The Long Reach of War: Canadian Records Management and the Public Archives

by

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Author’s Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Abstract

This thesis explores why the Public Archives of Canada, which was established in 1872, did not have the full authority or capability to collect the government records of Canada until 1966. The Archives started as an institution focused on collecting historical records, and for decades was largely indifferent to protecting government records. Royal Commissions, particularly those that reported in 1914 and 1962 played a central role in identifying the problems of records management within the growing Canadian civil service. Changing notions of archival theory were also important, as was the influence of professional academics, particularly those historians mandated to write official wartime histories of various federal departments. This thesis argues that the Second World War and the Cold War finally motivated politicians and bureaucrats to address records concerns that senior government officials had first identified during the time of Sir Wilfrid Laurier.
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My mother and father have been a source of constant encouragement and emotional support. Their cabin on Lake Superior, filled with laughter of family and friends, surrounded by the beauty of Algoma, was a wonderful retreat that eased the long hours of reading, researching and writing. The family cabin oasis is the result of Mom and Dad’s focus and labour. They have always encouraged a similar work ethic in my siblings and I, and for this, I am grateful. Hard work pays off.
To my family, who dare to think of six impossible things before breakfast.
(Apologies to Lewis Carroll)
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Introduction

The purpose of this study is to examine how the Public Archives of Canada acquired its status as a public record office, from its origins in 1872 to the implementation of a comprehensive records management policy in 1983. The thesis argues that the transformation of the Public Archives into a fully professional records management institution began in earnest with the expansion of government activities during the Second World War. Both departmental civil servants and archivists came to recognize the need for an institution that possessed the expertise necessary to manage records related to the history and governance of Canada.

This experience was not unique. Both the American Archives and the Public Records Office in the United Kingdom were the results of sustained lobbying efforts.¹ While the Canadian experience started well before the American Archives was formed in 1934, the process of consolidating the Canadian mandate took longer. In this way, the Canadian experience resembled that of the British institution, 100 years prior. Both British and the American institutions had an influence on the growth and idea of the Canadian Public Archives.

To discuss the growth of the Canadian Public Archives and the expansion of its mandate beyond the war years, a discussion of the factors that motivated its creation is necessary. Chapter one addresses the development of the Public Archives, then known as the Dominion Archives, from the period of Confederation to 1939. The Public Archives stemmed from confused beginnings when the Cabinet of Sir John A.

Macdonald created the Archives Branch of the Department of Agriculture in 1872. In 1873, the Secretary of State appointed a Keeper of the Records, creating two bodies within the federal government that held claims to historical public records. In 1897, a departmental commission on government records, led by the Under Secretary of State of External Affairs, Joseph Pope, “examine[d] and report[ed] on the state of records in departments, safe-keeping, which would be permanently preserved and which should be destroyed after an interval.” Known as the Canadian Records Commission, the report highlighted the need for better protection of government records and recommended an integrated archive that included historic, public and cultural records.

The recommendations of the commission were not all implemented, but the government merged the two archival institutions under one archivist in 1903. Arthur Doughty was appointed as Canada’s Dominion Archivist in 1904, and remained in this position until 1936. Doughty showed considerable energy to establish and maintain an institution that supported the study of Canadian history, which greatly contributed to the professionalization of Canadian history. To do so, Doughty argued that he needed a stronger mandate than what he received in 1904. In 1912, the Public Archives Act strengthened the mandate of the Public Archives, and gave the Dominion Archivist some authority over government records. But the Act did not give the Dominion Archivist any way to enforce his recommendations, nor the space to store valuable documentation. The Archives Act also left significant confusion concerning authority over government records. The Treasury Board had general control over government records, but the Dominion Archivist held authority over records that had historical value. No clear guideline described when a government record shifted from the control of the Treasury Board to the Archives.

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Like Brymner before him, Doughty focused on collecting all types of materials relevant to the history of Canada. This focus anticipated a concept described in the 1970s as “Total Archives”. Laura Millar argues that this concept originated from an “acceptance of public responsibility for the preservation of a wide range of archival materials, in all media and from all sources, in order to preserve society’s documentary heritage.” These archivists were focused on building a collection that reflected the country’s experience. Their emphasis was on acquiring and sometimes copying private records and those government records of historical interest to Canada in the United Kingdom and France. Both archivists gave lesser priority to government records in Canada.

In 1914, Doughty, with Joseph Pope and Ernest Frederick Jarvis, a senior official with the Department of Militia and Defence, led a Royal Commission on Departmental Records. The commissioners surveyed all departments and advocated a wider role for the Public Archives in the management of government records. The Commission’s primary recommendation was to establish a Canadian public records office to provide federal departments with improved protection for their records and better access for departments to dormant records stored offsite. The commissioners agreed that the Archives as a Public Records Office would not solve the issues of records storage in department offices. The government needed a plan to deal with the current volumes of records and future records. The Public Archives could increase accessibility, rid departments of obsolete records and establish mechanisms for the disposal of old files.

The government did not act on these recommendations, though they remained the ideal sought by records organizations until 1966. The 1914 Royal Commission acknowledged the potential for significant difficulties with government records. The onset of the First World War, however, interrupted the momentum the Archives and

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5 Wilson, “Noble Dream”, 32.
Pope had achieved by 1914. The question of who looked after government records remained unanswered.

The first chapter also explores the importance of the First World War, and the developments that occurred within the Public Archives in the 1920s and 1930s. From 1914 to 1918, Doughty continued to show his prowess as a collector, gathering war trophies, and creating travelling exhibits for Canadians on aspects of the First World War. His focus, however, was on the home front, as Sir Max Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook, the ex-patriot newspaper magnate and British politician, took on the task of gathering the war records created by the Canadian forces overseas. These records were repatriated to the defence department in the years following the armistice, for the purposes of an official history of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Those placed with the responsibility for these histories dramatically shaped the management of the records. With the First World War, the Army faced difficulties with record organization and appointed an individual who lacked historical training in Colonel A.F. Duguid. The First World War illustrated that records organization and care affected the process involved in official histories. The problems experienced with the official history of the First World War, shaped the direction of the official histories of the Second World War.

A lack of storage space for government records reached a crisis during the 1920s and 1930s, and the manner this problem was addressed shaped the response of the Public Archives and the government in the years that followed. Under the authority of the federal Department of Public Works, the government created an offsite storage facility for departmental records in 1933. Officials at the Department of Public Works assured their colleagues that their departments retained authority for their own records, but there was no means for these departments to retrieve their records. Departments started to find alternatives, including storing records in less desirable departmental facilities, such as basements and attics, and in over-crowded office space. Before the Public Archives achieved the status of a Public Records Office, future archivists and
civil servants needed to convince departments that a Public Record Office would differ in its operations from the Public Works storage facility.

The first chapter also highlights the role of the Public Archives in the professionalization of Canadian history. Doughty’s collection efforts, established a solid foundation for historical research. Doughty’s own involvement in the publication of Canada and its Provinces, (1913-1917) a 23-volume contribution to the country’s history, was, according to Donald Wright, a landmark in Canadian historiography. Doughty’s work led to a close alliance with Adam Shortt of Queen’s University. As Carl Berger explains, Shortt’s work represented a new brand of Canadian history. The relationship between Doughty and Shortt led to a close association between the Public Archives and the growing field of Canadian history.

The influence of Canadian professional historians is but one part of how the Canadian government understood the Public Archives during the Second World War, the subject of Chapter two. The impetus for better care of government records came from the office of the Prime Minister, who, either because of his civil service, family or political background, seemed very aware of the historical importance of his role and the actions of his government. King, through Arnold Heeney, his Cabinet Secretary, first urged departments in 1942 to afford better protection to records that contained historically valuable material. In 1944, King’s government created the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Public Records (IACPR) to support these efforts. With tensions forming between Gustave Lanctôt, who succeeded Doughty as Dominion Archivist in 1937, and King, the Prime Minister appointed capable federal bureaucrats outside the

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archives to address the records issue and ensure that the records of his government’s participation in the war were preserved.

As a series of brief case studies will show, the Canadian government lacked a unified records policy during the Second World War, which left departments responsible for the creation and management of their own filing systems. Officers within departments organized the documents, managed their circulation within the office, and initiated destruction procedures. Each department had control over how records came to the Public Archives. However, departments struggled with the expansion that resulted from the Second World War. The Public Archives and the central agencies of the federal government needed to help departments manage the mountain of wartime files, particularly those that offered insight into the country’s vast and wide-ranging war effort.

Federal departments responded to King’s encouragement in a variety of ways, but the issues of record collection became apparent in the efforts (not all of them successful) to publish official departmental histories after the war. The three departments to be examined, National Defence, Munitions and Supply, and External Affairs each had different organizational histories and records management procedures. The expansion of activities that occurred in departments during the war affected each department differently and each department had a unique response. These chapters will examine the efforts to produce official departmental wartime histories to describe how and why departmental records policies varied, and how the deficiencies affected the shape of the collection at the archives.

Each department tended to develop filing systems based on standard file keeping techniques, the registry. In this system, “a record is made of documents in the order in which they accumulate,” and each record received consecutive numbers that
control the documents and ordered the files. However, the specific nature of the
department activities affected how these registries were managed. Since each
department controlled its own records and systems, analysis into several departments
highlights how different departmental structures shaped the variety of record keeping
systems that existed during the war.

The third chapter on the Department of National Defence will focus largely on
the efforts of the three armed forces as they came to terms with the challenges of record
keeping in active operational theatres. The Air Force and Navy had special challenges
because the two services had substantial commands on the Atlantic and Pacific coast
engaged in far-reaching operations against enemy forces, and also large overseas forces
that were closely integrated with British forces. The exceptional experience was that of
the Army, whose overseas forces came under First Canadian Army headquarters in
1942. C.P. Stacey, a professional historian who worked at Canadian Military
Headquarters in London, had access to considerable resources, both at the bureaucratic
and political levels, to collect war materials for the purposes of the official history. In
1945, he became the Army’s official historian, with the rank of full colonel, with director
status at Army Headquarters in Ottawa. He was head of the General Staff’s substantial
and well-established historical section. Stacey also had effective personal relationships
with many senior army officers, and, more generally with senior government officials.
Stacey’s efforts show how one person with a strong historical background, and support
from the military authorities could affect the outcome of records management policies.
Stacey’s experience was exceptional. By contrast, the navy and air force had no such
tradition of historical record keeping and research. Their historians enjoyed nothing like
the support and access enjoyed by Stacey. As a result, their histories reflected very
different records keeping practices.

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9 T.R. Schellenburg, Modern Archives: Principles and Techniques (Chicago:
Outcomes varied significantly among departments. The Department of Munitions and Supply had a chaotic record keeping experience, which significantly affected the department’s official history. This department was founded for wartime purposes and designed to promote efficient management of materiel procurement. The department was established only weeks before the collapse of France in May 1940. By default, Canada was Britain’s ranking ally, which placed extraordinary demands on Canadian war production in rapidly changing circumstances. Munitions and Supply became a sprawling organization that addressed many diverse functions with divisions that operated with considerable autonomy. There was little time, and often few resources, to devote to uniform, coordinated administrative procedures and record keeping. Jack de Navarre Kennedy, appointed as the department’s official historian in 1946, had to find ways to create a narrative using piecemeal record structures across a vast bureaucratic infrastructure. The Department’s experience, the topic of chapter four, illustrates that not all record keeping efforts during the war were successful. The file keeping challenges of the department had a profound effect on the ability to assemble a complete and comprehensive narrative, a process heavily shaped by the government’s Public Records Committee.

The fifth chapter looks at the experience of the Department of External Affairs. Thirty years established at the start of the war, External Affairs was a developed organization with records procedures. Its activities expanded exponentially during the course of the war, which saw Canada emerge as a significant player on the world stage. One result was the explosive growth of records. The most interesting aspect of External Affairs’ experience was the complete failure of the filing system in 1940, when it proved unable to accommodate the increase in department activity. The transition to a new system in the midst of war revealed the records management challenges faced by the Canadian government. Unlike most other departments, External Affairs held on to its records well beyond the war. Despite the presence of notable historians on staff, the
official history of the department’s wartime experience evolved slowly, published only in 1978. Those who managed the record keeping systems in External Affairs during the war did not, at any point, envision the writing of an official history, which was not the case with some other departments.

As the country emerged from the war, Mackenzie King and his well-educated collection of bureaucrats reminded departmental staffs of their responsibility to monitor and protect their records. From 1945 to 1949, the period addressed in chapter six, the government started to streamline records management efforts, providing departments with the assistance of the IACPR, which became Public Records Committee (PRC) in September 1945. The IACPR was formed in 1944, partially on the encouragement of the Canadian Historical Association and senior civil servants, many of whom were trained historians. The PRC was to assist departments with the management of records for official histories, by working directly with the official historians and those placed with the responsibility for the care of department records. In the matter of a few years, the PRC expanded its mandate to include departments not directly involved in the war, as well as to encourage professional development activities for departmental records officials. The early efforts of the PRC were compromised, however, by strained relationships between the Dominion Archivist, Gustave Lanctôt, the Secretary of the PRC, W.E.D. Halliday, and Prime Minister King. The lack of a strong working relationship between the Prime Minister and the Archivist led King to delegate responsibility to the PRC to build the Archive’s capacity to manage government documentation.

With the appointment of W. Kaye Lamb as Dominion Archivist in 1949, the Public Archives experienced a major shift in the institution’s leadership styles. Lamb started to work with the PRC in efforts that are described in the seventh chapter. Lamb had scarcely entered his new office when he had to participate in hearings by the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, (The Massey
Commission) which drew attention to the issue of government records and started the dialogue required for a comprehensive records management policy. While the Massey Commission reported accurately on the Public Archive’s shortcomings and challenges of government records, this thesis argues that the Commissioners did not understand the extent of the difficulties that the Archives faced, the work of the PRC or offer realistic recommendations to help Lamb manage these challenges.

While the preservation of Canadian heritage advocated by Massey’s Commission was a desired outcome, it appears that the Canadian government was better motivated to protect its records by the threat of the Cold War. Faced with the prospect of governing during a nuclear disaster, departmental staffs worked through the Emergency Measures Organization to recognize the essential role of documents, and the necessity of protecting them. In the rush to preserve valuable records, departmental staffs started to recognize the need for a stronger archives mandate.

The eighth chapter deals with the years from 1955 to 1966, when the most important changes occurred in Canadian records management policy. During this period, the PRC and the Records Management Association, formed in December 1952, not only convinced the federal government of the value of protecting public records but provided the Public Archives with the professional body and training capability required to manage government records. The Report of the Civil Service Commission, led by Mackenzie King’s former secretary, Arnold Heeney, stressed the need for a professional civil service, and proper methods of training. Further impetus for action came in 1962 with the report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization. Chairman John Glassco set out to professionalize the civil service and argued for the administrative benefits of a strengthened public records office within the Public Archives. In the view of contemporary observers, Glassco made a number of

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recommendations that “served as a catalyst for the modernization of government administrative machinery and processes.” Such change within a government structure takes time, significant financial resources and the support of the wider public. Four years later, the government started to implement Glassco’s recommendations on public records. With a professional group of archivists and support from the business community, the government revisited the concept of a Public Records Office within the Public Archives.

The 1966 Public Records Order provided both the legislative mandate and resources to place the Public Archives at the head of a federal government records managements program. The 1966 Order was the belated outcome of developments during the Second World War. Significant programs of records management became unavoidable with the rapid expansion of government and the near explosion of records between 1939 and 1945. While many archivists and records managers were immediately aware of the resulting problems, and no less a figure than William Lyon Mackenzie King took early steps to respond to those difficulties, senior officials and their political masters did not appreciate the extent of the challenge and the urgency for change until the deepening of the Cold War, and imperatives for efficiency and economy in administration that led to the appointment of the Glassco Commission.

The year 1966 offers a key point in the evolution of the mandate of the Public Archives for government records. The ability of the Public Archives to care for government records, however, was shaped by the resources it had available. The gradual expansion of the Archives’ ability to care for government records is an indicator of the resources it received from the government. Without significant increases in

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financial and human resources, the implementation of a government records program could only occur on an incremental basis.\textsuperscript{12}

An underlying theme in this narrative is the importance of records, why they are created, and why they are worth saving. Governments create records to inform, communicate and stand as confirmation of actions. The reason for preserving such records is a legal one. The tools used to communicate and inform are preserved for accountability. As Geoffry Yeo offers in an \textit{American Archivist} contribution, government records act as evidence and information.\textsuperscript{13}

However, as Laura Millar points out, the Canadian archival institution suffered from an indifference to government records until around the Second World War.\textsuperscript{14}

Focusing instead on the historical aspects of records, there simply was not a demand for the information contained in Canadian government records. American Archivists were quicker to appreciate the importance of government records. Former President of the Society of American Archivists, John Fleckner, suggested,

\begin{quote}
The archival record… is a bastion of a just society… The archival record will help to secure justice… The archival record serves all citizens as a check against a tyrannical government. We need to look no further than the Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals to see that without the documentary record there could have been no calling to account, no investigation, no prosecution. And that record – the tapes, the documents and all the rest – stands as witness in the future to those who would forget or rewrite the past.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

Even though Canadian Archivists did not collect government records, as Millar suggests, the Canadian government continued to produce records. This thesis highlights the evolution of the Canadian archival thought that came to appreciate the need to collect government records.

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\textsuperscript{14} Millar, 110  
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As Canadian government activities expanded, so too did the legislation that documented how departments managed records. The regulations established by the Treasury Board dealt specifically with the financial management of the government and the public service. Public servants were first offered pensions in 1924, a program that required the creation of detailed personnel files. Seven years later, the *Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act of 1931* increased the Treasury Board’s control over government expenditures, and included specific regulations for the communication and retention of records outlining expenditures that applied to all departments.\(^{16}\)

The requirements to document financial transactions for the Treasury Board, long followed record keeping practices throughout the federal government. The Department of National Defence, for example, had long-standing rules and regulations that guided the records of its services. These only increased during times of war. In the *Instructions Governing Organization and Administration* from 1916, units of the Canadian Expeditionary Force were given specific instructions regarding regimental documents and records.\(^{17}\) The regulations covered the handling of nominal rolls, attestations papers, declaration papers, medical histories, conduct sheets, casualty forms and family information. Other records included pay records and statements.\(^{18}\) This pattern continued into the Second World War.

Departments created many more records than those categorized as legal or financial records. In many cases, departmental records were kept simply because the department had the storage space. As Laura Millar explains, “records generated by


departments were used, filed, and, “where the papers are not so numerous as to lead to inconvenience,” retained in the same rooms where regular clerical work was done.”

While concerns were expressed, little was done in the early 20th century to offer suitable arrangements to protect these government records.

This thesis is largely based on primary resources from Library and Archives Canada and the Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence but the author has drawn upon a wide secondary literature as well. It is significant that, speaking to the membership of the Canadian Historical Association, C.P. Stacey observed that the archivist and the archival institutions remain less known than the historian. Like the “fellow who passes the ammunition” to the man wielding the rifle, the archivist plays a vital but often overlooked role supporting historical endeavours. This comment also reflects the literature available on the Canadian record keeping experience. Many archivists like Jay Atherton, Ian Wilson, Tim Dubé, Brian Masscheale, and Paulette Duzois have written on the wider record keeping experience of the Canadian government, but they have not all articulated the development of the archival institution within a historical context.

Terry Cook has produced numerous articles on the development of Canadian archival theory. His article on Archivist W. Kaye Lamb explores the dramatic influence Lamb exerted on the archives and government during his tenure from 1949 to 1968. However, a gap still remains in the discussion of the

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long-term development of records management in the Canadian government, and how external events and forces affected changes within the national institution.

Given the role that Canadian historians played in the development of the Public Archives, it is surprising that the subject has not received more attention from later historians. In 1969, John Hall Archer completed a dissertation at Queen’s University on “A Study of Archival Institutions in Canada.” Archer’s research focused on the broader institutional archival experience in the country, including provincial and church archives. Archer looked at the establishment of institutions in Canada, and how the creation of the Public Archives stemmed from a strong cultural lobby, particularly from historians. Archer provided background on the development of the international archival environment, including a discussion on the growth and expansion of the British Public Records Office, the French Archives Nationales, and the National Archives in the United States. He also offered a thorough discussion of the development of archival theory from the creation of the Canadian archives in 1872 until 1969. Archival theory looms large in this study, which concerns itself more with the Ottawa context, that is the influence of politics including those of the bureaucracy, and the wider development of government that shaped records creation.

The Canadian and British archival traditions were similarly aligned. The British Public Records Office (PRO) was created in 1838 after a lengthy lobbying process to store and protect government records that spanned thousands of years, documenting Britain’s rich public and government, history. The PRO received a mandate to store documents created by government agencies and organizations. Since many of the documents in its collections were created by organizations long since dissolved, the PRO had little concern for the wishes for the creating bodies for it did not have to deal

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24 Archer, Archival Institutions in Canada, 11-17.
with sensitive issues concerning active records. This allowed the PRO to establish itself as protector of the records, the guardian of the evidentiary record. The PRO did not choose which documents it held; that was decided by department officials. This prerogative was most strongly asserted by Sir Hilary Jenkinson, an assistant keeper with the Public Records Office in London and employee of the PRO from 1906 until 1954. Jenkinson served as the deputy keeper of the Public Records Office from 1947 until 1954. Archivists in the PRO during Jenkinson’s time were cautioned against deciding what types of documents were worthy of archival protection.  

The creation of the National Archives in the United States in 1934, 100 years after the PRO, marked the evolution of a new archival perspective, whereby archivists actively selected records for collections. Former President of the United States, Herbert Hoover, was appointed to chair the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch in 1947 by then President Henry Truman. Emmett J. Leahy, who would become the National Archivist, chaired the Task Force on Paper Management, a component of the larger committee, which first used the term “records management.” Since the departments determined which records the National Archives would collect, American archivists requested that departments organize the records they planned to transfer to the record office. With the long history of departmental archiving and the expertise that existed in state-run organizations, engaging departments in the procedures of the national institution was a logical step.

The most significant addition to archival policy and the birth of records management theory was the creation of the records life cycle principle. The work of

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archivists Margaret Cross Norton and American archival activist Waldo Leland, this theory acknowledged the full life span of a record, noting variances in the types of records created, used and stored by departments. These archivists developed the theory to help manage the large collections that developed during the Second World War. In 1944, Norton, the State Archivist in Illinois, acknowledged the need for a selection function for government records when she stated, “it is obviously no longer possible for any agency to preserve all records which results from its activities.”

The resulting theory led to dramatic changes in records management policies.

T.R. Schellenburg, a notable American archivist at the national institution, advanced the concept of record appraisal. Schellenburg began to formulate the theory from the time he joined the archives in 1935, and developed his ideas in a series of Fulbright lectures in 1956. Schellenburg saw records management as a “concern with the whole life span of most records. It strives to limit their creation.” He felt that proper record management techniques were of great importance: “government efficiency can be often measured by the efficiency with which its records are managed.”

Schellenburg argued record managers needed to identify the needs of government officials and dispose of records once they served their purpose. Knowing the context of the documents’ creation, record managers were able to create disposal schedules for documents, even those not yet created. Organizations could transfer records to repositories and archives on a regular basis, which increased the efficiency of records management as well as the involvement of the archives in the record management process. Appraisal in advance would help the archives and departments manage the large volume of documents.

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29 Terry Cook, “What is Past is Prologue,” 26.
30 Schellenburg, Mordern Archives, 37.
31 Ibid.
A good deal has been written on the Second World War and its effect on the Canadian government.\textsuperscript{32} There is also a great deal of analysis on how the record keeping policies contributed to the writing of Canadian Second World War histories and the effect of the war on the Canadian government.\textsuperscript{33} In \textit{Clio’s Warriors}, for example, Tim Cook shows how individuals who collected records for official histories continued to influence the writing of the history in the post war, as well as how those records were managed.\textsuperscript{34} This thesis applies Cook’s approach to explain how the writing of official wartime histories of other federal departments influenced the process of federal records management in Canada.

The process of professionalizing the Public Archives and records management was influenced by a number of other factors and circumstances, which appear throughout the narrative. In the absence of a strong archival profession, Canadian historians served as lobbyists for the institution and perhaps more importantly, the records. In some cases, this influence originated from the Canadian Historical Association, and leaders of the field, such as George Brown at the University of Toronto. A number of bureaucrats recognized the problems with government policies on records handling, and the potential of the Public Archives to address these shortcomings. Men like Joseph Pope, A.D.P. Heeney, George Glazebrook, and William Edward Durant Halliday lobbied hard for the development and strengthening of the archival mandate. Each official historian during the war came to exert influence on archival collections, helping the government direct efforts to organize and control the collections and departmental registries.


\textsuperscript{33} Stacey, \textit{Arms, Men and Governments}; Granatstein, \textit{The Ottawa Men}; Granatstein, \textit{Canada’s War}.

\textsuperscript{34} Tim Cook, \textit{Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and the Writings of the World Wars} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006).
The personalities of Prime Ministers, members of Cabinet, politicians, bureaucrats and Archivists further influenced the advances made by the archival institution. Strong working relationships among these people led to collaboration on records policies and archival issues. Without such collaboration, development was either stalled, or a party was excluded from dialogue. Such exclusions often limited the effectiveness of the policies devised, or stalled the progress completely.

No fewer than four Commissions had a major impact on the development of the archives. These were: the Departmental Commission on Public Records (1897); a Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the state of the records of the public departments of the Dominion, (1912-1914); the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (the ‘Massey Commission,’ 1949-1951), and the Royal Commission on Government Organization (the ‘Glassco Commission,’ 1960-1963). In several cases, influential bureaucrats shaped the direction of the commissions’ reports and highlighted for the government, accurately or not, the role of the Public Archives in regard to government records.

The impact of war and apprehended war is a central theme of this study. Security is the ultimate responsibility and test of government, and nothing stimulates action and change like a menace to national security. The Second World War profoundly shaped the development of a records management program by creating a records problem of gargantuan proportions, itself a function of the greatly increased range of activity undertaken by the government in response to that global conflict. The Cold War, with its threat of attacks on the homeland that could cripple the capacity of the government to govern, then led the wider civil service to realize that records, properly managed and securely stored, were essential for the daily conduct of government. While a few astute bureaucrats identified the problems of the government’s records policy before 1939, the government’s response came during
periods of conflict and apprehended conflict that increased government activity, magnified the records problems, and threatened to hinder ongoing operations.

C.P. Stacey is particularly important to the discussion of the Department of National Defence records management as well as the involvement of historians in the promotion of records management in the federal government. British models often influenced Stacey and his generation of academics and government officials. The British offered examples of best practices, but also those to avoid or change. In the case of records management, Stacey and Canadian Air Force and Navy historians overseas during the war had worked closely (but not without more than occasional frustration) with their British counterparts; Canada’s overseas forces operated as integral parts of British higher commands.

After the war, when Schellenburg and the American Archives started to implement new modes of archival appraisal, the Public Archives in Canada was limited in its capacity to implement these theories. The records that had accumulated over the course of the war required organization and care, and the archival theory emanating from the United States provided the tools to manage such records. However, the Canadian institution needed the human and financial resources for such an effort. The institution faced many shortcomings, and could not yet implement new and innovative records theories. The Public Archives needed a stronger archival profession to help manage government records. The development of a skilled work force depended on a supportive public service and an increased understanding of the records problem. This required archival courses and professional associations, which were just emerging in the creation of the Records Management Association of Ottawa, to help departments manage records in the post war.

In short, there was a need for an archival profession in Canada, which like other professions, had a specialized area of expertise, courses of training, sets of regulations
and guidelines, and a responsibility to those it served.\textsuperscript{35} The concepts of expertise, corporateness and responsibility are valuable to the discussion of the Canadian Public Archives. The growth of government and expansion of records production that resulted during the war required the attention of the Public Archives and a trained body of records managers. The Public Archives come to be a centre of research and scholarship for Canadian historians, but it had not adequately addressed the management of government records. The Second World War and the records that were created in the administrative effort required new measures of organization and protection. If the Public Archives wanted to continue to offer historians government records for historical research, the organization had to increase its involvement in the management of government records to ensure their preservation. To accomplish this, archivists and the Public Archives needed to develop expertise within records care, develop professional organizations and offer training opportunities for archivists. Managing government records required new skills, and the Public Archives needed time to develop a strong infrastructure to support a viable Public Records Office.

The 1966 Order was the belated outcome of developments during the Second World War. Significant programs of records management became unavoidable with the rapid expansion of government, and the near explosion of records in 1939-45. While many archivists and records managers were immediately aware of the resulting problems, and no less a figure than William Lyon Mackenzie King took early steps to respond to those difficulties, senior officials and their political masters did not appreciate the extent of the challenge and the urgency for change until the deepening of

the Cold War, and imperatives for efficiency and economy in administration that were reflected in the recommendations of the Glassco Commission. Until the late 1950s, and officially, 1966 with the passing of the Public Records Order, the Canadian Public Archives shifted from an institution driven by a mandate of historical relevance, subject to the archivist’s discretion, to an institution that assisted departments in managing paper burdens for more efficient and economic government administration. While only a part of the Public Archives mandate, the public records office function coordinated the scheduling of masses of material for removal to non-departmental storage, and eventual destruction or safe keeping as a historical document within the Public Archives. This transition occurred because of the records management imperative established by the challenges created by the growth of records and government functions during the Second World War.

This study addresses several central questions. Why did the Public Archives receive authority over public records as late as 1966, more than 90 years after the founding of the institution? What external forces account for the belated achievement of such an apparently fundamental measure? Did role did personalities play within the government, public service and the Public Archives? What role did academic historians and other members of the historical community in Canada play in the development of the Public Archives? Did Royal Commissions and other investigations accurately perceive the problems the Public Archives faced? This thesis explores how these forces influenced the development of the Canadian archival institution.
Origins of the Dominion Archives, 1867 – 1939: Searching for a Mandate

This chapter explores the evolution of the Public Archives from its origins to the eve of the Second World War. In that time, public officials debated the role and mandate of the Public Archives. Two Royal Commissions, in 1897 and 1912 sought to settle the issue. The appointment of a Dominion Archivist in 1903 and another Archives Act in 1912 helped refine the purpose of the Archives, but they did not fully address which federal body had the responsibility for government records. The mass of records produced from the First World War and the limited records organization that occurred during the war, the efforts to produce an official history of the Canadian Expeditionary force, and then the deep constraints on public spending that resulted from the Great Depression of the 1930s raised fresh challenges that left little resolved before Canada entered the Second World War.

With only 310 government employees in 1872, the federal government did not require an elaborate organization to preserve records. The government adopted the system used by the British, controlling correspondence entering or leaving the offices through a central registry. The Treasury Board was established at Confederation, but not to keep and classify state records, but rather to provide central management for the federal government, which included managing records and government forms. Archiving was not a part of the Records Branch mandate. The young Canadian government had yet to appoint a body to care for records of historical importance.

A growing body of prominent Canadians interested in their country’s past agreed that an archives charged with collecting records would form the foundation of a

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Canadian patriotism and identity. In 1871, the Quebec Literary and Historical Society, an influential academic society based in Montreal, started to pressure the federal government for greater archival initiatives to assist with historical endeavours and to preserve government records. The Earl of Dalhousie, the Governor in Chief of British North America from 1820 to 1828, founded the Society in 1823. Its first president was appointed in 1831, when the association received a Royal Charter. Lieutenant Governor of Lower Canada, Sir Francis Nathaniel Burton, became the first president. Other politicians, academics, doctors and military officers succeeded Burton. It would not be the last time when a historical organization promoted the importance of archives.

The Society’s prominent membership helped garner a response from a government that included at least two influential ministers who shared the Society’s views. They were Thomas D’Arcy McGee (who died in 1868) and John A. Macdonald. The Dominion Government issued an Order in Council on 20 June 1872 that appointed Douglas Brymner as an archivist within the Department of Agriculture, Arts and Statistics. Brymner’s role was to collect, arrange and make records that contained historical information available for research. His work did not specifically address government records. Born in Greenoch, Scotland on 3 July 1823, Brymner came to the Canadas in 1857, and settled in the Eastern Townships, where he was elected mayor of Melbourne for two years. While in Montreal, Brymner was a journalist for the Montreal

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Herald, the editor of The Presbyterian, and was known for his involvement in the small and exclusive Parliamentary Press Gallery in the 1860s. Amongst government officials and other members of the gallery, Brymner was a well-known amateur historian, which likely motivated his appointment as a clerk in charge of the archives in Agriculture. In the 1872 estimates, Brymner received $4,000 dollars and three rooms in the West Block of Parliament to fulfill his duties.

Lacking significant direction or guidance, and with little knowledge of archives, Brymner started by collecting and preserving records stored in British garrisons and forts within Canada. He also negotiated with British authorities for government records that contained historic information on the Canadas. These were government records, but Brymner’s focus was on their historical content. In 1873, he travelled to London, visiting the War Office, the Hudson’s Bay Company, the Colonial Office, the Public Record Office, the British Museum and the Tower of London searching for records related to Canadian history. In the 1880s, he organized a lengthy program to transcribe from the British Museum the papers of Sir Frederick Haldimand. While his assistants searched for and transcribed documents in Paris, Brymner asked prominent Canadian families to donate their records and papers. Former archivist Glenn Wright has argued that Douglas Brymner’s efforts to find historical Canadian records formed the basis of the Public Archives collection.

43 Wilson, “Shortt and Doughty,” 3.
Brymner was mandated to collect and arrange historical records and provide historians with access to the records, a very different function than those performed by the Records Branch in the Treasury Department. The latter organization was responsible for the creation and use of government records, and less with records that had already been used and were no longer needed by departments. These government records, inactive and relegated to storage rooms, did not fall within either of the mandates of the Records Branch nor Brymner’s Archives.

Within five years of Confederation, the Canadian government had organized two records organizations, but with no clear definitions that separated the functions of the two organizations, conflict was inevitable. Shortly after his appointment, Brymner located in a vault under Government House in Montreal valuable records created by the governments of Upper and Lower Canada. The question arose: were these government records or historical records? Which body was responsible for them, the Treasury Board or the Archives Branch?

Instead of clarifying the issue, the government of Prime Minister Macdonald further complicated matters. Atherton has suggested that officials in the Secretary of State, which was responsible for government records, viewed Brymner in the Department of Agriculture as a threat to their mandate. In October 1873, Cabinet agreed that one person should arrange and classify important government documents. Cabinet reasoned the Treasury Board should complete this task, since it was responsible for the arrangement of records created through daily departmental business. The Department of the Secretary of State appointed Henry J. Morgan, an early Canadian

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historian, lawyer, editor and long serving civil servant, to the Records Branch as Keeper of the Public Records. He became Chief Clerk in December 1875, a position he held until 1883, and oversaw government records. Morgan was demoted in 1888 for using government monies for his own use. After fighting for years to clear these charges, Morgan retired in 1895.

In 1892, Brymner was in London organizing the transcription of records when he started to investigate the record keeping practices of several European countries. Of most direct influence was the British Public Records Office (PRO), which was created in 1838 to store and protect government records that spanned thousands of years of British history. Its first building opened in 1851, but it was not until 1877 that its staff addressed inactive and dead departmental records accumulations and created disposition schedules for departmental papers. The PRO became a model for Brymner, an institution that sought out manuscripts and papers of historical interest that documented all aspects of British society from all types of creators, including government officials. Brymner returned to Canada in 1894 with the recommendation to amalgamate the Records Branch in the Treasury Board and the Archives in the Department of Agriculture.

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Brymner was too busy copying transcripts to pursue his idea, but he did find a sympathetic and influential ally in Joseph Pope. A longtime civil servant, Joseph Pope, figures prominently in the story of the archives. Pope came from a family with strong ties to public service. Pope’s uncle, James C. Pope, was the Premier of Prince Edward Island in 1870, and his grandfather became the provincial government’s Treasurer. Joseph became the clerk of the Treasury when he was just sixteen.\(^{54}\) In 1879, when John A. Macdonald was re-elected Prime Minister, he appointed James Pope as the Minister of Marines and Fisheries. Joseph Pope became his uncle’s secretary. Two years later, Joseph became one of the prime minister’s two private secretaries. In 1886, he became Macdonald’s sole secretary, and in 1889, assistant clerk of the Privy Council.\(^ {55}\) After Macdonald’s death in 1891, Pope continued under Prime Minister Sir Charles Tupper as the Under Secretary of State in January 1896. Remarkably, Pope retained the position under Liberal Wilfrid Laurier in 1896, partly due to the influence of his wife, Minette, a Taschereau who had long been close to the Laurier family.\(^ {56}\)

Joseph Pope was thus well acquainted with the workings of the civil service when he urged the Laurier government to address the insecure way the government handled its records of business. In January 1897, Pope warned his colleague Richard Scott, the leader of the Senate and long time civil servant, that the attic in the East Block of Parliament was “filled with original plans, field notes, etc., of the North West Surveys.” Pope noted that “A match would set the whole thing in a blaze and the loss


would be irreparable.” After voicing his concerns to Scott, Pope had an opportunity to express his views to Laurier on the 17th of January. Pope recalled in his diary,

Mr. Laurier showed himself a most sympathetic listener, thanked me for bringing the matter to his notice, and promised to consult his colleagues as to the steps which should be taken to remedy this state of things, which he agreed with me was discredit to the country.

On 11 February 1897, the West Block of Parliament caught fire, destroying the entire top floor and with it records from the Departments of Railways and Canals, Public Works and Marine and Fisheries, and correspondence files of the North West Mounted Police.

According to Pope, the government responded promptly, appointing the Canadian Records Commission to investigate the procedures that governed and protected government records. A Treasury Board minute of 19 February 1897 directed J.M Courtney, J.L. MacDougall and Pope to “examine and report on the state of records in departments, safe-keeping, which would be permanently preserved and which should be destroyed after an interval.” The Commission was to create a records plan for the government that addressed cost, storage space and accessibility of documents. In his memoirs Pope recalled that Courtney and MacDougall were not on speaking terms, so they left him with the work of the Commission.

The Commission’s report, published in 1897, reflected many of Pope and Brymner’s ideas, highlighting the need to better protect government records. Pope wanted to see a concentration and unity of control for government records. The

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57 Pope to Scott, (7 January 1897): 5-6, vol. 303, RG 37, LAC.
60 Pope, Public Servant, 114.
62 Correspondence from Joseph Pope to Newcombe, Deputy Minister of Justice, 17 March 1897, vol. 1893, RG 13, LAC.
63 Pope, Public Servant, 114.
64 Pope to Scott, (7 January 1897), 5-6, vol. 303, RG 37, LAC.
Commission argued for a board of inspection that was to conduct departmental reviews of filing systems to avoid registering, docketing and filing correspondence of little value, and to unify archival functions.65

The publication of the Commission’s recommendations fell in between sessions of Parliament, and the government was slow to respond.66 However, Pope’s influences were apparent in a letter written by the Governor General, Lord Minto to the Prime Minister in January 1903. Pope and the Governor General were already involved in the Alaska Boundary question, where Pope had been embarrassed by how badly organized were the Canadian diplomatic papers related to the dispute.67 Minto began his letter by referring to his own research into the defences of Quebec, when he discovered that related War Office papers that had been transferred to the Canadian government in 1891 “had entirely disappeared.” The papers finally turned up in the Department of the Interior, but his search “revealed to me what I can only call the most lamentable disregard for the historical archives of the Dominion.” He complained that important papers were scattered throughout different departments, “committed to the flames,” or “removed . . . for the benefit of the paper factories.” Minto quoted from the 1897 Commissioners’ report that no one official was responsible for government papers, and that no “system...would appear to exist for their custody.” Even though Henry Morgan had long since retired and Douglas Brymner had died in 1902, Minto noted that two “gentlemen” still claimed themselves to be “Archivist & Keeper of the Records, while

Mr. McGee as Clerk of the Privy Council, is also entrusted with the classification of old
records.” All of this, he claimed, “came at considerable expense and duplication.”

For a solution, the Governor General again looked to the 1897 Commissioners’
Report, which recommended that a Cabinet member be appointed the “Keeper of the
Records” to oversee a Canadian Public Records Office. The “Deputy Keeper of the
Records” would then act as the “chief executive officer.” Minto also made clear the
immediate need for a “fire-proof building suitable to receive the enormous number of
papers it would be required to contain.” The Governor General apologized for the tone
of his letter, but the matter was urgent: “It is not only in the Government Offices that I
know many valuable papers exist, but that scattered throughout the country, in the old
Hudson Bay posts, for instance—there are many utterly uncared for documents which
are of the greatest historical value.”

Laurier finally took notice. Later that year, Laurier amalgamated the positions of
Dominion Archivist and, the Department of Agriculture and the Keeper of the Records
under the Secretary of State, and started the construction of a new archival building, on
Sussex Drive in Ottawa. Laurier also heeded the advice of his Governor General, who
had outlined the high standards required for “the appointment of a Deputy Keeper of
the Records [who] would be of the greatest possible value to the history of the
Dominion . . .” The position would “require that the person selected should not only be
possessed of clerical ability as regards classification, but of literary & historical tastes of
some connection with the leading historians & litterateurs of other countries besides his
own. It w[oul]d. appear to me that the appointment would be thrown away upon

68 “Lord Minto to Laurier, 19 January 1903,” in Gilbert John Murray Kynynmond Elliot
Minto, Lord Minto’s Canadian Papers: A Selection of the Public and Private Papers of the Fourth Earl of
Minto, 1898-1904, ed. Paul Douglas Stevens and John T Saywell, The publications of the
69 “Lord Minto to Laurier, 19 January 1903,” in Gilbert John Murray Kynynmond Elliot
Minto, Lord Minto’s Canadian Papers: A Selection of the Public and Private Papers of the Fourth Earl of
Minto, 1898-1904, ed. Paul Douglas Stevens and John T Saywell, The publications of the
anyone not possessed of the above qualifications.” Lord Minto thought “Mr. Doughty of Quebec” a likely candidate.\textsuperscript{70}

Born in 1860 in Maidenhead, Berkshire England, Doughty immigrated to British North America in 1886. Doughty started to work at the Legal and Commercial Exchange, while spending his spare time writing poetry, songs, and reviews for the Montreal Gazette. He started working in the Quebec government in 1895.\textsuperscript{71} In 1901, Doughty was appointed as the Librarian of the Legislative Assembly of Quebec.\textsuperscript{72}

Doughty’s research and interests reflected a growing Canadian national sentiment at the turn of what the Prime Minister had proclaimed would be ‘Canada’s century.’ To that end, Doughty wanted to provide academics with records that would form the basis of Canadian scholarship.\textsuperscript{73} In the early 1900s, little material existed for historians who wished to conduct research on the Canadian past. George Wrong was appointed in 1894 as a lecturer and first Chair of Canadian history at the University College in Toronto, and started to publish the \textit{Review of Historical Publications Relating to Canada}.\textsuperscript{74} Wrong’s publication joined \textit{Queen’s Quarterly}, which Adam Shortt at Queen’s University initiated in 1893 to examine current economic events in Canada.\textsuperscript{75} According to Carl Berger, Shortt’s contribution was “one of urging a broadening of the scope and subject matter of history to include the social and the economic life of the people, and the accumulation, organization and publication of documentary evidence.”\textsuperscript{76}

Doughty fostered a strong and lasting relationship with these scholars. In 1907, the government created the Historical Manuscripts Commission to assist the Dominion

\begin{footnotes}
\item Ib\textit{id.}, 251.
\item Wilson, “Noble Dream,” 24.
\item Wilson, “Noble Dream,” 24.
\item Berger, \textit{The Writing of Canadian History}, 8; George Wrong, \textit{Review of historical publications related to Canada} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1911).
\item Berger, \textit{The Writing of Canadian History}, 13.
\item Berger, \textit{The Writing of Canadian History}, 26.
\end{footnotes}
Archivist to gather original sources and publish historical documents to develop a national spirit and a Canadian historical community. The commission consisted of five historians who advised the Dominion Archivist on policy development, and helped the Archivist overcome the sizeable workload he faced. They were Adam Shortt, George Wrong, Charles Colby, and two French Canadian historians, Abbe August Gosselin and J. Edmond Roy. The Commission helped foster a relationship between Dominion Archivist and Canadian historians, which led to numerous publications including the twenty-three volume series, Canada and its Provinces, (1913-1917) as well as the Makers of Canada series and the Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1759-1791 (1907, revised 1918).

As much as Doughty and his archives began to serve the needs of a growing historical community, little developed concerning the best use of government records. Records remained in the possession of the departments, managed through their central registries. Determining the historical value of these documents was problematic. To Joseph Pope’s continued frustration, Prime Minister Laurier read excerpts of diplomatic dispatches to his cabinet “to decide which ministry they would go to. No record of their destinations existed except in Laurier's head.”

Joseph Pope’s influence continued into the government of Sir Robert Borden after 1911. In 1912, the new government passed the first Public Archives Act. The Act covered “all such public records, documents and other historical material of every kind,

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78 Wilson, “Noble Dream,” 27.
81 Pope, quoted in Waite, “Sir Joseph Pope.”
nature and description… [these were] placed under the care, custody and control of the Dominion Archivist. With this clearer, broader mandate, the Public Archives’ role in the handling of government records seemed to increase. Yet there remained uncertainty in the authority granted to the Public Archives to gather, manage and collect government records. The legislation gave authority to the Governor General, acting on advice of the cabinet to transfer authority for government records from the department to the archives. But the Cabinet was not well situated to comment on the historic value of public records. The Act did not clearly state how departments were to preserve their records, nor did it offer guidelines for supervised destruction.

With his new archival mandate, Doughty wanted to determine the state of government records. He encouraged the government of Robert Borden in 1912 to appoint a Royal Commission “to examine the state of departmental records,” including the

Nature and extent of the records, their state of preservation; the use made of them in conducting public business and state of the building where they are deposited; the space they occupy; the facility of access thereto by the Departments… and the control exercised over the records.

Borden appointed Arthur Doughty as a commissioner, as well as Joseph Pope, who was then continuing his appointment under Laurier as Under Secretary of External Affairs in the Borden government. The Deputy Minister of the Department of Militia and Defence, E.F. Jarvis joined them. Interestingly, his department’s records were the only ones to have been deposited into the Archives to that time.

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82 An Act Respecting the Public Archives, 1912, SC, chapter 4, section 7.
83 When the Governor General acted on the advice of the cabinet, legislation often referred to the Governor General’s position as the Governor in Council (GIC).
Through late 1912 and much of 1913, the Commissioners conducted over 200 visits to various government departments, libraries and commissions. Only the scale of disorder varied from what Pope had first discovered 16 years before. In the East and West Blocks, the Parliament Buildings and the Langevin Building, the Commissioners counted over 24 miles of shelving. They noted, “every available room in the various buildings is occupied with records, and moreover, that vacant houses and extra rooms in different parts of the city are utilized for the purpose.” From stables and attics they rescued “whole series of papers, some of them very valuable; the very existence of which seems to have been forgotten.” The commissioners found “older documents [were] commonly relegated to basements, attics and dark rooms, apparently rather as lumber to be got rid of than as records to be preserved.”87 The Commissioners concluded that, “one fact, everywhere observable, is that the preservation and care of the older records is the last thought of anybody.”88

It was clear to Doughty, Jarvis and Pope that records storage space was a significant problem, but obtaining the necessary financial support remained a challenge. In late January 1914, in advance of the Royal Commission’s final report, Rodolph Lemieux, a former Liberal Cabinet minister and legal scholar, asked the Minister of Public Works to look at the advisability of building a new archival building for Doughty. Lemieux stated, “having occasion to frequent the building [on Sussex] quite often, I know that it is impossible to accommodate all the documents within the four walls of the present building.”89 It seems likely that Doughty met and conversed with Lemieux during his visits to the Archives, and helped convince the Minister of the need for a new building and additional space. On 17 March 1914, the House was informed that the estimates provided to the Archives were to be decreased by $4,500. Lemieux

stood in the House, outlining for the members the importance of the Archives to Canadian history, and the efforts of Brymner and Doughty to gather records of value to Canadian history. In response, Louis Coderre, the Secretary of State reported to the House of Commons that supplementary estimates for 1915 included $50,000.00 allotted for the extension of the archives building, for space three times what it had available in 1914. Parliament approved the sum. It would seem that Doughty, with his ability to convince these members of the importance of the archives mandate, would receive the additional storage space for government records.

The Commission released its findings in March 1914, and its primary recommendation was to establish a Canadian public records office to provide federal departments with improved protection for their records and offer better access to departments. A public records office is a repository designed specifically for records created by government departments and agencies. Records offices do not exercise a collection or appraisal function to the same extent as archives, but provide a safe storage area for those records deemed important by the creating body, often while offering access and retrieval services to the creating bodies. In most cases, records at the record office were governed by a records schedule, which anticipate when certain types of records will arrive at a records office. This helps the records office anticipate the volume of records it needs to store, and assist with the administrative processed in a government department.

A Public Records Office alone would not solve the issues of records storage in department offices, according to the Doughty, Pope and Jarvis. The government needed a plan to deal with the current volumes of records and future records. The Commissioners recommended that,

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91 Wilson, “Noble Dream,” 32.
Files of correspondence, registers, indexes, books of account and so forth, belonging to any Department or the Public Service, should after 25 years (or an earlier date, if the Department so desires,) be removed to the Public Records Office and deposited in the section set in the Office for the use of the Departments...and remained under the control of the Department concerned.\textsuperscript{92}

As to the destruction of records, the Commission recommended that a centralized authority under the “Treasury Board should be sought for the destruction of all documents as competent authority may consider useless.” The Commissioners also envisioned a reference library where the government’s extensive and growing lists of publications could be housed.\textsuperscript{93}

The Royal Commission of 1914 provided a most distressing picture of how badly the federal government was then dealing with the growing weight of bureaucracy, and the paper that it produced. The Commission demonstrated the continued influence of then Sir Joseph Pope, (knighted 1912). Nevertheless, his continued work in the Department of External Affairs found him in early 1914 overseeing the drafting of the government’s War Books. Above all, the Commission showed the growing influence of Arthur Doughty.

The Commission offered the first set of guidelines for records management within the federal government. Its recommendations formed the theoretical basis for the introduction of records schedules, destruction procedures, and the idea of a Public Records Office to the federal government. The Canadian government had started to expand, and the Commission offered a roadmap for the management of government records in the federal government.

Unfortunately, response of the House to the Commission was muted. In June 1914, Borden offered to show the report to any honourable gentlemen, as it was “very

\textsuperscript{92} Royal Commission to Inquire into the State of Records, 21-22.
\textsuperscript{93} Royal Commission to Inquire into the State of Records, 28, 29.
well got up indeed.” Mr. Rodolphe Lemieux encouraged Borden to print the report for all members to read, but the Prime Minister seemed content to leave the ten-volume report, which included the Commission’s review of department records, available for those interested parties willing to step forward. Aside from the promise of funds in the following year for more storage space, which was no minor accomplishment, the House did not act on the recommendations offered by Doughty, Pope and Jarvis.

The eve of the First World War was seemingly a significant point in the life of the Public Archives. A Royal Commission had just outlined the limitations of government record keeping, a new Archives Act had expanded the role of the archivist, and there was some greater appreciation for the records issue and the physical constraints the archives faced within the federal government. The Archives was also on track to obtain more physical space in 1915. However, all attention turned to the war once it began in August. All non-essential building was suspended leaving Doughty frustrated in both his search for more space, and for a centralized archival policy.

The First World War had a dramatic influence on life in Canada. Of a population of 8 million, 619,636 men and women served over the course of the war: 60,661 Canadians died. In Canada, the war effort extended the reach of government in many significant ways. Regulatory boards increased in size and frequency and the introduction of income tax further expanded the size of government machinery. With few records management procedures in place, and fewer storage facilities, records storage continued haphazardly. Arthur Doughty’s work was made that much more

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96 Atherton, “The Origins of the Public Archives Records Centre,” 46. (Coderre to J.D. Reid, 27 July 1914; Reid to Coderre, 30 July 1914; Doughty to Coderre, 10 December 1914; Coderre to Rogers, 9 January 1915; Coderre to Doughty, 19 January 1915; Doughty to Coderre, 21 January 1915, RG 37, LAC.)
difficult, for not only did he have to maintain regular archival services, he also had to help manage wartime records without clarified authority and with little space.

The creation of Canadian records overseas presented even greater challenges for Arthur Doughty. The Archivist did not have the capacity to oversee the gathering of these historical records, nor did he have the time to address the authority issues the records would create. Doughty had little choice but to leave the Canadian overseas forces to implement its own records preservation projects.

That formidable task fell to a formidable Canadian, Max Aitken. Born in New Brunswick, his success in the Canadian financial sector made him a very wealthy man at a young age. In 1910, Aitken moved to England and won a Conservative seat in the British House of Commons that same year. As an associate of the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence, Sam Hughes, and an advisor to the Borden government, Aitken helped Canadian politicians gain access to the British political world. He also drew on his journalistic experience as the ‘Canadian Eye Witness’ in France to write dramatic stories of the Canadian Corps that helped forge its reputation.98

Aitken also invested considerable energy to improve the quality of Canadian wartime records, thereby helping to shape the record and promote the efforts of the Canadian soldier.99 As Canada’s military participation fell under the authority of the British War Office, Aitken realized that this relationship jeopardized the safety of the Canadian wartime record. Sam Hughes responded by appointing Aitken the official Canadian Records Officer in May 1915. Aitken then created the Canadian War Records Office (CWRO) in January 1916 and started to gather Canadian sources from the British for battle narratives and publications, such as Canada in Flanders, which sold thousands of copies in Canada.100

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99 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 23.
100 Cook, “Documenting War and Forging Reputations,” 265.
Doughty was understandably nervous with the growing list of Aitken’s responsibilities and the authority over the records. Doughty traveled overseas in the spring of 1916 to ensure the transfer of records to the Public Archives at the war’s end. Perhaps intimidated by Aitken’s strong personality and political connections, Doughty quoted the archives’ legislated mandate, and accused Aitken and his staff of stepping on his jurisdiction. Aitken was not at all intimidated. He still promised to refer all questions of record keeping to Doughty and to deliver documents to the Archives when possible.\textsuperscript{101} Doughty acknowledged that with the Archives’ limited mandate, there was not much he could do for the records overseas. While he was still puzzled about Aitken’s motivations, Doughty and the archives offered their support to the CWRO for the remainder of the war with Aitken acting as an unofficial wartime archivist.\textsuperscript{102}

Such arrangements became even more confused as other organizations claimed jurisdiction over federal records. At war’s end, the Canadian Corps Commander, General Sir Arthur Currie, established his own historical section after Sam Hughes accused him of needlessly sacrificing Canadian soldiers.\textsuperscript{103} Currie hoped to defend his actions by researching and writing his own history, and he did not particularly trust Aitken to write a historically accurate account.\textsuperscript{104} He ordered the CWRO to loan the records to the Canadian War Narrative Section (CWNS), led by Brigadier General Raymond Brutinel.\textsuperscript{105} After the CWNS utilized the records for research, the CWRO wanted to transfer the documents to the Public Archives as arranged with Doughty. Unfortunately, Doughty did not have the physical space to accommodate the

\textsuperscript{104} Cook, \textit{Clio’s Warriors}, 29.
\textsuperscript{105} Cook, \textit{Clio’s Warriors}, 34.
materials. Instead of going to the Archives, the records were placed under the authority of the Department of Militia and Defence and the Official Historian, Colonel Archer Fortescue Duguid.

Duguid was a trained civil engineer and a militia artilleryman who served at Second Ypres, Festubert, St. Eloi, Mount Sorrel and the Somme. In 1920, the then head of the Army Historical Section, Brigadier Ernest A. Cruickshank received the files from the CWRO. Cruickshank retired in 1921, leaving Duguid, the new Director, with much of the work. Duguid tried to develop a fully regulated central registry to impose some order, but the task soon overwhelmed him. According to Tim Cook, Duguid allowed a few regimental historians access, but he guarded the official record closely and delayed much military scholarship in the years following the war. Duguid in 1938 published just one volume of a planned eight-volume history of the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Such a delay significantly affected how the Armed Services approached official narratives and the gathering of records in the Second World War.

The problems associated with the wartime record of the First World War were the result of authority issues and the shortage of archival storage space. But the wider problem of dealing with wartime records also prompted new discussions in archival theory and practice. The theory that archives had followed was dated, and no longer suited the reality that archives faced. Archivists had long tried to follow Dutch theorists Muller, Feith, and Fruin, who argued in 1897 “that archives…[must] not mix with the archives of other creators, or placed [sic] into artificial arrangements… the arrangement of such archives must be based on the original organization of the archival collection.”

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106 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 36.
108 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 62.
According to nineteenth century archival theory, archivists were not to rearrange materials under their care. Nor were archivists to appraise, or judge the value of the information contained in the records. Sir Hilary Jenkinson, an assistant keeper with the Public Records Office in London from 1938 to 1947, Deputy Keeper 1947 to 1954, and employee of the PRO since 1906, suggested that records were “impartial evidence, and archivists [were] their guardians.”¹¹⁰ He argued archivists were not to select the documents to be accessioned, but rather were to retain the records the creator deemed worthy of preservation. Creators determined which documents held historic value and which documents could be destroyed.¹¹¹ Archivists could not organize or appraise records, and thus had no control over the materials that were in their collections, nor could they protect records against creator-led destruction. Without guidance from archivists, record-creating bodies applied their own biases to record collection. This theoretical framework could not support archival work as the space constraints affected archival institutions.¹¹²

Perhaps attempting to obtain for the archives what he almost achieved in March 1914, Doughty began to mobilize his own resources to manage government records and increase the capacity of the Archives to preserve these materials. In 1917, he proposed a survey of war records that included provincial and municipal governments to document the various levels of the war effort in 1917. Doughty convinced the government of this need, and received $5,000 for the survey.¹¹³ He estimated that existing records required the construction of a building that could accommodate 125,000

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¹¹⁰ Cook, “What is Past is Prologue,” 23.
cubic feet of records. In 1921, under the new government of Mackenzie King, Doughty achieved some measure of success. He convinced the new Secretary of State, A.B. Copp, of the need to expand the Archives building. Construction started in 1924 and Doughty opened a new wing at the Sussex Drive location in December 1926. Much of the space allocated went towards a museum to display the archives’ wartime collections that Doughty hoped would attract visitors. Unfortunately, the addition of the museum did little to address the wider problems of records storage.

The introduction of the King years in 1921 was the start of a period of relative prosperity for the Public Archives. King’s appreciation for Doughty and his efforts had steadily increased since the 1910s when King was a civil servant, and this support was reflected in the collections Doughty was able to obtain for the Archives. As Ian Wilson suggested, from Doughty, “King learned the value of archives, the need to preserve documents and to make them available for research purposes.” The close relationship that the two men formed over their years of public service led to a beneficial period for Doughty and the Archives.

King’s sense of the value of the institution was not solely due to Doughty, as King himself held a strong sense of the use of history. King’s previous experience as a civil servant, as well as being the grandson of William Lyon Mackenzie, made the Prime Minister appreciate better than his predecessors the importance of the administration of governance, the role of a centralized archives, and the importance of historical knowledge. In December 1915 King successfully fought in court to prevent the

116 Doughty reported that the Archives obtained the Monckton Papers, the Van Loo Portrait of Louis XV. And the Montcalm-Levis-Vaudreuil papers in 1923. Arthur Doughty, Report of the Public Archives for the Year 1923 (Ottawa: Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1923). Unfortunately, Doughty did not see purpose in reporting the financial information of the Archives in his annual reports.
117 Wilson, “One of the Closest and Truest of Friends I have Ever Met,” 2.
publication of William D. LeSueur’s critical manuscript on his grandfather for George Morang’s *Makers of Canada* series.118 During the course of the case, King often visited the Public Archives to check the content of the collection, ensuring that an accurate record of events was kept. King also lobbied to have a statue of his grandfather, crafted by Vimy sculptor Walter Allward, placed in Toronto’s Queen’s Park. King saw himself as the one to uphold the memory of his grandfather and ensure the family legacy a place within Canadian national memory.119 King’s family legacy also helped him understand the importance of maintaining an accurate and thorough archival record.

King’s political experience prior to 1921 reinforced his appreciation for information and history. King became the first Under Secretary of Labour in 1900, and chaired two Royal Commissions, one on labour disputes and another on the losses experienced by the Japanese population in Vancouver after the riots of 1907.120 King’s position often called for the management of large amounts of information, which could influence the response and reaction to a particular scenario. He developed this keen ability in his years at the University of Toronto, writing for the student newspaper on sensational topics and later, labour issues, which led him to work at larger publications, like the Evening *News*, Toronto’s *Globe*, and *Mail and Empire*.121 More than most, King learned to understand the value of information. Such lessons put him in good stead when, defeated as an MP in 1911, King worked for the Rockefeller family managing public affairs and labour relations through the First World War, including the Ludlow

Massacre in 1914. King’s responsibilities relied on the use of and access to proper documentation, and his role as a bureaucrat, and labour relations manager likely shaped his perception of the role of government records in public business.

King’s own “personal sense of history,” and his belief that the Archives had a role to play to build a national consciousness led to the growth of the Archives during his time in Ottawa. Between 1909 and 1937, the Archives went from a “few basement rooms in the Langevin Block in 1904 to a well-designed and modern building on Sussex in 1907… By the mid 1920s, it was an institution that combined the functions of the archives, a library, and a museum.” King and Doughty shared a desire to promote the formation of a national memory and history, and worked well together towards this goal. The Archives, to an extent, was the benefactor.

While King worked in the Department of Labour, his close friend and colleague Doughty continued to build the collection in the Public Archives to support the growth of Canadian history, and expand his influence within the federal bureaucracy. In 1926, the King government created a Public Records Commission. Its role was to advise on how to control, preserve, index, and increase the accessibility of the records of Canada. However, Doughty remained the only appointee to the Committee. Ian Wilson argued that while this appointment was rooted in the need for a federal records program, “the commission seemed less the means to control federal records and more subterfuge to raise Doughty’s salary and provide him with a pension.” John Hall Archer pointed out that rumours had circulated in Ottawa that Doughty was being enticed to head the

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125 Ibid.

Hudson’s Bay Co. Archives in London. The salary he received from the new commission raised his salary to the rumoured offered from London, and him in Ottawa, but it did nothing for the management of government records.  

As Doughty continued his tenure as Dominion Archivist, the close community of historians and scholars that he had developed had started to diminish with the natural passage of time. Sir Joseph Pope, whose civil service career began in the time of Sir John A. Macdonald, and who sat on two commissions into the state of federal records policy, died in December 1926. Adam Shortt, Doughty’s good friend and close associate, passed away in 1931, and the Board of Historical Publications in the Public Archives, concluded its activities. The loss of such key advocates, did not help Doughty, especially during the tenure of R.B. Bennett from 1930 to 1935. Both the institution and its mandate suffered. Between the start of 1931, and the end of 1935, the archives lost twelve of its employees, six of whom were senior personnel. Only one archivist was replaced at a time when the total number of federal government employees continued to increase.

Despite the lack of personnel, the Bennett government started to address the shortage of storage space for government records in 1933, but without any archival involvement or influence. The Department of Public Works, in collaboration with the Treasury Board, started to plan for a new records centre to store non-active records. To determine the amount of records expected in the centre, the Treasury Board asked

departments to determine what records they could destroy after periods of five and ten years, and which needed permanent retention.\textsuperscript{130} Public Works intended the record centre building as a storage room for departments, and did not consult the Archives in this project.\textsuperscript{131} Public Works and the Treasury Board were not concerned with historical records, and focused instead on alleviating over-crowded office space in government departments. Problems became apparent soon after departments began transferring materials to the Federal Records Centre, built at Ottawa’s Experimental Farm, in 1938. Each department retained authority over their files, and remained responsible for their care, but with no centralized services available to retrieve documents, departmental staff preferred to keep records close to their over-crowded offices.\textsuperscript{132}

This Canadian experience stands in sharp contrast to the developments in the United States during the 1930s. The most significant addition to archival policy was the general acceptance of the need for appraisal and selection in archival bodies, which occurred in the American National Archives shortly after its creation in 1934. Archivists Margaret Cross Norton, the State Archivist in Illinois, and American archival activist Waldo Leland looked at the full life span of a record, noting variances in the types of records created, used and stored by departments. Different records served different purposes, so the period of active use of records varied. The American archivists developed this theory to help manage the large collections that started to arrive at the national institution, and would help alleviate the strain of documents created during the Second World War. After the Second World War, Norton noted “it is obviously no longer possible for any agency to preserve all records which results from its activities,” acknowledging the need for a selection function for government records.\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{130} Wilson, “Noble Dream,” 33.
\textsuperscript{131} Wilson, “Shortt and Doughty”, 173-174.
\textsuperscript{132} Atherton, “The Origins of the Public Archives Records Centre,” 48-49.
Unfortunately, the Canadian archival institution was not well situated to accommodate such a dramatic shift in its policy. In the 1930s, the Canadian body had yet to obtain the proper mandate to act as a Public Records Office, at least not to the same extent as its American counterpart. The American government had also started a Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, which highlighted the need for increased attention to record care. The Commission highlighted Records Management as a key feature for effective management of the executive branch. Its members urged the creation of a new records service “to consolidate and reduce the records centres which various Government agencies now operate, and to direct the work of these regional records centres along with that of the National Archives in Washington.” The Commission recommended that the government create a records management bureau for the Executive Branch, which would include the National Archives, the enactment of a new records management law and a new, effective, records management program. The American model surged ahead, and four years after the initial report in 1949, the U.S. Government reported progress on each of the recommendations.

The re-election of Mackenzie King in 1935 brought some initiatives that helped define the Public Archive’s mandate. A Treasury Board Minute, created in 1936, provided the Dominion Archivist with the authority to intervene in the records disposal process by marking records of historic value for permanent retention. It was a small effort to bring the Archivist into the framework of the Department of Public Works

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135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.

storage facility. The legislation obliged the Treasury Board to forward lists to the Public Archives of documents intended for destruction. The Dominion Archivist then had six months to set aside documents of value. Unfortunately, the lists did not describe the content of the records, which made it difficult to judge their significance.

By the time the Canadian government finally started to clarify the role of the Public Archives in the handling of government records, Doughty had been the Dominion Archivist for thirty three years. In 1936, Doughty accepted partial retirement and received a knighthood for his efforts as Dominion Archivist. Sir Arthur George Doughty died that same year. Acknowledging the stature that Doughty had achieved over the course of his tenure as Dominion Archivist, Prime Minister Mackenzie King commemorated Doughty’s service with a statue of Doughty in front of the archives building on Sussex Drive. In the three decades that Doughty spent with the Canadian archival institution, the collection had expanded from 3,155 volumes to over 500,000 volumes of manuscripts, records, and transcripts, 30,000 maps, 20,000 pictures, 40,000 books, and 10,000 pamphlets. According to Ian Wilson, Doughty provided the Public Archives with a large collection of Canada’s pre-Confederation history, and brought a level of enthusiasm to the role of Dominion Archivist and influence within the Federal government that would be difficult for successors to replicate. Despite Doughty’s enthusiasm for laying the foundation for the Canadian historic collection, he could not extend his energies indefinitely. While he did acknowledge the weakness of the Archives treatment of government documents, Arthur Doughty was not able to implement a lasting remedy. The problems of storage space for government records continued well beyond his time as Dominion Archivist.

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139 Ibid.

140 Wilson, “Noble Dream,” 33. The building has been moved to the new location on Wellington. The statue faces the Ottawa River.

The King-Doughty period was one of profound cooperation between the Dominion Archivist and Prime Minister. Both men held each other in high esteem. This type of relationship was not common. King faced significant challenges attempting to locate a replacement for Doughty who had the same passion for his work and influence in government.

Back in 1903, Lord Minto had felt that the federal archivist required “clerical ability as regards classification,” but also “literary & historical tastes of some connection with the leading historians & litterateurs of other countries besides his own.”\footnote{Lord Minto to Laurier, 19 January 1903 Minto, 	extit{Lord Minto’s Canadian Papers}, 251.} Over 33 years later, Mackenzie King had to choose Arthur Doughty’s successor. Two candidates had emerged from the staff at the archives, who both had exceptional careers, and separate spheres of political support. Gustave Lanctôt, the Chief French-language Archivist, had been earmarked as the next archivist, but acting archivist, James F. Kenney, enjoyed support from those within the government and Archives. Dr. Kenney was born in Belleville, Ontario, and was a part of the American Catholic Historical Association and founder of the 	extit{Canadian Catholic Historical Review}. Kenney had a Master’s degree from the University of Toronto in Canadian history, a second Master’s degree from the University Wisconsin and a PhD from Columbia University. He joined the Archives in 1912 and became the Director of Historical Research and Publicity in 1926. Upon Doughty’s retirement, Kenney became the Acting Dominion Archivist.\footnote{John A. Gallagher, “A Tribute to our Deceased Secretary Dr. James F. Kenney to Whose Memory this Present Volume is Dedicated,” 	extit{Canadian Catholic Historical Association Report} 13 (1945-1946): 7-8.}

Lanctôt also joined the Public Archives in 1912. Born on 5 July 1883 in St. Constant, Quebec, Lanctôt was educated as a historian, spending time at Université de Montréal, Oxford and the Sorbonne. While in Montreal, he was also taught by the Liberal politician and nationaliste Rodolphe Lemieux, who advocated on Lanctôt’s
behalf as a junior archivist in 1914. Lanctôt enlisted with the 163rd Battalion in the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Returning to the Public Archives in 1922, Lanctôt received a promotion as the Chief French-language Archivist. After Kenney served for two years as the acting Dominion Archivist, King removed him from the position and appointed Lanctôt on 26 November 1937.

Lanctôt largely reflected his predecessor’s philosophy, delighting in museum objects and records of cultural value that promoted historical scholarship. Lanctôt understood that the collection had a significant gap in post-Confederation material, which he endeavoured to address. However, Lanctôt lacked the energy and magnetism that Doughty used to promote the Public Archives, a shortcoming that King readily acknowledged early on in Lanctôt’s tenure. The personality and the connections of the Dominion Archivist mattered.

Lanctôt became the Archivist in the midst of significant change in the role of the archival institutions. He followed a politically astute and energetic archivist who set the foundation for the Public Archives. But Doughty created a sizeable obstacle for Lanctôt with his collecting efforts. Records were left uncatalogued, unorganized and inaccessible. The growth of government during the interwar period pointed to a potential need to address government records in a way that differed from those available at the Federal Records Centre. The haphazard and ill-defined policies that governed records policies in Doughty’s time were difficult to overcome, and Lanctôt faced rectifying this situation upon his appointment.

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146 Wilson, “Noble Dream,” 34.
147 Wilson, “Noble Dream,” 34.
148 In 1939, Lanctôt noted in the Annual Report that collection first acquiried in 1902 and 1904, the State Papers of Lower Canada and Upper Canada, as well as the Selkirk papers had their calendars completed. He also stated “several collections of documents which have been in the basement of the Archives for years are being examined and classified.” Gustave Lanctôt, Report of the Public Archives for the Year 1939 (Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, 1940): 9.
This brief history of the Public Archives from its origins to the eve of the Second World War highlights several important and lasting themes. Here we see how those interested in Canada’s history advocated for better records management very soon after Confederation, and such efforts continued well into the twentieth century. The early importance of Canadian archivists such as Arthur Doughty is clear as well, but so are those from Britain and the United States who developed wider notions of archival practice, particularly after the First World War. We see here also the importance of long-serving bureaucrats, beginning with Joseph Pope, whose accumulated knowledge and experience within the ever-expanding civil service spanned several federal administrations. Federal governments of different political stripes responded by calling a number of commissions that examined the archives ‘problem’ but successive governments never implemented recommendations that solved the basic problems that were clear from the first years after Confederation. What role should the Archives play? How would the Public Archives come to manage the public record of the Canadian government? How would the institution balance the two roles? Was it to be a storehouse of materials that described the story of the nation, or was it to be a Public Records Office that would oversee the federal government’s expanding bureaucracy? These questions were to become even more pressing as Canada entered the Second World War.
The Second World War Experience: King, his Record and his Boys

On 10 September 1939, Canada declared itself in a state of war against Germany. Of a population of 11,267,000 in 1939, 1,086,343 men and women served in the armed forces during the war. Millions of others helped through charitable organizations and Victory Loan campaigns. The country’s economic contribution included producing massive quantities of agricultural products, raw materials and war materials. The Second World War changed Canada and its government. It also profoundly influenced the process of record-keeping in the federal government and the Dominion Archives.

This story of how Mackenzie King ‘managed’ the Canadian war effort is well known. But much less is known of how Prime Minister King attempted to protect and manage the government’s wartime records. Prime Minister King instigated two events that occurred during this period that dramatically shaped the development of records management procedures in the federal government: a 1942 communication to government departments urging them to preserve government records; and the creation of the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Public Records in 1944, which would become the Public Records Committee a year later. The creation of the Public Records Committee (PRC) marked a significant departure from the previous methods used to address government records. Not only would this Committee last longer than any of the other Royal Commissions created to inquire on the state of public records, the Public Records Committee marked the first time representatives from the historical community, the Public Archives, and the government gathered to discuss the management of government records and affect change in the procedure.

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149 Stacey, Arms, Men and Government, 66.
Certainly the PRC was partly a response to the limitations of the Public Archives. Dominion Archivist Gustave Lanctôt struggled to manage an archival institution that suffered from a lack of physical space, a reduced staff, and a declining budget. The war further restricted funding for the Public Archives from $173,435 in 1939 to $144,410 in 1940. The government also cut the archives’ administrative budget from $23,500 in 1939-40 to $10,500 the following year.\textsuperscript{151} It was further reduced in 1942 by another 22 percent from 1941.\textsuperscript{152}

These budgetary cuts suggest that Lanctôt and his Archives did not have the confidence and support of the King government. Despite Lanctôt’s prominence as a Canadian historian, a certain atmosphere of tension and distrust was present by 1942, when Lanctôt approached Secretary of State Norman McLarty with an offer to help manage and collect government records.\textsuperscript{153} According to McLarty’s correspondence, Lanctôt stated he had approached King about the matter, and the Prime Minister had prepared a recommendation to council that would reconstitute the Public Records Commission, the body King had first created for Arthur Doughty in 1926. According to Lanctôt, he would become the chairman of the Commission and receive the same remuneration as Doughty had, $3,000 per year. When McLarty approached King about the recommendation, King denied having seen the proposal, suggesting that Lanctôt was the real author.\textsuperscript{154} This evidence seems to suggest that Lanctôt tried to increase his

\textsuperscript{151} Dominion of Canada, \textit{Report of the Public Archives for the Year 1940} (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1941): vii.
\textsuperscript{152} Dominion of Canada, \textit{Report of the Public Archives for the Year 1942} (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the Kings most Excellent Majesty, 1942): vii. All other reports for the war years cease to mention budgets. Dominion of Canada, \textit{Report of the Department of Public Archives for the Year 1943} (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the Kings Most Excellent Majesty, 1945); Dominion of Canada, \textit{Report of the Department of the Public Archives for the Year 1944} (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1945); Dominion of Canada, \textit{Report of the Public Archives for the Year 1941} (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1944); Dominion of Canada, \textit{Report of the Department of Public Archives for the Year 1945} (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1946).
\textsuperscript{153} McLarty to Heeney, 9 November 1942, Papers of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, MG26-J1, LAC.
\textsuperscript{154} McLarty to King, 1 March 1943, Papers of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King, MG26-J1, LAC.
own financial situation and position in government by misleading the Secretary of State. It is unclear, however, whether Lanctôt’s actions led to the Archives declining budgets, or whether such behaviour was the result of a sense of desperation for lack of funds. It was clear that Lanctôt did not have the political capital to rally support as could his predecessor. Gustave Lanctôt and the Archives appeared detached from government efforts towards a wartime records management program.

In the event, the federal government took the lead over federal records management policies. The Prime Minister played a strong role in this involvement. With an eye to the importance of records, King implemented numerous changes to his day-to-day routine and government structures to ensure the preservation of the wartime records. There were many examples of King’s dedication to the record of his government. On 4 September 1939, King “spent the morning going through dispatches and morning letters, indicating outlines for a speech for Thursday and dictating this diary today. I should, perhaps, have given time to the speech above all else, but I feel that the record of one’s actions and thoughts at this time in the light of subsequent developments may be worth more than ought else.” In King’s view, the public record would justify the actions of his government. When he wrestled with the idea of charting a path of war for the country, King wrote in his diary, on 25 August 1939,

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155 In his wartime annual reports, the Dominion Archivist did not offer detailed information on the decline in his departmental budget. In 1941, he acknowledged the reduction of staff and budget, but did not provide specifics. In 1942, he stated that between 1939 and 1942, the staff was reduced by 24%, while salaries and expenses represented 22% and 57% reductions. 1943 offers a similar message. In the annual report for 1945, the Archivist reported that the war was over, and it looked forward to better times. Dominion of Canada, Report of the Public Archives for the Year 1942 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the Kings most Excellent Majesty, 1942): vii. All other reports for the war years cease to mention budgets. Dominion of Canada, Report of the Department of Public Archives for the Year 1943 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the Kings Most Excellent Majesty, 1945); Dominion of Canada, Report of the Department of the Public Archives for the Year 1944 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the Kings Most Excellent Majesty, 1945); Dominion of Canada, Report of the Public Archives for the Year 1941 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1944); Dominion of Canada, Report of the Department of Public Archives for the Year 1945 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1946).

I then pointed out to Cabinet that I did not give [a] rap for what people said about me today or tomorrow, or about the time when war might or might take place. What I was concerned about was the position I had been in once the event in which we were concerned, had taken place, or had been disposed of. I pointed out wherein we had everything to gain but my being able to show that Canada’s appeal for peace had been spurned, equally with that of other countries that we would have, therefore, to defend our own concept of right. That, on the other hand, if war were to be averted, the country would credit us in having had a hand in this but having wisely sought peace instead of adding fuel to the flames already engendered.\textsuperscript{157}

King’s diaries are filled with such justifications, but it may be significant that at this crucial moment, King’s concern was with the record of his actions, and those of his government.

To this end, the Prime Minister hired personnel to organize a complete record of his own wartime experience.\textsuperscript{158} J.W. Pickersgill, the Prime Minister’s personal assistant starting in December 1937, sorted all communications sent to the Prime Minister and gathered political gossip.\textsuperscript{159} King assigned James Gibson to Laurier House, King’s Ottawa residence, to keep “dispatches and memoranda... the minutes of the War Committee and other secret documents.”\textsuperscript{160} With direct access to the Prime Minister, Cabinet Office and External Affairs, Gibson also arranged Mackenzie King’s personal papers.\textsuperscript{161}

King showed a similar concern for the efficient running of his government that only increased through the war years. In 1937, King offered a position to Arnold Heeney that resembled a personal secretary to the Prime Minister. Heeney, a lawyer by training and the son of an Anglican clergyman, was educated at the University of Manitoba, St. John’s College at Oxford University and McGill University, where he

\textsuperscript{158} Granatstein, \textit{The Ottawa Men}, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{159} Granatstein, \textit{The Ottawa Men}, 213-214.
\textsuperscript{161} Pickersgill, \textit{Seeing Canada Whole}, 192.
graduated in 1929.\textsuperscript{162} Heeney understood that King wanted him to “correspond in a way [as] that of a Deputy Head of a Government Department… liaise with other Ministers of the Crown and exercise general supervision over the work of the Prime Minister’s Office.”\textsuperscript{163} Heeney accepted King’s offer. According to Heeney, King was reluctant to delegate responsibility and had “reservations about violating the first secrecy of committee proceedings,”\textsuperscript{164} which had long governed Cabinet meetings. Until 1940, all Cabinet meetings were held \textit{in camera}, without any recorded information. O.D. Skelton, the Under-Secretary of External Affairs, convinced King of the need to establish a Cabinet Secretariat in 1940, and Heeney finally receive a more detailed job description as Cabinet Secretary.\textsuperscript{165}

Arnold Heeney became Clerk of the Privy Council Office, the Secretary of the Cabinet and the Secretary of the Cabinet War Committee in March 1940. Heeney’s position constituted a major change in protocol for Cabinet meetings.\textsuperscript{166} This addition was made necessary by the conditions imposed by the war. Heeney suggests, “by March of 1940 when a Secretary to the Cabinet was first appointed, conditions of government had become such that sheer necessity compelled the introduction of systematic procedures for the conduct of Ministerial business, with the inevitable consequence that much of the flexibility and informality of pre-War Cabinet meetings disappeared.”\textsuperscript{167} Heeney set out to “collect and put into shape agendas for Cabinet meetings, provide information and material necessary for the deliberations of the

\textsuperscript{162} Granatstein, \textit{The Ottawa Men}, 190.
\textsuperscript{163} Arnold Heeney, \textit{The Things that are Caesar’s: Memoirs of a Canadian Public Servant} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972): 42.
\textsuperscript{165} Heeney, \textit{The Things that are Caesar’s}, 46; J.W. Pickersgill, \textit{Seeing Canada Whole: A Memoir}, (Markham, Ontario, 1994), 156; Masschaele, 158.
\textsuperscript{166} Heeney, \textit{The Things that are Caesar’s}, 79; King to A.D.P. Heeney (25 July 1945), Papers of William Lyon Mackenzie King, MG26 J1, LAC.
\textsuperscript{167} A.D.P. Heeney, “Mackenzie King and the Cabinet Secretariat,” \textit{Canadian Public Administration} 10, no. 3 (September 1967): 336.
Cabinet and draw up of records of the result, for communication to the departments concerned.”

It should be noted that King himself had little time for the administrative aspects of government. King was focused on defending his own record, and understood the role of history and documentation to this end. A.D.P. Heeney quickly realized that,

Like most Prime Ministers, Mr. King had little abiding interest in the administrative process... His primary, if unacknowledged, objective was to enhance his authority as Prime Minister by strengthening the means of its exercise... At no time did he give the impression that he had any real interest in the Secretariat as an institution. Nor had he addressed himself to understanding its significance in the scheme of things. Like most great Prime Ministers, Mackenzie King thought primarily in terms of ends and of the “personal” means to such ends.

Heeney was undoubtedly right, but the civil servant in King understood better than his predecessors the importance of managing information. King’s desire to form a national memory and consciousness led to a number of other important developments over the course of his political life. King’s own sense of history, and his place within it, led King to keep a very detailed diary that he started as a student at the University of Toronto in 1893, and he wrote regular detailed entries until 1950, only a few days before his death. King could not oversee the creation of records for his whole government, but he appointed staff to care for his records and those of his government.

King also adjusted his bureaucratic structure to ensure a more effective wartime government. With the escalating tensions in the international sphere in the late 1930s, King created the Canadian Defence Committee (CDC), on 20 August 1936. A smaller committee of Cabinet, the CDC was designed to alleviate three issues of wartime administration: secrecy, expeditious handling of time sensitive issues, and the equal allotment of responsibilities to ministers. In 1940, Cabinet was reorganized to nine responsibilities to ministers. In 1940, Cabinet was reorganized to nine

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168 Heeney, The Things that are Caesar’s, 74.
169 A.D.P. Heeney, “Mackenzie King and the Cabinet Secretariat,” Canadian Public Administration, 10, no. 3 (September 1967): 367.
171 Stacey, Arms, Men and Government, 3, 113.
Cabinet Committees “to provide more effectively for the conduct of all phases of Canada’s war effort and for the efficient co-ordination of the various activities of government related thereto.” These committees included the War Committee; War Finance and Supply; Food Production and Marketing; Fuel and Power; Shipping and Transportation; Price Control and Labour; Internal Security; Legislation; Public Information; and Demobilization. With representation from the Prime Minister, and the departments of Justice, National Defence, Finance, Mines and Resources, along with the Government Leader in the Senate, the Committees reviewed the country’s war effort as a whole. Each committee’s importance varied during the war years, as certain committees merged with others. Only the War Committee and Committee on Demobilization lasted the war’s duration.

The Cabinet War Committee (CWC) was smaller than the CDC. It included the Ministers from eight departments, plus the Prime Minister, who also represented the Privy Council and the Department of External Affairs. In May 1940, the CWC included the Minister of Munitions and Supply, the Finance Minister, the new Minister for National Defence of Air, and the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services. When the Department of War Services was created in July 1940, the Minister, J.G. Gardiner, joined the CWC. However, as C.P. Stacey notes, Gardiner never appeared at a Committee meeting, nor did his successor. The Department of External Affairs did not have a position on the Committee, but Under Secretaries Skelton and Norman Robertson often attended as advisors on the invitation of the Prime Minister. With fewer people involved, King could focus the Cabinet Committee, maximize efficiency and better control the country’s war effort and the record of his wartime government.

172 Qtd. in Stacey, Arms, Men and Government, 114. (P.C. 4017 ½, 5 December 1939 Heeney.)
173 Stacey, Arms, Men and Government, 114.
174 Ibid.
175 Stacey, Arms, Men and Government, 114.
Until 1942, the noticeable changes in the creation and care of records in the government structure occurred within the Prime Minister’s office and his personal papers. In that year, the King administration made a number of changes to protect government records as a whole. In November, Arnold Heeney asked Finance Minister J.L. Ilsley and other ministers what the departments were doing to collect and preserve war records and data.\textsuperscript{177} Heeney informed departments, “the government has been giving consideration of the question of suitable arrangements for the collection and conservation of war records and data of the various departments and war agencies.”\textsuperscript{178} Heeney also asked departments to consider possible alternatives for the arrangements and collection of war records for accountability purposes and official historians.\textsuperscript{179}

King’s approach to his own records during the war suggests that Heeney acted with the agreement and support of the Prime Minister. However, not all of these concerns were apparent to those who received Heeney’s request. Robert B. Bryce, an economist in the Department of the Finance, and a future Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet,\textsuperscript{180} wrote to Heeney regarding the request, and told a co-worker, “I called Mr. Heeney to find out what was behind this, and he says that the Dominion Archivist has suggested the establishment of a special war archives, and the Government wants to know what arrangements are being made for the collection and preservation of significant records of the war.”\textsuperscript{181} The Dominion Archivist was concerned with the wartime records but he did not, maintain this interest. Indeed, as

\textsuperscript{177} A.D.P. Heeney to J.L. Ilsley, 4 November 1942, file 129-43, RG 19, LAC.
\textsuperscript{178} W.O Clark to Donald Gordon, 16 November 1942, file 129-4, vol 526, RG 19, LAC. Clark's memo is the response to the memo from Heeney to Ilsley. It references the original in great length, serving as a reminder to the departments. The memo inquires about the methods departments had implemented to protect the documents, and facilitate the writing of wartime narratives. It also quotes the original in great length.
\textsuperscript{179} W.O Clark to Donald Gordon, 16 November 1942, file 129-4, vol 526, RG 19, LAC; A.D.P. Heeney to J.L.Ilsley, 4 November 1942, file 129-43, RG 19, LAC.
\textsuperscript{181} Memorandum for Dr. Clark from R.B. Bryce, 10 November 1942, file 129-74, vol 526, RG 19, LAC.
noted in the last chapter, Lanctôt’s efforts to reinstate a Records Commission in 1943 likely lost him the trust of the prime minister. Instead, a selection of King’s appointees took the lead and directed the program of records care. The government had started to experience a lack of space, required greater economy, and the war effort had started to challenge the government’s ability to maintain its records.

Locating adequate storage space for records through the Department of Public Works was problematic in 1942. Projects completed before the war, such as the Public Works building at Experimental Farm, had done little at the time, and the weight of government records had only increased. Heeney, with the support of King, encouraged departments to pursue all other options through the proper and effective file management, before the government had to construct a new building or lost valuable wartime records.

The responses of departments were inconsistent and varied. In several cases, the organization of records occurred under the guidance of the official historians, appointed for the writing of the wartime narratives. However, the pressure associated with the war effort led to a unique set of circumstances for record organization. In a number of departments, concern for narratives and records occurred only after the war ended. Such differences were not simply an inconvenience; they affected the efficiency of government procedure.

Historians had long lobbied the government to improve the care and protection allotted to its documentary heritage. Since the days of the Quebec Literary Society, historians had a long history of lobbying the government to increase archival services. By 1944, the Canadian historical community had become vocal in its displeasure of the care allotted to government records, and the role of the archives in this process.

George Brown, a prominent Canadian historian at the University of Toronto and president of the Canadian Historical Association (1943-1944) was a vocal advocate of the Public Archives increasing its role to care and protect government records. Brown
and the Dominion Archivist were familiar with each other through membership on the Canadian Historical Association, but there is no evidence that Brown’s promotion of the Public Archives was in any way connected with Lanctôt. The Public Archives had not pursued a program for government records, and Brown was concerned with the care these records received. In a letter to a member of the Ontario Historical Society on 15 March 1944, he stated, “There are a number of signs in fact which suggest to me that there is a growing appreciation of the importance of History in various places… I am publishing a short article about the archives in the March issue of the CHR.”  

In the March 1944 issue of *Canadian Historical Review*, Brown addressed the care of government records in Ottawa. He argued that the state of records in Canada was “deplorable and scandalous.” There existed a “serious need for constructive policy,” to ensure the preservation of records of national interest. While archives provided historians with valuable sources, the federal government and archival users mistakenly believed that the archives existed to serve only research needs. He argued a case for the Archives as a Public Records Office, stating,

> Archives should first of all be a public records department for the preservation of the non-active records of government. It should serve the government in this important respect as every government department does in its own way. If this practical purpose is achieved, other historical interests will be served in their turn, and the archive will cease to be regarded merely as a king of academic luxury which should be neglected in preference to almost any other interest which comes to the government’s attention.

Brown’s argument reflected a growing sense of nationalism that was emanating from the historical association at the time, as well as the importance of total archives. As Walter N. Sage noted in his Presidential Address to the CHR in 1945, “Canadianism is growing from coast to coast and it is noteworthy among the younger generation.”

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war played a significant role in this development. Sage emphasized, “It is possible that to Canada the Second World War may be what the defeat of the Spanish Armada was to Elizabethan England, the letting loose of a genuine and all-embracing patriotism. It might and should be accompanied by a real advance in Canadian art, literature, and in the writing of Canadian history.” The functions of government were of historical importance, and the mandate and programmes of the archives needed to reflect this.

Brown was also concerned with archival policy development in the United States in the 1930s. Brown argued that the Archives needed to help departments determine what constituted an inactive record, how to preserve records, which documents the archives could destroy after careful consideration, and how to save space through the new technology of microfilm. Brown noted that the size of wartime records would place further pressure on space. American archivists not only acknowledged these limitations, but in 1934, started to implement a new policy through the US National Archives that helped departments and agencies handle government records, reduce the buildup of files within department spaces, and offer improved care and protection for those historically valuable government records.

Brown’s article found an audience in the civil service, particularly among former students and colleagues. George de T. Glazebrook, a University of Toronto graduate and an officer in the Department of External Affairs, wrote Brown soon after the article was published, and agreed with the historian. Glazebrook wrote:

I may tell you confidentially that there have been discussions here on the general problem of the preservation and organization of government records, and it would be helpful to have any future views or materials you could send me... There is, I think, a possibility that we may be able to do something quite useful so that any help you could give would be particularly valuable at this date.

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188 Cook, “What is Past is Prologue,” 26.
189 Letter from George Glazebrooke to Brown, 31 March 1944, 1, Personal Letters, Box 23, George William Brown Fonds, University of Toronto Archives.
Glazebrook, a historian of Canadian external relations, seems to have been suggesting that some external motivation might help the department address the shortcomings of its records policies.

Brown received a second letter of support from R.G “Gerry” Riddell. He had taught at University of Toronto and joined the External Affairs office in Ottawa in 1943 after representing Canada at the League of Nations. Riddell wanted Brown’s concerns and recommendations before the Prime Minister, and Jack Pickersgill, one of King’s personal secretaries and another member of the Canadian Historical Association, agreed to help with this endeavour. Riddell asked Brown,

“Would you care to send an off-print of your article under cover of a letter to the Prime Minister? The letter should be a brief one saying something about the concern [that] historical scholars have in regard to the question of records and the possibility that a good records office might be of service both to scholars and administrative officials. You should mark the envelope (not the letter) attention of Mr. JW Pickersgill. It will then go through Jack’s hands and will be dealt with in the normal way. You might also send half a dozen of the off-prints to Jack Pickersgill personally for him to distribute as he thinks best.”

Riddell provided Brown with the opportunity to have his arguments presented directly to the Prime Minister, permitting the historical community to influence change in the management of government records.

It may be more than a coincidence that a month and half after Riddell’s instructions to Brown, the Prime Minister created the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Public Records (IACPR), in June 1944. The Secretary of State, Norman McLarty, convened the informal committee on the invitation of the Prime Minister. King wanted the committee to report on methods that would conserve public records,

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191 Ibid.

192 “Minutes of a meeting of the Public Records Committee held on Monday, June 5th, 1944 in Room 496, House of Commons,” 5 June 1944, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.
particularly those related to wartime activities. Some measure of the importance of the government gave to this committee was that its membership consisted of senior officers of the Department of External Affairs, the Secretary of State, the Department of National Defence, Department of Finance, Department of Munitions and Supply, the National Research Council, the Department of National War Services, Wartime Prices and Trade Board, and the Privy Council Office. The secretary of the committee was W.E.D. Halliday, an expert in constitutional law and a civil servant in the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources. Halliday had served King as Cabinet Registrar, and understood the intricacies of governance and the bureaucracy, which would serve him well navigating the departmental policies on record keeping. The Dominion Archivist and the three official historians from the branches of National Defence were also on the IACPR.

The inclusion of the Dominion Archivist deserves special note. Evidence suggests that while Gustave Lanctôt was an active member of the Canadian Historical Association, he was not able to fill the void left by Arthur Doughty, or satisfy King’s expectations. King’s own view of Lanctôt led to the Archivist’s isolation from key developments. In fact, in February 1943, King went so far to declare his own disappointment in the Archivist’s performance. He stated privately, “It is a great shame that Lanctôt was ever appointed to the Archives. Doughty never trusted him and with

193 “Minutes of a meeting of the Public Records Committee held on Monday, June 5th, 1944 in Room 496, House of Commons,” 5 June 1944, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.
194 “Minutes of a meeting of the Public Records Committee held on Monday, June 5th, 1944 in Room 496, House of Commons,” 5 June 1944, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.
196 Halliday was the registrar of Cabinet from 1940 until his retirement in 1963. He was also heavily involved in the National Capital Commission, serving on its Historical Advisory Commission. His finding aid at Library and Archives Canada also suggests an involvement with the history of the Canadian flag. William E. Durrant Halliday Fonds, MG30-C67, LAC. Available at <http://collectionscanada.gc.ca/ourl/res.php?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&amp;url_tim=2011-08-08T15%3A08%3A18Z&amp;url_ctx_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Actx&amp;rft_dat=101825&amp;rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fcollectionscanada.gc.ca%3Apam>. Accessed on 1 September 2011.
good reason.” However, with the representation of the Archives alongside the Privy Council, the political associates of the Prime Minister, and representatives from the Canadian historical community, the IACPR was the first time that these bodies had gathered over a prolonged period to discuss the care and protection of government records.

The first action of the IACPR in June 1944 was to explore the nature of the records problem. Halliday requested Archivist Lanctôt to outline the role of the Archives in the conservation and preservation of government wartime records. The IACPR also addressed the procedure (or lack thereof) for destroying government records, a growing necessity. The Government simply had too much to store for an undetermined amount of time. The IACPR had to determine what authority was required to destroy records to protect records of value and address the backlog of government records.

As departments had pushed aside records concerns to focus on the war, the second meeting, held on 18 July 1945, had a greater sense of urgency. The Secretary of State expressed to the members of IACPR the Prime Minister’s desire to “have the question of public records advanced as expeditiously as possible.” Halliday completed a report on the handling of public records based on the information he had gathered since the last meeting.

Halliday’s five recommendations helped form the basis of the IACPR’s mandate. He recommended that the IACPR become a permanent organization to provide for the “organization, care, housing and, where possible, destruction of public records.” IACPR membership would include senior officials from departments as well as

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197 The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, 26 February 1943, MG 26 4, LAC.
198 Minutes of a meeting of the Public Records Committee held on Monday, June 5th, 1944 in Room 496, House of Commons,” 5 June 1944, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.

199 Advisory Committee of Public Record, (18 July 1945), 1, vol 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC. The title selected for this document does not indicate and change in the name of the committee.

200 Advisory Committee of Public Record, (18 July 1945), 2, vol 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
representatives from the Canadian Historical Association to act in an advisory capacity. The second recommendation was that all departments and agencies needed to be aware of their responsibility for the care and maintenance of records, and each needed one or more senior officers to oversee departments’ responsibilities for their records, the third recommendation.

The fourth recommendation was to employ narrators to help departments “prepare accounts suitable for publication on the wartime activities of the department.” This recommendation suggests that the historical efforts that had occurred were not even in their treatment of departments, and there was a need for central control and guidance over such projects. However, to do this, Halliday believed that the IACPR needed to adjust its structure and methods to fulfill the mandate the Prime Minister had bestowed on the organization.

The final, and most influential, recommendation in Halliday’s report referred to the 1914 Royal Commission on Public Records. Halliday wanted the permanent version of the IACPR to “examin[e] and report to the government on the question of putting into effect the approved recommendation[s] of the Royal Commission on Public Records” of 1914. The Commission’s primary recommendation was to establish a Canadian public records office and provide federal departments with improved protection for their records. This anticipated a wider role for the archives in the management of the federal government records. In the IACPR, politicians, bureaucrats, historians and the Dominion Archivist were working together towards a Canadian Public Records Office to help protect and care for government records.

It is important to note that Halliday did not present these recommendations without referring his actions to the man who motivated the government to act. In April 1945, Halliday asked Professor George Brown, the author of the March 1944 article in

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201 Advisory Committee of Public Record, (18 July 1945), 4, vol 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
202 Advisory Committee of Public Record, (18 July 1945), 5, vol 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
203 Wilson, “‘A Noble Dream’,”32.
the CHA, for his input. Brown, and a number of his associates in the history department at the University of Toronto were clearly pleased with the direction Prime Minister King and Halliday had taken. In reference to Halliday’s recommendations, Brown said, “We all think that it is excellent in its clarity and its practical and comprehensive approach to the problems. We have, in fact, nothing to offer by way of criticism or amendment.”

Brown highlighted that Halliday’s recommendations for a Public Records Office offered something entirely new for the Canadian government, as it was designed to “do something that has never as yet been even begun in Canada.”

Gathering senior departmental staff, Cabinet and the Secretary of State would help foster a sense that “the proper handling of records was an essential part of their work, and they would be helped to solve their individual problems within the framework of the government’s general policy regarding records. The Archives was never able to get any such effective relation… this has been a fundamental weakness.” In Brown’s view, Halliday’s recommendations offered a significant step forward, bringing all departments together to improve their records procedures.

As a friend, confident, and experienced scholar, Brown had a degree of experience handling challenging colleagues in a diplomatic fashion, and offered Halliday some advice on Gustave Lanctôt. Brown acknowledged the tensions that Halliday had to navigate to establish a new government framework for public records and reasoned that the Public Archives needed to become a public records office, but “the past record and present condition of the Archives make this difficult.” Brown congratulated Halliday on his success working with Lanctôt thus far, but suggested that the success of his committee depended on Halliday’s ability to accommodate the

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204 Correspondence from George W. Brown to W.E.D. Halliday, 27 April 1945, vol 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Correspondence from George W. Brown to W.E.D. Halliday, 27 April 1945, 2, vol 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
Dominion Archivist. Brown hypothesized that “A very great deal will depend on the personal relations of Lanctôt and those who have to work with him in carrying the policy into effect... I cannot help feeling that Lanctôt would like to see a constructive solution worked out, and it would certainly be far better to have his co-operation than his hostility.”

With Brown’s comments and support, Halliday reconvened the IACPR in July 1945. That was just two months after the war had ended in Europe, and one month after Mackenzie King had won yet another (albeit reduced) majority government. Halliday presented the information he had gathered over the year, offering his five recommendations to help with the IACPR’s mandate. With the support of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, Halliday’s recommendations were accepted.

With such a mandate approved, the Committee needed to move beyond its advisory role. On 10 September 1945, the Secretary of State submitted a request to the Governor General to create a permanent committee on public records. The Secretary of State bolstered his request by pointing out that the informal committee had gathered on the direct request of the Prime Minister, and to implement the Prime Minister’s objectives, the committee needed to be permanent. With the support of Cabinet, the Governor General created the Public Records Committee (PRC). The most significant change to the PRC’s mandate was that it included records other than those created during the war in its mandate. This meant that the PRC could advise any departments or agency on the state of its record keeping, and left the PRC in a much stronger position to address issues of record storage and destruction.

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208 Correspondence from George W. Brown to W.E.D. Halliday, 27 April 1945, 2-3, vol 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
209 To His Excellency The Governor General in Council, (10 September 1945), vol 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
210 Order in Council establishing the Committee on Public Records, P.C. 6175, 20 September 1945, vol 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
211 “Order,” 10 September 1945, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
By the fall of 1945, the PRC was a powerful body charged with helping departments address their responsibility for the care, organization and destruction of their records. The mandate of the PRC also included overseeing the creation of a number of historical narratives from the departments. The historians appointed to these projects experienced a number of challenges maintaining the official record over the course of the war, which are reflected in the varied quality of the historical narratives produced. It is also important to recognize that with their experience with department wartime records, the historians became experts on the masses of documentation, and would act as advisors to the government in the postwar. The historical projects undertaken during the war provide ample insight into the state of records in the government, and set a number of patterns in the postwar.

The next three chapters will highlight these patterns by studying the various attempts to write official wartime histories in three separate federal departments. The Departments of National Defence, Munitions and Supply, and External Affairs had different histories and record keeping experiences. These affected the state of the collections, and how and when these records were transferred to the archives. The next chapter on the Department of National Defence shows that the differing record keeping practices of the three armed services very much affected how their respective histories were written. The work of the Army’s historian C.P. Stacey became the yardstick for the other armed services. However, his experience helping establish the wartime army’s records procedures and then writing the official history was unusual.

The norm, unfortunately, was for government departments to struggle with the increased burdens of wartime operations and record creation. The experiences of External Affairs and Munitions and Supply are two such examples. External Affairs, a relatively veteran department, experienced tremendous difficulty implementing records procedures that could accommodate the rate of records creation. The Department of Munitions and Supply, created in 1940, had to formulate record handling procedures in
the midst of the war. This chapter will explore the pressures felt by the staff of Munitions and Supply, and how this influenced the writing of the department’s official narrative. The historians who served the departments would come to know the collections, organized or not, better than most staff. In the postwar, the PRC relied on the expertise gathered by these historians to help the departments manage their overwhelming wartime collections.

In the first half of the war, Prime Minister King ensured that his own immediate areas of concern had sound records practices, and his staff reminded departments of their responsibility for their own records. After 1944, he started to encourage the rest of government to do the same and established a committee to help departments with this goal. The Canadian historical profession played a significant role in encouraging King to take this action, while the secretary of the PRC determined “what arrangements are being made for the collection and preservation of significant records of war.”212 King’s government showed a greater concern for wartime records and the value of the information they contained, and extended efforts to ensure the records received proper care. The network of civil servants and politicians in the King government started to mould department policies and procedures to reflect this concern for government records and information. King might not have had direct influence within the record keeping procedures of the departments, but he established the future direction of the government and the Public Archives regarding the safe keeping and protection of government records.

212 “R.B.B. to Dr. Clark,” 10 November 1942, file 129-74, vol. 526, RG 19, LAC.
Department of National Defence

The Department of National Defence published multiple official histories during and after the war that described the wartime experiences of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Each service had historical sections with mandates to gather records and produce reports with an eye towards official publications. The experiences of the three armed services were not uniform, nor were the official histories equal in quality. The Army’s record keeping experience and histories stand out as exceptional. The First World War, and the failure of the Army Historical Section to complete a timely history, also heavily shaped the Army’s approach to the historical narrative of the Second World War.

Charles Perry Stacey was appointed early in the war. He was a professional historian, trained at Princeton, with military experience and the support of the highest military authority in the Army. As an Army Historical Officer during the war, Stacey was able to oversee the administration of war diaries and implement thorough record filing techniques to preserve valuable information.

The Navy and Air Force historians were not as well positioned. Both services had very quick transitions from peace to war, and needed to contribute as much as possible, as soon as possible. Kenneth Conn was appointed to the RCAF before Stacey’s appointment in the Army, but he did not share Stacey’s academic background. Conn, an ace from the First World War, was appointed to manage the records produced by the British Commonwealth Air Training Program (1939), and the new department of National Defence for Air (1940). He was thrust into a new department that did not have established a registry system or records keeping standards.

It is not surprising that the armed services had different records keeping experiences. Parliament created the Department of National Defence on 1 January 1923, unifying the Departments of Naval Services, Militia and Reserves, and the Air Board.
The Department of Militia and Reserves developed out of the system established by the British prior to Confederation. Officially, Militia and Reserves emerged in 1906, when the British withdrew its forces, including naval forces, from Canadian locations. The Laurier government created the Naval Service of Canada in legislation passed on 4 May 1910, which became the Royal Canadian Navy the following year. The result was that the Navy had a separate records registry, which was merged briefly with the Headquarters 1903 registry, but was removed in 1938 with the creation of a new Navy registry. The Navy continued to use this system until the integration of all of the forces in 1965.

The Air Force and Army used the 1903 system until both services adjusted their registries to accommodate the growth due to the war. File numbers were reassigned and others retired to create more of a block structure, where similar topics were filed in like groups of numbers. The Department of National Defence for Air created a separate registry in 1940 and Army Headquarters continued to use the 1903 system for topics that related to the overall defence programme until the file system’s disbandment in 1946. Each service maintained a similar structure to the original 1903 series, but they varied in consistency.

The war led to an expansion of the Department of National Defence’s structure and areas of responsibility. Prime Minister King’s creation of the Cabinet War Committee (CWC) in 1939 was one of the first additions to Defence Minister Norman Rogers’ responsibility. The sudden and additional burdens brought on by the fall of Western Europe through the spring of 1940 proved too much for a single Minister,


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leading to a departmental reorganization in May 1940. The Prime Minister appointed three Ministers for the Department of National Defence. J.L. Ralston was originally appointed as the Minister responsible for the Army. However, with the sudden death of Norman Rogers in May 1940, Ralston also took on the Ministerial responsibility for the entire department. C.G. Powers became the Minister of National Defence for Air and also acted as an Associate Minister to help Ralston. Angus MacDonald, a former Premier of Nova Scotia, rose to be Minister of National Defence for Naval Services.\(^{215}\) All three ministers of National Defence worked with the Chiefs of Staff who advised on military matters through the Defence Council.\(^{216}\)

The three services each had historical sections with similar mandates and functions. Each published multiple articles and official histories during and after the war. The first volume of the ‘RCAF Overseas’ came out in 1944, and the three army historical booklets, ‘Canadians in Britain’, ‘Canadians in Normandy’ and the booklet on the first half of the Italian campaign were prepared during the war, and published in 1945. Stacey and Gilbert Tucker, the Navy’s historian, also published a number of articles in academic and popular journals, such as the CHA Annual Report, CHR and Canadian Geographic.\(^{217}\)

C.P. Stacey produced four volumes for the Army’s official history. *The Canadian Army, 1939-1945*, was published in 1948, and was quite successful. *Six Years of War* came out in 1955, followed by *The Victory Campaign* in 1960. *Arms, Men and Government: The War Policies of Canada* was published in 1970.\(^{218}\) G.W.L. Nicholson authored the history on the Canadians in Italy, which appeared in 1956.\(^{219}\) The Navy and Air Force did not

\(^{215}\) C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Government*, 120.

\(^{216}\) C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Government*, 121.

\(^{217}\) Gilbert Tucker, “The Royal Canadian Naval Historical Section,” *Canadian Historical Review* XXVI, No.3 (September 1945); Kenneth B. Conn, “The Royal Canadian Air Force Historical Section.” *Canadian Historical Review* XXVI, no. 3 (1945); C.P. Stacey, “Historical Programme of the Canadian Army Overseas.” *Canadian Historical Review* XXVI, no. 3 (1945).


have as thorough a publication record. In 1948, Brook Claxton, the defence minister, ordered the wind down of the official histories program, with only books completed by that time to be published. Dr. Gilbert Tucker published his two-volume history, *The Naval Service in Canada: Its Official History*, in 1952. Tucker refused to take on the planned operational volume because he did not have access to secret intelligence files and enemy records; thus the Naval Staff commissioned journalist Joseph Schull to write *‘Far Distant Ships’: An Official Account of Canadian Naval Operations in World War II*, which appeared in 1950.\(^{220}\)

The Historical Section of the Royal Canadian Air Force published three wartime volumes. The first, *The RCAF Overseas: Volume 1*, covered the first four years, and was published in 1944. The second and third volumes, *The RCAF Overseas, Volume 2: the Fifth Year*, and *The RCAF Overseas, Volume 3: the Sixth Year*, were published in 1945 and 1949. The RCAF abandoned publication after *The RCAF 4th Year* appeared in 1949 – and only Stacey had the clout, through his personal connection to Lester Pearson, then a top bureaucrat at External Affairs - to persuade the government to reverse the cuts in the historical program, which is why he was able to continue with the books that appeared in the 1950s.\(^{221}\)

The differences between these publications, including when they were published and the quality of the contents, were the result of the very unique record experiences the official historians of each service faced during the war. The Army historian hired for the overseas effort and record-keeping experience stands out as exceptional. Charles Perry Stacey was a professional historian.\(^{222}\) With his unique background, Stacey, an Army Historical Officer during the war and appointed as Official historian in 1945, was given access to records he otherwise would not have

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\(^{220}\) Sarty, “‘The ‘Battle we Lost at Home’ Revisited,’“ 41-50.

\(^{221}\) Stacey, *A Date with History: Memoirs of a Canadian Historian* (Ottawa: Deneau, 1983), x-xx.

\(^{222}\) Charles Perry Stacey was a Toronto native, educated at the universities of Toronto, Oxford and Princeton. Stacey first joined the Canadian Corps of Signals in 1924.
seen. Stacey was able to oversee the administration of war diaries and implement thorough record filing techniques to preserve valuable information. This ensured a fairly thorough evidentiary record of the war experience, one that could not be matched by the Navy or the Air Force.

Stacey also benefitted from the well-established Army Historical Section (AHS), which was supported by a staff complement, and lead by Archer Fortescue Duguid, the historian responsible for the Official history of the First World War. Duguid, an engineer by training, became the head of AHS in 1921. Lacking any historical training, Duguid became the authority on the Canadian effort in the Great War and undertook an eight volume historical project.223 The historians within the AHS also had archival responsibilities, looking after all the records collection and narrative writing for the huge range of army activities in Canada. The navy and air force had no such institutional base for historical work. Conn, a flier from the Great War, and Tucker, a top academic from Yale University, had to organize records produced in Canada and overseas, and create historical narratives, without a similar support structure as the AHS.

When the war started in 1939, the Army, by its very nature, had a number of policies that governed the creation of its records. Duguid’s historical section continued to publish materials with guidelines and routine orders for consistent filing, and units were directed to arrange their files according to directives that streamlined procedures. Stacey was not appointed until very late in 1940 – and then solely to gather records of the Army Overseas. However, Stacey encountered an army that was already operating on a set of guidelines for its records, drawn from British army practice. The war, however, presented a new environment for record preservation. With so many units in the Army, members of the central registry at Headquarters wanted to merge files as seamlessly as possible. DND attempted to standardize its record creation and

223 Cook, “Quill and Canon: Writing the Great War in Canada,” 506-507.
management procedures.\textsuperscript{224} When the Army appointed Stacey as its overseas historical officer, he encountered a well-entrenched records system, which would greatly assist the writing of the Army’s history.

The Department created the Directorate of Records after the First World War to help organize and manage wartime records, particularly the personnel files. When the Second World War started, the branch had 43 staff. Over the course of the war it required additional resources to handle the substantial increase in files to fulfill its mandate of “preparing rapid and accurate statistics, nominal rolls, strength returns and general information regarding personnel to maintain administrative control of all Canada’s military personnel.”\textsuperscript{225} The Directorate of Records quickly expanded to over a thousand personnel.

The creation of records overseas at Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London and the units in Europe increased both the complexity of the record keeping experience in Europe and the volume of records the organization created. CMHQ was designed to manage the Canadian effort overseas and liaise between National Defence in Ottawa and the British War Office. This organization was the centre of the Canadian military effort overseas.\textsuperscript{226} Major-General H. D.G. Crerar, the chief of the general staff in 1940, set up the CMHQ organization, and oversaw the creation of a records program that resembled the 1903 classification scheme.\textsuperscript{227} A veteran of the First War World and an experienced army bureaucrat, Crerar wanted to enhance the professionalism of the

\textsuperscript{226} C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Government, 206
\textsuperscript{227} C.P. Stacey, “The Historical Programme of the Canadian Army Overseas,” Canadian Historical Review XXVI no. 3 (1945): 230.
army. He believed that records documenting the contribution of the army to the Allied war effort would help achieve this objective. Crerar started to send requests to the Directorate of the Historical Section, Duguid, in November 1939 for a historical officer to help manage the creation of war diaries and historical information. Only a month into the war, Crerar had already requested the services of C.P. Stacey.

Stacey’s training, experience, and personal connections separated him from the other two service historians. While working at Princeton, Stacey had written *The Military Problems of Canada*, (1940) which brought him notice from several senior military officials, including Harry Crerar. On 11 October 1940, Crerar informed Stacey that the Minister of Defence, Col. J.L. Ralston had authorized his appointment as a Historical Officer with the Army Historical Section. Stacey was based in Canadian Military Headquarters, London, where he would be working with the General Staff. Stacey accepted immediately and arrived in Ottawa in December. Officially, Stacey was a part of Duguid’s Army Historical Section in Ottawa. His position, which carried the rank of major, involved securing and preparing records for the official historian, a position Stacey received in 1945.

The historical projects of the Second World War were set against the experience of the Great War historical projects, which were discussed in the first chapter. According to Stacey, Crerar “made no secret of the fact in hiring [Stacey] he was trying to provide against another such fiasco in connection with the Second World War.” In many ways, the historical efforts of the Second World War were in response to Duguid’s failed attempts to complete the official history of the First World War.

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229 Cook, *Clio’s Warriors*, 94; Tim Cook, “Clio’s Soldiers: Charles Stacey and the Army Historical Section in the Second World War,” *Canadian Historical Review* 83, no. 1 (March 2002): 2; Crerar to Defensor, 28 November 1939, 4/History/1, vol. 12339, RG 24, LAC.
230 C.P. Stacey, *A Date with History*, 59, 63; Cook, *Clio’s Warriors*, 94.
231 Cook, *Clio’s Warriors*, 94.
232 Stacey, *A Date with History*, 66.
233 Cook, *Clio’s Warriors*, 70.
Some key comparisons can be made between the histories that emerged between the First and Second World Wars. The task of record gathering for the CEF fell to Max Aitken, whose efforts to document the achievements of the CEF was described in the first chapter. Aitken was a political appointment, and was neither a trained archivist nor historian. Two decades later, Charles Stacey had a similar job, but with a very different mandate, and with very different qualifications. On 26 December 1940, Stacey arrived at Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London, and met with the Brigadier-General Staff, Maurice Pope. Despite the support of Crerar and the GOC 1 Division, General A.G.L. McNaughton, Pope informed Stacey that many Canadian officers had objected to the role of the historical officer. The support of senior army officials helped Stacey increase his legitimacy among wary Canadian officers, allowing him to create policies and procedures that supported the development of wartime narratives.

Stacey’s first task was to address the record keeping of the Army overseas. Stacey quickly established several important components of a records management plan, and reassessed the established procedures for the care of files. Stacey started to send files to both Duguid and a duplicate set to the General Staff (Intelligence). He consulted the Central Registry in Ottawa, so that the records he gathered were organized in a manner that reflected the larger collection. This would help with the eventual merger of the documents overseas into the larger DND collection. Stacey’s close attention to detail led to a file structure that withstood the pressures of record keeping while in theatres of operations.

One of the official sources of information maintained by all Army units was the War Diaries, and Stacey devoted a great deal of time to ensure these documents

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234 Stacey, A Date with History, 71. M. Pope was Joseph Pope’s nephew.
235 Stacey, A Date with History, 79.
236 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 95.
237 WD HIS SEC CMHQ, 1 January 1941 to 31 January 1941, (1-2 January 1941), 2, vol. 17, 508, RG 24, LAC.
received the care they warranted. The purpose of the War Diary was to inform the historical record when units were on active service. It was used to “supply authentic material for the history of the unit, and of the force; to furnish a historical record of operations; and to provide data upon which to base improvements in the training, equipment, organization and administration.”

Instructions issued at the start of the war noted that War Diaries were to include,

Important orders, instructions, reports, messages or dispatches, daily maps locations, employment, movements and dispositions, important movement of officers and matters relating to the duties of each branch of the staff, detailed accounts of operations, including exact hour, location and circumstance of important occurrences, nature and description of trenches, field works or accommodation and changes in the establishment of strength.

To ensure all units were following procedures, on 19 March 1941, General A.G.L. McNaughton asked Stacey to “investigate the question of War Diaries being kept by Canadian troops at Gibraltar.” Stacey had to ensure that units adhered to DND’s guideline and policies governing War Diaries and ensured they contained historically relevant information.

Stacey worked alongside Captain H.M. Jackson, from the Records Branch of CMHQ located in Acton to ensure that war diaries were kept. Jackson’s responsibility was to educate units of the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom of the process involved in producing good, valuable war diaries. He visited units, wrote letters of advice, and produced documents that offered general counsel on the writing of war

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240 WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 March 1941 to 31 March 1941, (19 March 1941), vol. 17, 508, RG 24, LAC.
diaries. Stacey, interested in the completion of thorough war diaries, followed Jackson’s efforts closely, and the men collaborated in several areas.

On 15 April 1942, the First Canadian Army headquarters was established with General McNaughton as its General Officer Commanding. He needed Stacey to help create a sound administrative mechanism for this historic moment. If Canadian soldiers were to participate in an operation and required a historical officer, Stacey would have been unable to perform both tasks.

As Stacey’s workload became too great, McNaughton recommended an assistant for Stacey. McNaughton did not want to overwhelm Stacey, as he had a strong desire to see that “the comprehensive narrative of our operations and developments in 1940 may be prepared at an early date.” Perhaps drawing to mind the experience with Duguid from the First World War, McNaughton was concerned that “otherwise there is a danger that we may lose the full story of this phase.” McNaughton wanted Stacey to record the experiences of those individuals involved in the events.

The growth of Stacey’s historical section at CMHQ illustrates not only that the Canadian Army records were increasing in volume and complexity, but also that the Canadian Army itself, more specifically senior officers, saw value in the services provided by C.P. Stacey and his section. With the changing nature of the war, Stacey needed to ensure he could gather and protect the records of the wartime experience.

The raid on Dieppe forced Stacey to realize that his own capacity to fulfill his mandate was strained. On 19 August 1942, parts of the Canadian Second Division and 14th Armoured Regiment (Calgary Tank Regiment) landed on or near the shores of

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243 WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 July 1943 to 31 July 1943, (22 July 1943), 7, vol. 17,508, RG 24, LAC.

244 WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 April 1942 to 30 April 1942, (16 April 1942), vol 17,508, RG 24, LAC.
Dieppe in Operation Jubilee. Of 4,963 soldiers involved in the raid, 3,369 were either killed or wounded. Away on leave the day of the raid, Stacey returned to London to start collecting various documents and opinions on the operation. Stacey began by interviewing Dieppe survivors, Canadian Naval Officers, and collecting the written records requested of every Canadian soldier who returned. With his own ability to interview and gather records stretched, the Dieppe experience highlighted for Stacey the need for historical units in operation theatres, to gather historical data while operations progressed, before information was lost.

After the Dieppe experience, Stacey expanded the historical section to include a field component so that historical officers could join Canadian units in operational theatres. On 25 September 1942, Stacey drafted a submission to the B.G.S. on the “desirability of Historical Officers and Artists getting closer to operations than was the case with Dieppe.” The appointment of George Stanley, an Oxford trained professor who taught at Mount Allison University, and a number of other historical officers, greatly assisted in this task. Both Stacey and McNaughton wanted to ensure units created thorough and accurate information of their activities. Stacey’s experience following the Dieppe raid led to significant changes to the structure of the historical section. Stacey convinced Crerar and McNaughton that the historical group needed advance warning of operations so that a historical officer attached to headquarters could follow the operation and maintain accurate records. With the plans for the landing in Sicily, Stacey was able to use the Field Historical Section, No. 1, for this purpose. The expansion of Stacey’s section was another indication of his remarkable influence.

\[245\text{ WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 August 1942 to 31 August 1942, 14 August 1942, vol. 17, 508, RG 24, LAC.}\]
\[246\text{ Stacey, Arms, Men and Government, 80.}\]
\[247\text{ WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 July 1942 to 31 July 1942, 16 July 1942, vol. 17,508, RG 24, LAC.}\]
\[248\text{ WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 October 1942 to 31 October 1942, 7 October 1942, vol. 17,508, RG 24, LAC.}\]
\[249\text{ WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 September 1942 to 30 September 1942, 25 September 1942, vol. 17,508, RG 24, LAC.}\]
The 1 Canadian Infantry Division and 1 Armoured Brigade landed in Sicily on 10 July 1943. Over the next month the Allies advanced through the island, before landing at Reggio di Calabria on the toe of Italy on 3 September 1943. Following close behind was A.T. Sesia, who was the first historical officer attached to a Canadian force in an active theatre. Sesia had previously been an intelligence officer in 1 Division, so was surprised by the appointment, but he became interested in his own position when Gen. Guy Simonds pointed out to him the importance of the work.250 This was a new experience for Stacey’s organization, and Sesia’s reports provide insights on the development of the field organization. In a report to Stacey dated 7 August 1943, Sesia described the numerous problems that developed during the course of the operation. He outlined for the Stacey the functions a historical officer deployed in an active operation should expect to serve, recommending the use of shorthand for interviews, the ability to sketch accurate maps to depict battle dispositions and to remember that major operations lasted periods extending two days or longer. He told Stacey that one of the most difficult experiences was the expectation that he “be almost a superman in his efforts to bring into a single picture events that may be happening in a dozen places at once.”251 Sesia recommended the attachment of a clerk-stenographer, who could help complete notes, a task increasingly difficult to complete with the increasing list of duties. “With the lengthening nights it is not possible for the historical officer to transcribe his roughly written notes into something decent and then type them out himself.”252 Stacey had greatly underestimated the manpower required to gather and create records during an active operation, and the Field Historical Sections needed to expand to fulfill their objectives.

250 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 101.
251 WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 August 1943 to 31 August 1943, 31 July 1943, vol. 17, 508, RG 24, LAC.
252 Ibid.
Sesia’s second report in October 1943 commented on the changes implemented while he was in theatre. The Historical Section in the Mediterranean had “grown to unheard of proportions since the day I landed in Sicily.” It included a Historical Officer, two war artists, a clerk, two drivers, a typewriter, tools for written correspondence, transportation and a 15 cwt lorry, with the addition of a number of batmen. Slowly, the CFHS determined the required staffing for creating and managing records in an operational theatre, knowledge that greatly assisted CFHS with the Normandy campaign.

When Stacey was in the Mediterranean with Duguid in March 1944, Stacey’s assistant, George Stanley, took over the effort to establish Canadian Field Historical Section No. 2, which was attached to the headquarters of the II Canadian Corps and the 3 Canadian Division. A.T. Sesia was recalled from the Italian theatre to help Stanley oversee an organization that committed one historical officer and one war artist to each of Canada’s three fighting divisions that were heading to France. These commitments were not the result of lobbying efforts from Stacey, nor from the influence exerted by McNaughton or Crerar. Stacey discovered that each of the divisions did not want to enter operations without a historical section to document their participation.

The historical officer attached to 3 Division, Jack R. Martin, landed on the Normandy beaches at 2000 hours on 6 June 1944. Martin issued his first report on 12 July 1944. Stacey later recalled “looking back on these memoranda, clear, precise, militarily accurate, succinct and yet in essentials complete, I wonder how Jack did it in the conditions in the bridgehead.”

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253 WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 November 1943 to 30 November 1943: Correspondence from Capt. A.T. Sesia to Colonel C.P. Stacey, 26 October 1942, vol. 17, 508, RG 24, LAC.
254 WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 March 1944 to 9 April 1944, 28 March 1944, vol. 17,508, RG 24, LAC.
255 WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 March 1944 to 9 April 1944, 29 March 1944, vol. 17,508, RG 24, LAC.
256 Stacey, Date with History, 137.
257 Stacey, Date with History, 138.
information on the combat experience and documenting the actions of the Canadian soldiers. There were limitations to how thorough the historical officers could be while in the field, a fact recognized by Stacey. According to Tim Cook, the historical officers were told to “focus on recording personal evidence through interviews and ensure that units provided accurate and detailed accounts of their engagements.”

Although the historical officers continually faced the challenge of accurately representing the field of battle, they gathered as many different types of documentation as possible to compile their battle narratives.

With the CFHS, Stacey was able to influence the management and creation of records within operational theatres, something that the Air Force and Navy could not accomplish to the same extent. Stacey had developed a sufficient records plan within the Army, which later attracted the attention of W.E.D. Halliday and the Public Records Committee in 1944. Stacey’s success lent him credibility in Ottawa that lead to greater involvement in records and the archives in the post war.

The conclusion of hostilities presented a unique challenge for Stacey and the staff at the CFHS. With a sense of approaching victory, the Historical Section started to organize the records with a view to expedite the merger of their files into NDHQ systems. Stacey also wanted to see as many of the records as possible reside in the Archives. In December 1944, Stacey returned to Canada to meet with Colonel Duguid and W.E.D. Halliday, from the Privy Council Office and Secretary of the Public Records Committee. Stacey was the expert on the Army’s wartime files, and Halliday was exploring the extent of the wartime records issue in the federal government to determine the future direction of the IACPR.

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258 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 102-103.
259 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 103.
260 WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 January 1945 to 31 January 1945, (13 December 1944), vol. 17,508, RG 24, LAC.
The three discussed Halliday’s draft report to the IACPR on the extent of the records problem in government departments. Stacey expressed concern that the report did not acknowledge the proper role of the Public Archives, for he believed that the Archives was to assist in the development of Canadian historical scholarship. This required public, or government, records, a view he continued to hold into the 1950s, when he appeared before the Royal Commission on the National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences. Stacey’s first meeting with Halliday in established a professional relationship that continued into the postwar and helped strengthen the case that the Archives should widen its role as a Public Records Office.

However influential Stacey was to become, the conclusion of hostilities placed the armed services’ official history programs in doubt. In May 1945 Stacey’s Historical Section was rushing to collect war trophies and documents before Canadian units returned to Canada. That fall, Stacey was appointed as the Army’s official historian, but the future of the Historical Section remained in doubt. There was no way to prevent it from being disbanded with every other unit of the Canadian Army.

Stacey sat down with the other heads of the General Staff on 19 June 1945 to discuss how the reduction of the various GS branches would affect his section’s ability to fulfill its mandate. He explained that the Historical Section faced the task of producing a history in five years, and yet did not have a clear policy governing its existence during this period. He recommended to the other section heads that the Historical Section “keep the present staff at work pending developments, and to bring

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261 WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 January 1945 to 31 January 1945, 12 December 1944, vol. 17,508, RG 24, LAC.  
263 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 133.  
264 WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 June 1945 to 30 June 1945, (4 June 1945), vol. 17, 508, RG 24, LAC.
the personnel of 1st Canadian Field Historical Section to CMHQ to work here."265 This arrangement gave Stacey time to address record management policies for unit files, an important component to the Second World War archival collection, and ensure the posterity of the Canadian Army’s record after demobilization.266

At the start of the war, the Army was lucky to possess leaders who wanted to increase the public’s perception of the service, and see the completion of an official history. Generals Crerar and McNaughton understood how a written history could influence the nation’s memory of the Army’s war effort.267 With the support from the Army’s senior officers, Stacey was able to access files and other members of the Canadian Army that otherwise would not have been available. This access allowed Stacey to manage the record keeping structures, protect and develop unit war diaries, organize the CMHQ and unit files and protect these valuable records from premature destruction. Not only did this result in a strong historical narrative, but through Stacey’s efforts a massive body of paper was saved for future historians.

In the fall of 1945, Stacey then returned to Ottawa as the head of the Army Historical Section, then the Directorate Historical Section, as the Army’s official historian.268 Stacey’s publication record was the strongest of all of the services.269 Stacey was able to capitalize on the support he received from the highest military authorities in the Army, his historical training, and the Army’s gradual and incremental operational pace assisted Stacey’s efforts at gathering and collecting records during the war contributed to a stronger official record, a strong base for the official history, and a

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265 WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 June 1945 to 30 June 1945, (19 June 1945), vol. 17,508, RG 24, LAC.
266 WD Hist Sec CMHQ, 1 June 1945 to 30 June 1945, (19 June 1945), vol. 17,508, RG 24, LAC.
267 Dickson, Thoroughly Canadian General, xvii.
268 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 135.
269 C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-45 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1948); C.P. Stacey, Victory Campaign: the Operations in North-West Europe 1944-1945 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1960); Stacey, Arms, Men and Government; Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy.
foundation for other historians to develop their own work. But, as Cook notes, these provisions did not prevent delays in the publication of the Army’s Official Histories.\textsuperscript{270}

The historical officers from the Navy and Air Force worked under very different circumstances. With the declaration of the war, these two services had very little time to shift from peacetime operation to war. Wing Commander Kenneth Conn was appointed to care for the RCAF history and records in the Directorate of Staff Duties. His appointment came in January 1940, after Air Commodore A.M. Croil, who was interested in a historical project, created a section dedicated to writing reports and gathering records. Conn did not have any historical training, working in the tourism industry in between the war.\textsuperscript{271} Conn faced a difficult task. The RCAF was established in 1924, and did not have an interwar historical section, so Conn took on the responsibility to integrate the incomplete and unorganized First World War records into the growing body of documents from the Second World War that would form the basis of an official history.\textsuperscript{272}

The Historical Officer of the Air Force had to gather and organize records from an organization that was dramatically altered with the onset of the war. Conn’s section was first directed “to gather records and prepare reports for RCAF headquarters.”\textsuperscript{273} Conn oversaw the central registries and correspondence files organized by each headquarters formation and unit, and provided the authority of records of historic value for the Department of National Defence for Air.\textsuperscript{274} According to Tim Cook, the senior officers of the RCAF were not as supportive of Conn’s project as the officers of the Army were of Stacey’s. The RCAF officers had little historical interest and, according to Cook, openly “questioned the usefulness of the work which was being

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{270}{Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 153-154.}
\footnote{271}{Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 111.}
\footnote{272}{Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 111.}
\footnote{273}{Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 111.}
\footnote{274}{Committee on Public Records General Questionnaire to Government Departments and Agencies, (31 August 1944), file 15-9-100, vol. 1592, RG 24, LAC.}
\end{footnotes}
done.”

This perspective affected the types of records the officers produced. Conn complained after the war that the “paucity and poor quality of official records, [as the daily diaries submitted by units] were, at best, of dubious value.” According to Conn, he was given “high sounding but vague instructions… [leaving him] to plot a hitherto uncharted course,” of the RCAF history.

When Conn started as the Official Historian, the major role of the RCAF was centred on the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP), which started in December 1939. The program was to provide training to aircrew, navigators and personnel at airfields created across the country. When the first graduates of the BCATP started to move overseas in the spring of 1941, increasing the size of the RCAF representation in England, Conn did not have the capacity to follow these Canadian airmen, nor did he have the capacity to trace the thousands of Canadian air personnel who were attached to the RAF units. The history of the RCAF required an introduction to the Canadian air force, whose traditions traced back to the first flight in Canada in 1909. The British Air Ministry held the relevant files. Conn, stationed in Canada monitoring the BCATP, could not function as an overseas historical officer as well. In late 1941, the RCAF posted an officer, W.R. Thompson, overseas to “extract from the records of RAF the pertinent data to construct … a runway from which the history of the RCAF could take off.” While this officer started to gather historical information on Canadian fliers in the RAF, another soon joined to oversee the completion of unit diaries.

Unlike the Canadian Army overseas, the RCAF in England resembled “a clearing house for Canadian units and personnel placed under strategic and tactical

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275 Cook, *Clio’s Warriors*, 111.
277 Conn, “The Royal Canadian Air Force Historical Section,” 246.
279 Conn, “The Royal Canadian Air Force Historical Section,” 249.
control of the Royal Air Force.”

Without influence in the strategic and tactical commands of the RAF, Conn could not obtain the information necessary for a narrative that was similar in scope to Stacey’s. Into this vast organization, Conn dispatched a number of historical officers to make sense of the air campaign. Squadron Leader W.R. Thompson was posted to the RCAF Overseas Headquarters to gather and organize unit diaries and other historical information, like combat or bombing reports, in order to identify discrepancies with other squadron or group record books. F.H. Hitchins, a trained historian and professor at New York University, was sent to the RAF archives in Aberystwyth, Wales, to gather material for the official history. Conn was also able to obtain two War Artists to create works that “depict every phase of the varied activities of the RCAF from the training schools in Canada to all types of operational units overseas in Britain, Africa and on the continent.” In the spring of 1942, he was also able to attach R.C.A.F. Historical Officers to Fighter, Bomber and Coastal Commands, as well as the Headquarters in the Middle East to give the Historical Section a record of the policy that guided R.C.A.F. operations. While it was relatively easy to obtain the tactical information of the RCAF, finding the information held by the RAF and higher Allied command remained a challenge for the historical officers.

Through much of the war, Conn’s continued staff duties with the Historical Section kept him from focusing on the historical projects. Not until 1944 was Conn relieved of staff duties and thus able to devote all of his energy to the task of writing the history. To assist the Historical Officer with his expanding workload, the Historical Section had “thirty-two officers, [including] eight at Headquarters, ten in a special

282 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 112-113; Conn, “The Royal Canadian Air Force Historical Section,” 249.
284 Conn, “The Royal Canadian Air Force Historical Section,” 250
detachment in Canada, and the remainder overseas,“ by 1945. These men completed several historical narratives and reports for the timely completion of an RCAF history.

The first volumes produced in 1944 by the Historical sections were interim reports, supported by a private individual, who preferred anonymity. A number of bureaucrats and high ranking airmen felt that the RCAF was not getting the recognition that it deserved for its wartime contribution, and pushed to have the reports published before war’s end. The first volume focused on the feats of Canadian airmen in the first four years of the war, showing Canadians that the BCATP program was a success. In the foreword, the Minister of Air Defence, C.G. Power, stated that he hoped that the popular narrative would help foster “a deeper knowledge and appreciation of our airmen’s way of life, their duties, their intrepid heroism and their steadfast honour,” acting as inspiration for younger generations. The RCAF involved a significant Canadian contribution to the war, and Power did not want his service overlooked. He acknowledged that the history lacked specific detail on Canadian involvement, due to restrictions of censorship. Nor could the RCAF rely on detailed reports from Historical Officers attached to units on operations, as was the case with the Army. For the air service, this was not feasible. The resulting volumes published in 1944 and 1945 were not academic texts; they contained no sources as they simply recounted the feats of individual airmen. They included a roll of honour, which listed those killed in action, as well as a list of decorations.

The cessation of hostilities was a time of uncertainty for historians in all three services, who recounted their trials in a volume of the Canadian Historical Review in 1945. The RCAF soon lost Kenneth Conn as he returned to civilian life. He recommended two

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286 Conn, “The Royal Canadian Air Force Historical Section,” 246.
287 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 119.
of his historical officers, Wing Commander Hitchins and Flight Commander Coulson as his successors, both able researchers in the Historical Section. The new RCAF historian, Fred Hitchins lost several more of his staff to civilian life. Hitchins also assumed that the work on the official history had received ministerial approval. Conn had never approached the minister regarding an official history, but had continued to conduct the research for the project. Hitchins continued the work until May 1946, when historical officers overseas were barred access to the RAF’s strategic record.

The result was a much-limited history of the RCAF. A third volume published in 1949 described operations in the last year of the war. It had many of the same limitations as the previous two editions, with a focus on the actions of Canadian units overseas and little strategic discussion on the wider air effort. Like previous volumes, it contained many pictures of individual airmen and included a roll of honour and a list of decorations.

The lack of success of the RCAF history effort was a result of the constraints that occurred with the RCAF. Both Conn and Hitchins were thrust into a position with few established procedures. The placement of Canadian airmen within RAF units created another significant challenge, as there was no established method for keeping track of, or monitoring, their efforts within the larger RAF structure. The efforts of these Canadians were largely lost to the historical officers. In addition to the structural limitations, the historical officers found that they did not have strong support from the highest RCAF authority, which severely limited their capacity to access the strategic documentation that would have informed the tactical operations of the Canadian units. Conn and Hitchins faced a number of limitations that were not a challenge for the Army.

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291 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 193.
292 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 139.
294 Ibid.
historian, which dramatically affected the outcome of the service’s history. The history reflected the wider problems of record keeping.

However, the official historians did hold influence in the wider question of government record keeping. Hitchins’ efforts as a Historical Officer with the RCAF’s Historical Section led to his postwar involvement with the PRC to determine how best to handle the RCAF’s records. Despite significant challenges and limitations of writing of the official history and creating wartime documentation, Hitchins became the expert on the RCAF’s wartime record, and occasionally appeared before the PRC, on invitation, to help determine the best course for the long-term preservation of these records in the postwar.295

The official historians of the RCN faced similar difficulties. The RCN differed from the RCAF and the Army in that their wartime services were immediately required in 1939. In this environment, the senior leadership wholly overlooked records management and provisions for a historical section.296 Once appointed, this historian faced a significant challenge locating information for the official narrative. The historian was not given the same amount of authority, or access to senior officers that Stacey had. This lack of support and the immediate operational activity of the Navy were exacerbated by the official historian’s inability to ensure the creation of records that would inform the official history.

By February 1940, the Navy had not appointed any historical officer, which concerned the head of the Army Historical Section, Colonel A.F. Duguid. Perhaps acknowledging his own limitations addressing the records of the Great War, Duguid cautioned the chief of the naval staff, Admiral Percy Nelles, of a performance similar to

296 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 119.
the First World War, stressing the importance of documents to the creation of a service history.297

In response to Duguid’s encouragement, Nelles appointed Lieutenant John Farrow, a Hollywood movie director, as the Controller of Naval Information (CNI) in March 1940.298 Farrow, who had a background in theology, started to address the records that were created for ships, construction and supplies. One of Farrow’s contributions to the Navy’s record keeping was an increased emphasis on photographs, in an attempt to diversify the records.299 A photographic section was created, consisting of three units, one for each coast, and one at Headquarters in Ottawa. The photographers of each unit were responsible for producing the historical record and for press releases, and joining any ships dispatched on special missions.300

In the fall of 1939, the Navy started to publish a weekly report on naval activities for senior officers and government officials.301 The reports later fell under Farrow’s responsibilities, but the Acting Deputy Minister of Naval Service, K.S MacLachlan, complained in September 1940 that the they were “entirely unsatisfactory for both the Prime Minister himself and for future historians.”302 Farrow was not appointed as an official historian, and the efforts to address record policies in the Navy during this time were not implemented towards supporting an official history.

Farrow’s position at the CNI remained vacant for six months, further jeopardizing the collection and management of wartime records.303 In June 1941, the Navy appointed historian Dr. Gilbert Tucker. He was an expert in nineteenth-century

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298 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 119-120.
299 Memorandum to CNI from John Farrow, 16 May 1940, file NSS 1000-5-26, vol. 4115, RG 24, LAC.
300 Memorandum: To CNI from NNR, 21 May 1940, file NSS 1000-5-16, vol. 4155, RG 24, LAC.
301 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 120.
302 Qtd. in Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 120. (Nelles to Deputy Minister, 20 September 1940, NHS 1000-5-18, DHH).
commercial mercantile history, who had served for three years in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, received a doctorate from Cambridge and an appointment at Yale. Tucker was directed “to collect the material for, and to write, the official history of the Navy.” Tucker performed his duties on the home front while a group of young historical officers captured eyewitness accounts and gathered records overseas at the Naval Service Headquarters in London. Among this group was Lieutenant James George, who used his personal contacts with senior officers at the London Office to expand his section, and obtain additional personnel to administer the documentation of the Navy’s contribution to the war.\(^{305}\)

Writing in 1945, Tucker described well the kinds of sources he required to write an official wartime history of the Royal Canadian Navy.

The story of Operations is mainly based on prior plans or orders for the operation in question, framed in the light of existing Intelligence; on reports of proceedings, action reports, and track-charts, drawn up in the warship concerned; on ships’ logs; on signals, either ship-to-ship or between ship and shore; and on subsequent appreciations and Intelligence reports. A war-ship entering harbour after a cruise has on board, for the time being, the only complete record of her own recent activities. An obvious weakness here is that all these classes of documents present the operation from one side only; and unless the former enemy publishes a satisfactory account first, the final story is bound to be one-sided. After an action also, owing to the high speed of contemporary war-ships and the complexity of their equipment, it would be far more difficult than it formerly was for the participants to know what had occurred, were it not for the existence of certain detecting and recording devices.

For Tucker, the source material demanded a close relationship between the historian and archivists working in several locations.

The principal sources for activities carried out on shore are, periodic reports which sometimes take the form of War Diaries, memoranda on almost every subject under the sun, correspondence, minutes, and signals. The material as a whole is exceedingly raw; with the results that its mass is mountainous and that the research worker may be either

\(^{304}\) Tucker, “The Royal Canadian Naval Historical Section and its Work,” 240; Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 122-123.

\(^{305}\) Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 122.
saved or consigned to purgatory by those who do the filing. The repositories of the records concerned are situated at Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa, at the Admiralty, at the bases and other shore establishments in Canada and Newfoundland, and in Londonderry.\textsuperscript{306}

Few commentaries better describe the importance of a well-organized archive, or the difficulties in drawing together so many sources from so many different places. According to Tim Cook, Tucker wanted to destroy some of his files after he had extracted the information he required for the official history, arguing that they were no longer useful. Tucker saw the official history as the product of all the records and served as the “last word,” a severe limitation for future Canadian naval historians.\textsuperscript{307} Another irony came in 1948, when the federal government cut the funding available for the official histories, jeopardizing the histories that were underway. Commands in the East and West gathered volumes until departmental reorganizations jeopardized the storage rooms containing the records. Only by happenstance did the Directorate of History at the Department of National Defence retrieve these valuable materials before they were discarded in the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{308}

Not surprisingly, the two publications chronicling the Navy’s wartime contributions depended little on the kinds of records Tucker described in 1945. Joseph Schull wrote \textit{The Far Distant Ships} in 1950. Schull worked in Gilbert Tucker’s historical section and relied on the preliminary worked completed by Tucker, a number of official reports, and the work of other historical officers.\textsuperscript{309} The work provided a much-needed account of the Canadian contribution to the war effort at sea, but Schull did not reference any official documentation or reports completed by the historical officers. As Roger Sarty explains, Tucker wanted to produce a volume on the operations from 1939 to 1945, but not without reference to the records of enemy naval forces or the

\textsuperscript{306} Gilbert Tucker, “The Royal Canadian Naval Historical Section and its Work,” 241.
\textsuperscript{307} Tim Cook, \textit{Clio’s Warrior’s}, 169.
intelligence reports that informed the Allied operations. However, this documentation was not readily forthcoming, and the department was concerned that to wait would overlook the war at sea. Schull’s work was the response to a growing desire for information on the role of Canadians in the war, particularly the Battle of the Atlantic.\footnote{Sarty, “The Battle We Lost at Home”, 42; W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty, and Michael Whitby, No Higher Purpose: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Second World War, 1939-1943, volume II, Part 1 (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2002): xvii.}

Although not published until 1952, Tucker’s official history of the role of the Canadian Navy in the Second World War suffered from the pressures of a deeply reduced budget in the Department of National Defence.\footnote{Gilbert Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1952); Douglas, Sarty and Whitby, xvii.} Told to complete the work by 1948, Tucker focused solely on the actions of the Navy on Canadian shores, looking at ship procurement, naval base operations in Halifax, personnel and training, merchant shipping and trade, the organization at Naval Service Headquarters and how the Canadian Navy liaised with the Admiralty.\footnote{Ibid.} Tucker wrote very little on the actual contribution of the RCN to the war effort.

At the end of the war, each of the service historians had an opportunity to publish articles in the Canadian Historical Review on their experiences gathering records and contributing to the three Historical Sections. Each also presented papers at the Annual meeting of the association that appeared in the printed Report of the Annual Meeting. It is not hard to see why the CHA membership considered these papers so important, for its executives had already alerted Canadians to the role the Public Archives needed to play writing the history of Canada. The CHA President in 1944, Walter N. Sage, wanted his members to assess the state of Canadian History as the country moved through this very important period. The three service historians were not only filling significant gaps in the Canadian historical field, but also writing about a
profound shift in the country’s wider narrative, as it moved from a colony, to a strong, middle power.  

Like the CHA, the IACPR, and later the PRC, relied heavily on the official historians for their insight into the wartime records. The historians, particularly C.P. Stacey, also helped the PRC determine how the Public Archives should manage government records. As the experts on the military wartime record, the historians helped the PRC rid the department of inactive and dead records, establish a records schedule, and preserve those records that documented the wartime achievement of the department. The experience and knowledge of the service historians helped shape the Public Archives and its collection of national defence materials.

The experience of the Department of National Defence illustrates the variety of record keeping experiences that could exist within a single department. C.P. Stacey’s efforts led to the preservation of large amounts of Army records. Without the immediate pressure of operational theatres, Stacey had time to establish guidelines and practices for record keeping in the Army, and expand his Historical Section. Stacey’s efforts, informed by his historical training and education, received support from the highest authority in the Army, which gave Stacey a degree of authority and importance within the realm of Army records care. Stacey’s success in this area led to a number of postwar appointments, alongside prominent Canadian bureaucrats, who sought out his expertise. Stacey benefitted from a background of historical training, military experience and support from the highest Canadian Army authorities, which helped the Army’s historical section produce one volume of a well-documented and well-received official history before 1950. However, according to Tim Cook, this close relationship meant Stacey’s work was far too influenced by these individuals, and he tended to err

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on the side of caution rather than critically assess the decisions made by these Canadian generals. 314

The historical officers of the Royal Canadian Air Force were neither as fortunate nor as influential. Kenneth Conn was not able to overcome the structural difficulties faced by the wartime RCAF. As a result, the record of tens of thousands of Canadians who fought with the RAF lay beyond the scope of his efforts. Conn was able to gather limited support within the RCAF to expand the number of historical officers working towards gathering official records. Unfortunately, he was limited by his own lack of historical training, and continuing staff duties, which prevented him from devoting all of his energies to the history. The resulting histories was not a complete historical narrative, but rather a collection of anecdotal stories of Canadians in the war, without the contextual information provided by the strategic view of the RAF and wider Allied effort.

While Conn struggled to fulfill his mandate to the best of his ability in an environment where he had some degree of support, the Navy’s senior officials seemed less concerned of the value inherent in the records it produced. Pressured to react quickly to the outbreak of hostilities, the upper echelons left non-essential duties unattended until they were admonished by the Prime Minister. The head of the historical section, while a trained historian, preferred to stay in Canada, venturing overseas only once, and focusing on the policies of procurement and merchant shipping rather than the participation of the Navy during the war. Nor did he allocate much of his time to the management of naval records. The histories produced by this section tell the story of the RCN, but without much reference to the records that Tucker saw as so

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314 Cook, “Clio’s Soldiers,” 1.
important. Tucker left the historical record in a precarious situation in the immediate postwar, jeopardizing future historical study. 315

The histories and narratives of the Navy and Air Force fell short of the effort put forth by the Army. However, as exceptional as he was, even Stacey could not control the official histories against post-war political delays. Even so, all three were influential in helping determine the future of the archives through their membership and contributions to the PRC.

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315 Cook, Clio’s Warriors, 169. (Committee on Public Meetings, Minutes, 13 December 1945, pt 1, file 6-0-14-1, box 26, URF, DHH).
Department of Munitions and Supply

There are two important facets to this chapter on the Department of Munitions and Supply. First, even though the Public Records Committee, established in 1944, had relatively little involvement with the historical narratives compiled by the Department of National Defence, the PRC took a direct and unique interest in the records and official history, of this department. The PRC’s mandate included assisting departments with the writing of wartime narratives. The PRC approved the department’s appointment of Jack de Navarre Kennedy as the official historian in 1946. Even with the assistance of the PRC, Kennedy could not overcome the problems of organizing the departmental records. Faced with the dual challenge of organizing wartime records and completing a history within a very short time frame, one might argue that even a more experienced historian would not have overcome the problems he faced.

The second point is that Munitions and Supply was the only truly wartime department. That is, it began in 1940 and ended its operations in 1945. When it was created, it lacked a record keeping ‘tradition’ similar to other departments. In addition, the department expanded dramatically with the war effort, and grew rapidly. This led to enormous problems for record keeping.

Perhaps the connection is never clearer than here between the writing of official history and the problems of wartime record keeping. This department, created specifically for the war, started to wind down its activities in the aftermath of the conflict, and without a records tradition, the historian faced a number of challenges finding the documentation necessary for a historical narrative. These two factors help explain why the PRC became so intimately involved in this department’s history.
The Department of Munitions and Supply was created in April 1940 to manage and control domestic industry directed towards defence materiel. The Minister of the department had the power to compel manufacturers and construction contractors “to do whatever the exigencies of war demanded, for such prices and on such terms and conditions as the Minister might consider to be fair and reasonable.”\(^{316}\) As the war effort increased, the activity and structure of the department grew dramatically, adding dozens of Crown Corporations and Branches to its decentralized organization. The narrative of the official history highlights the difficulties experienced in the department’s effort to organize its records.

The job of writing the department’s official history fell to Jack de Navarre Kennedy, who headed the Department’s legal branch during the war.\(^{317}\) He soon found that administrative procedures did not promote the ordered collection of records during the war. It was difficult enough for existing departments to adapt their record keeping practices to wartime, but the challenge of building a wartime organization, and its records practices, from scratch was even more daunting. Record keeping was not standardized, and many records were disorganized, lost, or destroyed. Such difficulties reflected directly on the two-volume history that Kennedy published in 1950. The Department of Munitions and Supply evolved through a number of orders in council and legislation created amidst the increasing tension in Europe in the summer of 1939. The Canadian Government first passed the Defence Purchases, Profits Control and Financing Act to manage and control domestic industry directed towards defence materiel. This legislation, which came into force in July 1939, centralized the procurement of defence supplies, materials and other items through the Defence

\(^{316}\) Structure and Operation of the Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply, 22 April 1941, vol. 48, RG28-A, LAC.

Purchasing Board (DPB), which had the “exclusive power to enter into contracts for the purchase of munitions and the construction of defence projects.”

When Canada went to war in September 1939, the Government went ahead with a department devoted to managing defence supplies and Canadian industry, and started to alter the structure of the Board. Not knowing the nature of the Canadian war contribution, the government proceeded cautiously. The DPBs powers and responsibilities were transferred to the War Supply Board (WSB) in October 1939, a temporary agency that was designed to obtain “greater freedom of action and authority,” in the purchase of munitions and war supplies.

Fresh from a new electoral mandate won in March 1940, the King government passed the Department of Munitions and Supply Act on 9 April 1940. The Minister of Munitions and Supply assumed the work of the WSB, but with Ministerial powers to compel manufacturers and construction contractors to fulfill the necessary materiel requirements for the war effort, for prices and conditions set by the minister. The Minister selected to lead the new department was Clarence Decatur Howe, an American-born engineer who had made his fortune in Port Arthur Ontario, where he built grain elevators at the head of Lake Superior. He started his political career as Minister of Transport in 1935, and soon became one of King’s most trusted ministers with an ability to complete difficult projects.

As the Minister of Munitions and Supply, Howe selected a committee from outside the public service to increase business skills in the department and improve the department’s ability to communicate with private industry. Gordon Scott, Henry

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320 Bothwell and Kilbourn, C.D. Howe, 123.
321 Kennedy, 5.
322 Structure and Operation of the Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply, 22 April, 1941, vol. 48, RG 28-A, LAC.
323 Bothwell and Kilbourn, C.D. Howe, 128.
Borden, R.A.C. Henry and Edward Plunkett Taylor, all prominent figures in business and industry, were the first four members of his executive team.\textsuperscript{324} Bill Bennett managed Howe’s schedule, set his priorities on correspondence, and managed access to the Minister. G. Kingsley Sheils was Howe’s deputy minister, and meticulously managed Howe’s personal filing system.\textsuperscript{325} Sheils’ efforts were largely responsible for the formation and maintenance of the Department’s registry.\textsuperscript{326}

Munitions and Supply started its dramatic expansion just as Western Europe fell to the German Army in the spring of 1940. In May, the British Expeditionary Force lost much of its equipment in the retreat from Dunkirk. Britain turned to Canada to fill many of its materiel needs, and Howe’s department started to take orders as quickly as possible. There was not much time to establish department procedures as staff began to mobilize private industry and gather the materiel required for the war. By 1943, the department had added 26 branches, 19 controls and 28 crown companies.\textsuperscript{327}

Howe established the War Industries Control Board in June 1940 to mobilize greater numbers of Crown Corporations for the war effort. With Board representatives from timber, steel, oil, metals, machine tool and power industries, Howe was able to control whole industries and produce the ships, trucks, shells, rifles, ammunition, artillery, aircraft and tanks required for overseas.\textsuperscript{328} Board representatives “were empowered to buy, expropriate, manufacture, ration and, generally, to take such steps as might be necessary to further the war effort in their respective fields of operation.”\textsuperscript{329} The Department developed into a vast organization, with a network of controls, boards and committees, all directed at supplying the war effort.

\textsuperscript{324} Scott would later fall victim to a torpedo attack on the S.S. Western Prince.
\textsuperscript{325} Kennedy, \textit{The History of the Departments of the Munitions and Supply}, v.
\textsuperscript{326} Bothwell and Kilbourn, C.D. Howe, 130-132.
\textsuperscript{327} Bothwell and Kilbourn, C.D. Howe, 133-134; Kennedy, \textit{The History of the Departments of the Munitions and Supply}, xvii.
\textsuperscript{328} Bothwell and Kilbourn, C.D. Howe, 136.
\textsuperscript{329} Kennedy, \textit{The History of the Departments of the Munitions and Supply}, Vol II, 2.
This large network of branches and corporations did not have a standardized departmental administrative policy or central control. The Service and Finance Branch of the Department was the home to the Minister’s Financial Adviser. The Comptroller’s Branch oversaw accounting issues for all department expenditures, including the Crown Corporations.\textsuperscript{330} For records, facts and statistics, the Department relied on the Economic and Statistic Branch. The Secretary’s Branch oversaw the receipt and dispatch of correspondence, while the Registry Office managed the files produced by the Department. Together these two organizations were responsible for the records management of the Department.\textsuperscript{331} Deputy Minister Kingsley Shiels, who handled the central registry, had to manage the records created by this network of organizations.

Shiels’ central registry oversaw the receipt, recording and distribution of incoming correspondence, as well as the dispatch of outgoing mail.\textsuperscript{332} The registry was also responsible for record keeping, including creating, recording and storing files. When the registry was first created, one filing clerk handled incoming mail. By 1943, mail distribution in the Department required 200 employees.\textsuperscript{333}

It was noted in chapter two that, on the encouragement of the Prime Minister, the Privy Council notified departments in November 1942 to prepare records for the writing of war narratives.\textsuperscript{334} Cabinet Secretary Arnold Heeney wanted to determine what departments had been doing to preserve the war records that had been accumulating since 1939.\textsuperscript{335} Heeney’s request came at a key junction in the DMS record keeping experience, for it seemed to anticipate efforts by the Deputy Minister to incorporate the files of branches and corporations into the main registry.

\textsuperscript{330} Kennedy, \textit{The History of the Departments of the Munitions and Supply}, vol. II, 296.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{332} Kennedy, \textit{The History of the Departments of the Munitions and Supply}, vol. II, 397.
\textsuperscript{333} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{334} A.D.P. Heeney to J.L. Ilsley, 4 November 1942, file 129-43, RG 19, LAC.
\textsuperscript{335} W.O Clark to Donald Gordon, 16 November 1942, file 129-4, vol. 526, RG 19, LAC. Clark’s memo refers to a message sent out by A.D.P. Heeney to departments regarding the war records, acting as a reminder to the departments. The memo inquires about the methods departments had implemented to protect the documents, and facilitate the writing of wartime narratives. It also quotes the original in great length.
In the first four months of 1943, the departmental Registry took over the files and filing staffs of several key organizations, including Shipbuilding, Signals Production, Munitions Contracts, Metals Control, Steel Control, Construction Control, Rubber Control and the W.I.C.B. Secretariat. Registry staff found a diversity of records and increasingly mismanaged records. While not wanting to “interfere with the work of the Branches and Controls,” the staff had to address the poorly organized files before merging them with their own files. The staff attempted to steer branches and corporations towards improved record keeping policies, but these efforts were not entirely successful.

There were other problems. Staff noted in September 1943 that in the rush “new employees without any knowledge of government routine were pouring into the department, setting up their own filing systems and generally disregarding established Government procedures.” By then space was becoming an issue. Some organizations had “no official files… and where old files have been accumulating in vaults and other store rooms.”

By 1944, the massive ministerial organization (appended) was in fact a series of separate organizations with diverse records systems that were almost impossible to bring under one central registry. No doubt the situation in the Department of Munitions and Supply was yet another reason to create the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Public Records (IACPR) in June 1944. As discussed above, the organization was to consider “the methods for providing adequate conservation of public records, with particular reference to those records relating to the wartime

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337 Ibid.
338 “Secretary’s Branch: Record of Development of Secretary’s Branch,” 15 September 1943, vol. 17, RG 28-A, LAC.
activities of the government.” At its second meeting in September 1945 Munitions and Supply sent two representatives to the Committee, W.J. Neville and R.T. Donald.

With the added encouragement from the PRC, the registry tried to continue its work towards merging files. In December 1944, departmental staff discussed the handling and storage of dormant records, reorganizing and classifying the records held by the former Industry and Sub-Contract Co-ordination Branch and the Plan Records Divisions. Integrating files from various branches increased the registry by 1,278,573 files. The quarterly reports produced by the Secretary’s branch outline the growth experienced by the central registry, providing some insight into the scope of the records issue. The Secretary’s Branch noted that it had created 121,900 files for the year 1943. The pace of expansion only increased: the Registry reported another 127,573 new files in the final quarter of 1944 alone. All of these activities were steps towards expediting the merger of files with the Central Registry system. Bring the 1943 figure on departments, crown corporations up to here.

342 Report for the Secretary’s Brance Presented to Staff Meeting on January 19th, 1944, 19 January 1944, vol. 59, RG 28-A, LAC.
344 Ibid.
Deputy Minister

Secretary’s Branch

Liaison – Workmen’s Compensation

Organization and Personnel Branch

Publicity Branch

Protection of Petroleum Reserves

Wartime Administrator Canadian Atlantic Ports

War Assets Corporation Limited

Liaison Officer with Department of Labour

Washington Office

Comptroller’s Branch

Liaison with the Treasury

Industrial Security

Defence Communications Limited

Polymer Corporation Limited

Wartime Housing Limited

United Kingdom Office

Montreal Office

Toronto Office

Ibid.
Coordinator of Controls and Chairman, Wartime Industries and Control Board

Wartime Industries and Control Board

Aircraft Control

Power Control

Chemicals Control

Rubber Control

Coal Control

Ship Repairs and Salvage Control

Construction Control

Steel Control

Machine Tools Control

Timber Control

Metals Control

Transit Control

Motor Vehicle Control

Priorities Branch

Oil Control

Ibid.
Financial Advisor

Munitions Contracts Branch

Defence Projects Construction Branch

AeroProducts Timber

Citadel Merchandising Co. Limited

North West Purchasing Limited

Veneer Log Supply Limited

Wartime Metals Corporations

Fairmont Company Limited

General Purchasing Branch

Atlas Plant Extension Limited

Eldorado Mining and Refining

Melbourne Merchandising Limited

Park Steamship Company Limited

War Supplies Limited

Wartime Oils Limited

Ibid.
The presence of the PRC did not spell the end for the Central Registry’s difficulties. The registry’s beleaguered staff continued to uncover incomplete collections, missing files and information. The registry saw “Branches and Divisions

349 Ibid.
withholding correspondence from the regular files.” Whether this occurred so that records remained available for the daily business of the branch, withheld records left significant gaps in the department’s wartime record. No one oversaw this enormous expansion with a view to writing an official departmental history.

In April 1945, the Secretary of State and a member of the PRC, Norman McLarty, asked C.D. Howe to establish records policies in various branches of the Department. Howe did as instructed, and contacted a number of branches regarding their record keeping policies. However, he requested information, rather than actively promoted the establishment of effective policies during the war. Unfortunately, Howe’s limited response affected the long-term accessibility of the Department’s records and the shape of the department’s history.

On 31 December 1945, the Department of Munitions and Supply merged with the Department of Reconstruction to become the Department of Reconstruction and Supply. Not until three months later in March 1946, did the Public Records Committee approve the Department of Reconstruction and Supply’s recommendation to appoint an official historian. The government had already started to conclude the activities of the department following the war.

Jack de Novarre Kennedy had a great deal of support from the PRC and Munitions and Supply’s Deputy Minister, Kingsley Sheils, to outline the “evolution of the department, the difficulties encountered and experience gained, and provide suggestions and recommendations for future procedure.” This motive was certainly in line with the mandate of the PRC.

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351 Correspondence from C.D. Howe to Norman McLarty, 10 April 1945, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
352 Ibid.
353 W.E.D. Halliday, Memorandum to the Public Records Committee, 4 May 1949, vol. 5, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
Kennedy was born in London, England in 1888. He completed an M.A. at Cambridge in 1909 and was called to the Bar in British Columbia in 1918 and in Ontario in 1921. He joined the Department of Munitions and Supply in 1940 upon his appoint as the director general of the legal branch.  

Kennedy was certainly familiar with the work of the Department, but he faced a considerable task. Unlike Charles Stacey, Kennedy was not a trained historian, but a writer of fiction. Nor did Kennedy have the luxury of organizing and preserving the records he would need, nor did he likely have the kinds of relationships with key individuals within the department that Stacey then enjoyed at National Defence. Finally, Kennedy was set to write a history of a department that technically no longer existed. From his appointment, Kennedy faced pressure from the PRC to complete the project before his department retired and concluded its activities, and had little opportunity to establish firm working relationships with the members of the PRC. Much of the interaction between the PRC and the Department and its historian highlight the development of the history.

It was apparent immediately that to understand the complex organization of the Department, Kennedy needed to engage the entire departmental apparatus. Unfortunately, many of the branch heads and representatives ignored his requests. Some were simply not interested, held other priorities, or had destroyed relevant files. As Halliday explained to Arnold Heeney, then Clerk of the Privy Council, in January 1948, “It had been taken that the historical records of the units would be in good order but this had not proved to be the case; some units had no historical records and others only for a limited period, therefore a great deal of additional material had to be

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in the fall of 1948, an order in council passed on 19 January 1949 appointed Heeney as the undersecretary of state for external affairs.


Evidence suggests that the lack of interest in records and the history within the branches that Kennedy faced may have originated from the Minister himself.

In December 1947, only a year and a half after his appointment, Kennedy had completed an outline that included a preface by the Minister, an introduction of the senior officers of the Department, and a forward. In 1948, Halliday noted that Kennedy had found “some units had no historical records at all, and others only went up to the end of 1943 and most of such records were in poor shape.” Kennedy had still not obtained information or located historical documents on the Clothing and Textile Production Branch, the Eldorado Mining and Refining Company Limited, Toronto Shipbuilding Co. Limited, Wartime Administrator of Canadian Atlantic Ports, Aero Meters Limited and the War Contracts Depreciation Board. Faced with such poor records, Kennedy requested summaries from branch heads that documented their wartime activity. His decision was understandable, but it was problematic, for Kennedy had little control over the content each branch included. Many organizations had already destroyed records that contained valuable information on their wartime efforts. In some cases, senior representatives were far too busy with the work in the department to complete such briefs. Kennedy had little else to rely on.

Without staff, or the luxury of time, Kennedy was limited in the additional research he could conduct. The Department awarded him an extra $10,000 for his research efforts, but the PRC wished to see Kennedy with additional funds for his work. It is not surprising that in many of the letters and interactions with the PRC,

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357 Ibid.
360 Committee of the History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, 15 December 1947, vol. 7, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
Kennedy appeared defensive, highlighting his frustrations with the deficiencies that affected the development of his history.\textsuperscript{361}

By 1948, Kennedy was pressed for time as the Department of Reconstruction and Supply had started to wind down activities. W.E.D. Halliday sent a letter to the Deputy Minister of Reconstruction and Supply, C.P. Edwards, in February 1948, outlining the rules that governed the records and narratives of the section, recommending action for the Department and reminding the department of its responsibility to its records. Halliday and the PRC had already started to discuss how to manage the Department’s records, dispose of business and solicitation files and records of the War Assets Corporation, retain certain dormant Crown records of Munitions and Supply, and transfer records to the Department of National Defence.\textsuperscript{362}

The Secretary of the PRC, W.E.D. Halliday, started to inquire on the progress of Kennedy’s narrative.\textsuperscript{363} All of the developments in regards to the narrative had gone through the PRC. The Committee members, including C.P. Stacey, reviewed Kennedy’s narrative.\textsuperscript{364} C.P. Stacey was reluctant to recommend Kennedy’s work for publication, but had little opportunity to influence the manuscript.

Stacey recorded his comments in a memorandum in October 1949. He noted that the chapters on the branches contained a great deal of factual information, but with little analysis or context. Kennedy’s history read like a reference text, as it lacked any sense of the department’s dynamic growth over the course of the war. Stacey was especially concerned that Kennedy did not provide any footnotes to primary source material, nor did he refer to departmental files in his research. Instead he based his

\textsuperscript{361} Committee of the History of the Department of Munitions and Supply, 15 December 1947, vol. 7, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
\textsuperscript{362} W.E.D. Halliday to Commander C.P. Edwards, 5 February 1948, vol. 5, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
\textsuperscript{363} W.E.D. Halliday, Note for File: Munitions and Supply Narrative, 7 October 1949, vol. 5, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
history solely on narratives prepared by the various units and branches. Stacey felt that, “it will not be a good book which can be relied on with confidence as a well-grounded record of events.” Stacey left the meeting with Kennedy under the impression that “this history will be of only limited value,” as it was the “result of no experienced historian having been consulted until the book was already set in type.” There were large sections of the narrative that Stacey could not review. He argued, “It was quite possible that it will still be exposed to severe criticism when published,” despite the efforts of the PRC and Secretary of State.

Kennedy explained that the departmental files were too voluminous and disorganized to use for the history. Kennedy did not have research assistants to help sort through the materials, nor did he have a great deal of time to devote to the project. Kennedy was not completely defensive, and welcomed the opportunity to improve the project, accommodating Stacey’s suggestions as much as possible. However, due to the pressure to finish the project before the department retired, by October 1949, the history was at University of Toronto Press, leaving little room for improvement.

Published in 1950, the first volume of Kennedy’s history contained sections on the Production Board and branches. The section on the Production branches includes all of those that fell under the responsibility of the Production Board. These chapters contained details on the types of materials produced or manufactured, the rates of manufacturing, the costs associated with the production of the material, and amount of orders processed during the war years. Occasionally, chapters contained statistical information at the end of the section on the rates of production. In cases where the branches had divisions operating under the branch umbrella, usually a brief description of the activities and contributions of the division was included. However, the chapters

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365 Memorandum to DHS Files, 6 October 1949, vol. 5, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
366 Ibid.
367 Ibid.
368 Ibid.
369 Ibid.
remained uneven in their treatment. The Chemical and Explosives Production Branch contains thorough information in 33 pages on the types of chemicals produced, the research and development program involved, yearly production and the subsidiaries that provided the raw materials required. By comparison, the chapter on the Defence Projects Construction Branch contains in just six pages information on the construction of barracks, aerodromes, forts and other defence projects.

The second volume of Kennedy’s history, also published in 1950, included chapters on the controls, service and finance branches, as well as additional units associated with the department. The Controls included those that reported to the Wartime Industries Control Board. The Service and Finance Branches included the Comptroller’s Branch, the Economics and Statistics Branch, the Financial Adviser’s Office, General Counsel’s Office and Legal Branch, Industrial Security Branch the Labour Liaison Office, Organization and Personnel Branch, Publicity Branch and the Secretary’s Branch. The units that were associated with the department included the Auditor-General’s Office, Canadian Mutual Aid Board, Cost Inspection and Audit Division, Inspection Board of the United Kingdom and Canada, Treasury Office, War Assets Corporation, and the War Contracts Depreciation Board. Kennedy explained that the chapters on the organizations provide “an outline of some of the duties, problems and achievements of the controls.”

Despite Kennedy’s brief attempts within the introduction to integrate the sections of the department within its wider experience, it is clear that each section on the branches, corporations, and production branches was presented in isolation to each other. In the first volume, there are significant variances in the treatment of several of the branches, units and controls. The section on the Aircraft Control included the

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reasons for establishment, the manner of implementation, the development of the control, the handling of surplus materials, the sale of surplus aircraft, and the conclusion of activities with the war’s end. There was also a timeline of orders in council and other dates of relevance to the control. Despite an acknowledgement that “the activities of the [Aircraft] control grew far beyond the original purposes for which it had been created,” the chapter does not include information on this expansion.\textsuperscript{371} The chapter devoted to Aircraft Control consisted of just three pages.

By comparison, the chapter on the Chemicals Control provided specific information on how the control managed the supplies of various important chemicals. Information on the demand and uses of a number of chemicals is provided.\textsuperscript{372} The chapter also includes a section on the Pharmaceutical chemicals needed for the war effort, and the efforts of the control in this area, as well as an extensive timeline and a chart containing volume statistics on the chemicals discussed.\textsuperscript{373}

C.P. Stacey’s concerns were warranted. The two volumes were uneven in their treatment of the various controls, branches and units, as Kennedy was forced to rely upon the contributions of division heads. In each chapter, Kennedy included information that outlined the activities of the branches during the war, various statistics, and the processes involved in the wartime activities. This information was offered without reference to documentation, or to the individuals involved in the process. Kennedy also excluded any commentary on how the controls, branches and department interacted together during the war.

Kennedy was well aware of the challenges presented by his manuscript, but he understood the constraints of its creation. Halliday, too, appreciated that Kennedy

\textsuperscript{371} Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply: Canada in the Second World War, vol II, 23.
\textsuperscript{372} Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply: Canada in the Second World War, vol II, 26-33.
\textsuperscript{373} Kennedy, History of the Department of Munitions and Supply: Canada in the Second World War, vol II, 47-51.
himself was frustrated. He noted in October 1949 that Kennedy “was not entirely satisfied with the nature of the book as being uneven in its style and content.”

Kennedy’s history appeared more as a reference text on the organizations rather than a departmental history.

The issues experienced with the development of the departmental history were the result of inconsistent record keeping in the Divisions and Section registries during the war. It is difficult to blame the Department’s officials for overlooking administrative procedures at the start of the war, for the department was rushed into existence to respond to an immediate need. Despite the attempt to merge files and impose standards of the central registry, poor record keeping continued in the Divisions, Branches and Sections of the Department throughout the war. The structure of the Department of Munitions and Supply was just too large and dispersed for the registry to impose standards in 1943. The PRC encouraged the development of a thorough and even historical narrative of the department, its branches and corporations, by supporting Kennedy and offering the assistance of C.P. Stacey. Even with an understanding of the nature of Kennedy’s problem, neither Kennedy nor the PRC could overcome the inherent administrative limitations of the department.

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374 Memorandum to DHS file, 6 October 1949, vol. 5, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
The chapter on Munitions and Supply shows the difficulties of organizing the records of a large wartime department. The case of the Departmental of External Affairs reveals a very slightly different story. For as much as the Department was staffed with very well-educated employees (including historians) who recognized the problems of the department’s record keeping practices, External Affairs had no one appointed during the war to oversee record management with a mind towards an official departmental history. Nor was the PRC as actively involved with the records of External Affairs. There seemed little concern that the department did not have a historical project of any kind.

Equally surprising was the Department’s challenges with record organization. The Department’s record keeping practices could not keep pace with wartime expansion. Not until 1967 did the Department publish the first volume of the series, Documents on Canadian External Relations. The first volume of the Department’s Official history, that included its service during the Second World War, was not published until 1990. The very nature of the records produced by the Department of External Affairs helps explain this long delay in the publication history. From its beginnings in 1909, successive Under-Secretaries of State maintained very centralized records systems that did not lend themselves to rapid expansion or easy access. The department had significant record challenges during the war, and despite the involvement of the PRC and an effort to organize the wartime records, the difficulties with active records continued into the postwar.

There is a certain irony that Sir Joseph Pope, the longtime civil servant who worked to ensure that the Public Archives became a keeper of public records, was also the civil servant who imposed what would prove to be such a burdensome system of
records management on the Department of External Affairs. Pope, the Under Secretary of State, submitted a memorandum to the Royal Commission on the Civil Service in 1907, suggesting a more systematic method for handling Canada’s external affairs, particularly the management of correspondence coming into the office. Pope felt correspondence was organized haphazardly. He lamented in his diary on 9 September 1909, “One dispatch is referred to one minister – the next one on the same subject to another – the next to nobody, the fourth somewhere else, so that nobody has any connected knowledge of any of the questions and the dispatches remain undealt with.” Pope wanted a department that held a complete record of correspondence on a given subject relating to external affairs.

Drawing from his formidable experience with Canada’s growing civil service, Pope envisioned an efficient organization that had a coherent mandate and an educated staff trained to handle diplomatic correspondence. Pope started to gather support for his organization. James Bryce, British Ambassador in Washington, was highly supportive of the new department. Bryce wanted to improve Canadian relations with the United States, but was, in the words of C.P. Stacey, “discouraged by the failure of the machine in Ottawa to work faster.” Better record management policies would help expedite the department’s communications and improve the country’s international relations. Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s government introduced the External Affairs Act in June 1909. Its primary purpose was to organize and manage the country’s increasingly complex diplomatic correspondence under the authority of the Prime Minister.

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376 Joseph Pope, Public Servant, 212.
Parliament allotted an operating budget of $13,350 to the new department and appointed Pope as the new Under-Secretary. The Department’s main responsibility, according to John Hilliker, the Department’s official historian, was to “manage the paper flow between Ottawa, London and foreign capitals.”

To understand how to organize the new department’s record, Laurier sent Pope on a visit to the Foreign Office in London to consider British systems and filing methods. Laurier also hoped Pope would develop a sound and effective filing system reflective of the department’s role. Pope’s visit led him to choose a chronologically-based system, where new topic files were created each year. While this reflected the Foreign Office system to a degree, Pope’s department did not have the staff of the Foreign Office to support the diverse units and divisions that helped clarified the department’s record structure. Nor did Pope utilize the subject series found in the Foreign Office files. However, with a small department, both in size and function, Pope’s choice of file systems, must have seemed suitable for the new department.

Pope’s system of compiling Canada’s diplomatic correspondence for the Prime Minister’s use anticipated a small, centralized department. In 1914, two assistant under-secretaries, Loring Christie and W.H. Walker, joined Pope’s staff to advise Prime Minister Borden throughout the First World War.

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383 C.P. Stacey, *Canada and the Age of Conflict*, 166.
But Pope still handled most of the departmental activities. In 1921, at age 71, Pope’s health began to fail though he did not retire until 1925. For all of his remarkable work to ensure that the records of the Canadian government be preserved, he left the Department of External Affairs with a highly centralized system of records management that was little able to adjust to the demands of another war.

Pope’s replacement as the Under-Secretary of State was O.D. Skelton. A graduate of Queen’s University, Skelton was the Head of the Department of Political Science and Economics at Queen’s, and had risen to the position of the Dean of Arts when Prime Minister Mackenzie King hired him as his advisor during the Imperial Conference of 1923. The next year he became Counsellor in the Department of External Affairs until he replaced Pope in 1925. Skelton established a very close relationship with King, and was, according to Stacey, his “closest adviser on all public affairs, domestic as well as external.”

The role and responsibilities of External Affairs continued to expand after Skelton’s appointment, due to a wider interest “in an enlarged and more independent international role for Canada,” and full autonomy of the dominion, which was to be affirmed in the Statute of Westminster in 1931. To that end King and Skelton helped oversee a wider international presence for Canada. The Canadian Government appointed its first Ambassador in February 1927 when Vincent Massey became Canadian Ambassador to the United States in Washington. Soon the Department had embassies in Paris, London, Washington, Paris, Geneva and Tokyo.

Canada’s growing presence beyond its borders was not matched by additional staff in Ottawa that could address administrative procedures. Until 1939, the

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387 Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, 166.
390 Ibid.
Department continued to use the filing system first created by Joseph Pope thirty years before. Since files were consecutively ordered, each subject acquired a different file number from year to year. Indexes and registers helped locate information, but the system was complicated and inhibited retrieval and research.

The highly centralized nature of the department affected the way the records were created and organized. Staff managed the department in ways that fit their day-to-day operations. As historian John Hilliker explains, Skelton’s secretary, Marjorie McKenzie, oversaw the “paper flow through the under-secretary’s office…and was] keeper of his confidential records and the author of some correspondence.” Joe Boyce was the department’s chief clerk in central registry, to whom the responsibility of departmental records fell, and accountant Agnes McCloskey complemented McKenzie’s efforts. McCloskey occupied several positions within the department from 1909 to 1943, and included the positions of Departmental Accountant, Chief Clerk, and general assistant to the Under-Secretary of State on administrative and financial operations. J.L. Granatstein presents an unflattering view that McCloskey “arrogated to herself total control of the department’s administration.” While Boyce handled the central registry files, McCloskey and McKenzie created their own filing systems with separate headings and information. McKenzie kept Skelton’s confidential papers as well as the correspondence that came through his office, while McCloskey handled all other administrative tasks relating to finances. Without the efforts of Boyce, McCloskey and McKenzie, valuable documentation addressing the administrative, financial and budgetary matters of foreign posts, diplomatic practices, organized matters and the war itself, might have been lost.

395 Granatstein, The Ottawa Men, 4.
396 Hilliker, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, 203-104; Hilliker, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, 48-49.
But such a system only made worse the problem of finding or retrieving information. In 1939, there was little sense of the growth of responsibility the department would experience over the course of the war. The cumbersome file system led to significant delays in file retrieval. The staff kept the system in place at the start of the war, and the growth that it caused in the department rendered Pope’s filing system unusable. As John Hilliker explains, in 1939, the Department was creating files at the rate of approximately 12,000 per year, without a systematic method of retiring old ones. There was no space for orderly storage and retrieval in the main file room, since cabinets were stored on top of one another. The practice of creating new files each year was abandoned after 1940... The once-orderly system having outgrown itself, much now depended on the memory of individual staff members... there were many gaps in the registry files.

In 1940, the department stopped creating new files each year, and underwent a process of reorganizing the file procedure. The central registry clerk Joe Boyce instituted a file block system with similar subjects in similarly numbered files. This new system, named the 1940 series, had three sub-series: the general registry, the special registry and the top-secret registry. The new series reduced the number of like files created each year.

The new 1940 series was a notable improvement, but the department did not offer comprehensive guidelines for the system. By abandoning the creation of new files each year, the department seems to have hoped to ease the retrieval of information. However, the small staff that comprised the Department of External Affairs was focused on the practical responsibilities of international diplomacy, and not on records management, the creation of an official history, or the procedures required for the destruction of records. The department simply did not have the staff for a thorough reorganization during the war. As John Hilliker points out, the Department was a non-war department, and staff members were not exempt from wartime freezes on

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397 Hilliker, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs*, 262.
398 Hilliker, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs*, 262-263.
promotions. A number of staff joined the armed forces, while others found better working conditions and increased pay with competing employers. Departmental historian Greg Donaghy points out that even Sir Joseph Pope’s papers were not beyond such poor treatment, being exiled to the basement of St. George’s Anglican Church on Wellington Street in Ottawa. Policies for the destruction of files in the 1940 series, access to files and the guidelines for closed departmental files evolved through the daily actions of the small, centralized staff, not through policy directives or guidelines.

The demands of wartime placed a great deal of stress on O.D. Skelton. On 28 January 1941, Skelton suffered a fatal heart attack. As Skelton’s replacement, King chose Norman Robertson. Robertson started work in the Department in 1929 as Third Secretary, where he slowly built a reputation as a trade expert and negotiator. Despite a personal dislike for King, as J.L. Granatstein points out, he had the rare ability of being able to work well with the Prime Minister. As the responsibilities of the department continued to expand, King offered Robertson the support of assistant under-secretary Lester B. Pearson. Robertson also started to delegate more responsibilities to departmental staff, which resulted in a process of decentralization.

With Robertson’s appointment, the department underwent a reorganization to improve efficiency in its responsibilities, and to alleviate some of the Undersecretary’s responsibilities. The reorganization established four divisions, the Diplomatic and Economic Division; the Commonwealth and European Division; the American and Far Eastern Division; and the Legal Division. According to Hilliker and Kilbourn, this was “the first time the department was organized according to levels of descending

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399 Hilliker, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs*, 262.
401 Correspondence between Dr. Lamb and W.I Smith, 8 September 1959, vol. 33, RG 37-A, LAC.
402 Hilliker, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs*, 218; 236.
403 Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men*, 94-95.
responsibility, with well-defined demarcation between its various activities.” The department also increased its international representation, appointing a new ambassador to Washington in February 1941 and Japan in July 1941, to manage the increased workload, including the treatment of Japanese in Canada after the declaration of war, defence cooperation with the United States and assisting with Mutual Aid programs.

In 1942, Agnes McCloskey was transferred from Ottawa to a posting in New York. The transfer was a key component in the department’s attempt to make dramatic changes to its administration. As Hilliker notes in the official history, “the practices she had devised… were inadequate to the volume and complexity of work arising from the war. Her unmodified practices became… an obstacle to departmental efficiency.” The appointment of Donald Matthews, a lawyer with experience at the Washington embassy, worked towards clearing out McCloskey’s garbled systems.

From 1943 to 1945, the department fulfilled its mandate while attempting to establish a postwar direction. New areas of concern centred on commercial policy, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the changing nature of the Commonwealth and Canada’s role in the United Nations. Entering the postwar, the department faced the need for a second reorganization and a revision of administrative policies.

External Affairs had not given significant thought to a history documenting its wartime activities. The lack of historical activities or concern for the longevity of the departmental record during the war is particularly surprising given the number of academic bureaucrats within the department, who led the effort within the government to improve records keeping standards. However, as British historian Keith Wilson

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406 Hilliker, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, 243.
407 Hilliker, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, 251-256.
408 Hilliker, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, 267.
409 Ibid.
410 Hillier, Canada’s Department of External Affairs, 296-302.
points out, governments have purposefully published information originating from foreign offices, or withheld it. “Just as keeping the archives closed prevents harm being done… so opening the archives provided governments with the opportunity to manufacture new [legends, while] able to control both access to and selection of the source material.”[411] Both examples can be seen in External Affairs

Despite the department’s ambivalence to an institutional history during the Second World War, there were a number of publications published at this time that touched on the department’s activities since 1909. George Glazebrook, a special assistant in the Department during the war, and a professor in the history department at the University of Toronto, published several works in 1942: a two volume set on the history of Canadian External Relations, and a history of the Canadian involvement in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.[412] These works, however, have few references to files originating from the department, and instead focused on the evolving nature of Canadian foreign policy rather than the development of the department.[413] These histories were not considered official department publications or specific wartime histories.

Publishing three works on external relations without reference to the files of External Affairs might have persuaded Glazebrook to campaign for improved file procedures. In 1944, Glazebrook was one of two prominent members of the Department, who started to voice concerns about record keeping within the wider

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[413] George Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations, Volume II: In the Empire and the World, 1914-1939 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited). In this volume, Glazebrook refers to the expansion of the Department and the establishment of international delegations, but only briefly, treating external relations in a broad sense, and not an institutional one. For sources, he relies on newspapers, government reports and memos, but not the departmental files from External Affairs.
government to historian and President of the C.H.A. George Brown.\footnote{Letter from George Glazebrooke to Brown, 31 March 1944, Box 23, George William Brown Fonds, University of Toronto Archives; Letter from Gerry Riddell of External Affairs to Brown, 12 April 1944, Box 23, George William Brown Fonds, University of Toronto Archives.} Brown, who had just published his concerns on the government record keeping efforts in 1944, calling for a new, constructive policy to preserve government records, implemented by a Public Records Office.\footnote{George Brown, “The Problem of Public and Historical Records in Canada,” \textit{Canadian Historical Review} XXV, no. 1 (March 1944).} With the help of Jack Pickersgill, one of Prime Minister King’s personal assistants, W.G. Riddell, also a graduate of the University of Toronto and a colleague of Glazebrook’s, encouraged Brown to send his commentary directly to King. Two months after encouraging Brown, Prime Minister King established the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Public Records (IACPR). King appointed Glazebrook, to the IACPR.\footnote{Meeting of Advisory Committee on Public Records, 5 June 1944, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.} Glazebrook was brought into External Affairs during the war as a special assistant where he worked within the Canadian intelligence community, after teaching in the History Department at the University of Toronto.\footnote{Donaghy, “Documenting the Diplomats,” 16.} King’s appointment of Glazebrook to the IACPR started his lengthy involvement with wartime records. Glazebrook would work alongside other bureaucrats and historians, like C.P. Stacey, as the government, and External Affairs, started to address its records management problems into the postwar.

The efforts extended towards publishing the External Affairs documents, or the historical narrative, had to fit within the desires of the government. In 1949, A.D.P. Heeney joined the new Minister, Lester B. Pearson, as the new Under-Secretary. It is likely that Heeney, the former Clerk of the Privy Council, and the individual responsible for motivating departments to initiate wartime historical projects and records preservation programs, brought with him to External Affairs a desire to increase access to wartime documentation to showcase the country’s role in the war, and implement changes to the department’s administrative procedures. As official
historians, John Hilliker and Donald Barry note, Heeney came to the department as one of the most able administrators in the public service, ready with ideas to improve External Affairs.\textsuperscript{418} Despite the presence of an enthusiastic, academic staff, that wanted to “document and celebrate the emergence of an independent Canadian foreign policy as well as an experience in Cold War cultural diplomacy,” the budgetary and staff constraints of the postwar placed significant restrictions on External Affairs historical projects.\textsuperscript{419}

As a part of the IACPR, which became the PRC in 1945, Glazebrook helped other departments with the care of its records and official histories, his own experience with External Affairs’ history serving as a source of expertise.\textsuperscript{420} External Affairs only started to mobilize a department sponsored historical project in the late 1940s. In 1949, F.H. Soward joined the department staff on a summer contract to determine what to do with the dormant and obsolete files stored in the department offices. Soward, an Oxford-trained historian and a professor at the University of British Columbia, asked Arnold Heeney to establish a Historical Research Unit (HRU) for the department.\textsuperscript{421} Soward wanted the HRU to work on collections of documents similar to what the United States started in 1861 and Great Britain had started to publish as recently as 1946. He also wanted to help manage the department’s records by destroying useless records and transferring those that were valuable to the National Archives.\textsuperscript{422} As departmental historian Greg Donaghy notes, staff members such as Gerry Riddell, George Glazebrook, and Terry MacDermot, another special wartime assistant to the Under

\textsuperscript{418} Hilliker and Barry, \textit{Canada’s Department of External Affairs: Coming of Age, 1946-1968}, 47.
\textsuperscript{419} Donaghy, “Documenting the Diplomats,” 10.
\textsuperscript{420} Minutes of a meeting of the Public Records Committee held on Monday, June 5\textsuperscript{th}, 1944 in Room 496, House of Commons, 5 June 1944, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.
\textsuperscript{421} Donaghy, “Documenting the Diplomats,” 11.
\textsuperscript{422} The American government had published \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States}, (FRUS) in 1861, and the British had released documents for the \textit{Documentation on British Policy Overseas} (DBPO) starting in 1946.
Secretary, supported Soward’s proposal. In late August of 1949, Soward obtained Heeney’s approval for the HRU.\textsuperscript{423}

Soward’s first project included the examination of the Loring Christie papers, the papers in Miss McKenzie’s possession and the Governor General’s papers, with an end towards consolidating them into the current file systems, identified as inactive, or destroyed. These projects were meant for the summer of 1949, and Soward worked in collaboration with a committee that consisted of MacDermot, Riddell, Glazebrook and Leon Mayrand, who was the head of the American and Far Eastern Division in the years following the war.\textsuperscript{424} In the first meeting, the committee decided “to discuss with Mr. Soward the other major aspects of the problem, namely, plans for setting up a complete records sections [in order to] lay down the general principles on which the records of the Department would be dealt with in accordance with their character.”\textsuperscript{425} Soward stayed only for the summer months of 1949, and he transferred the bulk of his tasks, including an introductory piece on the department and its organization, to Marjorie McKenzie.\textsuperscript{426}

The Committee that met to discuss Soward’s work became the Archives Committee on 31 August 1949. Its members noted that the unit required “a fully qualified Head” to continue Soward’s work.\textsuperscript{427} At its December meeting, the Committee set out “a more useful project… a set of documents on a specific problem, possibly

\textsuperscript{423} Committee on Mr. Soward’s Work: Summer 1949, 31 August 1949, pt 1, file 997-C-40, vol. 3556, RG 25, LAC.
\textsuperscript{424} Hiller and Barry, \textit{Canada’s Department of External Affairs: Coming of Age, 1946-1968}, 49.
\textsuperscript{425} Sub-Committee of Mr. Soward’s work: Summer 1949, 28 June 1949, pt. 1, file 997-C-40, vol. 3556, RG 25, LAC.
\textsuperscript{426} Committee on Mr. Soward’s Work: Summer 1949, 22 August 1949, pt. 1, file 997-C-40, vol. 3556, RG 25, LAC; Committee on Mr. Soward’s Work: Summer 1949, 31 August 1949, pt 1, file 997-C-40, vol. 3556, RG 25, LAC.
\textsuperscript{427} Committee on Mr. Soward’s Work: Summer 1949, 31 August 1949, pt 1, file 997-C-40, vol. 3556, RG 25, LAC.
something showing the development of policy on a given question,” for publication.428

The Committee decided to approach Soward for another summer of work.429

According to Greg Donaghy, the major obstacle for Soward’s project was to obtain the financial resources required for a departmental historian. As the longtime clerk who maintained the Department’s confidential records, Marjorie McKenzie was an obvious choice to document the department’s early history. In the summer of 1949, McKenzie became the head of a new Archives Unit. Unfortunately, McKenzie had a long list of archival duties that prevented her from devoting much time to the project and this continued to delay her report to the Archives Unit. Not until a year later did the Unit receive her report.430 The Archives Unit requested that Soward edit a collection of documents that outlined Canadian diplomatic efforts from the end of the First World War until the mid 1940s to help McKenzie with her workload.431

While the idea of a published volume of material remained the goal for the Department, Soward started to run into challenges. The nature of the Department’s activities during the war was such that other parties were often implicated in the records, and this security issue presented a problem for publication. Soward also felt the Department needed to rely too much on British records to publish their materials. Many of the British records from the post 1902 era remained closed and Soward required the cooperation of the British. There was also the issue that those still in government might not want to see documents of public interest in print.432 To address these issues, Soward recommended the writing of narratives based on the documents, but the Archives Unit did not appreciate Soward’s concerns. It sought someone else to complete the project,

428 Committee on Mr. Soward’s Work: Summer 1949, 31 August 1949, pt 1, file 997-C-40, vol. 3556, RG 25, LAC.
429 Committee on Mr. Soward’s Work: Summer 1949, 19 December 1949, pt 1, file 997-C-40, vol. 3556, RG 25, LAC.
430 Archives Committee: Minutes of a meeting held on Monday, September 16 at 5:30 PM in Mr. Glazebrook’s Office, Room 343, East Block, 17 September 1950, pt 1, file 997-C-40, vol. 3556, RG 25, LAC.
and created a new organization, the Directorate of Historical Research and Reports, to foster the publications progression. According to Donaghy, the next historian of the Directorate of Historical Research and Reports, Paul-Emile Renaud, showed little interest in the publication of documents.\textsuperscript{433} No one took up the project, and progress stagnated. Historical representation within the department did not decline drastically, but staff members on the Archives Committee of the Department were posted abroad, decreasing the department’s ability to complete any historical project.\textsuperscript{434}

Frustrated with the Department, the Canadian historical community started to apply pressure to release some of the Departmental records, especially as the publication efforts began to stall. Canadian historians had once reminded the government of its responsibility for records and this remained true with the Department of External Affairs’ wartime publications. Access to information became a major point of contention between the department and the Canadian Historical Association (CHA). Lead by notable presidents C.P. Stacey, Jean Bruchesi, M.H. Long, J.J. Talman, and G.F.G. Stanley in the early 1950s, the historians had the support of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, which urged the government to make documents freely available to historians.\textsuperscript{435}

The Department of External Affairs was not opposed to the views of the CHA. As trained historians, Archibald Day and George Glazebrook, members of the department, wanted to provide historians with departmental documentation. In 1957, Glazebrook became the head of the Historical Division and was directed to make the publication of the historical documents the priority of the Division.\textsuperscript{436} After much work, in 1960 a series of publications of documents was approved and Glazebrook started the process of consulting with editors and other academics to ensure the series would meet

\textsuperscript{434} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{435} Donaghy, “Documenting the Diplomats,” 15.
\textsuperscript{436} Donaghy, “Documenting the Diplomats,” 16.

Any volume on the history of the Department of External Affairs required records to base its narrative. One of the greatest challenges of the wartime record for the Department of External Affairs was the consolidation of its files. In early 1956, the Public Archives received the first batch of records from Canada House, which had been inventoried six years earlier by department representatives from the Archives Unit.\footnote{Lamb to McKenzie,” 10 January 1956, vol. 320, RG 37-A, LAC; G.W. Hilborn to Lamb, 22 September 1950, vol. 319, RG 37-A, LAC.} In 1959, the department further consolidated its wartime record by gathering the registries created overseas to merge them within a broader departmental framework. However, while the department had established a filing system for its active records and knew the extent of its dormant records, it had not implemented a method for disposing of inactive or dead records. In May 1959, the Dominion Archivist W. Kaye Lamb accepted the transfer of all of the remaining dormant records from the Office of the High Commissioner in London to the Public Archives.\footnote{W.I. Smith to W.K. Lamb, 12 May 1959, vol. 33, RG 37-A, LAC; E.A. Huestis visited several branches of the Department of External Affairs when he was in London in May 1959, including Canada House, and reported back to the Record Management Survey Committee, which will be further discussed in the postwar chapter. (Robertson to Lamb, 12 May 1959, Vol. 305, RG 37-A, LAC.)} In October 1959, the department
started to remove records from Canada House in London, which involved the transfer of 1556 feet of inactive records.  

While Glazebrook’s staff learned a great deal under his tutelage, compiling documents and information for the series, unfortunately, the task was too large for the department’s numbers. The department still lacked an official historian. In 1961, Glazebrook was promoted to the Under-Secretary position, reducing his ability to work on the project. The need for another skilled scholar was highlighted with the publication of the first series of Documents in Canadian External Relations in 1967. Historians and academics were disappointed. As Donaghy reported, scholars complained of the lack of file references, exclusion of important files, the chronological format, the narrow selection and very little inter-departmental correspondence.

The response did not bode well for the relationship between the department and the academic community. In the late 1960s, the Directorate of Historical Research and Reports that had taken over for McKenzie’s Archives Unit, now under Arthur Blanchette, strove to rectify the criticism that the department was “frustrating the government’s effort to release its files.” Blanchette revived the documentary series, known as the Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER), and conducted outreach to the academic community to help with its publication. By the mid 1970s, the department dramatically shifted the purpose of the series, making it more detailed and substantially larger. Such a move received approval from the academic community.

While Soward and Blanchette worked on the department’s history project, External Affairs implemented a new filing system. In 1963, the Department closed the

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1940 series and created the 1963 series to better suit the continually expanding role of the department.\textsuperscript{445} However, the department could not retire the 1940 system entirely. Many of the files were still active, and staff needed to access files for reference purposes. To help access the 1940 series, External Affairs created a Key Word Out of Context finding aid, (KWOC) finding aid, to aid retrieval. As Don Page notes, providing access to academics and historians was complicated in External Affairs by a need to protect sensitive information. First, an officer had to identify the relevant files for the request. Then, sensitive files and foreign documents had to be identified. A clerk removed these files, and indexed the contents, so the file could be recompiled.\textsuperscript{446} While researchers were undoubtedly frustrated by the removal of documents, Page suggests that the real issue for researchers was the time delay imposed by this process. As the number of researchers interested in the documents increased, External Affairs simply did not have the staff to support this policy.\textsuperscript{447} The KWOC helped with this cumbersome process by using subject headings to help officers and researchers locate files in a relatively quick manner. Luckily, the KWOC was created prior to the Department’s destruction of a sizable volume of material. While some files were destroyed, the descriptive file names are listed in the KWOC, providing researchers with information on the file contents.\textsuperscript{448}

Unlike National Defence and Munitions in Supply, the story of the External Affairs history went well into the 1970s. The work on the department’s history was not started until 1978 under Don Page in a new version of the Archives Unit, the Historical Division. Five years later, an editorial board began to “oversee production of an official history for publication in the Canadian Public Administration Series of the Institute of

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\textsuperscript{445} Finding Aid, RG 37, LAC. \\
\textsuperscript{446} Don Page, “Unlocking Canada’s Diplomatic Record,” \textit{International Journal} 34, no. 2 (Spring 1979): 256. \\
\textsuperscript{447} \textit{Ibid.} \\
\end{flushleft}
The editorial board conducted a great deal of research for the project in its preliminary stages. According to John Hilliker, after Arthur Blanchette’s appointment as the Director of the Historical Division in 1970, the official history started to receive the support that it required, culminating with the appointment of an official historian. John Hilliker, Blanchette’s successor, did not experience any difficulties obtaining access to the departmental files. Hilliker located the files that were created before 1940, and the under-secretary’s files until 1946 at the Public Archives. As Hilliker worked on the history, the department was in the process of preparing the records created after 1946 for transfer to the archives. Hilliker had to navigate volumes of records that did not have permanently assigned volume numbers. The historian was forced to cite only the departmental file numbers. Relocating these files, after their transfer to the Public Archives, was a difficult task.

Despite the challenges with the records, after years of struggling, the Department was able to produce an official history of 1909 to 1968 that met academic standards, 35 years after the conclusion of the war. Even into the 1970s, External Affairs did not have a solid understanding of its records, and the historical narrative illustrates this.

The Department of External Affairs emerged from the war with vastly increased responsibilities that reflected a stronger Canadian international presence. However, this did not translate into an organization with well-managed records. Early in the war, the 1939 filing systems (based on methods and assumptions established 30 years before) proved to be completely inadequate. A reorganized 1940 system provided better

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451 Hilliker, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs: the Early Years, 1909-1946*, 323. As Hilliker notes, files from 1940 and later were in the process of being transferred to the Archives when he was conducting research. Hilliker was given unrestricted access to records, including those that resided in the Records Information Management Division, in the Archives. Hilliker does not provide dates or transfer, nor does the description at LAC provide information on dates of transfer. Evidence would seem to point to a transfer of older materials when the PARC was created in the 1950s.
accessibility to valuable resources, but without a thorough policy framework for the handling of the Department’s record, the 1940 record could not accommodate the growth and activity of the Department.

The record keeping practices of External Affairs during the Second World War did not suit the department’s expanding mandate and required adjustment. Nor did the procedures reflect the level of involvement that External Affairs representatives had in improving records practices across the government. There was not a historian like Stacey dedicated to organizing records. The academics in External Affairs had to address the department’s regular, and expanding responsibilities. The challenges that the department faced with the record keeping practices during the war did not directly influence the writing of the official narrative, but it foreshadowed the difficulties that the historians faced when the project received departmental approval and support.
The Archives in the Postwar Years, 1945-1949

Preserving and organizing the wartime records of the federal government were beyond the capacity of any previously created body. Prime Minister King created the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Public Records (IACPR) to help departments preserve their wartime records and clarify policies and procedures. King wanted to protect and conserve the documentary evidence of the Second World War and appointed a number of his most trusted and capable bureaucrats to implement change in records management procedures of the federal government and influence the development of the archives. In the immediate postwar, the IACPR, and later the Public Records Committee (PRC) gathered information on the nature of the records that accumulated in the federal government, with a view to establishing records procedures. This chapter explores the workings of the PRC from 1945 to 1948. Through this period the Committee defined its terms of reference, with the aim of making the Public Archives a public records office.

At the end of the war, the Public Archives attempted to recover from diminished financial and human resources, and reintroduce peacetime activities. The Archives itself had continued collecting during the war, and in 1945, could boast a library of 51,000 books, an index of 72,000 pictures, and 20,400 maps. Over the course of the year, the Dominion Archivist was also able to obtain the letters of William Lyon Mackenzie from 1858, the Memoirs historique du Nord-Ouest, by Louis Riel, and a number of War Office Papers.453

Evidence suggests that from 1945 to 1949, Dominion Archivist Lanctôt was not heavily involved with the Committee’s mandate, despite his attendance at the

organization’s gatherings William Halliday and the PRC had to manage the Dominion Archivist while trying to develop and strengthen the institution. Lanctôt had little role during the Second World War, focusing instead on his own publications. Lanctôt seems to have been pushed from the wider discussion on public records, as the government and civil servants close to King assumed responsibility for the care of government records.

Clearly the IAPRC could not look to the archives for advice on the destruction of records, a problem that had existed since the 1930s, and had only worsened through the war. The terms of the Archives Act of 1912 established the Treasury Board’s control over the process, but the Act gave the Dominion Archivist limited powers to sort through the materials to determine the historic content of materials identified for destruction. A Treasury Board Minute from 1936 provided the Dominion Archivist with the authority to mark records of historic value for permanent retention. The sheer volume of the wartime record exacerbated this problem. By 1944, a backlog of two years existed.

On 10 September 1945, the Secretary of State asked the Governor General to create a permanent committee to address the ongoing issues of Public Records. With its creation, the PRC acquired new authority to oversee records other than those created during the war, placing the PRC in a must strong position to address the issues of record storage and destruction. The permanent Committee also gained authority to work alongside the Treasury Board to change record destruction procedures to better

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454 Minutes of a meeting of the Public Records Committee held on Monday, June 5th, 1944 in Room 496, House of Commons, 5 June 1944, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC; Memorandum Re: Authority for destruction of Public Records, 30 November 1945, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
455 Treasury Board Minute no. 160481, 1 June 1936.
456 Meeting of Advisory Committee on Public Records, Room 456 House of Commons, June 5th 1944, 5 June 1944, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.
457 To His Excellency The Governor General in Council, 10 September 1945, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
458 Order in Council establishing the Committee on Public Records, P.C. 6175, 20 September 1945, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC; To His Excellency The Governor General in Council, 10 September 1945, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
protect historical records. The only solution that Halliday could propose that suited the needs of both the PRC and Treasury Board was to have departments apply directly to the Governor in Council to destroy their records.\(^{459}\) This option conformed to the recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1914 and contained the elements that would ensure an effective, viable policy for the destruction of records.\(^ {460}\)

By the fall of 1945, the PRC was a relatively powerful body charged with helping departments address their responsibility for the care, organization and destruction of their records. On 26 October 1945, the PRC created a sub-committee to “consider and report on the institution of a Public Records Office.”\(^ {461}\) Early in 1946, the sub-committee’s members had started to discuss the custody of government records and the idea of the Dominion Archivist as the custodian of records that departments did not require for the daily operations.\(^ {462}\) The subcommittee also started to gather information to determine the space and staff required for a Public Records Office.\(^ {463}\)

But the PRC still needed detailed information on federal records that were inactive or dormant. Its members suggested that the Treasury Board complete a report on the “state and disposition of the records of every department... showing the classes in which records were placed in respect to length of retention before destruction.”\(^ {464}\) This information would help the PRC determine how much space the government required to store materials and whether the Archives had the capacity to handle this volume.

On 11 March 1946, the PRC met again to discuss the first few responses from the questionnaires distributed to the departments. Halliday expressed disappointment that

\(^{459}\) Memorandum: Authority for destruction of Public Records, (30 November 1945), vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
\(^ {460}\) Ibid.
\(^ {461}\) Memorandum to the Public Records Committee, 18 January 1946, file 6575-A-40, vol. 3275, RG 25, LAC.
\(^ {462}\) Memorandum to the Public Records Committee, 18 January 1946, file 6575-A-40, vol. 3275, RG 25, LAC.
\(^ {463}\) Ibid.
\(^ {464}\) Meeting of Public Records Committee held in the Office of the Secretary of State in the West Block of Friday, October 12, 1945, 12 October 1945, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.
“with a few exceptions, departments and agencies did not appear interested in transferring any records either to the Public Archives or the Public Records Office.”

George Brown, who represented the Canadian Historical Association, figured that this was due to a misunderstanding. He believed “if departments of government were fully aware of the type of organization proposed and realized that they would obtain efficient service, they would be more favourably disposed to releasing some of their documents.”

The departmental questionnaires made it clear that departments were reluctant to transfer records because of the memory of the failed records storage building at Experimental Farms in the 1930s. There existed a “certain lack of mutual confidence [between the archives and departments]… as a result no important transfers have taken place.”

The PRC asked departments and agencies which classes of records they would transfer to a Public Records Office under the assumption these records would remain available to the department. The Department of Agriculture had substantially more records for a Public Records Office, if one existed, than the current Public Archives, as did the Comptroller of the Treasury and agencies of the Department of Finance. Responses from the Post Office and the Department of Transport both expressed dissatisfaction with the previous arrangement at Experimental Farm, particularly transport and location. The Department of Transport officials informed the PRC that it would only transfer “files containing little reference value,” deciding to keep all relevant documentation on site. The PRC had to increase awareness of archival

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466 Meeting of the Public Records Committee, January 18, 1946, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC. Prof. Brown attended a number of the PRC meetings as the Toronto representative from the Canadian Historical Association. He was present at meetings held on 11 March 1946, 1 November 1946, and 15 January 1947.
467 Meeting of the Public Record Committee, 6 September 1946, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.
services among departments to establish an effective PRO. Brown recommended that the PRC remedy this most pressing and urgent custody issue first. By establishing the Public Archives as a records office, the PRC could work on the relationship with departments.

By 1946, the PRC had started implementing a number of Halliday’s original recommendations and looking at the 1914 recommendations from the Royal Commission. Halliday wanted to see the IACPR as a permanent organization that organized, cared, housed, and destroyed public records. He wanted all departments and agencies to be aware of their responsibility for the care and maintenance of records, and the presence of one or more senior officers in each department to oversee records. Halliday also recommended the employment of narrators to help departments create narratives that outlined the wartime activities of the department. The final recommendation was to report on the progress achieved in the implementation of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Public Records of 1914, which included the establishment of a Canadian public records office.

The scope of the task was overwhelming, and the Canadian government lacked a bureaucrat experienced in the management of a public records office to guide the PRC with this recommendation. Halliday turned to the expertise of the United States Archives, and its Archivist, Solon J. Buck, for guidance. The American archival institution had assumed responsibility for government records in 1934. In the institution’s early years, a number of archivists started to rethink what were increasingly dated notions of archival accession. According to the Jenkinsonian perspective, named after the long time Keeper of the Records in the UK, archivists were

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469 Public Records Committee No. 1, Memorandum on the Public Archives, 18 November 1946, vol. 4, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
470 Ibid.
471 While some departments already had narrators appointed, others, like the Department of Munitions and Supply, had not. Halliday’s recommendation coincided with the appointment of Kennedy, the historian for Munitions and Supply.
472 Advisory Committee of Public Record, 18 July 1945, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
not to judge records; their task was “the physical and moral defence of the records’ integrity, impartiality, authenticity and their resultant ‘archival value.’” According to Hilary Jenkinson, once records fell within archival custody, archivists were not to select records or oversee their destruction.

Buck’s experience with the mass of records generated by the American war effort helped advance a rethinking of archival theory. He commended the PRC for initiating a survey of the government records as a “prerequisite to planning and justifying a new archives building or an expansion of an old one,” and cautioned Halliday of the challenges he would experience in the implementation process. He warned of the difficulties determining what “papers [were not] worthy of permanent preservation.” Lacking the capacity to estimate the space required for government records, Buck recommended that the Canadian archives “construct [a building] that will have unused stack space for a generation to come.” This was the most Buck could offer without detailed information on the departmental records.

Archival storage space did concern Gustave Lanctôt, although he and Halliday differed over what should come first, the mandate to handle government records or the storage space needed to keep them. The Canadian Political Science Association warned the archives it was not prepared to receive the number of records created in the wartime departments. The overburdened Public Archives would not be able to perform the functions of “selection, preservation and organization of public records.” Members of the PRC continued to offer alternatives to help preserve the documentation and find appropriate storage space, but there seemed to be a general consensus that the Public

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475 Ibid.
477 Meeting of the Public Record Committee, (September 6th, 1946), vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.
478 Meeting of the Public Record Committee, (September 6th, 1946), vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.
Archives needed assistance managing public records and the policy framework that would guide the materials.

Until the fall of 1946, the Dominion Archivist had remained surprisingly quiet. Lanctôt was present at the majority of meetings of the PRC, yet he seemed to fall to the periphery of the Committee’s activities. In November 1946, he started to increase his participation in the discussion of a Canadian Public Records Office. Lanctôt reported to the Secretary of State that the strain on the archives to locate space had not diminished, and seemed to accept that only a change in the Public Archives mandate could bring this about. The PRC needed to offer departments an option for its records. Lanctôt was wary of promoting the Public Archives as a records office before it acquired the necessary physical space, but appreciated the PRC’s perspective. He agreed to promote the Public Archives as a records office before the government provided the required space, and strongly encouraged the Committee to determine how the Public Archives could effectively and efficiently transition to a new role.

Despite his seeming collegiality with the PRC, Halliday discovered that Lanctôt seemed to be operating with little reference to the PRC. Lanctôt recommended that the PRC and Public Archives conduct a survey of the non-active records of government departments to identify how much storage space was required for dormant records. Lanctôt seemed unaware that the PRC had already completed such a survey with the cooperation of the Treasury Board. This recommendation likely frustrated Halliday, and placed significant constraints on the advancement of the PRC recommendations.

In late 1947, without the knowledge of W.E.D. Halliday, Lanctôt prepared a bill for the Secretary of State to increase the archives’ capacity. This bill caused a more

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479 G. Lanctôt to Paul Martin, 18 November 1946, file 60-3, vol. 52, RG 37, LAC.
480 Meeting of the Public Record Committee, 6 September 1946, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.
481 Public Records Committee No. 1, Memorandum on the Public Archives, 18 November 1946, vol. 4, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
frustration for Halliday, who complained in a memorandum to Arnold Heeney, still the Clerk of the Privy Council, in January 1948. Lanctôt prepared the bill without the consultation of the PRC, even though it encroached heavily on its mandate. The bill attempted to amend the previous archives act passed in 1912. It proposed to change the name of the archives and the Dominion Archivist to the National Archives and Archivist of Canada. Lanctôt’s bill sought to establish the Archives as a full department, bestowing upon the archivist the duties of a Deputy Minister. While none of these elements were particularly damaging to the PRC, they were not created with reference to the PRC and attempted to institute changes that the Public Archives was not yet physically ready to support.

Halliday did not believe that Lanctôt meant any ill will by drafting and submitting the bill, but he was concerned that the draft bill did not help the orderly and regular flow of non-active government records from departments to the Archives or protect the efforts of the PRC. Halliday saw the implementation of the bill only serving to stir the resentment of the departments and ultimately reduce the strength of the archives as a National Public Records Office. Lanctôt’s individual effort undermined the PRC efforts and highlighted the problems with Lanctôt’s understanding of the records situation. Luckily for Halliday, Lanctôt retired in 1948, the same year that Prime Minister King left office. The bill did not make it to the new Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent, before Lanctôt’s retirement and Halliday did not have to worry about its implications.

The years between 1945 and 1949 saw the establishment of a body that was permanently mandated to deal with the crushing problem of government records.

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484 Public Records Committee, file II, W.E.D. Halliday, Memorandum to Mr. Heeney, 19 January 1948, vol. 4, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
Halliday’s recommendations set the direction not only for the PRC, but also for the development of a records management profession in Canada. The problem was to convince the rest of the government of the need to implement the recommendations that would lead to the creation of a Public Records Office. Prime Minister King wanted to preserve the documentary heritage of the war effort, and urged the Secretary of State to gather the committee for this purpose. King established the committee to affect change in the record systems of government. The placement of Dominion Archivist Lanctôt with these bureaucrats is a curious one. We cannot be sure how overtly King disliked Lanctôt, but it was clear that Halliday, King’s representative, had a difficult time with the Archivist. Despite this friction, Halliday spent these years gathering very important information on the records situation in departments. He tried to get Kennedy to finish the departmental history, and gaining the confidence of the federal departments whose officials did not want to surrender their records. Halliday’s efforts would help the PRC establish policies and procedures for records destruction, authority over researching and the Archives as a PRO in the coming years.
Building the foundation: Culture, War and W. Kaye Lamb, 1949-1954

The year 1949 ushered in a new era for the Public Archives with the appointment of a new Dominion Archivist, William Kaye Lamb. Prime Minister King’s hiring of Lamb, before King retired from politics, led to an improved working relationship between the Dominion Archivist, Prime Minister and the Public Records Committee (PRC). The PRC and Lamb started to manage the growth of records production in the federal government under the new Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent. The membership of the PRC and the National Archivist understood the challenge presented by inactive government records, many left over from the Second World War. From his appointment, Lamb and the PRC worked to develop the Archives’ capacity. The PRC membership promoted the Public Archives as a Public Records Office and lobbied for more storage space.

To make effective changes, the PRC needed a stronger archival profession and skilled records managers. The Record Management Association of Ottawa (RMA), started in 1952, helped fill this gap. By 1954, the RMA established programs to train senior officers and department staff in records management techniques. After its establishment and beyond 1954, the RMA helped develop a sense of the value of records within departments, which would help implement the rest of Halliday’s 1945 recommendations.

Such developments were aided by a curious set of forces, both within Canada and beyond. The postwar era commonly associated with the growth of a more assertive form of Canadian culture that is often most closely associated with the 1951 report of the Royal Commission on the National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences. The Massey Commission, named for its chair, Vincent Massey, explored the
state of Canadian cultural institutions, including the Public Archives. But the Massey Commissioners did little to help the PRC develop the Public Archives capacity to address government records.

It was less a concern for Canadian culture than the threat of the Cold War that led to a better awareness that government records needed to be preserved. The Cold War created within government organizations a better understanding of the connection between government and information. Governance could not occur if records were destroyed. As Canadian governments considered the prospect of nuclear war, the preservation of the country’s heritage and records necessary for continued governance took on a greater meaning that lead to the establishment of a new archives records building at Tunney’s Pasture in Ottawa in 1956.

On 10 September 1948, the Public Archives acquired the services and leadership of Dr. William Kaye Lamb, an experienced librarian and trained historian. He completed his BA and MA at the University of British Columbia, and his PhD at the London School of Economics, specializing in the history of British Columbia. Lamb rose to become Provincial Archivist and Librarian of British Columbia from 1934 to 1940 and the Librarian of the University of British Columbia from 1940 to 1948. At UBC, Lamb handled the increased demands on the library and archival services brought about by the war, as “veterans arrived in droves and [the university] tried to meet the needs of 9300 students with facilities designed to serve 1800.” Lamb successfully expanded services to support additional students, and in 1948, he increased the library’s physical size. In background and temperament, Lamb seemed well suited to nurture more collaboration between the Public Archives, PRC and the federal government.

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487 Wilson “Noble Dream,” 35.

488 Ibid.
Lamb’s appointment came just months before Vincent Massey became the chair of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences in April 1949.\footnote{Meeting of the Public Records Committee, (21 October 1948), vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.} The Massey Commission sought to address the state of Canadian culture by exploring specific cultural areas such as education, libraries, galleries, museums, mass media, television, radio, film and archives.\footnote{The Committee consisted of Vincent Massey, the Chancellor of the University of Toronto, Arthur Surveyor, a civil engineer, Norman A.M. MacKenzie, President of the University of British Columbia, Most Rev. George-Henri Levesque, the dean of Social Sciences at Laval and Hilda Neatby, a history professor from the University of Saskatchewan. Paul Litt, The Muses, the Masses and the Massey Commission (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992).} Lamb appeared before the Royal Commission on 10 August 1949, representing both the Archives and the PRC.\footnote{Meeting of the Public Records Committee, 14 January 1949, vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC; Meeting of the Public Records Committee, (9 May 1949), vol. 9, part 7, RG 37, LAC.} Lamb brought along Assistant Dominion Archivist, Norman Fee, who had worked at the Archives since 1906, and C.P. Stacey, representing the Department of National Defence as the Army Historian, and George Glazebrook, who then represented the Defence Research Board.\footnote{Norman Fee Fonds Description, MG 30 – D194, LAC. Available at <http://collectionscanada.gc.ca/pam_archives/index.php?fuseaction=genitem.displayItem&lang=eng&rec_nbr=103236&rec_nbr_list=103236,1343385,627334,3441817,3706824,3993083,428711,436578,1897027,1897026>. Accessed on 22 April 2011; Minutes of Proceedings and Evidences, Public Archives and Administration Public Records, 10 August 1949, Nos. 331-351, vol. 28, RG 33, 28, Royal Commission the National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, LAC.} Lamb, Fee, Glazebrook and Stacey were invited to discuss their experiences with the Public Archives as both academics and public servants with exceptional research experience.\footnote{Minutes of Proceedings and Evidences, Public Archives and Administration Public Records, 10 August 1949, Nos. 331-351, vol. 28, RG 33, 28, Royal Commission the National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, LAC.}

Lamb highlighted the poor state of the Archives, and advanced his own long-term plan for Archival involvement in government records. In Lamb's opinion, the Archives had changed little since Arthur Doughty's time, when the Archivist endeavoured “to gather in one building the material from which the complete history of Canada could be written.”\footnote{Minutes of Proceedings and Evidences, Public Archives and Administration Public Records, 10 August 1949, 185.} As a result the Archives’ collections emphasized historical
and pre-Confederation records while ignoring current government records that did not fall within the Archives mandate. According to Terry Cook, Lamb was “anxious at all costs to avoid… the erection of a records building on the 1938 [Treasury Board halfway house] model that had no connection with the Public Archives. Firm archival control of what would go into [the record centre] was the first requisite.”

Lamb had a clear idea of where he wanted to take the Public Archives, which was towards the concept of a total archives. He was concerned that the Massey Commission presented a significant obstacle. The PRC was a positive development, but Lamb pointed out that the body only dealt with the records problems placed before it, and usually these were only the desperate cases. Lamb outlined for the Massey Commission how the PRC sought to alleviate the build up of records that had occurred since 1912. Lamb lamented that the PRC could not actively protect government records, but had to wait on departments and agencies to accept the committee’s assistance. Nor did the PRC have any space to relocate records of those departments that referred their problems to the Committee. Lamb had attended just two meetings of the PRC, but he seemed quite certain of the limitations the organization faced.

Lamb had a clear idea of how he wanted to increase the involvement of the Public Archives in the management of government records. The Dominion Archivist did not want to see the regular transfer of materials from the departments directly to the Archives, but rather to half-way house administered by the Archives [and not by the Treasury Board] which would provide retrieval and access services. Lamb believed “that records should be the responsibility of the department, and that the Record Office should not be compelled to take them.” Lamb did not want to confuse the purpose of

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496 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidences, Public Archives and Administration Public Records, 10 August 1949, 198.
498 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Public Archives and Administration Public Records, 10 August 1949, 188.
the Public Archives with those of a storage room for government records, as was the case with the Experimental Farm ‘model’ of the 1930s. Lamb quoted to the Massy Commission, “Materials transferred to the Record Office should be restricted to documents of permanent historic interest. Departments must not be permitted to impose upon the Public Archives by saddling it with files that must be retained for a term of years, but are not of historic interest.” Lamb’s argument to the Massey Commission suggested he desired a record policy separate from the institution’s archival function.

Evidence suggests that Lamb wanted to draw distinct lines for the Massey Commission, to encourage a recommendation to improve resources specifically for the records function. If the Commission viewed the archival and government records function as one in the same, an outcome that helped promote the development of a sound records policy might not have been as likely.

When Stacey appeared before the Massey Commission, he voiced the opinion that there was little difference between the Archives and a Public Records Office. Stacey stated that he had accessed and used files from the Archives, and argued the Archives, in the past, had accomplished both functions. It is likely that Stacey’s research called on documents the Archives viewed as historically important, and had extended an effort to collect. These records were not the result of a records programme of the type Lamb was envisioning. However, Stacey acknowledged the limitations of the current practice, and wanted to see the concept of the public records office developed. George Glazebrook, recalling his experience as a historian and senior officer of External Affairs, reinforced much of what Stacey had told the Commission. He believed that there was little difference between public records and historical items, the undesirability of establishing

500 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Public Archives and Administration Public Records, 10 August 1949, 236.
a separate institution for public records and the need for more staff. Unfortunately, Stacey’s view directly challenged Lamb’s, and did not take into account the problems that existed within the wider government.

While the Massey Commission understood the problems that faced the Public Archives, its members lacked the insight to offer a set of recommendations that would help the institution address its weaknesses in the area of public records. The Commissioners offered ten recommendations for the handling of the public records, suggesting that the regulations of the PRC be reviewed and more clearly defined. A systematic and continuous transfer of inactive records to the Archives should be created and supervised by the PRC. The PRC’s authority should be required for the destruction of materials, requiring communication between the PRC and Treasury Board. The Commissioners also felt that all federal departments should have a records officer to care for records, implement a program devised by and in collaboration with the Dominion Archivist, and regularly review department files. Departments also needed to distinguish between modern and old systems. The Commission also wanted to see more trained records officers review departmental files to locate records of value, ensure regular review of files in departments, and establish departmental records schedules. Lastly, the Archivist needed the authority to preserve records of national historic interest, and that all questions that were unanswerable by the Archivist and departments be forwarded to the PRC.

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502 Until this point, the PRC need to be notified of destruction so that it could remove valuable records. Authority was only needed from the Treasury Board, who sought final authorization from the Governor General. There was a problem of inserting the PRC in this hierarchy as it presented the question of whether departments could exercise rights to approach the Treasury Board or the Governor General on its own. The PRC had not yet been inserted to the extent that Massey was suggesting.
Massey’s recommendations accepted Lamb’s view that the Public Archives needed to strengthen its role in the preservation of public records, but ultimately the Massey Commission seemed to overlook the reality that faced the Public Archives. In support of the systematic and continuous transfer of records, the Commission wanted the institution to focus on departmental reviews of records and analyses of filing systems. The members argued that this focus would expedite records transfer to the Public Archives or aid in the orderly destruction of materials. At this time, the PRC held authority, not the Public Archives. It was not that the Public Archives lacked the ability to conduct reviews; the Public Archives lacked the storage space required to protect the records that departments would transfer to the archives.504

W.E.D. Halliday did not believe that the Massey Commission reflected a full understanding of the PRC’s mandate. Its recommendations prompted Halliday to write a memorandum, dated September 1951 to Norman Robertson, A.D.P. Heeney’s successor as the Clerk of the Privy Council. In it, Halliday summarized the Massey Commission’s report and the comments directed to the Archives and Public Records.505 Halliday felt that the Commission lamented, “that the labours of the Royal Commission on Public Records of 1912 had been of little avail. It is recognized [by the Massey Commission] however, that establishment of the Public Records Committee has been an important advance.”506 Halliday outlined for Robertson that the Commissioners felt the terms of reference for the PRC were not well defined to fulfill its purposes, and based its recommendations on this assumption.507 The recommendations that the Commission laid out were very similar to those offered by Col. Stacey, a member of the PRC.

505 W.E.D. Halliday, Memorandum for Mr. Robertson: Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences; public records, 8 September 1951, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
506 W.E.D. Halliday, Memorandum for Mr. Robertson: Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences; public records, 8 September 1951, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
507 Ibid.
However, according to Halliday, “there [had] been some rearrangement and alteration [by the Commission] so that, in my opinion, the net result [of recommendations] is not quite as satisfactory as were Stacey’s original suggestions, (which he discussed with me before submission).” Halliday went on to explain that the majority of recommendations that the Massey Commission offered were already underway or easily accommodated. Space and skilled personnel remained a challenge, according to Halliday.

What the PRC and Archives needed were skilled records managers to ensure effective policy in department. However, the government lacked a records training program, and had no source for such expertise. As Halliday explained, “I do not think there are any courses of this nature available in Canada and persons which such qualifications might be difficult to obtain.” Nor could the Archives offer any space for the transfer of records. While the Massey Commission made a reference to the need for an addition to the building, Halliday remained nonplused, as “under present circumstances, [a building] is unlikely to be realized.” The Massey Commissioners understood where the Archives and PRC needed to be, but they overlooked several areas that needed considerable attention and were simply unable to effect enough change to make the Public Archives become a Public Records Office.

W.E.D. Halliday appreciated that if the Public Archives were to control and oversee the destruction of departmental records, it required additional physical space and trained personnel, two areas that the Massey Commission acknowledged, but not in a substantial way. The Commission referred to the need for a program implemented by trained managers, but said nothing of how the government was going to obtained those skilled personnel. The Public Archives almost obtained additional

\[508 \text{Ibid.}\]
\[509 \text{Ibid.}\]
\[510 \text{Ibid.}\]
\[511 \text{Ibid.}\]
\[512 \text{Ibid.}\]
storage offsite in 1950 with a halfway house containing 10,000 square feet of floor space for records. Halliday had lobbied for this, but the government allotted this building to the 1951 census. In his memorandum regarding the Massey Commission to Robertson in September 1951 Halliday had started to plan for alternate spaces. He noted, “Public Works, however, plans for two more similar buildings to go up in the vicinity but the go-ahead signal has not been given. If construction could be approved now, and one building at least definitely pre-empted for records purposes, it would be possible to get the proposed transfer programme moving.” Halliday started to lobby on behalf of Lamb for the construction of a building at Tunney’s Pasture in Ottawa, to serve as an annex to the Public Archives.

With the attention garnered by the Massey Report in 1951, the PRC and the Dominion Archivist started to increase their influence in departments, as departmental officials became aware of the care records required. In February 1950, the PRC added the Organization and Methods Division of the Civil Service Committee (O&M Services) to its organization. The Division provided departments and government agencies advice on management problems, including those associated with records handling. It applied management principles to scrutinize the objectives, planning, coordination and control of Government activities. As a part of the PRC, the O&M Services was a way for the PRC to help departments manage daily records with the hope of reducing the number of records in storage. The O&M Services Committee also provided the PRC with an opportunity to gain more information on the state of records held in the departments.

514 W.E.D. Halliday, Memorandum for Mr. Robertson: Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences; public records, 8 September 1951, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
As the new Dominion Archivist, Lamb wanted to gain an appreciation of the public records that existed in Ottawa and to improve on the available services. He proposed a comprehensive survey of departmental records, similar to the survey conducted in 1912 by Pope and in 1944 by Halliday. The 1914 Royal Commission of Public Records had “made over 200 visits to Departments, going through them, making an inventory of contents, department by department,” to bring information up to date. Lamb opined, “So far as I can discover no one knows the extent or can hazard a guess as to the extent of the problem at the present time.” He wanted to address the differences between public and archival records and determine the efforts required to add the functions of a Public Records Office to the Public Archives.

While the Massey Commission gathered information and issued its report, other developments were occurring that actually had a greater impact on the Public Archives. The Cold War had first emerged in September 1945 when Igor Gouzenko defected from the Russian embassy in Ottawa with evidence of a Soviet spy ring in Canada searching for atomic secrets. Gouzenko’s revelations helped start the Cold War. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 came the same year that the Soviets exploded their first nuclear device. Then in June 1950, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel into South Korean, prompting a UN sanctioned, American led ‘police action’ in Korea.

In October of that year, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent read about the implications of a nuclear attack on the running of the government of Canada. R.B Bryce, the Chairman of the Special Committee tasked by the PRC to study the protection of records, stated, “if headquarters could be dispersed before the commencement of a war... the danger of attack would seem likely to be reduced, and

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518 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Public Archives and Administration Public Records, 10 August 1949, 197.
the damage to the essential Government Organization would be much less.\textsuperscript{519} Four months later, in January 1951, Cabinet established a dispersal committee to conduct a study on the movement or reproduction of records.\textsuperscript{520}

In July 1951, the PRC, in collaboration with the dispersal committee, issued a set of points to guide the development of an emergency policy for the Canadian government. The members agreed that protecting public records through regulations was an option, but the ideal called for the protection of records required for the conduct of department operations on a long-term basis, a records management plan of sorts. The PRC encouraged departments to organize their records to ensure quick response, and directed departments and agencies to establish priorities for emergency records administration.\textsuperscript{521}

Over the next several years, the PRC established clear steps for a records classification process in the event of an emergency. With contributions from the department representatives, the PRC requested that departments establish which records they required to function in an emergency. The plans suggested the PRC duplicate and disperse the original copies for safekeeping.\textsuperscript{522} The PRC needed to know every department’s state of security, and whether any additional steps were required to protect these records in the case of war.\textsuperscript{523}

The PRC submitted this information to the Cabinet Secretary who decided not to circulate the decision of the PRC at this time.\textsuperscript{524}

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\textsuperscript{519} Protection of Government Records, Memorandum for the Cabinet, Re: Government Buildings, Ottawa – Civil Defence Aspects, 31 October 1950, vol. 6, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
\textsuperscript{521} Protection of Government Records, 17 July 1951, vol. 6, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
\textsuperscript{522} Note for File: Safeguarding of essential public records, 22 June 1954, vol. 6, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
\textsuperscript{523} Secretary of Cabinet, For heads of all departments and agencies, 22 June 1954, vol. 6, series 7, RG 35, LAC; Memorandum for the Cabinet Committee on Emergency Measures, 22 June 1951, vol. 6, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
\textsuperscript{524} Memorandum for the Public Records Committee: Safeguarding of ‘essential’ records, (15 July 1954), vol. 6, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
Cabinet Secretary delayed the implementation of the PRC’s recommendations in an effort to increase the storage space available for government.

There was not much time to wait. In late 1951, Lamb received the long awaited news that the government had allocated funds for a new records centre at Tunney’s Pasture, the half way house discussed by Lamb during the Massey Commission.\(^\text{525}\) W.E.D. Halliday suggested the project in his memorandum to Robertson on the report of the Massey Commission, which came out in 1951. The building, named the Public Archives Record Centre (PARC), was handed over to the Public Archives in 1955, and opened in April 1956. The building was “to provide economic storage for dormant records of government departments, combined with quick reference service,” to enable access to the materials.\(^\text{526}\) The PARC was designed for the care and protection of government records and allowed the archives to divide records into dead and dormant files. Here, finally, was a building with adequate space where the Archives could conduct records management operations.\(^\text{527}\)

The establishment of the PARC under the authority of the Public Archives helped the PRC and the Public Archives promote the management of government documents.\(^\text{528}\) The PARC was so successful that staff at the Archives suggested that the Public Archives then effectively functioned as a Public Records Office.\(^\text{529}\) In the first three years of its operation, the centre accessioned 113,720 cubic feet of records, cleared

\(^{525}\) Tunney’s Pasture is an area within Ottawa that has a high concentration of federal government buildings. It is located East of the Canadian War Museum, in the block between Parkdale Avenue, Scott Street, and the Ottawa River Parkway.


87,642 square feet of floor space, and destroyed 12,313 cubic feet of records.\(^{530}\) The Public Archives and PRC had solved the problem of storage space, for the moment.

In anticipation of the completion of the new PARC, the PRC started to work in late 1954 alongside Public Works and the departmental committee it had established to study the protection of records. The PRC asked departments what records they required to carry on operations in the case of a sudden move or destruction of large quantities of documentation, a similar question to what was asked in 1951.\(^{531}\) Halliday suggested that there were two decisions that were needed to address to move forward. Departments and agencies had to determine if essential records needed to be duplicated, and whether special storage space outside of Ottawa was necessary.\(^{532}\)

The nature and direction of the discussion surrounding essential records suggests a significant shift in the departments and agencies of the federal government. The efforts towards the protection of essential records, supported by Cabinet, suggest a growing appreciation for the value held in government records. This was a key development for the Public Archives and PRC in their efforts to implement a sound public record office for the Canadian government. The EMO investigation and recommendations for the preservation of records increased the perception of records’ value. The collaboration with the PRC meant that the Public Archives could benefit from, as well as support the development of a program to protect essential records. Offering government safe storage for its essential records strengthened the Public Archives’ claims as a Public Records Office.

Two problems remained. The first was that the Archives still had no legislated mandate for government records; Massey’s recommendations did not lead to a

\(^{530}\) Public Archives, *Report on the Public Archives for the Years 1955-1958* (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1959): 9. In his annual report, Lamb does not specify which departments had transferred records, but did state that the PARC had undertaken a project to consolidate files from the Civil Service Commission and Department of Finance.

\(^{531}\) Memorandum for the Public Records Committee: Protection of essential records, survey of departments and agencies, 15 April 1955, vol. 6, series 7, RG 35, LAC.

\(^{532}\) Memorandum for the Public Records Committee: Protection of essential records, survey of departments and agencies, 15 April 1955, vol. 6, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
strengthened mandate to govern government records for the Public Archives. The Public Archives had little authority to manage department record processes. Assistance came from a very unlikely external force. The Cold War forced the government to question how it would continue to operate if Ottawa was subjected to a nuclear attack. Many of these documents outlined how the departments actually functioned, and Cabinet was very concerned for the preservation of its tools of governance. The Cold War led to a new appreciation of record content and value.

The second problem was that the Archives, indeed all the federal government, needed trained records managers to help with record programs. To accommodate the demand for records officers in departments, the PRC had to find a way to offer training. Until 1952, the PRC did not have the strength, resources or support to provide departments and agencies with skilled employees. On 28 November 1952, W. Kaye Lamb, W.E.D. Halliday, J. Cardillo from National Defence, B. Dungan of the Civil Service Commission, and A.J. Brown from National Defence formed a provisional committee and gathered 113 records staff for an initial meeting. The provisional committee appointed an organizational committee to set a constitution for the association, nominate officers, and an executive board. On 19 December 1952, an Organization Committee brought together representatives from the Department of National Defence, Transport, Veterans Affairs, Defence Production, the Post Office, the Civil Service Commission and Agriculture. J. Cardillo, M.E. Kenny, F. Graham, W.H. Reid, W. Mills, B Dungan, M. Featherstone and Secretary A.J. Brown, all senior civil servants, created the Records Management Association of Ottawa, the first organization dedicated to the coordination, organization and protection of government records.

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533 Records Association of Ottawa, Minutes, 28 November 1952, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
534 Records Association of Ottawa, Minutes, 28 November 1952, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
According to the constitution, the RMA’s responsibilities included the
discussion of “the study of records management, as well as classifying, coding, indexing
and filing, to standardize terminology and filing equipment, to promote the study of
office methods and procedures, to devise methods of training of staffs in records
management, stimulate the retirement of records and encourage cooperation between
Canadian government departmental records offices.” This was the first centralized
organization in Canada designed to train records managers and increase
professionalism in the field of records management. This Association satisfied the
recommendation offered in W.E.D. Halliday’s 1947 memorandum to the PRC for
increased training and educational opportunities for records managers.

Each department engaged in active records management work sent two
representatives to the association. These were usually senior records officers or
individuals appointed by a senior officer. Associate members were engaged in records
work in departments or agencies within Ottawa, but did not have a vote in the
association. Honourary members were those who had worked with departmental
records, but had since retired. They offered much-needed depth and experience to the
Association.537

The membership of the RMA started by discussing the theory, policies and
procedures that governed records in the previous decades, so as to determine the best
record management plan. It established definitions and discussed issues surrounding
centralized control of documents. The advantages and disadvantages of centralized and
decentralized filing systems was an important facet to this discussion, as both systems
had created challenges in the postwar. As we saw during the war, government agencies
tended to create decentralized filing systems, leaving large numbers of decisions up to

536 Records Association of Ottawa, The Records Management Association of Ottawa –
Constitution, 19 December 1952, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
537 Records Association of Ottawa, Centralized Files vs. Decentralized Files, 17 May 1954,
vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
the record creating body. In an effort to be cost and time efficient, the RMA encouraged the use of a centralized system with departments. However, by filing all records in one structure, some organizations found that they complicated filing structures and diluted content by forcing documents into a larger structure. The association wanted to ensure that alternatives existed for departments so the file structures reflected the department’s needs, the space available for storage, the types of records produced by the department and trained records officers provided adequate maintenance. The training and expertise provided by the RMA enabled departments to select systems that best suited their needs.

The continuing issues of storage and the growing issue of records security stressed the need for trained records managers in the government. Before the RMA, Ottawa could rely only on those employees who had trained in records management positions. Staff learned records management techniques on the job. The RMA was a professional organization that offered standards of training, and training opportunities. It could help the government develop a pool of skilled employees for departments. Any controls applied to a department filing system needed personnel to enforce the policies. The RMA supported the appointment of full time records personnel to departments, releasing untrained office staff of this responsibility. Obtaining and retraining skilled personnel was not an easy task, however. Turnover inhibited the development and maintenance of service standards and skills were often tied closely to personnel. Only with time could the RMA train enough personnel for each department.

The federal government took notice of the work of the RMA. D.M. Watters, the Assistant Secretary to the Treasury Board, was invited to speak to the Records Management Association in 1954. He outlined the importance of a records management

\[538 \text{Ibid.}\]
\[539 \text{Ibid.}\]
\[540 \text{Ibid.}\]
\[541 \text{Ibid.}\]
program to an organization. Watters described records as “the embodiment of [the organization’s] experience.” Most importantly, Watters connected records and the care of information to effective governance. He argued, records “are the means by which public officials in a democracy are accountable to the people.” Watters saw records as a key part of governance and alluded to the government obligation to offer protection and encouraged the RMA to continue their work. Watters’ comments reflected the tone of the Cold War, calling on the RMA membership to continue their efforts, which were helping to prevent threats against democracy. The growing support from the federal government would help the PRC and RMA fulfill what remained of Halliday’s recommendations.

In his speech to the RMA, Watters referenced advances in the American approach to records management, especially in the work of Philip C. Brooks, the Chairman of the Committee on Record Administration of the Society of American Archivists. Brooks was a strong advocate for the implementation of the records life cycle, a new development in American records management theory. The RMA urged departments to consider the stages for their records: the creation of records, effective handling during records use, selection for retention and disposal, and retirement by transfer to storage or to the archives.

The proposals offered by the RMA referenced advances and changes that had been occurring in the national archival institution in the United States. T.R. Schellenburg, a notable American archivist, had developed the concept of the records life cycle over the course of his work with the Archives. Schellenburg had arrived at the archives in 1935, and became the Director of Archival Management in 1950. He published his work in a number of Fulbright lectures delivered in Australia in 1956.

542 Records Association of Ottawa, Address by Mr. D.M. Watters, Assistant Secretary to the Treasury Board to R.M.A. of Ottawa, 22 March 1954, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
543 Ibid.
544 Ibid.
545 Ibid.
Schellenburg saw records management as a “concern with the whole life span of most records. It strives to limit their creation.” He felt that proper record management techniques were of great importance: “government efficiency can be often measured by the efficiency with which its records are managed.” Schellenburg argued record managers needed to identify the needs of government officials and dispose of records once they served their purpose. Once records were classified according to function, record officers could create schedules of records based on their final location or disposition. Knowing the context of the documents’ creation, record managers were able to create disposal schedules for documents, even those not yet created. Organizations could transfer records to repositories and archives on a regular basis, which increased the efficiency of records management as well as the involvement of the archives in the record management process. Appraisal in advance would help the archives and departments manage the large volume of documents.

The theoretical framework offered by American Archivists in the postwar was a dramatic shift from the longstanding British perspective. Stated in earlier chapters, Hilary Jenkinson, the author of Manual of Archival Administration in 1922, clearly stated that there was no role for appraisal in the Archivist’s arsenal. Archival collections accumulated through a natural process, influenced by the custodial context. Selection meant sacrificing impartiality and authenticity. However, with the volumes of records produced by government bodies, the archival bodies did not have the capacity to preserve every record, and a method of selection and appraisal was required.

With Watters endorsement, the RMA was able to build momentum. The RMA started to work alongside government bodies, like the PRC to support the recommendations offered by Halliday in 1947 and increase the number of trained

547 Ibid.
The RMA started to host workshops, training opportunities and conferences for records managers. By gathering individuals interested in records organization, the RMA advanced the policies that governed file structures. The RMA agreed that managers should implement and monitor the record life cycle, and that the responsibility for records management should still reside with the PRC. The RMA continued to gather information to improve record management across the federal government and support the PRC and its goal of creating a public records office.

The Massey Commission highlighted the importance of Canadian cultural institutions, including the archives, but did not base its recommendations on the reality of the Public Archives at the time. The Massey Commission wanted a strengthened Public Archives to support the protection of government records and encouraged the Government to act. The Commission did not, however, convince departments the need to care for its records.

The nature of the Cold War brought about the impetus for departments to consider record protection. The practical implications of governing without records that outlined responsibilities, or expectations of skills personnel were both stark realizations for departmental staff. The threat of this situation resulted in plans for long-term protection of records. The efforts of the EMO in 1950 to protect records and the development of guidelines to support records management and the establishment of the Record Management Association in 1952 were taken in response to the threat of the Cold War, and were important factors in the development of the Public Archives.

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550 There were also a number of other civil servants who appeared before the PRC and attended the RMA meetings.
551 Public Records Committee, 30 November 1955, vol. 1, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
552 Ibid.
Starting in 1934, the American Archives had started to dramatically reshape archival appraisal. In the year immediately following the war, the government did not have a great deal of support from the Dominion Archivist to implement such changes. The PRC, created by Prime Minister King, started to help departments with records organization and destruction, with input from official historians and department representatives. The Dominion Archivist was present, but had little involvement in the proceedings, and was not an effective advocate for the Public Archives. The appointment of William Kaye Lamb shifted the direction of the Public Archives.

Lamb was thrust into the discussion on the role of the Archives immediately in 1949, appearing before the Massey Commission, alongside C.P. Stacey, George Glazebrook and Norman Fee. While the Massey Commission served as a forum to hear opinions on the role of the Archives, it did little to change perspectives within the government. The Cold War, and the resulting EMO, raised the concern for record protection, and led to a number of measures to duplicate and preserve information. Department staff appreciated that records had value.

However, to assist with the implementation of the EMO, departments needed senior records officers. Not the Public Archives, the PRC, nor the federal government had a method of training staff towards this purpose. The RMA offered professional development for departments to help implement and manage new files structures and procedures. Such developments in training echoed the growth of archival theory. As a gathering place for all records managers, the RMA offered the professional capacity that the PRC required to implement its policies on a managed records life cycle. By 1955, the Public Archives had better access to trained staff, willing federal departments, and the necessary physical storage space with the opening of the Tunney’s Pasture building. The PRC and Public Archives waited on the government for a stronger mandate and a clear authority over public records.
Working for Change, 1955-1966: the RMA, the Glassco Commission and the Public Record Order of 1966

At the end of 1955, the Public Archives was in a profoundly different environment than it was at the end of the war. With the leadership of a new Dominion Archivist, W. Kaye Lamb, the Archives was able to strengthen its position as a national institution, obtaining more physical space and actively contributing to the workings of the Public Records Committee. Canada’s growing cultural awareness, but perhaps more importantly the fears of the Cold War, increased awareness in the federal government of the need to preserve the records it created. The policy for records preservation required a level of expertise in records management that prompted the first meeting of the Records Management Association of Ottawa in 1952, and established a direction for training records officers. Archivist Lamb had more physical space and departmental officials were finally aware of the importance of records management, stemming from the growing body of professional records managers who were gaining employment throughout the federal civil services. W.E.D. Halliday’s five recommendations made to the PRC in 1947 were being acted upon.

Certainly the Archives had continued its long tradition, started in the days of Douglas Brymner, to acquire papers of national importance. By the end of 1954, the Archives had acquired the papers of Mackenzie King, Sir George E. Foster, Sir Clifford Sifton, John W. Dafoe, J.S. Woodsworth, Sir Charles Tupper, and Charles A. Magrath. The Archives had also acquired microfilm copies of the Derby Papers and Cardwell Papers, as well as copies of Colonial Office papers and records from the Archives of the Hudson’s Bay Company. The Public Archives was expecting the completion of the Records Centre in 1955, which would contain five stories, and four acres of storage.

space. Dominion Archivist Lamb boasted of the activities and acquisitions of the Map Division, the Picture Division, the Museum, the Numismatics Section, the Publications Division, the Library, and Laurier House. Noticeably absent from Lamb’s discussion was any orderly transfer of departmental records to the Archives.

The only factor missing was the establishment of the Archives as a proper Public Records Office, and a shift in professional culture within the civil service. There was a need for a new perspective within the federal government, one that viewed the civil service as a profession. The following chapter will look at the efforts of the PRC, Lamb and the RMA from 1955 and 1966, A.D.P. Heeney’s Civil Service reform, and the influence of a unique source of archival support from the Glassco Commission.

It should be noted that in 1957, A.D.P. Heeney, the former clerk of the Privy Council, briefly left his position in the Department of External Affairs to become the Head of the Civil Service Commission. During his two-year tenure, Heeney produced a report on the Commission, recommending changes to the personnel administration procedures, including the training of personnel. This would greatly assist in the training of departmental records managers, and help with the effort to implement the plans for a Public Record Office in the postwar. After 1959, Heeney returned to External Affairs, and took up the position of Canadian Ambassador to the United States. Heeney’s progression of appointments closely resembled that of a former influential bureaucrat, Sir Joseph Pope.

The years under review did not occur in a vacuum. In 1957, a 22-year Liberal reign ended in Ottawa when Progressive Conservative John Diefenbaker became Prime Minister. Perhaps with some justification, Diefenbaker viewed the senior members of the federal civil service with some suspicion. The Public Records Committee had among its member’s bureaucrats who had long careers under the Liberal administrations of

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Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent. During this period, the PRC, which remained unaltered in its membership and maintained pace assisting departments with the care and disposition of records.\textsuperscript{556} The change in the political environment shaped the conduct of the PRC, as its members worked hard, but quietly, towards its goal, before the government had the time to address the records issue.

Certain efforts by the PRC initiated prior to 1955 continued during this period. The concern for the preservation of records in emergency situations remained an issue since it was first raised in 1951. In late 1954, the PRC and a departmental committee within Public Works started work towards an ongoing program to protect essential records. In August 1959, the Privy Council Office issued a report on the protection of government records.\textsuperscript{557} It recommended that each department to have an Emergency Measures Organization (EMO) liaison officer, who implemented and managed the emergency policy. The PRC offered guidelines to each department and the liaison officer, and these officers were to then devise a plan to guide the records. The Privy Council report did not address records with archival or research value, but those necessary for the continuation of government protection, such as,

\begin{quote}
Statements of functions in an emergency, plans and programmes for carrying out these functions, statements of delegations of authority and of succession to command, any pre-drafted regulations or announcements to be issues immediately upon the onset of an emergency, action programs, information as to the whereabouts of essential records, and information on personnel and property.\textsuperscript{558}
\end{quote}

Department officials were beginning to view records differently, seeing the value of the information they contained. The efforts of departments to protect essential records started the development towards records programming, and raised the profile of the work conducted by the PRC.

\textsuperscript{557} Protection of Government Records, Protecting Essential Operating Records, 7 August 1959, vol. 6, series 7, RG 36, LAC.
\textsuperscript{558} Protection of Government Records, Protecting Essential Operating Records, 7 August 1959, vol. 6, series 7, RG 36, LAC.
The Public Archives was also increasing the training opportunities for records managers. Starting in 1961, the Archives offered its first four week Records Management course, which was offered two or three times a year. Other resources programs developed, including External Aid Training programs, archival courses sponsored by the Archives and universities, Public Service Commission courses, Emergency Measures Organization sessions and other in-house sessions. The Public Archives had a noticeable demand for the services, as the courses were well attended by foreign, provincial and municipal government organizations.\(^{559}\)

While the PRC continued to work with departments to implement records programs, the PRC maintained its strong ties with the historical community. In 1958, Lamb became the president of the Canadian Historical Association. Lamb’s tenure as president shows that as focused as he was on establishing coherent records policies for the government, he was very conscious of the historical work associated with the Public Archives, and that his contributions were well respected. In his presidential address, Lamb offered an overview of his ten years as Dominion Archivist. He outlined for the CHA the addition of the storage building that housed the Public Archives Record Centre, the growth of post-Confederation private papers, and the use of microfilm to the Archives collections. He felt that he could boast to the CHA that “The Public Archives is in a position to help departments and agencies with their records problems, and the danger of wholesale destruction of departmental records of long-term value would seem to be definitely a thing of the past.”\(^{560}\)

From 1955 to 1963, the RMA and the PRC worked towards a programme that governed the records life cycle of Canadian federal government records. This included aspects of education and promotion, training, information gathering and records


The Public Archives, in collaboration with the RMA, started to develop a process of educating records managers. Departments and organizations had long complained of the shortage of training opportunities and professional development activities for records management professionals.

To help the development of a long-term records management program, the RMA had to gather information on the state of department records and procedures that governed their file systems. The previous surveys conducted by the Treasury Board and PRC focused on dormant records stored in departments. To implement, manage and enforce legislation, the PRC needed information on the policies that governed department records. On 14 August 1956, the Records Retirement Committee (RRC), a special branch of the Records Management Association, conducted a preliminary survey of federal departments and agencies to determine records and files held in common for the PRC. Representatives from the Public Archives, the Organization and Methods Service of the Civil Service Commission, the Treasury Board, Department of Veterans Affairs and Records Management Association of Ottawa began to gather more specific information on the volume of records in departments and the record systems in use. The PRC needed information on the patterns of record creation, usage and storage in departments to establish government wide guidelines and procedures, and set out to gather this information with other, similarly interested organizations.

The Records Management Survey Committee (RMSC) presented its findings to the PRC in January 1959. The RMSC’s survey was much larger than those conducted in the past. In the course of analyzing 52 departments and agencies of the federal government, the RMSC found that some departments maintained good records procedures and complete registries, but others still kept storage rooms and files, used

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561 W. Kaye Lamb, “Presidential Address,” Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers (1958): 1
562 Public Records Committee, 14 August 1956, vol. 1, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
563 Ibid.
valuable office space for dormant records and outdated and wasteful procedures. The report was reminiscent of the findings of 1897 and 1914. The amount of floor space used by departments for storage in 1958-1959 totaled 2,449,680 cubic feet. The use of this space cost the government $4,718,802.75. This cost was only going to increase, as many departments did not have plans to transfer records from dormant storage to accommodate the increase of active records.

According to the RMSC, there were three specific areas of concern about government records: the overall control of records; appropriate records offices and facilities; and the training of senior officers in departments. The RMSC stressed the importance of the PRC and Records Centre in these areas. Even though the Public Archives and the PRC had obtained additional space, there was general acceptance that this new space would quickly disappear under the volumes of government records. The survey was an important measure in the “long-term planning of the records management programme.” A firm understanding of the nature of records accumulation was required to address the backlog of government records, and continue to develop a records management procedure.

The RMSC offered 34 recommendations to the PRC, many of which were reiterations from previous Royal Commissions. The RMSC stated that the PRC needed a clearer mandate, a full time secretary, regular meetings, increased educational efforts directed at departments and agencies and the use of records schedules in departments. Other RMSC recommendations focused on the need for properly trained records managers, which included new courses at universities for managers and new

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training for administration staff. The RMSC was also concerned with maintaining proper records of departmental procedures and records holdings. To keep these records accurate, departments needed to monitor storage locations and create documentation for volumes destroyed, transferred and put in dormant storage. The RMSC also wanted to see the Dominion Archivist with the authority to investigate department records to recommend records of disposition. An authoritative archivist could better assist with the development of a records management programme.\(^{570}\)

These recommendations were key components of comprehensive records management procedures. Departments needed clearer responsibility and the Dominion Archivist needed greater authority, which would lead to better control over the records of government departments. These recommendations pointed to a government wide records life cycle managed by the National Archivist. The information gathered by the RMSC was for the Dominion Archivist and PRCs use, so that together they could better direct these records management efforts.

The RMSC survey was a significant development for the PRC and the Dominion Archivist. From 1960 to 1966, these two organizations became the centre of activity for government records, and the effort to manage the public record originated within the PRC, and was directed by the Dominion Archivist with input from PRC representatives. The PRC, with the support of the RMA, EMO and RMSC, worked at implementing the RMSCs recommendations. They focused on clarifying mandates, establishing educational and training opportunities for records managers and setting destruction procedures. The RMSC report in 1959 helped the PRC consolidate the efforts directed at the records programmes for the federal government.

The RMSC’s recommendations came at a time when the entire Civil Service was coming under wider scrutiny. A.D.P. Heeney, who had served as Mackenzie King’s cabinet secretary and Clerk of the Privy Council, authored a report of the Civil Service

\(^{570}\) Ibid.
Commission in 1959. It will be remembered that Heeney had a prominent role in King’s wartime Cabinet, and helped establish the Public Records Commission in 1944. Four years later, in the fall of 1948, Lester Pearson, the new secretary for External Affairs in Louis St. Laurent’s government, approached Heeney and offered him the undersecretary position. In April 1952, he left for Paris for a new Canadian mission at NATO. A year later, in May 1953, he was posted to Washington as an ambassador.

Four years later, Heeney returned to Ottawa to join the Civil Service Commission as its chairman, and entered a period of dramatic reform for the Commission. In 1959, after Heeney presented his report on the Civil Service, he returned to Washington. Heeney had a long career in the Canadian government, and helped the government create a thorough record of its activities, contributed to the country’s international role with External Affairs and improved the management of government through the Civil Service Commission.

As the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, Heeney was asked to review the legislation that governed the commission, and “examine the role of the Commission in the machinery of Government.” Heeney brought to the task his years of experience working in the Privy Council and as the Cabinet Secretary. Heeney set out to determine “how to provide the freedom and flexibility required to enable the administrator to do the job and, at the same time, maintain the measure of central control necessary to ensure a career service based on the merit principle and governed by uniform standards.” Heeney envisioned a public service that promoted quality and administrative efficiency in its works, developed employees that promote higher

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572 Heeney, *The things that are Caesar’s*, 104.
573 Heeney, *The things that are Caesar’s*, 113.
574 Heeney, *The things that are Caesar’s*, 144.
efficiency in the business of government, balanced centralized control of the service with a flexible approach, and addressed the rights and obligations of employees to enhance morale.\textsuperscript{577}

Arnold Heeney’s report offered a number of recommendations, but those that were most applicable to the PRC and the Public Archives dealt with staff development, training and counseling. Until this time, the PRC faced a significant challenge insuring that departments had senior staff with the requisite training to manage record systems. The report suggested the “PRC be authorized to establish standards and coordinate departmental activities… that deputy ministers be responsible for initiating programmes and making appropriate provision to meeting continuing or changing conditions… [And] that all employees be given equal opportunity to be considered for training.”\textsuperscript{578} Overseas during the creation of the RMA, Heeney had missed the developments that had occurred in his absence. Heeney offered recommendations geared to the training of the public service to help the central authority for government records, the PRC and later the Public Archives, ensure that departments had trained personnel for a government wide records program. The 1959 Report of the Civil Service Commission of Canada supported the PRC’s objective of ensuring records managers were properly trained, a key facet of the long-term records programme.

Certainly the survey results and Civil Service Commission report suggested a central role to the Archives, something that Lamb was already working hard to achieve. An important shift had started to occur with the establishment of the Public Archives Record Centre, for Public Archives had started to implement policy that had previously resided with the Public Records Committee. In 1960, the Archives established new guidelines for the disposal of obsolete records and record schedules. It also added the Disposal and Scheduling Section at the Public Archives Records Centre to assist

\textsuperscript{577} Civil Service Commission, 8-10.  
\textsuperscript{578} Civil Service Commission, 17.
departments in the preparation of schedules for record disposal. In 1963 the Archives published General Records Disposal Schedules of the Government of Canada, which acted as guidelines for the departments on their records calendars. The new section assisted departments with record schedules and increased the Archives’ ability to manage a records management program.

Dominion Archivist Lamb continued to assume more leadership roles within the Archives and the wider government. Lamb assumed a position of authority on records destruction and disposition, and became the Canadian expert. He did not want this as a permanent role, however, and envisaged a time when such authority was not required. But the role of the archivist had changed considerably over the course of the twentieth century, driven in large part by the growth of wartime government. In an essay written in a festschrift for Hilary Jenkinson in 1962, Lamb stated, “Perhaps some day, when all the old accumulations of records have been cleared out, and both the creation and destruction of files is under perfect control, the contribution that the archivist can make may be less important than it is to-day. But for the time being, his watchfulness can be of the greatest importance.” Lamb pointed out that,

The sheer bulk of modern records makes destruction inescapable. The extent and cost of storage space in which to retain them all would be prohibitive. The difficulty is to decide wisely and well what shall be destroyed and what shall be retained. At the extremes are groups of documents about which no question need arise. It is obvious that great numbers of papers become superfluous after a time and there would be no justification for keeping them, even if it were feasible to do so. It is equally obvious that other papers belong to categories that must be retained permanently. But between these two extremes one finds a great mass of material, the interest and long-range value of which is a matter of opinion, and it is here that the most difficult decisions with regard to the destruction of records must be made.

The Dominion Archivist had to prevent randomized destruction, and encouraged departments to produce “destruction diaries [to document the records destroyed] take fully into account the possibility that files may have value that have little or no connection with the purposes for which they were originally created.”

Only then could departments implement a full program of records control.

Into the 1960s, Lamb and the PRC started to implement the use of new technologies, like microfilm, to assist departments with the disposition schedules and the pressures on storage space. The PRC had started to discuss the use of microfilm in government departments in 1951, and had established a subcommittee to help streamline the use of the technology in government departments. The PRC reviewed proposals by departments with input from the Public Archives. With each proposal, the PRC considered “preserving and protecting records, frequency of reference to them and the anticipated economies to be realized by microfilming.”

The request for project proposals for microfilm use was a way for the Public Archives and PRC to offer support and expertise in the revision of administrative procedures. Records scheduling helped engage in the ongoing destruction of certain types of records, and ease storage pressures for departments and the archives.

The expanding capacity of the Archives to take on a larger role in the management of government records received acknowledgement from the government in February 1961. The Privy Council issued an order that changed the composition and mandate of the PRC. The order increased the representation given to the Public Archives to better reflect the increase in the Archives’ capability and expertise. The Privy Council Order officially acknowledged the Dominion Archivist as the chair of the PRC and adjusted the representation on the PRC to better reflect the shifting mandate of the Archives.

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583 Public Records Committee, 7 December 1951, vol. 8, series 7, RG 35, LAC.
the Committee towards the long-term records management programme. The
Department of National Defence lost two of its three positions on the PRC, as did
Department of Defence Production. The Order brought about the addition of new
representatives from the Treasury Board Office, Veterans Affairs, Transport, Northern
Affairs and Natural Resources, the Civil Service Commission, and the Clerk of the Privy
Council Office.\footnote{586}{Ibid.}

The inclusion of the Treasury Board, which was responsible for many of the
processes that created records, suggests a shift towards a long-term records
management programme that incorporated all stages of the record life cycle, and
offered better control over government procedures and record creation. Historians
continued to have a prominent place on the PRC. The Canadian Historical Association
continued to have two representatives on the PRC, and departmental official historians,
such as Stacey, were often invited to meetings as experts on departmental records.\footnote{587}{Ibid.}

This shift in representation signaled the PRCs changing mandate from wartime records
to all public documentation from all departments, and placed the organization in a
better position to address a long-term records management programme. This was an
indicator of the increasing role of total archives in the institution.

It is important to remember that the PRC and Public Archives did not have the
capacity to enforce its guidelines or policies. However, Halliday, Lamb and the RMA
had started to create the necessary preconditions for a comprehensive records
management program by consolidating information and expertise. The Public Archives,
the PRC and the RMA were demonstrating to the wider government that the Public
Archives had the required skills to provide a records service effectively. Some measure
of how closely was the PRC and the Public Archives working together came on 22
March 1961, when W.E.D. Halliday retired after seventeen years of service to the PRC.

\footnote{586}{Ibid.}
\footnote{587}{Ibid.}
Dr. Lamb, the Dominion Archivist, who had taken on an informal leadership role under Halliday’s direction, attributed much of the Committee’s status and influence to Halliday’s efforts. He was succeeded by A.M. Willms, Chief of the Records Centre, who had been with the Archives since 1950. Willms was also a historian by training, a graduate of the University of Toronto, and was a special lecturer in Political Science at Carleton University. Willms, who started as the Secretary to the PRC on 22 March 1961, had also served on previous committees and participated in records management surveys. Halliday did not disappear from the archival scene completely, supporting Willms by periodically attending meetings of the PRC, and reviewing minutes, offering suggestions and advice to ease the transition.

Upon Halliday’s retirement, Lamb assumed the position of chair on the PRC, and was supported by the secretary, who held a permanent position within the Archives. It should be remembered that then Prime Minister King created the IACPR as a means of addressing records procedures in government in a way that circumvented Lanctôt, whom King did not trust. Lamb’s chairmanship on the PRC signaled a distinctive shift in the Archives’ leadership in handling Canada’s federal government record.

The Public Archives, in collaboration with the Civil Service Commission, also started offering a Records Management course in 1961. This course ran once per year, from 1961 until 1967. In 1968, the Archives was responsible for the course, and offered more than one course per year. In the twelve courses offered, the Archives saw 360 students.

From 1961 through to 1966, the PRC worked to fulfill the mandate covered in the new 1961 order. The PRC then had to assist departments with records schedules, analyze records suggested for destruction and provide departments with the necessary authority to destroy dead or dormant records. Much of the work completed by the PRC was supported by the expertise of the RMA and the Public Archives. Acknowledging this reliance, from 1961 to 1966, there was a movement within the government to consolidate the effort to manage government records within the Public Archives.

The changes to the Public Archives that occurred in the 1960s needs to be understood within a wider study of government administration, which was taking place under the Royal Commission on Government Organization, with John Glassco as its chair. Appointed in 1960 by John Diefenbaker, the Commission reported its preliminary findings on records management in 1962, with the final report released in early 1963. The Commission set out to “inquire into and report upon the organization and methods of the departments and agencies of the Government of Canada.”

According to a member of the Commission, political scientist J.E. Hodgetts, the Commission was set up to “tackle the reform of what was seen as a system bloated by wartime additions that were obviously to remain permanent in the face of rising expectations of government services.” The Commission looked at 116 departments and agencies, including the Department of External Affairs, National Defence and the Archives. The goal of the Commission was to make the administration of the federal government “most responsive to the wants and needs of the Canadian people [while

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offering] public servants… the widest possible opportunity for the development of their varied capacities and for serving the Canadian public.”  

The result in 1963 was five volumes that contained 24 reports that offered over a 100 recommendations. Glassco felt that records and systems were components of good management, which could support timely government decision-making, effective channels of communication and efficient use of public funds. As a number of political scientists have argued, this Royal Commission was responsible for the modernization of the machinery of the Canadian Government.  

As a Commission designed to address government management and organization, the Glassco Commission approached records administration as a necessary component of a government based on the principle of merit and directed by central controls. Glassco, with input from Dominion Archivist Lamb who sat on the advisory committee, argued that government records should have disposition patterns that governed records from creation to better handle the departmental records. This argument was not new. It reflected the conclusions of the 1897 and 1914 Royal Commission as well as the PRC’s and Dominion Archivist Lamb’s postwar arguments. However, the source of the argument was unique. Glassco was a new voice who provided insight into the financial benefits provided by a stronger Public Archives with a corresponding mandate and authority.  

Glassco drew heavily on the survey commissioned by the Records Management Survey Committee (RMSC) back in 1956, but emphasized the cost of records storage and management. He found departments lacked policy guidelines for its records.

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595 Paperwork and Systems Management, 25.
598 Hodgetts, “Royal Commissions and Public Service Reform,” 527.
Without direction, records were created haphazardly, leading to “well over 2,500,000 cubic feet of records, [of which] 500,000 were kept in department work space.” Glassco found that “every year a cost incurred of 5 million [dollars] for floor space to house these records and more than 28 million for the 12,000 people required to serve them. Annually, at least 250,000 cubic feet are created, utilizing 30,000 filing cabinets and almost 180,000 cubic feet of space.” Despite the progress of emergency measure efforts, many departments did not recognize the value of records management and did not allocate budgetary funds for qualified personnel. As a result, departments did not have “persons equipped with the necessary statistical skills for good managerial control.” The Commissioners believed that with adequate support, the Public Archives could offer better management of government records, which meant smaller expenditures and increased effectiveness.

The assumption that underpinned the Commission’s recommendations was that government had a responsibility to protect its own records. The Commission recommended the Treasury Board, reorganized “to control and harmonize government organizations,” enforce a policy that “control[led] the creation, use, retention and disposition of public records, and ensure[d] both efficient administrative systems and proper documentation of government business.” The only way this could occur, according to the Commissioners, was to create and enforce legislation directed at the management of records in departments. This was how the Public Archives needed to play a central role.

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600 Management of the Public Service, 492.
601 Management of the Public Service, 492.
602 Management of the Public Service, 503.
603 Management of the Public Service, 494.
605 Ibid.
606 Ibid.
The Glassco Commission publically promoted the ideas that the Public Archives, PRC and RMSC had advocated over the past decade. Glassco argued that the Dominion Archivist needed to have a central role in a records programme and required an empowered and educated public service. To ensure success, the Commission argued that “a records centre, as a half-way house, must store and service the dormant records until some final disposition can be made, either by transfer to the archives or by destruction.” This was a similar plea to what Lamb had stated during the Massey Commission.\(^\text{607}\) The Public Archives had, in fact, largely achieved this type of relationship with the establishment of the Public Archives Record Centre. The Commission’s report, published a decade after the Massey report, built on the observations of the records management profession and opined on the ability of the Public Archives to help the federal government, with input from the Dominion Archivist Lamb.\(^\text{608}\) Lamb who sat on the Advisory Committee of the Paper and Office Systems Section of the Commission was well versed in the problems that faced the Public Archives, and outlined these challenges for the Commission.

The Commission found that there was “no indication of overstaffing [in the Archives]; the morale [was] good; and the staff merits commendation.” The Public Archives was well placed to accept greater responsibilities but required greater financial resources. With “financial support commensurate with its status and responsibilities as a national institution,” the Archives could help promote and implement the care of federal records.\(^\text{609}\) The Royal Commission on Government Organization identified the problem that had plagued the Public Archives for decades and encouraged the government to address this gap.

\(^{607}\) *Management of the Public Service*, 563.
\(^{608}\) *Glassco Commission*, Royal Commission on Government Organization: First Report on Progress, vol. 204, RG 58, LAC.
\(^{609}\) *Management of the Public Service*, 576.
Soon after the Commission reported published its preliminary report in 1962, the Conservative government lost power, and a Liberal government, under Lester Pearson, took office in 1963. While there may have been an underlying suspicion between the bureaucracy and Conservative politicians during Diefenbaker’s government, this does not seemed to have affected the work and the progress of the PRC or the acknowledgement of the importance of the Public Archives. In fact, the program suggested by the new Liberal government might have served the mission of the PRC. The introduction of the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) in 1964 meant significant growth for the administration of the Canadian government at a time when the government was starting to address the wartime excesses with the Glassco Commission. The administration of the Plan required the collection of personal information of Canadians. The organization had to find a way to manage and protect this sensitive information. Perhaps the recommendations of the Glassco Commission came at a very strategic point in the Pearson administration. The Commission on Government Organization stressed the importance of modern administrative measures, expressing the effects of the policies in terms the government clearly understood.

Nor did the Glassco Royal Commission disappear once it had tabled its recommendations. In an unusual case, in February 1964, Parliament created a committee to follow up on the government’s implementation of the Glassco recommendations.610 This committee reviewed the recommendation that relied on the involvement of the Public Archives, which stated that in regards to the handling of public records,

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\text{To accomplish the orderly disposition of public records, an adequate legislative base is needed. It should provide for both the required central leadership and the conduct of departmental programme. Large sums of money could be saved annually by effective implementation of centrally}
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610 Glassco Commission, Follow-up on the Findings of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, 21 September 1965, vol. 204, RG 58, LAC.
co-ordinated programmes, utilizing sound disposal schedules and adequate records centres in both Ottawa and in the field.\textsuperscript{611}

After reviewing the departments, the Glassco Commission found that this recommendation had not led to significant changes within 13 of the departments reviewed. By September 1965, conditions remained as they were prior to the Glassco recommendations in four, five departments were still under study, and only three departments could claim that such records problems had been addressed.\textsuperscript{612}

The Pearson government needed to address the issues of managing an expanding bureaucracy. In 1966, the government responded by issuing the Public Records Order (PRO-1966). The PRO-1966 revoked previous orders of 1961 which had acknowledged the Archivist as the lead of the PRC. PRO-1966 expanded the responsibility of the Dominion Archivist to include public records held by departments, authority that the Archivist needed to enforce destruction schedules. While daily processes remained in the purview of the Treasury Board, the Archivist’s new responsibilities placed Lamb in the middle of department record policies. With PRO-1966, the National Archivist had the authority to

\begin{quote}
Assess all proposals to destroy records and approve these proposals…
approve all proposals for removal of records for the ownership of the Government of Canada…
assess all proposals for departments for microfilming…
review existing microfilming installations…
assess the adequacy of departmental records classification systems as a means of preventing loss within the holdings…
assess the extent to which records are segregated as to value and given adequate storage and handling in order to protect them from deterioration and from accidental and wartime destruction.\textsuperscript{613}
\end{quote}

This list of responsibilities over government records adjusted the Dominion Archivist’s responsibility for those public records already in the Archives’ possession. He was to “classify, store and safeguard historical records no longer required by departments…

\textsuperscript{611} Glassco Commission, “Glassco Report: Examples of “F” Findings,” 21 September 1965, vol. 204, RG 58, LAC.
\textsuperscript{612} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{613} Canada. Privy Council. Public Records Order, 9 September 1966, file 3-0, vol. 475, RG 37, LAC.
and records of defunct departments that have not been placed in the custody of some other department.”\textsuperscript{614} The Order officially placed the Archivist’s expertise into the records management process.

The Dominion Archivist was not the only one affected by PRO-1966. Departments received a new set of responsibilities. Each department henceforth required a records coordinator who submitted destruction proposals to the Dominion Archivist if records were not already covered by schedules. The Dominion Archivist had to ensure that department records coordinators had the training required to complete such tasks, and oversaw the wider management of the records.\textsuperscript{615}

The PRO-1966 consolidated and sorted the once confused relationships involved in government records. It did not alleviate all records challenges, but it was the first step to locating solutions for these issues. An Archives report issued in 1969 noted,

Recognizing the general responsibility of the Treasury Board for records managing and of departments for the proper care of their records, it assigned to the Dominion Archivist responsibility which includes the provision of advisory services, staff training, the establishment of standards and production of guides, the promotion of the use of a records centre, complete control over destruction and transfer of public records, and technical responsibility in regard to microfilm, in addition to the traditional archival responsibilities for preservation and research facilities.\textsuperscript{616}

The Dominion Archivist could not address all of these issues on his own. The PRO-1966 created an Advisory Council on Public Records, (ACPR) to promote discussion between records managers, the Treasury Board and Privy Council Office and assist the Archivist overseeing record management programs.\textsuperscript{617}

With this new body in place, the PRC concluded its activities and the Advisory Council on Public Records started a new mandate.\textsuperscript{618} The most significant difference

\textsuperscript{614} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{615} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{616} Public Archives, Public Archives, 1959-1969 (Ottawa, 1969): 2. This is a report from the archives that covers the ten years indicated in the title.
\textsuperscript{617} Ibid.
between the two bodies was that the ACPR was created to support the Dominion Archivist and his role as supervisor of record management programs. The Dominion Archivist “referred matters of policy and proposals for the destruction of records whenever he considers that the experience of the department and the views of the academic community are especially relevant.” Members of the ACPR included the Dominion Archivist, twelve members appointed by the Treasury Board, nine members for the government departments and agencies, three members from the public service and another from the Canadian Historical Association. This composition reflected the previous PRC, except for the noticeably stronger representation from the Treasury Board. While always present, with a strong, more coherent long-term records plan, the Treasury Board, long responsible for the regular use and creation of active records of government, provided the Public Archives and ACPR with the experience to implement the new programme universally.

This Privy Council order had a dramatic impact on records management, for it shifted the authority for the records management process to the Dominion Archivist. In the words of future archivist Ian Wilson, PRO-1966 ended “the tenure of the Public Records Committee and delegated the responsibility of records scheduling to government departments in consultation with the Dominion Archivist.” Before, the PRC consulted the Dominion Archivist on records management matters in departments. This relationship was reversed. The Public Archives was responsible for active and dormant records, microfilming, and the selection and transfer of records to the Public Archives. The Order unified the record management process of the Canadian government, addressing many conflicts that had existed previously, and placed the

619 Ibid.
620 Ibid.
Public Archives at the forefront of record protection. The Order gave the Public Archives the mandate it needed to implement a long-term records programme.

With the new Records Order, the status of the Records Centre had to evolve to fit within the new mandate of the Archives. The Records Management Branch grew out of and assumed the branches and sections of the Public Archives Records Centre (PARC). The Public Archives developed a Reference section to offer continued access to the records. One clerk provided access to approximately 10,000 cubic feet of records. In cases where neither the Archives nor the creating body required the records, the records disposal centre conducted the required activities to ensure control, and purposeful destruction of records.

The benefits of centralized authority in the Public Archives meant nothing if the archives did not have the physical space to store the materials. The Archives required more space and obtained a new building at 395 Wellington Street on the eve of the nation’s centenary. The new building, opened in June 1967, contained 13 acres on seven stories and fifteen stacks levels. The building cost thirteen million dollars, a cost the government might not have incurred if it was not the nation’s centenary.

The Archives expanded dramatically after 1966, as it continued to gather documents of historical importance and offered safe storage for government records. In the immediate aftermath of the order, annual accessions for the Manuscripts Division increased by 2500% while the number of researchers registered increased by 25%. Improved procedures provided a sense of urgency to the selection, arrangement and information retrieval of government records.

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Through the post war, there were several arguments that strongly supported widening the archival mandate. These included: a need to preserve Canada’s culture; a need to preserve records in case of war; and a need to make the running of government more efficient. It seems that the centenary may have helped the government provide the Archives with the building it required. The new building and the PRO-1966 placed the Public Archives in a position to consolidate authority on government records management and implement significant change to secure an institutional memory for government departments. By 1966, the government had acknowledged both the role of the Public Archives in a government records program, and its importance as a cultural institution.

In 1968, after twenty years of service, Dr. William Kaye Lamb retired as the National Librarian and National Archivist. W.I. Smith, his successor accorded Lamb with high praise on his retirement.

It was under his leadership and direction that the Public Archives became an efficient modern archives, that the volume and scope of accession multiplied, a large microfilming program was developed in the London and Paris Offices, the present system of records management was developed and archival science was developed as a distinct profession in Canada.\(^{629}\)

Lamb’s accomplishments were quite remarkable, as he was able to initiate change in areas where previous Archivists had failed, obtaining more space and resources for the archival institution.

In 1955, a dramatic gap widened between the expectation of the Archives and the authority allotted to the organization by legislation and regulations. After identifying this gap, the PRC, the RMA, the RMSC, and the Royal Commission on Government Information brought the expectations of the government and the capability of the Archives closer together. The concept of the records life cycle, in use in the United States, appeared in Canadian practice, and increasingly informed policies and

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guidelines. A key facet of increasing the ability of the archives to handle an enlarged mandate was increasing the number of skilled records managers within each department. This required training, skill development, and educational opportunities for employees that explored the various aspects of records management, including classification and theory. With the RMA, archivists and record managers had a forum for a uniquely Canadian discussion on archival services and functions. The Archives, rather than the PRC, became the centre of archival and records activity, pointing to a degree of professionalism that had not existed in the Canadian archival profession prior to the Second World War, and it was established to manage the dramatic growth of records that occurred during and following the war.

None of these developments would have occurred without change in the perception of records management and the role of the Archives in the Canadian government. The demands of the Second World War required the federal government to expand and increase its activities, leading to a dramatic growth in records production. The PRC exerted efforts to alleviate the strain placed on departments by the number of government records. The Emergency Measures Organization stressed to departments the effect records destruction could have on the government’s ability to provide effective governance in a time of war. The government started to take steps to ensure that effective governance could continue, which encouraged the design and implementation of records schedules. By highlighting the potential of Archives to lead to savings as a Public Records Office, the Royal Commission on Government Organization strengthened the Archives’ position as a leader in the Canadian record management community.

By 1966, the Public Archives and its staff had the support structure and resources necessary to assume a major role in the protection of government records. The inclusion of the Archives in a policy once regulated and administered by the Treasury Board signified that the government had come to appreciate the function and ability of
this institution. Charging the Archives with the responsibility of overseeing the records life cycle of public records officially recognized the Archives as a Public Records Office. The efforts of W. Kaye Lamb and the PRC in the management of wartime records were very important in the growth of the Canadian archival community. The recognition by the Royal Commission on Government Organization that archival direction was necessary for effective management of government records led the government to support an archives driven record management plan to preserve public records of historical value. This realization led to the strengthening of the Public Archives of Canada to serve both the federal government by protecting public records and the historical community by preserving historical records.
Conclusion

The evidence presented here suggests that war, and apprehended war, played a significant role in exacerbating the records problems identified within the Canadian federal government. The Second World War led to a records problem that the government could no longer ignore. However, the Public Archives was in no condition to accept such responsibility in the years immediately following the war, and from 1945 to 1966, its staff worked to create the physical and human resources required to implement and maintain a program for the records of the federal government.

The creation of Canada’s archival institution in 1872 established future challenges with government records. The small government structure did not require an extensive organization, funds or procedure to protect its records. From the 1860s to the 1890s, two government officials and organizations were mandated to protect government records. Douglas Brymner, with the Department of Agriculture, Arts and Statistics, and Henry J. Morgan of the Secretary of State, were tasked to protect government records, in competition with each other. In 1903, with the merger of the two archival bodies in the federal government, the government gave the Public Archives the ability to collect government documents. Unfortunately, without the resources to collect government records or implement records schedules, the new Dominion Archivist Arthur Doughty focused on other archival areas, creating a strong historical collection for the institution. Yet two Commissions that studied the state of records management in Canada, in 1897 and 1914 continued to demonstrate the growing problems associated with poor records management within the federal government.

Several themes help explain the gradual transformation of the Public Archives. First, people mannered. Archivists and influential bureaucrats play a major role in this story. The professional development of records management is significant here also. Historians, as well, provided their expertise in the development of the Archives as a
The evolution of the total archives concept is readily seen in this narrative. The Archives expanded its responsibility to government records from a focus of historical importance, to a government-wide records management program. Finally, a number of Royal Commissions also shaped the evolution of the Archives’ responsibility towards public records.

The first archivist that mattered was Douglas Brymner, who identified the problems with the archival structure prior to 1903, but had too few resources, both personnel and financial, to implement much change. Arthur Doughty, Dominion Archivist from 1903 until 1935, brought to his post a strong desire to encourage the growth of the Canadian historical community and a strong acumen for diplomacy in Ottawa. In the longtime bureaucrat Joseph Pope, Doughty found an ally, and these men worked together to advance the Archives’ mandate. Doughty also formed a strong relationship with William Lyon Mackenzie King in his early political life, an alliance that helped Doughty achieve his own goals for the institution. Doughty ensured a strong emphasis on collection development as he strove to create a Public Archives that served the country. Doughty was the builder of the Public Archives, and gathered numerable and valuable sources on the history of the country. Even so, a number of problems grew out of these years, which Doughty could not overcome. Limited by financial and human resources, the initiatives in the 1930s would limit the growth and influence of the Public Archives.

Gustave Lanctôt succeeded James Kenney, the Acting Archivist following Doughty, in 1937. The Dominion Archivist during one of the most dramatic periods of Canadian history, Lanctôt’s efforts as Dominion Archivist did not measure up to those of his predecessor. He did not share Doughty’s political capital, and was unable to gain the ear of Prime Minister King. In February 1943, King went so far to declare his own
disappointment in the Archivist’s performance.630 The next year, the Prime Minister established bodies outside of the Public Archives’ framework to address the issue of public records, which arguably fell within Lanctôt’s mandate. There was a significant disconnect between the Public Archives and the objectives of the wider government during Lanctôt’s tenure.

Upon Lanctôt’s retirement, Prime Minister King appointed W. Kaye Lamb as the Dominion Archivist. Lamb’s personality was a boon to the Public Archives. However, with more resources than Doughty, Lamb was able to extend his influence and increase the mandate and scope of the institution. Under Lamb’s tenure, the Public Archives started to work with bureaucrats once again to promote the care of government records. Slowly, Lamb rebuilt the perception of the Public Archives in the federal government, and strengthened its capacity to assist and eventual lead in the management of federal government records.

With the appointment of William Kaye Lamb in 1949, the federal government once again had a Dominion Archivist who had Doughty’s ability to build and nurture relationships and institutions. With the support of the PRC, the Public Archives started to strengthen its institutional capacity. Lamb worked carefully with bureaucrats, politicians and historians so that the Archives could eventually replace the Public Records Commission, and take over the function that Arthur Doughty had anticipated over a half century before.

To support the management of government records, however, the Public Archives had to establish a body of expertise. A number of notable bureaucrats worked with Lamb to form the Records Management Association in 1952 to help train records experts. The Records Management Association provided an opportunity for senior officers involved in central registries to communicate ideas and concepts, aiding in the development of the archival profession in Canada. Departments needed a trained group

630 The Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, 26 February 1943, MG 26 J4, LAC.
of experts and the PRC and Records Management Association helped to contribute to the development of training and courses to professionalize the files. Lamb, involved with the activities of both organizations, helped to bring this to fruition.

In addition to the Prime Ministers, the Dominion Archivists worked with a number of influential bureaucrats who lobbied on behalf of the Public Archives. Both Brymner and Doughty worked with Joseph Pope, the private secretary to Prime Minister Macdonald, and Under-Secretary for External Affairs, who foresaw many of the problems with government records as early as 1897, and recognized the need for a body to organize the international diplomatic correspondence of the government.

Pope’s most significant contribution came in the Royal Commission of 1914, whose recommendations served as the long-standing ideal for the Public Archives. Doughty and Pope worked together on the 1914 Royal Commission on Government Records, and expressed an appreciation for the challenges that existed in the government filing system. These two men identified a set of problems that would plague the government for decades to come. The Commission’s primary recommendation was to establish a Canadian public records office to help federal departments better protect their records and offer better access to departments.631 The government needed a plan for the current volumes of records and future records, and the Commission recommended that a centralized authority under the “Treasury Board should be sought for the destruction of all documents as competent authority may consider useless.”632 The recommendations of the 1914 Royal Commission became the standard for later bureaucrats who sought to implement a records policy for the federal government.

There were limits as to what an archivist could do, even someone as influential as Doughty. The recommendations of the 1914 Royal Commission were not

631 Wilson, “Noble Dream, 32.
632 Royal Commission to Inquire into the State of Records, 28, 29.
implemented, as the country turned its attention to the First World War. With the death of Pope in the 1920s, no one bureaucrat seemed to carry the case for the Public Archives. Even the relationship between Doughty and King did not prevent the Archives from losing funding through the 1930s, or from being a part of a disastrous storage plan that created nothing but distrust.

With the absence of an active Dominion Archivist during the Second World War, a number of influential bureaucrats and politicians started to help strengthen the position of the Public Archives and centralize authority for federal government records. Prime Minister King affected significant change in the government’s record keeping policies during the Second World War. King led by example, knowing the value of information, keeping his own thorough evidentiary record of his public and private life. With the creation of the Cabinet War Committee to help streamline the Canadian war effort, King changed the policies of Cabinet, requiring, for the first, the creation of documentation on Cabinet activity.

In 1938, King appointed A.D.P Heeney specifically for this purpose. Heeney took up where Pope left off. His role and influence in the federal government reflected Pope’s path in many ways. Heeney started as a private secretary to the Prime Minister, and in 1940 was appointed as the Cabinet Secretary and Clerk of the Privy Council. In 1942, King told all departments, through Heeney, to ensure that departmental policies preserved wartime records. Like Pope before him, Heeney moved from his close alliance with the Prime Minister to the Department of External Affairs. Lester Pearson handpicked Heeney to become the Under Secretary in 1949. Heeney had several influential posts in this department, including the NATO mission in Paris and the Canadian ambassador in Washington. In 1957 to 1959, Heeney also helped direct the review of the Civil Service Commission, which provided guidelines on selecting,
appointing, and hiring personnel for positions with the Canadian government. Heeney’s influence matched, and even exceeded, that of Joseph Pope.633

Heeney was by no means the only influential civil servant during the war years. There were a number of others who assisted in the promotion of a new records program in the federal government, but many of these individuals were motivated by their connections to academia, particularly the Canadian historical community. In the later years of the war, members of the Canadian Historical Association had published a number of works on the importance of record keeping during the war, and outlined the efforts undertaken in federal departments.634

By 1944, a number of publications had addressed the history of Canadian external relations. However, without access to the records of the Department of External Affairs, little could be done on the department’s history. In 1944, the Canadian historical community, through George Brown, brought their concerns about the state of the Archives and the care of government records into public debate. Bureaucrats made the most of the opportunity. With the help of his former colleagues, George Glazebrook and Walter Riddell in the Department of External Affairs, Brown was able channel his criticisms directly to the Prime Minister. Glazebrook, with his expertise in the area of Canadian external relations, made him an ideal candidate for involvement in a department history, and a records program. Shortly after Brown contacted Glazebrook and Riddell, King established the Interdepartmental Advisory Committee on Public Records (IACPR), and appointed trusted members of his government to help departments manage wartime records and write official histories, including

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633 Heeney, *The things that are Caesar’s*, 96-144.
Glazebrook. W.E.D. Halliday, a long time colleague of A.D.P. Heeney’s and one of King’s respected civil servants, became the Secretary of this body.

The members of the IACPR, later the Public Records Committee (PRC), realized the diverse experiences of departments, and the need for central control to protect records that would inform the official narratives of the war. Halliday lobbied for centralized authority for federal government records within the Public Archives, in the Dominion Archivist’s stead.

It is important to remember, however, that King only appointed Halliday in 1944, and that prior to this, departments and agencies lacked a body that actively promoted records care, offered direction on storage options for government records, or guided departments on the official wartime narrative projects. The three departmental histories highlight the challenges of record keeping, and the variances that existed between departments. The uneven treatment of department experience during the war speaks to the differences in records keeping procedures. By 1944, the IACPR, and the later PRC, had to address the diverse record experiences within the federal government during the postwar. The chapter on the Department of National Defence illustrated how C.P. Stacey became a standard for other departments, as he was able to capitalize on a unique set of circumstances to influence the management of records in the Army. A trained historian, with a military background, and the support of top military officers, Stacey was able to influence the Army’s well-established policies on records handling to suit the circumstances of the Canadian involvement in the Second World War. But Stacey was an exceptional circumstance.

The record keeping experiences of the Navy and the Air Force were drastically different from the Army. They did not have the same factors that supported success. The purpose of the discussion on the Department of National Defence is not to point out that two of the three services struggled in their attempts to manage the records they produced. During the Second World War, such struggle tended to be the norm among
government departments. The exceptional part of the department’s experience was the relative success achieved by C.P. Stacey, whose achievements became the desired standard for record and historical efforts. Stacey’s own historical background, his ability to recognize the historic value contained in the records, the trust he developed of senior Army officers encouraged the safekeeping of the Army’s records in a relatively volatile environment. This aided in the development of a narrative on the Army’s contribution to the Second World War. All department historical activities were measured against Stacey’s efforts, even if he experienced publication delays for his own official histories. Stacey became a reliable source of expertise for the PRC, as it sought to address the accumulations of departmental records in the postwar.

The experience of the Navy and the Air Force highlight the exceptional circumstances Stacey encountered in the Army. Kenneth Conn and Gilbert Tucker, the historical officers for the Air Force and the Navy, were neither as successful nor influential as Stacey. Conn experienced a number of structural difficulties, which left the record of tens of thousands of Canadians who fought with the RAF beyond the scope of inquiry. Conn’s office expanded modestly during the war to ensure the publication of a number of popular histories, but he was limited by his own lack of historical training, and continuing staff duties, which prevented him from devoting all of his energies to the history.

Senior naval officials seemed oblivious to the value inherent in the records it produced. The upper echelons of the Navy left non-essential duties unattended until they were admonished by the Prime Minister. Appointed in 1942, Gilbert Tucker, the Navy’s official historian, preferred to stay in Canada, focusing on the policies of procurement and merchant shipping rather than the participation of the Navy during the war. Nor did this trained historian allocate much of his time to the management of naval records. The histories produced by this section tell the story of the RCN, but
without much reference to the wartime records. Tucker left the historical record in a precarious situation in the immediate postwar, jeopardizing future historical study.\(^{635}\)

Despite the uneven treatment of the historical narrative projects in the three services, all three suffered from post-war political delays. However, the historians from the three historical sections represented a body of expertise on the wartime record of the Department of National Defence. Each would assist the PRC fashion the organization of the records, strengthen the Public Archives and implement a federal records program.

The experience of the Department of Munitions and Supply depicts how an institution could easily overlook records management policies. The only truly wartime department required significant assistance organizing the official history given the state of the wartime records and the closure of the department in 1945. The establishment of Crown Corporations and the inclusion of private companies meant that government officials did not oversee the protection of the records. Minister C.D. Howe’s antipathy towards file keeping did nothing to alleviate the inherent structural difficulties within the Department. The limitations of the record collections created significant challenges for the departmental historian, Jack De N. Kennedy, who was appointed by the PRC. Kennedy was forced to rely heavily on input from Crown Corporations and Branches, which compromised the department’s final historical narrative and subsequent historical research. Unlike the historians from the Department of National Defence, Kennedy had limited involvement in the PRC’s postwar efforts.

The record keeping experience of the Department of External Affairs serves as an example of a records procedure that failed under the pressures of the war. The department’s activities expanded significantly with the Second World War, and the record program was unable to accommodate the growing number of records. The Department was forced to redesign its system in 1940, a jarring transition that led to the

\(^{635}\) Cook, *Clio’s Warriors*, 169. (Committee on Public Meetings, Minutes, 13 December 1945, pt. 1, file 6-0-14-1, box 26, URF, DHH).
loss of documents. The importance of this experience was not lost on the academics
turned bureaucrats within the department. Walter Riddell and George de T. Glazebrook
helped present the concerns of the historical community to the desk of the Prime
Minister, and in Glazebrook’s case, participate in the growth and development of the
archival and record management professions in Canada.

Prime Minister Mackenzie King encouraged official histories that documented
the wartime effort of his government, and he understood the role of records in these
projects. King, through Heeney, directed departments to care for their records so that
historians would have materials on which to base their histories. The result was that the
historians often became the experts on the department filing systems. As the historians,
like Stacey, Kennedy, Conn and Tucker navigated, successfully or not, the filing
systems during the war for their histories, they became the experts on the department
record, and a valuable source of information for the PRC in the postwar. The PRC relied
on experts with a thorough knowledge of the record to create guidelines and
procedures to protect departmental records in the postwar.

Stacey, Conn, Tucker, and Kennedy were a group of official historians who
helped shaped the record collections, and helped the PRC manage the wartime record.
However, there were other historians that continued to influence the direction of the
Archives development, and growth of a public records office. George Brown, a
professor at the University of Toronto and a president of the CHA, called for the
government to improve its treatment of government records in March 1944. He also
contributed to the PRC’s mandate, as a colleague of W.E.D. Halliday, and an occasional
CHA representative. George Glazebrook and Gerry Riddell, members of the
department of External Affairs, were former students of Brown’s. In Glazebrook’s case,
he used his historical skills to publish extensively on the history of External Affairs, and
was a longtime member of the PRC.
The 1966 Public Records Order also coincided with the emergence of a new type of history. The collections held at the Public Archives had long supported the development of a historical profession that focused on a national political history, offered by such historians Adam Shortt, Arthur Lower, and Donald Creighton. These historians explored how Canada came to exist. As Carl Berger explains, a new generation of historians started to sever nationalism from the study of Canadian history. Ramsay Cook, H. Blair Neatby and P.B. Waite started to explore events, personalities and intent from a variety of perspectives, which included the pluralistic experiences defined by race, regionalism and religion.\textsuperscript{636} The professionalization of Canadian history, and the diversification of perspective studied under this umbrella, coincided with the expansion of the Public Archives mandate to gather and protect the records of the Canadian government.

The weight of records that grew from the Second World War moved the government towards action. It was clear from the experience of the official historians that records were inconsistently created and haphazardly stored. Prime Minister King created the PRC to assist departments with the records challenge they faced well into the postwar. The PRC’s mandates changed so that it continued to play a central role in the management of all government departments and all government records.

The influence of conflict on procedures used in the federal government did not stop with the Second World War. Departments had little motivation to alter records procedures that governed active records or those not yet created. This changed with the Emergency Measures Organization Survey, conducted during the height of the Cold War. With the continual threat of war, staff were forced to set out how best to provide governance if all departments in Ottawa were seriously disrupted. The effort to protect essential records in response to the Cold War was initiated in 1951, and increased in 1955. This scenario highlighted the role of records in governing the country, which

\textsuperscript{636} Carl Berger, \textit{The Writing of Canadian History}, 259-261.
presented convincing reasons for departments to engage in record keeping practices. The EMO survey also stressed to the wider government the need for appropriate storage and departmental staff trained in the care of government records.

Addressing the need for storage space came slowly. It took time for the government and department officials to trust archivists, in light of the difficulties created in the 1930s with the Experimental Farm project implemented by Public Works. After losing the opportunity for a storage unit, in late 1951 Dominion Archivist Lamb received the long awaited news that the government had allocated funds for a new records centre at Tunney’s Pasture. The building, named the Public Archives Record Centre (PARC), was handed over to the Public Archives in 1955, and was designed for the care and protection of government records, and allowed the archives to divide records into dead and dormant files. The PARC could offer adequate space and conduct records management operations. The establishment of the PARC under the authority of the Public Archives helped the PRC and the Public Archives to promote the management of government documents after it was opened in April 1956.

The early 1950s also witnessed the creation of a Records Management Association of Ottawa. With the start of the RMA, records managers had an arena to discuss new developments in records management and archival theories. RMA’s responsibilities included “the study of records management, as well as classifying, coding, indexing and filing, to standardize terminology and filing equipment, to promote the study of office methods and procedures, to devise methods of training of staffs in records management, stimulate the retirement of records and encourage

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637 Tunney’s Pasture is an area within Ottawa that has a high concentration of federal government buildings. It is located east of the present day Canadian War Museum, in the block between Parkdale Avenue, Scott Street, and the Ottawa River Parkway.
cooperation between Canadian government departmental records offices.\textsuperscript{640} This was the first centralized organization designed to train records managers and increase professionalism in the field of records management.

The discussion of archival theory and records management techniques underlined the purpose of the RMA. A product of the war, T.R. Schellenburg’s concept of the records life cycle and record scheduling called for increased archival involvement in the care of government records. Schellenburg argued record managers needed to identify the needs of government officials and dispose of records once they served their purpose. Knowing the context of the documents’ creation, records managers were able to create disposal schedules for documents, even those not yet created. Organizations could transfer records to repositories and archives on a regular basis, which increased the efficiency of records management as well as the involvement of the archives in the record management process.\textsuperscript{641} This was a dramatic departure from the perspective that had guided archival management in the years leading up to the Second World War.

While the Cold War was successful in raising awareness of the importance of adequate storage space and skilled personnel to manage records, a number of Royal Commissions had attempted to accomplish the same objective and advance the Public Records Office cause. Royal Commissions mattered, as ways to survey and explore the problems. But they were more influential if they were acted upon. The 1897 department commission on public records, lead by Joseph Pope, recommended centralizing the management of government records.\textsuperscript{642} The Commissions also argued for a board of inspection to conduct departmental reviews of filing systems to avoid correspondence

\textsuperscript{641} T.R. Schellenburg, Modern Archives, 37.
\textsuperscript{642} Pope to Scott, (7 January 1897), vol. 303, RG 37, LAC.
of little value, which would preserve the adequate space that the government could offer.643

In 1912, the Government created the Royal Commission on Public Records, led by Joseph Pope, Dominion Archivist Arthur Doughty, and E.F. Jarvis, to address the state of records in the federal government. This included

Nature and extent of the records, their state of preservation; the use made of them in conducting public business and state of the building where they are deposited; the space they occupy; the facility of access thereto by the Departments… and the control exercised over the records.644

The Commissioners conducted over 200 visits to various government departments, libraries and commissions. The commissioners concluded, “One fact, everywhere observable, is that the preservation and care of the older records is the last thought of anybody.”645 Both the 1914 Royal Commission and the 1897 departmental commission raised concerns and recommendations that would continue to arise.

In 1949, the Government heard the recommendations offered by the National Commission in Arts, Letters and Sciences. Named for its Chair, Vincent Massey, the Massey Commission offered a set of recommendations that accepted the view offered by Dominion Archivist Lamb, that the Public Archives needed to strengthen its role in the preservation of public records. However, the Commission overlooked the reality that faced the Public Archives. In support of the systematic and continuous transfer of records, the Commission wanted the institution to focus on departmental reviews of records and analyses of filing systems to expedite records transfer to the Public Archives.646 The Public Archives did not lack the ability to conduct reviews, but rather

645 Royal Commission to Inquire into the State of Records, 18.
the storage space required to protect the records that departments would transfer to the archives. Space and personnel remained an issue for the Public Archives.

The most influential Royal Commission for the Public Archives was established in 1962. The Royal Commission on Government Organization argued that the government needed to modernize its administrative functions, including records management and place the Public Archives at the head of this program. The Public Archives could streamline records processes and curb government expenses. The Royal Commission on Government Organization provided the federal government with the motivation for change: financial savings and government modernization. The Glassco Commission highlighted for the government the savings that could occur by providing the Public Archives with the additional resources it required to manage federal government records. The Commission effectively restated the recommendations of the 1914 Royal Commission for a Public Records Office, but with the extent of the records issue, and the wider understanding of record value, the government was ready to implement change.

From 1872, the Public Archives had been subjected to mandates provided by the governing Canadian authority, none of which had been especially clear. The Public Archives had functioned as a body responsible for historical information and had a claim to government records that contained historical material, but not over the wider body of government records. With the Public Records Order of 1966, the Public Archives finally received authority over the process that governed the destruction of public records. This did not mean that the Public Archives had the capacity to implement this new mandate immediately, but it was a step towards a clarified mandate and central authority for government records. By officially including public records as a part of the Public Archives mandate, the institution expanded from a body focused on documents of interest to Canadian history to an institution focused on preserving the evidentiary heritage of Canada and the Canadian government.
With the 1966 Order, the Public Archives was able to implement new techniques and theories of records management that had been emerging in the United Kingdom and the United States. Once the Canadian Public Archives received the mandate for government records in 1966 and established a young Canadian archival profession, it was able to integrate the new theory into policies directed at protecting government records.

The Public Archives of Canada also started to take the lead in developing or implementing archival theory in the post 1966 period. Archivists at the Public Archives had always followed a theory that emphasized content over medium. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Canadian archivists labeled this technique as total archives, capitalizing on many of the ideas long circulated within the archival community. In a commentary of total archives, archivist Terry Cook offered four different dimensions of the concept.

Archives should acquire collections reflecting the total complexion of society. A second perspective of total archives concerns networks; there should be an institutionalize[d] system of archives to ensure that the records of all significant human endeavour are preserved. The third and more traditional dimension concerns the archival involved in each stage of the total life cycle of institutional records. Most popularly, total archives is the desirability of preserving all types of archival material.

This was a significant development from gathering records of historic value. Canadian archival thought did not end with the creation of this concept either. Laura Millar explains that many archivists believed that the total archives concept meant, “publicly funded archival institutions... would acquire, preserve, and make available for public use both government and private sector records in all media, including paper documentation and visual and cartographic images.” The total archives concept was

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one that evolved, but it indicated that the Public Archives had grown into a dynamic organization supported by a community of archival experts.

Despite the impetus for records organization provided by Prime Minister Mackenzie King during the war, and the Order in 1966, the Government and the Archives did not establish a comprehensive Records Management Policy until 1983. After the Order, the Public Archives created the Records Management Branch in September 1966, and a series of regional offices were subsequently created, starting with one in Montreal in November. The process of implementing records management plans and assisting departments with disposal schedules required significant effort and resources. With the PARC, the Archives was able to assisted departments with records, but only increased this capacity on a gradual basis. In 1959, it had accessioned 39,360 files into the PARC. By 1969, the Records Management Branch had extended its capacity and accessioned 57,396 records during that year. The Public Records Order provided the Public Archives with the legal mandate to assist and direct departments with record schedules, but it did not have the financial resources to address all issues in the years following 1966. While it coincided with a period of significant growth in the institutions infrastructure, it would still take twenty additional years to fully implement a complete records management plan.

With the introduction of the Public Records Order of 1966, the Public Archives and Treasury Board distinguished between private records and institutional records of a minister, but this took time to implement. Abuses of record destruction were not uncommon for a time. In their contribution to The Archivist, Charles MacKinnon and Robert Czerny found that Judy LaMarsh, who served as Minister of National Health and Welfare, Minister of Amateur Sport, and Secretary of State during the Pearson

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administration, remembered some colleagues transferring records to institutions, while she recalled burning records in her backyard. The Public Archives specifically targeted the records under the control of institutions, and forbid the destruction of these records without the consent of the National Archivist who then determined what the Archives should acquire, to safeguard the official record.

The 1966 Order was the start of significant records accession to the Public Archives and development in record management policy in the federal government. The policy in 1983 led to even greater record transfers to the archives. In 1983 and 1984, the Public Archives accessioned 9,105 meters, 2,739 microfilm reels, and 858 microfiche of federal government records, including substantial volumes of Second World War materials from the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs.

By 1983-84, the Public Archives had consolidated its new and expanded mandate to reflect its objective of collecting and protecting both private and public records. The Public Archives operated as a total archives. According to the Auditor General’s Report, the Public Archives focused on

The systematic preservation of government and private records of Canadian national significance in order to facilitate not only the effective and efficient operation of the Government of Canada and historical research in all aspects of the Canadian experience, but also the protection of federal records.

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653 MacKinnon and Czerny, 3
654 Canada, Public Archives Canada, Federal Archives Division, Accessions 1983-1984, Sandra G. Wright (Ottawa: Public Archives Canada, 1984): v; The central registry records of the Army, from 1914 to 1963, which equaled 532.2 meters of materials, war diaries and fort record books from 1939 to 1951, and 23.1 meters of records from the Directorate of History records relating to the Royal Canadian Air Force from 1920 to 1968 came into the possession of the archives. 2,349.9 meters of records of the various Headquarters, Boards, and establishments during the war also found their way to the Archives in 1983. The Directorate of History also transferred 66 meters of captured German records to the Archives. While the Department of External Affairs held on to the majority of their World War Two documents until the late 1980s, some of the records from the war, were accessioned to the Archives in the large 1983 and 1984 accession. The archives obtained the central registry files from the new filing system, the “1940 system”, which reflected all aspects of the departmental operations from 1940 until 1963. While several other central registry files were accessioned, only one other had a period that encompassed wartime activity, ranging from 1940 to 1944.
of rights and the enhancement of a sense of national identity based on archives as the collective memory of the nation.\textsuperscript{655}

By this time, the Public Archives expenditures reached $36.1 million, a significant increase from the initial budget $4,000 budget allotted to Douglas Brymner in 1872.

The Public Archives was by no means perfect in the post 1966 era. A 1983 report by the Auditor General outlined the gaps that existed in the Archives policies and regulations. The Public Archives expanded to sixteen million items from private and public sources, but the Branch responsible for these acquisitions “did not have explicit approved acquisition policies and written criteria to guide archivists in selecting and appraising materials.”\textsuperscript{656} The Auditor General claimed that the Public Archives’ staff had inadequate knowledge of the physical conditions of its collections, limited standards for appropriate descriptive information, a lack of computer technology, inconsistent reports to the Treasury Board on records management in government and a weakness identifying user needs as a basis for cost-effective records management in government.\textsuperscript{657} All of these weaknesses existed despite the multiple surveys conducted from 1945 to 1966. In fact, the Auditor General found that the Public Archives had “no systematic plan for identifying the needs of users or potential users of its records management services or for assessing how well it responds to these needs. While the 1966 Order created the basis for the Archives to exercise authority over Public Records, twenty years later, the Public Archives still needed to address the methods used to administer this authority.

From 1945 until 1966, the government, bureaucrats, wartime historians and the Public Archives worked towards strengthening the Archival institution so it had the


capacity to manage government records. The lobbying efforts of the Canadian historical community, the personalities and working relationships of the Prime Minister, the National Archivist, and the public service, influenced the pace of the Public Archives’ development and evolution. The working relationship between the Prime Minister and the Archivist, strained during the wartime years, meant a greater emphasis upon the relationship between public servants in the Prime Minister. During the war and the years immediately following, the decisions that influenced the Archives’ development occurred not within the Public Archives structure, but within the Public Records Committee, an organization created on the recommendation of Prime Minister King that gathered representatives from departments, including the historians, to discuss government records and the official histories. The official wartime historians had detailed knowledge of the departmental file systems aided the bureaucrats on the PRC. The historians informed the PRC of the realities of the departmental record system, and helped the PRC create realistic procedures and policies for the departments. Royal Commissions, while drawing attention to the Public Archives’ role within the government, identified, but not always accurately, the problems with its mandate. The report of the Massey Commission, released in 1951, did not fully appreciate the extent of the Public Archives difficulties, or the nature of the problem that the Archivist had to address after the war. Glassco, however, highlighted to the government how to operate more efficiently than continuing with the status quo, denying the Public Archives the proper authority it required within in mandate.

One of the Public Archives’ greatest obstacles was convincing the wider government of the need for stronger policies to protect records and destruction schedules for records. While the Second World War created the records problems in departments, the Cold War created the awareness that departments needed to protect records to ensure the capacity to provide governance. After 100 years of effort on the part of the PRC and the threat of war or apprehended war, the Public Archives, its
strong cast of supporting bureaucrats, historians and politicians, and the new body of professional records managers, received the necessary authority for records management within the federal government.
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