First Impressions of Manager Fairness:

Set in Stone or Revision-Prone?

by

Corey Bainerman

A thesis

presented to the University of Waterloo

in fulfillment of the

thesis requirement for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Psychology

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2010

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

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Abstract

Manager fairness matters to employees and has important work outcomes. The current research explored whether differences exist in the rate of revision (change) of first impressions of a manager's interactional and procedural fairness/unfairness. After observing impression-inconsistent information, participants' initial impressions of interactional fairness/unfairness were hypothesized to exhibit greater amounts of impression revision than impressions of procedural fairness/unfairness. A 2 (fairness type: interactional vs. procedural) x 2 (initial behaviour: fair vs. unfair) x 2 (time of rating: initial vs. revised) experimental design involving 165 participants was implemented. Results show that the rate of change in ratings of interactional fairness over time was significantly greater than the rate of change in ratings of procedural fairness in the unfair initial-impression condition, as predicted. This was not true for the fair initial-impression condition. Unexpectedly, first impressions of fairness in general did not exhibit more revision than unfair first impressions. Implications are discussed.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Ramona Bobocel, whose guidance, advice,

support, and discussion have greatly helped me to conduct this research, and have provided many

rich experiences under the supervisory of an exemplary researcher.

  I extend my heartfelt appreciation to my parents for their ongoing support and encouragement.

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Introduction

The fairness of authority figures in the workplace has blossomed in popularity as a research topic over the past 30 years (e.g., Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter & Ng, 2001; Barling & Phillips, 1993; Lind, Kray & Thompson, 2001). One well-established principle in the justice literature is that fairness – or justice – in organizations is important to employees. This is illustrated by the fact that these impressions have critical outcomes on employee work behaviours. For example, holding the impression that one's manager at work is unfair has critical outcomes on the employee, such as antisocial behaviour (Greenberg, 1997), work stress and disobedience (Huo, Smith, Tyler & Lind, 1996), and turnover (Alexander & Ruderman, 1987).

In contrast, impressions of manager fairness at work results in increased commitment and job satisfaction (Folger & Konovsky, 1989), organizational citizenship behaviours (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998), and job performance on the part of employees (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). Does an employee's impression of manager fairness change over the course of their relationship, or is it more stable in nature? This is a question that is yet to be addressed by research.

The justice literature has demonstrated that there are three ways in which employees think about and evaluate fairness in organizations. There is distributive fairness, which refers to the allocation of material resources. Procedural fairness pertains to the appropriateness of the processes used to determine the allocation of resources. Finally, interactional fairness is the quality of interpersonal treatment given when communicating outcomes. Recently, researchers have come to understand interactional fairness as its own separate type (e.g., Barling & Phillips, 1993; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). The current research takes the same stance on this matter, as

much evidence corroborates this position. For example, the three types of fairness are associated with different classes of dependent variables (Bies, 2001; Colquitt, 2001). Distributive fairness is strongly associated with evaluations of the allocation of material resources (e.g., pay satisfaction). Procedural fairness is associated with evaluations of the processes by which allocation decisions are made, and are reflected in attitudes toward the organization such as commitment (e.g., Sweeney & McFarlin, 1993). Finally, interactional fairness is strongly associated with evaluations of the interpersonal behaviour of authority figures (Bies, 2001). Interactional fairness affects employee trust in authorities, and perceptions of leader–member exchange (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001).

The current research focuses on procedural and interactional fairness. Managers typically have more control over these two perceptions, whereas they often have less control over aspects of distributive fairness. Another important reason for focusing on procedural and interactional fairness is that, based on our theory, we have differing expectations for the way that people's impressions of these two types of fairness are revised. Indeed, the impression revision processes likely differ from one type of fairness to another.

Substantial strides have been made in the broader social psychology literature regarding impression revision. The organizational fairness literature is a burgeoning one as well. Nevertheless, many topics of research in these areas are yet to be broached. In general, there is a dearth in the literature about how people form impressions of the fairness of their managers at work, and how those impressions change over the course of time. Do first impressions of manager fairness hold up in the face of impression-inconsistent information? If impression revision occurs, what is the process by which it is carried out? These questions are yet to be

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addressed in both the impression revision and organizational fairness literatures. The current research seeks to bridge the two literatures to provide some initial answers.

<div align="center">*Impression Revision*</div>

There is an underlying organization in people's implicit theories of personality (Asch, 1946; Asch & Zukier, 1984). We are not passive or random perceivers of others' behaviours. A plethora of evidence suggests that people have a proclivity toward forming initial impressions of other people's traits even when in contact with them for a very brief period of time – as little as 30 seconds (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). These impressions are heuristics that help us make sense of the world around us. It is apparent, then, that the formation of first impressions is relevant in everyday life.

Evidence exists to support the fact that impression *revision* occurs, as well. Once a perceiver forms an impression regarding a particular trait of some actor, there are expectations for particular patterns of behaviour for that person, within that trait domain (Reeder & Coovert, 1986). If that person's actual behaviour violates the perceiver's expectations, a process of impression change, or revision, is set into motion (Ybarra, 2001). This violating information often causes the perceiver to make adjustments to update the relevant impression. A study by Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie and Milberg (1987) demonstrated that perceivers use a continuum for impression revision of personality traits, whereby impression-inconsistent information can result in adjustments to the already existing impression. In summary, evidence supports that first impressions are important, but also that a process of impression revision can take place. In order to better understand the nature of our impressions, the current research will explore which of these two – first impressions or impression revision – play a larger role when the impressions pertain to the fairness of a manager.

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The impression revision research has demonstrated that the impressions we form of various traits differ in stability depending on the underlying trait domain that the impression is based on (Ybarra, 2001; Reeder & Brewer, 1979). One reason for this is that perceivers apply different inferential rules to others' behaviours depending on the trait domain that the particular behaviour seems to be expressing. Generally speaking, the type of trait that an impression is based on, matters to the perceiver.

For example, imagine witnessing your co-worker of five years, Ben, stealing money out of a colleague's purse. Even if you have never observed any dishonest behaviour by Ben before, seeing him steal will undoubtedly impact your impression of how honest a person he is. Just like that, with a single "negative behaviour" in the honesty trait domain, you likely perceive Ben as dishonest. Or, imagine that your co-worker, Bill, asks you to edit his paper that he wishes to submit for publication. You have read all of Bill's previous papers, and their quality is always most excellent. This paper, however, is very poor. A similar question as above is, will this single demonstration of a "negative behaviour" in the paper-writing ability trait domain change your impression of Bill's skillfulness in writing? Perhaps it will, to some extent. Will this impression change as much as your honesty impression of Ben changed when he demonstrated the single "negative behaviour" in the honesty trait domain? Probably not, because you have observed Bill's impeccable writing in the past and know that he is capable of brilliant work. Bill received the benefit of the doubt. Ben, on the other hand, did not.

The goal of the current research is to explore whether differences exist in the rate of revision of first impressions of a manager's interactional and procedural fairness/unfairness. Does impression revision always occur when we witness an actor perform behaviour that is incompatible with our already existing impressions of him or her? It critically depends on the

particular trait domain that the behaviour is expressing. Our theory includes two important trait domains, which we turn to next.

Morality and Competence

Morality and competence are two predominant trait domains that underlie most impressions and social judgments (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt & Kashima, 2005). Morality refers to traits that are relevant to considerate interpersonal treatment in relationships, such as friendliness, sincerity, honesty, and respect. Competence refers to traits that are relevant to task accomplishment and achievement, such as intelligence, mathematical proficiency, and general skillfulness. To connect these trait domains with the aforementioned examples, honesty falls within the morality domain, and paper-writing ability falls within the competence domain. These two trait domains are important in the current research because our theory maintains that they are uniquely related to interactional and procedural fairness.

Diagnosticity

Morality and competence differ in their respective levels of an important dimension called diagnosticity. The diagnosticity of an observed behaviour refers to how demonstrative or representative it is of the actor's actual, underlying trait. What is being "diagnosed" is the actor's true personality trait.

Diagnosticity played a major role in several studies (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986a; Kunda & Nisbett, 1986b) that explored people's impressions of the competence and morality traits in others. Participants estimated the cross-situational consistency of morality-related or competence-related behaviours. First, information was provided about a person's past morality behaviour or competence behaviour. For example, "Jane was honest when telling her husband

that she had been fired." Then, participants were asked to estimate the probability that this person would behave similarly in the same domain in the future. Specifically, they estimated the probability that the actor would maintain his or her relative ranking within the relevant peer group. Results showed that when predicting the consistency of competence-related behaviours, participants' estimates were very accurate. Their estimates were similar to the actual cross-situational consistency of the trait, which was acquired by the researchers. For morality behaviours, the participants' estimates were very inaccurate. The participants significantly underestimated the cross-situational consistency of morality behaviours. The results demonstrate not only inaccuracy, but also a lack of confidence when estimating the consistency of morality behaviours. Conversely, the estimates of the cross-situational consistency of competence behaviours were highly accurate.

Understanding diagnosticity helps to explain these results. Competence behaviours consist of skill-based traits that have objective and measureable units, such as scores and percentiles. This is why there is a high level of diagnosticity in competence behaviours. The fact that the information is extremely quantitative makes it very meaningful to the perceiver. It makes interpretation – or diagnosis – of the actor's underlying traits tremendously easier. That is why participants in the Kunda and Nisbett study (1986a) were more accurate in estimating the actual consistency of these traits. If a person scores in the 99th percentile of the LSAT or MCAT, for example, we believe that he or she is very intelligent and will continue to demonstrate intelligent behaviour in the future. This is because the information is so objective. We have a lucid understanding of what it means to score in the 99th percentile of a standardized examination. Therefore, knowing about this test score conveys meaningful information about the person's underlying intelligence trait.

The diagnosticity of morality behaviours, on the other hand, is low. These behaviours, which represent such traits as friendliness and honesty, have no obvious or interpretable units of measurement, and no well-defined method of assigning scores to behaviours. Just how much friendliness is there in a smile? Surely, it is difficult to articulate. In a study by Kunda and Nisbett (1986a), people were not only demonstrably poor perceivers of the consistency of morality behaviours, but they were also very unsure about their estimates. Thus, we have difficulty determining just how representative an actor's morality-related behaviour is of his or her relevant underlying morality traits. To reiterate, the diagnosticity of morality behaviours is low. The research by Kunda and Nisbett (1986a; 1986b) makes it clear that people believe that others will continue to act the way they do in the future for competence behaviours, but not necessarily for morality behaviours.

Maintenance

Maintenance is another dimension on which the morality and competence trait domains differ. Maintenance refers to the consistency of positive behaviour that is required in order for an observer to maintain an already-existing positive impression of an actor's trait. Morality traits are high in maintenance (Ybarra, 2001). This means that any negative behaviour that is witnessed by an observer in the morality domain will cause severe changes to an observer's initially positive impression of that trait. High maintenance of a trait results in a high degree of behavioural *consistency* that is required by an actor in order for an observer to maintain the initially positive impression. This was illustrated by the example of Ben stealing money, and the ensuing impact on our impression of his honesty. It didn't matter that you had known Ben for five years and never witnessed any dishonest behaviour. The one negative behaviour of stealing was enough to drastically alter one's impression of how honest a person he is.

Competence traits, on the contrary, are low in maintenance (Ybarra, 2001). This means that negative behaviour that is witnessed by an observer is much less damaging to an initially positive impression of the trait. The low maintenance of competence traits results in a lower degree of behavioural consistency that is required by an actor in order for an observer to maintain an initially positive impression. This was illustrated in the example of Bill's poorly written paper, and our subsequent leniency and willingness to preserve the positive impression of his paper-writing ability.

Maintenance is a product of diagnosticity, and the two constructs share an inverse relationship. The low diagnosticity of morality behaviours means that observers are unsure about how representative any positive behaviour in this domain is of the actor's underlying personality trait. This results in the higher behavioural consistency requirement on the part of the actor in order for an initially positive impression to be maintained. Thus, low diagnosticity leads to the high maintenance for Morality behaviours.

On the other hand, the high diagnosticity of competence behaviours means observers are more accurate and confident about how representative positive behaviour is of the actor's underlying traits. These traits are more easily quantified and interpretable. Consequently, observers will interpret an actor's single behavioural demonstration of high performance in a competence-related behaviour as proof of high ability in that trait domain. Once proven, less behavioural consistency is then required by the actor in this domain in order for an observer to maintain the initially positive impression of the trait. That is, there is more "wiggle room" for negative behaviours before an initially positive impression is subject to revision for competence traits. Again, the high diagnosticity leads to low maintenance for competence behaviours.

Further support for these findings come from previous research that shows that even a single negative behaviour in the morality domain can lead an observer to drastically revise their initially-positive impressions of an actor (Kammrath et al, 2007). In the competence trait domain, conversely, a single negative behaviour does not have such a dire effect on the overall impression.

Take the morality trait of patience, for example. Imagine that it is your first week at a new job, and you hold the first impression that your manager is patient because she has been patient with you thus far. Suddenly, after only a few days on the job, she blows up at you unexpectedly for being too slow in finishing a small project. That single negative morality-related behaviour will stick with you, even if it is an aberration from her normal behaviour. In the face of this impression-inconsistent information, your already existing positive morality-based first impression of how patient she is will change markedly. In other words, the morality impression will undergo considerable impression revision.

Suppose now that you hire a piano player for a dinner party you are having. This pianist performed wonderfully when you hired her for your last party, so you hold the impression that she is a highly skilled player. At this party, however, she performs poorly and is noticeably off tune. Since piano playing ability is a competence trait, you will still hold the impression that the piano player is talented, because of your past experience witnessing her tremendous piano playing behaviour, even if it was just one time. In the face of the impression-inconsistent information of her poor playing at your most recent party, your positive competence-based first impression is essentially maintained. In other words, the competence impression does not undergo very much impression revision. In summary, positive first impressions of competence-

based traits are more resistant to impression revision than are positive first impressions of morality-based traits.

A number of studies provide support for the finding that first impressions of morality-based traits are more prone revision in the face of impression-inconsistent information, as compared to first impressions of competence-based traits. One of these studies was carried out by Kammrath, Ames, and Scholer (2007). In one of their experiments, participants formed initial impressions of positive morality-based traits or positive competence-based traits of an actor for whom they were given behavioural information. Then participants observed a mixture of both impression-consistent and impression-inconsistent behavioural information about the actor in that same domain. Results supported the finding that morality-based impressions were more easily subjected to impression revision than competence-based impressions.

The research that has been discussed up to this point has explored how positive first impressions of morality and competence traits are revised when impression-inconsistent behaviour is observed. A shortcoming of this collective research is that it has only explored initial impressions that are positive. But there is another, separate stream of research that compares positive *and* negative impressions more generally, and without the distinction of trait domains such as morality and competence. Generally, results show that positive first impressions are more easily revised than negative first impressions (Lind, Kray & Thompson, 2001, Ybarra, 2001).

A general finding in psychology is that more weight is usually placed on negative information as compared to positive information. When forming impressions, for example, observers typically place greater weight on negative information than on positive information (Birnbaum, 1973; Hamilton & Zanna, 1972). A study by Briscoe et al. (1967) showed that

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impressions underwent greater change following the observation of inconsistent negative behaviour rather than inconsistent positive behaviour. These findings are significant because they examined negative first impressions in addition to positive ones.   No research has ever examined first impressions of morality and competence that were negative. Therefore, much research remains to be carried out in the impression revision literature. The current research aims to explore this research opportunity, and to bridge the gap between the impression revision and organizational fairness literatures.

Theoretical Postulations

How do the different ways of thinking about organizational fairness relate to the morality and competence trait domains? We propose a conceptual framework that connects the organizational fairness and impression revision literatures. As noted earlier, interactional fairness refers to people's perceptions of the quality of the interpersonal treatment that they receive from authority figures that enact procedures (Bies & Moag, 1986). One core element of such perceptions is the degree to which people are treated with warmth, politeness, dignity and respect by authorities. Interactional fairness works primarily to alter reactions to decision outcomes, because sensitivity on the part of the manager can make employees feel better about an unfavourable outcome (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Holmvall & Bobocel, 2008). Since interactional fairness perceptions are rooted in warm, respectful, and dignified interpersonal treatment, our theory holds that interactional fairness can be conceptualized as falling within the morality domain.

Procedural fairness refers to evaluations of the processes that are used to determine outcome distributions or allocations (Colquitt et al., 2001). Lind and Tyler (1988) brought the concept of procedural justice out of the legal field and into the organizational setting. Procedural

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fairness, according to Leventhal (1976), meant that organizational procedures should a) be applied consistently, b) be free from bias c) be free of vested interests, d) ensure that accurate information is collected and used in making decisions, e) have some policy for correcting flawed decisions, f) conform to prevailing standards of morality, and g) ensure that the opinions of groups affected by the decision have been taken into account. Employees are willing to relinquish control over decision-making as long as they have some process-related influence (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Since ensuring procedural fairness involves a set of concrete skills aimed at being consistent, accurate, and unbiased when making decisions about people, our theory holds that it can be conceptualized as falling within the competence domain. This postulation, together with the aforementioned one – that interactional fairness can be conceptualized as falling within the morality domain – comprises the backbone of our theory.

Our theoretical reasoning is as follows regarding all first impressions, both positive and negative. We know that morality impressions are more prone to revision than those of competence. Our theory holds that interactional fairness falls within this morality domain. We also know that competence impressions are more resistant to revision, and our theory holds that procedural fairness falls within this competence domain. Therefore, it is expected that interactional fairness impressions, as compared to those of procedural fairness, will show more revision when an observer witnesses impression-inconsistent behaviour. This line of reasoning is based on research that examined positive first impressions only. As stated earlier, no research has ever examined how first impressions of the fairness – or unfairness – of a manager is or is not revised in the face of impression-inconsistent information. The current research will be the first to delve into the world of a particular type of negative first impressions – those of unfairness – which will be explored in addition to first impressions of fairness.

Hypothesis 1: After observing impression-inconsistent behaviour, initial impressions of *interactional fairness/unfairness* will exhibit more revision than initial impressions of *procedural fairness/unfairness*.

Figure 1 and Figure 2 are theoretical depictions of the expected patterns of data for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, respectively.

As stated previously, there has also been a plethora of research to suggest that, generally speaking, negative first impressions are more resistant to revision than positive first impressions (Kammrath, Ames & Scholer, 2007; Lind, Kray & Thompson, 2001). At the heart of the issue here is the fact that negative information about others is weighted more heavily in impressions than positive information (Ybarra, 2001; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer & Vohs, 2001). Based on this finding, we expect a main effect of negativity, such that first impressions of unfairness will exhibit less revision than first impressions of fairness, regardless of the type of fairness. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: After observing impression-inconsistent behaviour, first impressions of *fairness* will exhibit more revision than first impressions of *unfairness* (regardless of fairness type).

Figure 3 is a theoretical depiction of the expected pattern of data for Hypothesis 2.

Pilot Study 1

Several tasks needed to be completed in order for this research to be carried out. First, there was a need for a number of examples of manager behaviours that were representative of interactional and procedural fairness/unfairness. In order to achieve this, 36 items of manager behaviour were created. These items were derived from the definitions of these constructs in the literature. After reading the definitions of interactional and procedural fairness, participants rated each item on its level of both types of fairness. The items that best represented each type of fairness were selected for potential use in the main study.

Method

Participants and Design

Thirty-one undergraduate students (20 women and 11 men) at the University of Waterloo participated in this study for course credit. Participants were recruited through the Psychology Department's research participant pool.

Materials

Thirty-six episodes of manager behaviour were generated. Each item was designed to uniquely reflect the definitions of either procedural or interactional fairness or unfairness from the organizational fairness literature (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt et. al., 2001). Eighteen interactional fairness items (10 positive, 8 negative) and 18 procedural fairness items (10 positive, 8 negative) were generated.

An example of an interactional fairness item was, "*H.G. was sincere when breaking the news to a young employee that the employee was being demoted.*" An example of a procedural fairness item was, *"H.G. decided his/her employees' duties for the week in a consistent manner."*

Procedure

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Participants first read the definition of interactional fairness. Next, they read each of the 36 items and provided a rating of interactional fairness for each one. Participants were told that the episodes they were reading were examples of real behaviours of managers from organizational records. Ratings were provided on a likert scale, from -3 to 3 (-3 = *Extremely Interactionally Unfair,* 3 = *Extremely Interactionally Fair).* Next, the definition for procedural fairness was provided. Participants then re-read the same 36 managerial behaviours and provided a procedural fairness rating for each one. In the end, then, participants had provided ratings of both interactional and procedural fairness for all items. The participants were counterbalanced such that half provided ratings of interactional fairness first, while the other half provided procedural fairness ratings first.

Obtaining ratings of both types of fairness for each item was essential in determining which items were most representative of their intended type of fairness. Of all of the items, we were able to determine which ones were actually perceived to be reflective of the fairness type that they were created to reflect. This paradigm enabled us to examine, for instance, the procedural fairness items that were rated as highly procedurally fair while being rated more neutrally in interactional fairness. This would be an ideally representative procedural fairness item, since it was only being rated consistently high in the type of fairness that it was created to reflect.

An item was only considered for inclusion in the main study if certain criteria were met. First, the item had to exhibit a more extreme mean rating in the appropriate direction for the intended fairness type (the type from which the item was created) than for the unintended fairness type. The mean rating for an interactional unfairness item, for example, should have had a significantly more negative mean rating on interactional fairness than procedural fairness.

Second, the item needed to show a mean rating that was relatively neutral (between -1.5 And

1.5) on the unintended type of fairness. Third, a *t*-test needed to show a significant difference

between the mean ratings in each type of fairness for the item.

<div align="center">*Results*</div>

The results are shown in Table 1. All in all, 27 of the 36 items met the criteria listed

above. For seven of these items, the differences in the *t*-test were marginal. In order to further

narrow down the number of items to be used in the main study, another study was carried out,

which we turn to next.

Pilot Study 2

The purpose of the second pilot study was twofold. First, valence ratings for each of the 36 items of manager behaviour were obtained. These ratings were desired in light of evidence in the literature that morality behaviours generally elicit stronger impressions in observers than do competence behaviours (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). Due to their theorized links with interactional and procedural fairness, respectively, it is plausible that the valence ratings of interactional fairness would be more extreme than the valence ratings of procedural fairness. If this were found to be true, one could argue that valence is responsible for why interactional fairness impressions might show more revision than procedural fairness impressions; interactional impressions were rated more extremely to begin with, and so they would have farther to fall. In any case, it will be useful to control for valence when comparing the amounts of impression revision among participants in the main study.

The second purpose of this pilot study was to empirically test our theoretical postulations that interactional fairness maps onto the morality trait domain, and that procedural fairness maps onto the competence trait domain. In order to test this, participants carried out a Q-sort task in which they read the same 36 items and sorted each one into what they perceived to be the most appropriate trait domain.

Method

Participants and design

A new sample of 30 undergraduate students (20 women and 10 men) at the University of Waterloo participated in this experiment for course credit. Participants were recruited through the Psychology Department's research participant pool.

Materials and Procedure

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The same 36 examples of manager behaviour that were used in pilot study 1 were used in this study. The participants first carried out the valence task. They read each item and provided a rating of its "positivity or negativity." The ratings were made on a 7-point likert scale (*-3 = Negative, 3 = Positive*).

The Q-sort task is a simple sorting exercise. Participants were first provided with the definitions of morality and competence, which were described to them as "psychological constructs." Then they read the same 36 behavioural episodes again, and chose which of the two trait domains that each item best represented. There was also an option to choose neither morality nor competence. In reality, these were the same items that were created to uniquely reflect interactional or procedural fairness. The expected result was that the items created to reflect interactional fairness would be consistently sorted into the morality domain, and the items created to reflect procedural fairness would be consistently sorted into the competence domain.

The Q-sort is a pretest methodology that draws on the concept of substantive validity (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991). Substantive validity refers to the degree to which a measure is theoretically linked to a certain construct. Substantive validity contributes to the measure's construct validity (Loevinger, 1957). If the results of the Q-sort task emerge as expected, there will be support for the fact that the interactional and procedural fairness items tapped the relevant trait domain of morality and competence, respectively. Since the theoretical reasoning for our hypotheses rests on these two connections, the Q-sort can assist in the development of the main study.

The index of the Q-sort that is employed in the current research is the *proportion of substantive agreement, p_{sa}*. It is defined as the proportion of participants who assign an item to its intended category (Anderson & Gerbing, 1991). In the current research, the criterion for

inclusion of an item in the main study was that at least 70% of participants placed the item into its intended domain (interactional fairness items into the morality domain, and procedural fairness items into the competence domain).

Results

The results for the valence ratings are displayed in Table 2. In contrast to what prior literature has suggested, it was the procedural fairness/unfairness items that exhibited slightly more extreme ratings of valence, overall. For unfairness items, the mean ratings of valence were lower for procedural items than they were for interactional items (Ms = -2.69 and -2.82, respectively). As well, for the fairness items, the mean ratings for the procedural items were higher than the mean ratings for the interactional items (Ms = 1.31 and 0.77, respectively)

Two *t*-tests were carried out in order to determine if the interactional valence ratings were significantly different from the procedural valence ratings. For the items that only portrayed unfairness, the valence ratings between procedural and interactional unfairness items were not significantly different from each other. A paired *t*-test for the mean ratings of items of procedural unfairness vs. interactional unfairness did not show a significant difference, $t(28) = -1.30$, $p = .21$. A different outcome was found for items that reflected fairness. A paired *t*-test for the mean ratings of items of procedural fairness vs. interactional fairness did show a significant difference, $t(28) = 6.80$, $p < .01$.

Table 3 shows the results for the Q-sort task. There were 32 items that were placed into the intended domain at least 70% of the time, and this includes all 27 items that met the criteria in pilot study 1.

Fortunately, only 16 items were required in order to carry out the main study. Five items for each type of fairness and three items for each type of unfairness were required. The reason

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for this unique number of items is that the main study of the current research is a replication of a study by Kammrath, Ames & Scholer (2007), in which the same number of positive and negative items was used. Therefore, we selected the best 16 items to use in the main study, those that were rated as most representative of their respective type of fairness in pilot study 1. These two pilot studies provided us with the tools needed to compare the impression revision processes for interactional and procedural fairness/unfairness in the main study, which we turn to next.

Main Study

As explained in the introduction, the purpose of the main study was to compare revision processes for impressions of interactional and procedural fairness/unfairness. One approach to doing this was to measure how much these impressions changed from a first impression to a later impression, after more information about the actor was disseminated. The main study was constructed as a replication of the experimental paradigm developed by Kammrath et al. (2007, Experiment 3). In that experiment, participants formed initial impressions of several personality traits of an actor. Subsequently, additional information was provided about the actor, and participants' impressions were once again reported.

In the current study, participants read a single behavioural episode about a manager in an organization, and formed an initial impression of the actor's interactional or procedural fairness. They reported that impression by providing a rating of the fairness of the manager. Subsequently, six additional episodes of behavioural information were provided about the same manager. Participants then provided an updated impression of the fairness of the manager in the form of another fairness rating. Within-person changes in each participant's fairness impressions were assessed.

Two between-subjects factors were experimentally manipulated. The first was the type of fairness information that was given about the manager. One of either interactional or procedural fairness information was provided. The second factor was the initial behaviour that was read by the participant about the manager, which was either fair or unfair. Finally, participants rated the valence of each of the individual behavioural episodes.

Method

Participants

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One hundred four undergraduate students (62 women and 42 men) at the University of Waterloo participated in this study for course credit. Participants were recruited through the Psychology Department's research participant pool. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of the 2 (fairness type: interactional vs. procedural) x 2 (initial behaviour: fair vs. unfair) factorial design.

Materials and Procedure

Participants were told that they would be reading information about an anonymous manager from an organization. First, they read a single, initial example of managerial behaviour. This is where the manipulation occurred. Participants in the interactional fairness/unfairness conditions read a behavioural episode relevant to interactional fairness or unfairness. Likewise, participants in the procedural fairness/unfairness conditions read a behavioural episode in the realm of procedural fairness. The definition of the relevant type of fairness was then provided. Participants then gave two ratings of the manager's relevant type of fairness. Both items were likert-style, and asked for a rating of the manager's fairness (e.g., for interactional fairness conditions, *-3 = Very Interactionally Unfair, 3 = Very Interactionally Fair*; for procedural fairness conditions, *-3 = Very Procedurally Unfair, 3 = Very Procedurally Fair*). For each participant, the two ratings of fairness were combined to form a 2-item composite. This composite constituted their initial impression of the manager.

Next, participants read six additional behaviours about the manager. Across all conditions, four of the behaviours were fair and two were unfair. The order of these six behaviours was as follows: fair, unfair, fair, unfair, fair, fair. It is important to note that participants in both interactional conditions – fair and unfair – read the same six behaviours, and that these behaviours pertained to interactional fairness/unfairness. Participants in the two

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procedural conditions also read the same six behaviours, which pertaining only to procedural fairness/unfairness. After receiving this additional information about the manager, participants provided another impression of the relevant type of fairness on the same two items as before. And as before, the two items were combined to form a composite score, which represented the revised impression. Finally, participants rated the valence of each of the seven behavioural episodes on a seven-point likert scale (*-3 = Negative, 0 = Neutral, 3 = Positive*). The participants were then debriefed and thanked.

<div align="center">Results</div>

In order to evaluate the hypotheses, we conducted a 2 (fairness type: interactional vs. procedural) x 2 (initial behaviour: fair vs. unfair) x 2 (time of rating: initial vs. revised) ANOVA, in which the first two factors were between-subjects, and the third (time of rating: initial vs. revised) was within-subjects. None of the main effects were found to be significant, whether or not valence was controlled. Participant gender did not moderate any of the effects in this analysis. Therefore, gender is not considered further.

Hypothesis 1 stated that after observing impression-inconsistent behaviour, initial impressions of interactional fairness/unfairness will exhibit more revision than initial impressions of procedural fairness/unfairness. Hypothesis 1 thus predicts a significant three-way interaction. A significant three-way interaction was found, $F(2,100) = 3.89$, $p = .05$. The means and standard errors for the 3-way interaction are given in Table 5, and plotted visually in Figure 4. As can be seen, the results are consistent with prediction in that, in both the fair first-impression and the unfair first-impression conditions, the rate of change in fairness judgement is steeper for interactional fairness than for procedural fairness. Although the 2x2x2 pattern is consistent with Hypothesis 1, we further analyzed the simple effects to test Hypothesis 1. More

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specifically, we conducted two separate 2 (fairness type: interactional vs. procedural) x 2 (time of rating: initial vs. revised) ANOVAs, one within the fair-initial impression condition, and another within the unfair-initial impression condition.

The results revealed that, within the fair initial-impression condition, the drop in ratings of interactional fairness over time (from $M = 1.87$ to $M = 0.11$, see Figure 4) was not significantly greater than the drop in ratings of procedural fairness (from $M = 2.08$ to $M = 0.62$), $F(1,51) = 0.57$. This analysis showed only the expected main effect of time, such that ratings were more negative at Time 2 vs. Time 1, $F(1, 51) = 66.3$, $p < .01$.

Within the unfair initial-impression condition, there was the expected significant main effect of time, such that ratings were more positive at Time 2 vs. Time 1, $F(1,49) = 55.31$, $p < .01$. Importantly, we also observed the predicted interaction. That is, the rate of change in fairness impression was significantly greater for interactional fairness (from $M = -2.09$ to $M = -0.17$) than for procedural fairness (from $M = -1.67$ to $M = -0.56$), $F(1,49) = 4.07$, $p < .05$.

In summary, Hypothesis 1 was supported for unfair-first impressions: interactional fairness impressions were adjusted "upward" more than procedural fairness perceptions, in the face of later impression inconsistent behaviour. Although the pattern was in line with prediction for fair-first impressions, such that interactional fairness impressions were adjusted "downward" more than procedural fairness, this interaction was not statistically significant. It is also noteworthy that, in follow up analyses, we statistically controlled for the valence ratings made by the participants, and the interaction for unfair-first impressions remained statistically significant.

Hypothesis 2 stated that after observing impression-inconsistent information, first impressions of *fairness* would exhibit more revision than first impressions of *unfairness*, regardless of fairness type. In order to assess this hypothesis, we assessed whether the relevant

two-way interaction - initial behaviour x time of rating-emerged out of the primary 2x2x2

ANOVA referred to earlier.

Among all of the two-way interactions in the model, the only one that was significant was that between initial behaviour and time of rating, $F(1, 103) = 121.25$, $p < .01$. Of course, this interaction was not surprising: the significance here was due to the fact that the slopes of impression change were opposite in sign in the fairness-first and unfairness-first conditions. That is, over time, participants' impressions became more negative in the fair-first manager behaviour conditions. In contrast, participants' impressions became more positive in the unfair-first manager behaviour conditions from the initial ratings to the revised ratings.

Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the results showed that first impressions of fairness/unfairness exhibited relatively equal amounts of impression revision. This is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows the mean changes for the initial-to-revised impressions of unfairness and fairness, collapsing across fairness type. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was not supported.

Discussion

Taken together, the results of these three studies suggest that people think about and manage interactional fairness/unfairness impressions differently than they do with procedural fairness/unfairness impressions. This was found to be the case, regardless of whether those impressions were of fairness or unfairness. The results from the main study suggest that first impressions of interactional fairness/unfairness are subject to greater amounts of revision in the face of impression-inconsistent behaviour than first impressions of procedural fairness/unfairness. Impressions of procedural fairness/unfairness exhibited less revision under identical conditions. It is important to note that these changes were not significantly different, and so these effects should be acknowledged as trends.

Whether the first impression was fair or unfair, interactional impressions showed a proclivity toward ongoing, continuous revising as more information about the manager was revealed. For procedural fairness, it was the initial impression that ultimately carried more weight. Significantly less "real-time" impression revising occurred with procedural fairness impressions.

The logic regarding diagnosticity and maintenance, along with our theoretical postulations, were the predominant reasons why Hypothesis 1 received support. From the previous research literature, we knew that humans are both very poor and unconfident in their predictions of the consistency of the morality-related behaviours of others. We also knew that they are very adept and confident at predicting the consistency of competence-related behaviours (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986a).

Another way to understand diagnosticity is to think of it as the amount of confidence an observer has that an actor's particular behaviour will be repeated again in the future. As

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observers, we have been shown to be confident, accurate estimators of the likelihood that observed competence behaviours will be repeated again in the future (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986a; Kunda & Nisbett, 1986b). The objectivity and transparent interpretability of competence behaviours are behind this phenomenon. In contrast, we are inaccurate, unconfident estimators of the likelihood that observed morality behaviours will be repeated again in the future. As can be seen in the current research, interpretation of morality-related behaviour is difficult. As such, it makes predicting behaviour in this domain radically more difficult. Taken together, it is clear that morality behaviours are low in diagnosticity, and competence behaviours are high in diagnosticity.

The results of the Q-Sort task in Pilot Study 2 provided full support for our theoretical postulations. Indeed, the results showed that interactional fairness can be conceptualized as mapping onto the morality trait domain, and procedural fairness can be conceptualized as mapping onto the competence trait domain. As expected, the participants consistently sorted the interactional fairness items into the morality category, and sorted the procedural fairness items into the competence category. As well, only the items that were most representative of the type of fairness for which they were created to reflect (as rated by participants in Study 1) were selected for use.

The supportive findings from Pilot Study 2 coincided nicely with what was known from previous research about the maintenance levels of the morality and competence trait domains. Interactional fairness falls within the morality domain. Morality impressions are higher in maintenance and thus are more prone to revision in the face of impression-inconsistent information. Therefore, we reasoned that impressions of interactional fairness would exhibit

greater amounts of impression revision when an observer was faced with impression-inconsistent behavioural information. The data in the current study supported our reasoning.

Similarly, procedural fairness was found to fall within the competence domain. Coupling this with the established finding that competence impressions are low in maintenance and are thus more resistant to revision, we had a basis for predicting that impressions of procedural fairness would exhibit less revision under identical conditions.

The explanation for the results of the main study comes back to the theoretical postulations about the two types of fairness and how they map onto their respective trait domains. Interactional fairness falls within the morality trait domain. The low diagnosticity of morality-related behaviours can explain why participants spent considerably more cognitive resources on "real-time" revising – or updating – of their interactional fairness impressions as they learned new information about the manager. The difficulty of determining how representative an actor's morality-related behaviour is of his or her relevant underlying trait leads the observer to allocate more cognitive resources on "accounting" processes. Due to the fickle relationship between morality behaviours and morality traits, then, people are more willing to spend the mental energy keeping tabs on the morality-related actions of others.

On the contrary, the high diagnosticity of competence-related behaviours explains why participants did not need to spend as many cognitive resources revising their impressions of the manager's procedural fairness as new information was learned. Competence behaviours are completely indicative of their relevant underlying traits. As such, people are more likely to allow their initial impressions of fairness to anchor their later judgments for procedural fairness impressions as compared to interactional fairness impressions.

In Pilot Study 2, participants rated the valence of each of the 36 items. Results showed that, as a group, the items pertaining to procedural fairness/unfairness received slightly more extreme ratings of positivity and negativity than items of interactional fairness/unfairness. Specifically, procedural fairness items were rated more positively than the interactional fairness items, and the procedural unfairness items were rated more negatively than the interactional unfairness items.

This finding in Pilot Study 2 does not confound the results of the main study. If the interactional fairness items had instead been rated more extremely in valence than the procedural fairness items, one could argue that the greater amount of impression revision that was seen in interactional fairness impressions was due to the fact that the initial impressions of interactional fairness had greater starting points to change from, due to their more extreme valence ratings. That is, the greater amount of impression revision for interactional impressions that was found in the main study could have been partially accounted for by the more extreme ratings of valence of the interactional items. However, it was the procedural fairness items that were rated more extremely in valence. Therefore, valence does not confound the explanation of why impressions of interactional fairness/unfairness exhibited greater amounts of revision in the face of impression-inconsistent information.

As stated previously, there had also been a collection of research findings to support the notions that negative information is weighted more heavily in impressions than positive information (Lind, Kray & Thompson, 2001), and that negative impressions are more resistant to revision than positive first impressions (e.g., Ybarra, 2001; Kammrath, Ames & Scholer, 2007). Along with Hypothesis 1, then, a main effect of negativity was also expected, such that first impressions of unfairness would exhibit less revision than first impressions of fairness,

regardless of the type of fairness. Thus, we proposed a second hypothesis, that after observing impression-inconsistent behaviour, first impressions of fairness would exhibit more revision than first impressions of unfairness, regardless of fairness type.

While a significant two-way interaction was found, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. First impressions of fairness did not exhibit more revision than first impressions of unfairness. In fact, first impressions of fairness and first impressions of unfairness showed relatively equal amounts of impression revision after impression-inconsistent information was observed.

This study was not without its limitations. This can be considered a low impact study because since participants were simply reading behavioural information about a manager. This study may have lacked experimental realism. In the future, a similar study could be carried out in which participants observe and rate the fairness of the behaviour of an actual manager. While the manager behaviours were pilot tested to ensure that they were representative of their intended type of fairness in the current research, one cannot be certain that the single initial episode of managerial behaviour in the main study really evoked an impression of fairness or unfairness within the participants. As well, the main study relied on a single behavioural episode in order to create the impression in each condition. It would have been useful to vary the initial behaviour. This way, we could determine if the same effects were found.

We are still learning about how new behavioural information pertaining to fairness becomes integrated into existing impressions of fairness. To our knowledge, there simply has not been any research conducted in this area. Nor has this type of research been conducted in an organizational setting. This research was carried out with the intention of bridging both of these literature gaps. This paper has allowed us to reach a better understanding of how first impressions of the fairness of a manger are or are not revised as an observer learns more about

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that manager. We hope that the current research will stimulate subsequent studies of impression revision in an organizational setting, because manager fairness clearly matters to employees and has important outcomes on them. The current research can be applied in order to improve manager-employee relations.

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Appendix

Figure 1

Theoretical Depiction of Hypothesis 1: Initial and Revised Impressions of an Initially Unfair

*Manager*

Figure 2

Theoretical Depiction of Hypothesis 1: Initial and Revised Impressions of an Initially Fair

Manager

Figure 3

Theoretical Depiction of Hypothesis 2: Initial Impressions of Fairness vs. Initial Impressions of

Unfairness

Table 1

Interactional Fairness and Procedural Fairness Ratings

Fairness Type and Valence	Intended type rated more extreme?	Interactional Fairness Mean Rating	Procedural Fairness Mean Rating	t-statistic, p-value	Label	Met all 3 criteria?
1: PF (+)	No	6.19	5.74	$t = -1.70$, $p = .1$ Marginal	Voice their opinion / about changes at work	No
2: IF (-)	Yes	1.58	3.61	$t = 7.36$, $p = .000$, Yes	Hurtful remarks / denying vacation time	Yes*
3: IF (+)	Yes	6.36	5.12	$t = -5.12$, $p = .000$, Yes	Concern for / informing of lay-off	Yes
4: PF (-)	Yes	3.16	1.84	$t = -5.45$, $p = .000$, Yes	Not ensure info was used / deciding divisional cuts	Yes*
5: IF (-)	Yes	2.10	3.16	$t = 2.97$, $p = .006$, Yes	Disrespectfully / not allow them to go to conference	Yes*
6: IF (+)	Yes	5.23	4.58	$t = -1.85$, $p = .074$, Marginal	Concern and sensitivity / death in the family	Yes*
7: PF (-)	Yes	3.39	2.58	$t = -2.70$, $p = .011$, Yes	Not by the book / planning work activities	Yes
8: PF (-)	No	3.03	3.45	$t = 1.53$, $p = .136$, No	Not willing to change perf. ratings	No
9: PF (+)	No	5.81	5.39	$t = -1.82$, $p = .079$, Marginal	Asked for opinions about holiday work schedules	No
10: IF (-)	Yes	2.06	3.90	$t = 6.50$, $p = .000$, Yes	Insensitive / not willing to discuss a salary increase	Yes
11: IF (+)	Yes	5.32	4.55	$t = -2.32$, $p = .027$, Yes	Non-verbal concern / informing that they lost a	Yes*

					competition	
12: IF (-)	Yes	3.03	3.65	$t = 2.21$, $p = .035$, Yes	Didn't explain why they couldn't move into new office	Yes
13: PF (+)	Yes	4.61	6.61	$t = 9.19$, $p = .000$, Yes	Methodically handled harassment claim	Yes*
14: IF (+)	Yes	5.71	5.29	$t = -1.82$, $p = .079$, Marginal	Respectful / explaining about budget cuts	Yes
15: PF (-)	Yes	2.71	2.58	$t = -.349$, $p = .73$, No	Did not allow appeals / about relocation	No
16: PF (-)	Yes	2.71	2.52	$t = -.641$, $p = .527$, No	Did not provide justification / setting own work schedules	No
17: PF (+)	Yes	4.87	6.45	$t = 5.87$, $p = .000$, Yes	Consistent / in deciding employee duties	Yes
18: PF (+)	Yes	4.87	6.52	$t = 6.12$, $p = .000$, Yes	Used established point system / determining bonus	Yes*
19: IF (-)	Yes	1.84	2.84	$t = 3.55$, $p = .001$, Yes	Disrespectful / do a project that H.G. was supposed to do	Yes
20: PF (-)	Yes	2.10	1.81	$t = -1.09$, $p = .286$, No	Failed to justify a decision to fire an employee	No
21: PF (+)	Yes	4.68	6.45	$t = 8.03$, $p = .000$, Yes	Used accurate data / informing who gets a pay cut	Yes*
22: IF (+)	Yes	6.19	5.19	$t = -4.17$, $p = .000$, Yes	Open and honest / informing that they need to improve	Yes*
23: PF (-)	Yes	3.39	1.77	$t = -5.45$, $p = .000$, Yes	Failed to collect info when doing performance evals	Yes*
24: PF (+)	Yes	4.65	5.71	$t = 3.68$, $p = .001$, Yes	Impartial and unbiased / selecting for	Yes*

					training course	
25: IF (+)	Yes	5.58	4.61	$t = -3.78$, $p = .001$, Yes	Non-verbal concern / informing who got promoted	Yes
26: IF (+)	Yes	5.94	4.77	$t = -5.89$, $p = .000$, Yes	Sincere / informing that they get no flex time schedule	Yes*
27: IF (-)	Yes	2.03	3.45	$t = 4.91$, $p = .000$, Yes	Rude / informing of the overtime they had to work	Yes*
28: IF (-)	No	2.97	2.65	$t = -1.24$, $p = .224$, No	Waited until Friday / had to work Saturday	No
29: IF (-)	Yes	1.87	3.39	$t = 5.05$, $p = .000$, Yes	Hurtful remarks / informing of no bonuses	Yes
30: IF (+)	Yes	6.07	5.32	$t = -2.47$, $p = .019$, Yes	Respectful / granting time off	Yes*
31: PF (-)	Yes	3.29	1.87	$t = -4.98$, $p = .000$, Yes	Didn't use accurate / decide vacation	Yes*
32: PF (+)	Yes	5.42	5.97	$t = 1.64$, $p = .111$, No	Behaved ethically / correcting error	No
33: IF (+)	Yes	5.50	4.75	$t = -2.02$, $p = .061$, Marginal	Sincere / informing of demotion	Yes
34: IF (+)	Yes	5.90	5.39	$t = -1.83$, $p = .077$, Marginal	Open and honest when explaining about pay-cuts	Yes
35: PF (+)	Yes	4.81	6.35	$t = 6.29$, $p = .000$, Yes	Assembled a committee / how to cut costs	Yes*
36: PF (+)	No	5.19	4.58	$t = -1.98$, $p = .057$, Marginal	Allowed them to have a say / in starting salary	No

Note. N = 31; Ratings recoded to a scale from 1-7; PF = Procedural item; IF = Interactional item; + = fairness item; - = unfairness item; * = item was selected for use in the main study

Table 2

Mean Valence Ratings

Fairness Type	Label	Mean Valence Rating
PF (-)	Failed to go by the book / planning work activities of employees	4.13
IF (+)	Was respectful / sorting out family issues	4.43*
IF (-)	Rude / overtime	3.37*
PJ (+)	Assembled a committee / to cut costs	5.63*
IF (+)	Sincere / no flex-time	3.60*
IF (-)	Disrespectfully / not attend conference	3.37*
PF (-)	Did not use accurate info / deciding vacation times	1.70*
PF (-)	Not willing to change / performance ratings	3.67
IF (+)	Open and honest / need to improve performance	5.77*
PF (+)	Allowed them to have say / salary	5.57
PF (+)	Asked opinions / holiday schedules	3.97
IF (-)	Waited until Friday / come work Saturday	2.00
PF (+)	Impartial and unbiased / allowed to attend a training course	5.83*
PF (-)	No justification / not set own work schedules	1.73
IF (+)	Concern and sensitivity / death in the family	3.33*
PF (+)	Followed a point system / determining bonuses	6.40*
PF (+)	Behaved ethically / correcting a computer error	3.60
IF (+)	Concern and sensitivity / informing of lay-off	5.70
PF (+)	Methodically followed / harassment claim	4.13*

PF (-)	Failed to collect info / performance evaluations	3.97*
IF (+)	Non-verbal concern / informing about promotions	5.40
IF (-)	Improper and harmful / denying request for vacation time	1.67*
IF (+)	Sincere / informing of demotion	5.53
IF (+)	Respectful / explaining budget cuts	3.93
PF (-)	Failed to justify decision / to fire employee	1.37
IF (-)	Improper and hurtful / not to give bonuses	3.60
PF (+)	Encouraged to voice opinion / about changes at work	6.27
IF (+)	Non-verbal concern / informing them lost a sales competition	3.90*
IF (-)	Insensitive / wasn't willing to discuss a salary increase	2.57
PF (+)	Decided based on data / to decide on who received a pay cut	5.63*
IF (-)	Did not explain / why employee couldn't move into the new office	2.50
IF (-)	Disrespectfully / not explain why they had to do project that manager was to do	3.50
PF (-)	Did not allow appeals / about relocation	1.53
IF (+)	Open & honest / explaining process used to make pay-cuts	6.10
PF (+)	Consistent / in deciding duties	6.13
PF (-)	Did not take relevant info into account / when deciding on budget cuts	3.40*

Note. N = 30; PF = Procedural item; IF = Interactional item; + = fairness item; - = unfairness item; * = item was selected for use in the main study

Table 3

Q-sort Data

Fairness Type of Item	Intended Trait Domain	Label	p_{sa}	Met the 70% criteria?
PF (-)	Competence (-)	Failed to go by the book / planning work activities of employees	28/30	Yes
IF (+)	Morality (+)	Was respectful / sorting out family issues	29/30	Yes*
IF (-)	Morality (-)	Rude / overtime	30/30	Yes*
IF (+)	Morality (+)	Sincere / no flex-time	28/30	Yes*
IF (-)	Morality (-)	Disrespectfully / not attend conference	28/30	Yes*
PF (-)	Competence (-)	Did not use accurate info / deciding vacation times	20/30	Yes*
PF (-)	Competence (-)	Not willing to change / performance ratings	12/30	No
IF (+)	Morality (+)	Open and honest / need to improve performance	21/30	Yes*
PF (+)	Competence (+)	Allowed them to have say / salary	18/30	No
PF (+)	Competence (+)	Asked opinions / holiday schedules	17/30	No
IF (-)	Morality (-)	Waited until Friday / come work Saturday	23/30	Yes
PF (+)	Competence (+)	Impartial and unbiased / allowed to attend a training course	27/30	Yes*
PF (-)	Competence (-)	No justification / not set own work schedules	21/30	Yes
IF (+)	Morality (+)	Concern and sensitivity / death in the family	24/30	Yes*
PF (+)	Competence (+)	Followed a point system / determining bonuses	20/30	Yes*
PF (-)	Competence (-)	Behaved ethically / correcting a computer error	19/30	No
IF (+)	Morality (+)	Concern and sensitivity / informing of lay-off	25/30	Yes
PF (+)	Competence (+)	Methodically followed / harassment claim	27/30	Yes*
PF (-)	Competence (-)	Failed to collect info / performance evaluations	30/30	Yes*

IF (+)	Morality (+)	Non-verbal concern / informing about promotions	27/30	Yes
IF (-)	Morality (-)	Improper and hurtful / denying request for vacation time	28/30	Yes*
IF (-)	Morality (+)	Sincere / informing of demotion	25/30	Yes
IF (-)	Morality (+)	Respectful / explaining budget cuts	24/30	Yes
PF (-)	Competence (-)	Failed to justify decision / to fire employee	22/30	Yes
IF (-)	Morality (-)	Improper and hurtful / not to give bonuses	20/30	Yes
PF (+)	Competence (+)	Encouraged to voice opinion / about changes at work	23/30	Yes
IF (+)	Morality (+)	Non-verbal concern / informing them that they lost a sales competition	29/30	Yes*
IF (-)	Morality (-)	Insensitive / wasn't willing to discuss a salary increase	22/30	Yes
PF (+)	Competence (+)	Decided based on data / to decide on who received a pay cut	26/30	Yes*
IF (-)	Morality (-)	Did not explain / why employee couldn't move into the new office	22/30	Yes
IF (-)	Morality (-)	Disrespectfully / not explain why they had to do project that manager was to do	25/30	Yes
PF (-)	Competence (-)	Did not allow appeals / about relocation	22/30	Yes
IF (+)	Morality (+)	Open & honest / explaining process used to make pay-cuts	21/30	Yes
PF (+)	Competence (+)	Consistent / in deciding duties	21/30	Yes
PF (-)	Competence (-)	Did not take relevant info into account / when deciding on budget cuts	28/30	Yes*

Note. N = 30; PF = Procedural item; IF = Interactional item; + = fairness item; - = unfairness item; * = item was selected for use in the main study

Table 4

Number of Items Selected for Use in the Main Study

	Procedural	Interactional
Fair	5	5
Unfair	3	3

Table 5
Descriptive Statistics

Fair First Impressions

Time	Interactional Fairness				Procedural Fairness		
	n	M	SE		n	M	SE
Initial	27	1.87	0.19		26	2.08	0.19
Revised	27	0.11	0.26		26	0.62	0.26

Unfair First Impressions

Time	Interactional Fairness				Procedural Fairness		
	n	M	SE		n	M	SE
Initial	27	-2.09	0.19		24	-1.67	0.20
Revised	27	-0.17	0.26		24	-0.56	0.27

Figure 4

Initial and Revised Ratings of Fairness, within each of the Fair First Impression and Unfair

First Impression Conditions.

Figure 5

Initial and Revised Ratings of Fair and Unfair First Impressions