(de)militarized zone:
faction space as borderline landscape

by
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I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Tension has been the most significant and constant factor in the relationship between North and South Korea over the past sixty years. The differences in the political systems and the economic disparity between the two countries have resulted in what was once one nation moving in two radically divergent directions. These differences have led to a state of imbalance and resulted in constant political instability that has been playing out within the boundaries of the two countries, explicitly in no-man’s land, the demilitarized zone (DMZ).
As one of the world’s most heavily militarized border-line, the DMZ embodies a wide range of political and social tensions. Among these is the action-reaction relationship between the Imnam Dam of North Korea and the Peace Dam of South Korea; the Imnam Dam was built as an act of offence to flood Seoul by bombing the dam down, and the Peace Dam was built as an act of defence to prevent overflow of water into Seoul. The historical and present conditions of this relationship maximize the military limitations and the possibilities of greater exchange between the two Koreas in creating a mutually beneficial relationship. In this thesis, this relationship is realized through “faction space”, a specific space situated in a fictional reality that does not reflect on its immediate surroundings, but of its own world, a speculative fictional idea of what it could become. Four different types of borderline conditions are studied to find out how these conditions can be translated into opportunities of creating spaces not only for the military, but also for the public. Each condition focuses on a topic derived from the existing surroundings. The final faction spaces perform as architectural stimuli within the feuding landscape of the two Koreas, striving to relieve or intensify the social and political tension between each other, while offering mutual benefits at the same time. Conditions of these faction spaces may begin to exist in various places around the DMZ, redefining the borderscape. A time may come when the most heavily militarized zone in the world shifts its focus to become a space for reciprocity.
[ acknowledgements ]

My advisor, John McMinn, and my committee members, Maya Przybylski and Lola Sheppard, for their guidance and support. Philip Beesley for his initial guidance through M1 studio.

Hanjoon, for always being there for me as my other half, a friend, and a critic.

Friends who spent time together in 2023— but especially Kristal, for going through the happy and the stressful times of studio life with me.

Thank you.
[ dedication ]

To my God the Father.
To my family and friends.
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01.
Full of unbearable memories and traces of war, 248km of cold wire fence is embedded into the ground exposing the tension between the two countries, North and South Korea. This fence is the physical representation of the DMZ, a demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. Just like the rust on the decaying fences, the political tension between the two Koreas has lasted for the sixty years while being in an armistice state. During the years, many political and economic deals have worked out across the DMZ despite this tension, which sometimes has eased and sometimes heightened. Recently, this tension reached its highest point when the North’s leader Kim Jong Il died in December 2011, resulting a sense of instability not seen since the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994. Over the past year, numerous instances proving this instability have occurred, including the ones where two North Korean soldiers defected to South Korea, only four days apart from each other. According to the South Korean government officials, it is speculated that the reason behind these actions are because of the abolition of the food distribution system in the army.1 The imbalance between the two Koreas is getting steeper and steeper.

1 Bae, Yoon Kyeong. MK News,
This thesis explores the concept of creating a counteraction to the imbalance between the two countries by proposing ways of mutual benefits to both countries, politically, economically, and socially. This is achieved through the ideas of faction space: a fictional reality within the factual circumstances of the present condition of the DMZ. Faction space requires a state of exception for it to be realized. An Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben refers the state of exception as a paradigm of government, “a technique of government rather than an exceptional measure,” and that it “lets its own nature as the constitutive paradigm of the juridical order come to light.” He also mentions how Clinton L. Rossiter “is aware that constitutional dictatorship (that is, the state of exception)... is fraught with dangers”. As a policy that occurs to temporarily avoid the situation during a state of emergency or to counteract the existing legal conditions, state of exception exists beyond the norm. In this thesis, the state of exception is redefined as an opportunity rather than danger. In the context of the two Koreas, the state of exception generates opportunities for various relationships between North and South Korea, and develops into a spatial condition—faction space. Spatially, the characteristic of faction space is similar to how Michael Foucault defines heterotopia as a place “outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality.” The difference between the two is that “there is probably not a single culture in the world that fails to constitute heterotopias”, while faction space is constituted only at specific moments to embody the physical need of a state of exception. Being a spatial resultant of the state of exception, faction space is also not a norm by nature, but it can evolve to become a norm in the future. Some examples around the world are the tunnels crossing under the US Mexican border, the indefinite presence of Palestine as a nation and territory, and the city of Berlin within the territory of East Germany following the WWII: detailed examples of already existing mutually beneficial relationships between the two Koreas are discussed later in the thesis. Then, there will be a discussion of how these opportunities of mutual benefits are translated to become an alternate way of structuring the borderline of North and South Korea’s DMZ.
When Japan surrendered to the western Allied forces in 1945, it was also the end of the thirty-five years of ruling Korea. As a result, an escalation of tension occurred between the two countries, the USA and the USSR, which sponsored the two Koreas. This history itself illustrates the concept of “faction,” an unusual condition where the contents of the situation does not relate to the immediate context of the surrounding environment. Due to its nature of being “fiction” plus fact, factions are not so permanent: a story can always be rewritten. In this part of history, the environment was Korea, the Korean people, and the Korean culture; yet, the actual contents within them were purely Japanese enforcements, or those from the USA or the USSR after being released from Japan. After a number of uprisings and protests, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established through the election of a president on August 15th, 1948: North Korea followed shortly after on August 25th, 1948 to form the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) through parliamentary elections. The creation of two countries intensified the tension even more, and finally on June 25th of 1950, the Korean War began. The war first broke out due to North Korea’s invasion to the South because of Kim Il Sung’s confidence in achieving victory. At the time, the North was better resourced: however, their tactics failed, and the war ended without any gain in territory at the 38th parallel on July 27th, 1953. The Armistice Agreement was signed on this day and the DMZ line was established. The two countries have been operating as separate sovereign states under the name the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), informally North Korea, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), informally South Korea. Under two very different governments, they have developed into distinct two countries, but the Korean people still call themselves as a “divided country.”

6 This part of Korean history is well known to all Koreans from their elementary years. Details can be found on HISTORYNET by the National Institute of Korean History. (http://contents.history.go.kr)
1910-1945: Japanese ruling era
August 15, 1945: Japanese surrender
1945-1948: Unified Korean government
July-Aug., 1948: Separation into two | Communism vs. Capitalism
June 25, 1950: North invades south | Korean War begins
September 1950: Battle of Incheon | UN forces help south
October 1950: China intervenes | China helps north
July 27, 1953: Armistice | Creation of DMZ

fig. 1.1 Korean history
Brief timeline of the Korean War
This anti-Communist North Korean just released from a prisoner of war camp is serving as a kind of cheerleader for fellow ex-POW’s as they shout their joy of reaching Seoul. The flags are of the Republic of South Korea. Ca. 1953-54. Gravy. (USIA)
With her brother on her back a war weary Korean girl tiredly trudges by a stalled tank, at Haengju, Korea. June 9, 1951. Maj. R.V. Spencer, UAF. (Navy)
Establishing the DMZ buffer territory was the end of the Korean War, but it was also the beginning of the never-ending tug of war between the two countries. During the 1950s and 1960s, both North and South Korea were busy taking care of their own countries on their parts of the peninsula: they were finding ways to support and develop themselves without much external help from sponsor countries. Strengthening military forces was the top priority for both the North and the South in order to defend themselves not only from external forces, but from each other as well. Nevertheless, publicly, neither of the countries appeared to be interested in starting a war. One idea that Kim Il Sung and Park Jeong Hee had in common was to free Korea from the influence of external powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. This agreement is illustrated through the conversation between Kim Il Sung and Lee Hu Rak, director of the ROK intelligence agency, during a secret meeting on May 4, 1972 and, then again, through the official joint statement announced on July 4, 1972.

7 Oberdorfer, 23.
May 4, 1972.

LEE: President Park Jeong Hee and I believe unification should be achieved by ourselves without interference of the four powers [the United States, China, Japan, the Soviet Union]… We are never front men of the United States or Japan. We believe we should resolve our issues by ourselves….

KIM: Our position is to oppose reliance on external forces on the issue of unification. This is where I agree with Park Jeong Hee….

LEE: I’d like to tell you that President Park is a person who detests foreign interference most.

KIM: That being so, we are already making progress to solve the issue. Let us exclude foreign forces. Let’s not fight. Let’s unite as a nation. Let’s not take issue with communism or capitalism….

LEE: A nation with 40-50 million people is a powerful country. [The population of the South in 1972 was 32 million; that of the North 14 million.] One hundred years ago we yielded to big powers because we were weak. In the future the big powers will yield to us. I’d like to make it clear to you, the big powers only provide lip service to our hope for unification. But in their hearts, they don’t want our unification.

KIM: Big powers and imperialism prefer to divide a nation into several nations.
A few months after the secret meeting, the two leaders came to an agreement about the methods to unify the two countries. They are as follows:

*First, unification shall be achieved through independent efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference.*

*Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through use of force against one another.*

*Third, a great national unity, as a homogeneous people, shall be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems.*

This agreement seemed to be a significant step for both North and South Korea. Since the joint statement, both countries have worked hard to enhance their international reputation. The first visit by North Koreans to the South was made two months after the statement was issued, and then, several more followed over the years. These exchanges of ideas and interests were made in the hope that the external forces would remove themselves from Korea. However, North Korea began to lose interest in maintaining the relationship with South Korea because it was becoming evident that this inter-Korean relationship was not leading to the withdrawal of the US military. Then, the trouble deepened. On August 15, 1974, President Park Jeong Hee was making his speech at the National Theater in Seoul when an assassin attempted to shoot him. Instead, the First Lady fell to the floor and died within hours from a bullet wound to the head. This was a second assassination attempt by North Korea after the one in 1968. This time, the assassin was a 22-year-old Korean citizen born and raised in Japan, who confessed that an official of a North Korean residents association had recruited him and trained him to carry out the assassination. Although this incident was presented mostly as a Korea-Japan conflict, deep inside it was between North and South Korea as it was the North Koreans who wrote the assassination plot. The declaration of the joint statement itself may be seen as a faction from the beginning: both sides were writing a story of its own, creating their own boundaries, aside from what is seen on the outside. Standing on the margin, either one was ready to step out of the line anytime.
As the relationship between the two Koreas began to weaken “above ground,” a silent war was developing “underground.” On November 15, 1974, only three months after the assassination attempt on President Park, a South Korean army squad discovered steam rising from the ground only one kilometer from the southern DMZ line. A soldier poked his bayonet into the ground, and at about only 46 centimeters, he hit the top of a reinforced tunnel.11

The discovery was extraordinary; they found an underground tunnel. The tunnel still exists, and is 1.2m high, 0.9m wide, and 3,500m long; its walls are made of reinforced concrete; it has complete electric lines and lighting; there are side areas for sleeping and storage, and a narrow-gauge railway is in place. It was calculated that, about two thousand soldiers could standby inside this tunnel for initial attack, and then additional soldiers transported at a rate of five to seven hundred men per hour. The second tunnel was discovered in March 1975. About 0.8km away from the southern DMZ line, the tunnel was found by lowering a special camera into a borehole at a suspected site, after researching and closely examining the ground conditions of the DMZ. This tunnel is 2.0m high, 2.0m wide, and 3,500m long, and is constructed through solid granite more than 45m below ground. It was estimated that, initially, about eight thousand soldiers could standby inside this tunnel for initial attack, and then additional soldiers at a rate of three thousand men per hour, including light artillery and other weapons. The third tunnel was discovered in October 1978, followed by the fourth tunnel in May 1989. Both tunnels are similar in size to the second tunnel; the first is 2.0m high, 2.0m wide, and 1,635m long; the latter is 1.7m high, 1.7m wide, and about 2,052m long. It was estimated that approximately thirty thousand soldiers per hour, including artillery, could be transported through the tunnels.12

The South Korean and the US Armies had no choice but to respond to this underground threat. A total of 245 seismic listening and analysing devices were placed along the DMZ area in order to find more tunnels. While looking at the complex geology spreading across the 248km of the DMZ, an American physicist remarked that this effort was “worse than looking for a needle in a haystack; more like looking for a vacuum in space.”13 Estimates have been made that there are twenty-two tunnels within the DMZ area, but no more have been discovered to date.


Oberdorfer, 56. 11

Oberdorfer, 58. 13
속전속결전법을 도입하여 기습전을 강행할 수 있게 하라.
Carry out a suprise attack by introducing blitz tactics.

Kim Il Seong, 25th of September, 1971
Along with the discoveries of the tunnels, there were other factional incidents near the DMZ borders that contributed to intensifying the tension between North and South Korea. Known as the “Axe Murder Incident,” two US soldiers were killed by North Korean officers on the morning of August 18, 1976. These two men were cutting down a poplar tree that was obstructing the view towards the North from two nearby guard posts at the Joint Security Area (JSA). Just as the work got underway, two North Korean officers and nine enlisted men appeared in a truck, demanding the work to stop. As the US soldiers continued their work, the North Korean soldiers began to attack them, eventually killing them with an axe at site. Nine other US and Korean soldiers were also injured during the fight.\textsuperscript{14} JSA is an area where both sides have agreed to have no heavy artilleries to avoid conflict leading to direct combat, because the soldiers literally face each other with only a six-inch wide step between them. A direct murder incident in this area can be seen as a factional situation because of its unexpectedness: North Koreans created their own imaginary boundary with their own rules, out of the norm, during the moment of the murder.

Ten years later, the North initiates another faction around the DMZ area. On April 1986, North Korea announced the construction plan for the Imnam Dam (also called Mt.Geumgang Dam in South Korea), a hydroelectric dam located on the mouth of the Bukhan River. The “official” purpose of this construction was the preservation of water resources; however, South Korea saw it differently. War scenarios were written. The Bukhan River is a tributary of the Han River, the river that flows through the center of Seoul. If North Korea were to ever bomb the Imnam Dam, it would release great amounts of water that could flood the entire city of Seoul. The South Korean government did not stay silent. The following November, the government began to inform the citizens about the great threat of the Imnam Dam to the capital city: “Holding over 200 billion tons of water, North Korea will be able to submerge Seoul fifty meters deep.”\textsuperscript{15} Although the information was exaggerated, nobody questioned it; everyone lived in fear. Donations were collected nationwide to support building a responsive dam downstream. Construction began the next

\textsuperscript{14} Oberdorfer, 74-75.

\textsuperscript{15} Kim, Jongdu. The Kyunghyang Sinmun.
year, and the first phase of the Peace Dam, 85 meters high, was finished in 1989. However, the construction did not continue once it became public that the information about the Imnam Dam had been exaggerated. After the first phase, the water capacity of the Peace Dam was only 590 million tons, significantly less than the water capacity of the Imnam Dam, which is 2.62 billion tons. Then, construction resumed again in 2002 as reports appeared about the instability of the structure of the Imnam Dam: provisions had to be made for the possibility of massive flooding due to the collapse of the Imnam Dam. After the second phase, the Peace Dam was 125 meters high, with a water capacity of 2.63 billion tons. It seems ironic that the Peace Dam has no other function than flood control, whereas the Imnam Dam was constructed to produce hydroelectric power: the Peace Dam can be represented merely as a defensive mechanism to control flooding. Nevertheless, the dam proved itself as a useful flood control dam during the localized torrential downpours in 1995 and 1996, as well as in September 2005, when North Korea released waters from the Imnam Dam without any forewarning.

With respect to the greater whole, the tension between the two countries began to ease as the then South Korean president Kim Dae Joong introduced the “Sunshine Policy” in 1998.17 The term is derived from Aesop’s Fables – The Wind and the Sun: it is not the strong wind that makes the man take off his coat, but the warmth of the sun that shines above him. Kim’s policy referred to presenting an appeasement policy where the South Korean government would help North Korea move towards reformation and an open economy. After the policy took effect, there has been a significant change in the amount of aid South Korea sent to North Korea. In 1998, the total amount of humanitarian aid was 42.9 billion won (approximately 38 million dollars), and then after just two years, it was 242.2 billion won (approximately 214 million dollars). The amount increased slowly over the years, increasing to 439.7 billion won (approximately 388 million dollars) in 2007; however, it was cut to one-quarter of the amount the next year when the present president Lee Myeong Bak was elected.18 He did not agree with the sunshine policy and slowly began to take a tougher stance against North Korea.
Closeup of an illustration demonstrating the level of flood in Seoul if the Mt. Geumgang Dam was bombed.

Excerpted from article dated November 6, 1986.

*The Kyunghyang Sinmun*
fig. 1.7 The Threat of 200t Dam, 1986

Article covering the “threat” of 20 billion ton of water that Mt.Geumgang Dam holds upstream in North Korea.

(center diagram) Illustration of dams along the Bukhan River from Mt.Geumgang Dam (right) to Seoul (left).

November 5, 1986.

*The Kyunghyang Shinmun*
March 26, 2010.

On this date, the relationship between North and South Korea shifted entirely in a new direction: a South Korean warship, Cheonan, was sunk by a North Korean torpedo in contested waters in the Yellow Sea. The loss of the ship and forty-six sailors increased the tension between the two Koreas significantly. This act of aggression marked the end of the so-called “sunshine policy” that former President Kim Dae Joong established. “We have always tolerated North Korea’s brutality, time and again, … . We did so because we have always had a genuine longing for peace on the Korean Peninsula. But now things are different.”19

President Lee Myung Bak made this announcement right after the incident, and he suspended all trade, as well as aid for food and daily necessities. North Korea denied any responsibility for the sinking and threatened South Korea that they would back out of the nonaggression pact.20 Then, on November 23, 2010, North Korea shelled Yeon-pyeong Island in reaction to the annual joint operation by the Allied land, sea, and air forces of South Korean and the US Army. Two soldiers and two citizens lost their lives, and nineteen people were seriously injured. Various theories about the North Korea attack existed, but the most convincing was that it was due to the instability of Kim Jeong Eun at that time. As the successor to Kim Jeong Il, Kim Jeong Eun had to demonstrate that he too had the power to command the military. However, Andrei Lankov, an expert on North Korea, argues that the attack was a way of sending a message: “We are here, we are crazy, we are dangerous. And our last paycheck is long overdue.”21

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19 CNN Wire Staff, “South Korea Suspends Trade with N.Korea,” CNN.com.

20 CNN Wire Staff, “North Korea Rejects Torpedo Findings, Threatens War,” CNN.com.

21 Andrei Lankov first went to North Korea back in September 1984, as a participant in an exchange program between the then-USSR and North Korea; he became intrigued with the country. He is currently a professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, South Korea.

Salmon, Andrew. “Theories Abound on N.Korea Attack,” CNN

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### Table 1.1 Economy Comparison between North and South Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Life expectancy</th>
<th>GDP (purchasing power parity)</th>
<th>GDP (real growth rate)</th>
<th>GDP (per capita)</th>
<th>Labor force</th>
<th>Budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORTH KOREA</td>
<td>24,457,492</td>
<td>68.89 years</td>
<td>$40 billion (99°)</td>
<td>0.9% (19°)</td>
<td>$1,800</td>
<td>12.2 million</td>
<td>3.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH KOREA</td>
<td>48,754,657</td>
<td>79.05 years</td>
<td>$1.459 trillion (133°)</td>
<td>6.1% (50°)</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>24.75 million</td>
<td>235.1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RATIO (South : North)</td>
<td>1.99 : 1</td>
<td>1.15 : 1</td>
<td>36.48 : 1</td>
<td>6.78 : 1</td>
<td>16.67 : 1</td>
<td>2.03 : 1</td>
<td>73.47 : 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(de) militarized zone
The so-called “overdue paycheck” that North Korea is still demanding is not an obligation that South Korea has to fulfill; the previous aid was sent either through mutual agreement between the two governments or through the generosity of humanitarian organizations. It was always a one-way relationship. Over the years, North Korea experienced economic isolation from the rest of the world, and the rigidity of the totalitarian state suppressed active economic development and prosperity of the country. As seen in Table 1, the contrast in the economies of the two is very clear. The current statistics indicate that the ratio of the differences in the economic level of South Korea and North Korea is 384:1.22 Also, social interaction, such as mobile communication and broadcasting, in South Korea is much more active than in North Korea. These differences can be derived from the communication levels of the two countries; communication is the main element in social interaction. Depending on the government state, focus areas of development are different; one may be focused on the economy, while the other is on the government structure and power.

Data retrieved from *The World Factbook 2009.*
This limitation and growth keep the two Koreas different from each other, and hold them back from easily collaborating with each other. Nevertheless, certain projects that North and South Korea have agreed to undertake exist in North Korea; these projects have existed and more can exist in form of what I call “faction space”.23 Coming out from the initial concept of “faction,” faction space refers to a specific space situated in reality that does not reflect on its immediate surroundings, but of its own world. In other words, the purpose of the space is not derived from the site context, but of the creator’s specific intentions and reasons, regardless of what is and can be situated at the site. Firstly, exploring the concept of “state of exception” will help to understand how faction space can be achieved.

A state of exception exists where there is an imbalance between two immediate environments, and then it is transformed into a norm. To create a state of exception, necessity to counteract the imbalance is required. For instance, strict security measures were enforced around all the airports in the US after the 9/11 incident; this was a reaction to the state of emergency caused by terrorist attacks in the country. Good-byes had to be made in front of check-in kiosks instead of at the gate, people now had to go through extensive security checks before boarding, and, even a very minor action that seems suspicious could result in immediate custody. It was a major change in a short period of time. Now, nobody questions the procedures— it is a norm.

On his essay, “The State of Exception as a Paradigm of Government”, Giorgio Agamben, an Italian political philosopher, defines that state of exception is “not a special kind of law (like the law of war): rather, insofar as it is a suspension of the juridical order itself, it defines law’s threshold or limit concept.”24 In other words, state of exception is not the existing law itself, but a vertical expansion from it, giving it another dimension. Instead of creating an entirely new law aside from the existing, it is like creating a new category within it that has power to overrule the existing whenever necessary. Essentially, undoing of the existing law creates a new condition that will satisfy the exception. Agamben explains the structure of state of exception by borrowing the words from Saint-Bonnet and Fontana as follows:

23 The word “faction” is a combination of “fact” and “fiction.” In film or literature, the term describes a piece of work comprising a dramatized presentation of real life events or characters.

24 Throughout his essay, Agamben discusses in detail, the necessities and the negative effects of state of exception. He especially emphasizes on the essentiality of absolute necessity and temporariness, and how there are no limits to state of exception. This thesis uses these elements as a descriptor for the concept of faction space.
the state of exception constitutes a “point of imbalance between public law and political fact” (Saint-Bonnet 2001, 28) that is situated—like civil war, insurrection and resistance, in an “ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the political” (Fontana 1999, 16).

This point of imbalance situated in a “borderline fringe,” in this case, the DMZ, is required to create a state of exception within the common grounds of North and South Korea. The imbalance can be any difference between the two countries, whether it be political tension, military tactics, or economic disparity. Where do these points of imbalance exist? The points of imbalance tend to exist near the border, as the two Koreas are a “divided” nation. The infiltration tunnels dug by the North are examples of military imbalance: the DMZ, on land, and the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a maritime border on the Yellow Sea, are examples of not only military, but also political and physical imbalance between the two Koreas. These imbalances are the results of the conflict between the two countries: however, some imbalances have also sprung from mutual agreements. The fundamental idea of Agamben’s state of exception is that it refers more directly to the state of emergency occurring at a threat to governmental or political status: this state of emergency undoes the law to temporarily solve the problem. However, these imbalances, under a mutual agreement between the two Koreas, take the basic theory and change the term “threat” into “economic benefit.” Moving slightly away from the law or policy, these imbalances focus more on spatial and social terms with relevance to North and South Korea. They physically exist as faction spaces in two areas of North Korea: Gaeseong Industrial Complex and Mount Geumgang Tourist Region.

In the case of North and South Korea, these two faction spaces did not emerge from the state of emergency; rather, it was solely based on calculations of economic benefits for both countries. The necessity of economic growth made these two countries shake hands over the barbed wire fences. The possibility and the opportunity to strengthen their economy were greater than the fact that they are in a state of armistice. On top of the calculations, people’s desires played a great factor in driving these faction spaces forward: the North Koreans’ desires to work in a better environment and earn more money, and the South Koreans’ desires to use cheap labour or visit Mount Geumgang. Further discussions on these examples will be made in the next chapter.
fig. 1.8 Inventory of Events at the DMZ
the faction
Spatial products of tourism are designed to freely conquer territory that is unencumbered by the inconveniences of politics. Yet the same fantasies and fictions they deploy possess an ancient political instrumentality.

Keller Easterling
As referred previously, two faction spaces already exist as an agreement between North and South Korea. Both of these faction spaces are physically located in North Korea, but were planned and developed by South Korea. They are both unique worlds within themselves, constituting neither of North or South Korean laws, but of its own. People live, work, and visit these places—the place is real. Yet, the spaces are designed to illustrate certain stories, not like any other in North or South Korea. A script is written and strictly followed; then, is one really experiencing the real aspects of the space or the fairy tale-like aspects of the space? It becomes a moment when reality is stranger than fiction.
Gaeseong Industrial Complex is located in North Korea, only 50km away from central Seoul. Its agreement first signed on August of year 2000, Gaeseong Industrial Complex is a joint project between the North and South Korea in pursuing economic development for both countries. Although located in the north, the complex houses only South Korean companies, whereas the workers are all North Koreans (except for South Korean managers). Since its official opening in December 2004, the complex has grown exponentially. In total, there are 123 companies, which are mainly simple goods factories such as textiles and machinery metals, and 48,206 North Korean workers and 722 South Korean managers are dispersed amongst these companies. The average salary of North Korean labourers is approximately one hundred and sixty US dollars per month, the highest in North Korea, but still quarter the salary paid to labourers in China. This way, North Koreans receive fairly high wages, and

26 More detailed statistics are available at the official website of Gaeseong Industrial Complex. (www.kidmac.com)

South Korean companies spend less on labour costs than those in China. For ordinary North Koreans, being selected to work at the complex is also the best possible job in the country. Not only the wage attracts people, but also the working conditions at the factories in the complex. Most of these factories are either at the same or better working conditions than those in South Korea: each factory has showers, change rooms, rest areas, restaurant/cafeteria, and even a paramedic. The work environment is much better because the law requires a sufficient amount of natural daylight and adequate air quality.\(^{28}\) For the past seven years, collaboration at the complex has been positive, and both sides functioning satisfactorily. Recently, the practice of offering workers small bonuses has become a significant burden. An example of this is seen with the offering of ChocoPies\(^{29}\) in addition to workers’ regular wages, as a gesture of encouragement to enhance efficiency. In South Korea one ChocoPie would cost about fifty cents, but in the North, the price escalates exponentially to almost ten dollars apiece, almost one-tenth of an average monthly wage. This inflation is a result of the scarcity of South Korean products in the North. As a result, black markets began to form dealing in these ChocoPies, and the workers began to demand for even more, resulting in an awkward position for the companies.\(^{30}\)

Gaeseong Industrial Complex is a good example of a faction space where North and South Korea meet: owned by South Korea, located in North Korea, and staffed by mostly North Koreans. The outer appearance resembles any South Korean industrial complex, whereas the actual rules applied to the workers are North Korea’s. This kind of partnership between the two countries was and is still possible because of the economic profits that each gains. For the North, Gaeseong Industrial Complex is one of their greatest sources of foreign currency, whereas for the South, it offers cheap and available labour. The conditions of being a faction space are maintained through the state of exception caused by a win-win situation for both countries.

More detailed information is available at the official website of Gaeseong Industrial Complex. (www.kidmac.com)

ChocoPies are chocolate covered marshmellow cakes made in South Korea.

*Kyunghyang Sinmun, 2011.*

\(^{28}\) Kyung Hyang Sin Mun, 2011. \(^{29}\) ChocoPies are chocolate covered marshmellow cakes made in South Korea. \(^{30}\) Gaeseong Industrial Complex is a good example of a faction space where North and South Korea meet: owned by South Korea, located in North Korea, and staffed by mostly North Koreans. The outer appearance resembles any South Korean industrial complex, whereas the actual rules applied to the workers are North Korea’s. This kind of partnership between the two countries was and is still possible because of the economic profits that each gains. For the North, Gaeseong Industrial Complex is one of their greatest sources of foreign currency, whereas for the South, it offers cheap and available labour. The conditions of being a faction space are maintained through the state of exception caused by a win-win situation for both countries.
Fig. 2.2 View of Gaeseong Industrial Complex
fig. 2.3 North Korean workers inside a typical factory within the Complex
The Mount Geumgang Tourist Region is located in North Korea by the East Sea, just above the northern DMZ boundary line. It first opened its doors to the South Korean tourists in 1998, after years of discussion between the North Korean government and Hyundai Asan, a sub-company officially established by Hyundai in 1999 to deal with projects dedicated to North and South Korean relations. The idea for the tours was first introduced by the former CEO of Hyundai, Jung Mong Jun, to make it possible for the people, mostly Korean elders who moved from North Korea before the war, to visit Mount Geumgang.

In making this agreement reality, Hyundai Asan had to fulfil various demands by the North. During the initial stage, Kim Jong Il and his top officials requested thirty thousand 25-inch colour television sets from Hyundai in addition to the $942 million that they had to pay North Korea over a period of six years for the exclusive rights to development. They were also responsible for all the costs related to the construction of the transportation systems (ports, roads, airports, and railways) and the resort buildings, which included hotels, a performance center, shops, and restaurants. A cruise ship was the first transportation method, then later trains, airplanes, buses, and cars. Considered to be one of the best presents for parents because of its meaning to the elders, Mount Geumgang tour package sales grew rapidly, and correspondingly, the number of tourists increased every year, reaching over three hundred thousand in 2007 alone.

Mount Geumgang is a faction space where a “drop” of South Korean culture is within North Korea, like Gaeseong Industrial Complex, except for the fact that the users are only South Koreans. By law, only South Koreans were allowed to enter the tourist area: the only North Koreans permitted into the area were the official tour guides and military soldiers. However, it was the North Korean government who set strict policies regarding the tourists’ visit to the area. Tourists were not allowed to carry cameras with lenses above 24x zoom or focal length of 160mm, have any type of mobile communication system (cellphones or walkie talkies), bring multiple copies of documents or videotapes that were not directly relevant to the tour. They were also disallowed from carrying Japanese and American flags. Visitors were also not allowed to talk to the North Korean tour guides about “inappropriate” topics, which included life in South Korea,
international news, and negative aspects about the North Korean government. The tour was successful for ten years without any issue until July 2008: a South Korean woman was shot by a North Korean soldier at the beach. At the resort, tourists could move only within a set boundary in order to prevent anyone going over to the “North,” including a vague line at the beach. The woman was strolling along the beach at night and she did not realize that she had crossed over that line. According to the report by North Korea (which cannot be confirmed to be true), the soldier gave her three warnings before shooting her. This incident put a stop to the tours, which have since been cancelled indefinitely. Faction space was no longer maintained: the laws within this state of exception could not be maintained against the pressures of the world outside the resort.

34 Easterling, 27.

35 Statement written by a witness of the scene is available in Korean at: The Hankyoreh, July 13, 2008.
fig. 2.5 Tourist Map of Mount Geumgang Tourist Region
From the previous examples of faction spaces, I would like to show how the fiction is overlaid on top of the fact. To create faction spaces, the spaces first have to be restated in terms of topics in order to actually write the stories. Gaeseong Industrial Complex would be categorized under economics and production; Mount Geumgang Tourist Region would be tourism (leisure) and economics; and both examples have a base layer of politics.

Although she does not exactly use the term “faction space,” Keller Easterling\textsuperscript{36} discusses Mount Geumgang in terms of fictional space. In her essay “DPRK”, she states:

\textit{Fiction, the cheerful friend of politics and tourism, generates symbolic capital not because the comedy of its fake crests, seals, and epaulets actually means something, but precisely because there is a tacit agreement that it means nothing.}\textsuperscript{37}

According to Easterling, “fiction” is a powerful tool in creating or erasing the meaning behind what exists in reality; in the case of her example of the Mount Geumgang Tourist Resort, they are politics and tourism. This idea leads to the question, “what is the story that means nothing but means everything?” This story does not need any factual significance; rather, it has to touch people’s emotions and memories in order to manipulate them to think that the space actually has significance in their lives. In the case of Mount Geumgang, the sensual meaning of the mountain (which is equivalent to Mount Fuji of Japan) and the opportunity to visit it in person were the main derivatives of the story.

\textit{Yet the phenomenon of the Mount Kumgang tour may have less to do with neoliberal naturalizing of the spectacle and more to do with compatibility, even attraction, between fictions, delusions, and fetishes in the fairy tales of both communism and capitalism- fairy tales in which tourism and landscape are active solvents.}\textsuperscript{38}

North and South Korea chose “connection,” “longing,” “reunion,”

\textsuperscript{36} Keller Easterling is an American architect, urbanist, writer, and a professor who focuses on the issues of spatial products in relation to globalization.

\textsuperscript{37} Easterling, 26.

\textsuperscript{38} Easterling, 21.
and “hope” as the themes for the fiction to be written over the fact about the “beautiful” nature and space of Mount Geumgang. These themes were able to offer an experience that stimulated the tourists’ emotions without any connections to politics because these words had no meaning or power from a political viewpoint. The stories targeted specifically the elders, the majority of the tourists, who moved from North Korea to South Korea before the war. To them, it was a “dream come true” the moment they set their feet on the cruise ship. Nevertheless, North Korea wrote the majority of this fiction under a strict set of rules and boundaries; they had to keep the “real” North Korea hidden from the South Korean visitors.

Footnote 39

…only do tourism and totalitarianism utilize the same tools of mental vacuity, they become each other’s next masquerade. The fact that both masquerades require the obfuscation of meaning is not a tragedy of meaninglessness. Rather, this meaninglessness is the meaning as well as the opportunity for political leverage.

Creation of this faction space based on the concepts of states of exception profited both countries economically and politically: the people were thankful to both governments for making this tour possible. As a result, both sides were willing to leverage their political stance, the armistice state, for capital development. Nevertheless, no one can conclude whether this type of faction space will last or diminish: it may become too weird to exist any longer, or become too normal to be considered as faction space.
Theories discussed in previous examples can be used to begin setting up the storyboard of the faction space that responds to the potential development occurring between the two Koreas. General limitations and conditions of both countries regarding political, economic, and social activities should be noted again in order to translate these into spatial limitations.

Overall, North Korea has much more restrictive laws than South Korea. Under the dictatorship of the Kim family, North Koreans have limitations in every aspect of their lives, including private ownership, social activities, and individual rights. From kindergarten, children begin to join the Youth League that fulfills social education outside of regular school hours; these leagues (later, Unions for adults) enforce “manifestations of collective activities” and the idea of Juche.40

Pyongyang is a theater, a Potemkin village, and as many as a thousand people may be called upon to play shoppers and pedestrians when Kim Jong Il stages urbanism for visiting dignitaries.41

On a guided tour of the city, we encountered several hundred fourth-grade boys, led by an adult instructor, doing mass exercises with wooden swords or, lacking these, pieces of flat wood cut to the length of swords. The boys slashed, jumped, and shouted with enthusiasm and on cue. This was only one of many manifestations of the collective activities that were being emphasized. People on the streets avoided glancing at us when we approached, and the children in a model school did not even look up from work when their headmaster, two strange Westerners, and guides invaded their classroom—evidently because they had been instructed to take no notice. I found this chilling and dehumanizing.42

40 Juche refers to the political thesis of Kim Il Sung. The word itself means “independent stand” or “spirit of self-reliance”.

41 Easterling, 27.

42 Oberdorfer, 234.
As portrayed in the text above, life in North Korea is much more structured and organized under a strict set of laws than what has been depicted through the two previous examples of faction space. What an international audience saw and heard can be assumed that they have been staged and carefully planned by the North Korean government. Nobody really knows about the actual living conditions and limitations faced by the North Korean people in general. On the other hand, South Korea is extremely open in all aspects related to the individual’s rights, whether choice of religion, freedom of speech, or the “right to know.” What is seen and heard on the streets of South Korea are not a master plan by the government, but a result of the individual’s own will and actions. These limitations, regulations, or freedom can be used to design spatial parameters of the faction spaces.

fig. 2.6 Pyongyang, North Korea
A view of Pyongyang streets, with a glimpse of the Ryugyong Hotel, a 1,083-foot tall skyscraper that was abandoned in mid-construction in 1992. (center, pyramid-shaped building in the distance.)
If North Korea is a perfectly knotted string, South Korea is more like a freely tangled string. What would happen if someone tied a knot inside the tangled string or vice versa? A positive outcome might be that it allows for variations or opportunities for innovative findings: new type of spaces might emerge out from the mixture. However, if the implementations are not planned out thoroughly enough, negative outcomes may arise. As discussed before in the previous chapter, the state of exception created by the 9/11 incident was an outcome of state of emergency; security enforcements were applied excessively to the extent that some individuals began to feel offended.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, faction space is created from the policies and limitations set by the conditions of the state of exception. This process can be translated into a spatial concept. In his essay “Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias”, Michel Foucault discusses the presence of heterotopia as “a sort of place that lies outside all places and yet is actually localizable”; it is the marginally occupying space that works within the greater whole. This idea can be applied to the previously discussed examples, where the sites have their own set of stories and are surrounded by an area with clearly different qualities than themselves.

On the one hand they perform the task of creating a space of illusion that reveals how all of real space is more illusory, all the locations within life is fragmented. On the other, they have the function of forming another space, another real space, as perfect, meticulous, and well-arranged as ours is disordered, ill-conceived, and in a sketchy state.

As Foucault states, this type of space has two-sides: the space created by the story which was written because of the fact that the space is different from its surroundings, and how the space functions in real life just like any other space. This is possible by applying Henri Lefebvre’s theory of space.
...spatial practices as “space perceived (percu) in a commonsensical mode”; the representations of space as “discourses on space” or “the discursive regimes of analysis, spatial and planning professions and expert knowledges that conceive of space (l’espace concu)”); and, finally, the spaces of representation as “discourses of space,” “space as it might be, fully lived space (l’espace vecu)”": the spaces of representation form the social imaginary.

When one takes into account how a person perceives, conceives, and imagines a space when writing the fiction over the space, they are drawing out the connection between the person’s emotions and how they experience the space. This shows clearly in the example of Mount Geumgang Tourist Region, where the entire resort was covered in stories to connect personally with every tourist’s emotions. To the tourists, the reality of issues of politics and economics do not matter when the stories themselves actually are the final outcome of these issues.

_Spatial products of tourism are designed to freely conquer territory that is unencumbered by the inconveniences of politics. Yet the same fantasies and fictions they deploy possess an ancient political instrumentality._

In the following proposal, this method is applied in creating another faction space, this time, across the borderline of the DMZ. The fiction is written according to the facts of the site, the desired outcomes, and its ties to human perception and emotions.
the field
...the borderline landscape interventions perform as remedial architectural stimuli within the feuding landscape...
Since 1945, North and South Korea have been in a constant state of war, in political, economic, social, and even, at times, in physical terms. As one of the only few divided nations in the world, the two Koreas face various challenges with each other as well as with the rest of the world. The complexity of the relationship makes it difficult to speculate on the future of the one nation in two countries. Over the past sixty years, North and South Korea have played a game of tug-of-war, from digging infiltration tunnels and building dams to sending food aid and setting up reunions for separated families. Usually, the negative aspects were permanent, whereas the positive ones were temporary. Nevertheless, there have been times when the two countries worked together to create something beyond the norm; the examples of the cooperation are the Mt. Geumgang Tourist Resort and the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. These two areas have been created as faction spaces because of the economic benefits to both countries by constituting a state of exception; the two Koreas are not at peace, but at armistice state. These faction spaces are very fragile because the their foundation in politics and the economy fluctuates depending on the governments’ internal conditions and relations with other nations. Mt. Geumgang Tourist Resort is a good example of this fragility; the resort closed after ten years of operation due to a shooting incident on its the resort grounds, where North Korean soldiers killed a South Korean tourist for crossing a boundary on the beach.

These faction spaces were transformed from policy agreements into physical reality. A fictional story was written over the factual reality of the space, in order to justify and make sense out of the existence of conditions outside the norm. Faction allows the site to transform into a totally different space perceived by the users; people are connected to the space experientially rather than being filtered by political agenda. The faction space becomes a world of its own within the greater whole—essentially, it becomes a heterotopia with an ironic twist.
The current relationship between North and South Korea is not at its best. After the many years of ups and downs, it is slowly going into a downfall, especially after the change in regime. It seems to be a time that North and South Korea begin to find new ways to work with each other to create more mutually beneficial relationships, rather than threatening ones. Fully accepting the reality of the armistice state between North and South Korea, this thesis proposes a relationship not through the physical presence of both North and South Korean people in one place, but through the faction spaces that each side creates and inhabits. This proposal points to a way to overcome the imbalance between the two Koreas by establishing a new “faction” within the DMZ, rather than trying to establish a permanent condition between each other. The new faction is written under the condition of sharing the common necessity of both countries: water. Both North and South Korea face problems with water throughout the year: South Korea is categorized as the country that will have the highest water stress level by 2050. North Korea faces shortage of water every year, let alone of basic food necessities. Soon, North and South Korea will need to develop a more efficient system of managing their water resources. This thesis attempts to create this system by allocating faction spaces along the DMZ landscape, establishing a new trans-territorial relationship connecting the two Koreas.
Water is one of the basic necessities of the human race. Approximately 1.2 billion people around the world live in areas with a “physical” scarcity of water, and 500 million people more will soon face this problem: another 1.6 billion people face “economic” water shortage. According to “OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050,” South Korea faces the highest water stress by using more than 40% of the country’s total average water yield. South Korea’s mean annual precipitation is 1,283mm, which is higher than the world average of 973mm. However, after factoring in the population, the average drops to 2,705m³ per capita, which is significantly less than the world average of 26,800m³. In addition, two-thirds of the annual precipitation falls from June to September, leading to severe flooding in the summer and droughts in the spring and winter. Although no specific data are available for North Korea, the average freshwater withdrawal is only 401m³ per capita, and the country experiences droughts in late spring, followed by severe flooding during the summer. It is essential that better water management systems be developed for the sake of both countries’ futures.

This “water” becomes the basis of creating the new faction space that connects both North and South Korea. Unlike the existing examples, this new faction space can become more grounded and permanent because it focuses on a common necessity rather than a desired economic result. The relationship between the two Koreas no longer depends on political or economic benefits, but on the basic necessity of life: water. The proposed faction spaces are located across the length of the river that flows down from Imnam Dam of North Korea, passing through the DMZ, until the Peace Dam of South Korea. The history of these dams and the past tensions are the groundwork for the new faction. The fiction written for the space transforms the current definite boundary into a trans-territorial condition: it creates a relationship through this mutual element – water – on both sides and either intensifies or diminishes the border depending on the condition of the proximate faction space.

48 “Water scarcity”, un.org
49 OECD, 215.
50 Korea Water Resources Corporation (http://english.kwater.or.kr)
All are places where shortages of water contribute to poverty. They cause social hardship and impede development. They create tensions in conflict-prone regions. Too often, where we need water we find guns. [...] There is still enough water for all of us - but only so long as we keep it clean, use it more wisely, and share it fairly.

Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary General
[ the site ]

The site of the proposal is the 34km strip of the Bukhan River and the surrounding pocket spaces located between the Imnam Dam of North Korea and the Peace Dam of South Korea, inclusive of the DMZ in between. Covering approximately 5.1km² of surface area, the mean depth of the water is only approximately 1-2 meters. Initially, the conflict may have started with the threat of severe flooding, but in reality, it is leaning towards the threat of water shortage in the South.
fig. 3.1 site location
DMZ area between Mt. Geumgang Dam in North Korea and Peace Dam in South Korea
(AMS L752 as base map; originals in UCBerkely; obtained from www.koreanwar.org)
(de) militarized zone
fig. 3.2 greater context
Location of major dams along the course of the water from Imnam Dam, North Korea to Seoul, South Korea. The grey dots are the locations of guard posts: dark grey for North Korea, and light grey for South Korea.
Demilitarized Zone
established
July 27, 1953

fig. 3.3 before dams in 1955
Imnam Dam, North Korea
1986-2003

Location
Gangwon Cheongdo-gun Imnam-ri

Height | Width
121.5m by 710m

Water capacity
2,620,000,000 tons

Function
Hydroelectric

Peace Dam, South Korea
1987-1989
2002-2005

Location
Gangwon Hwacheon-gun Dongchon-ri

Height | Width
125m by 601m

Water capacity
2,630,000,000 tons

Function
Flood control

fig. 3.4 after dams in 2012
Potential bombing of Imnam Dam: overflow of water

Rise of water level: fills up pocket spaces

Slight overflow over Peace Dam: overflow amount equivalent to preoccupied volume of water between the two dams

Rise of water level at Lake Paro: possibility of overflow at Hwacheon Dam

fig. 3.5 potential flooding
Proposal of a series of developments relative to local and overall area:
- most programs are supported by the Bukhan River
- programs allocated to fit into surrounding area

agriculture  military  ecology  tourism

fig. 3.6 proposal development of water control with secondary programs
Through four major programs consisting of Agriculture, Military, Ecology, and Tourism, the proposal focuses on creating faction spaces along the site to create a series of predictable, but also unexpected spaces. By introducing various visual and tactile public and military interactions, such as wetland exploration, productive farming and fishing, military training, and sightseeing, the borderline landscape perform as an unusual spatial stimulus within the feuding landscape. In order to transfer the different types of faction spaces from one country to the other effectively, these stimuli are proposed with similar architectural language, inspired by elements existing on site. As a result, the DMZ border is atomized into smaller worlds of their own, forming a borderline with various stories rather than one. This ideological connection of programs launches new borderline conditions that establish mutually beneficial relationship between the two Koreas.

“… both sides pretend to be what the other wants just long enough to make the deal.”

The two Koreas pretend to care for each other; but in reality, all moves are calculated strictly based on economic and military advancement of its own country. In reaction to this reality, the economic benefits is the base layer of the whole faction: above these, the topics of agriculture, military, ecology, and tourism cover them up to make the story richer and more favourable. The site is divided into four different zones according to the different conditions of the site. The programs of each zone determine the relationship between North and South Korea. Zone A is located in North Korea, and it focuses on agricultural production: this zone has contributions from both North and South Korea. Zone B is located on the Northern borderline of the DMZ, and it focuses on military productivity: this zone is maintained solely by North Korea. Zone C is located on the Southern borderline of the DMZ, and it focuses on ecological research: this zone functions under the collaboration of both North and South Korea. Zone D is located in South Korea, and it focuses on dynamic tourism: this zone is developed by South Korea. These zones are ultimately faction spaces that lead to an alternate way of structuring the borderline: instead of revealing the tension and mistrust between each other fully, North and South Korea utilize secondary programs to dilute their real intentions and goals.

51 Easterling, 26,
The site is divided into four zones according to the different conditions of the site. These zones are located in North Korea, borderline of North Korea-DMZ, borderline of DMZ-South Korea, and South Korea.
There are six infrastructures interacting directly with the water and the surrounding landscape at the site. These were made strictly for their functionality to the military.

**fig. 3.8 existing infrastructures**

There are six infrastructures interacting directly with the water and the surrounding landscape at the site. These were made strictly for their functionality to the military.
fig. 3.9 proposed infrastructures
The proposal contains an addition of six new infrastructures on the site. These are to be applied according to the program of the zone, not of location (whether they are in North or South Korea.)
Zone A: North Korea [Agricultural Production]

Located just south of the Imnam Dam of North Korea, this zone focuses on agricultural production. The main objective of this zone is to activate the public engagement with the landscape by utilizing all types of landscape for agriculture. The Imman Dam is one of the major facts of this zone; when used, it has the capabilities to generate hydroelectric power to support the nearby villages. Releasing the water from this dam is crucial for this proposal: water is needed. Once the dam begins to release the waters at regular rate, the river’s water level rises, and as a result, the aquaculture and ecology of the river becomes more diverse over time. The existing villages and the farmlands are the other facts of this zone: the villages have developed within the valleys and the farmlands on the plateaus by the river edges. As one of the typical rural areas of North Korea, a form of collective residential area (all the same type of housing) is observed, but no permanent military presence above ground (military bunker or barracks) is observed although the area is very proximate to the DMZ border.

Taking advantage of the existing villages and farmlands, the faction space focuses on developing the area into an extensive production district through farming and fishing. South Korea can help by investing in constructing the farms, orchards, and fisheries; in addition, the South Korean farmers will be able to share their knowledge and skills to the North Korean farmers as a gesture of exchange for the amount of water sent down the river from the North. In North Korea, approximately 36.8% of the total labour force are agricultural workers.

52 Speculated by the author through studying satellite images on Google Earth.

53 The City of Jaecheon created apple and peach orchards (10,000m² and 23,000m²) near the Mount Geumgang Tourist Resort back in 2004. The city and the farmers supported the orchards with seedlings, soil conditioner, and farm machineries. -Min, Woongki, Yeonhap News.

54 South Korea faces extreme drought at times because of the shortage of water. After Imnam Dam, the volume of water South Korea received from the North decreased by approximately 3.5 billion m³/year.

55 Calculated based on the numbers from The World Factbook.
Under the assumption that North Korea follows the system exactly as South Korea, it can be speculated that their GDP in agriculture will increase as much as South Korea. The rate is speculated based on the numbers from The World Factbook.

Among them, many face shortage of production due to the lack of productive environment, such as technological skills and knowledge, for farming. This zone can provide opportunities for agricultural growth in North Korea. More farmers can move in to support the needs, and the North Korean military can be involved for management and security. This faction space illustrates the ironic situation similar to the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, except this time, South Korea invests not for direct profits from the produce of the area, but for the water. This concept of trade for benefits is the strongest driving force for this faction space. Preliminary design elements are proposed to show how the space may function under this main concept.

The farming and fishing systems are designed to minimize negative impact on the water. For example, the river is used as the main water source for the farm, and any discharge after use is directed into the wetlands for purification before being released back into the river. The produce is marketed with higher value for being ecologically cultivated: this means higher profit for the North. In addition, the additional hydroelectric bridge generates extra power required to process the goods. The farmlands and orchards may extend further on the nearby valleys and hilltops in terraced landscapes for additional profit opportunities. All of these systems are to be developed with the help from South Korea: essentially, South Korea is helping North Korea grow. Under this system, North Korea will be able to slowly increase their productivity up to four times greater, given that their agricultural industry levels with South Korea.

This zone is like an agricultural version of the faction of Gaeseong Industrial Complex. The economic benefits resulting from this zone may allow the physical tension to ease along the entire site and form a tighter relationship with South Korea. North Korea is earning direct profit from the system that South Korea has developed for them in return for the water. Nevertheless, the mistrust resulting from the sixty year separation of the two countries may be hard to reverse, but can be confronted by expanding the on-going economic relationship, enabling a building of familiarity and trust. This zone is beneficial to both North and South Korea.
fig. 3.10 existing on site

bridge  dam  villages

farmlands  fishing circles  hydroelectric bridge  wetland  observation post  water storage

fig. 3.11 addition on site

(de) militarized zone
Zone A is developed with focus on creating an agricultural production zone around the Imnam Dam area. Every possible piece of land is used to cultivate produce for the North Koreans: all work is observed and controlled by the military.
fig. 3.15 zone b partial plan

constructed wetland system

watch tower

to Imnam Dam

processing warehouse

farmlands
(de) militarized zone
fig. 3.16 view into zone a
(de) militarized zone
fig. 3.17 view of farmlands and orchard
Zone B: North Korea - DMZ [ Military Grounds ]

Located right on the Northern borderline of the DMZ, this zone focuses on developing military grounds for North Korea. The main objective of this zone is to raise the North Korean soldiers’ morale. The facts of this zone are comprised of the above ground fence along the DMZ boundary, the military guard posts and barracks, and the nearby farmlands and villages. Among these lies an interesting fact: the farmlands are not only for the public, but also for the military as well. In North Korea, the soldiers also have a duty to farm their own produce, or at least be part of the community farming practice.\footnote{Speculated by the author based on aerial photography which reveals that next to each military installation, there are farm fields regardless of whether there is any nearby civilian population.} Now that each military unit has to find ways to sustain themselves regarding food after the abolition of the distribution system to the soldiers, the needs for self-farming has increased. In North Korea, approximately 41% of the total population is fit for military service, and is estimated that approximately 1.16 million of them are active soldiers.\footnote{The World Factbook. Lee, Seok. "What is the real number of North Korean soldiers?", KDI Policy Forum.} This means that 1.16 million more people are facing food shortage problems.

\footnote{57\footnote{58}}
Taking in the fact that the soldiers have to self-sustain, this faction space is written to dedicate the entire area solely for a self-sustainable military village. Unlike Zone A, this zone is built and maintained solely by North Korea because to South Korea, contributing to develop a military village has no benefits to them in any way. For development, the northern area where public farmlands are now is transformed into military training fields and barracks, creating a community of soldiers. The military uses the existing landscape at maximum efficiency for their training: the area even extends into the river for underwater training to prepare and prevent for any underwater attacks from South Korea and defections to the South by the North Koreans. This is a great area for military training because the soldiers are exposed to the various landscape conditions of the borderline; they are gaining an advantage of being familiar with the region. The farmlands on the southern area are kept for military farming, and then, dedicated fishing areas are added on the river to expand the types of food source available for the military. Based on their needs, more food can be produced in Zone A; this also creates opportunities for north-south expansion between the two zones. Same as the system in zone A, the river is used as the water source for the farm, and the discharge after use is directed into the wetland for purification before being released into the river. An infrastructure that generates hydroelectric power is constructed on the edge to support the needs of the military village.

If zone A carries an opportunity of easing the tension, this zone intently exposes the tension. For the North, it may become a prototype for a smaller scale military base located at borderline conditions: the presence of the base itself becomes a threat and a symbol of power to the opponent. This faction space is the most risk taking out of the four spaces. By unexpectedly locating a full military base right on the borderline, North Korea is being vulnerable to the potentials of being attacked by South Korea; the distance is close enough for South Korea to perform a sudden attack. However, they are taking the risk to train their soldiers to fully adopt the DMZ landscape for better efficiency in case of physical war. This zone is beneficial to only North Korea.

Only 4km apart by straight-line distance, or approximately 10km by waterway.
fig. 3.18 existing on site

fig. 3.19 addition on site
Zone B is developed with focus on the North Korean military. A self-sustainable military village is designed on the border-line for maximum efficiency.
fig. 3.23 zone b partial plan

military training grounds
mountain

existing bridge

military only zone
(de) militarized zone
fig. 3.24 view into zone b
(de) militarized zone
fig. 3.25 view of military training field
Zone C: DMZ - South Korea [ Extensive Research ]

Located right on the Southern borderline of the DMZ, this zone focuses on facilitating extensive research about the DMZ ecology. The main objective of this zone is to study the ecological value and quality of the DMZ and the Bukhan River, and find ways to enrich and maintain the biodiversity of the area. There already have been establishments of research groups, such as The DMZ Forum60, to promote and support the conservation of the unique ecological and cultural conditions of the DMZ. Similar to zone B, the existing facts of this zone are mostly military related. There are gated military guard posts on the highest points of the mountains, an above ground fence along the South Korean DMZ borderline, a military bridge, and underwater screens below the bridge and also a separate screen fence just north of the bridge. Currently, there is absolutely no public access to this zone; ecology researchers or reporters are sometimes permitted only when accompanied by the soldiers.

Although the facts are almost identical to zone B, the resulting faction for this zone is written differently. In Zone B’s faction, North Korea emphasizes on military power, but in this fac-
Kim, Ji-seung. “DMZ not recognized as a biosphere reserve.” *The Hankyoreh.*


South Korea puts greater interests and weight on gaining knowledge about the ecology of the DMZ and how to sustain it. Many researchers around the world, as well as the general public of South Korea, are interested in the effects and the system of the “sixty-years untouched” nature inside the barbed wire fence line. The South Korean government applied for the southern part of the DMZ to be designated as a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve in September 2011, but it was turned down recently in July 2012. One of the main reasons was that it did not have a clearly identified buffer zone: North Korea. In response to this situation, South Korea takes a bold move to push stronger towards the development of private research facilities inside the southern DMZ boundary, inviting researchers from around the world, including North Korea, to collaborate in promoting the biodiversity of the DMZ as well as the symbolic meaning of peace between the two countries. The research specifically focuses on studying the overall ecology and animal life of the DMZ, including water quality, animal, fish, and plant species. Currently, there are 2,900 plant species, 70 types of mammals, and 320 kinds of birds, of which include rare species such as Red-crowned Crane, Korean Tiger, and Amur Leopard, in the DMZ. Most species are specific to the ecosystem of Korea, and sustaining them would be crucial to the future of both Korea’s nature. In addition to the research facilities, there are water storages located proximately to not only record precipitation levels and water quality of the DMZ, but also to provide freshwater for the nearby military guard posts and to control flooding during the heavy rainfall season in the summer. The hydroelectric bridge acts as a circulation method for the researchers to keep them separate from the military, as well as a power source for the facility.

This faction space goes beyond the norm of questioning just the adjacent countries of the borderline; it works to solve questions for the greater whole. Although studying nature may not seem helpful to either of the Koreas at the moment, it opens up opportunities for the two to connect with each other through the common denominator of nature. It also leads to greater chances of the DMZ receiving designation by UNESCO as a Heritage Site, resulting a more positive reputation to the international crowd as well. This zone is beneficial to both North and South Korea.
fig. 3.26 existing on site

bridge  fence  guard post  screen

fig. 3.27 addition on site

wetland  observation post  hydroelectric bridge  water storage

(de) militarized zone
Zone C is developed with focus on the research of the DMZ ecology. The research facilities are located “inside” the DMZ in order to get hands-on access to the resources.
fig. 3.32 view into zone c
(de) militarized zone
fig. 3.33 view from water storage area
Zone D: South Korea [ Dynamic Tourism ]

Located upstream of the Peace Dam of South Korea, this zone focuses on activating the tourism aspect of the area. The main objective of this zone is to immerse the existing tourists into the landscape, specifically, the river. The Peace Dam is the predominant fact of this area: as a responsive dam to the Imnam Dam of North Korea, this dam does not have any other function than flood control. It has been built to simply hold back any excessive water volume, such as in case of the potential Imnam Dam bombing. As a result, there currently is a floodgate on the north side of the dam that leads the water towards Hwacheon Dam for drainage. Around the dam are various public programs, such as the Peace Square, Bell Park, camping grounds and Water Centre; they are connected from the top of the dam through a pathway that cuts diagonally through the south surface of the dam. In this zone, there is no residential area close by: the Peace Dam functions purely as a destination tourist point.

In this faction, the northern area of the dam is developed to intensify the existing tourism element of the zone. More area is dedicated for camping grounds and additional programs, such as public pools, leisure sports on water, and fishing circles, are distributed along the river to attract more people to stay longer. Recently, the number of visitors increased every year, from 188,550 people in 2008 to 248,964 people in 2010. With the increase in camping area and programs, it can be speculated that the number of visitors will increase at a rate of at least 20-30%.

a public research and education branch is located in this zone to promote the ecological value of the DMZ for visitors: the branch also manages the fish farms to maintain the diversity of the species. This branch will also be the grounds for the collaborative research group from Zone C, allowing the international researchers, including North Korea, to interact with the public visitors. This is similar to how the Mt. Geumgang Tourist Resort functioned, except this time, it is located in the South. The North Korean researchers will be free to talk only about their field of study, and not about anything related to their lives back home in North Korea.

The overall programs of this zone promote the benefit to the society of the Bukhan River and the meaning of the Peace Dam. From the four zones, this zone may be the one that focuses mostly on the reconciliation of the two Koreas through the mutual importance of water to the two nations and the potential of peace, arising from greater cooperation and familiarity. Nevertheless, one can also perceive this situation differently. South Korea is emphasizing the tourism of this zone, resulting in great potentials of increased profit, although it is only a small fraction of the GDP. Essentially, South Korea is benefiting from the outcome of a tragic history. If the tragic history does not lead to a tragic future, would South Korea really want reunification, especially at times when their economy is growing? If North and South Korea are to reunite, economic depression is not avoidable, as was seen in Germany.

Many unification movements already exist in South Korea and while this may not be the tipping point to major changes in the political dialogue between the two nations, it aims at contributing to the dialogue, positively or negatively. The purpose of this zone is to literally and figuratively immerse southerners into the waters from North Korea, educate them about where they are, and make them think about the relationship between the two Koreas through experiencing the landscape and learning from the researchers directly. Opportunities rise for thoughts to change into actions. This zone is beneficial mostly to South Korea.
fig. 3.34 existing on site

dam

public facilities

fig. 3.35 addition on site

pools

fishing circles / fish farms
Zone D is developed with focus tourism. The public programs are integrated into the existing landscape around the Peace Dam.

- fishing grounds
- Peace Park
- Peace Dam
- public programs
- water storage
- fish farms
- hydroelectric bridge
- natural wetland
- water storage
fig. 3.39 zone d partial plan

- parking
- camp buildings
- sports fields
- open area
- public pools
- boat docks
- public pool
- wetland
- Peace Dam

0 10 30 100m
(de) militarized zone
fig. 3.40 view into zone d
(de) militarized zone
fig. 3.41 view of camping grounds and river programs
[ conclusion ]

A problem exists between North and South Korea, and that problem cannot be solved instantly. Over the years, many have tried to solve it, of which some seemed to work and some failed tremendously. The problem, armistice state, requires years of planning and careful construction in order for the solution to even begin to take place. This thesis proposes that solution to be mutual benefits in forms of faction spaces rather than the one word, reunification. Faction spaces are not something that people encounter throughout their everyday lives; it is a place where it has been carefully scripted for its uses and how the users perceive it. As such, faction spaces become a powerful tool of achieving economic and cultural alliance between North and South Korea by establishing a relationship other than “two countries at armistice state.” Exchange of resources and people has been made through the faction spaces. It is not about trying to reunify the two Koreas together, but rather, help them coexist as independent countries with no tied strings. Mt.Geumgang Tourist Resort’s existence as faction space for almost ten years and Gaeseong Industrial Complex still existing today may be the solution in redesigning the relationship between North and South Korea. Not necessarily towards reunification, but something more positive than the current state can be anticipated. The governments can essentially become architects, designing spaces with specific programs and purposes that are targeted for specific users, but always with an ending that is as open and hopeful, as it is unpredictable. It is this open ending that makes the existence of faction spaces captivating. Faction spaces may either diminish back into the previous state, or be absorbed as the norm; this change in state is therefore what keeps the continuing relationship between the two Koreas moving forward. If the faction spaces do become absorbed into the norm, and as these increase in numbers, they may become the source for possibly creating a new kind of borderline condition that conceptually and physically extend beyond the two sets of barbed wire fences that currently define the edges of the DMZ.
Smaller fragments of faction spaces come together to create a greater faction space, and smaller events come together to stimulate an evolving relationship rather than the current static and escalating antagonistic relationship. North and South Korea exist in different realities and different conditions, but through the gradient of faction spaces, it may become possible to move toward an evolving and integrated relationship. A time may come when the most heavily militarized zone in the world, the demilitarized zone of North and South Korea, shifts its focus to become a space for reciprocity, a place of relief, a source that generates a healthier relationship between the two Koreas.
01. the imbalance


Kim, Jongdu. “금강산댐 이것이 문제다 (5) 국방당국의 분석 (this is the Problem of Mt,Geumgang Dam (5) the Analysis of Military Authorities).” The Kyunghyang Sinmun, November 6, 1986, sec. Serial Article.


02. the faction

“ChocoPie, $10 a Piece at North Korea’s Gaeseong Industrial Complex.” Kyunghyang Sinmun, November 25, 2011, sec. Politics.


03. the field


