Central Asia (Rodzinski, 1979:123).

The Chinese influence also extended further to the Western regions. Through the middle of the eighth century the area west of Pamirs-Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, Ferghana and much of Afghanistan were all under the control of Chinese. However, the Western Turks and the Arabs in late seventh and eighth centuries challenged the Chinese influence and Chinese control was not welcomed in this region as well (Rodzinski, 1979:131).

The T'ang dynasty employed certain strategies to provide commitment of these tributes such as force and diplomacy, conquer and divide, bribes or marriages (Wechsler, 1979:223; Yang, 1968:24). They employed the old policy of playing on the divisions between the tribes. Especially in times of military weakness, the Chinese developed certain methods such as cessation of contact, buying them off by honors or material inducements, using one barbarian against another through diplomacy and finally accepting barbarian rules at the apex of the Chinese world (Fairbank, 1978:11-2). The Emperors were eager to assimilate the barbarians and many barbarians were brought to capital in the military service of the Empire and many sons of barbarian princes were educated in the schools of the capital (Latourette, 1967:145).

Nevertheless, as we see from the factual historical progress, these strategies were successful to a certain extent and the Sino-centric world order was not firmly accepted by the non-Chinese neighbors of the T'ang dynasty (Cranmer-Byng, 1973:68). Then the final question is although there was a contradiction between the theory and facts of Chinese world order, why or how the Empire sustained for such a long time. Zhang asks that why the Chinese international order should have been organized differently from the ancient Greek city-states

system (2001:56). Why did the tribute system persist and even expand when the Chinese Empire was extremely weak? Why did the Chinese world order organize differently and why did alternative institutions fail to replace the Pax Sinica when the Chinese were weak. In other words, Zhang aims to explain the institutional rationality of the tribute system.

Zhang agrees with the idea that the ideas about the moral purpose of the state could explain the divergent institutional designs and practices of historical societies of states. Therefore, the endurance of a particular world order could be attributed to “the persistence of a dominant idea about the moral purpose of the state” (Zhang, 2001:56). In Chinese society the hegemonic belief in the moral purpose of state is embodied in Confucianism, which is to promote social and cosmic order and harmony. “As the Confucian conception of the world is civilizational, the organizing principle of sovereignty is concentrically hierarchical, with China sitting at the core and others assigned a place according to how ‘civilized’ they are” (Zhang, 2001:56). An elaborate set of rituals was designed as standards of an ancient civilization, which defined the norms of procedural justice and the observance of which decides the places of others in the hierarchy of Chinese world order. It also enabled others to participate in this order. In this context, the tribute system seemed the fundamental institution that embodies both philosophical assumptions and institutional practices of the Chinese world order and organized the relations between the Chinese and others.

Zhang argues that so long as the hegemonic belief in the moral purpose of the state, namely the belief of Chinese on Confucianism, prevails, the tribute system is likely to remain as a basic institutional practice in the Chinese world order (Zhang, 2001:57). Furthermore, this

argument also explains: (a) how Imperial China could maintain its world order in times of military weakness because military strength is neither necessary nor a sufficient condition for the maintenance. (b) It explains the fact that no alternative institutional design could serve the purpose better as long as the non-Chinese ruling elites accept the assumptions underlining the prevailing belief about the moral purpose of the state as Chinese do. However, as explained above, there was no stable belief in the institution among the non-Chinese.

Fairbank points out that the rule of Son of Heaven could be maintained over so much people and terrain because of its superficiality (1968:8). The emperor was the supreme ruler because his officials did not attempt to rule directly in the districts and remained loyal to the emperor. Their training in Confucianism committed them to social order which formed the privileged upper strata. Therefore, the answer might be the cultural influence of the Chinese in general and the Emperor in particular. The Chinese believed that the mystical influence of the all-wise example of virtue of Son of Heaven reached beyond China to all mankind and gave them order and peace as parts of a concentric hierarchy (Fairbank, 1968:8). However, since rulers outside China beyond the administrative-bureaucratic structure, they became attached to Empire by personal ties that form the feudal relations. The interior vassals were under the effective influence of the Son of Heaven, both cultural and coercive. However, the exterior vassals were of lower rank and ruled in peripheral areas were not under the coercive power of the emperor. As the area under the control of Chinese expanded, the exterior vassals became interior as they come into contact with the Son of Heaven. It was in this way that the Chinese world-order was unified and centralized in theory by the universal preeminence of the Son of Heaven (Fairbank, 1968:9).

In respect of the perception of the non-Chinese people, Schwartz says that “How the Huns, Turks, Tibetans, Mongols, and others responded to this Chinese perception is a question that remains to be explored. No doubt investigation will reveal that many of these peoples by no means accepted Chinese claims and that even where they used the language of the Chinese world order they may have done so with total mental reservations” (Schwartz, 1968:276). However, he also suggests that “after all the qualifications and corrections have been made, the notion of a Chinese perception of world will still prove generally valid in the sense in which all general propositions about entities such as Chinese society or Chinese culture are valid” (1968:277). Schwartz believes that at the heart of the Chinese world order, there is a notion of universal kingship linked to a widely shared sense of participation in a high culture. The Chinese approach to their world order; claiming some kind of unique universal authority and a universal king at the top of highest civilization was not much different from other civilizations. The difference of Chinese world order was the linkage of the concept of universal kingship and the Confucian criteria of higher culture (Schwartz, 1968:277).

Schwartz admits that the power of the Empire was an important factor that affects the ability of the Empire to exert its influence, to force its tribute system and shape practical consequences of events. Nevertheless, the operational consequences of Chinese perceptions can be observed through Confucianization of non-Chinese peoples in a spirit of total cultural absolutism (Schwartz, 1968:278). That is to say, the Chinese could exert power by using culture rather than mere use of force in order to affect the course of events and impose their perception of world order on ethnic groups. “One is struck by the relative strength and

persistence of the Chinese perception of world order before the end of the nineteenth century” (Schwartz, 1968:281).

The reasons of strong and durable overarching perception of such an order were: (a) A historical contingency, that is to say throughout the course of Chinese history, China was not challenged in its immediate vicinity by the emergence of any universal state that based its claims in cultural terms. (b) The Chinese conception of world order may have a much firmer religio-cosmologic foundation than the other cultures (Schwartz, 1968:278). The Confucian interpretation of universal kingship was supported by a moral system, which was itself a part of the ultimate fabric of cosmos. In China, various schools viewed the cosmic status of the universal kingship differently but they never fundamentally challenged it (Schwartz, 1968:284).

On the one hand, it is definitely clear that the T’ang dynasty was successful in sustaining the commitment of Chinese people through coercive and non-coercive means such as rituals and the examination system. On the other hand, the T’ang dynasty’s relations with non-Chinese people were quite complex. The relations between the Chinese and non-Chinese people were based on the Sino-centric worldview and the tribute system. The Chinese attempted to provide the commitment of these people through non-coercive and coercive means. Furthermore, through the examination system they had the opportunity to rise to higher ranks of the administrative system. Nevertheless, the evidence shows us that the theory of Sino-centric worldview did not always fit the tribute system in practice. Although the Chinese were successful to a certain extent, ultimately the non-Chinese people struggled for their

independence whenever they had a chance. Therefore, eventually we are faced with the question that how the Chinese were able to sustain their Empire. All the answers have significant merit, namely, the moral purpose of the state, superficiality of the administration of the reinforcement of a high culture had considerable impact upon the structure. Nevertheless, the question still remains to be explored.

As a conclusion, the T'ang dynasty presents us an outstanding example of a hierarchical structure that persisted for a long time. Obviously, the T'ang dynasty was very successful in providing peace and prosperity as common goods and sought to distribute the burdens and benefits among all subjects. Furthermore, there were substantial developments that resulted in the reduction of transaction costs in the spheres of security, economy and administration such as the standardization of administrative procedures, a codified law, coinage and weights and measures. The Empire was also able to provide commitment and legitimacy of its subjects through coercive and non-coercive means, though there is still a debate over the commitment of the non-Chinese people.

CHAPTER IV
THE MULTI-STATE SYSTEM OF GREECE
THE ARCHAIC AND THE CLASSICAL PERIOD (800-400 B.C.)

Many historians conceived Greece after the collapse of the Mycenaean civilization about 1200 B.C., as a prolonged Dark Age in which economic and political life turned out to be a rudimentary stage. After that epoch, the Greek history is conventionally divided into four periods: the Archaic Period (800-500 B.C.), the Classical Period (500-400 B.C.), the Hellenistic Period (336-31 B.C.), and the Roman Period (31 B.C.-300 A.D.) (Finley, 1963:17). During the epoch of Archaic Greece (from 800 B.C. to 500 B.C.), the urban pattern of classical civilization firmly established and the multi-state system of Greece developed. The Archaic and the Classical period presents us a regional anarchical system until the establishment of the Athenian Empire (approximately in 440s B.C.). Nevertheless, compared to the anarchical period, the hierarchical period was short, for fifty years or so. Afterwards, the Macedonian and the Roman invasion of Greece followed. In this context, the analysis of the Archaic and Classical periods serves to compare and contrast an anarchical structure with the hierarchical ones that were dealt in Chapter one and three. The main question of the present chapter is why an anarchical structure prevailed over the Greek city-state system (The Hellas)³ in an era, marked by hierarchical structures. Initially, the political structure of the anarchic system shall be considered.

³ 'Hellas' will be used interchangeably with Greek city-states since it comprised all Greek cities and their culture. (Watson, 1992:48; Walbank, 2002:241).

The Political Structure of the Multi-State System of Ancient Greece

The Archaic period (8th-6th centuries) is perhaps the most important period in Greek history that introduced fundamental innovations. The city-state or polis was the main form of political organization throughout the Greek world from the eight century to the late fourth century B.C. The Greek word *polis* or *poleis* in its classical sense meant a self-governing state (Finley, 1963:45). The physical base, a sense of community and the notion of independence were crucial for the polis (Forrest, 1991:14). It was occupying a defined area and a dependent territory. Most of them were comprised of a group of towns or a small city surrounded by small areas of agricultural territory. The city was the center for religion, politics and administration and it was usually fortified, always consisted of an agora, a place for assembly, a seat of justice and of government.

Another important criterion for *polis* was the size of the population because the *polis* was people acting in concert (Finley, 1963:47). “The Greeks did not say that Athens went to war with Sparta: they said that the Athenians, meaning the corporation of armed proprietors, went to war with the Spartans” (Watson, 1992:50). Therefore, they must be able to assemble and deal with problems face to face, which was one of the necessary conditions of self-government. Furthermore, the polis must be self-sufficient as much as the nature permits. Hence, it must not be so small that it lacked the manpower to carry on the various activities of a civilized existence, such as defense.

As a community the city-state consisted of citizens (adult males), citizens without political rights (women and children), and non-citizens (resident foreigners and slaves). The

polis was like a limited corporation of citizens who were hereditary armed proprietors of the corporation (Watson, 1992:49). Therefore, one needs to be descended from citizens, have to own some property and have also to bear arms, which were all together difficult to achieve. Hence, the polis was an exclusive community and the citizenship was restricted to a small minority among the majority of non-citizens, slaves and women.

Finally, *polis* was a self-governing body so that freedom was very important for the citizens. The freedom was not equated with anarchy but with an ordered existence within a community, which was governed by an established code respected by all (Finley, 1963:50). The people were living under a defined or definable constitution, independent of outside authority to an extent that citizens feel that they are independent. “The commitment of the Greeks to independence is legendary” (Watson, 1992:49). Each city-state should manage its own affairs and resented any kind of overlordship or hegemony by another. During the Archaic period, the Greeks several times fought for this freedom, first against the nobility and later against the tyrants. “The fact that the community was the sole source of law was a guarantee of freedom” (Finley, 1963:50). Even though in later periods, some part of the city-state could be shed involuntarily, by acceptance of tribute paying to a stronger power or voluntarily by joining an alliance or a federation, there was always a sense of autonomy (Forrest, 1991:14). The power of the polis was total, it was the source of all rights and obligations, and its authority reached into every sphere of human behavior. “The polis was inevitable” and “The law is king” (Finley, 1963:50).

The system of political administration of city-states evolved from hereditary kingships to tribal aristocracies, then tyrannies, and afterwards to democracies or oligarchies. Initially, the central institutions in city-states consisted of a king, a council and an assembly. From the eighth century onwards, the local kingships were overthrown by tribal aristocracies who had formed the king's Council and Court. Anderson argues that the Greek city-states were founded and developed by these tribal aristocracies (1974:29). In this period, the city-states were based on the privileged rule of hereditary nobility over the rest of the population, which was exercised through the government of an aristocratic council. The magistrates were the executive organs of the Council. The authority was based on religious and social tradition and also economic and military strength. The nobles had the best land and only they could afford to fight, so that mass population could participate neither in the wars nor in the Council, and all the important offices were controlled by nobles. Nevertheless, the aristocratic government was based upon the consent of the citizen community and the Assembly of citizens was not suppressed. It could voice its opinion on major issues such as foreign policy, colonial policy, land tenure, etc.

Later on from the mid-seventh century to the sixth century, these aristocratic forms of rule were transformed either into oligarchies or replaced with tyrants. The main problem stemmed from the extreme concentration of economic and political power in the hands of aristocracy (Hammond, 1986:144) and the inability of aristocracy to adapt themselves to new conditions of life such as the transformation of the Hellenic economy (Bengtson, 1988:62). Whereas, some states modified their institutions peacefully and transformed into an oligarchy

or democracy, some of them could not solve these problems and a single individual, the tyrant, seized power (Anderson, 1974:30; Hammond, 1986:145, 150).

The tyrannies were important because the decline of tyrannies gave way to oligarchic or democratic forms of government soon after and through the end of the sixth century and in this period the military and economic foundations of Greek classical civilizations were firmly developed. The significant shifts in the military organization of the cities also promoted the establishment of oligarchic or democratic administrations (Bengtson, 1988:62). Armies began to be composed of hoplites, which were heavily armed medium farmer class citizen-infantry. These soldiers formed the basis of later Greek democracy and oligarchies, because the decision to wage wars began to be made by the mass of hoplites. In this context, the tyrannies' agrarian revolution and military innovations prepared the Hellenic polis of the fifth century. As a result, more people began to participate in political life.

When the city-states took their ultimate forms of organization in the classical period, the administrative structure was based on the Council and the Assembly. A smaller Council proposed a public decision to a larger Assembly that voted on them without rights of initiative. The relative degree of democracy or oligarchy within each polis was determined by the variations in the composition of the Council and Assembly and by the election of magistrates of the State who performed the administrative duties. Besides, the Council, the Assembly and the magistrates, there were also state officials who performed the daily administrative duties.

The colonization movement, which began towards the middle of the eighth century to middle of the sixth century, played a vital role for the spread of polis. The colonies of several city-states spread from the Greek heartland to the coasts of the Aegean, Black Sea, North Africa (Egypt, Morocco), Italy, Sicily, Gaul and Spain. The colonization was a highly organized movement by the mother cities and we see that institutions of mother cities were reproduced in these cities from the beginning of the colonization (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:50). The colonies adopted the religious and political institutions of their mother city such as constitution, calendar, dialect, alphabet, and etc. However, each colony from the outset, and by intention, was an independent Greek community (Finley, 1963:27, 29). The motivations were various, such as surplus of population, poverty and desperation, ambition, the shortage of land and to farm, to trade, to take a chance, personal reasons (Forrest, 1991:17; Hammond, 1986:121; Haywood, 1971:119; Sealey, 1976:31-2; Van Sickle, 1970:206-7). As a result of this movement, cultural and political forms of organization of city-states spread around and formed the geographic basis of Hellas.

In the classical period, parallel to these developments, the structure of the system became more stratified and rigid (Holsti, 1974:47). Some city-states, such as Athens, Sparta, Acragas, Corinth, Argos and Thebes, increasingly began to dominate the smaller states. Main sources of this change were the rapid growth and extension of the Athenian naval and commercial power and the threat of Persian penetration into the Hellas and Macedon (Holsti, 1974:47). As a response to the external danger, several Greek city-states united under the Hellenic league, which was a military alliance gathered under the leadership of Athens and Sparta. After the Greeks defeated the Persians, the Hellenic League was reorganized by Athens

into the Delian League in 454. In order to deter the further Athenian expansion, the Peloponnesian League was established under the leadership of Sparta. The League developed from the alliances between Sparta and various Peloponnesian states in the course of the second half of the sixth century. The autonomy and independence of the members of these leagues were always a matter of dispute among the League members. During this period the Athenians had to suppress several revolts by coalition of city-states such as the Boetian and the Euboean. The Spartans also had difficulties to gather the commitment of its allies although the sovereignty of members remained unaffected (Bengtson, 1988:80).

Nevertheless, several authors agreed that the Delian League was transformed into the Athenian Empire in 440s or 430s (Freeman, 1999:201; Holsti, 1974:48; Van Sickle, 1970:354-5; Doyle, 1986:55-6). The League was transformed when Athens began to capture cities, coerce the members to confirm the Athenian exactions and send emissaries to supervise the payment of tribute and domestic policies of weak members (Doyle, 1986:55-6). The purpose of the League altered to maintain Athens' economic, cultural and political supremacy. The position of Sparta in the Peloponnesian League was categorized as hegemony, because of the differences in degree of control, coercion and influence in domestic affairs (Doyle, 1986:58-9). Therefore, a diarchic or two-bloc system dominated the Hellas throughout the end of fifth century, which resulted in the Peloponnesian War between two blocs from 460 to the end of the fifth century. In fact, by the time of the Peloponnesian War, the system of Hellas was characterized by formal and informal relations of supremacy and subjugation and hegemonic and imperial ties dominated what to be an independent states-system. Finally, the Hellas fell

under the hegemony of Philip II and later on it was transformed into a single imperial structure by the Alexander the Great, the king of Macedon.

Comparison of Anarchic and Hierarchic Systems

The Generation of Common Goods

Security

“Peace is merely a name; in truth an undeclared war always exists by nature between every Greek city-state”

Plato, *Laws* (Osborne, 2000:82)

Hierarchic type of relations is better to provide security as a common good. The political unification of autonomous units may provide peace for long periods of time as in the case of Rome and China. Throughout the archaic and classical period, although peace was seen as the primary goal of Greek way of life, the Greeks were not quite successful in achieving it. War was a normal instrument of policy for Greeks, which they used fully and frequently (Finley, 1963:56). “They did not particularly seek war...but neither did they go to lengths to avoid it” (Finley, 1963:56). The Greek city-states felt little responsibility towards Hellas and war was considered as a legitimate means if the citizens saw advantage in it. According to Thucydides war was common because “We believe that it is divine, and know for certain that it is universally human, by natural compulsion, to rule whatever one can” (Osborne, 2000:83). “War was always fairly probable; and encounters at sea between the ships of rival corporations, which fell below the level of formal war, were to be expected” (Watson, 1992:50). During the classical period, “It has been estimated that classical Athens was at war two years out of three” (Osborne, 2000:82).

The immediate causes of war were the desire for power and aggrandizement, border incidents, material enrichment through booty, protection of corn supply and transport, the search for outside support for internal strife (Finley, 1963:56-7). All these factors were precipitated by the large number of small independent states. Osborne claims that acquiring a recognized position of leadership was an important goal of city-states so that they wage war in pursuit of leadership as a regional power. Thucydides describes three reasons for waging war for power: honor or respect, profit and fear. However, among these reasons, the most remarkable one was desire for honor and respect. The reason was that much of the hegemony and domination as a regional power lay in the prestige or honor and when city-states feel that they were being treated disrespectful they sometimes did respond with force (Osborne, 2000:83).

Bozeman argues that major reason was the *polis* itself, which was the major impediment against political unification. The Greeks agreed that peace was the essential condition of human existence and the city-state was the most appropriate political institution for the Greek way of life (Bozeman, 1960:77). Nevertheless, they were not successful to sustain peace and the chief reason was the very success of the city-state:

Since the generally accepted function of the polis was to secure a good life for the people in terms of individual development, and since the realization of this aim was deemed to be possible only if a city did not exceed a certain size, peace through political unification was actually inconsistent with the primary purpose of political association as understood by the Greeks (Bozeman, 1960:77-8).

Therefore, Greeks believed that any hope for permanent peace between so many independent states was a wishful thinking.

Nevertheless, although acknowledging the validity of these arguments many authors argue that the Greek city-states were not in a constant state of war or lived in a system of unremitting hostility, of all against all (Watson, 1992:50; Kokaz, 2001:95; Osborne, 2000:82). Osborne claims that although war was common in Hellas, the Greeks did not think of war as the normal state of affairs in relations among them. Kokaz suggests that the depiction of the system of Hellas as a state of war is largely misleading (2001:95).

The Greeks developed certain normative institutions and practices to regulate the pursuit of power and to provide peaceful settlement of disputes. Bozeman claims that because the Greeks believed that peace through political unification was a wishful thinking they developed three different methods to the problem of peace and security: (a) they tried to mitigate the destructiveness of war once it had broken out. (b) they tried to prevent the outbreak of major wars by maintaining a balance of power between states (in the form of alliances, leagues and confederations); and (c) they tried to settle disputes peacefully wherever possible (arbitration). Finley suggests that, since war was considered as a means not an end, the Greeks relied also on peaceful alternatives and sometimes they were successful (1963:58). One of them was alliance, the strongest force of a few great city-states for peace. Alliances were successful because they provided great auxiliary manpower, which was vital at that period.

Reus-Smit argues that there was extensive cooperation among city-states through extraterritorial institutions and the most important was the institution of third-party arbitration from the sixth century to the first century B.C. (1999:41). Obviously, sometimes these institutions were successful sometimes not. He attributes this particular way of practice to the

constitutional structure of the ancient Greek society of states and a distinctive conception of the moral purpose of the state and norm of procedural justice (Reus-Smit, 1999:41). The states used arbitration to solve a wide range of cooperation problems, such as the treatment of foreigners, regulation of borders, etc. It was also central to other instruments of interstate cooperation such as concluding bilateral treaties. Although, it was not underpinned by a body of codified law like today's system, it was the predominant fundamental institution of cooperation and an instrument of coexistence among Hellas (Reus-Smit, 1999:45).

In this context, it is obvious that the Greeks did not aim to achieve peace through political unification because of their conception of primary purpose of political association and a distinctive concept of moral purpose of the state. However, they attempted to develop other methods for peaceful settlements of disputes among the city-states such as rules governing conduct of warfare, balance of power through alliances, and arbitration. It is difficult to claim that the Greeks were in a constant state of war because these mechanisms were sometimes successful and there are certain periods that the Greek cities did not fight with each other severely such as the sixth century (Starr, 1991:211-2). However, compared to a truly hierarchic structure, the probability of war among the Greek city-states appears to be higher than the probability of war among units under a truly hierarchic structure.

Economic Prosperity

In general, the economic prosperity of Hellas improved during the Archaic and Classical period. In fact, the economy expanded slowly during the archaic period but the massive changes in the economic and social structure of the Hellas during this period gave way

to a new framework and the greater economic boom of the Classical one (Starr, 1982:417). The economy of Hellas was based on agriculture and the ideal of self-sufficiency. There was very little trade between the Greeks and other people before colonization began (Cook, 1946:83, 87). The Greeks in the eighth and seventh centuries needed few imports and therefore little trade. There was small-scale local production and imports were required most of the city-states (Osborne, 2000:40). The resources of most city-states were limited and roads were primitive. In addition, the ideal of the *polis* was self-sufficiency so that there was no powerful urban bourgeoisie and assemblies and upper classes were rurally based. Moreover, the political machinery of the polis was too limited to guarantee order and justice beyond its local market (Starr, 1982:435).

Nevertheless, during the Archaic period, thanks to more skilful exploitation of native resources and a geographical position between the developed Near East and the barbarian farther shores of the Mediterranean, the population of Greece covered its needs, expanded its numbers to some degree and even produced a modest surplus (Starr, 1982:435). These developments resulted in the rise of cities, the appearance of coinage, the wave of colonization and the growth of trade by the sixth century, which brought about a remarkable period of economic prosperity in the classical age. There were fundamental causes of this economic development (Starr, 1982:419).

First of all, the Greeks acquired great benefits by providing raw materials to the more advanced eastern centers. Second, the growth of population and the colonization movement itself promoted the economic growth because the Greek trade was due to need and large-scale

trade could not arise until city-states began to maintain populations, which could not be supplied locally, and until urbanization reached certain levels (Starr, 1982:420; Cook, 1946:86). The increase in population stimulated a need for improvements in techniques, skills and interest. Moreover, the surplus population led to a rise in urban population that dealt with manufacturing (Mann, 1986:207).

Third, colonization was another encouraging factor. Better ships were built and were used in greater numbers in this period so that the Greeks gained access to many sources of raw materials (Starr, 1991:220-1). The archaic age witnessed a substantial development of manufacture and commerce between mother cities and colonies (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:54). The prerequisite of large-scale trade was a regular surplus of production in colonies so that trade was a result of colonization (Cook, 1946:86). Finally, desire of upper classes for foreign goods, their search for disposable wealth and new routes for booty was crucial for the growth of trade (Mann, 1986:207; Starr, 1982:421).

All states in this period acquired revenues through market and harbor dues, which were a major source of actual cash revenues for public treasuries. The polis partially enabled this process, sometimes unintentionally, by standardization of weights and measures, issue of coinage, better water supplies and harbor works, and easier transportation (Starr, 1982:433). For instance, Corinth, which was located suitably to control land and sea trade became prosperous through raising taxes on commercial activity. Through the end of the colonization period the Greek world exhibited an unparalleled prosperity (Starr, 1991:313). Hammond urges that prosperity based on commerce and spread to Hellas, colonies and even to areas such as the

Mediterranean coast of Spain, Sicily, the Adriatic Sea, the Balkans, and south Russia (Hammond, 1986:521-2).

In this context, it could be argued that the economic prosperity increased in the archaic and the classical period. However, the question is whether Hellas might have been more prosperous if it was organized hierarchically. For instance, Starr believes that making economic activity was very difficult in Hellas because it was split into a host of fiercely autarchical states, which had very little policy of public finance. Apart from tolls, fines and fees major expenses were funded by rich in the forms of confiscation or inflation of the currency. Within these systems the surplus of economic production over basic human needs was not great and society was commonly divided into a relatively small rich class and a large group of the poor (Starr, 1991:315). Furthermore, he mentions that the establishment of the Athenian Empire enabled a more feasible economic interaction among the city-states. Starr says that “In these respects the unification of much of the Aegean under Athenian rule eased commercial interchanges, and the Athenian “owls” were famous as a stable coinage” (Starr, 1991:315).

Furthermore, the lack of security was another impediment in further growth of trade and prosperity. Hammond notes that prosperity did not bring peace to the fourth century. It simply enabled states to recover quickly and wage another war. The wars were almost continuous from 431 to 351, between and within the city-states. The result for Hellas was the loss of strength. Another hindrance was the lack of public goods such as transportation among the city-states. The only feasible transportation was by the sea. Therefore, we could not

encounter such transportation system such as the roads of the Roman Empire or Grand Canal of the Chinese Empire. The insecurity of sea-borne commerce discouraged the growth of commerce. Starr suggests “Only a small part of even if the urban population ever cared to commit itself to maritime dangers... and the main source of demand was internal” (1982:428) The fierce sense of independence of each polis, however, and the costs of land transport led to the rise of many small economic centers along the Aegean coasts (Starr, 1982:428). In this context, although the economic prosperity of Hellas improved during the archaic and classical periods, compared to Rome and China, there were more serious impediments in Hellas due to lack of a central organization that might facilitate the economic interaction of all city-states.

The Decline in Transaction Costs

Transaction costs are an important factor that influences the binding arrangement among autonomous actors. As the level of transactions costs increase states are more likely to enter into binding arrangements to reduce them. By reducing transaction costs hierarchic organizations facilitate interactions among individual units. In respect to Hellas, there are certain elements that reduced the transaction costs among city-states. Nevertheless, due to the importance given to the independence and autonomy of the city-states, these factors were mostly limited to the boundaries of individual city-states. Unlike Rome or China, the standardization of language, administrative and legal procedures, coinage or weights and measures did not happen in all the Greek city-states. Although, there are remarkable achievements that generated common practices in inter-city-state relations, these cannot create any incentives toward a centralization of authority.

The Standardization of Written Language

The written language was initially introduced to Greeks in about 800 B.C. The Semitic peoples of Syria, Palestine and near-by countries had evolved a true alphabet and as a result of commercial contacts between the Phoenicians and the Asiatic Ionians, the Greeks adopted this system. Later on this system became widespread in the remainder of Hellas before 700 B.C. (Van Sickle, 1974:269). However, the Phoenician alphabet changed so radically that it became in a true sense the alphabet of Greeks.

Mann suggests that after 700 B.C. an extensive literacy developed in Hellas and it was diffused to all average citizens (Mann, 1986:206). In cities like Athens reading, writing and arithmetic seems to be common attainments among the free population (Finley, 1963:89). The reasons of diffusion of literacy were, on the one hand the Phoenicians trade routes and on the other hand democracy (Mann, 1986:206). Thanks to the Phoenician trade routes, literacy spread to southern Asia Minor colonies and then to the largest traders and the wealthy in each state. In addition, the democratic structure and institutions of the polis required widespread literacy because a restricted literacy among oligarchic elite would contradict with the ideals of democracy.

Obviously, there was a diversity of dialects and customs in the new Greece, which was reflected in the local variations that appeared in the alphabet (Van Sickle, 1974:270). There were two main groups, the eastern and the western. The former included the Ionian and Athenian alphabets, from which today's Greek alphabet derived from. Nevertheless, despite the differences in dialects and changes in language, many authors claim that Greeks had a common

language and they view it as a symbol of Greek cultural unity. Rollo suggests that the Greeks were a community of language in spite of the many dialects in Early Greek (1937:135). Namely, language was a real tie between members of different states, which could be seen on the Greek view of barbarians. Originally, the word *barbaroi* was used to identify people speaking a language unintelligible to Greek ears (Rollo, 1937:136). The Greeks possessed a common identity and Hellas became their term for this unity. They believed that they had come from a common ethnic heritage and one of the indicators was the common language. The literacy fixed and reinforced cultural identity and it was the first shared, cross-class, stabilized culture of known history that was shared by citizens and their families. From eighth and seventh centuries then on, they were a single linguistic people although there were dialect differences and rapid changes in languages (Mann, 1986:204).

The Standardization of Administrative Procedures and the Codified Law

An essential element of gradual democratization of the Greek city-states was the codification of law (Bengtson, 1988:63). Greek legislation in seventh and sixth centuries was a genuine innovation of Hellenes. The first written code was seen in the Italian-Greek city of Locri in 660s. Afterwards, Thebes, Corinth, Athens, and many other states of continental Greece and the Aegean area codified their laws before the end of the seventh century. The laws basically regulated administration, crimes and penalties, funerals, education, property, debts, and murder.

The Greeks believed that the most efficient way of exerting authority through the law was to provide an all-embracing code. One of the outstanding examples of codification of law

was realized by Solon, the magistrate of Athens. Under the authority of Solon, the Athenians inscribed a comprehensive law on wooden tables. It was truly comprehensive in that it dealt with the laws of the state, high treason, criminal law, family relations, and commercial activity (Freeman, 1999:104). However, these laws were not absolute, the Athenians believed that laws were to serve a community and they could be changed as a community's needs changed (Freeman, 1999:104). This understanding of codification of law later on laid the foundation for European law and promoted the development of western law and legal thinking.

Nevertheless, when we consider the entire Hellas, there is a debate over whether the Greeks had a notion of international law that governs relations between them. Wight suggests that the Hellenic system had no notion of international law because the Greeks did not view polis as possessing rights and being subject to obligations (1977:52). This was because the polis was developed as the final term of human organization in an early period and also because of lack of inheritance of legal codes, legal thinking or legal practice. The Greek city-states had procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes but these provisions were not examples of arbitration, rather they were just conciliation (Wight, 1977:52). The conciliations were based on principles of equity rather than law; the decisions were moral rather than legal; and aimed to establish friendship rather than technically satisfactory settlements. The only body of international law was the Rhodian maritime law, which was developed in Hellenistic times. Therefore, Wight concludes that there is not a body of uniform legal principles that regulate the relations between city-states.

On the contrary, Kokaz urges that “The *History* is full of observations that prove otherwise, such as the tremendous importance accorded to international treaties, the observance certain rules of warfare for the most part, and the complex judicial system through which the Athenians governed their empire, to give just a few examples” (Kokaz, 2001:95). She believes that Wight’s argument is based on the idea that international law is equated with the formally enacted rules. Ober and Kokaz emphasize the role of informal and unwritten conventions governing inter-state conflict deriving from common practice (Kokaz, 2001:96; Ober, 1996:56). Ober also suggests that most of the informal rules were followed most of the time in intra-Greek warfare of about 750 to 450 BC, although he admits that there is lack of evidence (Ober, 1996:56). Nevertheless, even though there were informal rules that governed the inter-state relations of warfare, apparently these rules were confined to the sphere of war and there is uncertainty about the validity of the time frame.

Finally, it was clear that almost all Greek city-states had a tradition of codification of law. However, these rules vary according to individual city-states so that the codification of administrative procedures and law did not serve the purpose of lowering the transaction costs between the city-states. Furthermore, the existence of informal rules and unwritten conventions and the procedure of third party arbitrations could not definitely play the role of facilitating the transaction costs because they aimed to resolve conflicts rather than enabling and encouraging easy transactions such as the Roman Law or Chinese administrative procedures.

The Standardization of Coinage and Weights and Measures

The use of precious metals as a medium of exchange was not new when it was introduced in Hellas. Through the end of eighth century or, some authors, say in 650s, the kings of Lydia introduced a coinage as a device to facilitate trade. From Lydia the new practice spread to Ionia, where the city-states began to mint gold and silver coins (Hammond, 1986:132). Coinage had never existed before 700 B.C. but in the seventh and sixth centuries it became an important force in the economic progress of Hellas. Before the end of the sixth century nearly all-important Greek states had their own mints (Van Sickle, 1974:287).

There is no clear agreement on whether the primary motivation of use of coinage was economic or political in Hellas. The invention and spread of coinage in archaic Greece might be understood in the framework of the development of social relations and the definition of values (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:56). The development of civic consciousness is very important because coinage was first and foremost a civic emblem for Greek city-states (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:57). “To strike coins with the badge of the city was to proclaim one’s political independence” (1977:57). All states had their unique coins e.g. turtle of Aegina, Pegasus of Corinth, owl of Athens. In this respect, Athens’ attempt to ban all silver coinages of her allies and to replace with her own could be understood as an indication of demonstration of Athens power. Therefore, the spread of coinage was related with the phenomenon of the development of the cities and civic consciousness (1977:58).

Nevertheless, Hammond claims that the primary function of the coinage was to accelerate the movement of commercial exchange and to enrich the city-states by the

accumulation of mobile capital. It also promoted the process of internal retail and introduced a novel form of property in the individual polis. Furthermore, when cities became geographical centers of economic life coinage emerged as a tangible economic force because there was a need of a standard measure and medium of value (Starr, 1982:430). Starr urges that the coins were used for public objectives, for building navies, paying the mercenaries of tyrants, for fines and tolls on commercial activity, for expenses in the construction of temples, and it was used to demonstrate the growing pride and power of the minting polis. Coinage was not itself a major economic force until well after 600, but it was invented when society had grown sufficiently mobile for the concept of the coinage to take hold Greek economic life.

Greek coinage was developed initially at the main centers of exchange by city-states, which drew their revenues from commerce. There were three groups (Hammond, 1986:134): (a) Ionian, led by Miletus and Ephesus, (b) Aeginetan, including Aegina and her financial allies; (c) Corinthian, led by Corinth and Samos and comprising later Athens and Euboea. After the use of coinage became widespread, secondary centers began to mint coins and two systems of coinage dominated continental Greece (Van Sickle, 1974:219). The Aeginetan system, which was the standard currency in most of the Dorian states, in Peloponnese, southern and southeastern Aegean including Crete and Egypt and the other was the system of Chalcis of Euboea, or the Corinthian system, which dominated the West Acarnania, Ambracia, south and west Italy, Sicily, and Gaul and Spain. This system became more popular when it was adopted by Athens. Other states had their own coins that were acceptable only within their own domains. However, Hammond claims, there was no uniformity in coinage in Hellas, and from the beginning, different standards and types of coinage were in competition (1986:134). There

was large number of issuing states, each autonomous, each competitive and each partially dependent for income on the profitable exchange of their coins due to different amount of silver and weight of coins (Sutherland, 1940:66). It is only possible to identify an international currency at the end of the fifth century (Van Sickle, 1974:219). Furthermore, the Greeks used the old Oriental system of weights and measures differently. The units of value derived from this system with smaller sub-divisions.

The Commitment of the Members and the Legitimacy of the System

The ability to provide commitment of members is crucial for a political form of organization to exist for a long period of time. The commitment to the polis is vitally important to understand why an anarchic structure predominates in Hellas, because it might clearly impede any incentives or attempts to unite all the Hellenes and built-up a viable empire or a single authority. The main political form of Hellas, the *polis*, unlike its contemporary forms of organizations was very successful in sustaining not only the commitment of elites but also the loyalty and active participation of all male adults. The consideration of these reasons will be very helpful to compare and contrast the commitments of Romans, Chinese and Hellenes to different forms of organization.

The Greeks were strongly committed to their polis and loyal to these small independent units. There are various arguments about the reasons of this commitment. First of all, geographical factors contributed to the development of this political organization and commitment. One of the causes of development of polis was the physical fragmentation of Greece (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:50; Finley, 1963:21). Mountains and small plains and valleys divided much of terrain so that small communities were isolated from each other and

transportation and communication were very difficult and sometimes impossible. Therefore, settlers generally concentrated in inland valleys and coastal plains. Thus the terrain favored the development of a large number of independent communities or city-states rather than a single authority (Sealey, 1976:10).

Second, the moral basis of the polis was a crucial factor that deeply influenced the political life of Greek people. Bozeman argues that the Greeks had a unique understanding of international affairs that conceived it as essentially human affairs (1960:70). The moral values and philosophical assumptions of Greeks led them to form a community life based on the form of *polis*. The Greeks believed that freedom is necessary for the evolution of reason, achieving the true self and excellent man, so that freedom is the chief value and interest in human life. Therefore, the community life should take a form that would permit all men to pursue the goals of life disclosed by reason and all men could develop potentialities for excellence (Bozeman, 1960:71). The realization of this aim was deemed to be possible only if a city did not exceed a certain size. Hence, the political unification of all Greeks is incompatible with the ultimate aim of a good life. In addition, historically, Mesopotamian countries had a political organization based on city-states, which influenced the Greek system.

Similarly, Holsti suggests that the polis for the Greeks meant more than a political institution because it was the ideal social organization for liberating man from his natural state, and for providing justice, promoting fellowship and harmony and training personal character (Holsti, 1974:46). There was no incentive among Greeks to unite all the Hellenic people and built-up a viable empire because Greeks emphasized the virtue of limited political

organizations (Holsti, 1974:46). Small political organizations allow for the assembly of all free citizens to help make political decisions and small enough for government and administration never to impose impersonal influences over the lives of citizens. Therefore, state and society were indistinguishable concepts among the Greeks.

Reus-Smit explains the reason d'être of the polis on the basis of Aristotelian moral philosophy. The polis was the preeminent form of human organization for Greeks because they believed that quest for justice is a political activity, men are political beings and therefore the rational pursuit of justice was possible only within the *polis*.

Its raison d'être was not, first and foremost, to provide physical security or to facilitate economic exchange, but "to engender a certain character in the citizens and to make them good and disposed to perform noble actions."⁴ The moral purpose of the ancient Greek city-state thus lay in the cultivation of *bios politicos*, a form of communal life characterized by the rational pursuit of justice through action and speech (Reus-Smit, 1999:46).

This conception of the moral purpose of the state entailed a discursive norm of procedural justice that functioned through a process of public moral debate and deliberation. The belief that public moral discourse was the appropriate way to decide questions of right and wrong shaped political and legal practices across the Hellas. Even oligarchic states, such as Sparta, relied on discursive norm of procedural justice. Thus, eventually the moral purpose of the state requires the participation and commitment of all citizens and the form of political organization of the city-state.

⁴ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I.9, 23.

Kokaz, referring to the Aristotelian philosophy, emphasizes that state comes into existence for the sake of good life and the good life invokes the practice of excellence in the lives of individuals as well as political communities. “Thus, not only the power and unity of the *polis*, but also the very goal of political independence, is irrevocably tied to the practice of excellence” (Kokaz, 2001:101). Therefore, the most suitable institutions to secure the internal and external unity of the polis are the ones that promote the good life and the practice of excellence. The institutions that are based on divine law, human law, written and unwritten, goodwill, friendship and trust when combined with practical wisdom and moderation might generate political unity, power and the practice of excellence.

Third, in addition to the geographical factors and the moral basis of the state, the development of citizenship and notion of community was very important (Austin and Vidal-Naquet, 1977:54). The concept of citizenship was crucial to the identity and functioning of a Greek polis. The Greeks conceived town and country (city center and rural areas) as a single unit (Finley, 1963:23). The whole was bound by not only economics or use of force but also by psychologically, by a feeling among the members of the community of a unity underpinned by common cult and tradition. The idea of Athens as a political unit was expressed as Athenians. Therefore, the Greeks thought of themselves not only as Hellenes against the Barbarians but also as members of groups and sub-groups within Hellas (Finley, 1963:23). The citizens of a polis undertook mutual responsibility for the administration of its city’s affairs, its defense and a relationship with its gods. In return, they shared its wealth and success (Freeman, 1999:90). Hence, the concept of citizen stood for a shared ownership of a common concern and ownership of land. Citizenship was both a legal status and implied active involvement in the

city's affairs. The Greeks believed that a human being could only reach his fullest potential as a citizen sharing the government of a polis. In this sense, it had a psychological and a legal meaning. Furthermore, the development of citizenship and community consciousness also brought about antithetical notions such as non-citizens and slaves.

The emergence of hoplite warfare and phalanx was an important factor that promoted the emergence of community consciousness and commitment to the *polis*. The defense force of the polis was the phalanx, which developed from 725 to 675 (Freeman, 1999:91). Phalanx was “a tightly packed body in which lines of men standing shoulder to shoulder, eight or more deep, fought as a single coordinated force” (Freeman, 1999:91). The soldier in the phalanx had a special armor called hoplon that gave the name of hoplite warfare. Due to its effectiveness the form of hoplite warfare became standardized across the Greek world and spread almost all prosperous states as a defense force. The most important implication of this type of warfare was that to defend their territory, fighters had to ignore their differences and work together. “They had to create a community spirit and there was no other way than through consolidating their loyalty to a city” (Freeman, 1999:93). Therefore, hoplite warfare served to define city identity and it did not threaten to destroy that identity by its demands on resources. The need to unite in defense served to create a sense of community among citizens (Freeman, 1999:94). With this transformation the duty of defense passed from aristocratic heroes to the hoplite. All citizens participate after a communal sacrifice and are eligible for equal shares. Therefore, the development of community consciousness was directly influenced by the hoplite reform.

In sum, there was no mechanism to guarantee security as a common good in the anarchic Greek system so that war was endemic. Furthermore, peace through political unification was incompatible with the primary goal of political association. Although, the Greeks experienced substantial economic development the anarchic brought about several factors that impede further economic growth such as different tolls, fines, fees and currency, lack of public finance policy, lack of security and lack of public transportation. In addition, the standardization of language, administrative, legal procedures, coinage and weights and measures which brought about decline in transaction costs was limited to the boundaries of individual states. Finally, several factors encouraged the Greeks commitment to the polis and prevented political unification such as geography, morality and method of warfare. The belief in the moral purpose of the state which also underpinned the legitimacy of the system was the major factor that promoted the persistence of the anarchic system.

CONCLUSION

The general topic of this study is change in the international system. Particularly, the study focuses on change in the structure of the international system. Several forms of political organization such as city-states, empires, city-leagues, nation-states in certain periods of history coexisted, disappeared and reappeared again in different forms up until the late nineteenth century. All of these political units shaped different forms of structures of the international system. One of the ways of understanding change is to look at persistence of these types of structures. Hierarchy is one of these forms and several authors emphasized the persistence of hierarchic structures during the Ancient and Classical eras in world history (3000 B.C. to 1500 A.D.). Anarchic structures were not stable and several times transformed into hierarchic structures during these periods. In this context, the major research question of this study is why hierarchic structures prevailed during the Ancient and Classical eras. For this purpose four case studies have been compared: the Roman Empire (the Pax Romana period 1st century B.C.-3rd century A.D.), the Chinese Empire (the T'ang Dynasty 618-907 A.D.), the multi-state system of ancient Greece (8th-4th century B.C.) and the multi-state system of ancient China (The Spring and Autumn and the Warring States Period 722-221 B.C.). The Empires were studied to examine hierarchic structures and the multi state-systems were considered as anarchic structures.

The transformation of anarchy to hierarchy might be analyzed in three stages: the emergence, the persistence and the collapse of hierarchic structures. I believe that the reasons why a system shifted to a hierarchic structure and why it remains as such may be different because after the first stage certain dynamics emerge and create incentives to the actors of the

system (both center and parts) to sustain the structure. Nevertheless, the major focus of the study is limited to the first and the second stages.

The analysis of the Roman and the Chinese Empire demonstrates that the major reason for the transformation from hierarchy to anarchy was the unification of the system through conquest. Both Romans and the Chinese believed the idea that domination of all enemies will lead to peace and their main foreign policy was based on this vision. For this purpose they waged continuous wars. Obviously, the conquests were encouraged by other several factors. The Romans and the state of Qin benefited from several advantages such as geopolitical position, rich natural resources, strong aristocratic warrior traditions and values, glory, booty, the size of their territory, the impact of outside pressure and most significantly the military capabilities and inability of their neighbors to prevent their domination.

After the establishment of the hierarchic structure, several dynamics emerge in the system. These dynamics promoted the persistence of the structure by generating incentives for both the center and the provinces. Certain dynamics of the hierarchic systems generate common goods such as security, economic prosperity and effective mobilization of resources and they encourage the provinces to remain part of the structure. Both the Roman Empire and the T'ang dynasty were able to provide enduring peace and economic growth during the periods when their structures were truly hierarchic. The military capabilities and military strategy, the national fidelity of people, the strength of balanced government, the political stability, the social and cultural forces of honor and religion, the foreign policy behavior of neighbors and the habituation to war were some of the factors that contributed to the endurance

of peace in Rome and China. Furthermore, control of immense material resources, the growth in agricultural production, effective mining, development of trade by land and sea, development of crafts and manufacture, effective usage of transportation and communication systems and effective administrative policies were some factors that resulted in economic growth in both of the systems. It should be emphasized that the Empires enabled all parts of the system to benefit from the economic growth so that they were attracted to the system.

On the contrary the analysis of the multi-state systems of Greece and China demonstrates that anarchic systems were less likely to generate common goods. In both of these systems insecurity prevailed and there was a great difference in the number of wars compared to hierarchic structures. Various reasons such as power and aggrandizement, material enrichment, border disputes, honor and respect, fear, control of strategic regions, and increase in territory led to conflict among states. Furthermore, even though economic growth can be identified within the systems, there were clear-cut impediments against further increase in the economic prosperity. Namely, if these systems were hierarchic structures it is more likely that further economic growth could be achieved. The impediments stemmed from the anarchic organization of the states such as the lack of security especially in sea-borne trade, numerous medium of exchanges and methods, difficulties in transportation, lack of standardized economic regulations, lack of legal security and property.

The generation of common goods is also directly related to the decline in transaction costs. Standardized and uniform regulations, procedures and implementations are easier to realize in hierarchic structures and if they can be implemented effectively they substantially

reduce the transaction costs in various spheres of life. The analysis of Rome and the T'ang dynasty demonstrates that there were significant reductions in transaction costs in the fields of security, economy, transportation and law. Especially the standardization of administrative law and procedures, the standardization of coinage, and weights and measures greatly facilitated all types of interactions in political and economical life of Romans and Chinese. Furthermore, the Empires also implemented successful administrative policies to facilitate transportation and communication by building roads, canals and protecting sea routes. In this sense, all members of the Empires benefited from this process and becoming a part of this structure turned out to be an advantage compared to anarchic structures.

In the case of multi-state systems of Greece and China, due to the importance to the independence and autonomy of the small states, the reductions in transaction costs were limited within the boundaries of individual states. Due to lack of standardization of laws, procedures and implementation of policies in the entire system, there were substantial difficulties in several types of transactions. For instance, although there was a reduction in transaction costs among the Greek cities due to standardization in language and alphabets, codification of law and administrative procedures, these developments were strictly limited to the boundaries of individual city-states. Likewise, the Chinese states standardized their administrative procedures by the replacement of older internal rules by a systematic code of laws and they realized uniformity in medium of exchanges and weights and measures internally but at the systemic level there was no uniformity in either of these spheres.

Finally, the commitment of the members and the legitimacy of the system is a crucial factor that determines the persistence of the hierarchic structures. The commitment of the members can be provided through several means. The Roman Empire was very successful in maintaining the commitment through the use of force, the gradual development of ideological, political and cultural integration among all provincial elites (the Romanization of the provincial elites), the extension of citizenship, the diffusion of Senate membership and the Rome's process of interaction between center and periphery. Similarly, the T'ang dynasty was also able to provide elite commitment through political, cultural and ideological integration, by using ideological, coercive and remunerative measures, and through the legitimacy of the concept of Sino-centrism. Easier integration to the system and high mobility among elites were crucial factors that increase commitment of the members. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the system turned out to be an important element that determines the persistence of hierarchic structures which could be observed more clearly in the case of anarchic structures.

The commitment and loyalty to the individual states and the legitimacy of the system as a whole contributed to the persistence of the anarchic structures. The Greek poleis and the Chinese states were very successful in maintaining the commitment, loyalty and active participation of its members. The geographical fragmentation and isolation, the moral basis, the moral values and philosophical assumptions, the development of citizenship, and the methods of warfare played the major role in development of such commitment.

Finally, I agree with the idea that whereas the persistence of hierarchic systems depends on the existence of several factors, only one factor can promote the persistence of anarchic

structures. In this sense, the Greeks' belief in the moral purpose of the polis was the primary factor that brought about the persistence of the anarchic system. Greeks believed that individuals could only develop themselves if they can actively participate in the political life and this can only be realized if the political organization of a city does not exceed its boundaries. Therefore, political unification of the city-states was inconsistent with the Greeks' primary purpose of the political association and led to the persistence of the anarchic structure.

In the case of multi-state system of China, the major factor that brought about the anarchic system was the dissolution of the feudal system of Zhou dynasty. However, the two periods were marked by consolidation and absorption of weak states by the strong. Although the system remained anarchic there was a clear-cut tendency towards the political unification of the system and this tendency stemmed from the belief in moral purpose of the state. The state of Qin organized the state for war and achieving peace through universal conquest. Its policy was based on the Legalist doctrines and the belief in Mandate of Heaven. These doctrines suggest that the order can only be sustained if an emperor had the mandate of Heaven and this was only possible through the elimination of all enemies. On the basis of these policies the state of Qin realized the unification of the ancient Chinese system in 221 B.C. In this sense, the incompatibility of the moral purpose of the state and the political organization of the system created a desire to transform the system.

Some of these arguments have been made by several authors. However, the comparative historical analysis enabled us to test these arguments empirically. It was argued that hierarchic structures produce common goods such as security and economic prosperity but

this has never been tested in terms of the Empires in the Ancient and Classical eras. Furthermore, as Hendrik Spruyt clearly demonstrates, the decline in transaction costs was vital in the emergence of nation-states against city-states and city-leagues. However, this study reveals that it is possible to reduce the transaction costs within the Empires as well. The reduction in transaction costs can be realized in any type of hierarchic structure. In addition, the study demonstrates the importance of the commitment of the members and the legitimacy of a system. The shift in the commitment of the member might directly alter the form of political organization and the structure of the system. The study also emphasizes the role of belief in the moral purpose of the state in the formation of structures. The beliefs in the moral purpose of the state have been emphasized by several authors, however, the multi state-systems of Greece and China presents us useful historical cases to demonstrate their role.

Change is a very complex phenomenon and recent developments demonstrate that change in the structure of the international system will continue to be one of the major issues of international relations. The European integration process and the gradual progress of the European Union are the most remarkable examples of this change. The analysis of the hierarchic and anarchic structures in the Ancient and Classical eras shows that similar factors can be identified in different periods of history. These factors have an important role in stimulating change in the international system. In this sense, further studies on change and persistence of different forms of political organizations in different historical contexts will definitely be helpful to understand the complex phenomenon of change.

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