FROM CONTROL TO CUSTOMER SERVICE: GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF LIQUOR IN ONTARIO, 1927-1972

by

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ABSTRACT

The first four and a half decades of government control of liquor in Ontario, from 1927 to 1972, saw a general trend away from an early emphasis on moral control towards a commitment to business-oriented customer service. This trend, however, was far from consistent. The government adopted two predominant, though often incompatible, roles for its liquor boards. It intended the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), the retail agent, and the Liquor Licence Board of Ontario (LLBO), the licensing body created later with the reintroduction of public drinking, to function both as moral guardians and as customer service providers. These twin impulses informed policy change throughout the entire period.

The moral control character of the early government control structure was not surprising given the province’s decade-long experience of Prohibition, the lingering prohibitionist sentiment in the province and the political tradition of paternalistic reliance on the state to regulate a dangerous or special product like alcohol. What was surprising in the early history of government control, was the clear emphasis on customer service. As a government monopoly, the LCBO was forced not only to justify its existence through a minimum standard of service, but in the immediate aftermath of Prohibition, it needed to wean drinkers away from a reliance on bootleggers, now direct competition for the LCBO.

The notable aspect of liquor control in Ontario was the enduring character of this moral control philosophy and its conflict with increasing customer demands in the post-World War Two era. The government’s reliance on incremental policy change contributed to the endurance of these moral controls. This approach to policymaking flowed from the province’s traditional ‘progressive conservative’ political culture, which valued the status quo and slow, cautious change only when supported by a large majority of society. Several pressures impelled change and clashed with this cautious approach throughout the period: consistent demands for private alcohol retail; constant lobby efforts by the tourism industry; and frequent petitions by Ontarians for the types of drinking and retailing services observed in other regions of North America and Europe. These pressures coincided with an overwhelming post-war shift in social attitudes towards greater permissiveness in all public indulgences. These forces impelling change clashed with forces resisting liquor law liberalisation. The resulting tensions challenged Ontario policymakers to adapt a system predicated on significant moral control to a post-war society dedicated to a belief in personal freedoms restricted only by reasonable limits to ensure healthy lifestyle choices.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis has come to fruition as a result of a great deal of support and guidance from a number of sources. The bulk of the primary research was done at the Archives of Ontario. As a result I owe a debt of gratitude to the very helpful reference archivists who guided me through the maze of finding aids, following the many changes of Ministries that the LCBO and the LLBO endured over the course of the first 45 years of government control. Many of the files necessary for such a study proved to be restricted. Nevertheless I received all the files I needed quickly due to the dedication of the Archives' Freedom of Information Officers. Because of the restricted nature of many of the files I have cited I have protected the identities of the private individuals by providing only initials. The staff of the University of Waterloo’s Interlibrary Loan Department also proved invaluable in locating books, government regulations, articles and reel after reel of regional newspapers.

I would also like to thank the many individuals who lent their time and patience to this project. My friend and colleague Dr. Robert Bell provided constant encouragement and tremendous insight after reading an earlier draft of this work. Paula and Brendan Byrne lent their technical expertise to the creation of graphs. I would also like to thank Lisa Petsinis, not only for lending me a place to stay during all those trips in to the Archives but also for her loyal friendship and intellectual stimulation. Dr. John English offered support and perspective to a draft of this thesis. Dr. Robert Williams shared his passion for Ontario politics and his specific suggestions on a draft of this thesis. Dr. Heather MacDougall helped inspire this work through a discussion of Robert Campbell’s history of government control in British Columbia in my M.A. public history course. More importantly she provided constant feedback, steady guidance and personal motivation. I would also like to thank my parents for their constant encouragement of my endeavours. Finally, I am indebted to David Jaeger for his unyielding optimism, ceaseless support, and love. Any errors that remain are mine.
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INTRODUCTION

“BORN OUT OF...THOSE AMAZING FORMATIVE YEARS”¹

In 1926 Ontarians heartily endorsed Conservative Premier Howard Ferguson’s sole re-election platform of replacing the decade-old policy of Prohibition with government control of alcohol. Since that time the government control system has become a defining characteristic of the province. Why did Ferguson create the type of system that he did? What did he intend it to accomplish? How did the system evolve over the next four and a half decades in the context of the Depression, the Second World War, post-war consumerism and European immigration? Coming to grips with these fundamental questions requires a detailed and intensive examination of the ‘amazing formative years’ of government control in which the foundations of a highly moralistic system were set. This system was then continuously questioned and re-evaluated over nearly half a century to arrive at a system dedicated primarily to customer service. This thesis will explore how and why the focus of government control shifted from 1927 to 1972.

Why undertake such a study? The history of liquor control is an intrinsically interesting pursuit. It is characterised by the conflict between a society’s desire for access to a consumer product, associated with celebration and socialising, and government’s role in imposing control on buying and consuming behaviour in order to prevent or minimise the violence, disorder and immoral behaviour, associated with the excessive use of an intoxicating substance. The history of liquor control is also characterised by intense drama resulting from the high stakes (political, economic and moral) involved in the debates surrounding the regulation of alcohol. Many scholars have contended that there is no more politically contentious policy area,² while more than one Ontario premier has been ruined in its wake.³ Furthermore, many of the sources involved in understanding the history of liquor control exude sarcasm and emotion as masks for serious commentary on a philosophical argument. For example, the issue of regulating a
product associated with conviviality as well as moral degradation lends itself to the types of arguments that became the stock-in-trade for editors and columnists intent on criticising the government throughout the period under study. The debates surrounding the government’s ability and right to regulate the liquor trade made colourful copy for the sharp-witted journalists, who often played the role of unofficial opposition in the absence of a strong Official Opposition inside Queen’s Park.

CONSTRUCTING A HISTORIOGRAPHY

Above all, this thesis represents the first systematic history of government control in Ontario from the end of Prohibition in 1927 to the early 1970s. To date no other historian has examined in depth this type of intense government involvement in the sale and use of a consumer product for Ontario. During these four and a half decades the complex and often convoluted and hypocritical laws, regulations and policies that dictated liquor sale and consumption changed tremendously and it is only by analysing the glacial pace of change that genuine understanding of the process and its impact emerge. Many other works refer to specific liquor policies or issues in Ontario history. The Addiction Research Foundation, for instance, used Ontario as a frequent example throughout its history of alcohol use in Canada. Unfortunately, because of the work’s cursory treatment of the historical context of the issues it studied and the absence of primary research, many of its observations regarding the history of government control in Ontario proved faulty.

Robert Campbell has written a history of government control in British Columbia from the end of Prohibition in 1920 to the 1980s. In doing so he discovered the absence of studies of government control in Canada. While the central struggle between control and business evident in the British Columbia experience mirrors in many ways the history of government control in Ontario, the timelines, ideological struggles and mid-1980s privatisation trend in the Pacific province proved distinctive compared to the pace and nature of change in Ontario. Political culture, the strength and endurance of the temperance movement and the relative absence of political upheaval accounted for Ontario’s history of government control. While he concluded that his book was not a social history of alcohol, Campbell balanced his study by investigating the social, as well as the political, aspects of government control, illustrating the
endurance of moralistic regulations into the late twentieth century as a political compromise within an otherwise liberalised consumer society. In demonstrating this over such a lengthy historical period, Campbell generalised over the details of many of the important debates and struggles surrounding these enduring moralistic regulations, prompting questions about their roots and their evolving place in British Columbia's system of government control. Nevertheless Campbell's study, a forerunner in an admittedly new field of inquiry, provided a stimulating model.

Campbell's 1998 Ph.D. thesis on the regulation of Vancouver's beer parlours, from their creation in 1925 to the introduction of spirits by the glass in 1954, flowed from his interest in government control and provided more detail regarding the themes that he highlighted in his 1991 book. While he cautioned that his book was not a social history of alcohol, he placed his later thesis firmly within the field of social history. For Campbell, the most important aspect of the regulation of public drinking in British Columbia's largest city was the moral regulation of 'decency,' which was constructed on the basis of class, gender and race. Therefore he structured his study thematically, focusing on the beer parlour as a setting to study, in turn, each of these three modes of regulation. He argued that this thematic approach was the best way to discuss the complex dynamics of moral regulation. This was possible since he had the chronological approach of his earlier, more comprehensive study as a backdrop for this specialised inquiry. Also, he focused strictly on the licencing side of government control (as opposed to the monopoly retail side), another approach that was made workable because of his earlier history of the entire system. Campbell emphasised the complex and nuanced differentiation between social control, which he described as a linear top-down imposition of coercive control by the state, and moral regulation, as a more inclusive method of analysis which moves beyond the state to see many actors involved in wielding power over the definition of decency. For Campbell, blending the two approaches necessitated focusing predominantly on those being regulated (drinkers) and those charged with enforcing and implementing regulation (licensure inspectors, proprietors and waiters) to explore the complex negotiation process that occurred among various groups over the regulation of decency. Nevertheless, he concluded that the state remained a powerful moral regulator, deserving of study. For historians interested in the
history of the policy of government control, Campbell's approach offers a way to look at this type of intense state involvement in an economic and social activity that explores the tremendous regulatory power of the state while also acknowledging the degrees of power exercised by the many other actors involved.

Criminologist Mariana Valverde also explored government control as moral regulation in her study of the various modes of governance of alcohol consumption as a site to analyse the ways in which individuals' wills, health, and consumption patterns have been governed from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century in Western society. Among these modes of governance, including medicalisation and self-help groups, Valverde dedicated one chapter to the government regulation of liquor sale and consumption, although she focused primarily on the regulation of consumption through liquor licencing. For Valverde, government control systems have had as their main regulatory target the economically and physically defined 'space' of the licenced 'establishment.' This is a valuable observation. As chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis demonstrate, Ontario policymakers took great pains to delineate and therefore control the specific spaces legalised for public drinking, first of beer and wine in the mid-1930s and then of cocktails in the late 1940s. As Campbell did in his thesis, Valverde focused only on public drinking and neglected to include the 'space' of 'residence' as the other highly regulated and defined area of legal consumption in government control systems. As chapter 1 reveals, in reintroducing legal alcohol retail through government stores in Ontario after a decade of Prohibition, Premier Ferguson took great pains to define those specific spaces that qualified as a 'residence,' the only legal place to have or consume alcohol in the early years of government control. When combined with the concept of the residence as a drinking space, Valverde's use of the 'establishment' as a site of regulation illuminates Ontario policymakers' struggles in the post-World War Two decades. As chapters 4-9 show, Ontario's politicians and bureaucrats had difficulty adapting a system, predicated on the regulation of only these two sites, to a modern post-war world.

Valverde also concluded that governments regulated these physical sites out of their concern for orderliness, public morals and the non-corrupt running of the liquor industry rather than out of any
concern with disciplining drinkers individually or maximising the health of a whole nation. From this conclusion she argued that, an analysis of government control challenged the assumption, made for other sociological fields, that in modern times governance evolved from despotic rule, through discipline to risk management.11 This significant conclusion reminds us that, while Ontario’s history of government control tended to evolve from a highly moralistic system towards one based on greater consumer freedom, elements of moral control remained, as Campbell also argued, particularly since the system remained essentially one concerned with regulating spaces. Although, as chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate, for example, particular individuals, such as Premier Leslie Frost, sought to maximise the health of all Ontarians by preserving, throughout the 1950s, the moral controls that had been passed on to him.

Because Valverde’s study ranged over such a large area of time and space, her observations tended to be wide and sweeping, interspersed with ‘case studies,’ as she called them, from particular government control systems.12 While some of these observations proved accurate for the history of government control in Ontario, others, particularly those made for North America in general, tended to gloss over the distinctiveness of this policy field across regions and prompted questions of detail and degree. For example, she concluded that the government control systems established in Canada and the United States after Prohibition were managed with little public input.13 As this thesis will demonstrate, public input in the form of letters written to the government and the liquor bureaucracy, letters to the editor, and public outcries over particularly controversial liquor law enforcement, constituted an important form of public expression that cannot be underestimated. While Ontario’s policymakers specifically avoided direct forms of public input, such as referenda or public inquiries, these indirect methods greatly impacted their decisions. The persistent demands for paternalistic control over the liquor trade to protect the most vulnerable in society, for example, helped preserve moralistic regulations, while at the same time, demands for increased liberalisation to access to alcohol helped erode bedrock principles, producing a degree of tension throughout the period. In generalising about the overriding regulatory concerns in various parts of the Western world, Valverde concluded that North American government control systems shifted their focus away from alcohol strength, beginning in the 1950s and
1960s, and turned it towards the furniture, décor, and entertainment of licenced establishments. As chapter 2 explains, these aspect of the physical environment of drinking outlets preoccupied Ontario policymakers from the very beginning of public drinking in 1934 and continued to be a site of regulation until the 1970s. This thesis provides the detail, the chronology and most importantly, the primary research to substantiate these types of observations regarding the history of government control. Valverde provided an interesting perspective on the concept of government control and revealed the need for a systematic analysis and evaluation of the tendencies she observed, particularly as they are played out in practise over time in a specific region. She also highlighted the strategies, as well as the difficulties, of analysing liquor control policy, and these will be explored further below.

In borrowing widely from many fields to construct a historiography for government control in Ontario, while being sensitive to the strengths and weaknesses of each source, this work also responds to, and builds upon, the studies of alcohol policies by Ontario’s Addiction Research Foundation and the health promotion field. While works like R.A. Draper’s Health Promotion article “Trends in Alcohol Policy in Canada,”¹⁵ and Northern Spirits: A Social History of Alcohol in Canada by the Addiction Research Foundation’s Reginald Smart and Alan Ogborne¹⁶ incorporated brief historical overviews, they focused primarily on the health problems surrounding liquor consumption and the regulatory approaches employed to reduce them. This approach often results in cursory attention to the complex historical context that influenced how these problems were viewed at the time and what regulatory tools were chosen by governments. For example, Draper admitted that to provide “a precise historic account of alcohol control policies in Canada would be...unnecessarily complex” for his purposes. Therefore, while his paper highlighted the general shift towards liberalised access to alcohol since World War Two, his brief overview of that transition prompted more questions than it provided answers, especially about the formative years of government control and the impetus behind the original restrictive measures. His recognition of “a dichotomy in the public mind” between problems of abuse and easy access hinted at the struggle between government control’s twin impulses to control and serve and cried out for interpretation in an historical context.
This thesis endeavours to fulfil that need. Furthermore, many public health studies of alcohol control policies in Ontario and other jurisdictions promote the need to place such studies "in their historical and cultural context" not only because "changes in alcohol policy obviously do not occur in a vacuum" but more importantly because "the original motivations of control laws and the situations which brought them about have often been forgotten." As chapters 4 and 5, in particular, reveal Ontario policymakers defended and preserved the 1927 foundations of government control in a very different post-World War Two environment. Public health professional Griffith Edwards' 1994 international project Alcohol Policy and the Public Good addressed the issue of historical analysis more directly, urging the study of "the genesis of alcohol policies." It is necessary therefore not only to study what happened and when, but to place the changes in alcohol controls in historical context.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Creating an understanding of what happened and when entailed intensive research into various record groups at the Archives of Ontario. The ministerial responsibility for liquor control shifted numerous times throughout this period, with the retailing and licencing arms of government control not necessarily shifting at the same time or to the same ministry, as appendices 2 and 3 illustrate. This shifting revealed the government's ambivalence over its responsibility for liquor control policy from 1927 to 1972 and necessitated a detailed examination, not only of the records of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO), and the Liquor Licence Board of Ontario (LLBO), but also those of the Attorney General's department, the Provincial Secretary's department and the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations. Furthermore, control over liquor policymaking tended to be concentrated in the hands of the premier, a trend Ferguson established in 1926 with his decision to run for re-election solely on the platform of government control and his personal championing of this policy as a solution to the lawlessness of Prohibition. Also, disgruntled Ontarians most often identified the premier as the individual to whom requests, complaints and petitions regarding the liquor laws should be directed. Therefore, this study required an analysis of the Archives' records of the Premier's office for Ferguson and his five successors, ending with Thomas Kennedy, the interim Premier following George Drew's 1948 election
defeat. For the post-World War Two period, correspondence to the premier regarding liquor policy was found in the responsible minister's correspondence. Also, the Ontario Press Clippings assembled for the Premier's office from 1949 onward, provided a rich source of evidence of news reports, editorials and opinion articles from newspapers across the province. Finally, research in the major provincial newspapers for the entire period of study fleshed out the archival press clippings and focused on specific debates and controversies over the history of government control.

This complex and extensive research produced a history of the policy of government control of liquor in Ontario from 1927 to 1972, bringing detail and chronology to what Valverde admitted was a complex and "difficult" field, filled with "multifarious and little-understood technologies of liquor control and liquor licensing."\textsuperscript{20} This period saw a general trend away from an early emphasis on moral control towards a commitment to business-oriented customer service. This trend, however, was far from consistent. The government adopted two predominant, though often incompatible, roles for its liquor boards: provider of a business service through the LCBO, the retail agent, and guardian of society's morals through the LLBO, the licencing authority created after the reintroduction of public drinking. These twin impulses informed policy change throughout the entire period with the government vacillating between the two, unable to rationalise two seemingly opposing goals. The moral control character of the early government control system of liquor retail was not surprising given the province's decade-long experience of Prohibition, the lingering prohibitionist sentiment in the province and the political tradition of paternalistic reliance on the state to regulate dangerous or special products like alcohol. What was surprising in the early history of government control was the clear emphasis on customer service. Created in 1927, the LCBO strove simultaneously to control and serve due to the institutional style the government chose and the specific time period in which it was created. As a government monopoly the Board was forced not only to justify its existence through a minimum standard of service, but in the immediate aftermath of Prohibition it needed to wean drinkers away from a reliance on bootleggers, now direct competition for the LCBO. The notable aspect of the history of liquor control in Ontario was the enduring character of this moralistic regulation and its conflict with increasing customer service demands
by the late 1950s and early 1960s. Throughout the 1960s the government struggled to come to terms with the foundations of a system that had been established decades earlier. By the early 1970s it had abandoned the most obvious moral controls over the liquor trade, symbolised by the creation of a ministry dedicated to delivering customer service through the Liquor Boards. Two large areas of Ontario liquor policy will not be covered in this thesis. Advertising policy and the regulation of aboriginals’ access to alcohol are complex areas of the history of government control in Ontario, particularly due to the national scope of these themes. Therefore they will be left for separate analyses. Furthermore, this thesis is not explicitly a social history of alcohol. While the regulation and definition of drinkers according to categories like class, gender and race certainly shaped the government control policies adopted by the Ontario government, they will not constitute the primary focus of this thesis in the way they did for Campbell, for example. Rather, through a synthesis approach, they will help construct the context within which policy decisions were made.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL AS ABCs

These conclusions cannot be made solely on the basis of an analytical narrative of the institutional history of the LCBO and the LLBO. Although these Boards were established as ‘arm’s length’ regulatory agencies, as political scientist J.E. Hodgetts argued,\(^1\) this thesis reveals that they evolved within the power structure of the government and bureaucracy of Ontario, resulting, as political scientist F.F. Schindeler concluded, in no more than an ‘appearance’ of independence from the political arm of government.\(^2\) Therefore, as chapter 1 illustrates, these analyses of Ontario’s agencies, boards and commissions (ABCs), along with others,\(^3\) will place the LCBO and later the LLBO within the overall context of regulatory bodies in Ontario history. The remaining chapters will trace the Boards’ evolution from ‘orphan’ bodies, shuffled from department to department in an effort to come to grips with government control’s competing impulses, to a significant aspect of Ontario life within a ministry perfectly suited to their roles. Furthermore, because of the moral aspect of liquor control, these Boards evolved in a manner unlike other regulatory bodies, due particularly to the high political stakes involved.
in liquor policy. In establishing the LCBO, Ferguson established tight control not only over alcohol as a commercial substance, but also over the image of liquor sale and over the divisive debates on the issue.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL AS POLITICS

The history of government control from 1927-1972, therefore, provides an opportunity to study the political history of the province, particularly key aspects of the Conservative Party's political dominance in Ontario. Howard Ferguson rebuilt the party from the Opposition benches throughout the early 1920s and later in the decade solidified the party's renewed political power by assuming direct control over the divisive liquor issue. The governments of Ferguson's Conservative successors, George Henry, George Drew, Leslie Frost, John Robarts and William Davis, struggled to come to terms with a liquor system that Ferguson created in response to the particular circumstances of his era. The public drinking components added during the Liberal interlude of Mitchell Hepburn and again during Drew's tenure, adhered to Ferguson's intention of regulating spaces. Consequently, the main precepts of Ferguson's system endured well into the post-World War Two era, necessitating an analysis of the system's roots or 'formative years.' What can this political dominance reveal about the longevity of bureaucrats in powerful positions within both Liquor Boards? Did it contribute to the endurance of moralistic regulations and the preservation of the status quo? Placing these struggles into historical context required an examination of the political history of the province, particularly the historical biographies of the province's premiers and political figures. These sources not only illustrated the framework in which each individual was working, but also highlighted the intensely personal nature of politics and policymaking in Ontario until the early 1970s. The history of liquor control exemplified the powerful personal impact that political actors had over this particular policy area.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL AS POLICYMAKING

Given that the history of government control was so politically driven and that the Liquor Boards did not remain independent entities, at arm's length from the political decisions of the day, any investigation of government control necessitates a wider examination of the policymaking process. Vital to our overall appreciation of this aspect of Ontario history is understanding how and why certain liquor
control policies (including the laws, regulations and unofficial rules that controlled the liquor trade) were chosen and implemented, particularly since the policymaking process overwhelmingly dictated the pace and nature of change that the government control system underwent in this period. This is especially relevant as premiers, ministers and bureaucrats struggled to adjust the province’s government control system to a succession of societal crises: the end of Prohibition, the Great Depression, and the Second World War. How did the policymakers react to these crises? How did these reactions differ from the province’s overall policymaking approach? What characterised this approach and how did it inform the way in which post-war governments adjusted a system, created in the face of these crises, to a very different province and society in the second half of the twentieth century? Did the Ontario government’s policy of government control operate under a coherent rationale? How did policymakers identify targets for regulation and the means to control them? Answering these complex questions requires an examination of various theories of policymaking, which we will undertake below.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

The business and moral impulses of government control highlight that the political as well as the social aspects of the issues are important when they are united as they are here through original research. Since this thesis also flows out of and advances the history of temperance and Prohibition in Canada, an understanding of the social movements that brought about Prohibition and pressed for continued moralistic government regulation is also vital to the history of government control. In her collection of essays on the social history of alcohol in Canada, Cheryl Krasnick Warsh challenged historians to focus not on the failure of Prohibition, as Campbell likewise observed, but to ask why beverage alcohol has persisted as a legitimate retail product. The Ontario government’s creation of government control with its competing impulses to control and serve represented its recognition of the continued demand for alcohol despite a decade of Prohibition. The government struggled to balance control and service over the next four and a half decades in response to the public’s ever expanding and ever persistent demands for beverage alcohol, a further illustration of Warsh’s observation. For Warsh, the ambivalence towards alcohol in contemporary Canadian society represented a legacy of the nineteenth century and early
twentieth century anti-liquor movement.\textsuperscript{26} This thesis traces this struggle in Ontario from the creation of a system infused with significant moral control in response to a decade of official Prohibition and previous decades of temperance reform agitation, towards one dedicated to customer service, tinged lightly with Campbell's moral "residue,"\textsuperscript{27} and Warsh's ambivalence.

In order to trace the Ontario government's struggle to find a workable balance between such moral controls and customer service and to contextualise the resulting policy changes as they occurred over time, this thesis has drawn upon a variety of concepts and historical literature. For Valverde, in her earlier work on moral regulation in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Canada, the temperance movement, which led to Prohibition, formed part of a larger moral reform agenda concerned with prostitution, divorce, and immigration.\textsuperscript{28} She focused her study of moral reform on the social gospel movement in which Protestant reformers sought to 'regenerate' a society tainted by vices such as "the giant evil" of liquor by creating "the Kingdom of God on earth."\textsuperscript{29} For historian Ramsay Cook, the perceived failures of the social order compelled these Protestant reformers to identify the common enemy as "social sin" and no longer "personal vice."\textsuperscript{30} In the case of the temperance movement this meant that saving individual souls from the bottle was no longer enough; alcohol itself needed to be eliminated from society as a whole in order to purge the 'sin.'

This type of argument appealed to lawmakers in the environment of sacrifice and rejuvenation during World War One, resulting in prohibition laws across the country. As Valverde made clear, "practically every social issue," including liquor consumption, "was understood as moral in a not very distant historical period." Further, she emphasised that state organisations and private charities persisted in their moral perspectives into the late 1920s and beyond. As this thesis argues, a moral view of liquor consumption and its regulation persisted well into the 1960s. As such, Valverde provides several useful concepts in tracing this persistence. Her idea of the "community surveillance of the immoral" resonates in the history of government control as liquor permit booklets and extensive police search powers, for example, allowed the state to regulate the morality of buying and consumption behaviour. Valverde's emphasis on moral regulation "as an important aspect of ruling, helping to constitute class [and] gender"
also helps contextualise the government’s differential, even discriminatory, regulation of the drinking behaviour of women and the working class. Finally, her use of the concept of “moral panics,” which she employed again in her 1998 work, helps us understand how moral issues like drinking take on a symbolic meaning out of all proportion to their actual significance.\(^{31}\) While a moral panic similar to the one she describes surrounding prostitution led to the ultimate institution of Prohibition, smaller panics continued well into the government control era. These occurred around issues such as women drinking in beverage rooms in the 1930s, as chapter 2 illustrates, and the room service of alcohol, as chapter 4 analyses, resulting in specific moralistic control policies.

When borrowing these concepts from Valverde, we must be careful not to paint the prohibitionists, moral reformers or later temperance advocates as “antiquated and esoteric” caricatures preoccupied “with a conservative and fear-driven campaign” as historians Christie and Gauverau maintain in their study of the Protestant churches’ activities in social welfare early in the twentieth century.\(^{32}\) The religious reformers’ dedication to moral uplift and the state’s willingness to borrow and even extend moral regulation through government control of liquor can never be as single-minded or as deterministic as Valverde at times contends. This can be balanced, for example, through an examination of Sharon Anne Cook’s history of the Ontario Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) as she explores the Union’s preoccupations as well as its shortcomings.\(^{33}\) As Campbell argues, government control was as much a product of the Prohibition experience as Prohibition was of the social dislocation caused by the transformation of Canada into an urban, industrial society\(^{34}\) and all the fear and promise that that transformation entailed.\(^{35}\) Therefore, government control retained a great deal of “moral residue”\(^{36}\) from the temperance movement and then the Prohibition experience during which alcohol consumption came to be viewed as a sinful or evil activity. When Prohibition failed to ‘uplift’ society as reformers promised and actually promoted dangerous excesses of its own, the only socially and ultimately politically acceptable policy was legal sale under strict moral controls intended to prevent a return to the morally corrupt drinking conditions that prompted Prohibition in the first place.
Clearly the government’s adoption of these moral controls was more complex than simply the influence of Prohibition rhetoric and experiences. A significant aspect of these controls represented the government’s paternalistic attitude, a paternalism with deep roots in Ontario history. According to Schindeler, as Ontarians became more sophisticated, self-conscious and less self-sufficient after Confederation, “gradually the people [came] to expect the government to take a creative part in establishing a viable economy and the ‘good society.”’

Carolyn Strange and Tina Loo made a similar argument for Canada as a whole in their history of law and moral regulation for the early national period. “Making good citizens” constituted a primary goal for national leaders. For Ontario, instituting Prohibition served this role of endeavouring to create a better society. When Prohibition failed to do so the government was faced with several options.

POLICY APPROACHES TO LIQUOR CONTROL

In his analysis of the impact of health economics on alcohol policy, British health economist David Taylor argues that there are three main policy approaches to liquor control. They range from ‘free choice,’ through ‘paternalistic,’ to ‘balance.’ Free choice sees the consumer as completely free to choose what is best. In a balanced alcohol control policy consumer sovereignty is a desirable principle but alcohol is also viewed as a special case. Under this scenario it is assumed that some people find it hard to judge fully the costs and risks involved in alcohol consumption. From this perspective, history also indicates that a free market or free choice approach promotes consumption levels that are harmful to many. Therefore balance is achieved between consumer choice and consumption controls in order to minimise specific excesses and keep consumption stable. Finally, under a paternalistic alcohol control policy the government believes that most people have neither the experience nor the insight to judge the true costs of alcohol consumption. This type of policy aims to reduce consumption, control potentially harmful situations and make regular drinking less generally acceptable. Ontario’s initial government control system adopted many aspects of this paternalistic policy approach. Over the next four and a half decades the pendulum of government control policy swung slowly away from paternalism to include more aspects of the balanced approach outlined above. This proved to be an uneven and complex
transition, particularly as the retail side of government control abandoned its most obvious moralistic regulations more quickly while the licencing of public drinking remained controversial until the 1970s.

What influences affected the pendulum’s direction and rate of motion? Three large themes run throughout the history of government control in Ontario and help account for the transition from the ‘paternalistic’ approach to a more ‘balanced’ system. Firstly, pressure for private retail of alcohol, particularly for the sale of beer in grocery stores, constituted a consistent factor. Secondly, the tourism and hospitality industries continually voiced their concerns over what sort of image Ontario’s government control system was projecting to visitors. Thirdly, Ontarians and the press constantly compared Ontario’s system with those in other regions such as the United States, Europe and other provinces. For example, chapter 2 highlights comparisons with the United States after it repealed Prohibition in 1933. Chapters 3 and 4 reveal comparisons to English and French approaches to regulating alcohol sale and consumption after military personnel experienced pubs and cafés in Europe during World War Two, while chapters 7 and 8 analyse comparisons with Quebec before and after Montreal’s Expo ’67. Despite these constant pressures, this evolution away from moralistic controls was slow, and at times difficult, because the original paternalistic system flowed so naturally from Ontario’s historic protective and collectivist impulse.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL AS PROTECTIVE IMPULSE

From at least Liberal Premier Oliver Mowat’s era (1874-1896), the Ontario government employed various degrees of regulation and monopoly to protect society from the worst abuses of the free market especially in the resource and utilities sectors. Michael Bliss described this phenomenon as “the protective impulse.” 40 Political culture theory goes further to see this collectivism as a product of the ‘Tory’ influence on Canadian culture and politics, infusing them with the idea that government has a responsibility to protect society and encourage stability and order. 41 Far from subjugating private enterprise, monopoly and regulation proved in most instances to favour business by stabilising markets and promoting economic growth. As Armstrong and Nelles demonstrate in their history of utility regulation in Canada, regulation represented a continuous process of seeking accommodation within
particular political traditions. For them this included the political culture of a specific region which helped determine what regulatory and private business activities would be acceptable in that society. Therefore, while the government’s adoption of regulation and monopoly to deal with the liquor trade in 1927 followed the pattern established in the utilities and resource sectors, the moral aspect of liquor consumption infused into society through the temperance movement meant that government control would be different in many ways. In that case, moral control, with its religious overtones and intention of reducing damnation, corruption and sexual improprieties, would influence government control just as much or even more in certain cases than either economics or politics.

As a result, government control became infused with significant portions of both moral and paternalistic impulses as well as business goals. These impulses not only served government’s purposes to impose control and stability on the chaos of Prohibition, with its uncontrolled and clandestine drinking, but, as the Addiction Research Foundation’s study of alcohol control in Ontario argued, such controls “were congruent with prevailing social attitudes,” as the letters from citizens demanding moralistic controls over liquor availability, found in the Premiers’ papers, LCBO and LLBO records, and the correspondence of various government departments until the early 1970s demonstrate. The moral tone of such correspondence, however, declined steadily throughout the period. So too did the government’s moral controls over liquor as policy evolved towards Taylor’s ‘balanced’ approach especially, in the face of arguments supporting consumer rights and freedoms. This evolution proved similar to the one depicted in Leslie Pal’s analysis of the state’s policy reactions to social changes such as the women’s movement, the Quiet Revolution and the political awakening of ethnic groups. Pal argued that throughout the twentieth century the Canadian state’s role evolved from a brokering of debates and conflicts to identifying and protecting collective rights by the 1970s. Initially, the Ontario state employed government control to broker a variety of interests: it permitted the legal retail of alcohol, which appealed to producers and drinkers, and it imposed strict controls, which assuaged the fears of moderate temperance supporters. A variety of social changes such as World War Two, the baby boom and increased immigration rendered the compromise initially brokered in 1927 inappropriate for post-war
Ontario society. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the majority of Ontarians overwhelmingly rejected the moral control aspect of the original government control compromise and demanded consumer rights and freedoms in the purchase and consumption of liquor tempered only by reasonable controls.

For Pal, the state brokered debates such as these by providing "society with broad normative order." In early twentieth century Ontario, the state achieved 'order' over the extreme disorder created by Prohibition through the policy of government control, thereby contributing to Ontario's state formation. For Bruce Curtis, state formation involved "gaining monopolies over means of violence, taxation, administration and over symbolic systems." The creation of a government monopoly over liquor represented a degree of control over all of these. Government control necessitated the creation of an administrative structure for liquor retail, which in turn provided taxes and profits to the provincial treasury. Government monopoly also imposed far-reaching police powers of search and seizure in cases of suspected bootlegging in order to control situations that often degenerated into violence during Prohibition. Finally, liquor and its consumption took on a whole range of symbolic meanings during Prohibition and the preceding decades of temperance agitation, pictured for example as the 'grim reaper,' a skull and cross bones or "a cancerous growth." Through government control, the state assumed the responsibility for selling alcohol, previously carried out by the private sector, thereby legitimising its sale. The means employed to gain these monopolies were often expressed in moral terms. Strange and Loo also linked the moral regulation of Canadians to the country's early state formation as "laws provide[d] state-sanctioned muscle to enforce informal moral codes." It is therefore necessary to place the evolution of government control within this overall context of state formation in Ontario.

THEORIES OF POLICY ANALYSIS

As James Struthers demonstrated in his study of welfare policy in Ontario from 1920-1970, one must be cautious not to adhere too closely to any one guiding principle such as state formation when analysing policy development. Because his chosen policy area evolved over a similar period from an equally moralistic and paternalistic emphasis as did liquor policy, Struthers' observations on policy theory provided many insights for this thesis and an examination of these analytical frameworks can help
answer the questions posed above concerning the process of making liquor control policies in Ontario. For example, gender and class analysis prompt historians to view policy as a form of social control wielded by the state at the expense of women or of labour, for instance. The state certainly did promote social control, especially in moralistic terms over the purchasing and consuming behaviour of Ontarians and liquor policies such as the sexual segregation of drinkers and the strict regulation of the beer-dispensing working class beverage rooms prompted charges of class and sexual discrimination. While a certain class and gender component was evident in Ontario’s liquor policies, the majority of moral controls such as the liquor permit, hidden bottles in liquor stores and the ban on Sunday drinking, affected all in society, not just certain disadvantaged groups. As Struthers argued, class analysis gives a coherence and logic to policy that is very often not played out in practice and does not take into consideration the unintended consequences of policies.51 For example, the government instituted the supper hour closing of beverage rooms, the only public drinking in existence, as a rationing measure during World War Two. After the war the government permitted the sale of spirits in a new outlet, the lounge, with continuous hours of sale while preserving the supper hour closing of the working man’s beer outlet. A policy intended to ration beer supplies thus came to represent a means of class discrimination.

Struthers also presented the strengths and weaknesses of a state-centred approach to policy analysis utilised, for example, by Leslie Pal. This approach views politicians and bureaucrats as actors in the policy process rather than passive agents of societal forces.52 Clearly in the case of liquor policy, premiers, Cabinet ministers, LCBO chief commissioners and LLBO chairmen wielded significant influence in promoting and implementing policy. As such, the social characteristics of these actors, such as their ages, religions and ethnic backgrounds, become significant factors in shaping their decisions. As political scientists Graham White and F.F. Schindeler have argued, Ontario’s premiers and Cabinet ministers throughout this period exhibited a “marked homogeneity.”53 While the predominance of middle-aged Protestant males of British stock suggests “the political influence of the province’s entrenched social groups,”54 the slow erosion of this homogeneity, beginning in the early 1960s, as chapters 6 and 7 reveal, reflects the impact of immigration on society. The elevation of a younger, more multicultural generation
to the positions of power within the liquor policymaking process did not necessarily mean an evolution of policy, causing it to become a lightening rod for public discontent. While Campbell acknowledged the importance of the state in wielding regulatory control, his reminder about the importance of other actors such as drinkers and proprietors is a significant one. While this thesis will focus more on the state than on these social actors, it is vital to remember the complex interrelationships involved in the process of moral regulation. As Struthers noted, an emphasis on state actors, unlike class or gender analysis, allows for the importance of unintended consequences and incremental change. For government control these played a large role in how liquor policy evolved in practice. By placing so much emphasis on the primacy of state actors, however, this approach cannot adequately account for the inertia and resistance to change confronting Cabinet ministers, witnessed, for example, in the early 1960s when Provincial Secretary John Yaremko repeatedly attempted to implement liquor policies and initiate independent liquor enquiries.

Why, then, were policymakers often hindered in their attempts to effect change? In endeavouring to understand how liquor control policies are made, Valverde cautioned against the systematic use of theories, that she has relied on in the past, concerned with the state imposing discipline on individuals or society as a whole. These were not entirely appropriate, she argued, because of the persistence of highly moralised techniques of regulation that endured, many of which actually promoted consumption, thereby harming the health of drinkers. In observing "in the real world" that many government control mechanisms do not lend themselves easily to categories such as disciplinary techniques or health risk minimisation, she attributed the persistence of moral controls to "administrative habit." The history of government control in Ontario certainly exemplified examples of this type of 'habit' among bureaucrats and politicians, particularly, as chapters 3 and 4 reveal, in the preservation of World War Two rationing controls beyond the situations for which they were originally created. Furthermore, the Ontario experience reveals that the moral and business objectives of government control worked simultaneously to produce policies with different emphases depending on the swings of the pendulum between Taylor's 'paternalistic' and 'balanced' approaches, illustrating the difficulty in classifying policies and their
intentions. Nevertheless, Valverde’s valid observations stimulate questions about what prompts this ‘habit’ and how policy decisions are made.

If “policy decisions are usually made on the basis of organised or collective knowledge about policy problems,” as Pal contended, then one must be wary about calling changes made to the liquor laws, regulations and unofficial rules from 1927 to 1972 ‘policy.’ This definition presupposes a degree of study and evaluation representative of the rational model of policy analysis. This model depicts the ideal scenario whereby a decision maker undertakes detailed study, weighs alternatives and chooses a course of action to maximise the achievement of a stated objective. In the case of liquor policy, while the state actors had the potential to undertake research and learn from previous policy changes, in reality, studies, especially a fundamental liquor review, were resisted. Furthermore, as Valverde highlighted, unlike authorities in the field of criminal law, the government made no attempt to bring together all the multiple coexisting regulatory targets into a coherent system with a clear rationale. Instead, Ontario liquor policymakers tended to follow the incremental model of policy implementation. This model endeavours to come to terms with the challenges and difficulties inherent in policymaking for which the rational model fails to account. Perhaps most closely associated with political scientist Charles Lindblom, incrementalism is characterised by small marginal adjustments to the status quo, the consideration of a limited number of alternatives and a concern with reaching consensus rather than fundamental goals. While many observers agree that this model helps describe the way a great deal of policy is made, critics argue that it fails to explain much about the policy process. Nevertheless, Lindblom’s observations remind us of the complex array of possibilities and problems facing policymakers which their human shortcomings make almost impossible to address. This is important to remember since in retrospect it can be difficult to appreciate. For Lindblom, what might be dismissed as “indecisiveness, patching up, timidity, triviality, narrowness of view, inconclusiveness, caution and procrastination” can actually demonstrate “a shrewd, resourceful problem-solver who is wrestling bravely with a universe that he is wise enough to know is too big for him.”
Ontario liquor policymaking exhibited all these characteristics and increasingly attracted the wrath of the Opposition, the public and the press as a result. For example, instead of implementing a coherent overall policy of liquor control, the government employed an incremental approach that “is not made once and for all” and “excludes by accident.”62 This resulted in policies which, in many cases, contradicted past laws or failed to achieve real change—necessitating repeated amendments. As Lindblom pointed out “human information capacities are limited...actors cannot possibly have all the information or know consequences, or evaluate every alternative” as the rational model presupposes.63 The Ontario liquor policymaking process took this tendency to the extreme by proceeding “though a succession of incremental changes” and “trial and error.”64 The relative absence of in-depth research by the Ontario government to assess the impact of proposed or existing liquor policies was a characteristic of liquor policy change throughout this entire era and beyond. For example, it has been argued that the preparations leading up to the province’s 1990 Liquor Licence Act changes were characterised by “a lack of research assessing the impact of many policy options.”65 Public perception therefore, played a major role in determining the final recommendations the advisory committee made to the Cabinet.66 As in 1990, the Ontario lawmakers through the first half-century of government control, relied on their own paternalistic instincts, letters written to the government and to editors, as well as editorials and opinion articles to gauge public perceptions and desires regarding liquor policy. Therefore, the newspaper clippings from across the province collected by the Premier’s office, as well as the clippings found throughout the archival files of the LCBO, LLBO and various government departments responsible for liquor control, highlight the role these documents played in determining the government’s understanding of public sentiment.

The Ontario policymakers’ reliance on incrementalism flowed naturally from another approach to policy analysis that Struthers discussed. When combined with incrementalism, this approach is the most helpful in shedding light on why government control evolved in the manner that it did in Ontario. The theory of political culture emphasises certain common values, beliefs and attitudes held by a society that develop from common heritage and experiences and represents long-standing traditions that are not easily
shaken. The phrase ‘political culture’ was coined in the 1950s and since that time has been expanded upon and applied in various contexts. Louis Hartz’s theory of political culture, a prevailing model, emphasises the ideas and beliefs of the founding groups of a settler society or the “…fragments…detached from the whole…and hurled outward onto new soil.” In the Canadian context theorists such as Gad Horowitz draw on the Tory and feudal roots of Canada’s English and French heritage to account for a wide public expectation that the state will take a paternalistic role in addressing social problems. Liquor sale and consumption represented one such social problem. Because this problem tended to be viewed as symbolic of a whole range of moral and ethical consequences, the application of a concept focused on a society’s values seems most appropriate. Furthermore, as historian S.F. Wise has argued, Ontario’s modern political culture requires historical interpretation. In his exploration of the Loyalist experience in Upper Canada, political scientist S.J.R. Noel emphasised the Loyalists’ relationship with the land, which symbolised their sacrifice and risks in remaining loyal to Britain. Because of this reliance on a finite resource like land, the Loyalist experience fostered a political culture characterised by deeply rooted expectations that the state should carefully manage its resources and affairs.

For Ontario, political scientists have focused on political culture to understand the longevity of the Conservative dynasty in the twentieth century. Drawing on the work of Horowitz, Noel and others, John Wilson, for example, described Ontario’s political culture as one representing both conservative and progressive elements in society. Wilson argued that, on the one hand, Ontarians desire stability, order and continuity, while on the other, they demand fair play and equality. Therefore the Ontario electorate has tended historically to favour administrations that balanced the “principal interests” of society with stable leadership and cautious reform when necessary. For Wise, “incremental change, combined with moderate conservatism,” constituted the main features of Ontario’s political culture, that when practised judiciously, bestowed success on provincial leaders. The Conservative Party’s four post-war Premiers, Drew, Frost, Robarts and Davis demonstrated this by governing successfully according to Donald C.
MacDonald using a "cautiously progressive" approach. The roots of this approach can be found in the political style of their predecessor Howard Ferguson.

The excesses and abuses of Prohibition represented disorder and instability, characteristics Ferguson believed were anathema to Ontarians. Therefore, after gauging public opinion over a number of years, he responded to the values and beliefs of society by cautiously introducing a plan to re-establish control over the sale and consumption of alcohol. His efforts to create a policy, which reflected public desires and therefore Ontario political culture, resulted in a system dedicated to achieving stability through strict controls while providing legal customer service of alcohol. Despite the shortcomings of the theory, Ferguson’s policy responses to the challenges of liquor control, along with those of his successors, are best understood in the context of Ontario’s political culture. Struthers argued, for example, that political culture, as an enduring phenomenon, fails to account for change over time. Even Wise admitted that political culture can be “complex” and “slippery,” despite his extensive analysis of the theory. Others question the use of dichotomies such as ‘Tory-Reform’ or ‘progressive-conservative’ as a means of understanding the roots of Ontario’s political culture. While deeply held beliefs do endure over long periods, a political culture that values cautious reform can help explain change as it occurs over time. Furthermore, while antithetical phrases such as progressive-conservative may appear meaningless in their seeming contradictions, a political culture dedicated to progressive reform in a cautious manner is particularly fitting to analyse a similarly dichotomous Ontario phenomenon: government control. Therefore, political culture remains a useful explanatory tool in understanding the pace of change and the nature of liquor policies in Ontario. Likewise, the incremental approach to achieving policy, which, like the province’s political culture, valued “agreement and consensus,” helps describe how the succeeding administrations dealt with the challenges of government control. The three societal crises of Prohibition, Depression and World War Two presented the government with extra-ordinary situations, producing ‘conflict management’ liquor policies in response to specific circumstances, as Graham White observed in other areas of provincial lawmaking. The province’s overall tendency towards small, incremental
change determined that the emergency policies remained part of government control for years after the crises dissipated.

For Ferguson’s successors, the struggle to maintain stability by preserving moral controls while still responding to customer demands for reforms to liberalise access to alcohol, was consistent with the province’s political culture and the desire to balance competing interests. The evolution from a moralistic and paternalistic liquor control system towards Taylor’s balanced approach was informed and often hampered by an overriding belief in the benefits of the status quo tempered only by change when absolutely necessary. In his critical interpretation of the impact of political culture on the Conservative Party’s twentieth century dynasty, journalist Jonathan Manthorpe argued:

To a large extent the Conservatives have not led the province; rather, they have been dragged along by the needs and demands of its people. Changes in policy directions have generally been taken, not to anticipate a need, but when the need has become a problem, and the clamour for change has become so great that the political penalty for inactivity has outweighed the penalty for acting.80

This approach to governing more than any other factor influenced the pace and nature of liquor policy change in Ontario from 1927 to 1972.
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4 Ian Drummond provided a short analysis of the regulation of the drink trades from Confederation to the Second World War, however he acknowledged that the “larger questions” of government control, particularly its political, social and cultural effects were outside the mandate of the economic historian. Drummond, p. 299.
6 The first edition of Smart and Ogborne’s study appearing in 1986 noted the end of Prohibition in Ontario occurred in 1923 rather than in 1927. The updated 1996 version of the book repeated this contention, using that date for its statistical arguments regarding crime and alcoholism death rates during and after Prohibition in the province. Furthermore, in a detailed chronology of the post-war widening of liquor availability in Ontario, the book attributed many of these changes to the wrong years. For example, lounges sold spirits for the first time in 1947 and not 1948; the law permitted drinking in tents from 1927 and not in the 1950s; the government changed the law to allow drinking in backyards in 1958 and not in the 1960s; and finally dining outlets began serving drinks with meals on Sundays in 1967 and not in the 1970s as Northern Spirits argued. These many shortcomings illustrated not only the complexity of the history of liquor policy change in Ontario but the critical need for a systematic and straightforward study of these changes. See Reginald G. Smart and Alan C. Ogborne. Northern Spirits: Drinking in Canada, Then and Now (Toronto: Addiction Research Foundation, 1986), p. 52; and Smart and Ogborne. Northern Spirits: A Social History of Alcohol in Canada (Toronto: Addiction Research Foundation, 1996), pp. 49, 54, 58, 146-148.
10 Valverde, Diseases of the Will, p. 12.
11 Valverde, Diseases of the Will, pp. 144, 153.
12 Valverde’s observations regarding Ontario’s government control system are based largely on a criminology MA research paper on liquor licensing in Toronto for the period 1926-1946. However, legal public drinking did not return to Ontario until 1934. I. Baird. “A privilege to enjoy: liquor licensing and inspection in Toronto. 1926-1946.” (MA research paper, Centre for Criminology. 1996). She also bases her conclusions for the Ontario experience on the 1996 work of Smart and Ogborne.
13 Valverde, Diseases of the Will, p. 9.
14 Valverde, Diseases of the Will, p. 147.
16 Smart and Ogborne, 1996.
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21 Hodgetts. p. 163.
26 Warsh. pp. 5-6.
30 Cook. p. 228.
34 Campbell. Demon Rum. p. 188.
36 Campbell. Demon Rum. p. 4.
37 Schindeler. p. 13.
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43 Armstrong and Nelles, pp. 52, 322.
44 Armstrong and Nelles, p. 323.
45 Single, Morgan and deLint, p. 7.
47 Pal, Interests of State, p. 40.
50 Strange and Loo, p. 4.
52 Struthers, p. 12.
55 Campbell, "Hotel Beer Parlours."
56 Valverde, Diseases of the Will, pp. 12, 146, 153.
59 Valverde, Diseases of the Will, p. 147.
60 Doern and Phidd, pp. 141-143.
63 Parsons, p. 286.
64 Parsons, p. 287.
66 McKenzie, p. 47.
69 See Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968).
70 Wise, p. 57.
73 Wise, p. 56.
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75 Struthers, p. 8.
76 Wise, p. 44.
78 Doern and Phidd, p. 142.
80 Manthorpe, p. 8.
“AN ACT TO REGULATE AND CONTROL”

Like sardines they packed the galleries of the Legislative Assembly Chamber yesterday afternoon. They squirmed, in hundreds, in the corridors without. They were flushed... they were panting, and they were goggle-eyed with expectation [for the moment when] Mr. Ferguson rose majestically in his seat and said 'Mr. Speaker I move... that leave be given to introduce a bill entitled an act to regulate and control the sale of liquor in Ontario.'

On March 9, 1927, when Premier Howard Ferguson introduced what came to be known as the Liquor Control Act (LCA), he allowed anxious Ontarians their first official glimpse of the values that would replace Prohibition and form the backbone of liquor policy in the province for the next half century and beyond. This bill realised voters' "expressed wishes at the polls." On December 1, 1926 voters re-elected Ferguson and his Conservative government, thereby endorsing his policy to replace the decade-old Ontario Temperance Act (OTA), and the Prohibition it created with a system of government control of liquor retailing. As Robert Campbell observed about British Columbia's experience introducing government control in 1921, the fundamental compromise to end Prohibition revolved around removing liquor from the destructive profit motive of market influences by limiting sale through highly regulated government stores. Modelled on the Alberta system of government control created in 1923, the Ontario bill, and the system it enshrined, represented a direct reaction to the difficulties experienced under the OTA and the perceived problems of a return to the legalised sale of liquor. For Ferguson, the challenge of this first era of government control was to create an act that would establish both a business enterprise to dispense liquor to satisfy the public's well-demonstrated thirst and a moral watchdog to assuage the fears surrounding the ending of Prohibition. Though ultimately a policy disaster, Prohibition represented the hopes and aspirations of many Ontarians during the First World War. Once it became abundantly
clear that banning the retail sale of liquor could never foster a truly temperate society and actually created problems of excessive consumption and disrespect for the law, voters responded to Ferguson’s promise of true temperance legislation. The Liquor Control Act represented his approach to the challenge.

In this sense Ferguson acted as a ‘policy entrepreneur’ through his identification of this problem and his tenacity in championing his preferred solution: government control. As we shall see, this policy satisfied the three criteria necessary for the success of a policy entrepreneur’s goal: it must be technically feasible, compatible with the dominant values of the community, and able to anticipate future constraints under which it may operate. Ferguson’s actions as a policy entrepreneur appear even more obvious when compared to the arrival of government control in British Columbia (and every other province that had already abandoned Prohibition) as the result of a provincial plebiscite on which no major politician took an official stance. While Ferguson adapted the government control models employed in other provinces, he certainly acted as an entrepreneur in advancing and ensuring the success of the policy in Ontario.

**BACKGROUND: PROHIBITION AND LOCAL OPTION**

Prohibition in Ontario began in September 1916, instituted by Conservative Premier William Hearst during the World War One environment of sacrifice that fostered prohibition laws across the country. Province-wide Prohibition responded not only to the immediate crisis of war but also to decades of temperance agitation at the local level. Previously, Hearst’s predecessor Conservative Premier J.P. Whitney introduced a local option system in Ontario in 1906 in response to mounting pressure to institute prohibition. Similar in approach to nineteenth century federal local option laws as well as local option laws in every other province except British Columbia, and in 39 American states, this law provided a vehicle for municipalities to institute prohibition at the local level. If 25% of the electors in a particular municipality petitioned their local government a vote would be held to determine if local prohibition of the sale of liquor would be instituted. If three-fifths of the voters favoured the bylaw then all retail liquor shops and public drinking outlets like bars and saloons would be closed for a minimum of three years. At that point voters could repeat the same process to repeal the bylaw if they chose. Whitney included the requirement of a three-fifths majority instead of the customary simple majority in order to affirm that a
larger majority of people supported such a divisive and controversial issue. He also believed that the threat to the property and livelihoods of hotel and liquor shop owners inherent in such votes required a large majority of support. In the environment of uplift and moral reform around the turn of the twentieth century this tool to achieve local prohibition proved popular as Ontario boasted 575 dry municipalities out of a total of 851 by 1916 when the government instituted Prohibition across the entire province.

The Ontario Temperance Act (OTA) of 1916 therefore built upon the local option history in the province. This law outlawed the sale, possession and consumption of alcohol across the entire province. The law preserved the sanctity of the private residence, however, as possession and consumption remained legal there. Further, Ontario-produced wines, or native wines as they were called, continued to be sold legally at local wineries in an attempt to protect the Ontario grape industry and in recognition of the generally accepted belief that wine was less harmful than beer or spirits. Government-run dispensaries were established to sell the only legal alcohol permitted during Prohibition: for medicinal, industrial, scientific, and sacramental uses. In the early years of Prohibition Ontarians with the means to do so could legally import liquor for their own private use until the federal government banned this activity, which fell under its jurisdiction, in March 1918. When the federal government repealed the wartime regulations against importation at the end of the war in late 1919, Ontarians could once again briefly import liquor from outside the province. The United Farmers of Ontario government, elected in October of that year, successfully lobbied Ottawa to permit a provincial vote on the issue of importation. A majority of Ontarians endorsed the measure in April 1921 rendering importation once again illegal, this time during peace.

This compounded the problems already inherent under Prohibition. As the feelings of sacrifice and self-denial that initially fostered Prohibition began to fade with peace and the cellar stocks of liquor acquired by many wealthier drinkers before 1918, and between 1919 and 1921, began to deplete, frustrated Ontarians turned to patterns of illegal behaviour in order to drink. While bootleggers and blind pigs certainly existed in Ontario, Campbell has argued that the violence and syndicated crime inherent in the Prohibition image was an exaggeration even for the American era of Prohibition and had little
relevance for Canada. James Gray humorously contended that during Prohibition "in Western Canada nobody even punched anybody else in the nose." However, Ontario shared a large border with densely populated areas of the United States, accessible especially by the Great Lakes, which proved to be major smuggling channels. Once the United States instituted countrywide Prohibition of its own in January 1920 this smuggling took on a more violent character. For example, a provincial inspector shot and killed a tavern owner in 1920 during a confrontation with a major rum-runner in the border city of Windsor. This particular incident provoked fear and concern among many Ontarians that the image of violence and crime that they perceived in their southern neighbour was spreading northward. This intensified as Americans adjusted their behaviour to circumvent their own Prohibition laws. By 1926 local Ontario newspapers regularly reported on the murders and organised crime that seemed to have enveloped American cities such as Detroit and Chicago. Simultaneously, Ontarians read about their own crisis in liquor control with stories of wood alcohol poisoning in Hamilton, smuggling across the Great Lakes from Port Colborne and the murder of a licence inspector in Cochrane filling newspapers on the eve of the 1926 election, for example. Furthermore, Ontarians themselves demonstrated widespread disrespect for the OTA. As historian Peter Oliver argued "liquor flowed freely at Toronto hotels." While the contentions of Campbell and Gray may have had resonance for Ontario, the image of crime, violence and widespread disrespect for the law played an important role in reducing support for Prohibition and simultaneously increasing the attractiveness of Ferguson’s alternative of government control.

Recognising this shift, Ferguson ran for re-election in 1926 on the policy of government control of liquor similar to that practised in five other provinces. He felt this move was now politically feasible since he had carefully gauged public opinion throughout the early 1920s. Ferguson gained the Conservative leadership in 1920 at age 50 after his party’s humiliating defeat to the United Farmers in 1919. He inherited his love for politics and the Conservative Party from his father, a medical doctor and MP under John A. Macdonald. Ferguson’s Scotch-Irish background, his Anglicanism and his upbringing in the intensely Loyalist environment of the eastern Ontario town of Kemptville fostered his love of the
empire and Canada.\textsuperscript{24} As a "practical politician" with an instinctive understanding of the "essential thrust of the province's identity,"\textsuperscript{25} Ferguson championed the policy of government control because it appealed to his own and his province's desire for stability and control. It also coincided with his party's traditional identity as the urban-based 'liquor' party, compared with the Liberal Party's traditional identity as the rural-based 'temperance' party.\textsuperscript{26}

Control over liquor revenues constituted one aspect of this. While the issue of the tax money to be raised for the government under the proposed system gained little attention during the campaign, Ferguson certainly saw the surplus budgets and increased tourism in government control provinces like British Columbia and Quebec.\textsuperscript{27} The increase in car ownership throughout the 1920s in Canada, especially among people of average income, created the "summer tourist."\textsuperscript{28} In one of the campaign's few direct references to the economic side of the government control proposal Ferguson asked the electorate:

\begin{quotation}
Do you not think it would be better where the demand exists and there is a determination to secure liquor at any costs, that we should face the problems squarely and...that the profits now enriching the dealers should be made available for public uses and the reduction of taxation in Ontario?\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quotation}

Ferguson sought control not only over the revenues that would result from direct government retail of liquor, an argument certainly attractive in a province with consistent budget deficits, but also over the commodity itself. Prohibition, Ferguson argued during the campaign, promoted "an almost universal spirit of law resistance and non-observation" on the part of otherwise law-abiding Ontarians.\textsuperscript{30} Because liquor was an illegal substance under Prohibition the government had very little control over it. Therefore chaos and crisis ensued in a province which Ferguson believed valued stability and evolutionary change. The solution Ferguson maintained was "to again officially recognise liquor as a beverage, after it had been outlawed as such in Ontario for ten years."\textsuperscript{31} By doing this his government could control Ontarians' well demonstrated desire for liquor and curb and eventually end altogether the flagrant bootlegging of the Prohibition era. He argued that "the reason the bootlegger exists is because people want whiskey...if you give people the opportunity to buy it legitimately they won't hide behind a fence all night to buy from a bootlegger."\textsuperscript{32} Government control would also achieve control over the direct distribution of liquor and
end "the farce of medical prescriptions." Because the medical profession still adhered to the curative powers of alcohol-based tonics, medicinal alcohol was not outlawed during Prohibition. Therefore thirsty Ontarians resorted to feigning ailments to obtain liquor legally from their physicians, particularly after 1921 when the provincial government permanently banned importation. In 1924 doctors issued over 800,000 prescriptions for medicinal alcohol compared to 588,000 in 1920 prompting doctors to complain of being the "bartenders for the Province of Ontario." This blatant disregard for the laws of the province further heightened Ferguson's resolve to gain control over this commodity and the behaviour of its users. Government control represented a way to accomplish this task.

During the election campaign Ferguson outlined his policy of government control in a general manner, leaving himself the flexibility to create a sound system if re-elected. Because of his great desire to control the liquor trade and the divisive arguments surrounding it, he chose to place his entire administration on the line by running for re-election on the policy of government control. Ferguson promised to establish a strong and independent commission of "outstanding men" to oversee the sale of liquor to those over 21 years old. The commission would have the power to issue permit booklets required for the purchase of liquor in which each purchase would be recorded. He also announced that beer by the glass could be introduced in those areas that wanted it but that the existing local option system could be used to prevent any type of sale in local municipalities. This proposal to continue the local option system into the post-Prohibition era illustrated what political scientist J.E. Hodgetts described as "the persistence of the belief in the efficacy of local self-government." Although Ferguson was deliberately vague with the details, government control as a concept was familiar to most Ontarians. It had existed in British Columbia since 1921 and in four other provinces in the years intervening, including Ontario's two closest neighbours. The issue had also been discussed and debated in Ontario since at least 1919 when government control was included as an option on that year's provincial referendum. For Ferguson the two most salient features of government control on which to fight the election were the strict powers invested in the commission to control distribution and consumption, especially through the liquor permit, and the respect and compliance the commission would command.
Ferguson fought fiercely and creatively to protect this image of control and respect that he had created around the proposed system. The Conservative campaign strategy highlighted the names of some of the most respected figures in Canada that supported government control. This tactic revealed Ferguson’s instinctive appreciation for his province as it appealed to “Ontario’s deferential value system.” Ferguson employed another election strategy to undermine his opponents, particularly the Prohibition Union, a lobby group supported by the newly created United Church, when the Union questioned the control aspect of his liquor policy. These OTA supporters focused a tremendous amount of energy on attacking the beer by the glass provision of the proposal, a provision included in the Alberta model that Ferguson was following. They argued that a return to public drinking would mean a return to the wild saloon days before Prohibition. Even Ferguson’s argument that “no bar-room conditions would be tolerated, [only the] sale of beer in the glass at tables in standard hotels in wet municipalities” could not stem the tide of criticism. Therefore, in an effort to appeal to women voters and moderate dry supporters, Ferguson produced what he earlier hinted at to T.L. Kennedy, Conservative candidate in traditionally dry Peel County. “I have a card up my sleeve I haven’t played yet.” Two weeks into the campaign Ferguson announced he was dropping the beer by the glass aspect of the Alberta model, calling it only “incidental” to the entire system of government control. In announcing the abandonment of the beer by the glass provision, Ferguson declared:

I don’t intend to have the issue befogged and beclouded by any class of people whether they belong to a church or wherever they may belong to. I believe there are cases where people want beer by the glass, but I say to you here and now that I will wipe out any suggestion that beer will be sold by the glass or otherwise, in bars or beer parlours; that there shall be no suggestion of bars, or bar-rooms and the man who wants beer will have to go to get it at a government store.

In making this decision, Ferguson eliminated his opponents’ specific target of criticism. Many moderates, previously opposed to the policy proposal because of the beer by the glass component, could now wholeheartedly support the Premier and his policy of government control. He therefore ensured his
electoral victory and determined that public drinking would not be a feature of Ontario's government control policy, at least for the foreseeable future.

Ferguson used his government control policy to appeal to the desire for stability and law and order deeply felt in the large majority of moderate Ontarians. In doing so he demonstrated his skill at reading the electorate and was awarded with the largest proportion of votes earned by any party since Confederation. Ferguson successfully brokered the diverse interests in the province with a proposal that would please all but the most vociferous prohibitionists with its strict control provisions as well as all but the most determined free-enterprise advocates with the return of legal sale. The prescription abuses, violence and illegal consumption behaviour witnessed during Prohibition created a moral panic among Ontarians, of the type Valverde described. Therefore, while voters could endorse a policy that would reintroduce the legal sale of alcohol, the experiences of Prohibition heightened their expectations for strict moral controls to prevent the continuation of such behaviour. Out of the election compromise came the twin goals of government control: moral regulation of all aspects of the distribution and consumption of liquor and service to customers through government monopoly stores. In the weeks after the election Ferguson personally worked on the legislation that would embody these two goals. Not surprisingly the completed LCA resembled the OTA, which Ferguson also helped draft, particularly in its use of the concept of a private residence and its search and seizure powers. While he used the OTA and the legislation guiding the government control systems in existence in other provinces such as Alberta as a model, Ferguson also followed the history of regulatory bodies in his own province.

Since Confederation the Ontario government had regulated the sale and distribution of liquor through the appointment of local liquor licencing boards and liquor inspectors. This system provided not only a lucrative form of revenue for the government but also a significant opportunity for patronage. In 1906 Premier Whitney further centralised regulation over the trade. Along with introducing the local option system, Whitney created a Licence Branch and attached it to the Attorney General's office. This seemingly began the trend of absorbing independent regulatory bodies into government departments that eventually occurred with other agencies such as the Minimum Wage Board and the Mothers' Allowance
The history of liquor control proved different though. One year before Prohibition, Premier Hearst further centralised liquor licencing by creating a single five-member Board of Liquor Licence Commissioners to replace the local boards, thereby stopping any trend towards departmental absorption. The new Board also assumed a departmental minister’s powers to make regulations over the liquor trade. Ferguson’s proposed Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) followed naturally from this history as he placed it under the purview of his able Attorney General, W.H. Price, a politically shrewd lawyer and First World War veteran. Ferguson also invested the Board with all the regulatory powers of its predecessor. After a decade of Prohibition, Ferguson heightened the social control aspects that a regulatory body could offer by deeming “Every action, order, or decision of the Board as to any matter...[to] be final and shall not be questioned, reviewed or restrained by injunction, prohibition or proceeding in any court.” Ferguson required this social control function in order to modify and moderate liquor consumption behaviour from one characterised by “boisterous” and “notorious” flouting of the OTA during Prohibition to legal but highly controlled consumption under government control. Independent regulatory bodies like the LCBO allowed governments a “mechanism for depoliticizing the decision-making process.” Ferguson, therefore, chose this type of body to buffer himself and his party from the divisive issue of liquor control. By respecting the province’s regulatory traditions, Ferguson implemented a seemingly new policy in a cautious and incremental manner.

The LCBO not only regulated the liquor trade but it also provided the direct sale of liquor to customers, a combination of the “old regulatory powers” of the Board of Liquor Licence Commissioners and the “new entrepreneurial powers” in a single independent body. While the dichotomy between regulating consumption and raising revenues apparent in the old licencing apparatus created a certain ambivalence for the government, revenue remained the major objective with much less emphasis placed on influencing behaviour through licencing. Prohibition of course heightened the demand for moral regulation. Therefore Ferguson’s decision to combine regulatory powers and direct service delivery in one agency, the LCBO, heightened this ambivalence to a degree that would endure for decades. In doing so he infused the Board with two seemingly opposing goals: the strict control of consumption behaviour and the
sale and service of liquor to customers. While the government would continue its nineteenth century practise of taking "the high ground by stressing the salutary results of temperance-based...regulation, all the while quietly banking the large revenue so serendipitously forthcoming," it would thereafter struggle to come to terms with two competing goals.

The creation of a monopolistic government agency to sell liquor to Ontarians not only followed the pattern established in nineteenth century Sweden, turn of the century South Carolina and more recently in five Canadian provinces but also followed an early twentieth century Ontario trend of relying on independent agencies to deliver services. For example Ferguson's Conservative predecessors established the Hydro Electric Power Commission in 1906, the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railway in 1907 and the Workmen's Compensation Board in 1914. As in the case of the hydro and railway agencies, the LCBO delivered a service to Ontarians that had previously been provided by the private sector. According to Hodgetts these "operative" agencies functioned differently from regular government departments as "their mandates are viewed as akin to those of private business enterprises and are deemed to warrant an arm's length relationship to a parent ministerial department in order to secure 'business-like' procedures and results." Profits, efficiency and customer service certainly constituted the business-like results that Ferguson expected of his new creation. In the immediate post-Prohibition environment it was impossible for Ferguson to forthrightly emphasise the revenue-producing aspects of government control. Nevertheless, given the importance of government revenues inherent in the old licence system and the profits pouring into the coffers of the other government control provinces, profits certainly came as no surprise to Ferguson. During the period in which he was creating the LCA Ferguson received correspondence from the Alberta division of the Moderation League, a Canada-wide lobby group committed to government control, stressing that "the matter of revenue must not be overlooked."

These 'business-like' objectives of government control constituted only part of the new policy. Government control also followed Canadian precedents in its mandate to control consumption behaviour through strict moral regulation. As Strange and Loo argued, "through various branches of the emerging
Canadian state, a loose network of laws regulated morality by proscribing unacceptable behaviour in every sphere of life,” from Sunday leisure and sexual behaviour between consenting adults to the combination of work. In the Ontario context, Margaret Jane Hillyard Little argued in her study of the moral regulation of single mothers, that the introduction of Ontario Mothers’ Allowance in 1920 indicated a greater role for the state as moral guardian of its citizens. Government control heightened this role, making moral control and business proficiency the twin goals of the LCBO. In this way, the new government control system advanced Ontario’s early twentieth century state formation as it lengthened the state’s regulatory reach over both economic and social spheres of activity.

THE LIQUOR CONTROL ACT

Appointment of a Strong Capable Board: Upon introducing the bill, Ferguson pointed out the salient features of the new system, paying particular attention to the strict control side of the LCBO in order to ease the anxiety many harboured at the end of Prohibition. For Ferguson, the “first and most important” feature of the bill was “the appointment of a strong, capable and highly efficient Control Board commanding public confidence in such a high degree as to restore respect for the law.” Ferguson appointed “strong man” D.B. Hanna as Chief Commissioner and head of the three-member board. Born in Scotland, the 68-year-old industrialist accepted the position and its $20,000 salary for a one-year full-time term. This salary represented more money than either the Premier or the Chief Justice of the province earned. As Ferguson explained, Hanna sacrificed his private interests when he undertook the position of Chief Commissioner and needed to be fairly compensated even though it represented a cut in pay for the businessman. As former President and General Manager of the Canadian National Railways, Hanna brought to the LCBO “his splendid grasp of accounts and finances.” While Ferguson emphasised Hanna’s ability to inspire respect and compliance in the public, he clearly chose a competent businessman to wield the Board’s extensive powers of managing all aspects of the sale of liquor to Ontarians. Hanna’s ability to inspire respect was enhanced by the Board’s image of independence and freedom from political interference. In the aftermath of a decade of Prohibition, Ferguson needed to establish a system of liquor control free from any hint of corruption or immorality. Even the Liberal and prohibitionist Toronto Star
editors endorsed Hanna’s appointment, praising Ferguson for fulfilling his election promise to “place in charge a Strong Man…of such reputation and character that his name, if mentioned, would meet with the approval of all and end anxiety in every mind.” Ferguson’s choice was undoubtedly influenced by the scandal and corruption associated with British Columbia’s Liquor Control Board and its responsible ministry during the first few years of government control in the Pacific province.

Hanna’s lack of any overt political ties endeared him to Ferguson’s opponents and enhanced his reputation for integrity and respectability. Nevertheless Ferguson adhered to the patronage customs of the day in appointing two federal Tory MPs to assist Hanna as part-time Commissioners of the LCBO with annual salaries of $10,000. R.J. Manion, a medical doctor, had served in the First World War before representing Fort William in the Meighen government. Maclean’s proclaimed that “no one in the Conservative Party is so popular” as the 46-year-old Roman Catholic of Irish descent. Ferguson undoubtedly intended Manion’s appointment to consolidate support among Catholic voters and to focus attention on the problems of excessive drinking associated with northern communities. Ferguson also appointed 61-year-old Stewart McClenaghan, a retail clothing merchant and former Conservative MP for Ottawa as a Commissioner of equal rank to Manion. McClenaghan, a member of the Anglican Church, brought to the position his administrative experience as Chairman of Whitney’s old Licence Board. While observers bestowed unanimous praise on Hanna’s appointment, critics, like The Toronto Star’s editors, viewed the selection of Manion and McClenaghan as following conventional patronage procedures, rendering the Board “a customary three-man body.” The Commissioners’ overt political connections, particularly Manion’s continued presence in the federal Conservative government prompted the editors to conclude, “neither [man] could be popularly regarded as such giants of strength as [Hanna]." Nevertheless, Hanna’s impressive business expertise and his impeccable reputation lent the Board the authority and respectability it needed to weather the transition from Prohibition to government control.

“Wise and Efficient Administration”: The second temperance feature of the new legislation highlighted by Ferguson followed directly from the first. Not only would the Control Board contain
members who were ‘strong’ and ‘capable’ but also the success of the Liquor Control Act would rest on their “wise and efficient administration” of the system of government control.71 In order to facilitate this, Ferguson explained, “very wide discretion is given to the Commission” to carry out its duties. These included everything from the management of liquor stores, the setting of store hours and permit fees, to the selection and purchasing of liquor to be offered for sale.72 Ferguson boasted that the “legislation was so sweeping” that the Commission could easily address any future problems of enforcement.73 Indeed the 56 page Act was sweeping not only in its detail and scope but also in the sweeping powers bestowed on the Commissioners and law enforcement agents like local police and liquor inspectors employed by the Board to ensure compliance with the Act. In order to combat the Prohibition image of lawlessness Ferguson needed to construct a more powerful symbol of control, necessitating the “proliferation of prohibitions,”74 rather than simply the end of them. For example the Act made it an offence to be ‘found in’ “any house, shop, room or other premises” in which other people were breaking the liquor laws.75 The Act allowed inspectors and police to “enter and search…without warrant” if they believed “that liquor is unlawfully kept or had.”76 The penalty for bootlegging or “sale without authority” was automatic imprisonment for not less than two months, even on a first offence.77 As the Board’s first annual report boasted, these powers lessened “the bootlegging evil.”78 Immediately following Prohibition Ferguson designed the Act to deal directly and harshly with criminals who had honed their skills at eluding police over the previous decade. While later generations would view these aspects of the LCA as excessive and even oppressive Ferguson genuinely believed that he was giving “a democratic people the right to use their freedom and discretion” in the legal purchase and consumption of liquor.79 In order to achieve the control over the liquor trade that he desired such ‘sweeping’ powers were necessary not only to give enforcement agents the tools to curb bootlegging but also to inspire compliance in ordinary Ontarians.

“The Use of Liquor is Strictly Confined to Residences”: Finally, Ferguson explained the third aspect of government control underpinning temperance in the province. The Act “forbids any public drinking of liquor.” Since he dropped the beer by the glass proposal during the election, the only place to have or consume liquor legally in Ontario was “strictly confined to residences and what constitutes a
residence is clearly defined by law."\textsuperscript{80} This differed significantly from the government control systems in four out of the five other provinces that had already ended Prohibition. British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba and Quebec all allowed public drinking of beer by the glass in licenced outlets.\textsuperscript{81} Only Saskatchewan limited alcohol sale to stores. The Ontario Act went to great lengths to define the concept of residence and it included three specific locations. Most obviously a residence constituted "any building or part of a building...where a person resides." It did not include "any part of a building which part is not actually or exclusively used as a private residence." Curiously, the Act also included a "tent where a person resides" in the definition of a residence.\textsuperscript{82} Ferguson presumably intended to take into consideration the 400,000 overnight tourists who visited Ontario in 1927, many of whom were undoubtedly hunters and campers.\textsuperscript{83} Finally, the definition of residence included a private guest room in a hotel, again to provide a place of legal consumption for Ontario's many tourists but also for Ontarians themselves who either lived permanently in hotels or used them when travelling. Ferguson envisioned the definition of a hotel room as a residence for a "bona fide guest" only and sought to prevent the use of hotel rooms as convenient substitutes for 'public' drinking or locations for activities considered immoral like casual drinking among men and women or even prostitution. Therefore, the Act made it a crime to have or consume alcohol in a hotel room unless the occupant was "duly registered in the office of the hotel as an occupant of that room and has baggage and personal effects belonging to him in the hotel."\textsuperscript{84} The specific delineation of 'residence' as a site of regulation, was a fundamental precondition for regulating personal consumption in a liberal society, as Mariana Valverde argued.\textsuperscript{85} These three definitions of residence served Ferguson's purpose to permit the 'freedom' of legal sale and consumption under any reasonable circumstances, such as while travelling or camping, but still placed controls on those intent on circumventing the law.

After emphasising these three temperance features of his legislation intended to promote moral control over the liquor trade, Ferguson concentrated on the operative side of government control. For him, government control meant investing the Liquor Control Board with the means "to prohibit transactions except through Government agencies" and to make "such prohibition and control...effective."\textsuperscript{86} Government stores constituted the cornerstone of the new system and more than any other change, they
transformed the drinking and buying habits of Ontarians from the secrecy of Prohibition to the highly regulated government control era. Under the new system the LCBO established control over three types of retail outlets or 'agencies.' Firstly, the Board oversaw all aspects of the establishment and running of government liquor stores which sold domestic spirits and wine as well as imported spirits, wine and beer. Prohibition set the precedent for government stores. All the liquor that could be legally sold during Prohibition was regulated through the twelve liquor stores that the government operated under the OTA. During the 1926 campaign Ferguson pointed out the hypocrisy of the government running liquor outlets in the midst of official Prohibition.

Secondly, the Board issued licences to the province’s brewers who organised together to open beer stores, or brewery warehouses as they were called, under the Brewers’ Warehousing Company. The brewers consigned their beer to this company, which then acted as an 'agent' for the brewers handling and distributing their products on a cost basis. The Board regulated the price of beer while the Board’s inspectors closely supervised the day-to-day running of the brewery warehouses. This arrangement differed from that practised in the four western provinces where the liquor boards purchased beer directly from the brewers and then either sold it through the government liquor stores or consigned it to public drinking outlets which then sold it on an off-premises basis. The size of the Ontario market certainly justified the establishment of beer stores in addition to liquor stores while the absence of public drinking outlets in Ontario eliminated the option of selling sealed cartons of beer to customers from such establishments.

Finally, the Board assumed control over the existing 51 wineries in the province, which continued to operate and sell native wine throughout Prohibition. The Board issued licences to the wineries to sell wine from their production locations and "strictly regulated" the price, quantity and quality of wine sold as well as the hours of operation. Besides the rigid control that the Board exercised over the operations of these three types of retail outlets the LCBO also possessed the authority to cancel "without any hearing" the licences of producers to sell their products in Ontario. Ferguson obviously intended to exercise tremendous authority over the alcohol manufacturers and the sale of their wares. The producers
readily accepted these controls as the reintroduction of legal sale in Ontario "opened new horizons" and stimulated the distilling and brewing industries. As Armstrong and Nelles argued, government regulation offered a stable environment to promote economic growth, an atmosphere particularly welcomed for these industries after a decade of Prohibition. Ferguson's intention to closely regulate the alcohol manufacturers highlights the tremendous political influence of these industries. During Prohibition he blamed two Conservative by-election defeats on their "revengeful spirit" after losing their property and livelihood with little compensation. During the 1926 election he endured attacks that he had connections with the distilling industry. While such connections were merely rumours, as Ferguson's biographer Peter Oliver argued, Ferguson clearly intended to use the government monopoly apparatus as a way to achieve an image of control over the powerful liquor interests as well as a way to placate them.

Ferguson assured Ontarians that the establishment of any such stores would be subject to the local option system. Therefore he differentiated between the three types of stores—liquor, beer and wine—for the purposes of local option votes, reflecting the attitude that 'demon rum' was more dangerous than beer or wine. This attitude was partly a carryover from the mythology of the wild whiskey drinking saloon era and a reaction to the often-lethal spirituous bootleg concoctions of Prohibition. The government justified this differentiation arguing that "many localities which would object to the sale within their confines of liquors would not be so disposed to the vending, under Government jurisdiction, of beer and wine." Of course this would also maximise the number of potential stores that would be accepted under a local option system, a goal inherent in the business side of government control. However, even in wet or local option-free areas, the Board had the power to determine which type of stores to establish. According to Ferguson, "the object we have is that the Commission should study conditions and meet public conditions with the least possible offence and a minimum of harm in the community." Although the government demonstrated a clear commitment to meeting public demand, the fear of offending those opposed to the government sale of alcohol remained paramount.

Where the local option system controlled what types of stores if any were opened in a community, permits controlled the very act of purchasing liquor. Ferguson envisaged permits, the
personal licences required to purchase liquor, as the basis for the new system of government control. He proclaimed when introducing the bill: "no liquor hereafter may be purchased by anyone without a personal permit." While the initial draft of the LCA required permits for all types of liquor, the final Act required permits for the purchase of spirits and beer but not for Ontario wine. This reflected not only the fact that wine had been a legal commodity throughout Prohibition, but also the government’s desire "to encourage the purchase of native wine." These passport-style booklets, a new colour for each year to enable quick identification of expired permits, cost $2 annually for Ontario residents or $2 for one month for tourists. The permits identified not only the name, address, and age of the permit-holder but also his or her marital status, occupation and employer’s name. While the age of the purchaser represented the only really relevant information for the purchase of alcohol since sale was limited to those over 21, the Board sought to exercise strict social control over its customers. This constituted a clear example of Valverde’s “community surveillance of the immoral.”

During each visit to a liquor or beer store an employee called an ‘endorser,’ often a female employee, would “enter the date, type of liquor, amount, store number and initials of the employee” into the permit. Then the endorser would have the purchaser sign an order form and then compare it with the signature on the permit. This allowed store employees to keep track of the quantity purchased by each individual. The Board reserved the right to refuse to serve a customer suspected of neglecting his or her family, abusing liquor or buying large quantities to bootleg or sell illegally. Single mothers, for example, proved their moral worthiness for Mothers’ Allowance by having “no car, no radio, no liquor permit.” Clearly the government adhered to the traditional sexual division of labour by having female employees carry out the tedious and detail-oriented job of endorsing permits. Nevertheless, this also illustrated that the government valued the ability of its female employees to carry out this sensitive role in a manner that would diffuse the potentially volatile issue of regulating consumption. This aspect of the history of government control thus expands our understanding of white collar women’s work which in this period tended to be in less “responsible” and less powerful positions than men. The regimentation involved in buying liquor or beer in Ontario contributed to the image of control Ferguson desired. After standing in
line to have his or her permit endorsed and a purchase order filled out, the customer then queued to pay the cashier and then again to receive the purchases.

Besides the discretionary power to refuse to sell liquor in particular cases the Board exercised a more formalised moral control over the purchasing behaviour of Ontarians. The Board maintained an 'interdicted list,' posted in all stores of individuals forbidden by law to purchase liquor. After receiving reports or complaints from law enforcement agents or worried family members concerning the abuse of alcohol by a particular person, the Board placed his or her name on the interdicted list for a certain period of time. When presented with a permit matching the name of an interdicted person, the law bound endorsers to refuse to sell any liquor to the prospective customer. The permit and the interdicted list represented obvious moral controls on Ontarians' access to liquor.

Just as important for Ferguson was the after-sale control that permits allowed. During the election campaign he "laid great stress on the punishment that would be meted out to the individual who, caught with liquor in his possession, could not produce an endorsed permit to show that he had purchased it from a Government store, the only legal source of supply." Once a person had visited a government store, had his or her permit duly endorsed and had finally purchased the desired intoxicants, the Board's regulatory arm did not yet release the customer. Consumption of beverage alcohol was also highly regulated. This regulation directly responded to the experiences of public drunkenness, bootlegging, and secret drinking during Prohibition. It was also a reaction against the heightened fears, fuelled by prohibitionist rhetoric during the election, that the return to legal liquor retail would somehow transform Ontario back to the legendary days of the frontier saloon.

In seeking to overcome the ingrained drinking habits of Prohibition-weary Ontarians, Ferguson determined that control over consumption would be built right into the system. Therefore, he limited consumption to the residence or temporary home of the purchaser. The OTA, in effect, permitted the same thing since consumption in a private residence was never outlawed during Prohibition. However, the permit provided Ferguson with the direct control he desired over consumption since drinkers were now required to 'prove' with their permit that they had obtained their liquor legally. The Act went so far as to
dictate that only the permit-holder could consume the alcohol purchased under his or her permit. In practise this meant that spouses living in the same 'residence,' for example, could not share a bottle of imported wine. Each individual had to buy his or her own liquor under his or her own permit. Furthermore, because the Act confined consumption to one's own residence, one could not carry one's own liquor to another person's residence and consume it there or even consume someone else's liquor there. These provisions obviously represented Ferguson's attempt to gain control over patterns of consumption behaviour that had become deceptive and secretive as well as over patterns of illegal sale carried out under the guise of social gatherings. This paternalistic regulation over all aspects of liquor consumption, even within one's own home, illustrated the lengths that Ferguson felt he had to go to achieve legitimacy and success for his new system after a decade of Prohibition. The government received no criticism regarding this moral control aspect of the Act, revealing not only most Ontarians' satisfaction with the new system of government control but also Ferguson's ability to gauge the mood of the majority of the electorate.

The electorate's overall satisfaction with Ferguson's proposed system generally mirrored that within Queen's Park. The government's overwhelming majority assured the passage of the LCA while divisions within the Liberal Party on the issue of government control, highlighted during the 1926 election, hampered its effectiveness in opposing the measure. While Liberal leader W.E.N. Sinclair expressed his "misgivings as to the future" under government control, other members of his party promoted an even wider provision for sale. The so called wet-wing of the Liberal Party and several Conservative members argued during second reading that the entire system of government control as envisioned by Ferguson would fail without some provision for sale by the glass. Representing border areas like Windsor and traditionally wet ethnic communities such as Kitchener-Waterloo and the French speaking areas of eastern Ontario, these members argued that sale by the glass would curb the bootlegger and serve the working man who could not afford an entire case of beer from a store. Ferguson dismissed these arguments as he would less than a year later when the issue arose again. At that time he repeated his commitment to have "no tinkering" with the LCA until it had been given a fair trial in its
present form. However, this debate began a trend of support for beer by glass that would endure until Depression circumstances made it a viable policy option. The debate also established it as an issue supported to some extent by all parties. However, at this time, the LCA, as it stood, represented the minimum that Ferguson could establish in the province without alienating the moderates who had ensured his election victory. Clearly, once the crisis of Prohibition had passed and his entrepreneurial policy became established, Ferguson resumed a commitment to incremental policy change.

Outside Queen’s Park, critics also denounced a system that restricted sale to stores only. The secretary for an Ontario trades and labour council attacked the bill as encouraging secret drinking, especially in hotel rooms. “I think the conditions would not be so bad if the drinking was done openly... I think something must be done to avoid conditions which will arise in the homes and hotel rooms. If a fellow is given the chance to buy a glass of beer at a lunch room, he will drink it and go on.” Because Ferguson initially included the beer policy in his election campaign in response to workers’ demands for sale by the glass, labour groups reacted bitterly at being let down by the government. The hotel industry also opposed the LCA. Although it clearly had a financial stake in a policy that would allow the sale of beer by the glass in hotels, the industry expressed several serious concerns with the future of government control. For example, the secretary-treasurer of the Toronto Hotel Association, E. R. Powell, argued “that if drinking were allowed openly in hotel restaurants and dining rooms it would not proceed in the same extent as when it is forced into hotel rooms.”

Despite the strong arguments for beer by the glass, even from within his own party, Ferguson remained committed to the decision he had made during the election. The only legal sale of alcohol in Ontario would be in the form of bottles sealed with special government stamps from government stores.

The province’s traditional prohibitionists also voiced their opposition to government control though for obviously different reasons than the beer by the glass supporters. United Church minister Ben Spence, the 60-year-old former secretary of the Ontario branch of the Dominion Alliance for the Total Suppression of the Liquor Traffic, the group largely responsible for Prohibition, criticised Ferguson’s plan as “nothing more than a liquor-selling proposition.” The general secretary of the Board of Missions
for the Presbyterian Church in Canada pronounced "the only thing I feel about it is that no system that allows the sale of liquor for beverage purposes would appeal to me." However he did relent somewhat by admitting that, "if you have a strong Government behind it and if they can enforce it then it might be a better system." The general secretary of the Ontario Prohibition Union, a body active in defending any erosion in the OTA during Prohibition, exhibited a similarly divided opinion. While he feared that the new system would produce "a period of much-increased consumption of liquor with the accompanying social and business difficulties," he acknowledged significantly that, "the Premier has resolutely faced a very difficult task" by infusing the Act with "good features" such as local option, the permit and the restriction of consumption to private residences.\(^\text{113}\) This concern with liquor consumption constituted just one area of social behaviour that fundamentalists of the 1920s viewed as evidence of declining morals. These same reformers lobbied for controls on the "debased" theatre and motion pictures, immoral novels, dancing, immodest dress and birth control.\(^\text{114}\) Obviously Ferguson's ability to deliver a policy acceptable to the large majority of the population affected even the province's dedicated prohibitionist groups, the representatives of which appeared willing to concede the positive potential of government control despite their serious reservations.

**GOVERNMENT LIQUOR STORES**

If there was ever a doubt that the public desired retail liquor, the reaction to the opening of the first stores on June 1, 1927 quickly dispelled it. "When the Ontario government...threw back the lid of its liquor chest...the public helped itself generously." At the province's initial twelve stores, six in Toronto and six in other large centres, customers "waited in line for hours [and] left with wet goods in paper bags." Observers noted that at the various Toronto stores "many women were to be seen in the different line ups of purchasers."\(^\text{115}\) For the previous decade those Ontarians who desired a drink had to resort to faking an illness to get a doctor's prescription or risk legal consequences by buying from a bootlegger. As Table 1 shows, the Board initially sold nearly 280,000 permits\(^\text{116}\) to customers who waited in "long jostling lines,"\(^\text{117}\) illustrating the unquestionable popularity of the new stores. According to an outsider's perspective, however, "an Ontario liquor store is a grim, businesslike place."\(^\text{118}\) Coming from an
American writing in the midst of his country's official Prohibition, this observation appeared ironic, when his country had no legal liquor outlets. However, it undoubtedly referred to the imposing counter behind which all the liquor bottles remained hidden and the numerous lines that customers had to go through in order to receive their purchases. This regimented process must certainly have paled in comparison to the adventure, not to mention the danger, involved in a visit to the local bootlegger that the American visitor experienced back home.

![Table 1](source: LCBO Annual Reports 1927-1929/30)

Establishing a 'businesslike' image right from the start represented one of the Board's main objectives along with its desire to control the liquor trade in a moralistic manner. A business required employees and with the prospect of stores eventually opening up across the province loyal Conservatives lobbied Ferguson for patronage positions. The government officially maintained that the power to hire employees rested with the LCBO. Nevertheless the allure of attracting and repaying political loyalty with liquor store or inspector appointments must have been attractive to the Conservatives especially since the government ultimately approved all Board appointments. Therefore, as Ferguson's biographer Peter
Oliver argued, "the new liquor store system to all appearances was an important cog in the Tory political machine." An internal memo from the early 1960s confirmed that "appointments are made on the recommendation of the local [Conservative] Association." With almost 800 positions to fill initially, as Table 2 depicts, including 532 store employees and 133 inspectors, a number that grew to over 1000 after the first year of operation, government control proved an invaluable source of patronage.

**Table 2**

**Number of LCBO Employees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1927/28</th>
<th>1928/29</th>
<th>1929/30</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Employees</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1927-1929/30*

As a business enterprise the LCBO also intended to make a profit. The Board's predecessor, the Licence Commission and even Prohibition itself, set the precedent for this. During the decade under the OTA the Licence Commission made $5.2 million in net revenue from the sale of alcohol, mostly for so-called medicinal purposes, from the government's own dispensaries. As Table 3 illustrates, the over $3.8 million in net profit that the Board made in its first 5 months of operation (from the opening of the first stores on June 1, 1927 to the end of the fiscal year October 31) was no surprise to the government. The Board paid all but $4,700, retained for the following year's operations, to the provincial treasury as required by the LCA and helped reverse a long series of provincial deficits. The Board accrued these profits from sales through the 86 liquor stores and 86 brewery warehouses established by October 31, as shown in Tables 3 and 4 and "covering practically all the central points throughout the Province." The Board's profits resulted after it paid the alcohol producers and the various federal duties and taxes. Initially Ferguson promised to "give the workingman his beer at cost, or as near cost as possible,"
especially after he eliminated the beer by the glass provision of his policy. "We are not looking for any profit from the sale of beer," he proclaimed when introducing the legislation. Yet he conceded that the power to "cut" prices rested with the Control Board.\textsuperscript{125} Clearly the Board's profits revealed that it was selling its wares significantly above cost. While Ferguson intended his promises to the 'workingman' for affordable beer to lessen the disappointment over the revocation of his beer by the glass policy, the

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Total Alcohol Sales in Ontario and LCBO Profits to Provincial Treasurer 1927-1929/30}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Years & 1927 & 1927/28 & 1928/29 & 1929/30 \\
\hline
Dollars & Total Alcohol Sales & & & \\
\hline
Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1927-1929/30
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

prosperity of the late 1920s lessened the significance of workers' demands for cheap beer. And as Campbell discovered in the case of British Columbia, politicians argued that it would be "immoral" for them to sell liquor at cost, believing it would promote excessive consumption.\textsuperscript{126} The twin goals of the Ontario Board, moral control and business efficiency, coincided to produce tremendous profits for the provincial treasury and the image of control over excessive consumption.
These two impulses, to serve the public as a business enterprise and to regulate sale and consumption with moral overtones, competed within the Board from its earliest days. The Board's first annual report proclaimed that, "the desire of the Board has been to give reasonable service to all." Almost as an afterthought, the report added that, "a proper control of the purchase and sale of liquor should be its aim." Given the intense environment of public debate that still fostered the attitude of a major Toronto newspaper that government control was "an evil liquor-selling system," this commitment to public service in the form of liquor retail is surprising. However, in this period of adjustment away from Prohibition and towards government control, the Board and the government were still testing out their policies. In order to wean drinkers away from their reliance on bootleggers and prescriptions, the Board had to provide them with a certain standard of service. As Little argued in the case of Mothers' Allowance, a complex and interdependent relationship existed between the regulator and the regulated. While the government endeavoured to uphold the morality of society by regulating buying and consumption behaviour, it also needed to provide adequate service to the regulated to ensure that they purchased the products, thereby promoting the business success of the government policy.
By justifying its existence on the fulfilment of a public service, the Board not only established service as a primary goal but, in reaction to the fears of the excesses of the Prohibition era, and in combination with its twin moral control role, this service impulse took on a decidedly paternalistic hue. For example, the Board even created its own jargon to deal with its position as a business charged with morally controlling a consumer product. The Board rarely used the word ‘customer’ in its correspondence, preferring instead the utilitarian ‘purchaser’ or ‘permittee.’ The employees in charge of stores were not managers but instead were ‘vendors.’ The Board desired to function as a business enterprise but its impulse to regulate morality challenged this approach. Only with a paternalistic and moralistic view of liquor consumption was monopoly justified and in return this monopoly could only be justified through customer service. This type of circular logic reinforced the Board’s twin impulses. Even D.B. Hanna, the Board’s esteemed first Chief Commissioner, expressed this dichotomous attitude toward liquor control. While on the one hand he could casually refer to himself as the “boss bartender” of the province, at a time when the very word ‘bar’ evoked dreadful images for many, upon his retirement from the Board he announced that he would now return to his “legitimate business.”130 While he undoubtedly referred to his return to the private sector, reporters chuckled at the alternate interpretation of his comment: that government retail of liquor was a somewhat illegitimate endeavour.

Hanna’s retirement represented the completion of the initial establishment of government control. Although he spent only one year as Chief Commissioner he achieved what he promised Ferguson in the late winter of 1927: to lend respectability and authority to a Board charged with transforming buying and consuming behaviour into a new era. Dr. Manion also retired at the same time choosing to continue his political career in Ottawa on a full-time basis. An able politician, he went on to become leader of the federal Conservative Party. John M. McNamara, County Judge of Renfrew replaced him as a Commissioner. Ferguson appointed Sir Henry Drayton to replace Hanna as Chief Commissioner. Unlike his predecessor, Drayton was a prominent Conservative, holding the position of Finance Minister in two federal administrations and even the party leadership on a temporary basis.131 Despite these undeniable political ties, even the staunchly Liberal Toronto Star editorialised that “the Premier must again be
deemed fortunate in securing Sir Henry Drayton as his [Hanna’s] successor."132 Unquestionably the 50-year-old lawyer from Kingston brought to the job of Chief Commissioner a great deal more than his Conservative ties. For example, Drayton had served as Chairman of the Dominion Railway Commission, organised the evacuation of women and children from enemy countries during World War One and acted as Power Controller under the War Measures Act in 1917 during his long and varied career.133 Ferguson declared that he was “delighted” to secure “a man with the personal standing and administrative ability of Sir Henry Drayton.”134 In order to dedicate himself completely to the full-time position of Chief Commissioner, Drayton resigned his seat in the federal House of Commons.

Interestingly, Drayton shared the same divided philosophy towards government control as his predecessor, certainly a prerequisite for the position. In a circular to store clerks, Drayton instructed them that “courtesy must be extended to the public at all times.”135 However, he also warned them to be vigilant never to sell to people suspected of supplying bootleggers, depriving their families financially or abusing liquor. It appears as if two opposing principles were guiding the Board at the same time. In many ways this is exactly what was happening. It sought to be both an effective business and a moral watchdog over its customers. One important reason for the endurance of the moral role of government control was that the government still feared the political influence or perceived influence of the province’s prohibitionists. In a solicitous reply to the Ontario Woman’s Christian Temperance Union’s (WCTU) request for liquor sale statistics, Ferguson assured the Union’s corresponding secretary that, “the government is exceedingly anxious that no effort should be spared to lessen the consumption of alcohol [and is] anxious to have the support of all classes of people.”136 In effect he argued that the government agency charged with selling liquor was equally committed to curbing the amount sold. Although the 1920s ultimately represented the “last, sad decade of the Ontario WCTU,” from Ferguson’s perspective, the Ontario Union represented an important interest group whose membership nearly doubled over the decade of Prohibition.137 Clearly he desired to win over the support of the province’s prohibitionist forces and framed his reply to emphasise the temperance aspects of his government control program.
Every aspect of the operation of government stores revealed this desire to quell the anxiety surrounding the return to legalised liquor retail engendered by prohibitionist forces such as the WCTU. As a result the Board overcompensated in its obsession with the control aspects of the system. Permits constituted the first lines of defence against any breach of control. In a circular designed to "continue [the] progress [that] has been made in control," Drayton warned all vendors, inspectors and permit endorsers to "make close scrutiny of the signature on the purchase order and permit." During the 1927/28 fiscal year the Board cancelled 5,118 of the over 376,000 permits it had issued and placed 20 individuals on the interdicted list, a clear example of the Board's use of moral control for any perceived abuse of its products. Although there were "no hard and fast rules" regarding the volume and timing of purchases, these were also highly regulated. "Frequent or excessive purchasers should be referred to the vendor who will deal with them." As the Board's second annual report emphasised, "the purchase of liquor ought to come and must come after, and a long way after, the necessities of life, and adequate duty to dependants." By stressing the moral control aspect of government control in this manner the Board hoped to avoid the realisation of any of the fears surrounding the return of legalised liquor retail. Excess, abuse or hints of promotional selling were to be avoided at all times. All of these controls characterised a system predicated on the assumption that buying liquor was a privilege for Ontario citizens, not a right. The Board articulated this tenet when it instructed all vendors to turn over to the Board's liquor store inspectors the permit of anyone abusing the "privilege of purchasing." This approach to liquor retail and the paternalistic character of the early system of government control in Ontario is not surprising given the experience of Prohibition and the lingering prohibitionist sentiment.

What is surprising, however, is that in this environment of control and regulation the Board also demonstrated a commitment to provide customer service as a business enterprise. This commitment is clearly evident in the regular communications to store vendors emanating from the Comptroller's office, held by World War One veteran J.A. McGeachie. He oversaw the daily operations of the Board and answered directly to the Chief Commissioner. The tone and manner of store employees in direct contact with customers was of primary concern. In 1927 the Board proclaimed, "Every store employee must
realise that perfunctory service is insufficient and must interest himself intelligently.”144 Two years later the Board reinforced the same sentiment. “All public servants must treat people coming in to do business with courtesy.”145 The Board also sought to provide “good merchandising”146 in liquor retail and therefore closely monitored the brands and quantities desired by customers. The Stock Supervisor asked all vendors to advise him “if you are being asked for certain native wines that you do not stock.”147 This interest in satisfying customer preferences was matched by the desire to avoid any criticism when preferred brands were out of stock. “Take care to post information about brands out of stock so the customer does not make adverse criticism when told he must make out a new purchase order.”148

Customer service also extended into the domain of store hours. During the new system’s first holiday season the Board decided that for the two weeks before Christmas all stores would extend their hours to 9 pm on certain weekday evenings and to 6 pm from the usual 1 pm on Saturdays. Even these expanded hours could be modified to meet specific customer needs. The Board told vendors that “if you feel the public would be better served with your store open later on a different night please advise.”149 In early 1928 after that first Christmas rush under the new system of government control, the Board, anxious to improve its service and learn from the experience, asked all vendors to report on their situation during the holiday season. Did they run out of certain brands? Did they require extra employees? This information and “any other valuable points” would be used to “plan for next year.”150 In the first years of government control the Board sought not only to provide Ontarians with the basic sale of liquor but demonstrated a commitment to providing pleasant customer service, convenient hours and a sensitivity to customer brand preference.

This commitment is a little known aspect of Ontario’s government control history and a surprising one in this era following a decade of Prohibition. Prohibition not only set the precedent for government liquor stores, but the reaction against the excesses of that era also determined that an emphasis on moral control would be one of the Board’s guiding principles for the next half century. Despite this the service impulse was evident and under certain circumstances concern with pleasing the customer assumed prominence while under others it faded into the background. These formative years of
the LCBO, when ideas were being tested and the public mood was being gauged, provide an example of one of these particular historical times. Nevertheless, there was nothing altruistic about this service. Despite the fact that Ferguson himself admitted that the Board must be committed to avoiding excessive consumption, the business side of government control took to the forefront with good business practices. As the only legal source of liquor in the province, stores could have treated customers with indifference or even scorn. However, a desire to keep customers happy and away from bootleggers and to maintain or even increase Board profits came to the forefront more often than is usually assumed of liquor stores of the 1920s. The importance of profits became abundantly clear for Ferguson’s government at the end of 1928 when the Board earned a net profit of $7.8 million in its first full fiscal year of operation, $7.2 million of which it paid to the Provincial Treasurer as Table 3 shows. An additional 39 liquor stores and 27 brewery warehouses, depicted in Table 4, certainly contributed to these earnings while increased tourism and a generally “prosperous year” fostered the sale of over 376,000 resident permits and over 88,000 temporary visitor permits, shown in Table 2.131

Less than three years into his mandate, Premier Ferguson took advantage of this prosperity and the financial success of his government control system by calling an election for October 30, 1929. Though he appealed to the people on his government’s record of efficient and progressive management, the liquor issue quickly assumed centre stage. Liberal leader Sinclair grasped the issue as a way to attack the ruling Conservatives. Initially Sinclair acknowledged that “the method now required by the people as the means of dealing with the temperance question is that of government control.” He expressed support for the LCA and even argued that its goal “should be service to people requiring liquor for personal use.”132 This apparent belief in government control and even the right of citizens to this service was surprising from a man leading a party known for its dedication to the policy of prohibition. Instead of attacking government control or the LCA, Sinclair argued that a Liberal government would place more emphasis on enforcement, less emphasis on revenue and make the administration of the Board less partisan. In short, his government would do a better job of addressing the twin goals of the system—moral advancement and business efficiency—by favouring more generously the former. Nevertheless, by
the early weeks of the campaign Sinclair made his prohibition commitments clear. When the Prohibition Union proposed the immediate enactment of a prohibition law that would be made effective when endorsed in a non-partisan referendum, Sinclair revealed that this approach was "much the same as my own." Ferguson hotly rejected such a notion, and declared that "there will be no plebiscite so long as the Government is in power—and I happen to be at the head of it." He argued that such direct votes violated the principle of responsible government. Although he used them in the past, now that he achieved his policy of government control he sought to guard against any direct threat to it.

Voters rejected Liberal appeals for a prohibition referendum and returned Ferguson’s government “with the largest Legislative representation ever accorded an administration in Ontario,” to that point. Despite the consistent presence of the liquor issue in the debates, prohibition as an acceptable alternative was rejected. No one running as a Prohibition candidate was elected. With this first election after Prohibition, a return to that era would never again be a legitimate alternative in an Ontario election. Even the prohibitionist Toronto Star admitted “that nobody has any right to doubt that the people of Ontario, by a large majority, endorsed the liquor policy now in force and have expressed confidence in Mr. Ferguson and his colleagues to make such amendments in the law as they may consider advisable.” With this election, government control ceased to be an experiment being given a “fair trial,” and emerged as the official liquor policy of the province.

Government control was established in a time of economic growth, when “provincial finances were in such an improved condition.” This allowed Ferguson to ignore pleas for beer by the glass on the basis of working class poverty without any fear of political repercussions. Instead the Board focused all its energies on expanding the number of stores to serve thirsty Ontarians and visitors. By the end of the 1928 fiscal year, the Board directly operated 117 liquor stores, and regulated the operations of 102 brewery warehouses and 51 native winery outlets. The annual report for that year boasted that “1928 has been a prosperous year. The number of tourists has largely increased...The sale of liquors has increased...Periods of prosperity increase it.” The next fiscal year was also one “of exceptional prosperity” and correspondingly, “sales have increased,” as Table 3 illustrates. As Table 4 shows, new
liquor stores and brewery warehouses were opened, bringing the total to 122 and 105 respectively.\textsuperscript{161} However, by the end of 1930, the first full year of the Great Depression, “Ontario suffered from the economic depression...affecting to a more or less extent every branch of industry,”\textsuperscript{162} and thus no more new stores were opened. This, and Ferguson’s retirement at the end of 1930 to assume the position of High Commissioner to the United Kingdom,\textsuperscript{163} signalled the end of an era. The architect of Ontario’s government control plan had ushered the system through its formative years. He turned to loftier roles in the mother country while Ontarians turned their attentions to the worsening economic conditions at home, conditions that would have a significant impact on their government control system.
Notes to Chapter 1

8. Campbell, Demon Rum, p. 27.
17. Hallowell, p. 91.
18. Campbell, Demon Rum, p. 23.
20. Hallowell, p. 120.
23. Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson, p. 224.
25. Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson, pp. 229, 250.
27. Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson, pp. 159, 271.
29. Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson, p. 271.
30. Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson, p. 271.
34. Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson, pp. 165-6.
35. Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson, p. 272.
37. Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson, p. 272.
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38 Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson. p. 274.
40 Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson. p. 272.
42 Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson. p. 275.
44 Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson. p. 82.
45 Hodgetts. p. 30.
46 Hodgetts. p. 159.
47 Tennyson. 236.
49 Statutes of Ontario. 1927. 17 George V. c. 70. s. 25 (2).
50 See Oliver. Public and Private Persons. p. 76.
52 See Tennyson. p. 236.
53 Hodgetts. p. 164
54 Hodgetts. pp. 30, 64.
56 Campbell. Demon Rum. p. 42.
58 Hodgetts. p. 70.
67 Campbell. Demon Rum, pp. 60-61.
75 Statutes of Ontario. 1927, 17 George V, c. 70, s. 107.
76 Statutes of Ontario. 1927, 17 George V, c. 70, s. 108 (3).
77 Statutes of Ontario. 1927, 17 George V, c. 70, s. 103 (1).
78 First Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, June 1, 1927 to October 31, 1927, p. 7.
79 “Premier is Pleased By Reception Given to New Liquor Bill,” The Globe, March 12, 1927, pp. 21, 22.
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82 Statutes of Ontario, 1927, 17 George V, c. 70, s. 2 (q).
83 Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson. p. 203.
84 Statutes of Ontario, 1927, 17 George V, c. 70, s. 91 (b).
85 Valverde, Diseases of the Will. p. 145.
86 "Wide Powers Given Control Board By New Liquor Bill." p. 6.
88 The terms such as 'public drinking outlet' and 'licenced premises' are used here to describe facilities more commonly known as 'bars.' While admittedly awkward and vague these phrases accurately describe establishments that could not by law use terms such as 'bar.'
89 See Statutes of Ontario, 1927, 17 George V, c. 70, s. 45; First Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, June 1, 1927 to October 31, 1927, p. 6; and RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 2. LCBO Correspondence General Manager, File "Manitoba Beer Prices 1963."
90 First Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, June 1, 1927 to October 31, 1927, p. 6.
91 Statutes of Ontario, 1927, 17 George V, c. 70, s. 53.
94 Bothwell, p. 119.
95 Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson, p. 269-70
99 Liquor Control Act Comes Into Effect At Ten This Morning. The Globe, June 1, 1927, p. 13.
101 Valverde, Age of Light. p. 129.
102 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8. LCBO General Manager Correspondence File "Circulars 1927 #1-200."
103 Circular #169 October 25, 1927 to all vendors from Comptroller McGeeachie.
104 Little, p. 52.
106 Statutes of Ontario, 1927, 17 George V, c. 70, s. 95 (1).
108 Statutes of Ontario, 1927, 17 George V, c. 70, s. 42 (1).
109 Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson. p. 280.
117 First Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, June 1, 1927 to October 31, 1927, p. 15.
120 Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson. p. 279.
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120 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence, John Yaremko Liquor Files. File "LCBO 1960 and 1961." (restricted) August 31, 1961 to Provincial Secretary John Yaremko from Deputy Chief Commissioner W.T. Murchie.
124 First Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, June 1, 1927 to October 31, 1927, p. 5.
126 Campbell, Demon Rum, p. 44.
127 First Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, June 1, 1927 to October 31, 1927, p. 5.
129 Little, p. xviii.
130 "Hanna Smiles As He Returns To 'Legitimate' Job," The Toronto Star, April 16, 1928, p. 1.
131 "Ottawa Tories Surprised As Drayton Takes Post," The Toronto Star, April 16, 1928, p. 3.
135 RG 3-6-0-1468, Ferguson Correspondence. File "Liquor Control—Operation Of, 1929." Circular April 24, 1929 to all vendors from Drayton.
136 RG 3-6-0-1468, Ferguson Correspondence. File "Liquor Control—Operation Of, 1929" March 18, 1929 from Ferguson to the Ontario WCTU.
137 Sharon Anne Cook, pp. 196, 203.
138 Circular, April 24, 1929 to all vendors from Drayton.
140 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File "Circulars 1927 #1-200."
Circular #49 July 28, 1927.
141 Circular, April 24, 1929 to all vendors from Drayton.
143 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776, Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence, File "Circulars 201-400."
Circular #333 April 18, 1928 to all Vendors from A.H. Birmingham.
144 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence, File "Circulars 1927 1-200."
Instructions to vendors re. Issue of liquor permits 1927-28 from Hanna October 2, 1927, p. 5.
145 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence, File "Circulars 701-800." Circular #759 July 23, 1929 to all vendors from Director of Permits.
146 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence, File "Circulars 1927 1-200."
Circular #86 August 25, 1927 to all vendors from Birmingham.
147 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence, File "Circulars 1927 1-200."
Circular #40 July 18, 1927 to all vendors from Stock Supervisor.
148 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence, File "Circulars 1927 1-200."
Circular #15 to all vendors from McGeachie.
149 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence, File "Circulars 201-400."
Circular #219 December 6, 1927 to all vendors from Birmingham.
150 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence, File "Circulars 201-400."
Circular #255 January 3, 1928 to all vendors from Birmingham.
152 "Liberals Accept Liquor Law But Demand Enforcement," The Toronto Star, June 4, 1929, p. 5.
153 "Prohibitionists' Stand Is Much Like His Own, Mr. Sinclair Declares," The Globe, September 19, 1929, p. 1.
Notes to Chapter 1


"THE TAPS ARE TURNED ON"¹

[Beer and wine by the glass] offers the people of Ontario a little more freedom in their personal affairs, trusts them a little further in the matter of when, where and what they shall drink and in many ways it may make life a little more pleasant for a great many people.²

As the prosperous environment of the late 1920s shaped the initial form of the LCBO, so the Depression of the 1930s influenced the policy responses of the Board in that era. During the later 1920s Ferguson had to commit the Board to customer service to ensure the success of his infant system in the face of real competition from well-established bootleggers. By 1934 Ferguson’s successor Premier George S. Henry had to go even further in the face of depressed economic conditions that threatened the revenue of the government control system because this revenue became ever more valuable in the running of the province. This meant his government’s acceptance of the most significant liquor policy change since the creation of the LCBO itself: the reinstatement of the sale of beer and wine by the glass in the summer of 1934 after an 18 year absence in Ontario. The Depression circumstances had to advance beyond the initial 1929 crisis before Henry dared to take any action. The first four years of the Depression were the “leanest and most unsettling”³ of the economic crisis. By 1933 drought and economic dislocation resulted in approximately 12% of the population on direct relief for their bare necessities while living standards fell significantly for most Ontarians.⁴

Ferguson’s handpicked successor had to deal with this dramatic change in economic conditions. Known as ‘Honest George Henry,’ the wealthy 59-year-old York County farmer and lawyer served as Ferguson’s friend and loyal minister before being confirmed Premier at a party convention in late 1930.⁵ Described as hardworking, sincere, able and earnest, the United Church member appeared an uncontroversial replacement for the successful and flamboyant Ferguson. Lacking the flair and sensitivity
to public sentiment of his predecessor, Henry's cautious, businesslike and incremental approach to governing would be challenged by the Depression circumstances and their particular impact on liquor policy.  

**IMPACT OF THE DEPRESSION ON THE LCBO**

The Depression unmistakably affected the LCBO. The Board opened no new liquor stores between 1931 and 1935 and the number of brewery warehouses actually declined by one. The depressed economic conditions also solidified the Board's initial policy of limiting winery licences. Chief Commissioner Drayton defended the rejection of winery licence requests in early 1932, arguing to Premier Henry that "many wineries are too small and are really doing nothing." As a result of this conclusion, in 1935 the Board actually facilitated the reduction in the number of wineries by permitting the larger wineries to purchase the smaller ones. This allowed the larger wineries to open an additional retail outlet for each licence obtained. The total number of retail stores in the province remained static at 51, the original number of wineries. As Table 5 shows, overall alcohol sales decreased throughout the first years of the 1930s, "reflecting the economic depression." The fiscal year 1931/32 showed a decline of 21.2% in sales at liquor stores, brewery warehouses and winery outlets, while the next year reported a further 16.5% decrease. While prices were lowered in 1932 as a result of reduced customs duties, the volume of alcohol sold continued to decline. For example, the amount of imported spirits sold declined by over 33% between 1931 and 1933 while domestic beer declined by almost 13% over the same period. Diminished purchasing power among Ontarians also revealed itself in the number of permits bought, as Table 6 depicts. In 1932-33 residents and visitors purchased 27% fewer permits than in the previous year. Despite these declining sales, the Board showed a profit in 1932-33, paying $6 million to the provincial treasury, as illustrated in Table 5. Nevertheless this figure failed to match the $7.5 million paid five years earlier. The Opposition therefore questioned the Board's apparent inability to produce the revenue forecasted by the government. Liberal House Leader George McQuibban alleged in the spring of 1934 that the government had "drained the accounts" of the LCBO to the "last dollar" in order to boost the provincial coffers and make the best financial showing before the coming election.
Predictably government members disputed this version of the events but it was clear that by many indicators the Depression significantly affected the workings of the Board.

Table 5
Total Alcohol Sales in Ontario and LCBO Profits Paid to Provincial Treasurer
1929/30-1932/33

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<th>Years</th>
<th>Total Alcohol Sales</th>
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Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1929/30-1932/33
Table 6
Permit Sales in Ontario 1929/30-1932/33

Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1929/30-1932/33

Table 7
Number of LCBO Employees 1929/30-1932/33

Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1929/30-1932/33
The Board responded to the economic downturn in a number of ways. Its business impulse prompted it to shore up reduced profits and adjust its marketing to accommodate the public's generally reduced purchasing power, while its moral framework determined that it would prevent needy customers from spending their scarce income on liquor. Like other businesses during an economic downturn, the Board experienced a reduction in personnel as depicted in Table 7, even at the leadership level. When Chief Commissioner Drayton retired in April 1932 Premier Henry promoted former Commissioner Stewart McClenaghan to succeed him but without giving McClenaghan any increase in his former salary. Although with deflation he did not need to. Furthermore, Henry did not appoint anyone to replace McClenaghan in his old position.¹⁵

**Permit Now Required for Ontario Wine:** The Board also used its power over permits to simultaneously raise revenues and impose moral control. In November 1930 the Board reversed the Prohibition-inspired tradition of allowing Ontario wine to be purchased without a permit by imposing a beer and wine permit for one dollar per year,¹⁶ resulting in the increase in permit sales shown in Table 6. The original liquor permit remained and could be used for all types of beverage alcohol. Chief Commissioner McClenaghan later justified the move as a way to promote beer and wine instead of spirits.¹⁷ For one dollar less than the liquor permit, Ontarians interested in purchasing only beer or wine (domestic or imported) could buy this new permit and presumably never be 'tempted' to purchase spirits. While McClenaghan's argument had merit, the Board earlier argued that the sale of native wine, with an alcohol content up to 27%, "without the restriction of a permit...constitutes an anomaly which ought not to exist."¹⁸ Once the Depression began affecting permit and liquor sales the Board took the opportunity to impose this new permit in order to compensate for these dropping sales. At the same time the new permit represented an attempt to impose moral control over the sale of these products and appease dry supporters who were demanding even more restrictive control on liquor retail in the face of the early Depression conditions.¹⁹

The Board introduced another amendment to the permit system in late 1930 in order to "more strictly control the sales" in the face of the depressed economy. A new column in the permit booklets
contained a running tally of the cost of all purchases. The Board intended "to directly bring home to those purchasing liquor the amount of money they are spending on luxuries, possibly to the expense of real necessities." The addition of this new column to the permit provided store staff with an easily recognisable indicator of excessive purchases and provided customers with a bold reminder of their expenditures on alcohol, especially poignant in the midst of declining real incomes.

Relief Recipients Denied Liquor Permits: At the same time the Board also denied sale altogether to some of its prospective customers. In July 1931 Chief Commissioner Drayton emphasised to Premier Henry the need to compel relief associations to provide lists of relief recipients to Board stores. "It is not enough to just take permits away, it is best to try to have lists. Those requiring relief should deny themselves the unnecessary expense of liquor." In its 1931/32 annual report, the Board announced that:

in the City of Toronto all applicants for relief are required...to obtain a certificate from the Liquor Control Board to the effect that they do not hold a permit. [At liquor stores in all other areas of the province] vendors are instructed to obtain a list from...their Municipality of all parties on relief, so that should a person on relief apply for a liquor permit, same would be refused. [Relief recipients with permits already] were placed on the "Prohibited List" and will remain there until their names are removed from the [relief] lists.

This concern with selling liquor to needy Ontarians conformed to other Board policies such as the interdicted list. Economic conditions had never been so severe, though, as to warrant such a co-ordinated effort. Previously, vendors used their own discretion to determine if liquor sales harmed domestic finances. Once the Depression rendered financial hardship more widespread, the Board's belief that purchasing liquor was a privilege and not a right dictated the removal of that privilege for relief recipients.

The Sale of Single Bottles of Beer: While the Board endeavoured to protect the neediest and most vulnerable Ontarians from the unnecessary purchase of liquor, it attempted simultaneously to adapt its merchandising policies to the lowered economic status of others, displaying the dichotomous character of the Board's goals. LCBO headquarters directed all brewery warehouses to display special signs alerting customers that single bottles of beer could be purchased. Originally, the Board sold beer by the
This requirement originated from the immediate post-Prohibition fear of secret drinking facilitated by easily concealed single beer bottles. This policy change revealed the Board's willingness to abandon such moral controls in order to satisfy its business goals by widening its customer base when faced with an economic downturn. Those who would otherwise be unable to afford an entire case of beer in these depressed economic conditions could now purchase a single bottle. In this era without bars to provide the service of beer by the glass, this change in marketing policy created a whole new class of customers. This same Board could make it harder to purchase certain types of liquor with new permit requirements and deny sale altogether to relief recipients while making liquor easier to purchase for others. Clearly the moral and business impulses that formed the Board remained integral influences on policy change into the 1930s.

*The Sale of Smaller Bottles of Spirits:* Another change reflecting the Board's desire to respond to customer demands, and not coincidentally to shore up sagging sales, was the introduction of the 'half bottle' of spirits. In its 1930/31 annual report, the Board announced the sale of the new sized bottle in response to customer "requests that have been made that half bottles of spirits be sold." Previously, the Board sold only 40-ounce bottles for fear that "the ordinary half bottle could be carried in the pocket as readily as a flask, and that half bottles would facilitate drinking in motors and other illegal places." To prevent this, the Board instructed the liquor producers to employ a half bottle, "triangular in shape...that would be very inconvenient to carry on the person." Clearly the Board sought to introduce new marketing techniques while still finding ways to implement them with a moral overtone. Like the sale of single bottles of beer, the half bottle of spirits was an attempt to adapt to the changed economic circumstances of Board customers. Although the Board justified the change on the basis of customer requests, the timing of the introduction clearly indicated an influential economic stimulus.

**"THE BOARD IS ALWAYS CONCERNED WITH PUBLIC SERVICE"**

Even while the Board instituted ways to curtail or deny altogether sales from its stores, the business impulse that helped create the system was evident. Along with instructions on how to refer a permittee to the vendor when there were questions about the legality of a permit, the Board directed clerks
not to force permittees to stand in line twice "so the purchaser may obtain his requirements with as little delay as possible."26 This concern not to inconvenience the purchasing public, even a purchaser whose permit was questioned, exemplified a commitment to service that endured even into the Depression. Before the Christmas rush of 1930 the Supervisor of Stores reminded vendors to consider hiring new staff for the coming season since "the Board is always concerned with public service."27 The Board expressed this concern, as well as the influence of the wine industry, perhaps most readily in June 1933 when it notified vendors that a booklet called 'Wine Connoisseur' would be sent to them. "For some time past it has been the opinion of the Board that vendors should be supplied with...information regarding the various wines we carry...to answer satisfactorily questions from permittees about how and when to serve wines."28 This booklet represented the beginning of a long history of wine education by the Board. The Board's commitment to this form of education ebbed and flowed throughout its history, providing a gauge to measure its general commitment to the business goal of customer service.

While these service initiatives can be interpreted simply as attempts to bolster revenues, the Board's commitment to profits cannot always be assumed to be paramount. When confronted with the choice between moral control and profit the Board's decision was not necessarily predictable. In February 1933 Board Commissioner J.M. McNamara wrote to the Attorney General asking that the provision in the LCA requiring Board stores to close on all election days be relaxed. McNamara cited examples of municipal elections where only one ward was involved or only 16 votes were polled. He argued that these frequent closings resulted in a "loss of money to the Board" and suggested that closings be reduced at the discretion of the Board.29 After reviewing McNamara's arguments, Board solicitor, W.B. Common, advised the Attorney General that "I quite appreciate of course that a loss of revenue results from the closing of the Board's stores...at the same time I feel the government might be severely criticised if they relaxed the restrictions...in question."30 Common's argument endured into the early 1970s when liquor could be sold on election days for the first time but only after the polls were closed, illustrating the persistence of these moral constraints. While profit did motivate some liquor policy changes and certainly prompted many of the business initiatives throughout the history of government
control, the competing impulse of moral control always tempered the profit motive, never allowing the LCBO to operate like any other business.

**OPPOSING DEPRESSION SOLUTIONS: PROHIBITION AND BEER BY THE GLASS**

Just as the LCBO struggled to adjust to the Depression conditions, the economic downturn produced divergent reactions among Ontarians. Ferguson retired confident that the government control system he had ushered in was past its initial growing pains. But by the early 1930s the spectrum of liquor control policy options being proposed by various groups ranged from limiting store hours and even total prohibition on the one hand to increasing access to liquor in the form of beer by the glass on the other. Initially Ferguson, and then Henry, ignored these calls for change, opting instead for stability and the maintenance of the status quo.

Prohibitionist sentiments, largely dormant since the creation of the LCBO, came to the fore. Likening the depressed economic situation to the wartime crisis that ushered in the dry decade, prohibitionist groups and individuals proposed the restriction of liquor as a panacea. For example, in the summer of 1932 the Dundas Baptist Church argued to Henry that “the economic depression was like a war.” Their solution was to “prohibit the manufacture, importation and sale” of liquor as an economic measure.31 Similarly, the Hamilton Presbytery of the United Church described the present “economic conditions as more dangerous than war,”32 and called for the immediate closure of beer and liquor stores. The International Order of Good Templars echoed these sentiments, urging Henry to close liquor stores due to the “severe depression and unemployment.”33 The United Farmers of Ontario also demanded the closure of all liquor stores “as long as the depression lasts.”34 These correspondents justified these calls for various degrees of prohibition on the basis of the depressed economic conditions. Unlike the prohibitionist rhetoric of the early twentieth century, these arguments did not dwell on the moral or religious reasons for curbing the liquor trade, nor did they seek to end the trade forever, just for the duration of the economic crisis. Still, the underlying justification was that it was immoral for government to sell liquor when so many Ontarians lacked proper food, clothing and shelter.
This crisis prompted other, less extreme calls for restricted access to liquor. The Ontario Prohibition Union resolved in March 1931 that the government should institute tougher penalties for LCIA infractions, limit the number of bottles allowed at each purchase, and regulate the number of people allowed to drink in a hotel bedroom.35 Nowhere in the resolutions did the Union propose total prohibition. In fact it commended Henry for opposing calls for beer by the glass and for instituting the permit for wine. Similarly, temperance supporters, gathering in Smiths Falls in December, lamented the millions of dollars spent “annually on the drink traffic as well as on other evils.” But like the Ontario Prohibition Union they did not demand prohibition. They only urged “the people to consider seriously the advisability of saving the money spent in this traffic…to regain our old-time prosperity.”36 Clearly the government’s early Depression strategies of holding the status quo on government control and creating a permit for wine purchases deflected more extreme resolutions for various types of restrictions.

While some groups argued that expenditures on liquor exacerbated the Depression, other groups and individuals envisioned increased access to liquor and liquor profits as an antidote for the economic crisis. Municipalities, fighting in the front lines of the Depression, were among the first to recognise that an expanded role for the LCBO could be their salvation. In the spring of 1930 the Premier’s office received petitions from numerous municipal councils such as Walkerville, Hamilton and Peterborough, requesting that a “percentage of the profits from the sale of liquor be apportioned to the municipalities where liquor stores are located.”37 These requests illustrated the effect of the Depression on Ontario’s municipalities. Conditions were not serious enough in 1930 to prompt Ferguson to take any action but these requests set the precedent for allotting a proportion of hotel licensing fees to cash-starved municipalities later in the Depression after the government instituted beer by the glass. This was one of the first tentative realisations of the power of both liquor sales and the government control apparatus to address the Depression.

Many also began to look to the expansion of government control itself to include sale by the glass as an answer to the economic woes. In the early 1930s hotel owners called for the right to sell regular beer as opposed to the ‘Fergie’s Foam’ or light beer, named for Premier Ferguson, that many hotels
continued to sell since the late years of Prohibition. One proprietor argued that this would allow him to
"be in a better position to keep up." Another asserted that it would stop tourists from choosing Quebec,
where public drinking thrived, over Ontario. As the LCBO's 1929/30 annual report noted, the
Depression affected the flow of tourists to Ontario's hotels. Despite this, permit sales to visitors did not
decline as quickly as did the overall number of tourists to the province in this first year of the
Depression, decreasing the impact of such arguments. Veterans also looked to the possibility of selling
beer by the glass in their clubs as a way "to help their comrades in distress." Ontario workers, seeing
their pay packets shrink as the Depression advanced, called the LCA "class legislation" for not allowing
the sale of beer by the glass. Many municipalities, in even more severe economic distress by early 1931,
abandoned their earlier calls for a proportion of liquor store profits and adopted the attitude that some
hotel owners and veterans were taking. For example, the towns of Hawkesbury and Sioux Lookout, and
the City of East Windsor appealed to Henry to allow the sale of beer by the glass to "aid tax payers and
help relieve unemployment." These proposals illustrated the recognition that liquor policy was
intricately entwined with economic realities.

During the first few years of the Depression, the Premier's office received correspondence from
Ontarians suggesting opposing strategies to address the economic downturn within weeks or even days of
each other. For example, in the first three months of 1931 Henry received demands to prohibit the
manufacture and sale of liquor, to have a referendum on the legitimacy of government control, and to
relieve unemployment by having "beer of the usual strength sold by the glass." The Depression
produced a wide spectrum of options for the government. They ranged from total prohibition to wide-open sale, with many variations in between.

In the earliest months of the Depression Ferguson's approach to these various suggestions for
change was blunt and uncompromising. The owner of a veterans' club, wanting to sell beer by the glass,
argued that the veterans were "paupers" and "this privilege is being constantly asked for." Ferguson
stiffly replied that the "law says only government can handle liquors." The moral issue of having
government exclusively handle liquor retailing was not a debatable subject for him and the
economic/business side of the coin was one the government chose to downplay. Therefore, for Ferguson the issue was not open for debate and he felt the need only to state the reality of government control, not defend it. In response to a hotelman’s desire to sell “a firm bottle of ale,” Ferguson lectured: “I am confident there is not sufficient public favour of this change to warrant an amendment to the law. It is not what you or I or others may individually feel—it is only possible to do things that general public opinion will support.” Clearly the Depression conditions were not yet serious enough to warrant any consideration of changing the status quo. Initially, Henry also followed this approach. When pressured by prohibitionists to curtail access to liquor and resist demands for beer by the glass, he replied that “as long as people desire liquor, the safest law is government control.” Henry kept the prohibitionists at arm’s length by refusing to acknowledge their “biased” statistics and arguing that their role was educational, not political.

LIBERAL OPPOSITION DENOUNCES PROHIBITION

The other political forces in the province on the other hand were being much more forthright in their responses to calls to alter the government control system in reaction to the Depression. At their annual meeting held in Toronto on December 2-3, 1931, the United Farmers of Ontario (UFO) urged “the closing of all liquor stores in the Province during the existing depression.” Mitchell Hepburn, the new leader of the Liberal Party, in contrast, declared in a speech in Sudbury on March 9, 1932, “We as a Liberal Party, are no longer supporting the cause of Prohibition and never will, as long as I am Leader of the Party. Prohibition is no longer an issue.” While the UFO’s prohibitionist stance was consistent with its past declarations, the Liberal Party’s was not. Hepburn endeavoured “to peel the dry label from the Liberals,” in an effort to make the party a viable alternative to the ruling Conservatives. This would be a long drawn-out process, one that would not be complete until the post-World War Two years. It will be remembered that Sinclair, Hepburn’s predecessor, also renounced prohibition, temporarily, before the 1929 election, with mixed results. Varying degrees of prohibition continued to be proposed from different quarters. With the Liberal Party officially renouncing its dry past, the policy options seemed increasingly to be not whether government control would endure but what form it would take.

By mid-1932 the spectrum of options being batted about by various interests and individuals was reduced to the opposing or supporting arguments for beer by the glass. That year the Moderation League mounted a province-wide campaign demanding by the glass sale of "beer and wine in hotels, clubs and restaurants under licence." This Canada-wide organisation fought initially for government control during Prohibition and then for the expansion of government control to include beer by the glass. Not overtly tied to the liquor industry, the Moderation League comprised "solid upstanding citizens" including many former army officers, whose influence through the Canadian Legions was important, especially since these community social centres, unlike their counterparts in other provinces, could not sell beer by the glass. Significantly, the province's liquor producers did not participate publicly in any lobby efforts for the reintroduction of public drinking, preferring perhaps to leave the work to an officially independent group like the Moderation League. The League successfully campaigned for beer by the glass in four other provinces: British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba and Quebec. It was the Quebec system, however, that was most often mentioned as the model to be followed, perhaps because the proximity of that province allowed many Ontarians to experience public drinking there. While these other Canadian models laid the foundation for the eventual acceptance of public drinking in Ontario, they had been in place for too many years to be considered an immediate influence on Ontario policy.

The worsening Depression and the reintroduction of American bars represented the final push towards public drinking in the province. Generally vague about the proposed system, the League did assure an anxious public that there would be "no bar" in the new public drinking establishments, only tables for sit-down consumption. The League appealed to the Board's business acumen, arguing that the times had changed since the LCA was first created. While the Act was appropriate for the prosperous late 1920s, the Moderation League contended government control of liquor was a business and its practice needed to change in response to the Depression. Interestingly, the government received no appeals from the League or any other lobby groups for the return of spirits by the glass. There seemed to be a natural progression away from Prohibition in the other provinces that Ontario also followed: first stores and then
beer by the glass. No one contemplated easier access to ‘demon rum’ at this point, including Henry who assured a concerned correspondent “no change will loosen control over intoxicating liquor.”

The League consolidated and articulated the loosely argued points of hotel owners, municipalities, veterans, workers and others from earlier in the Depression. The League distributed resolutions to Ontarians, asking them to forward the correspondence to the Premier. These resolutions contended that the sale of beer by the glass would relieve the “present distressing conditions” by increasing tourism and revitalising the hotel and restaurant industries. In turn this would improve business for merchants, retailers and amusement operators. This economic stimulation would therefore augment the purchasing power of Ontarians. At the same time the League appealed to the moral side of government control arguing that the “expensive and cumbersome” way that liquor was sold in the province encouraged bootlegging, hotel bedroom drinking, and a preference for spirits over lighter beer. Therefore, the League concluded, by opening up access to beer and wine by the glass “at a convenient time and place,” the government would in fact be encouraging true temperance. Bootleggers and blind pigs would be put out of business while their profits flowed to the provincial government through the new beer and wine outlets. This argument, a clever amalgamation of both the moral and business arguments for government control hit home for Henry at this, the most severe point in the Depression.

In addition to the resolutions sent to Ontarians, in the late summer and early fall of 1932, the Moderation League undertook polls in Ontario factories and industrial plants on the idea of the sale of beer and wine by the glass. The result was 84% in favour in the 502 factories visited. Through the end of that year and into the beginning of 1933, the individual factories bombarded the Premier’s office with letters announcing the results of these polls. The combination of these two strategies placed a great deal of pressure on the government. The idea of beer by the glass polarised the province and quickly became the dominant political issue.

PREMIER HENRY FLOUNDPERS ON BEER BY THE GLASS ISSUE

While people involved in the hospitality industry supported the Moderation League’s proposal, like Ottawa’s Rideau Club’s president who argued in the fall of 1932 that it was “mollycoddle” to say
the club could not serve beer by the glass, some proprietors disagreed. For example, the owner of the Muskoka Beach Inn told Henry that there should be no beer by the glass since he had problems enough controlling the beer that was being drunk in the hotel bedrooms. In this divisive atmosphere, Henry floundered on the issue, torn between his desire to avoid controversy and his motivation to augment government revenues and the economic health of the entire province by expanding the government control system. Unlike Ferguson, who acted as a policy entrepreneur in promoting government control as the answer to the crisis of Prohibition, Henry did not champion beer by the glass as the policy solution to the crisis of the Depression. Because of his fear of political conflict and his commitment to incremental change, Henry waited until it became politically dangerous not to act, a tendency Manthorpe observed in Henry's Conservative successors. Other Conservatives, on the other hand, had no trouble declaring their support for beer by the glass. In late 1932 Toronto's Ward 4 Conservative Association notified the Premier that its members favoured an amendment to the LCA to allow beer and wine by the glass in hotels. Furthermore they wanted the option studied so the government could act on it in the next legislative session.55

Action was not Henry's response. Lacking his predecessor's effective sense of timing and sensitivity to public opinion, Henry disregarded the Moderation League's proposal by declaring: "the government has no intention of amending the Liquor Control Act to allow the sale of beer and wine in hotels."66 Perhaps prohibition crusader Rev. Ben Spence identified Henry's approach most accurately when he accused the Premier of concerning himself only "with how to least harmfully extend the sale of liquor."67 For Henry, the least harmful way to deal with the divisive issue was to do nothing. He was supported in this by many. For example, during the third week of September 1932, he received correspondence from a municipal clerk, a canning company's secretary-treasurer and a representative of the United Church congratulating him on his stand against beer by the glass.68 Yet, by early 1933 pressure was mounting to take action on the beer issue. One major influence was his own members. During the budget debate in late March, James Lyons, the member from Sault Ste. Marie, made the
argument that extending government control to include the glass sale could advance both economics and morality.

It is my view that we should consider extending the sale of beer and light wines to hotels and restaurants under proper regulations... This will not only in my opinion strengthen the temperance cause in the Province of Ontario but it will increase our revenue by three or four million dollars.69

Given the poor fiscal position of the government, these figures must have caught Henry's attention. In the budget just tabled, the government revealed an increase of over $5.3 million in the provincial gross debt from the previous fiscal year to bring the total to $570 million.70 Lyons also proposed that "at least 25 percent of the revenue from hotels and restaurants licenced [to sell beer and wine by the glass] should be handed back to the municipalities where the licences are issued."71 This remark must have likewise caught the attention of relief-burdened municipal governments. Lyons' outspoken support of the 'beer plank' paved the way for further government debate on the issue. A few days later Wilfred Heighington, Conservative member for Toronto's St. David's riding, tabled a resolution for beer and wine by the glass in hotels and clubs.72 Although the resolution was later withdrawn,73 the issue had ceased to be a campaign fought by interested parties and became a serious alternative inside Queen's Park.

As a result, Henry's inaction on the issue caused his own party to question his leadership. "Political insurrection is seething at Queen's Park," The Globe proclaimed in April. A conflict of interest over bonds was at the centre of the controversy but the beer issue remained prominent. There was much support for Attorney General Price, a well-known supporter of more liberal liquor laws, to succeed Henry as party leader. According to The Globe, "Colonel Price is the camel on which the Moderation League hopes to ride to a still wetter oasis."74 The wet wing of the party, under Price, was pressuring Henry to loosen up the liquor laws by amending the LCA along the lines of the Moderation League's proposal. These members argued that, despite the Premier's ambivalence about public drinking, he could "at one stroke bolster sagging Government revenue, deflect the voters' attention from any weakness in the administration's record, and almost certainly split the opposition down the middle."75 Despite this threat to his leadership, Henry maintained his support for the status quo, arguing there was not enough evidence
of a desire by the people to change the present system.\textsuperscript{76} Henry's attitude prompted Lyons to announce just days later that he would not run for the Conservatives in the next election if Henry remained leader of the party. Lyons criticised Henry's ability and argued the time had come to change the liquor policy to permit retail sale by the glass.\textsuperscript{77}

Even the Liberals were beginning to discuss this policy option. There had been factions in both parties supportive of beer by the glass since 1927. But by the spring of 1933 the support expanded beyond these small political factions. The hint of an upcoming election caused "Liberals and Conservatives [to] jockey for position on the liquor question."\textsuperscript{78} One of the most important factors was the end of Prohibition in the United States. In early April 19 states began legal sale of beer.\textsuperscript{79} Headlines like "Beer-Licence Fees Pour Into Coffers of United States,"\textsuperscript{80} emblazoned on the front pages of Ontario newspapers captured the attention of the province. In border areas the reaction was swift. An observer told The Globe, "In [Windsor] there was a clamour for beer—they must have something to offer with the bar sale opened up across the line."\textsuperscript{81} The Windsor Liberal Association reacted by proposing that Hepburn adopt an official platform favouring the Moderation League's beer proposal, the elimination of permits for beer and wine in stores and the allocation of a percentage of liquor profits to municipalities.\textsuperscript{82} The end of American Prohibition, perhaps more than any other factor, save the Depression, hastened the adoption by both parties of the policy of beer and wine by the glass.

Clearly both party leaders remained cautious. An editorial in The Globe concluded,

there can be little doubt that if either [leader] attached beer and wine taps to his running gear it would be for the sake of power—political power. The fact that this mooted and much-promoted addendum to political platforms remains only a possibility is a fair indication of the uncertainty of reception among the electorate.\textsuperscript{83}

A reading of the Premier's correspondence certainly confirmed that Ontarians supported no one policy as some groups demanded more restrictions on access to liquor retail while others demanded greater access through beer by the glass. The editorial also shed some light on Henry's insistent defence of the status quo. Above all Henry desired stability,\textsuperscript{84} a characteristic that his predecessor valued as much as did the electorate he read so accurately. Ferguson's success pivoted on his ability to deliver timely change to
address periods of instability like Prohibition. The Depression and the end of American Prohibition produced another era of chaos that cried out for action. Unfortunately Henry, universally described as “capable” and “solid,” proved unequal to the challenge. While his background as a United Church Sunday school teacher presumably indicated his own moral view of public drinking, Henry publicly offered no opinion on either side of the issue of beer by the glass. Furthermore, his inaction exposed his inability to read the public mood. As the many calls for beer by the glass from such diverse groups as municipal councils, labour groups and the hospitality industry increasingly made clear, the uncertainty among the electorate noted in several editorials and the Premier’s own correspondence was turning towards overwhelming support for the proposed policy.

Henry only acknowledged this change in public opinion after his predecessor publicly recognised the possibility of a new policy on beer by the glass in September 1933. While Ferguson adamantly rejected beer by the glass as inappropriate in the earliest years of government control, now in a very changed environment it appeared to him a viable option. Thereafter Henry revealed that the government “would consider the advisability of relaxing the restrictions concerning the sale of beer and wine [because] there appear to be some now who believe that the distribution of beer requires some change.” This represented the first definite sign that Henry viewed beer by the glass as a possible policy but only after his predecessor, the man who had conceived the system to begin with, recognised the need for change. Henry was not yet solidly convinced of the advisability of the beer policy but Ferguson’s support of the move would have represented undeniable pressure on the Premier and would have given respectability to the proposal in the eyes of the public.

This announcement set off a flurry of concern among Ontario’s dry supporters. A flood of protests poured into Henry’s office from Ontarians who had endorsed his earlier assurances that the LCA would not be altered. Representatives from the WCTU, the United Church, and Women’s Institutes wrote Henry of their dismay and disappointment at his reversal. In reply to one such letter, Henry defended taking the matter of beer by the glass under consideration by arguing that it was “quite apparent that there is an increasing number in this province who believe some change will be required due to the loosening
up that is taking place in the United States.\(^{90}\) By early November, Henry advanced this argument even more forcefully to his dry correspondents. He replied to a United Church minister that he was not giving the matter close study due to the arguments of the Moderation League but “because of the changed attitude of people in the United States. [We] cannot ignore the fact that in many ways social life in Canada is interlocked with that of the United States.”\(^{91}\) Hepburn also publicly noted the significance of the repeal of American Prohibition.\(^{92}\) With both leaders recognising the impact of American policies on the future of the LCA, a change in Ontario’s government control system appeared imminent.

Still, Henry continued to waver. Just a day after announcing that the government would give consideration to the beer plank and prepare a policy on the issue, he clarified that “that does not necessarily mean that this policy will embody the sale of beer and wine by the glass.”\(^{93}\) But a few weeks later he admitted to one of his dry correspondents that he “sometimes thinks freer distribution of beer would decrease the consumption of liquor.”\(^{94}\) Henry’s inability to come to grips with the many arguments surrounding a proposed change to the LCA was becoming more evident as 1933 came to a close. Henry perhaps came the closest to revealing his true feelings on the issue in December when he replied to an opponent of the beer plank that he was “loath to be responsible for making any changes in the present law.”\(^{95}\) He proved incapable of coming to terms with the demands for change, illustrating the paralysing effect that the opposing goals of government control could have on its administrators.

After almost two years of dithering, “Premier Henry has at last completed his long course of wabbling and waiting. His stentorian ‘No’ of not many months ago in reply to the freer-beer advocates soon was modulated to ‘Well, perhaps.’ At last it is a plain ‘Yes.’”\(^{96}\) On March 21, 1934, the government introduced the long-awaited amendments to the LCA allowing the sale of beer and wine by the glass. The new legislation, to become law only after the upcoming provincial election, allowed for the sale of beer and wine by the glass under the authority of the LCBO in specially designated areas of hotels and in veterans’ and labour union clubs subject to the local option system. The amendments left the sale of beer and wine in restaurants at the discretion of the LCBO. In keeping with the moral control impulse of the system, the Board would carefully scrutinise both the morals of the proposed liquor licence holder and the
physical quality of the premises to be authorised to provide sale by the glass. The amendments clearly outlined that no stand-up bars would be permitted in these licenced facilities. 97

After so many months of struggling with the idea of change, Henry found that his long-awaited amendments encountered no resistance in the House. In keeping with recent Liberal denunciations of prohibition, the Opposition issued this statement:

Prohibition is not and should not be made a political partisan issue... Our responsibility to the people of Ontario is such that we are determined to hold the Henry Government to a defence of their record of mal-administration... We are therefore, under the circumstances, prepared to acquiesce on the measure without discussion, regarding it as a Government responsibility. 98

The legislation passed with only a handful of Opposition members voting in protest. By acquiescing on the issue, Hepburn foiled any hopes that the government might have had to "win the rubber every time they care to pull a beer or whiskey joker off the bottom of the pack." 99 With Hepburn's success in peeling the dry label from his party no provincial election would ever again take the form of an exclusively wet versus dry contest. In the context of the Depression and the months of pent up demand for beer by the glass, voters may have been successfully distracted from Tory conflict of interest scandals by the prospect of public drinking. By agreeing to support the legislation, Hepburn rendered beer by the glass a 'non-issue.'

Henry had finally committed himself to the election plank that Ferguson could not advance in the two previous elections though much had changed in the intervening years. In the prosperous environment of the late 1920s, government control through retail sales met the desires of most Ontarians and offended only an ever-declining number while fulfilling government revenue needs. The end of American Prohibition and more importantly the increasingly severe Depression made beer by the glass an attractive policy for economic and social reasons. The economic arguments were clearly outlined in Moderation League propaganda: increased tourism, revitalised hospitality business, more government revenue and the potential sharing of licencing fees with relief-burdened municipalities. The expanded importance of tourism for the province cannot be underestimated. The Dionne quintuplets, born just weeks before the
election, provided a tremendous opportunity for tourism in the province. The provincial government recognised this and later "went to considerable lengths"100 to safeguard the material welfare of the quintuplets. As the world’s first surviving quintuplets, their immense celebrity attracted millions of visitors to the government-financed Quintland outside North Bay, launching "Northern Ontario’s flourishing tourist industry," and providing "a transfusion to the Ontario tourist industry."101 With a 55% decline in the sale of temporary tourist liquor permits between 1933 and 1934102 as Table 6, above, and Table 9, below, reveal, the League’s promise of increased tourism through the addition of beer by the glass must have been tremendously attractive.

The social reasons for supporting public drinking were harder to identify. The Ottawa Journal advanced this provocative argument just after the amendments were introduced: beer by the glass "may make life a little more pleasant for a great many people."103 The appeal of being able to enjoy a glass of beer or wine in a public place for "people, who are now passing through the most distressing...period in their history,"104 cannot be understated.

Henry also faced a much different opposition than Ferguson ever did. Hepburn, a prosperous 37-year-old onion farmer from Elgin County previously served as a Liberal MP. Despite his father’s short and scandal-ridden political career, Hepburn gained his passion for politics early in life. Hepburn dropped out of high school and after a short tenure as a junior bank employee, the United Church member turned to politics.105 Unlike many former Liberal leaders, Hepburn was no stranger to the bottle. In rebuilding the party, Hepburn carried out much of the work "at the local bootleggers," a business that continued to thrive in a province without legal public drinking facilities. He was a captivating and charismatic speaker, "words [coming] easily...if he had been drinking."106 Henry on the other hand was described as having about as much political charm as "a first mortgage or a bottle of milk."107 Known as a dependable leader who could "plough a straight furrow," he ran the province like "he [was] managing director."108 While these leadership characteristics appealed to Ontarians in times of growth and prosperity (such as in the late 1920s or in the post-World War Two era), they were no match for Hepburn’s charisma in a time of crisis when voters yearned for a saviour, not a manager. Furthermore, Henry lacked the ability to
instinctively gauge the public mood and deliver timely reforms that other successful Ontario leaders demonstrated. Even by playing the so-called ‘beer trump card,’ Henry could not measure up. By appearing to give in to the Moderation League and the liquor producers, interests his party had been traditionally associated with, he alienated his dry supporters and by “ponder[ing] much too long” on the beer plank, he failed to attract the wets. Meanwhile, the vast majority of moderate voters sought action, energy and change represented in the form of a Liberal future, not a Conservative past.

When Henry finally called the long anticipated election for June 19, 1934, Hepburn burst from the starting blocks with his ‘tollgate’ scandal, promising to expose a ‘Conservative-a-day’ during the campaign. He accused the LCBO of succumbing to political influence in deciding which brands were sold in Board stores. Hepburn kept up the charges during the campaign, even linking Mines Minister Charles McCrae with the scandal just days before the election. In taking this approach Hepburn managed to shift the issue “from the morality of drinking, which was at least debatable to the immorality of graft, in high places, which was not.” While the positive and negative arguments surrounding the proposed sale of beer by the glass made headlines during the campaign, they represented the opinions of groups and interests on the fringes of the election. With Henry promising a “sane beer” policy and Hepburn pledging “better beer,” the question of beer by the glass was reduced to a non-issue as Hepburn had hoped. Hepburn put Henry on the defensive and his record of coping with the Depression was not an impressive one on which to stand. With Hepburn’s fresh, energetic approach, the Ontario Conservative government, like so many others in Canada during that era, became a casualty of the Depression. As the headlines proclaimed “people smash Henry Ministry,” Mitchell Hepburn became the first Liberal Premier since George Ross lost to James Whitney in 1905.

**BEER BY THE GLASS LEGISLATION PASSED**

One of the first measures of business for the new administration was to proclaim the amendment to the LCA that the Henry government had passed in April. In keeping with his election promise to proclaim the Act without amendment if elected to power, Hepburn did so in early July. Departing from the format established by Ferguson in 1927, Hepburn appointed his friend 50-year-old Edmond Odette as
a one-man Commission to replace the three commissioners (later two) that had previously overseen the work of the Board. Though referred to as "revolutionary" in the press, this move coincided with Hepburn's election promise to reduce government waste. He simultaneously cut the leadership of Hydro to one commissioner. Odette, a Catholic motor manufacturer from Tilbury, was a former Liberal MP for Essex East. Hepburn continued the Conservative practice of entrusting LCBO leadership positions to friends of the ruling party. Regardless, Hepburn's choice "astonished" many loyal Liberals. While Odette's history as a rum-runner may have been no more than a rumour, as Hepburn's biographer argued, his "fondness for the bottle was not." One correspondent denounced Hepburn's appointment of a French Catholic as "minister over saloons" since "every Catholic likes to drink and every French Catholic likes wine." Where Ferguson went to great lengths to secure upstanding honourable businessmen as LCBO commissioners, "Mitch's sense of humour" seemed to dictate his selection. Given Hepburn's own drinking habits and his general disregard for political images of respectability or decorum, his selection should not have been a surprise. Clearly, the religious affiliation of public figures continued to spark controversy, particularly in the contentious area of liquor control. Odette's appointment may also have been Hepburn's way of repaying Catholic supporters, traditional Liberal voters, who many credited with electing his government.

Hepburn also departed from custom by giving Odette the status of Minister without Portfolio and the right to deliberate with Cabinet although he was not an elected member of the government. With this very significant move, Hepburn again demonstrated his indifference towards standard parliamentary practise and his desire to tie the LCBO more closely to his government and party after years of domination by the Conservatives. Critics opposed Hepburn's decision to invest Odette with Cabinet Minister status, preferring a clearer separation between the government and the Board, and fearing too much prestige would be bestowed on the liquor business. Others heralded the move as a way to bring the actions of the Chief Commissioner and the Board into the open for public scrutiny. Hepburn consolidated the control over liquor policy even further when he transferred the Board from the authority of the Attorney General, where it had remained since Ferguson created the LCBO, to the Provincial
Treasurer. While this move illustrated the increasing significance of Board profits to the government, particularly during the Depression, it was more indicative of Hepburn's desire for personal control over such an important source of revenue and controversy as he appointed himself Provincial Treasurer in his first Cabinet. Hepburn also demonstrated the importance of the government control structure to political patronage when he promptly fired 481 of the Board's over 1000 employees and replaced them with 265 of his own supporters. Furthermore, despite Hepburn's declaration that the new liquor licences were "out of bounds to members and ministers," the Liberal Party found the new source of patronage positions tempting, with the result that "there were too many signs of Liberal patronage to be ignored." Hepburn even admitted he was not above influencing the Board to reward a party supporter with a licence.

"BEER FLOWED INTO BRIMMING GLASSES"

Ontarians eagerly awaited the reintroduction of public drinking, the most significant change in the liquor retail landscape since the opening of the first liquor stores and beer warehouses seven years earlier. Board officials, working frantically since the election, initially granted licences to some 100 hotels. Board inspectors ensured that these hotels complied with strict regulations concerning number of bedrooms, meal service and record keeping. Furthermore, the proprietors had to obtain their beer supplies from the government-regulated brewery warehouses and not from the breweries themselves. The Board even regulated the price of beer at ten cents a glass, the cost for a milkshake that filled three glasses. By October 31, the Board licenced over 1000 hotels and 173 clubs. This amounted to one outlet for every 2,779 Ontarians compared to one for every 2,070 in 1916 just before Prohibition closed all bars.

The addition of public drinking to the existing government control structure necessitated the creation of new jargon. The Board referred to liquor licences to sell beer and wine as "authorities," while the locations of public drinking were called "licenced premises." Finally, the holders of these authorities were known as "licencees." These licencees could sell beer and wine with meals in their licenced dining rooms. They could sell only beer in the premises with the most euphemistic title: "beverage room." These stanzas from L.A. MacKay's 1936 poem, "Frankie Went Down to the Corner," bitingly satirise the name.
‘Bar’ is a nasty, a horrible word. ‘Taprooms’ and ‘taverns’ and ‘pubs’ are absurd. Give us a name with a resonant boom, A respectable name like ‘Beverage Room.’\textsuperscript{128}

Nevertheless, The Globe informed its anxious readers that “it’s a place to drink beer.”\textsuperscript{129} In answering the popular query of “how the working man will get his beer,” the same Toronto newspaper replied, “He’ll get it as he used to do before Prohibition: he’ll go to the beverage room of a small hotel, but he will find no bar there.”\textsuperscript{130} Beverage rooms and dining rooms, therefore, became the next ‘spaces’ of regulation in Ontario’s government control system. The traditional stand-up bar was one aspect of the frontier saloon that was not resurrected with the return of public drinking. Popular belief associated the bar with the worst aspects of public drinking: over-indulgence, violence and immorality. Orderly consumption “limited to persons seated at a table”\textsuperscript{131} now characterised public drinking in Ontario. As MacKay quipped:

Three cheers for the tables! A man on his feet can carry much less than slumped in a seat. Besides, it’s genteel, it’s very genteel; Beer served at a table’s completely genteel.\textsuperscript{132}

Regardless, Ontarians welcomed the new drinking facilities. When the first premises opened on July 24, during one of the hottest summers on record,\textsuperscript{133} “a cheery bubbling was perceptible at the nozzle,”\textsuperscript{134} as beer “flowed into brimming glasses and from them trickled down the throats of thirsty citizens.”\textsuperscript{135} And so, Ontario’s next experiment with government control began.

Like the ban on the stand-up bar, many aspects of the reintroduction of public drinking in Ontario were shaped in response to the province’s Prohibition experience, the enduring dry forces in society and the ever-present moral framework surrounding government control. For example, the Board strictly defined the type of clubs qualified to sell by the glass in an effort to control the sale of alcohol and to assuage the most acute fears among dry supporters concerning the return of public drinking. One of the greatest of these fears was that licence holders would “return to the nefarious practices of years ago”\textsuperscript{136} and promote the sale of liquor for their own personal profit. In response to these fears, the LCBO defined a club qualified to obtain a beer licence as having “a social or recreational nature and composed of not
less than fifty members... and in active operation for not less than one year and which is not operated for pecuniary gain.”\textsuperscript{137} Such provisions stood as moral buffers against so-called ‘fly by night’ clubs organised solely for selling beer. The Board similarly regulated hotel dining rooms and beverage rooms. For example, the service of beer or wine by the glass in a dining room was limited “to persons having a meal therein and while seated at a table.”\textsuperscript{138} Authority holders were required to “keep such books and records as shall fully and clearly set forth a daily record of all purchases, sales and stock-in-trade of beer and wine.”\textsuperscript{139} Using a strong moral overtone, the Board even regulated those aspects of the hotel business not directly related to the sale of alcohol. For example, the bedrooms of licenced hotels required “a secure bolt... and a distinctive and strong lock with a portable key.”\textsuperscript{140} Also, the Board decreed that the owner of a licenced hotel must be “a person of good character,” and must not permit “profane or indecent language or other unseemly conduct” upon his premises.\textsuperscript{141} The Prohibition experiences of excess and abuse and the criticisms of the province’s dry proponents determined this stringent regulation of all aspects of licenced premises.

The Board also adhered to the protests of dry organisations concerning the location of licenced hotels. In late August, less than a month after the first beverage rooms and dining rooms began dispensing beer and wine by the glass, a Toronto Baptist Church organised a petition opposing the location of several beverage rooms nearby. The pastor, in a radio address declared, “Without leaving the grounds upon which Jarvis Street Baptist Church stands, I have seen more drunkenness at this corner in four weeks than I have seen in the more than twenty-four years of my ministry in this place.”\textsuperscript{142} In direct response to this protest, Odette announced the very next day: “I have made it a ruling that there should be a block’s distance between hotel beverage rooms and churches, schools, hospitals and charitable institutions,”\textsuperscript{143} illustrating a moral association between liquor outlets and their locations. More importantly, by making an ad hoc policy change in reaction to dry criticism, Odette demonstrated that drinking and buying behaviour in the province was not only dictated by the official statutes and regulations, but also by proclamations by the Chief Commissioner. This arbitrary and reactionary
decision signalled a longstanding trend in liquor policymaking that constituted crisis management rather than the creation and implementation of an overall plan.

*Permit no Longer Required for Beer and Wine at Retail Stores:* While the Board responded to calls for tight regulations on the sale of beer by the glass, the ever-present tension between the moral and business impulses behind government control determined that service-oriented measures would also prevail. With the availability of beer and wine by the glass at local authorized premises, the beer and wine permit previously required for purchases at government stores was deemed unnecessary by the new amendments.\(^{144}\) Hepburn, quickly and without any of Henry's agonised analysis, ended this requirement. Therefore drinkers of Ontario wine could now, after four years, once again purchase their favourite beverage at a liquor store or a local winery outlet without a permit. For the first time in the history of government control, Ontarians could now obtain beer by the case without a permit at the brewery warehouses as well as imported wine and beer from the liquor stores. The Board introduced the special beer and wine permit in 1930 to combat its lost revenues with the onset of the Depression. With an increase of 120% in beer sales after only the first month of public drinking, the revenues generated by this new form of sale more than compensated for the loss of the beer and wine permit revenues.\(^{145}\) This clearly demonstrated the importance of the economic and business aspects of government control in this era. As another business service to its customers in the midst of the Depression, the Board created a new single-use permit. Costing twenty-five cents, this permit allowed a one-time purchase of not more than 12 bottles of spirits,\(^{146}\) and as Table 9 below shows, it proved extremely popular. This represented another attempt to garner more revenue and attract more customers.

The Board also set hours of sale for beverage rooms and dining rooms that could be interpreted as a service to its clientele. The original regulations set the maximum hours at 10 am to midnight Monday to Saturday.\(^{147}\) Needless to say, given the moral framework surrounding government control, Sunday sale was forbidden. Odette later defended the midnight closing time, not as a service to customers but as a way to "drive blind pigs out of business."\(^{148}\) Clearly bootleggers endured from Prohibition due to the lack of legal public drinking establishments. In order to preserve the government control system from
these interlopers and defend the government's monopoly, a certain standard of service was required. By the beginning of November, though, the experiment of public drinking required further correction. In response to the deluge of complaints about public drunkenness, Hepburn moved the closing time for beverage rooms, but not dining rooms, back one hour to 11 pm: a more "proper time," he argued. Even Hepburn, with his personal fondness for drinking, was not immune to moral arguments regarding the sale and consumption of liquor, although his decision was no doubt due to the perceived voting strength of the province's drys as opposed to any personal beliefs. This also signalled the beginning of discrimination between beverage rooms and other licenced premises, based on the assumption that beverage room drinkers required more moral control than others, discrimination that would become even more pronounced with the addition of different types of drinking outlets after World War Two.

As the first holiday season under the new system approached, licencees appealed to the Board for longer New Year's Eve drinking hours. While the Board refused to allow licenced premises to remain open until the desired 2 am, Deputy Chief Commissioner Arnold Smith announced that they could serve customers until midnight, the beginning of the new year. While this only restored the original closing hour and only for one night, the Board's ability to respond to the public's desires is noteworthy. Later Boards and governments would not always be so responsive. Yet under the leadership of Hepburn and Odette and in the midst of the economic crisis, the Board generally leaned more favourably toward the service and business aspects of government control and less in the direction of moral control.

The Board also revealed its ability to compromise later in the spring of 1935. Shift workers in the northern community of Porcupine protested the decision to change the beverage room closing hour from midnight to 11 pm. They made it clear that they wanted beer after their evening shift and would obtain it whether at the local beverage room or the bootlegger. Responding to this specific situation, the Board restored the midnight closing hour for this one community. This revealed a determination on the part of the government to make this experiment in public drinking work. By responding to specific complaints from customers and critics alike, the government ensured as smooth a transition as possible into the new phase of government control. This represented a transition away from earlier behaviours like
frequenting the local ‘blind pig’ for alcohol by the glass and towards controlled consumption in government-regulated premises. Once the initial transition was made, this responsiveness abated. Because the province’s overwhelming tendency towards incrementalism could only be broken by crisis, the beverage room as an institution became frozen in time as a relic of the Depression era that created it.

By shortening the drinking hours for beverage rooms across the province, Hepburn reacted to the many problems that accompanied the return of public drinking despite the steps the Board took to regulate and control the sale of beer and wine by the glass. After 18 years without legal public drinking establishments, Ontario underwent a period of readjustment during the summer and early fall of 1934. Reports of public drunkenness, rowdiness and increased crime abounded as Ontarians got their first taste of the suds dispensed by the glass at their local hotels. The Globe, making no secret of its dry leanings, denounced the beverage rooms for “turning drunken men and women on to the streets...and producing conditions both disgusting and deplorable.”¹⁵² Even the government’s own Health and Education Ministers voiced concerns regarding the potential harm that could result from exposure to the new beverage rooms, especially among the province’s youth.¹⁵³

Given the environment of the Depression, the sudden reversal in many American states from bone-dry Prohibition to wide-open sale and the long pent up thirst of Ontarians, these problems were not surprising to Hepburn. He remained calm amid the flurry of complaints surrounding the new drinking establishments. “Naturally,” he argued, “you would expect certain abuses in the first week, because it is a new thing and people would indulge more than they would otherwise.”¹⁵⁴ Hepburn defended the sale of beer by the glass as an experiment to be given a fair trial in the same way that Ferguson defended the original LCA. In reply to an unhappy correspondent, Hepburn argued that there would be abuses at first but defects in the operation of the licensed premises would be corrected along the way.¹⁵⁵ Above all Hepburn refused “to be stampeded by a few offensive temperance cranks.”¹⁵⁶ who were pressuring him to hold a general referendum on the issue of beer and wine by the glass. Clearly the temperance movement had been in decline since the end of Prohibition. By the end of the 1930s approximately 10,000 Canadian women belonged to the WCTU, a reduction of 50% from the late 1920s.¹⁵⁷ Many factors contributed to
the decline of the temperance movement in Canada: increased immigration from areas of Eastern and Southern Europe where Protestant ideology and temperance were foreign; the demographic shift to an urban society less likely to support temperance; and more concern over poverty and less over drinking given the overall decrease in consumption during the Depression. Furthermore, the tremendous impact of American culture in the form of periodicals, books and movies influenced Ontarians' attitudes, values and commodity demands. As H.F. Angus' 1936 sociological survey of Canadian attitudes towards the United States argued, the geographical contiguity of Ontario with the United States, particularly the large cities such as Chicago, Detroit, and New York, resulted in an "immediate," and "concentrated...intimacy of relations." Doug Fetherling, in his work on the Depression, also demonstrated the significant influence the United States' experience had on Canada. Despite their declining numbers, Ontario's temperance forces remained highly organised and vocal which meant Hepburn had to attempt to appease them to assure the success of the licenced drinking outlets. If they could not be won over to support the new system of liquor retail, at least they could be convinced that it was not debauching the province.

MORAL PANIC OVER WOMEN IN BEVERAGE ROOMS

This environment necessitated the meticulous regulations controlling the conduct and conditions surrounding the sale and consumption of beer and wine by the glass. The original legislation and regulations outlined the conduct expected under the proposed system but it was not until public drinking was operating in practice that many abuses became evident. Therefore Odette found it necessary to amend Board policies constantly during the first few months of beer by the glass. After only two weeks under the new system, overwhelming complaints caused Odette to announce the compulsory division of all beverage rooms into two separate sections, one for "lone stag drinkers," and the other for "ladies and their escorts." This represented one of Valverde's vocal moral panics surrounding the idea of "women of virtue being approached by men of evil intent," and of prostitutes propositioning men weakened by alcohol in such establishments. As Little explained in the context of moral regulation of single mothers in Ontario, the Depression witnessed tremendous moral turmoil and anxiety regarding the social roles of men and women. The harsh economic realities of the era forced some men and women to assume non-
traditional roles heightening the prevailing concerns with moral behaviour. This concern translated into magnified moral regulation of Ontario drinkers.

In instituting this division between men and women and their escorts Ontario made mandatory what some British Columbia proprietors practised only voluntarily. When the Pacific province reintroduced public beer drinking nine years earlier, the issue of unescorted women drinking in public immediately sparked controversy, not only for the prohibitionist forces but also for the proprietors and the male drinkers. The British Columbia regulations stipulated that proprietors must prevent anyone of a “poor character” from frequenting their establishments. This characterisation included prostitutes, a label conveniently bestowed on unescorted women in beer parlours. As a result, many proprietors chose to protect their liquor licences by banning women completely or by providing separate areas for ‘ladies and their escorts,’ while a small number risked a negative report by a licence inspector by permitting men and women to drink openly together. While Ontario’s amended LCA similarly stipulated that proprietors must not allow “any person of notoriously bad character” on their premises, after two weeks’ experience of public drinking the Board instituted the mandatory division between the sexes. Given the tremendous anxiety surrounding gender roles in the context of the Depression that Little described, Odette’s imposition of this division for every outlet should not be surprising. What was surprising was that it had not been decreed in the original Ontario regulations given British Columbia’s earlier controversy over the issue of single men and women drinking together. It seems that the lawmakers had not even taken into consideration that women would want to drink in the proposed beverage rooms. A great deal had changed for women since public drinking was outlawed in Ontario in 1916. They not only gained the vote and assumed non-traditional jobs during World War One, but as historian Veronica Strong-Boag explained, women took on “new public roles” in the intervening decades. The British experience saw respectable upper-working and lower-middle class women begin patronising pubs in unprecedented numbers during World War One. Without a period of prohibition, the war experiences of British women began a trend of drinking in public that endured, making them an important minority among pub clientele. A Toronto Star editorial observed that women in the mid-1930s competed with
men in all areas of life: social status, business, smoking and outdoor amusements. Therefore women would drink whiskey in the old bars if it were allowed. "Women seek to do all men do,"164 which included drinking. Once women demonstrated this by their patronage of the local beverage rooms, the Board took immediate action to avoid any immorality arising from the unfettered mixing of the sexes.

The Board reiterated the importance of this division right to the end of the decade in response to continued moral outrage. For example, critics complained of having women in the beverage rooms alone,169 of "young girls drinking with boys,"170 and of "too much familiarity between the sexes."171 Clearly the expansion of government control to include public drinking introduced a moral issue that had not existed previously. The detailed regulation of consumption behaviour inherent in the original LCA included such rules as the necessity of baggage in a hotel room or the restriction of drinking to one's own private residence in order to reduce the incidence of drinking parties in hotel bedrooms or private homes. Beverage rooms, on the other hand, fostered drinking among strangers, even of the opposite sex. Therefore, beverage rooms became the focus of moral regulation as the Board sought to control the consumption environment and appease the critics of the new system. In analysing the British Columbia experience, Campbell argued that its Liquor Board's strong stand against prostitutes and its defence of the decency of the beer parlours served to deflect criticism away from the legitimacy of the parlours themselves in their earliest critical months. Nevertheless, it preferred to leave the method of how to simultaneously prevent prostitution and promote decency in the hands of proprietors,172 while nine years later, in the context of the Depression, Ontario chose a mandatory and comprehensive approach.

This approach did not go as far as Chief Commissioner Odette wanted. In private correspondence to Hepburn in February 1937, he outlined major changes for licenced establishments that would address what he identified as the most serious problem facing the Board: "men and women...mingling...in beverage rooms." He proposed that beverage rooms as they currently existed be abolished, and replaced by rooms with a "counter for beer by the glass service" for men only.173 This suggestion amounted to the resurrection of the old saloon complete with stand-up bar, the personification of every prohibitionist's fear. These changes were never made and there is no indication in Hepburn's correspondence that he ever
considered them. In the midst of the Depression, Hepburn could not afford to ban 50% of the population from government control’s newest outlets, especially a population that had so clearly demonstrated a desire to take part in public drinking. Politically, Hepburn might have been justified in banning women from the beverage rooms as a gesture to his party’s traditional temperance supporters. Nevertheless, given his personal proclivity for “loose living, excessive drinking, philandering and partying,” his decision to ignore Odette’s suggestions are not surprising. Therefore women’s beverage rooms provided a moral buffer despite the great controversy surrounding them and remained Hepburn’s only option. While Odette clearly identified the presence of women in a realm that had for so long been exclusively male as a contentious problem, Hepburn knew that the gains women had made socially and politically since Prohibition could not be reversed in the barroom.

**BAN ON FOOD IN BEVERAGE ROOMS**

Despite the cancellation of the authorities of 41 hotels and 3 clubs between the beginning of the new system and the end of the fiscal year, October 31, 1934, the Board required many more ad hoc policy decrees to smooth the transition to public drinking. The issue of food attracted significant attention with a great deal of moral emphasis placed on its association with drinking. Although the initial amendment allowed the sale of beer and wine with meals in authorised restaurants, Odette refused to implement that provision. His refusal responded to an Ontario Temperance Federation (OTF) complaint that restaurant sale was “an obnoxious feature” of the Act. This ban on restaurant licences also answered the United Church’s temperance arguments regarding the “embarrassment” non-drinkers would experience when dining near drinkers. The restaurant lobby, upset at Odette’s decision, complained that beverage rooms gave away food to attract drinking customers. Instead of giving the restaurants the licences that the original LCA amendments allowed, the Board responded by eliminating any hint of promotional selling: it banned the sale of any food in beverage rooms in December 1934. While current knowledge demonstrates that the consumption of food with alcohol reduces intoxication, this ban adhered to the traditional temperance view that the service of food in bars attracted customers and therefore promoted consumption. Other critics complained that licenced dining rooms sold “cheap meals” in
order to sell beer. To reduce the licensee's ability to promote beer sales in this manner, the Board also set a minimum price of 25 cents for dining room meals. Because of a moral association between the consumption of food and alcohol the Board regulated drinking behaviour to the point of dictating when and where drinkers could eat.

The Board also regulated morality by controlling the physical environment of drinking. This included the posture of drinkers. While the original regulations clearly banned the traditional stand-up bar, the Board went so far as to instruct its inspectors to ensure that "customers remained seated while they tilt their glasses." Moreover, in January 1935 the Board decreed "music, dancing and other forms of entertainment are not permissible." As the Board's Assistant Director of Hotels explained to a Carleton County licence inspector, "the ban which the Board is now enforcing with regard to entertainment in hotels is...meant...to cut out floor shows and other forms of entertainment put on...for the purpose of increasing...beverage room sales." The Board identified even dancing and listening to music as behaviours associated with increased consumption. In September 1935 the Board banned booth-style seating in all new hotels because, according to Deputy Chief Commissioner Smith, they were "too private," (a veiled reference to the potential for sexual activity in licenced premises), and they "concealed hard liquor drinking." The Board also attempted to prevent relief recipients from buying beer or wine by the glass using the same paternalistic rationale that banned recipients from buying liquor from stores. While the Board sent relief lists to authority holders to ensure they were not served, this moral regulation of drinking behaviour would not have been effective in large anonymous communities.

All these regulations represented the Board's moral watchdog persona coming to the fore. This framework assumed poor behaviour on the part of drinkers and therefore dictated that this new type of liquor outlet required strict government supervision to prevent excessive consumption and immoral activities (particularly of a sexual nature) before they could occur. As Valverde observed generally for North America, the anxiety surrounding the return of public drinking coalesced around an obsession with eradicating any evidence of the image of the old frontier saloon. Policymakers assumed that there was a "moral architecture" of drinking establishments, creating a direct causal link between how buildings were
constructed and furnished and the behaviour of drinkers.\textsuperscript{187} As we have seen, this necessitated the separation of the sexes and bans on food, entertainment, the stand-up bar, and on the use of words like saloon or bar. From an economic standpoint, these moral regulations ensured the continued existence of these outlets by placating their most critical dry opponents. In the first year of public drinking in Ontario the LCBO attempted to come to terms with demand for beer by the glass by both men and women. The ad hoc policy changes responded to perceived abuses by both patrons and licencees. When the system was new, change came easily to the Board and the government with adjustments in response to specific problems or demands. Nevertheless, the overall tendency for incremental policy implementation determined that most of these changes would become permanent features of the beverage room, despite the fact that they were products of a unique period of unprecedented demand after a long absence.

**THE ‘MUSHROOMING’ OF HOTELS**

Besides the complaints about women and men drinking together, the most serious and immediate moral problem resulting from the new beer and wine amendments was the ‘mushrooming’ of hotels. Many establishments gained liquor licences even though they had never been run as hotels. Despite the detailed regulations specifying the guest services required by licenced hotels, many authority holders ran establishments containing “no bedroom or hotel furniture.”\textsuperscript{188} Other so-called ‘hotels’ remained open to the public only during beverage room hours, turning away travellers after midnight or on Sundays.\textsuperscript{189} These conditions prompted Hepburn to tighten the regulations surrounding the management of authorised hotels. By requiring at least six guest rooms and specifying the bedroom furniture to be provided, the dimension of windows and the types of menus permissible,\textsuperscript{190} Hepburn hoped to ensure the high quality of hotel accommodations. In reflecting on these changes a year later, Odette revealed that most of the problems arose “because the LCB had to deal with the nucleus of the old hotel system and adapt to public demand which presented itself at that time.” In making new rules, he argued, the Board had to keep in mind “the requirements of the public,” and “the regulation of the industry to remove the obstacles against its stabilisation.”\textsuperscript{191}
Demanding such high standards in hotel accommodation, Hepburn also helped relieve the Depression, one of the positive results of a return to public drinking that the Moderation League promised in 1932. For example, by March 1935 the Ontario Hotelkeepers’ Association president estimated that the new beer law created 5000 new jobs. The necessary renovations to hotels stimulated the building trades while the money spent on materials and labour further stimulated the economy. By September Ontario hotels had spent over $1.6 million in repairs and upgrades in order to conform to Board specifications. Moreover, this was not the only way that the new authorised premises alleviated the depressed conditions in Ontario.

After three months’ experience under the new beer and wine regulations, Odette proposed a number of changes to Hepburn. The most important change, as far as the economic solvency of the province’s municipalities was concerned, was the payment of 20% of authority fees to the municipalities in which the authorities were located. Odette explained to Hepburn that this money would ensure the close cooperation of the local police forces in upholding the LCA. When the measure was announced the next day on October 30, however, Odette declared that it would help the “struggling” and “bankrupt” towns. He fiercely denied that the payments were intended to bribe municipalities to support the government and its policies. This policy was another realisation of pre-election predictions regarding the promise of beer and wine as a cure-all for the Depression. Most municipal councils eagerly accepted their portion of authority fees though not everyone supported the policy. One Toronto woman, opposed to the sale of beer and wine, called the municipalities’ share of the licencing fees “blood money.” Even the mayor of Toronto expressed his own personal opposition to the municipalities sharing a portion of licencing fees. “I certainly have no desire to see Toronto as a city become a co-partner in the liquor traffic.” Nevertheless, as soon as the city received its share of licencing fees, he promptly voted to accept the money. In the Great Depression, economic realities obviously won out over moral convictions in certain situations.

Clearly the new drinking facilities had a tremendous impact on the economic situation in Ontario. They stimulated the building trades and cash-starved municipalities had no trouble putting their portion of
licencing fees to good use. After only a month with the new authorities, the Board paid two instalments of $500,000 to the Provincial Treasurer. Answering critics’ charges that this revenue proved that there were too many licences and too much consumption, Odette explained that the Board customarily made monthly payments to the government, keeping just enough for administration. “Only, we have been able to send the government more money,” he could not help but brag, much of which accrued to the Board from the flat fees charged hotel proprietors for each licence and a percentage of the gallonage sold. Although condemned by prohibitionists for his attitude, Odette made no secret of his belief that he was there “to make money for the province.” After three months with public drinking, Hepburn defended the Board’s profits.

Do these people who are doing so much criticizing realise that the province needs more revenue? I understand that so far Mr. Odette has turned in $2,300,000, but we are still in the red owing to the election debts of the Henry government. Would these critics want us to increase the gasoline tax, the income tax or other taxes?

By the end of 1935, after seventeen months experience under the new system, Odette bragged further that Board profits increased more than one million dollars over the previous year. As Tables 8, 9 and 10 reveal, by all indicators the addition of public drinking to the government control system dramatically increased consumption. This in turn increased government revenues and compensated for the general decease in store sales earlier in the Depression. For Ferguson, the importance of Board profits to government revenues became quickly apparent in 1927 with the province’s first surplus after eight deficits. By the most severe point in the Depression, “booze had averted bankruptcy” once again as the added revenues from licenced authorities determined the solvency not only of the provincial government but also its dependent municipalities. Hepburn and Odette’s straightforward defence of these revenues determined that they would remain crucial for every succeeding government.
Table 8
Total Gallonage of Alcohol Sold in Ontario 1932/33-1938/39

![Graph showing gallonage of alcohol sold in Ontario from 1932/33 to 1938/39.]

Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1932/33-1938/39

Table 9
Permit Sales in Ontario 1933/34-1938/39

![Graph showing permit sales in Ontario from 1933/34 to 1938/39.]

*Note: In 1934/35 fiscal year changed from October to March

Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1933/34-1938/39
Politically, both parties adopted the policy of beer by the glass as a way to please the wets and focus dry criticism onto one specific policy, thereby deflecting it from the retail store system and government control in general. The novelty of the new drinking facilities pleased the wets and almost eliminated calls for total prohibition from the province’s dry supporters. Nevertheless, every policy change brought with it calls for even further liberalisation. In the year following the opening of the beverage rooms, newspaper columnists, politicians and constituents began what would become a loud and long-running chorus. In March 1935 the Liberal member for Windsor-Sandwich, J.H. Clark, promoted the concept of grocery store sale of liquor. Calling Chief Commissioner Odette “too puritanical,” Clark sang the praises of this type of sale in France, where he observed a much lower incidence of public drunkenness. 204 While the Board never relinquished its retail monopoly to allow grocery sale during the period under study, Clark’s suggestion points to the long history of this concept in Ontario, a concept that would gain greater attention in the post-war era.

In the fall of 1935 Mail and Empire columnist J.V. McAree challenged “the vast paraphernalia with which government invests the relatively simple business of selling liquor in the province.” He called liquor permits a “revenue grabber,” and store slips “elaborate bookkeeping...to provide work for civil
servants." By likening a liquor purchase with that of a pound of tea, McAree extolled the hassle-free liquor retail system in Quebec. The only aims of government control, he argued, should be convenience to the purchaser and profit to the treasury. Instead "what we have is the maximum of what [the prohibitionists] will consent to."

This sentiment was echoed a few weeks later when a Toronto man complained to Hepburn that permits were unfair since the "the government should not charge [Ontarians] to buy what is legal." Because of the government's fear of prohibitionist sentiment in the electorate that McAree so clearly pointed out, as well as the moral goals built right into government control, permits and slips would endure as features of Ontario's liquor stores. Permits would not be abolished for another 25 years and customers would continue filling out order slips in liquor stores until the very end of the period under study. Therefore calls to end these requirements only escalated.

LIQUOR STORE RETAILING IN THE WAKE OF PUBLIC DRINKING

While the transition to public drinking dominated the business of the LCBO in this era, the retail aspect of government control continued to function, if in the background of public consciousness. The Depression conditions dictated that the number of liquor and beer stores remained largely static throughout the decade as Table 11 shows. Nevertheless, the business impulse guiding many liquor store policies in the early 1930s continued after the arrival of beverage rooms and in many ways was enhanced by it as stores now had competition in the area of legal liquor selling. Just two months after the opening of the first beverage rooms, Board Comptroller J.A. McGeachie announced that brewery warehouses would remain open until 10 pm in the province's larger cities "to give service to customers." The Board also strove to avoid customer complaints. Supplying customers with the products they desired, in top condition, and in clean surroundings became a dominant theme in Board correspondence in the second half of the decade. In August 1935 McGeachie reminded store vendors to "obviate any criticism of being out of stock" by submitting special orders of the brands "the public wishes to buy." Responding to customer complaints of being sold dusty bottles or bottles with discoloured labels, McGeachie reiterated to vendors in early 1937 that it was their "duty to ensure stock is delivered to the customer in a clean and tidy condition." Again in 1939 the Comptroller emphasised the importance of
handling the products to ensure they were kept at their highest quality. "Take proper care to rotate stock," he instructed, as it is necessary to adhere to "this fundamental of merchandising." This reference to merchandising revealed the impetus behind all the concern about the appearance, quantity and quality of stock in liquor stores. While moral control was at this time the most obvious force behind government control, running liquor retail as a business, or as much like any other business as possible, was also an integral aspect of liquor policy in the province.

Table 11

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1929/30</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930/31</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931/32</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>1937/38</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938/39</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1929/30-1938/39

By the end of the decade public drinking had begun to take its place in the social life of the province’s communities. The earlier bans on music, dancing and entertainment in beverage rooms represented policies to deal with the immediate transition to the new drinking facilities. As the Depression lessened somewhat in the later 1930s and the licenced hotel became a more accepted part of the local landscape, many Ontarians began to question these moral restrictions by requesting dancing, banquets, music and entertainment. The Board denied most requests, allowing "music of a subdued type," only with special permission. As public drinking became a more common characteristic of socialising, the ambience of many licenced hotels was found wanting for life’s most important social events. Near the end
of the decade the Board received many requests for licenced banquets in community halls or recreation centres for wedding receptions or other family occasions. The Board, however, consistently replied to such requests that "under no circumstances must beer be sold or consumed therein."212

The introduction of beer by the glass was clearly a product of the Depression era and the ultimate policy response to a particular set of historical circumstances. Public drinking, the next step in Ontario's evolution in government control, was clearly hastened with the onset of the Depression, the desire to promote tourism and the end of American Prohibition. Because of this context in which public drinking was introduced, the beverage room took on the characteristics that it did, ones that would endure for decades. Despite Hepburn's somewhat ambiguous legacy as a leader of the province, he responded to the Depression and implemented the new phase in government control in the same bold manner and in keeping with the province's political culture as his Conservative predecessor Ferguson.

If attitudes towards alcohol consumption can be read like an economic barometer for the province, the Board's reply to a request to further restrict relief recipients in beverage rooms is telling. In September 1939 a municipal official asked the Board to forbid relief recipients from even having a friend purchase a beer for them. Deputy Chief Commissioner Smith replied that the "Board would be going very far out of its way to prohibit a man from being served if his friend...wanted to treat [him]. The Board would not go so far as to interfere with this."213 With war in Europe beginning that month, the Depression had psychologically, if not officially, come to an end. Thoughts turned away from relief and unemployment and towards recruitment, combat, and war work. The next six long years of rationing, separation and death would impact government control policies more than even the Depression.
Notes to Chapter 2

6 Oliver, G. Howard Ferguson, p. 381.
7 See Fifth to Tenth Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario.
8 RG 3-8-0-227, Henry General Correspondence. File “Liquor Control Operation of #2 1932,” letter February 3. 1932 from Drayton to Henry.
9 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File “Circulars 1701-1800.” Circular no. 1707 June 13, 1935 to all wineries from McGechie.
16 Canadian Annual Review, 1932, p. 147.
17 RG 3-8-0-227, Henry General Correspondence. File “Liquor Control Operation of #2 1932,” November 23, 1932 to Price from S. McClennaghan.
19 See for example RG 3-6-0-1468, Ferguson Correspondence. File “Liquor Control—Operation of.” January 27. 1930 to Ferguson from Essex Presbytery of the United Church; and resolution February 21. 1930 to Ferguson from Rainy River Presbytery of the United Church.
23 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File “Circulars 1201-1300.” Circular no. 1294 August 20, 1931 to all vendors from Birmingham.
26 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File “Circulars 901-1000.” Circular 930 March 11, 1930 to all vendors from Birmingham.
27 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File “Circulars 1101-1200.” Circular no. 1139 November 12, 1930 to all vendors from the Supervisor of Stores.
28 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File “Circulars 1501-1600.”
29 Circular no. 1508 June 12, 1933 to all vendors from Birmingham.
30 RG 4-32 #840 1934, (restricted), Attorney General Central Registry Files. File “Complaints of Having to Close Doors on Election Days,” February 19, 1934 to Price from J.M. McNamara.
31 RG 4-32 #840 1934, (restricted), Attorney General Central Registry Files. File “Complaints of Having to Close Doors on Election Days,” memo March 1, 1934 to Price from W.B. Common.
32 RG 3-8-0-227, Henry General Correspondence. File “Liquor Control Operation of 1932,” June 9, 1932 to Henry from the Dundas Baptist Church.
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33 RG 3-8-0-227, Henry General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Operation of 1932." February 3, 1932 to Henry from International Order of Good Templars, Toronto.
35 RG 3-8-0-139, Henry General Correspondence. File "Ontario Prohibition Union 1931." resolution March 10-11 1931 to Henry from Ontario Prohibition Union.
37 RG 3-6-0-1531, Ferguson General Correspondence, file "Legislation 1930," March 27, 1930 to Ferguson from A.E.C., Clerk and Treasurer of Walkerville. See also memo April 4, 1930 to Ferguson from Clerk of Executive Council and Petition April 1, 1930 to Lieutenant Governor re. LCA.
38 RG 3-6-0-1533, Ferguson General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Board 1930." May 10, 1930 to Ferguson from T.F., Chesterville.
39 RG 3-8-0-111, Henry General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Operation of 1931." April 8, 1931 to Henry from J.H., Hawkesbury.
41 RG 3-6-0-1533, Ferguson General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Board 1930." April 4, 1930 to Ferguson from W.G.W., Hamilton.
43 RG 3-8-0-111, Henry General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Operation of 1931." resolutions March 28, 1931 and April 15, 1931 to Henry from City of East Windsor and Town of Sioux Lookout.
45 RG 3-8-0-111, Henry General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Operation of 1931." resolution February 24, 1931 to Henry from Belleville United Church.
46 RG 3-8-0-111, Henry General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Operation of 1931." resolution March 28, 1932 to Henry from City of East Windsor.
47 RG 3-6-0-1533, Ferguson General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Board 1930." April 4, 1930 to Ferguson from W.G.W., Hamilton.
48 RG 3-6-0-1533, Ferguson General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Board 1930." April 29, 1930 to W.G.W. from Ferguson.
49 RG 3-6-0-1533, Ferguson General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Board 1930." May 10, 1930 to Ferguson from T.F., Chesterville.
50 RG 3-6-0-1533, Ferguson General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Board 1930." May 12, 1930 to T.F. from Ferguson.
51 RG 3-8-0-227, Henry General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Operation of #2 1932." November 1, 1932 to Ben Spence from Henry.
55 Although the official platform of the Moderation League was for beer and wine by the glass. the issue was generally debated in terms of beer only.
56 RG 3-8-0-227, Henry General Correspondence, File "Liquor Control Operation of #2 1932." July 22, 1932 Speech by R. Home Smith of Moderation League before businessmen in St. Catharines.
58 RG 3-8-0-227, Henry General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Operation of #2 1932." Moderation League resolution, July 14, 1932, to Henry, sent in by F.G.V., Toronto.
60 RG 3-8-0-342, Henry Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Operation of #1 1933." December 12, 1933 to Rev. J.L., Bishop of Ontario at Kingston from Henry.
61 RG 3-8-0-227, Henry General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Operation of #2 1932." Moderation League resolution, July 14, 1932, to Henry sent in by F.G.V., Toronto.
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63 RG 3-8-0-226, Henry General Correspondence, File “Liquor Control Operation of #1 1932,” September 13, 1932 to Henry from Rideau Club President, Ottawa.
64 RG 3-8-0-226, Henry General Correspondence, File “Liquor Control Operation of #1 1932,” September 10, 1932 to Henry from Muskoka Beach Inn Proprietor.
65 RG 3-8-0-226, Henry General Correspondence, File “Liquor Control Operation of #1 1932,” November 12, 1932 to Henry from Ward 4 Conservative Association, Toronto.
67 RG 3-8-0-227, Henry General Correspondence, File “Liquor Control Operation of #2 1932,” September 15, 1932 to Henry from Ben Spence.
68 See RG 3-8-0-226, Henry General Correspondence, File “Liquor Control Operation of #1 1932,” September 19, 1932 to Henry from E.E. McElwain, municipal clerk of Snowden; September 19, 1932 to Henry from S.W.T., secretary-treasurer of Quinte Canning Co.; and September 21, 1932 to Henry from United Church, Guelph Presbytery.
72 “Beer, Wine Subject to be Introduced by W. Heighington.” The Globe, April 5, 1933, p. 9.
73 Canadian Annual Review, 1933, p. 159.
75 McKay, p. 47.
79 “19 States Wait Hour of Midnight And Legal Beer,” The Globe, April 7, 1933, p. 2.
85 Randall White, p. 225.
86 Schull, p. 281.
87 McKay, p. 48.
88 Schull, p. 292.
90 RG 3-8-0-342, Henry General Correspondence, File “Liquor Control Operation of #1 1933.” September 28, 1933 to United Church Guelph Presbytery from Henry.
91 RG 3-8-0-342, Henry General Correspondence, File “Liquor Control Operation of #1 1933.” November 3, 1933 to United Church Reverend F.E.C., Guelph from Henry.
94 November 3, 1933 to United Church Reverend F.E.C., Guelph from Henry.
95 RG 3-8-0-342, Henry General Correspondence, File “Liquor Control Operation of #1 1933.” December 12, 1933 to Reverend J.L., Bishop of Ontario, Kingston, from Henry.
97 Canadian Annual Review, 1934, pp. 148-149.
100 McKay, p. 183.
Notes to Chapter 2


104 RG 3-8-0-346, Henry General Correspondence. File Liquor Control Resolutions General 1933,” resolution October 3, 1933 to Henry from London Committee on Evangelism and Social Service of United Church.

105 Saywell, pp. 4-16.

106 Saywell, p. 125.

107 McKenty, p. 42.


109 McKenty, p. 53.


112 McKenty, p. 53.


118 RG 3-9-0-52.2, Container 175. Hepburn General Correspondence Public 1934. File “Liquor Control.” September 15, 1934 to Hepburn from E.S. Hamilton.


121 McKenty, p. 59.

122 See RG 3-9-0-52.2 Container 175. Hepburn General Correspondence Public. File “Liquor Control.” July 17, 1934 to Hepburn from United Church Board of Evangelism and Social Service, Toronto; and RG 3-9-0-52.3 Container 175. Hepburn General Correspondence Public. File “Liquor Control.” July 4, 1934 to Hepburn from General Secretary Ontario Temperance Federation, Toronto.


124 Hodgetts, p. 212.

125 Saywell, p. 175.

126 Berton, The Dionne Years, p. 128.


130 “Beer Sales This Week. 10am to Midnight, Trains, Boats and Dining-Rooms to Have Privilege.” The Globe. July 18, 1934, p. 1.

131 Ontario Gazette, vol. 67, Regulations of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, July 18, 1934, Section 179.

132 MacKay, p. 22.

133 RG 3-9-0-52.2 Container 175. Hepburn Correspondence, File “Liquor Control.” September 3, 1934 to Hepburn from J.J.G. St. Mary’s Rectory, Port Hope.


136 RG 3-8-0-226, Henry Correspondence. File “Liquor Control Operation of #1.” September 17, 1932 to Henry from A.A.B.

137 Ontario Gazette, vol. 67, Regulations of the Liquor Control Board, July 18, 1934, s. 156 (a).

138 Regulations of the Liquor Control Board, July 18, 1934, s. 178.

139 Regulations of the Liquor Control Board, July 18, 1934, s. 166.

140 Regulations of the Liquor Control Board, July 18, 1934, s. 85.

141 Regulations of the Liquor Control Board, July 18, 1934, s. 81 and 87.

142 “Church Members Score Beer Rooms.” The Globe, August 20, 1934, p. 2.

143 “Ruling Announced on Beverage Rooms in Church Locality.” The Globe, August 21, 1934, p. 5.

144 Eighth Report of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario, November 1, 1933 to October 31, 1934, p. 10.

145 Saywell, p. 175.
Notes to Chapter 2

147 Regulations of the Liquor Control Board, July 18, 1934, Section 172.
155 RG 3-9-0-52.2, Container 175, Hepburn General Correspondence Public 1934. File “Liquor Control.” October 3, 1934 from Hepburn in reply to A.C.B., Collingwood.
158 Smart and Ogborne, Northern Spirits: A Social History of Alcohol in Canada. pp. 33-34.
159 H.F. Angus, ed. Canada and Her Great Neighbour (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1938). pp. 42-43. 47.
162 Saywell. p. 175.
165 Statutes of Ontario, 1934. 24 George V, c. 26, s. 69j (2) d.
by Mr. Retsof. The Toronto Telegram, June 13, 1936.
170 RG 3-9-0-156.1 Box 187, Hepburn General Correspondence 1935. File “Liquor Control Board General.”
November 4, 1935 to Hepburn from J.G.B., Toronto.
173 RG 3-10-0-702.2 Box 276, Hepburn General Correspondence Private 1937, File “Liquor Control Board General.” February 9, 1937 to Hepburn from Odette.
177 RG 3-9-0-52.2 Container 175, Hepburn General Correspondence. File “Liquor Control.” July 17, 1934 to Hepburn from United Church Board of Evangelism and Social Services, Toronto.
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180 RG 3-9-0-156.2 Box 187, Hepburn General Correspondence. File “Liquor Control Board,” July 4, 1934 to Hepburn from W. McP of Hamilton.


188 “Licences Kept Down Odette Maintains.” The Toronto Star. August 30, 1934, p. 3.


198 Canadian Annual Review. 1934, p. 182.

199 “Licences Kept Down Odette Maintains.” p. 3.


203 Schull. p. 277.


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206 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File "Circulars 1701-1800." Circular no. 1728 August 12, 1935 to all vendors from McGachie.

209 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 8, LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File "Circulars 1801-1900." Circular no. 1855 January 8, 1937 to all vendors from McGachie.


211 See for example RG 36-4-0-9.1 Container 1, Liquor Licence Board of Ontario, Geographical Correspondence Files 1934-45, File "Essex," (restricted) December 19, 1939 to M.B., hotel proprietor Belle River from Arnold Smith.

212 RG 36-4-0-20.2 Container 1, Liquor Licence Board of Ontario, Geographical Correspondence Files. 1934-35. File "Kenora." (restricted) January 27, 1938 to N.K., Walford from Smith.

213 RG 36-4-0-50 Container 3, Liquor Licence Board Geographical Correspondence Files 1934-45. File "Victoria 1935-44." (restricted) September 26, 1939 to B.M.K., Assistant Clerk Treasurer, Lindsay from Arnold Smith.
"LIQUOR SALE BY GLASS RETURNS AFTER 30 YEARS"¹

Alcoholic beverages in every form are to be pressed upon the people in all sorts of places. First we got the sale of beer by the glass and now the public drinking of hard liquor.²

The sale of spirits by the glass returned to Ontario after a 30-year absence in reaction to the next crisis the province endured: world war. But like the government’s reaction to the crisis of the Depression, it would be several years before it instituted the policy of spirits by the glass. From 1939-1945 world war dominated life in Ontario and across the rest of the country. The Depression years were quickly left behind as mobilisation and war work preoccupied Ontarians. The Liquor Control Board’s own annual reports revealed this transition. While the 1939/40 report reiterated the Board’s policy of preventing relief recipients from purchasing liquor,³ the 1940/41 report revealed a new focus. “It should be borne in mind that the consumption of alcoholic beverages varies in accordance with economic conditions. Periods of prosperity increase it.”⁴ War work with its generous wages provided many Ontarians with the purchasing power they had lacked during the previous decade. Board sales in the early 1940s revealed that Ontarians spent some of this new income on liquor as Table 12 depicts. The gallonage of all liquor sold showed an increase of 14% at year-end in March 1941⁵ and 21% the following year,⁶ as Table 13 illustrates. The war itself provided incentives to increased consumption of liquor. “Thousands of people...find liquor an anodyne for the special anxieties and troubles which the war has brought...the strain of abnormally long hours of work and...everyday an epidemic of celebrations in honour of the departure or the safe return of some member of the fighting forces.”⁷ The war also encouraged migration to Ontario, and from country to city,⁸ contributing to the overall increase in alcohol consumption. This increased consumption set off alarm bells for many Ontarians, who viewed war as a time for sacrifice, not self-indulgence.
Like the First World War, the Second prompted vocal calls for liquor policy change from many quarters. The most vocal calls were from Ontario’s traditional dry advocates: the United Church, the
Baptist Church, the WCTU and the Ontario Temperance Federation (OTF). In reaction to this, the Board emphasised in its 1940/41 annual report the failure of "the experience of prohibitory legislation on the North American continent" during the last war. The only effective approach, the Board advised, was "voluntary limitation." Although given the dramatic increase in consumption revealed in Tables 12 and 13, such limitations did not work. In contrast to the First World War, these groups and others did not advocate complete prohibition as their primary policy proposal. The overwhelming number of letters and resolutions sent to Hepburn in 1940 and 1941 reflected four main policy proposals: the restriction of sales to stores only; the abolition of advertising except at point of purchase; the limitation of store hours to 3-8 pm Monday to Friday; and the closure of all wet military canteens. While these correspondents did not attack government control itself, these proposals amounted to the banning of public drinking.

Nevertheless, Hepburn did receive a few letters demanding total prohibition. For example, in July 1940, the Belleville WCTU argued for the need for total prohibition for the duration of the war to promote efficiency and eliminate the wasting of resources, both material and human. Later in 1940, a London woman described for Hepburn the scene of drunken airmen leaving licensed establishments. Nazi spies were found and dealt with, she argued, "but what of this much worse situation?" For her, the only answer was total prohibition for the duration of the war and the period of demobilisation. Such requests proved to be the exception rather than the rule. Because of the memories of the harsh experiences of the First World War, few Ontarians looked to war as an opportunity to uplift society. Furthermore, government control had become an integral aspect of Ontario society. Therefore few people questioned its general legitimacy. Instead the majority of critics targeted the most recent aspect of government control, public drinking, for their harshest wartime condemnation.

Of all public drinking establishments, women's beverage rooms continued to attract the most criticism, as they had in the mid-1930s. Officially called beverage rooms for "ladies and escorts," these facilities were popularly known as women's beverage rooms. In late 1941, 49-year-old Rev. J.R. Mutchmor, secretary of the United Church Board of Evangelism and Social Service, wrote to Hepburn demanding that women be banned from all beverage rooms. In 1942 the OTF circulated a pamphlet
entitled "Ontario’s Blight...Beer Rooms for Women and Girls."\textsuperscript{14} Many critics opposed women's beverage rooms throughout the period on the basis that they contributed to an erosion in morals, a rise in venereal disease and even an increase in juvenile delinquency.\textsuperscript{15} Another approach also criticised the beverage rooms but instead of proposing their elimination, the clerk of Elgin County suggested to Hepburn that women's beverage rooms be restricted to women only, to eliminate the problematic mingling of the sexes.\textsuperscript{16}

Hepburn acknowledged that the public's concerns seemed to revolve around women's beverage rooms, but he was reluctant to impose any restrictions on drinking in the province. Women themselves, he argued, would resent any action in the matter of their beverage rooms. He feared driving business to the bootleggers by restricting access to liquor and warned one critic in June 1942 that such restrictions would result in a decline in provincial revenue needed for hospitals, schools and roads.\textsuperscript{17} Even in these improved economic times liquor revenues played a significant role for provincial coffers, as Table 12 shows. Nevertheless, Hepburn promised to give the matter of restrictions on women's beverage rooms serious consideration. Despite this promise, Hepburn's reliance on liquor revenues, especially in his role as Provincial Treasurer, determined that he would not voluntarily interfere with public drinking in any way that might impinge on these revenues.

In response to the many complaints about public drinking in the context of wartime prosperity and purchasing power, the Board did reinforce its existing regulations on beverage rooms. For example, in June 1940 Deputy Chief Commissioner Arnold Smith firmly informed the representative of a Sault Ste. Marie hotel that "the Board under no circumstances will permit any musical contrivance in a beverage room."\textsuperscript{18} The very next day he reminded all Niagara Falls hotels that "no music of any description is allowed in any beverage room and if any music machine is installed in your beverage room please see that same is removed at once."\textsuperscript{19} The following day Smith also informed a Hamilton inspector that "under no circumstances may dancing be permitted."\textsuperscript{20} These reminders failed to satisfy many critics who continued to press for further restrictions or the elimination of public drinking altogether. A Guelph man criticised Hepburn for allowing beverage rooms to remain open until midnight when the federal government
enacted war measures to close gas stations at 7 pm. The money saved on beer during these late evening drinking hours, he argued, could be spent instead on “victory bonds to fight Hitler.”

Not everyone supported the idea of wartime restrictions on access to alcohol. The province’s distilling industry, clearly an influential lobby group, opposed any hint of wartime prohibition. The president of Hiram Walker—Goederham and Worts assured Hepburn in early 1941 that contrary to prohibitionist arguments the distilling industry did not waste resources on the production of liquor. Instead, he argued, it contributed to public revenues through taxes, provided technical personnel for the war effort, and supported the agricultural sector. Echoing the Board’s own annual report that year, the distillery president also reminded Hepburn that the experience of the last war proved that Prohibition did not prohibit the purchase and consumption of alcohol, it only substituted legal behaviour with the illegal variety. While the distilling industry had a clear stake in any future liquor restrictions, there were other voices appealing to the government using similar arguments. The representatives of many town councils wrote to the Premier’s office in late 1942, opposing any reduction in beverage room hours. They stressed the need to keep war workers happy. If the workers could not buy their beer after work they would resort to blind pigs and that illegal activity would be bad for the municipalities. Nevertheless, the matter would be taken out of Ontario’s hands by the end of 1942.

FEDERAL LIQUOR RATIONING

While liquor policy was primarily a provincial matter, various national temperance groups appealed to Prime Minister Mackenzie King to employ federal powers as a war measure against what was perceived as excessive liquor consumption. One area under federal control was the manufacturing of alcohol. Therefore, in response to appeals from groups such as the Canadian Temperance Federation and the Social Service Council of the United Church, and reflecting his own personal moral beliefs about alcohol, King issued the ‘Wartime Alcoholic Beverages Order, 1942.’ Under the War Measures Act, this order reduced the amount of alcohol released from bond by the National Revenue Department, thereby reducing the amount of alcohol available to be sold across the entire country. Using the total sales for the previous year as a benchmark, this order reduced the availability of spirits by 30%, wine by 20% and beer
by 10%. King also decreed a prohibition on liquor advertising and a reduction in the strength of spirits sold in Canada. King justified these restrictions as necessary to combat the sharp increase in consumption since the war began. Canadians purchased nearly 40% more spirits and 60% more beer in 1942 than in 1939. While this liquor rationing coincided with the extensive rationing of nearly every other consumer product in Ontario, King’s strongest justification conjured up the imagery of sacrifice, honour and self-denial necessary during the crisis of war. “We may be called upon to witness the greatest ordeal through which our young country has ever been obliged to pass,” he argued. “To be equal to that ordeal we must put on the whole armour of God.” This religious reference echoed the prohibitionist rhetoric of the last war. Unlike government actions during the first war, though, King instituted restrictions on access to alcohol, not its total prohibition.

In addition to these official orders, King also appealed to the provinces to exercise restraint in their own legal jurisdictions by restricting beverage room opening to eight hours per day. Ontario responded quickly though not in the far-reaching manner that King requested. Instead of reducing beverage room hours, the LCBO limited liquor and wine stores to eight hours per day. Beverage rooms on the other hand initially retained their usual hours with Chief Commissioner A. St. Clair Gordon vowing that “hours of sale in hotel beverage rooms will remain the same.” Gordon assumed the LCBO’s top post in 1939 after Odette’s sudden heart attack and death. Hepburn’s appointment of the 44-year-old industrialist and United Church member departed significantly from tradition. While Gordon’s business background in banking and manufacturing certainly mirrored that of past Chief Commissioners, he was also an elected member of the Ontario government for the riding of West Kent and a Minister without Portfolio. Therefore, Hepburn tied the Board more closely to his government, perhaps to address years of Conservative hegemony over government control, a trend he began in 1934 by giving Odette, a private citizen, Cabinet privileges. He reinforced this tie even further by appointing his personal secretary, Roy Elmhirst, to the position of Commissioner under Gordon in 1941.

Gordon’s refusal to comply with King’s request regarding beverage room hours revealed the complex federal-provincial power struggle over liquor revenues. In early January 1943, Premier Gordon
Conant, defending provincial business practices, wrote to all the other provincial premiers, asking for their support in securing financial compensation from King. Conant became Premier the previous October when Hepburn suddenly resigned, handing the leadership to his “sober” Attorney General with “imperial unconcern” for his caucus. Conant argued to his counterparts in the other provinces that the “regulations imposed by the Dominion government to restrict supplies of liquor in all forms will impair revenues and therefore threaten the financial independence and autonomy of the provinces.” Conant was not exaggerating in order to gain support from the other premiers. In Ontario’s case, as Table 12 depicts, Board profits paid to the Provincial Treasurer increased from $9.4 million in 1940 to $13 million in 1942. This revealed not only the increasing importance of liquor revenues for government budgets but the overall increase in consumption due to the onset of war with its job opportunities and higher incomes. The premiers eventually secured compensation in the form of a federal guarantee of stable and reasonably adequate liquor revenues that would not fall below the level of October 1942. Despite this economic victory, the reduced liquor supplies brought about by Ottawa’s Wartime Alcoholic Beverages Order, forced Ontario to institute further liquor controls.

LIQUOR RETAILING UNDER WAR RATIONING

During the first weeks under the new restrictions the Board instituted several ad hoc policy changes at the store level to deal with the reduced stocks. At the end of December Comptroller McGeachie informed all store vendors that in order “to promote orderly marketing of restricted gallonage,” the single purchase permit that had been created to deal with declining purchasing power during the Depression was discontinued. By January the Board stopped selling 40-ounce bottles of spirits and wine and 80-ounce containers of wine. Also, it rationed the number of ounces a customer could purchase per week. As a further restriction on access to its stocks, the Board declared that in order to make a purchase, customers must show their national registration certificates. Motivated by the same paternalism that inspired the Board to require purchasers to forfeit their permits if receiving relief, the Board sought to ensure that all its customers registered for the war emergency. In a legal opinion on the issue, the Deputy Attorney General defended the Board’s right to refuse sale to anyone unable to produce
a certificate as a matter of freedom of commerce and not wartime regulation. The war therefore presented the Board with an opportunity to amalgamate business efficiency and paternalistic regulation.

The Board justified all of these restrictions "in order to maintain continued service to the public." Service in this case meant, "sales must be kept to a minimum," and the "maximum limits should be the exception not the rule." Clearly the Board viewed these provincial restrictions as business practices to deal efficiently with reduced supplies rather than moral judgements on liquor as a beverage. Government control had become too important economically and too entrenched socially for the government to consider imposing anything similar to Prohibition. Even these restrictions could not keep pace with public demand. By March, reduced wine stocks forced McGeachie to announce the resurrection of a permit for native wine, which had been created early in the Depression and then discontinued in 1934 once wine was available by the glass. The Board also required purchasers of beer and imported wine to produce a resident liquor permit, something they had not had to bother with since 1934. Because of these new requirements, resident permit sales rose sharply in 1943 as Table 14 illustrates.

Table 14
Total Permits Sold 1939/40-1948/49

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of Permits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1941/42</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947/48</td>
<td>1500000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948/49</td>
<td>1000000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*note single purchase permit discontinued 1943

Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1939/40-1948/49
By the spring of 1943 the public demand for alcoholic beverages necessitated further restrictions. In May the Board inaugurated a ration coupon sales plan for domestic beer. Each week the Board announced how many coupons each customer could redeem. The following month the Board introduced a similar plan for domestic wine.\textsuperscript{44} This rationing resulted in long line-ups, especially at beer stores and by late 1943 these line-ups blocked the sidewalks in front of stores.\textsuperscript{45} To illustrate the severity of the problem Chief Commissioner Gordon sent photographs depicting these massive crowds to the Attorney General.\textsuperscript{46} To help alleviate the congestion and satisfy the public’s demand for beer for home consumption the Board ordered the Brewers’ Warehousing Company to establish six more beer stores. The Board also “decided to allocate a larger proportion of the total gallonage of beer available to home consumers [through] a reduction...in the gallonage of beer available to clubs and hotels.”\textsuperscript{47} At liquor stores the Board doubled the usual ration for the “festive month of December” and posted signs assuring customers that as citizens of a free country it was their “democratic right to buy whiskey or other liquor” for their personal use.\textsuperscript{48} The Board also reminded customers that any shortage they might experience was entirely due to the federal government’s actions. This notice not only deflected criticism away from the provincial government but also demonstrated a clear partiality towards the home consumer at the expense of the beverage room patron, a partiality that would have a profound impact on public drinking in the province.

Even before the Board further restricted the beer available to beverage rooms, the federal restrictions set off a flurry of complaints from beverage room patrons. Many opposed even the hint of reduced beverage room hours. Workers from Windsor informed Conant that they needed escape after long shifts. Protesting against calls for reduced beverage room hours they countered: “what do men in office work, ministers of the gospel and housewives know of the needs of those who make their living by the sweat of their brow?”\textsuperscript{49} Veterans of the current war also opposed any curtailment of public drinking hours, arguing in letters to every MPP that the freedom they were fighting for in Europe was the same as the freedom they sought in the beverage rooms.\textsuperscript{50} Conant resisted the vocal demands to comply with King’s wishes and curtail beverage room hours.
The next Premier, Conservative George Drew, continued this resistance. The August 1943 election ousted the Liberals, in disarray after Hepburn’s resignation, in favour of a minority government under the Conservatives and Drew’s 22-point program for social and economic development of Ontario. The 49-year-old Guelph native of Anglican Loyalist stock gained the Conservative leadership in 1938 after a successful career as a lawyer and a distinguished officer in World War One. With his post-war rank of colonel, Drew commanded respect with his “authoritarian” style. Drew’s love for the order and efficiency of the military made it almost impossible for him to maintain his resistance to King’s request for further restrictions on access to liquor. The federal restrictions caused congestion and beer shortages in many establishments. By November, when the Board reduced the beer ration for hotels even further in favour of stores, conditions went from bad to worse in the beverage rooms. Only then did the Board finally relent and cut drinking hours. Immediately after King announced his restrictions, the Board discussed the possibility of instituting a supper hour closing period for beverage rooms similar to the one practised in British Columbia. A year later, once the effect of rationing on store line-ups and beverage room crowding became critical, the Board followed British Columbia’s example and restricted drinking hours by closing in the late afternoon and opening again in the early evening. The Board also discontinued the room service of beer and wine in hotels. These two changes, representing ad hoc responses to wartime rationing, would have profound and long-lasting effects on Ontario beverage rooms.

When Chief Commissioner Gordon recommended these changes to Attorney General Leslie Blackwell, Blackwell immediately took a hands-off attitude to Board policy changes. He instructed Gordon to release the information to the public from the Chief Commissioner’s office since it was “not his intention to involve himself or the government in the details of Liquor Control Board administration.” After the Conservative election victory in August 1943, the ministerial responsibility for liquor control reverted back to the Attorney General’s office from Hepburn’s private preserve in the Treasurer’s office. Drew selected Blackwell, the “combative” and “out-spoken” 45-year-old Anglican lawyer from Lindsay to assume the often-controversial position. Appreciating this fact, Blackwell sought to distance himself from the inevitable backlash due to these further restrictions.
BEVERAGE ROOM CONDITIONS UNDER WAR RATIONING

A backlash certainly ensued. The combination of shortened hours, no room service and reduced beer supplies resulted in crowded and often violent conditions in Ontario beverage rooms. These conditions caused the Board to enforce drinking policies even more strictly than previously. Upon learning that beverage rooms often permitted customers to pickup their beer from the bar and served more than one glass at a time, the Deputy Chief Commissioner warned authority holders “the Board cannot permit this self-service of beer and the service of more than one beer at a time is prohibited.”\textsuperscript{56} The Brantford Expositor described "beverage rooms crowded to capacity," due to the "human nature to hoard when a commodity is in short supply."\textsuperscript{57} Despite the fact that King lifted the wartime restrictions on beer in mid-March 1944, beer shortages endured for months. Labour and material shortages in carton and bottle manufacturing plants and the lack of brewery stock accounted for this.\textsuperscript{58} The LCBO also continued to set the needs of the home consumer before the public drinker by supplying any increased gallonage of beer to stores rather than hotels or clubs.\textsuperscript{59} The shortages prompted excessive consumption. After hearing that King lifted the beer restrictions, J.W. Connell, the managing director of the Ontario Hotel Association (OHA), described “the fellow who goes into a tavern to get a bottle of beer [and] stay[s] for three or four more in case he can’t get any more the next time.”\textsuperscript{60} Connell hoped that eased restrictions would end this situation but beer shortages would continue until the end of the war.

Customers also continued to complain of shortages and poor service in Ontario beverage rooms. A Toronto labourer complained to Attorney General Blackwell that shortened drinking hours meant that the “working man cannot get a glass of beer after work.”\textsuperscript{61} A Hamilton man, working in a war plant, protested to Drew that when his shift ended all the beer was gone or the beverage rooms were full.\textsuperscript{62} Even licence inspectors began to voice their concern to the Deputy Chief Commissioner that enough beer be conserved in hotels “for the convenience of the working man and his wife.”\textsuperscript{63} Clearly though, the drinking ‘convenience’ of the working man’s wife, or any woman for that matter, was not a priority for everyone. Women’s beverage rooms received the majority of the criticism levelled at public drinking as they had earlier in the war. In May 1944 the Premier received 43 resolutions from a variety of women’s
and religious groups calling for the immediate closure of all women’s beverage rooms. The resolutions employed arguments similar to the ones used since the Board opened the first women’s beverage rooms in 1934: they promoted the spread of venereal disease and juvenile delinquency and threatened morals and home life. Drew referred the protests to Blackwell who disregarded the demand to close women’s beverage rooms. He maintained that the Board considered each authority application separately, regardless of whether it was a women’s beverage room or not. Nevertheless, the argument about venereal disease concerned the Board so much that it sought an opinion on the charge at the beginning of 1945. Dr. J.A. LeRoux, Director of Ontario’s Venereal Disease Control Unit informed the Attorney General’s department that “in an alarming number of cases the point of [sexual] contact exists in hotels holding authorities under your Act.” LeRoux’s counterpart in British Columbia made a similar observation in 1939, resulting ultimately in a mandatory separation between men and ladies and escorts in the Pacific province’s beer parlours, where it had previously been voluntary. Protests against women’s beverage rooms continued beyond the end of the war. Despite the continued barrage of complaints that these rooms were “evil” and bred divorce and illegitimacy and the rumours that they would be closed down, the Board resisted these moral arguments and maintained “there is no active move at present to close women’s beverage rooms.”

Beyond this vocal opposition to women’s beverage rooms, support for them flourished, particularly among the proprietors who had a financial stake in the issue. In order to protect this interest they lobbied the Board to keep them open. As the president of the Association of Toronto Hotel Proprietors pointed out, “neither government nor hotelmen could have foreseen their ultimate popularity resulting from the gradual emancipation of women since World War One.” The president of the Essex County Hotelmen’s Association, F.J. May argued “more women drink beer than don’t drink it, and they’re going to keep on doing it. Women who have never thought of patronising a blind pig before will get the idea right smartly if their beverage rooms are closed down.” Woodstock proprietors argued that “women, on their war record should have the same privileges as men.” Opposition to women’s beverage rooms seemed to escalate into moral panics at times of perceived excessive use of public
drinking facilities such as when beer by the glass was first introduced and during war rationing. Opponents targeted these rooms for the ills of the entire public drinking system. Women's contribution to the war effort and the popularity of their beverage rooms meant that public drinking by women would never be denied. The presence of women in Ontario's beverage rooms signalled the slow transition away from the separate spheres of the Victorian age towards integration of the sexes in the public realm.

By the end of the war many Ontarians recognised the need for improved beverage room conditions. The novelty of the new drinking facilities had barely worn off when the country was plunged into war. The resulting war rationing of alcohol created a crisis in public drinking. Amidst the many complaints levelled against the beverage room conditions a few constructive suggestions reached the Attorney General's ear. In late 1945 one woman argued that the government could not curb drinking through restrictions. To attempt to do so resulted in the opposite effect of overindulgence as evidenced by the war rationing conditions. She suggested instead that public drinking be brought "sanely into relation with the rest of life," with homey surroundings, meals, windows and pleasant lighting. The result, she argued, would be a positive public opinion promoting temperate drinking. Expressing similar sentiments to Blackwell the following month, a Toronto man complained of the lack of space and comfort in the average beverage room, and felt "entitled to some brightness and comfort." Instead of following these suggestions for improved beverage rooms, the Attorney General contemplated a completely new type of licensed establishment.

The war environment and liquor rationing exacerbated weaknesses embedded in the beverage room system when it was inaugurated during the Depression. The system had never really operated during so-called 'normal' conditions. First the depressed economy and then total war put their stamp upon the system. The government grafted the original beverage room onto the existing standard hotel system whereby the government regulated overnight accommodations for health and safety features. This association between public drinking and hotel surroundings endured into the war years. In response to an eastern Ontario member of the federal parliament's inquiring whether Ontario had an establishment similar to Quebec's tavern, located apart from a hotel, the Deputy Chief Commissioner replied "in
Ontario the only authority for the sale of beer can be a bona fide hotel." Beer and hotels were as synonymous in Ontario public drinking as they were in British Columbia, for example. A decade after Hepburn introduced beverage rooms the Conservative government came to regard this requirement that only hotels could be licenced to serve liquor as hypocritical.

**CREATION OF A SEPARATE LICENCING BOARD**

The government made its first move to come to grips with the shortcomings of the system in the spring of 1944. In 1934 the introduction of public drinking necessitated the enhancement of the original LCA’s regulatory features. One body combined both operative and regulatory powers and this incompatibility remained unrecognised during the Liberal regime. Liquor rationing made this incompatibility obvious to the Conservatives during the war. Therefore, in March 1944 Blackwell announced the creation of a licencing board, which would divorce the LCBO “from any connection with the granting and cancellation of beer and wine authorities.” By investing responsibility for licenced establishments in a specialised body, Blackwell intended to ensure “certain standards of decency...in the matter of consumption of alcoholic beverages.” The LCBO, which he described as “such a vast vending body...” was fully occupied with the duties of retailing alcoholic beverages for home consumption. In reaction to the beverage room overcrowding and overindulgence resulting from wartime anxieties and short beer supplies, the government realised that it required a separate regulatory body to address the special problems associated with meeting Ontarians’ thirst for beer by the glass.

The new Liquor Authority Control Board (LACB) fulfilled this role. Drew appointed 55-year-old Dufferin County Judge Walter Robb as chairman of the new Board. Later described by a colleague as a man who “does not like to be pushed around.” Robb brought to the LACB not only his judicial experience but also his uncompromising commitment to uphold the liquor laws. Robb took his new job so seriously that he chose to give up the occasional social drink that had been his custom, not out of a personal philosophy against consumption but to avoid any possible hint of impropriety. A member of the United Church and a native of Orangeville, Robb continued to preside as a judge in Dufferin County throughout what would become a 26-year tenure with the Board. Although no one questioned Robb’s
"incorruptible" character, he was "once a pillar of Toryism" and still had "strong friends in the party." While Robb made it clear from the start that he would not stand for political interference in his decisions regarding licencing, this did not prevent close communication between himself and Conservative premiers and party managers throughout his career. This change removed control over hotel licencing from the LCBO where it had served as an important cog in the Liberal patronage system and placed it under an independent judicial body. This image of independence served Drew's desire to retreat from Hepburn's overt use of patronage but did not lessen the licencing system's potential to reward the party faithful in less public ways. Also, the Conservative Party continued to look to loyal supporters to fill inspector and liquor store jobs and rent liquor store buildings. The LACB presided over the introduction of public hearings for the issuing of licences and administered the public advertising of the licence applications. This constituted only the "first step," as the government later admitted. The problems inherent in Ontario's public drinking system did not become completely evident until the new Board was established. By the end of the war the government recognised that this Board was serving a transitory role, a segue between the old beverage room and a completely new type of drinking establishment.

"A VAST VENDING BODY"

The "vast vending body" known as the Liquor Control Board certainly was fully occupied with the duties of retailing alcohol in the province. The establishment of the LACB left the LCBO to concentrate exclusively on the business enterprise aspect of government control. To facilitate this, in February 1944 Drew selected private businessman Victor Goggin to replace Liberal MPP Gordon as Chief Commissioner of the Control Board. Hepburn progressively politicised the position of Chief Commissioner in order to assume political control over the system of government control previously dominated by the Conservatives. Drew reversed this trend, exemplifying the increased business emphasis of government control. An engineering consultant, Goggin headed Wartime Housing Limited during the war and invested a dynamic energy into the Board that had not yet been witnessed. He vocally opposed the creation of the Liquor Authority Control Board. He feared conflict between the two Boards and appealed to Blackwell for a centralised system with further licencing powers for the Liquor Control
Board.88 "From the standpoint of being in the tempo of today," Goggin told Blackwell, "it [LCA] could stand for certain revisions. As an instrument to enable this Board to increase its function and its usefulness to the public, it could stand renovation and modernisation."89 Because the new Board was basically a fait accompli by this time, save official proclamation, Goggin's passionate opposition to a separate licencing body fell on deaf ears. Still, this statement exemplified Goggin's philosophy and it was in promoting this idea of change and modernisation that he spent all his energies.

In May 1944 Goggin inaugurated a series of circular letters sent to liquor store employees around the province. Unlike earlier circulars issued by past Chief Commissioners and other Board administrators to impart short policy directives, Goggin personally penned these long, friendly and at times chiding, communications. In the first one Goggin set the tone and established the themes that would define his short tenure as Chief Commissioner. "Let us be a family," he told Board employees. In order to "hold the place in the sun that is our right and our duty," we must be "a model among merchandising organisations." He argued that the Board had lost sight of that along the way. Bad habits and manners created an adverse opinion in the public. "That customer at the counter pays our salary," he reminded employees.90 Only through customer service could the Board earn public confidence and a good reputation, thereby deserving the position of a monopoly business. This emphasis on good business practices to justify the Board's position as a monopoly was nothing new or revolutionary for the Board though it had never been articulated in such a clear and forthright manner.

From its origins, the Board had demonstrated a clear commitment to customer service. Even with the challenges of war rationing, serving the public remained a top priority. The Board concerned itself especially with educating its employees and customers in the buying and serving of wine. For example, in September 1940 Comptroller McGeachie sent vendors a British magazine article on the topic "for your information and of customers who no doubt consult you on the matter of storing and serving wine."91 The following summer the Board issued its own brochure entitled "Some Facts About Wine."92 In February 1944 the Board revised this literature under the title "A Short Story for Users of Wine."93 While the Board continued to ration wine and to require the new wine permit, it demonstrated concern not only with
fulfilling the public's demand for wine but also for the all-important knowledge of storing and serving it. The Board's commitment to intelligently merchandising a commodity increasingly associated with dining and sophistication, served as a barometer for its overall responsiveness to customer service. Goggin's leadership at this particular point in Board history intensified an already well-demonstrated commitment to customer service as a basis for its business monopoly.

Goggin continued his circulars on a weekly or bi-weekly basis throughout the spring and summer of 1944. He repeatedly encouraged employees frustrated after several years of war and rationing to make suggestions for improvement to him personally. He forecast a post-war program of renovation and expansion but in the meantime instructed employees to present the best possible service and surroundings. "Dare me to inspect your store if you are sure it fits the bill," he challenged. Above all, he promoted customer service to preserve the government's monopoly. The Board's customers deserved courtesy and service, he argued, since they could not legally take their business elsewhere. "The honeymoon is over," he declared. "Discourtesy and the Board are parting company." Nothing that Goggin preached was new, but he articulated the Board's commitment to customer service in a way no other Chief Commissioner before him had ever done. He encouraged change and modernisation at a time when the Board was under extreme pressure.

Perhaps his passionate approach was too far out of step with the Board at this time as he favoured above all the business aspect of government control. This, combined with his opposition to the new regulatory board, certainly shortened his tenure as Chief Commissioner. By the end of the year he resigned, to be replaced by London MPP and Minister without Portfolio W.G. Webster in January 1945. Webster, a 60-year-old Anglican, brought to the position his business background in the air equipment and iron works industries. While Drew desired to distance himself from Hepburn's overtly political appointment practices with the selection of Goggin in 1944, he reversed his stance a year later. Goggin lent the Board an image of independence and professionalism similar to the one bestowed by Chief Commissioner Hanna in 1927. Nevertheless, in the tumultuous last months of the war his aggressive
business emphasis overshadowed the Board’s moral control goals to a point unacceptable to the
government and the public.

Goggin’s forceful reiteration of the necessity of customer service in a public monopoly like liquor
retailing can be explained by the threat of illegal bootleggers in the context of war rationing but also of
legal sale by the private sector. Since 1927 isolated critics periodically promoted the idea of the grocery
sale of beer. In the context of war rationing, new beer and wine permits and long lines at government
stores, the idea of private sale of alcoholic beverages for home consumption gained prominence. By early
spring 1946 the OTF lamented that “newspapers have freely predicted the sale of beer in grocery
stores.”

There is no indication that the government ever considered such a liberalisation although there
was another type of sale that the newspapers were also freely predicting, and this was a revolutionary
change in public drinking that the government was prepared to propose.

LIQUOR LICENCE ACT INTRODUCES SPIRITS BY THE GLASS

In March 1946 the government introduced legislation allowing the sale of spirits by the glass in
cocktail lounges and restaurants. Such sale had been illegal in the province since the beginning of
Prohibition in 1916 and no other province, with the exception of Quebec with its traditionally more liberal
attitude toward public drinking, permitted the sale of spirits by the glass. This move represented the
government’s response to the crisis in public drinking brought on by war conditions and rationing. These
circumstances, to quote one letter to the editor, caused “crowded, vulgar conditions” in Ontario
beverage rooms. While the new legislation tinkered with the old beverage room system, the government
primarily responded to the crisis in policy by creating a completely new type of licenced establishment.

In October 1943, the OHA first suggested cocktail lounges to the government as a legitimate policy
option. In the midst of severe beer shortages, the hotel industry sought new opportunities. Envisioning a
boom in post-war tourism, the OHA argued that in order to compete with Quebec for American tourists,
Ontario hotels needed “cocktail lounges where spirituous liquors could be sold.” Once the government
revealed its intention to end the so-called hypocrisy that all public drinking must take place in a hotel, the
hotel industry tempered its support for cocktail lounges. In an undated brief to Blackwell sometime after
the initial introduction of the new legislation, the Association of Toronto Hotel Proprietors defended its own interests and revealed several interesting conclusions concerning the demand for spirits by the glass. In the pre-war period when supplies were plentiful, the Association argued, the spirit drinker did not demand sale by the glass. When rationing forced many of these drinkers into the beverage rooms, they “found them not to their liking, forgetting that they were not designed for their convenience.” The Toronto Hotel Proprietors hoped that the Board would perfect the current beverage room system instead of introducing a new type of drinking facility which the Association believed was only conceived due to wartime conditions. Much to the disappointment of many hotel owners, this is exactly what the government had in mind.

Attorney General Blackwell played a critical role in ushering the new legislation through the Legislature. Once 50-year-old Windsor area MPP Colonel William Griesinger replaced W.G. Webster in early 1946 after his short stint as Chief Commissioner of the LCBO, he assumed Cabinet responsibility for liquor retail, leaving public drinking solely in the hands of Blackwell. When introducing the Liquor Licence Act (LLA) Blackwell described it as “being in line with public opinion and of such a nature that it will be accepted by those who ordinarily respect the law.” It represented his government’s response to the crisis of world war. Replacing the Liquor Authority Control Act of 1944 and the Board of the same name, the LLA created new facilities for the sale of spirits by the glass, enlarging the definition of ‘establishments’ and therefore the number of ‘spaces’ of regulation. Most importantly, for the future complexion of public drinking in the province, this Act ended what Blackwell referred to as the hypocrisy of requiring all licenced outlets “to qualify as hotels and, for that purpose to have at least six bedrooms.” This necessitated a complete inspection and reclassification of every licenced authority in the province. Establishments fulfilling new accommodation and service requirements earned the title ‘hotel’ and qualified for any or all of the new types of licences. These included: the lounge licence for the sale of all types of alcohol; the dining lounge licence for the sale of all types of alcohol with meals; the dining room licence for the sale of beer and wine only with meals; and the public house licence for the sale of beer only. The Act provided for the issuance of a lounge or dining lounge licence separate from a hotel. such
as in a restaurant. Establishments that did not qualify as a hotel but met certain standards of service qualified as taverns and could hold any two or more types of licences. Finally, an establishment that could not meet the requirements of either a hotel or a tavern was referred to as a public house, the new name for the old beverage room, and could serve beer only in separate premises for women only (a rarely requested licence), for men only or for ladies and their escorts.\textsuperscript{103} This complicated array of licenced establishments served as the blueprint for all future public drinking in Ontario.

Blackwell justified the new types of drinking establishments in a number of ways. In his public announcements and in every written reply to critics, Blackwell pointed out that his government only inherited the beverage room system from the previous Liberal administration. This system, he contended, granted licences “to places called hotels [which] in many instances qualified not by reason of rendering the usual services of a hotel to the community but merely in respect of having the statutory number of bedrooms.”\textsuperscript{104} The new legislation, Blackwell maintained, would “overcome years of administration with appalling effects.”\textsuperscript{105} Besides blaming the Liberals for the poor public drinking conditions, a luxury this administration would be the last to enjoy in the period under study, he also cited changed social and demographic conditions in the province. “The people of this province have demonstrated in sufficiently large numbers that they demand the right to consume alcoholic beverages.” In the large urban areas “the government assumes that public opinion has clearly revealed a desire for freer distribution of liquor.”\textsuperscript{106} During second reading of the LLA, Blackwell chronicled the “huge increase in consumption”\textsuperscript{107} since 1936. That year all the alcohol sold in the province totalled 24 million gallons.\textsuperscript{108} By March 31, 1946 that total more than doubled to 50.3 million gallons.\textsuperscript{109} as Table 13 showed. The government had not kept pace with public thirst due to the Depression and war and the only new outlets possible under the old system were the so-called hotels. Blackwell also lamented the hypocrisy facing the increased number of tourists and travellers for whom the only legal place to consume spirits was in “hotel bedroom ‘bars’ which,” he argued, “every travelling person knows exist.”\textsuperscript{110} The shortage of hotel rooms, resulting from years of economic depression and then war rationing of building supplies, further exacerbated this situation. Circumstances therefore forced spirit-drinking travellers and tourists to consume in “extremely
undesirable places” like automobiles and lavatories. The situation required “honest administration and decent conditions.” Blackwell maintained, and only the Liquor Licence Act’s new drinking establishments could bring these about.

The Act contained a significant restriction on the availability of the new cocktail outlets: it prohibited the establishment of lounges and dining lounges from areas having less than 50,000 population until a local option vote was held. This departed notably from the 1934 introduction of beverage rooms and dining rooms, which were prohibited only in the existing local option areas. Only the province’s five largest cities, Toronto, Hamilton, Ottawa, London and Windsor had more than 50,000 people in 1946. Therefore, they automatically qualified for these new cocktail-dispensing outlets. The people of these large urban areas clearly demanded a freer distribution of spirits, the government argued, while the opinion in the rest of the province was “debatable.” “The conditions vary throughout the province.” Blackwell explained. “and a solution which would be satisfactory in one locality may be wholly unsatisfactory in another.” Expanding upon his Attorney General’s rationale for the distinction between large urban areas and the rest of the province, Premier Drew argued.

In those great cities, the consumption and sale of liquor is more than a local problem...A huge transient population visits each one of them day by day to attend conventions, affairs, public meetings...They also have in addition the largest share of visiting tourists. Toronto, for instance may have as many as one hundred thousand people within its boundaries on a single day who are not residents of that city. This creates a situation which has nothing to do with the ordinary requirements of the people living in these larger communities. It creates a social problem of a special kind directly related to the use of spirits by so many people who are away from home.

Therefore, although licenced premises all across the province required immediate reclassification, only the five largest cities received automatic consideration for premises serving spirits by the glass.

In order to tailor the new system further to accommodate the various conditions across the province, the Act also extended the use of the local option tool. The ever-troublesome women’s beverage rooms served as a new target for local option votes. While the standard local option ballot questioned the popularity of the beverage room in general, the new Act allowed votes specifically on women’s beverage
rooms or any other type of licence or retail outlet.\textsuperscript{116} Blackwell described this provision as a “guard” against any unwanted liquor sale “in such a vast province [where] widely differing opinions existed.”\textsuperscript{117} In extending local option, the government appeased many temperance supporters who doubted the necessity of any new outlets, particularly ones dispensing “demon rum.” This move served to deflect much of the criticism back onto the municipalities, criticism Drew was anxious to avoid, particularly in the southwestern Ontario peninsula where the remaining dry areas were largely concentrated and where the Liberals traditionally drew their support. He made a bold foray into liquor policy, making Ontario the first English-speaking province to reintroduce the sale of spirits by the glass. At the same time, unsure of the reception, he sought to implement the policy in an incremental manner by limiting and regulating this new type of sale even if that meant extending into the post-war era a system originally created to harness turn of the century prohibitionist fervour.

Besides the hotel requirement, the new legislation addressed another hypocrisy of the old system. In the late 1930s the Board received many requests for special permission to serve beer or wine at banquets such as wedding receptions. The LCA provided for the issuance of such special permits but since the only place to legally consume alcoholic beverages remained a licensed outlet, one’s own residence or a hotel bedroom, the Board rarely issued them. The LLA ended this anomaly by permitting the consumption of alcoholic beverages under a banquet or entertainment permit in a banquet hall, hotel dining room or similar location.\textsuperscript{118} In ending one anomaly the Board created another. By early 1947 the Board received a complaint from a proprietor questioning the discrimination between the banquet permit parties he hosted and his regular dining room. While the Act permitted him to serve his own patrons only beer and wine until 10 pm, the guests at the nearby banquet drank beer, wine and spirits until 11:30 pm.\textsuperscript{119} Blackwell replied that the problem was “due to local option” which prevented him from getting the “type of licence he would like.”\textsuperscript{120} Instead of justifying the discrimination in hours and types of beverages allowed, Blackwell simply passed the blame onto the local option system, a response that had been employed successful by premiers since Whitney.
This legislation drew a great deal of criticism from a surprisingly diverse group of critics. The Opposition at Queen’s Park voiced clear criticism of the Act. Liberal leader Farquhar Oliver argued that there was no apparent public demand for new outlets. Building supplies for proposed hotel renovations were in short supply and grains for additional liquor production were required to feed starving Europeans. Furthermore, he charged the government with rushing the bill through the House without proper time for public consideration. He proposed that the bill be deferred for at least a year. Many critics echoed the charge that the government was rushing the legislation through the House at the very end of the session, accurately identifying a notable characteristic of Ontario parliamentary procedure by governments anxious to avoid debate on controversial issues.

Drew vociferously refuted this and every other criticism levelled against his legislation. He maintained that the bill was not being hastily pushed through, stating that in fact the interim between first and second readings “exceeded that of most legislation in the House.” The government recognised that the province required the measures contained in the Act when it first took office in 1943. he argued, but the war and minority status in the Legislature prevented him addressing the problems in the licensing system. With the majority earned in 1945, his “government now took [action] to introduce and uphold laws it deemed correct.” As to the suggestion that the bill be deferred for a year, Drew found it interesting that no member of the Opposition, nor any group he talked to, including the OTF, proposed prohibition as an alternative to his new licensing system. Therefore, without any alternatives being suggested he wondered “what could be learned in a year by any person who couldn’t construe 20 clauses in a week?...To procrastinate further would gain nothing: to suspend the bill for a year would lose one year’s experience.” On the issue of a shortage of building materials Drew countered “with a smile” that Ottawa had given control over materials to the municipalities who would “surely...determine where they should be used.” And in reply to the concern that starving Europeans needed grain destined for liquor production, he reminded Oliver that Ontario imported wine and spirits from these very countries. In order to counter continued criticism that “we are heartless in using grain and grapes for booze while Europe starves,” Blackwell later asked his staff for statistics to bolster his arguments. Despite Drew’s
deft handling of the Opposition's criticism inside the Legislature, vocal faultfinding swirled outside Queen's Park.

Many hotel owners and proprietors' associations opposed the new legislation. Fearing that reclassification of hotels according to stricter criteria would preclude many of them from gaining new licences or of even keeping the ones they already had, hotel owners attacked the LLA. The Hamilton and District Hotel Association, for example, condemned "fancy hotel cocktail bars [as] discriminatory to the working man who wants a glass of liquor."\textsuperscript{125} Labour groups similarly greeted the bill "sourly." The president of the Ontario executive of the Trades and Labour Congress, D.A. Dunlop, declared, "the people ask for wages and Drew gives them whiskey. In face of all the difficulties confronting the returned soldiers and working people in Ontario in the form of housing, living standards and other matters, I don't know of anything that could be of less importance now than the creation of cocktail bars."\textsuperscript{126} Many veterans expressed similar sentiments. For example, in a letter to the editor, one man directed his anger directly at Drew.

On behalf of myself and other homeless and unemployed vets, I would like to give thanks to that great champion of the people, man of at least 22 promises. George Drew, for passing his liquor bill. Thanks George, we didn't want to bother yourself about housing for us or jobs, and the minimum wage...some people are being so unkind as to suggest that the liquor bill was introduced to raise a hue and cry and cover up the main issue, the seven labour bills.\textsuperscript{127}

The LLA certainly did create a 'hue and cry,' lending credence to this argument that Drew sought simultaneously to gain the support of disgruntled drinkers after years of rationing and deflect criticism from the challenges of addressing the post-war labour issues. In much the same way that Ferguson desired control after a decade of Prohibition, Drew intended to control consumption behaviour that had reverted to covert practices in the face of short supplies. As Drew's supporters concluded, he had a visionary ability to foresee problems and the courage to implement courses of action that he believed were right, even though they might be unpopular.\textsuperscript{128} His introduction of spirits by the glass certainly exemplified this approach. While Drew may share some characteristics with a policy entrepreneur like Ferguson, he
persisted in implementing a policy that arguably was not "compatible with the dominant values of the community," unlike Ferguson's original government control plan.\textsuperscript{129}

Not surprisingly, Ontario's traditional temperance organisations vocally promoted opposition to Drew's policy among their members. After first reading of the new Act, Rev. A.J. Irwin, research secretary of the OTF, responded that the government was perilously close to the condition suggested by the adage, "Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad."\textsuperscript{130} Another OTF member, Toronto United Church Rev. E.G. Perkins, taking part in a rally at Queen's Park, opposed the new cocktail lounges, arguing the liquor trade should be a government enterprise rather than for private profit.\textsuperscript{131} This reasoning deviated from the United Church's former argument on the eve of the introduction of beverage rooms in 1934 that the government should not benefit from the 'blood money' of public drinking outlets. While the intention to limit liquor outlets remained the same, temperance supporters such as Rev. Perkins no longer attacked government control itself, only further extensions of it. Other United Church clerics employed more traditional prohibitionist rhetoric to achieve the same ends. Rev. W. Craw of Brantford predicted that with the new cocktail outlets, "Ontario will become a land flowing with beer and whiskey." Therefore, Craw called for a "tidal wave of opposition," against the government's proposal.\textsuperscript{132}

When temperance opponents of the Act tried to implement Craw's suggestion they faced their own tidal wave of opposition. An OTF delegation made several attempts to meet with either Drew or Blackwell before the introduction of the Act. Scheduling conflicts on both sides delayed the meeting until after second reading during which time the rebuffed delegation stood in the lobby of Queen's Park singing hymns. Drew later explained that he had set aside time for the group but that it was not suitable for its members. At the same time he took the opportunity to admonish his critics. "I feel a great gain would be made if those who talk so intemperately about temperance in the press and elsewhere would devote some of this time and energy to teaching true temperance."\textsuperscript{133} This attitude was not surprising as Blackwell revealed the administration's true attitude toward Ontario's dry supporters when the new Act was first forecast. "Prohibitionists in Ontario," he said "are a minority pressure group which is of no assistance to any government or any agency of government interested in establishing social conditions
designed to serve the interests of ordinary, decent, law-abiding citizens.\textsuperscript{134} While Blackwell used the term prohibitionist to describe the people he was criticising, none of the groups opposed to the new Act suggested prohibition or any version of prohibition as a policy alternative, as Drew pointed out during second reading.

Many Ontarians, most notably the OTF members and the United Church parishioners, opposed the extension of government control to include cocktail lounges. The proposed legislation sparked a wave of protests sent to the government with 95% of all correspondence up to October 1, 1946 written by United Church members.\textsuperscript{135} Their rhetoric at times echoed that of their prohibitionist forebearers. The Toronto Star editors for example, mirroring temperance sentiment in the province, made no secret of its views, calling the LLA “evil”\textsuperscript{136} and the extension of government control “an unholy alliance.”\textsuperscript{137} The editors also denounced the policy to licence restaurants since “patrons will have drinking thrust at them.” This scenario, “in its potentialities for evil [is] second only to the provision for hard liquor in streamlined bars.”\textsuperscript{138}

Once the Legislature passed the Act, the temperance forces turned to the only tool left to them, local option. Rev. J. R. Mutchmor informed Drew in early 1947 that the group had decided to focus its attention on opposing specific new outlets for spirits by the glass. Therefore he urgently requested that the LLA be amended to allow local option votes in all municipalities, even the five largest ones.\textsuperscript{139} United Church members and other temperance supporters would continue to wield the tool of local option, though with ever diminishing effectiveness throughout the post-war period. With the crisis of war safely past, prohibition would never again be proposed as a legitimate policy, even as an emergency measure, by any group in society. In a significant change in official policy, the United Church resolved at its 1948 General Council meeting, that “voluntary total abstinenence” was the only “wise and safe course to follow in relation to the use of beverage alcohol.” The Church even recognised that many of its own members use “beverage alcohol on social occasions and as individuals moderately practice its use.”\textsuperscript{140}

Drew refused to grant Mutchmor’s request and many Ontarians supported him in this and other aspects of the new legislation. The Globe and Mail editors acknowledged “the difficulties of legislating
for control of the liquor traffic," and praised the government for passing measures which "have behind them the guidance of well defined experience both in this Province and beyond." The editors viewed the new lounges and dining lounges, not as "catastrophic," as some claimed, but "in the nature of an experiment." This was the same expression used in 1927 when Ferguson established government control and in 1934 when Hepburn opened the first beverage rooms. The government first created stores and then beverage rooms to battle the evil of the bootlegger. Another evil, with an even more moralistic overture, served as the impetus for this newest experiment. The issue, the editorial explained, "is whether it is wiser to sell people a drink publicly, in well-supervised, reputable hotels, or sell them a bottle of twenty-six drinks to be guzzled in a hotel bedroom." Newspapers across the province repeated similar sentiments. The Brantford Expositor and The London Free Press also referred to the proposed policy change as an experiment. Syndicated columnist J.V. McAree, a long-time critic of restrictive liquor policies, described the proposed cocktail bars as a novelty that might well be greeted in the same way that "the sale of half a million pair of nylon stockings" would be welcomed. But, he cautioned, the new system should only be judged "after a fair trial."

Ordinary citizens echoed this support in correspondence directly to Blackwell. A woman from Toronto congratulated him for taking steps in the right direction in allowing Ontarians to drink where and how they choose. "just like other civilised areas of the world." She noted that the new system would be good for the tourist trade and it would dignify Ontario's "position in the eyes of the world as an adult, self-autonomous entity." The president of a Toronto tire company also congratulated Blackwell on his "courageous, down to earth liquor policy." It was the tremendous influence of mass American culture that promoted the popularity of the new cocktail lounges, associated in the public's mind with leisure and refinement in a new post-war world. While the United Church maintained its common front against the LLA, members of other denominations expressed support. Rev. D.M. Kerr of a Toronto Presbyterian Church opposed his church's official stand against the legislation by declaring at a meeting of the Presbyterian Church in Canada that "I believe it will mean a decided improvement." Rev. F. Mason of a Toronto Anglican Church wrote Blackwell that he "cannot see how reasonable people can object to the
legislation.” He hoped the new outlets would “adopt the best features of the English public house” by being open to the light and kept clean to lessen the shame surrounding drinking and reform poor Ontario drinking habits.148 The English pub, as experienced by many war veterans, also inspired supporters of the new legislation. A veteran from Toronto commented to Blackwell that it was only when he witnessed the behaviour of fellow servicemen in English pubs that he realised the poor drinking habits of Ontarians.149 Wartime experience in English pubs left an indelible impression on many Ontario veterans. Critics of Ontario’s beverage rooms continued to hold up the pub as an ideal model beyond the immediate post-war period. Nevertheless, the beverage room remained chained to its Depression-era past especially compared to its new upscale sibling, the cocktail bar.

**RATIONING MEASURES EXTENDED INTO PEACETIME**

Criticisms levelled against wartime drinking conditions certainly prompted policy change leading to the new cocktail bars. Yet the new legislation provided little in the way of improvements for the beverage room itself, besides changing its name to the seldom-used ‘public house,’ and in many ways actually exacerbated existing shortcomings. The Board instituted the supper hour closing in November 1943 in reaction to the shortage of beer supplies. After Ottawa lifted beer rationing in 1945, critics questioned this closing period. The Ontario Provincial Council of Culinary Workers, Bartenders and Hotel Service Employees complained to Blackwell that its employees experienced difficulties working split shifts.150 Despite this request, Judge Robb, Chairman of the renamed Liquor Licence Board (LLBO) informed Blackwell in late 1946 that “I think it [supper closing] should be retained so those who go to the beverage rooms will not be allowed to remain over the supper hour. If they are closed they will be more likely to go home.”151 Even though official rationing ended over a year earlier and the Board dispensed with its own beer ration coupons the following month, Robb favoured the continuation of this rationing measure into peacetime. A year later the government commissioned a public opinion survey covering all aspects of public drinking and sale for home consumption. Among its findings the report noted that “the largest number of those who are not satisfied with present hours [in public houses] want...[them] to remain open from 6:30 to 8 pm.”152 Two months later, in January 1948, the Union of International
Beverage Dispensers petitioned Blackwell to end the suppertime closing and "revert to the former beverage room hours before rationing." With Robb’s paternalistic justification replacing the previous beer shortage reasoning, the liquor policymakers’ commitment to incremental change determined that the supper hour closing would become an enduring characteristic of the public house experience.

War rationing also led to the discontinuation of room service of beer and wine by the glass in hotels. Even while official rationing was still going on, the president of the OHA informed Blackwell in late July 1944 that his members wanted to "again be able to serve registered guests" in their hotel rooms. In discussing this topic the following month, Chief Commissioner Goggin declared to Blackwell that he was "definitely against room service in hotels. When beer is more plentiful and hotels are in better shape then it will be time enough to discuss this troublesome phase of hotel operation." Even Goggin succumbed to the moral questions surrounding hotel ‘bedroom’ service though he believed it would be eventually reinstated. But after beer and other alcoholic beverages became plentiful again the Board still banned room service of alcohol in Ontario hotels. In February 1949, over two years after the Board ended its own coupon ration system, the OHA again requested the "resumption of room service." A flood of protests into the Attorney General’s office followed this request. The Ontario WCTU, for example, opposed the room service of alcohol as "a menace to society."

Like the supper hour closing, the ban on room service endured beyond its initial wartime impetus. The Board preserved three other war measures as well: the watering of spirits, the one glass of beer at a time rule, and the discontinuation of the 40-ounce liquor bottle. While they helped the Board weather the crisis of war rationing, the Board refused to revert to peacetime policies once the initial crisis subsided. On the one hand, the watering of spirits and the sale of smaller bottles undoubtedly translated into greater profits for the Board and therefore fulfilled the Board’s business impulse. The other three policies, on the other hand, served the Board’s paternalistic intentions. Without overwhelming public pressure to remove the war measures with the coming of peace, they became embedded in Ontario's post-war public drinking system. With the addition of an entirely new type of public drinking, the government chose to proceed
cautiously and incrementally, therefore preserving the war measures that so clearly satisfied government control’s divided purposes.

New policies inaugurated by the LLA further exacerbated the problems already evident in the beverage room system. In response to the wartime crowding and excessive drinking, *The London Free Press* declared after the introduction of the LLA, “there is general agreement that in part the present system in Ontario has been a failure.”¹⁵⁸ This echoed sentiment across the province and stood as the government’s ultimate justification for the new legislation. Aside from removing the necessity of having every beverage room located in a so-called hotel, the new Act did very little to fix the ‘failure’ of the beverage room. The portions of the Act that did pertain to the public house addressed only the temperance supporters’ most ardent and certainly most moralistic criticisms. For example, where an establishment possessed two types of public house licences, such as a men’s only licence and a ladies and escorts’ licence, the government took great pains to ensure that there would be no unauthorised mixing of the sexes or even the employees while on these premises. “There shall be no internal means of communication between the premises. Each of such premises shall have separate entrances for the public. The employees...serving beer to the public in each of such premises shall not enter the other of such premises.”¹⁵⁹ The Board went so far as to “strictly proscribe” the size and colour of beer glasses¹⁶⁰ and even the depth of the head or foam on draught beer.¹⁶¹ The regulations also determined that dining lounges operated until 2 am but that public houses closed at midnight.¹⁶² Although Chairman Robb noted that there “may be criticism of the differentiation” in closing hours, he assured Blackwell that they could “cross that bridge later.”¹⁶³ In trying to ease the transition away from a reliance on bootleggers and blind pigs for spirits by the glass towards the new legal cocktail lounges, the government instituted this somewhat surprising closing hour. Blackwell hoped that this would prevent “substantial numbers of the public [from] patronising the bootlegger.”¹⁶⁴ Although it was difficult to estimate the exact number of people resorting to bootleggers due to the underground nature of the operations, the public perception, which Blackwell expressed, was that the new legislation would divert a ‘substantial’ number of people from this illegal activity. Reports showing a decline in the amount of confiscated bootleg liquor after nine
months in the those areas of the province with the new cocktail lounges revealed the accuracy of Blackwell’s prediction. The government took a similar approach in 1934 when it initially declared midnight the closing hour for beverage rooms. In implementing a 2 am closing time for dining lounges it set the beer drinking establishment even further apart from the new cocktail bar. While these restrictions addressed some of the concerns of the government’s most vocal temperance critics, they did nothing to respond to the demands for better drinking conditions in the image of the English pub.

Why did the government promote this distinction between beer drinking and spirit drinking? It did not regulate the behaviour of lounge patrons or the nature of the drinking environment in the same way it did the old beverage room. It did not specify the cocktail drinker’s posture (i.e. standing versus sitting), the size or colour of the drinking glasses, the mixing of the sexes or number of drinks allowed at one time. These new outlets arrived on the Ontario drinking scene at a time when public attitudes had grown more accepting of drinking and alcohol itself was viewed less and less as a “special commodity.” Also, as Valverde argued for North American government control systems generally, in an effort to create a spirit-drinking environment unlike the old saloon, governments made the new cocktail lounge its complete opposite with colourful drinks, a congenial atmosphere and a mixing of the sexes in the context of the post-war cult of heterosexuality, middle class consumerism and early marriage. Similarly, Campbell set the post-war reintroduction of cocktails in British Columbia into the overall loosening of attitudes surrounding gender especially towards alcohol consumption, leisure and gender interaction. Beverage rooms, on the other hand, were the first public drinking establishments created after Prohibition so the accompanying rules and regulations, intended to obliterare the characteristics of the old saloon, were therefore not surprising. What is significant is that the government chose to extend them into the post-war period. This differential regulation also represented the continuation of late nineteenth century temperance concerns directed at drinking at the working man’s saloon rather than the businessman’s club. Although never specifically expressed by the government or the Board, the detailed regulation of beer drinkers represented ingrained paternalistic beliefs on the part of
the politicians and bureaucrats about the need to guide and protect the questionable morals of the lower class beer parlour patron.

Besides the specific written statutes and regulations framing the conduct of Ontario’s drinking establishments for years to come, the government made a significant move that would leave a tremendous amount of discretionary, some would later say arbitrary, power in the Licence Board’s hands. During preparation of the LLA’s regulations, the Attorney General’s legal advisors cautioned Blackwell that due to “our lack of experience in administering the Act.” the necessary regulations would be numerous. To avoid this, they could “redelegate many matters to the Board.” By leaving the regulations silent, “the Board is authorised to exercise its discretion in the administration of the Act: this flexibility is desirable.”170 This move, rationalised on the basis of lack of experience, would forever change the face of liquor licence administration. With the introduction of new public drinking outlets, the government endeavoured to portray a tough and uncompromising attitude in administrating the LLA in order to ease the transition from the crisis of war into the unprecedented novelty of the cocktail lounges. The assumption of this discretionary power helped serve this purpose though some dry supporters interpreted it differently. The secretary of the OTF, Rev. Albert Johnson, complained that “the bill itself is vague, dangerously vague” on many points and that “far too many important decisions [are] evaded by the Legislature and handed to the Board.”171 Clearly, these discretionary powers, a product of this particular time in Ontario history, failed to satisfy many drys in 1946. Interestingly, in later years, temperance supporters would urge the Licence Board to exercise these discretionary powers to block liquor licences.

Not only did the Board seek to exercise complete authority in areas not covered by the regulations but Blackwell also vowed that the government would enforce the written liquor laws “with ruthlessness.”172 Two such laws, framed from the moral view of liquor as a dangerous and corrupting substance, gained particular media attention when they were announced. The LLA provided penalties for parents who “enter or remain upon any premises where liquor is sold or kept for sale.”173 while leaving their children unattended. The Act also placed civil liability on licencees for injury or damage resulting from alcohol consumed on their premises.174 These provisions “introduce[d] entirely new principles.” and
reflected Blackwell’s desire to address two “of the worst abuses” of the old drinking system.\textsuperscript{175} Many dry supporters attested that the introduction of spirits by the glass represented the government’s admission of “unmitigated defeat” in enforcing the old Act.\textsuperscript{176} The government introduced these two new stipulations to try to assure these critics that it intended to ruthlessly punish violators of the new law. By responding to drinking conditions in a time of crisis and to prohibitionist-inspired criticisms, these provisions, like the many other changes made at this time, framed the province’s drinking environment for years to come.

Despite the loud protests, Drew used his legislative majority to pass the LLA in the spring of 1946. While the province’s dry forces demanded that the Act be set aside for a year for further study, it received royal assent on April 5 along with the rest of that session’s business. The press reminded Ontarians, though, that beverage rooms took several months to materialise when they were first created and so predicted that it could take as long as six months before any new cocktail lounges opened.\textsuperscript{177} The complex process of reclassifying all the existing licenced premises in the province occupied the LLBO for much of the rest of the year. Although the Attorney General publicised the general tone of the regulations while the legislators debated, Blackwell released the official regulations in early December. Even at that time Chairman Robb cautioned anxious Ontarians that due to the complicated application procedure “no cocktail bars will be able to open for at least two months.”\textsuperscript{178} In fact, Ontarians did not buy their first legal cocktails until the first week of April 1947. It seemed that the dry forces got their one year waiting period, though not in the form that they had hoped.

On December 5, 1946 Drew took to the airwaves to officially announce the proclamation of the Liquor Licence Act and to talk to Ontarians in their “own homes tonight in this informal way...about temperance and laws which will help increase temperance in this province.” He described the “intolerable” drinking conditions in Ontario and explained in broad strokes how the new legislation intended to overcome them. This chatty, informal address revealed few details that his constituents had not heard before. For our purposes, Drew made two very significant observations concerning the history of liquor policy up to that point. He explained that historically the “experiment” of prohibition failed each and every time it was tried such as in the era of Abraham Lincoln or of Cicero. “We had our own
period of prohibition.\textsuperscript{179} he reminded Ontarians, "during which the seeds were sown of so many of the evils we are striving now to overcome.\textsuperscript{179} Prohibitionist rhetoric continued to fuel an intense fear of spirits by the glass in many Ontarians, who viewed the new cocktail bars as little better than the old time saloon. The Prohibition experience also taught Ontarians to drink to excess when alcohol supplies were banned. "It was in the lamentable prohibition era," a \textit{Globe and Mail} editorial reminded Ontarians, "that the notion of hard drinking as smart, fashionable and daring got around.\textsuperscript{180} Wartime mimicked these conditions with limited supplies and hours of availability. Even more significantly, Drew explained that:

 \begin{quote}
 when we took office...we inherited a system of liquor control which was nothing but a patchwork of unsatisfactory compromises which had been carried forward bit by bit from the days of prohibition, without ever facing the whole problem at one time and dealing with it boldly and honestly.\textsuperscript{181}
 \end{quote}

This analysis revealed Drew's astute appreciation for the history of liquor policy so far in the twentieth century. He clearly identified the challenges to the government control system that he inherited. His cocktail bars and reclassified licenced premises went a long way towards overcoming many of the challenges.

Nevertheless, he unwittingly continued to contribute to the very problems he so accurately identified. The retention and even extension of the local option system obviously 'carried forward' a compromise his party made with the prohibitionist forces in the first decade of the century. He did not deal with 'the whole problem' at once. He created new drinking outlets but save a few ad hoc changes that actually magnified the problems. His new legislation did little to ameliorate the conditions in the old beverage rooms. The complex differentiation between hours, selection of beverages, and types of furniture, for example, among the various licences continued the patchwork and certainly did not represent any sort of overall policy. The strict moral regulation of all aspects of behaviour and environment in the province's new public houses also continued and actually exacerbated the 'evils' of excess and abuse he sought to overcome. Refusing to abandon war-inspired measures in peacetime, only added to the patchwork, which he argued constituted "a half measure of prohibition.\textsuperscript{182} Given the challenges his government faced at the end of the war, it is understandable that he overlooked these
issues. As a result, they would snowball in the upcoming years under his successors Leslie Frost and John Robarts, causing the same sort of problems that Hepburn's beverage rooms were causing him. By preserving the various prohibitions and restrictions conceived for a very different time, Drew, despite his stated intentions, continued the very trend politicians and bureaucrats had followed since Ferguson first inaugurated the government control system.

Still, Drew’s cocktail bars were certainly one innovation, which helped undo much of the damage the Prohibition years had wrought. They brought the drinking of spirits into the open and out of "dark and obscure places"\textsuperscript{183} such as cars, blind pigs, and hotel bedrooms. Ontarians with a thirst for spirits by the glass resorted to such places from the very start, but the situation only became critical once war rationing forced beverage room patrons to look elsewhere. And as Ontario’s Prohibition experience made abundantly clear, a bottle of spirits was much easier to transport, sell or drink surreptitiously than bulky beer.

In responding to this demand Drew was ahead of his time. No other English speaking province provided for the legal sale of spirits by the glass. Historically more progressive in this policy area, the western provinces adopted Prohibition quicker than Ontario, ended it in favour of government control much earlier and reintroduced public beer drinking at a faster pace. It would be several years, though, before any other province followed Ontario’s lead in bringing back the cocktail. When the western provinces eventually opened cocktail lounges in the second half of the 1950s, they did so as the result of non-partisan plebiscites. Drew, on the other hand, perhaps taking the lead in the context of Ontario’s position of ascendancy during the war, quickly recognised the unique situation in the country’s most industrialised and urbanised province and spearheaded the policy of spirits by the glass. Undoubtedly exaggerating the uniqueness of Ontario’s capital, Drew proclaimed, "There is not a single city in the world as large as Toronto where the law does not provide the sale of all types of liquor by the glass in licenced premises."\textsuperscript{184} Therefore, after studies of the English licencing system\textsuperscript{185} and various American state systems,\textsuperscript{186} Drew did “what has been done in every other country in the world where spirits are sold
as a legal beverage, and that is to sell them openly for public consumption under measures of sensible control."\(^{187}\)

**COCKTAILS ARRIVE IN ONTARIO**

This is what happened in Ontario on April 1, 1947, though the new cocktail bars with their "soft couches [and] streamlined bars"\(^{188}\) arrived with little fanfare. One *Globe and Mail* reporter had difficulty finding an open lounge on the day "liquor sale by glass return[ed] after 30 years."\(^{189}\) With only one lounge in Toronto "catering to a line-up of thirsty customers," he lamented that "the most liquid assignment of the year turned out...to be as dry as a WCTU bull session."\(^{190}\) Although this particular reporter blamed his disappointment on April Fool's Day, the same situation presented itself in the province's four other large cities. Ottawa opened no lounges on the first legal day of operation. Two hotels awaited final inspection and the others hoped to begin service by the summer.\(^{191}\) The necessity of extensive renovations and the complexity of the application and inspection process prevented most outlets from opening right away. By September that year the Attorney General's staff informed Chief Commissioner Griesinger that "at first such lounges and dining lounges were heavily patronised and overcrowded. But the novelty wore off and new licences were issued to relieve the overcrowding. As expected there was some criticism but generally there has been a favourable reaction from the public."\(^{192}\)

The new outlets did not please everyone though. The government, particularly the Attorney General, continued to receive protests against the new lounges in general or against specific licencees. One Toronto woman complained to Blackwell that there were too many new outlets near the University of Toronto. Blackwell took the opportunity to reply personally to this woman. Eschewing the government's traditional moral and paternalistic view of liquor consumption, he explained that the job of instilling youth with a sense of personal responsibility rested with parents and not the state. He hoped, he explained, to bring drinking into the open and controlled environment of the very outlets she opposed, rather than have youth lured by the danger of the bootlegger.\(^{193}\) This reply mirrored the many other long, detailed and personalised letters that Blackwell dictated in the months after the first lounges opened.
These efforts illustrated his determination to bring some sort of normalcy to Ontario’s drinking environment after the successive crises of depression and war.

Blackwell even managed to pen a few kind words to his most ardent critics. In one of the harshest prohibitionist protests directed at the government in a long time, a representative of Cooke’s Presbyterian Church in Toronto condemned Blackwell for his part in the “accursed liquor traffic [with] its diabolical influence.” Blackwell generously replied that prohibition was “a laudable habit for individuals.” Though, he went on, it “does not meet the views of a substantial majority of the people in the province.” Clearly critics protested more than just the new lounges. By mid-1948, the shortcomings of the old beverage rooms were beginning to show in the new public houses. Globe and Mail columnist Bruce West reported the views of a British humorist visiting Ontario. The visitor lamented the absence of the English pub on the Ontario landscape with its “tranquillity and decency” and he pronounced its poor substitute, the public house, “revolting.” A constituent sent this article to Blackwell along with his own request for an English pub-like atmosphere in Ontario beer drinking outlets. Blackwell revealed that he would be “very happy to see an English pub atmosphere in public houses in Ontario.” The absence of this atmosphere, he contended, did not result from legislation or enforcement but from the attitude of the Ontario people and the types of service they demanded. It seems that Blackwell answered the chicken and egg question posed years later by another Toronto columnist. In 1972 Hartley Steward of Toronto Life Magazine pondered which came first: the poor drinking behaviour or the restrictive laws? Was the belief that drinking was so demoralising that it should be made as unattractive as possible so widespread that this was the result? Or was it only the prohibitionist beliefs of a few that determined that restrictive laws would dictate the drinking behaviour of the majority? It would take almost a quarter of a century before this circular question would be tackled head on. Also, the different administrations and bureaucrats throughout the intervening years framed policy with changing emphases. For his own time period though, Blackwell advanced a strong argument for the former. He contended that his government regulated public houses in all the ways that have been
described here because that is what the electorate demanded. Given the vocal outcry against the new lounges and the way they were implemented, his interpretation was valid.

The electorate brought home the seriousness of this opposition to the new LLA during the provincial election of 1948, perhaps the last with a prominent wet-dry theme in the province. Issues of post-war reconstruction and labour dissatisfaction dominated the election but voters also got their first opportunity to voice their opinion on the newly created cocktail lounges. The United Church spearheaded a campaign against the Drew government’s liquor policy. Just a few days before the election, the Church’s Toronto Conference issued a public resolution contending that the government enacted “reactionary liquor legislation,” disenfranchised the province’s five largest cities by denying them the tool of local option, and legalised a “particularly pernicious form of liquor sale.” This election, the Conference maintained, represented the voters’ chance to decide if the government’s liquor policy was “right or wrong.”29 And the voters did express their opinion, though in a rather mixed manner.

The relatively quiet campaign resulted in a slightly reduced majority for the Conservatives. Most of the lost seats, located in the Toronto area, went to the rejuvenated Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), although one particular CCF victory stood out more than the rest. A self-proclaimed teetotaller and staunch temperance advocate, William Temple, defeated Premier Drew in his High Park riding by over 1000 votes.200 Many people, including Temple, took this victory and the government’s reduced majority as an official rebuke against the new cocktail lounges. Ontario historian Randall White and others201 interpreted the election results, particularly Drew’s defeat, as a reaction against his attempt to “introduce new elements of moderation into the draconian Ontario liquor laws left over from the ending of Prohibition in the late 1920s.”202 Certainly Drew’s personal defeat resulted partly from the reaction against a particularly contentious liquor licence proposed for his own riding.203 As well, his persistence in implementing a policy unpopular in many quarters because he believed it to be necessary meant he alienated some of his moderate supporters.204 Nevertheless, it is much too simplistic a conclusion to contend that his defeat resulted primarily from his government’s new liquor legislation.
Temple vocally opposed the Conservative Party's liquor policy, especially the introduction of cocktail lounges, yet the primary focus of his campaign revolved around Drew's failure to address Ontarians' concerns about housing, the high cost of living, health and social security. Moreover, Drew's "consistent use of abusive, intemperate and insulting language." against his opponents, especially left-leaning candidates, who he persisted in labelling Communists, accounted for most of the opposition against him. Even Leslie Frost, one of Drew's ministers and future premier, recognised this shortcoming. In a letter to his friend Harold Hale, editor of The Orillia Packet, Frost concluded that "the party’s misfortunes were largely within a dozen or so miles of Toronto City Hall and this situation was much aggravated by intemperate statements and attitudes." As well, the rumours that Drew called the election only three years into his mandate to hasten his federal aspirations may have contributed to his undoing. Furthermore, this was not the first election waged between Drew and Temple. As was noted after the 1948 contest, Temple came within 400 votes of Drew in the 1945 campaign, almost a year before the government introduced the LLA.

Perhaps the most telling evidence that cocktail lounges were not the primary issue in the election was the re-election of Attorney General Leslie Blackwell. The public identified Blackwell more closely with the new liquor policy than any other member of the government, even more than the Premier himself. The press even referred to the Liquor Licence Act as the 'Blackwell Bill.' Despite this, in the Toronto area, the district most ardently contested by the opposition candidates, "the first to be conceded a winner was Attorney General Leslie Blackwell, who won in Eglinton riding with a plurality in excess of 9000." Therefore, while liquor policy played a role in the 1948 election campaign, it constituted only one of many post-war issues concerning Ontarians like the price of milk, the lack of housing and the high cost of living. Despite Frost's contention at the time that Drew's loss had more to do with his own personal approach to the election than his liquor polices, the incumbent premier's defeat coloured the future premier's attitude toward liquor policy change. For Frost, and other future Conservative leaders, Drew's downfall became part of Tory mythology and came to represent the feared result of too hasty liquor policy change.
STORE RETAILING DURING PEACETIME

Like the immediate aftermath of the introduction of beverage rooms in 1934, public drinking dominated the public's attention during and after the opening of the first cocktail lounges. In its shadow, the retail aspect of government control continued to function quietly. There was nothing passive about this more quiet existence. Ottawa ended the restrictions on spirits and wine in August 1945 (it will be recalled that King lifted only the restrictions on beer in March 1944). Due to persistent shortages, the LCBO continued to ration the sale of all types of alcoholic beverages through its stores using its coupon system until early 1947. Once supplies of alcohol and building materials became more plentiful, the Board quickly commenced a period of growth and development unseen since the first months after Prohibition. Apart from the prosperous years of the late 1920s, government control existed in a constant state of crisis, weathering first depression and then world war in its relatively short history in the province. While consumption and permit sales increased, as Table 12 illustrated, reflecting a growth in the province's population and the increasing acceptance of social drinking, especially in the immediate post-war period, the number of retail outlets failed to keep pace. For example, in 1930 there were 122 liquor stores and 105 beer stores to serve the province's over 400,000 permit holders. A decade later, the Board owned only seven more liquor stores and regulated only four more beer stores as shown below in Table 15. A relevant comparison of permits cannot be made for 1940 since only spirit purchasers required a permit, unlike purchasers of all types of alcohol in 1930. Rationing determined that purchasers of all types of alcohol again required a permit by the end of the war. By early 1946 the province's over 1.5 million permittees sought supplies at 132 liquor stores and 128 beer stores as Table 14 illustrated. In 15 years Ontario's permit holders increased almost four fold while the number of outlets servicing their needs grew by only a small fraction of that rate.

The Board recognised the need for physical growth. Chief Commissioner Goggin forecasted it during the war. The long awaited expansion began at the first possible moment. Table 15 shows that between 1947 and 1949 the Board opened 16 liquor stores and regulated 17 new beer stores, the highest rate of expansion since 1927. This signalled the beginning of a period of rapid physical expansion
extending well into the next decade. The man to oversee this period and beyond was distinguished war veteran Brigadier J.G. Spragge. In April 1947 the 40-year-old Anglican replaced the late Comptroller McGeachie, who had served in that position since it was created in 1927 and began a 22-year career with the Board.\textsuperscript{213} The Comptroller reported only to the Chief Commissioner. ran the daily operations of the Board, advised the LCBO on matters of policy and proposed changes to the Act or regulations.\textsuperscript{214} The Comptroller’s office always used circulars to disseminate specific information to Board stores but Spragge commenced a more folksy informal tone in his communications, echoing many of the sentiments Goggin expressed several years earlier. In his first circular Spragge impressed on all vendors that “we are public servants,” and therefore are employed to look after the public’s interests. He admitted that “reconstruction after war is always hard but is nothing we can’t overcome.”\textsuperscript{215} He stressed co-operation, teamwork and efficiency as the keys to adjusting to the new post-war era. These watchwords guided Spragge throughout his long career with the LCBO.

**Table 15**

**Total Number of Liquor and Beer Stores in Ontario 1939/40-1948/49**

![Graph of total number of liquor and beer stores in Ontario 1939/40-1948/49](image)

Spragge’s appointment as Board Comptroller coincided with the Board’s transition into the peacetime world, unencumbered by depression or war rationing. This represented the post-war
“normalisation of alcohol in the marketplace.”^216 evident not only in Canada but also in other Western countries as reported by Addiction Research Foundation researcher Robin Room.^217 The Board not only set out on a program of opening new liquor and beer outlets but it also commenced a program of renovating and modernising existing stores.^218 Another important aspect of this return to normal retail procedures revolved around the permit system. Once a freer supply of alcohol rendered ration coupons unnecessary the Board also ruled that purchasers of wine and beer, including the imported varieties, no longer needed to present their liquor permits for endorsement.^219 resulting in a decline in resident permit sales as Table 14, above, illustrated. With this war measure removed, Ontarians once again purchased beer and wine without a permit as they had done since 1934 when beverage rooms provided these drinks by the glass. While the Board relaxed control over beer and wine in this manner, it did not do so for spirits, perceived to be more intoxicating and therefore more dangerous and in need of heightened moral control. Therefore, when cocktail lounges and dining lounges opened in 1947, offering Ontarians spirits by the glass for the first time in three decades, the Board continued to demand permits of spirit purchasers as it would for many years to come.

Spragge also sought to normalise store procedures regarding the quantity of merchandise sold to each purchaser. In May 1947 he clarified to vendors that “at no time was it my intention that the general public should be limited in their purchasing from our stores.” Some staff misunderstood his wishes “in their enthusiasm to enforce on all purchasers what he meant for a few.” The end of rationing meant that only three circumstances prevented potential customers from purchasing what they wished, the same three reasons McGeachie enforced in 1927: the customer’s age, financial standing, or “questionable character.” a veiled reference to bootleggers and alcoholics. Nevertheless, Spragge observed, “certain law abiding citizens,” who do not fit into any of these categories, “are unnecessarily humiliated in front of the public when questioned about the amount of purchases on their permit.”^220 Spragge reminded employees that once the years of “dark clouds” had passed “our service to the public” can once again “be a success.”^221 By 1949 he praised the efficiency of store employees, their numbers greatly increased since the beginning of the war, as Table 16 shows. He also noted the improved appearance of stores and that there were
"practically no complaints by the public." Quickly caught up in the Board's struggle to reconcile business and moral goals, Spragge found himself promoting both simultaneously.

Table 16

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<th>LCBO Employees 1939/40-1948/49</th>
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Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1939/40-1948/49

While the return of peacetime and more plentiful stocks made the provision of quality customer service easier for store employees, this goal had not disappeared during the war. In early 1944 Comptroller McGeachie and Board counsel W.B. Common opposed Blackwell’s proposal to sell permits at liquor stores only. "Undoubtedly such a plan would inconvenience the public." Two months later, Chief Commissioner Goggin informed Blackwell that an earlier change in the wine rationing plan succeeded in improving customer service. "You will be pleased to learn queues at wine stores are practically eliminated, that stores are remaining open almost full hours. Naturally that means that more people are getting their wine, getting it in comfort and at their convenience." That the LCBO should be concerned with customer comfort or convenience even during wartime illustrated the Board’s proven commitment to providing customer service in order to safeguard its monopoly, whatever the circumstances.
After the war the Board remained committed to this goal. The ever-present option of competition in the form of grocery sale of beer encouraged its continued commitment. This convenience, enjoyed by Ontario’s neighbours in Quebec, had received attention consistently since the creation of government control. The onset of beer shortages due to war rationing intensified the public’s interest in the concept and the press forecasted its coming along with cocktail bars in the months after the war. The government discovered the popularity of grocery sale of beer in studies it commissioned after the war to gauge public attitudes towards government control in general. In 1946 38% of survey respondents favoured the grocery sale of beer while a year later the number jumped to 45%.\(^{225}\) By 1948 the survey revealed Ontarians appeared “to have turned definitely from the idea of sale through grocery stores.”\(^{226}\) While more plentiful supplies of beer accounted for the decline in support for this type of sale, the Board’s own concerns with customer service, especially with the end of the beer permit, encouraged the public’s more favourable attitude towards government control of beer. Perhaps more than any other factor, the threat of losing control of beer sales prompted the Board to keep customer service a top priority.

The Board’s growth and expansion experienced in the late 1940s came at a price as it took on the trappings of a major business enterprise, removing store employees further from Board head office. In the last months of the war, Chief Commissioner Goggin asked store employees, almost pleadingly, to communicate directly to him their ideas and feelings. Spragge effectively outlawed this in August 1949 when he informed all employees that they could not “communicate directly with the Chief Commissioner or Deputy Chief Commissioner.”\(^{227}\) He instructed them to follow the chain of command and first direct their concern to the Supervisor of Stores. This internal Board policy took effect quickly as public attention focused just a few weeks later on the inaccessibility of the new Chief Commissioner. A Windsor Star opinion piece noted that when 52-year-old Muskoka MPP Colonel Arthur Welsh took office in the spring of 1949 “he would see anyone, talk with anyone, promise anything.” Yet, the columnist complained by early fall “his inner sanctum is harder to penetrate than the Great Mosque at Mecca.”\(^{228}\)
Despite this sudden aloofness, a product of the Board’s emphasis on proper channels of communication, Welsh, a veteran of both world wars, brought a wealth of experience to his new post. In 1946, while serving as Minister of the newly created Travel and Publicity portfolio, he organised the surveying of all resorts in the province. He preferred to “educate rather than bludgeon resort operators into providing good, reasonable tourist accommodation.” The connection between tourism and expanded liquor outlets, a consistent theme throughout the various debates over liquor policy changes in the province, became more evident given the expectation of heightened post-war tourism. The choice of Welsh for the position of Chief Commissioner, with his tourism background, made this connection even more prominent. As Provincial Secretary at the time, Welsh’s selection also transferred the ministerial responsibility for liquor retail to his office, known as a “catch-all” department. Since 1946 the Chief Commissioner had reported to Cabinet as a Minister without Portfolio. This shift did not reflect a change in philosophy on the part of the government but merely the preference for a particular MPP for the job. Liquor licencing—previously the Attorney General’s responsibility—also came under the umbrella of the Provincial Secretary, justified as a way “to end this divided jurisdiction between the two Boards.”

Out of world war came the realisation for Drew and for many in society that Ontario’s public drinking system required a major overhaul. By 1947, Ontario had become the first English-speaking province to permit the sale of spirits by the glass. Driven by his own deep-seated belief that only this type of significant policy change could address the rise of war-inspired bootlegging and illegal consumption, Drew spearheaded the move, one that many historians credit with the loss of his own seat. Ontarians revealed their ambivalent attitude towards the initiative by returning the Conservatives with a reduced majority and without their leader. This provided Drew with the opportunity to fulfil his national ambitions and he went on to become the leader of the federal Conservatives. Drew’s successor, Leslie Frost, would carry that legacy through his career, colouring his cautious approach to liquor policy as he attempted to address Ontarians’ continued ambivalence towards liquor sale and consumption.
Notes to Chapter 3

11. RG 3-9-0-349 Box 212. Hepburn General Correspondence Public. File "Liquor Control Board 1940." July 20. 1940 to Hepburn from Belleville WCTU.
16. RG 3-10-0-1225 Box 326. Hepburn General Correspondence Private. File "Liquor Control Board #1." June 15. 1942 to Hepburn from Clerk of Elgin County.
22. RG 3-10-0-1122 Box 314. Hepburn General Correspondence Private 1941. File "Liquor Control Board." January 15. 1941 to Hepburn from President Hiram Walker—Gooderham and Worts Ltd.
Notes to Chapter 3

34 RG 3-10-0-1285 Box 333, Hepburn General Correspondence Private 1943. File "Liquor Control Board," telegram January 13, 1943 to all premiers except PEI and Newfoundland from Conant.
37 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temporary Box 9. LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File "Circulars 3201-3300." Circular no. 3264 December 30, 1942 to all vendors from McGeeachie.
38 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temporary Box 9. LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File "Circulars 3201-3300." Circular no. 3274 January 20, 1943 to all vendors from McGeeachie.
39 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temporary Box 9. LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File "Circulars 3201-3300." Circular no. 3276 January 26, 1943 to all vendors from Chief Commissioner Gordon.
41 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temporary Box 9. LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File "Circulars 3201-3300." Circular no. 3276 January 26, 1943 to all vendors from Gordon.
42 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temporary Box 9. LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File "Circulars 3301-3400." Circular no. 3309 March 26, 1943 to all wine licensees from McGeeachie.
45 Consequently, despite the Board's best efforts to efficiently ration out its reduced stocks, some Ontarians resorted to measures that their predecessors had used during the Prohibition conditions of the First World War. Doctors still prescribed alcohol-based medicines for certain conditions. Obviously many Ontarians considered their thirst a medical condition as doctors' prescriptions for alcohol rose substantially between 1943 and 1944. This was so serious that the Ontario College of Physicians and Surgeons issued a warning to its members, alerting them that they could be prosecuted under the LCA. RG 4-2 Box 28, Attorney General Correspondence Files Legislative Assembly. File 28.8 "Liquor Control July-September 1944." (restricted) contains lists of physicians' prescriptions for liquor and "Announcement of College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario 1944-45."
46 RG 4-2 Box 29 Attorney General Correspondence Files. File 29.4 "Liquor Control Board 1943." (restricted) photos enclosed with letter November 18. 1943 to Blackwell from Gordon.
48 RG 4-2 Box 29, Attorney General Correspondence Files. File 29.4 "Liquor Control Board 1943," (restricted) December 9, 1943 "The Liquor Situation is in Your Hands," by Chief Commissioner Gordon.
50 The issue of veterans' clubs, particularly the Canadian Legion is an important one in the history of government control in Ontario, especially as they became focal points for socialising in many Ontario towns after gaining legitimacy through the members' war experiences. However, it is a large theme that deserves to be analysed separately. RG 3-15-0-89.1 Box 419. Conant General Correspondence 1943. File "Liquor Control #1," April 7, 1943 to all members of the Ontario Legislature and Ontario members of the House of Commons from Secretary F. Davison of Canadian Active Service Force Association.
51 Schull. p. 302.
53 RG 4-2 Box 29 Attorney General Correspondence Files. File 29.4 "Liquor Control Board 1943," (restricted) November 18, 1943 to Blackwell from Gordon.
54 RG 4-2 Box 29 Attorney General Correspondence Files. File 29.4 "Liquor Control Board 1943," (restricted) November 22, 1943 to Gordon from Blackwell.
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56 RG 36-4 Box 2 Temporary Box A93, LLBO Geographical Correspondence Files 1934-45. File 48.1
“Temiskaming 1934-44.” (restricted) memo February 1, 1944 to all authority holders from Deputy Chief Commissioner.
57 RG 4-2 Box 28. Attorney General Correspondence Files. File 28.5 “Liquor Control February 1944.” (restricted)
article “This is Not Temperance,” The Brantford Expositor. February 9, 1944.
13.
59 RG 4-2 Box 28. Attorney General Correspondence Files. File 28.6 “Liquor Control March 1944.” (restricted)
March 14, 1944 to Attorney General from Chief Commissioner Goggin.
60 ““Sold Out’ Signs Will Still Prevail Though Restrictions Eased on Ale.” p. 13.
61 RG 4-2 Box 28. Attorney General Correspondence Files. File 28.6 “Liquor Control March 1944.” (restricted)
March 3, 1944 to Blackwell from A.E.P., Toronto.
62 RG 36-4 Container 1 Temporary Box A92. LLBO Geographical Correspondence Files 1934-45. File 17.1
63 RG 36-4 Container 1 Temporary Box A92. LLBO Geographical Correspondence Files 1934-45. File 17.1
“Hamilton 1935-44.” (restricted) October 21, 1944 to Elmirst from Inspector Cheeseman.
64 RG 4-2 Box 29. Attorney General Correspondence Files. File 29.7 “Liquor Authority Licence 1944-45.”
(restricted) resolutions to Drew beginning May 4, 1944.
65 RG 4-2 Box 29. Attorney General Correspondence Files. File 29.7 “Liquor Authority Licence 1944-45.”
(restricted) reply to resolutions May 10, 1944 from Attorney General.
66 RG 4-32 1945 #1289. Attorney General Central Registry Files. File “Genera: File re. Liquor Authority.”
(restricted) memo January 19, 1945 to Liquor Authority Control Board Chairman Robb from W.B. Common of
AGO.
67 Campbell, Demon Rum, p. 90, and “Hotel Beer Parlours: Regulating Public Drinking and Decency in Vancouver.
68 RG 20 A-2 Container 5 Interim Box 26. Attorney General Correspondence. File 5.1 “Liquor Control.” (restricted)
brief March 25, 1946 re. Women’s Beverage Rooms to Attorney General from Mrs. W.B.L. Secretary of Federated
Women’s Institutes of Ontario.
70 RG 20 A-2 Container 5 Interim Box 26. Attorney General Correspondence. File 5.1 “Liquor Control.” (restricted)
“A Discussion of the Principles and Conditions Involved in Suggested Changes of the Liquor Control System of the
Province of Ontario,” undated by W.W.M., Association of Toronto Hotel Proprietors.
71 ““Views Clash Sharply On Women’s Beverage Beer Ban.”” p. 4.
72 ““Views Clash Sharply On Women’s Beverage Beer Ban.”” p. 4.
1945 to Blackwell from Mrs. K.M.H.
1946 to Blackwell from D.J.E., Toronto.
75 RG 36-4 Container 4 Temporary Box A93. LLBO Geographical Correspondence Files. 1934-45. File 40 “Prescott
1935-44.” (restricted) May 16, 1940 to Eli Bertrand. MP. L’Original from Smith.
76 Campbell, Demon Rum, p. 68.
77 J.E. Hodgetts. From Arm’s Length to Hands-On: The Formative Years of Ontario’s Public Service. 1867-
79 RG 4-2 Box 59.8. Attorney General Correspondence Files. File “Liquor Licence Board 1948.” (restricted)
December 17, 1948 to Blackwell from E.P.M. PC candidate Essex North.
80 See biographical sketch of Robb in Ron Poulton, “Drinks-At-Dinner Policy Revamped.” The Toronto Telegram.
October 23, 1962, p. 5.
81 Graham. p. 121.
82 Peter Oliver. Unlikely Tory: The Life and Politics of Allan Grossman (Toronto: Lester & Orphen Dennys.
History. 84 (1992), p. 111.
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55 Morris and Williams, p. 111.
57 "V.T. Goggin Named Liquor Board Head," The Toronto Star, February 21, 1944, p. 5.
58 RG 4-2 Box 28. Attorney General Correspondence Files. File 28.8 "Liquor Control July-September 1944." (restricted) August 8, 1944 to Blackwell from Chief Commissioner Goggin.
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74 RG 4-2 Box 30.1 Attorney General Correspondence Files. File "Liquor Authority 1946." (restricted) February 7, 1946 to Miss L.M.S. of Toronto Women's Liberal Association from Blackwell.
80 "Liquor Bill Carries in House." p. 2.
81 RG 4-2 #1533 1946. Attorney General Correspondence. File "Re. LCA 1946—General File," (restricted) "Liquor Control in Ontario" Address by Drew given over CBC December 5, 1946.
83 Statutes of Ontario, 1946, 10 Geo. VI, c. 47, p. 216
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87 "Liquor Bill Carries in House." p. 2.
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120 RG 4-2 Box 30.3. Attorney General Correspondence Files. File “LLB 1947.” (restricted) February 12, 1947 to R.S. from Blackwell.
121 “Liquor Bill Carries in House.” p. 2.
133 “To Meet or Not to Meet is Drew—Dry Question.” The Globe and Mail. April 2. 1946. p. 5.
135 RG 4-2 Box 30.2. Attorney General Correspondence File. File “Liquor Act 1946.” (restricted) memo October 1. 1946 to Drew from E.J. Young, his Executive Assistant.
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151 RG 4-2 Box 30.2. Attorney General Correspondence Files. File “Liquor Act 1946.” (restricted) December 10, 1946 to Blackwell from Judge Robb, Chairman LLB.


157 RG 4-2 Box 60.1. Attorney General Correspondence Files. File “LLB 1949.” (restricted) March 1, 1949 to Blackwell from the Ontario WCTU.


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178 “No Chance Bars to Open Before February—Robb.” The Toronto Star. December 13, 1946. p. 3.

179 Address by Drew over CBC Radio, December 5, 1946.


181 Address by Drew over CBC Radio, December 5, 1946.
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187 Address by Drew over CBC Radio, December 5, 1946.
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211 “‘Man Who Beat Drew’ Tells How CCF $1000 Bested Drew $50,000.” p. 2.
216 p. 166.
224 The Ontario government created this research organisation. the Addiction Research foundation. in 1949 under the Health Department with a mandate to study the treatment of alcoholism and other addictions. Single. Giesbrecht and Eakins. p. 137.
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227 RG 41-3 Temporary Box 9, LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File “Circulars 4101-4200.” Circular no. 4126 August 11, 1949 to all employees from Spragge.
232 Bothwell. p. 171.
"WON'T ALTER LIQUOR LAWS—FROST"\(^1\)

When Premier Leslie Frost declared that he would not alter the liquor laws at the end of the 1950s, he reiterated a creed he practised for the previous decade. In taking the province from the immediate post-war period through the middle decade of the century Frost imposed a degree of personal control over Ontario's liquor laws unseen since the days of Howard Ferguson. This was not surprising since, as Frost's biographer argued, no Premier since Ferguson "had so dominated the political life of the province."\(^2\) Leslie Frost became Premier in May 1949, succeeding Thomas Kennedy, who served as interim party leader after Drew lost his seat in the 1948 election. The 53-year-old United Church member served his country in World War One and came home to his rural roots: a small town law practice in Lindsay. Frost gained his love of public affairs from the lively political discussions at the family dinner table and went on to serve as Treasurer under Drew.\(^3\) Although he appeared "mild-mannered" and tranquil in public, those who worked most closely with him knew a "strong-willed," "commanding" and even "short-tempered" leader.\(^4\) Frost committed himself to achieving balance between two important goals: economic advancement and "human betterment."\(^5\) This commitment informed his premiership.

Economic advancement necessitated an emphasis on building liquor stores in much the same way he built roads, schools and hospitals. "Human betterment," however, required a controlled hand regulating access to liquor. His goal of "human betterment" illustrated Schindeler's argument that since Confederation Ontarians had looked to the state to create the "good society."\(^6\) Frost made it clear that he intended to avoid the mistakes that, in his opinion, proved the undoing of his predecessor, George Drew. Frost believed that Drew was far in advance of popular sentiment when he introduced cocktail bars in Toronto and the four other large cities in Ontario.\(^7\) This followed from Frost's commitment to the incremental approach to policymaking, which relied "heavily on the record of past experience" rather than a rational
evaluation of every possible alternative. Those closest to Frost also shared his judgement of Drew’s actions and helped shape his moral view of liquor policy.

Raised in a strict Presbyterian home by passionately dry parents, Frost outgrew “his parents’ obsession with temperance,” and began to drink moderately while serving in France in World War One. Long after explaining to his father that he preferred “true temperance to strict abstinence,” Frost found “himself married to one whose prohibitionist ardour was equal to that of the elder Frost.” Gertrude Frost’s prohibitionist sentiments diminished somewhat through the years but Frost debated many issues including liquor policy with his wife, the “leader of the opposition” as he called her. Other prohibitionist forces influenced the Premier as well. In early 1950 an opinion article in The Windsor Star complained of “rampant” prohibitionist sentiment in Frost’s Cabinet and argued that the government listened too intently to the “back concessions.” There was much truth to this statement as just over half of Frost’s 1950 Cabinet consisted of members who adhered to the province’s traditional prohibitionist religions, namely the United Church and the Baptist Church. Likewise, just over half of his Cabinet represented predominantly rural ridings. Clearly Frost surrounded himself with like-minded ministers particularly since increasing urbanisation rendered the rural areas of the province over-represented in the Legislature.

Representing a small Ontario town himself, Frost defended what his biographer described as “the values of small-town Ontario.” For Frost, these included vigilance against violations of the liquor laws and careless licencing. Above all, as he noted to one of his back-benchers at the end of the decade, he hesitated “to remove restraints in this day and generation when I am inclined to think that people drink certainly as much as is good for them, and in very many cases too much.” This overindulgence, Frost believed, hampered Ontarians’ ability to compete in the new post-war world. In the context of the Cold War, he valued “fitness” and sobriety in the fight between the West and Russia, “where they are shooting satellites at the moon.” Although he led the province in a post-war setting, Frost believed that restricted access to alcohol encouraged temperance, a moral framework that had informed earlier temperance
beliefs. This framework guided him throughout his career as Premier and formed the basis for understanding liquor control in the 1950s.

Frost’s beliefs mirrored those held by many across the province. And while moderate advocates of true temperance, not prohibition, undoubtedly made up the majority of Ontarians, Gertrude Frost’s credo was still common in some circles. As one syndicated editorial admitted in late 1953, there was a “hard dry core” in the province. A government survey in 1948 revealed that 30% of Ontarians were “confirmed dry.” Given that under local option prohibitionists needed to attract only 41% of voter support to block or close licenced premises or retail outlets, that ‘dry core’ wielded significant, though ever declining, influence throughout the 1950s. Between 1950 and 1960 the number of WCTU members in Canada declined from almost 9000 to just over 6000. One Union member concluded, “the Union’s difficulties arose with the war. The boys came home from the war and their wives, many of them our members, had to give up the WCTU because their husbands, who had learned to drink overseas, wanted to serve liquor in their homes.” Despite the reduced number of supporters, a suggestion or even a rumour of liquor policy change perceived by these dry groups to be a relaxation of the liquor laws resulted in a barrage of negative correspondence directed at the government. This pressure influenced Frost and the Boards immensely. But from the late 1940s those in favour of less regulation began to openly criticise the moral regulation of liquor consumption and the hypocritical situations that resulted particularly in public drinking. By the end of the 1950s, these even louder demands for liquor law liberalisation would drown out the dry protests. This “restlessness” in the liquor control debate oscillated between more liberalisation and more enforcement of the existing laws and came to be the hallmark of the period.

POST-WAR EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL SYSTEM

Frost governed through a period of tremendous growth not only in the province’s economy but also in its government control system. As Table 17 illustrates, the Liquor Control Board opened up an unprecedented 105 liquor stores and regulated 131 new beer stores between 1949 and 1960. This building explosion resulted in more than double the number of stores opened during the previous 20 years.
of government control. Population growth and its redistribution, especially in the form of suburbanisation, certainly accounted for some of this growth. In other ways the Board was merely catching up after years of depressed economics and war rationing of liquor and building materials. The number of Board employees similarly increased from 1,220 to 1,968 over the same period to staff these stores.\textsuperscript{24} as we see in Table 18. As Table 19 below depicts, permit sales also reflected this growth, rising from just over 800,000 in 1949 to over 1.3 million in 1960.\textsuperscript{25} Finally, the greater number of stores and permit holders translated into more sales and therefore more revenue for the provincial government. In 1949 the province’s various retail outlets sold 73.4 million gallons of liquor which translated into $38 million in revenue for the provincial treasury. In 1960 consumers purchased 102.5 million gallons while the Board paid $76.3 million to the government, more than double the amount a decade earlier.\textsuperscript{26} as Table 20 in chapter 5 shows.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Table 17}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Total Number of Liquor and Beer Stores in Ontario 1949/50-1959/60}
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![Graph showing the number of liquor and beer stores in Ontario from 1949/50 to 1959/60.](source)

\textit{Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1949/50-1959/60}
These figures reveal not only a growth in provincial population, which expanded from 4.6 million in 1951 to 6.2 million in 1961, but also changed attitudes toward drinking. In the post-war period patterns of moral behaviour among Ontarians, and Canadians in general, began to change. For example, religious historian John Webster Grant argued that, for many people, certain traditional taboos such as alcohol consumption gave way “before a style of life that included social drinking as a matter of course.” These new ‘anti-puritans’ as Grant called them, did not desire a return to the nineteenth century saloon but were eager to indulge in post-war prosperity after years of sacrifice by surrounding themselves with the amenities of gracious living, which for many included their favourite brands of liquor. Europe’s historically more liberal attitudes towards drinking influenced these changes in moral behaviour and came in many forms. As the WCTU member noted above, military personnel returned from war in Europe with a taste for the English pub and French wine. Post-war European immigrants brought their wine-making knowledge as well as their drinking customs and preferences to Ontario. And as trans-Atlantic travel became more common, Ontarians generally acquired more cosmopolitan tastes. Upon their return, many concluded, for example, that “the gateway to an appreciation for Italian culture was...Chianti.” Other
factors also resulted in higher consumption rates in the post-war years. A July 1950 *Saturday Night* article identified several of these: the immense and sudden increase in purchasing power due to higher wages; the ease of transportation to licenced premises and stores; and the increase in leisure time due to shortened work hours.\textsuperscript{32} The combination of these factors encouraged higher alcohol consumption by Ontarians and demands for better treatment of customers. By 1956, *Liberty*, ‘Canada’s Young Family Magazine,’ took aim at the country’s liquor laws, calling them archaic, prohibitive and “loony,” using Ontario throughout as a prime example.\textsuperscript{33} Young families in the midst of the post-war baby boom viewed alcohol as part of everyday life and reacted sharply when laws prevented them from indulging.

Nevertheless, Frost’s premiership began with a sense of optimism for those hoping for a more comfortable and enjoyable public drinking environment. The primary reason for this optimism was Frost’s July creation of the position of Vice-Chairman of the LCBO to act as “official trouble-shooter and fact-finder” in the government’s campaign to “clean up the sale and use of liquor in Ontario.”\textsuperscript{34} This new “padre of the pubs,” 45-year-old Durham MPP John Foote, was a Presbyterian clergyman, an ex-army chaplain, and a Victoria Cross holder.\textsuperscript{35} Foote’s first assignment involved a tour of England and Scandinavia “to see how liquor fits into the cultural life of those countries.” This goal reflected Foote’s own belief that the use of liquor “is rooted in social, environmental and psychological conditions.”\textsuperscript{36} His mandate revealed the direct impact that war experiences in Europe had on many Ontarians, especially in promoting the desire to incorporate more relaxed European attitudes towards drinking into the Ontario system. With exposure to British pubs during the war, and suffering through poor drinking conditions during war rationing, many people began to wonder if public drinking in Ontario, especially beer drinking, could be different. The creation of the new lounges and dining lounges with their food and entertainment only made the limited services of the public houses seem even more grim by contrast. In early December Foote described his experiences in Europe. For example, he reported that Denmark, “which had no limitation in hours or manner of consumption, had the best record for sobriety.” He explained that “alcohol is an ordinary accessory to living. The country is ‘wide open’ but the people are well-behaved.” Despite the food shortages, he found that English officials encouraged the service of food
with drinks in English pubs. "With food there is not the same danger of drunkenness," he observed. The English pubs he visited also provided games and entertainment. "The tendency of people in England is to go in for social entertainment and the behaviour is good." When pressed to make recommendations for the province, Foote declined to advocate Denmark's wide open system since he did not "think it would work here."37

Foote's observations reflected many of the proposals concerning English pub-inspired changes for the Ontario public house received by the government since the war. For example, in January 1949 the Ontario Hotel Association (OHA) protested the "notion that it's a sin for the poor man to listen to songs over his suds [in a public house] while the citizen who can afford the more expensive dispensations of a spot with a liquor licence [a dining lounge] may hear them."38 Two days later The London Free-Press editorialised that "there is no reason why the LLB should balk at permitting food served with beer...Ontario's attitude toward beverage rooms seems to have been to make them as unattractive as possible with music and food banned." "British pubs," the editorial pointed out, "are the social centre while Ontario beverage rooms are dedicated only to drinking."39 Despite his new found experiences and penetrating observations, little came of Foote's European tour. Although Foote concluded, like others before him, that Prohibition was at the root of the "unsatisfactory drinking habits in the province,"40 the government made little effort to reverse the traditional prohibition on food, entertainment and games in Ontario public houses because of its moral and paternalistic view of liquor. As Frost's hometown newspaper editorialised, his goal was to "re-establish control of liquor"41 that had been lost along the way, not to introduce a better ambience for the province's drinkers.

**FROST FACES CRITICISM OF CONTINUED WAR MEASURES**

Frost's initial challenge of the decade proved to be the ramifications of war-inspired liquor policies in post-war Ontario. His enduring fear of the voter strength of the province's 'dry core,' admittedly a small but highly motivated and politicised group which he believed helped defeat Drew, meant that he refused to relinquish policies created for a by-gone era. Those policies surviving from the days of war rationing struck many Ontarians as unnecessary at best and irritating at worst. For many,
these conclusions became even more evident as Ontarians travelled to other provinces or other countries. A man who recently moved to Quebec complained in a letter to the editor about Ontario’s permits and order forms compared to the ease and efficiency of the Quebec liquor retail system. While the regimentation of the liquor store experience certainly pre-dated the war, he used the opportunity to bemoan the fact that the government watered down spirits while raising the price. He set his grievances in the context of a comparison between Quebec and Ontario even though all Canadian provinces watered their spirits as they had done since the federal government decreed it as part of war rationing. Despite calls to resume the pre-war spirit strength, liquor boards across the country continued to do so, noting in 1952 that to discontinue the practice would result in even higher prices. Such reasoning failed to satisfy drinkers for long. Liquor policy critic, Kenora Liberal-Labour MPP Albert Wren, denounced the practice in the debate on the Throne Speech in 1954. Later that year another in a growing contingent of liquor policy critics, Globe and Mail columnist Frank Tumpane, satirised the plight of the poor, dumb, leaderless, inarticulate drinkers, who...have their whiskey adulterated with water, the price of it raised by the Government...and if they dare so much as to whimper in protest they are told to keep to their places—two steps to the rear.

Like many war measures, spirit strength continued to reflect the government’s action during the war crisis rather than the service enjoyed by Ontario drinkers in the early years of government control.

Another war measure that the government preserved in peacetime received even more criticism. Due to the shortage of alcohol during the war, the LCBO banned the room service of alcoholic beverages. Every year following, the OHA appealed to the Board and the Premier directly for the reinstatement of that important aspect of hotel service. These perennial requests caught the attention of the province’s major newspapers. A 1957 Globe and Mail editorial called the ban on room service a “preposterous bit of bureaucracy” forcing hotel guests to purchase an entire bottle of liquor or a case of beer from a government store even if he or she desired only a single refreshment. The editorial lamented that the intended purpose behind the ban was obscure. Obviously, the war measure had become so enshrined in the province’s liquor policies that most Ontarians had already forgotten why it was instituted in the first place. Perhaps this was the result of the “meek compliance” with which Ontarians had become
"accustomed to these ditherings," as the editorial argued. A Liberty article observed that "In Ontario a hotel guest may receive chopped ice and 'mixers' from room service—but no liquor." For the author and undoubtedly for his young readers, the province's lack of room service of liquor was ridiculous, archaic and an enduring contributor to bootlegging.

Most arguments for the return of room service revolved around the hotel industry's concern over competition for tourists since Quebec and many American states catered to their customers in this way. Tourism played a growing role in Ontario's economy in the post-war years. By 1958 the Ontario Department of Travel and Publicity reported that tourists spent at least $250 million per year in the province and almost 5.5 million U.S. cars crossed the border into Ontario in the previous year. The expansion of Ontario's highway system throughout the 1950s helped attract this "highly profitable flood of outside traffic." Given the economic importance of these tourists, the hospitality industry feared that Ontario's liquor laws, especially regulations obviously meant for another era, made Toronto look like a "hick town." Others complained that instead of enjoying the services they were accustomed to at home, American vacationers found "horse and buggy laws" in the province. American publications even broadcast the "silliness" of Ontario liquor laws. The Milwaukee Journal published a booklet about Canada in the summer of 1953 commending the "Presbyterian conscience" that informed Ontario liquor laws. Nevertheless, it went on to condemn the worst conditions these laws fostered such as full bottles of spirits and cases of beer in hotel rooms. The famous British conductor Sir Thomas Beecham publicly criticised the absence of this amenity in hotels and declared that he would not return to Toronto until it was reinstated. A hotel employees' union petitioned the LLBO in early 1958 to restore "the custom of room service." The union argued that the province's "legislators and administrators should be realistic and appreciate the trend of the times" by allowing that type of hotel service that was "prevalent in all parts of the world." Appearing before the Legislature's Standing Committee on Travel and Publicity a year later, a joint delegation representing the province's hotels, travel associations and restaurants appealed for the return of room service of alcoholic beverages as well. The government did not respond in the desired fashion and as a direct result the Royal York hotel in Toronto laid off 100 employees. The
hotel management blamed the lack of room service of alcohol on the continued decline in guests the Toronto landmark attracted.  

Earlier that year Licence Board Chairman Judge Robb and Premier Frost expressed opinions on the controversy surrounding the ban on room service. Appearing before the Legislature's Committee on Commissions, created in 1951 to periodically review the activities of the province's various commissions, Liberal member for Essex North, Arthur Reaume, another critic of the government's liquor laws, asked Robb why the province did not permit this service. Robb replied "Well, there was a lot of drinking in the rooms." Reaume retorted that the "hypocritical policy" resulted in even more drinking since it forced a guest to buy a whole case of beer when he only wanted one bottle. Even Robb seemed to have forgotten, conveniently or otherwise, the original purpose of the ban. During the war it preserved limited stocks for store customers and beverage room patrons but many years removed from the war he fell back on the moral control side of government control, explaining that "the rule was intended to try to cut down the amount of drinking in hotel rooms." Given his chance a month later to voice his opinion on the ban, Frost, unlike his LLBO Chairman, admitted to the Legislature "there were many good arguments for allowing room service at hotels such as the Royal York." But to do this, he argued, would be to remove one of the too few restraints on the sale of liquor. Both Robb and Frost echoed the tone evident in the OTF's moral outrage against any increase in the availability of alcohol in such a setting. In an early 1958 letter to the Premier, the group condemned room service to hotel 'bedrooms,' a term used to associate the location of drinking, (a place with a bed) with implied sexual improprieties. While travellers of the 1930s and early 1940s enjoyed the service of alcoholic beverages in their hotel rooms, the government denied this amenity to guests of Ontario hotels in the 1950s on the basis of a paternalistic and moralistic desire to control when and where liquor was consumed.

Another wartime change caught the attention of the press and government critics and led to a sustained attack on public houses. Like the watering of spirits and the ban on room service, the service of only one glass of beer at a time in an Ontario public house represented a government wartime measure to cope with the reduced stocks of alcohol. And like these other two measures, this rule became a
permanent peacetime feature of public house drinking. As the following examples illustrate, many critics began to view this rule as unnecessary, overbearing, and conducive to excessive consumption.

The OHA first identified these problems. At its January 1953 annual meeting, the Association petitioned Frost for a number of changes including the service of more than one glass of beer at a time in its public houses.62 Not only did this rule mean more work for the individual bartender but also any infraction could have dire consequences for the proprietor. The Board frequently suspended authority licences for "double servings," as they were called. For example, the official list of licence activities for one week in March 1958 noted that the Board suspended a licence in East York Township for a period of one week "when it was established that draught beer was served with more than the regulation one-half inch head and that there were double servings."63

While a patron could obviously only consume one glass of beer at a time, critics began to observe that the rule contributed to excessive consumption as drinkers adapted their behaviour to this type of regulation. The Globe and Mail's Frank Tumpane, reminded readers in early 1954 that during war rationing "beverage rooms took on a character and acquired an opprobrium...from which they have never fully recovered."64 Bruce West, another Globe and Mail commentator on Ontario's liquor laws, continued the criticism with an early 1956 column that described many critics' views vividly: "One at a Time: Silly Laws Encourage Gulpers." He argued that by keeping this "nuisance law," the Board treated Ontario drinkers "like a bunch of naughty little juvenile delinquents stealing cookies when they go into a beverage room to buy a glass of beer." What was even more dangerous and even hypocritical, he asserted, was that the rule did not encourage true temperance. Instead, due to the trouble in hailing a harried waiter in the crowded rooms and the fact that the Board forbade jugs of beer even for groups of drinkers, it caused customers "to gulp down a glass of beer as though someone had just sounded the fire alarm."65 By the mid-1950s, a law that was first conceived as a method of rationing, represented for many one of the worst aspects of the public house environment.

These newspaper columnists identified aspects of the liquor laws for ridicule that obviously made for good storytelling and attracted readers. More importantly, they articulated the issues in a manner that
caught the attention of ordinary Ontarians and prompted the official Opposition to action in their role as unofficial opposition outside Queen’s Park. During debate in the Legislature in early 1959, Liberal Arthur Reaume supported the idea of two glasses of beer at a time,66 echoing his leader’s charge that the government advocated Puritanism while allowing bad conditions to persist in the province’s public houses.67 Frost’s reply revealed his opinion on any liberalisation of the liquor laws: “I’m not for sticking booze under people’s noses.” 68 He believed “the proposal to allow more than one drink per person on a table would just lead to a breakdown in good order in beverage rooms.” Frost refused to consider any change in the rules and was not persuaded by arguments concerning excessive drinking as a result of the regulation. In fact, in attempting to fashion his liquor polices after those of former Premier James Whitney, the architect of Ontario’s local option system. Frost favoured what he called “intentional restraints,” such as the one glass limit, even if they were never devised as such.69 Frost overtly emphasised the moral control aspect of government control, especially in the area of public drinking.

Despite these ‘intentional restraints,’ or perhaps because of them, overindulgence clearly existed in Ontario’s public houses given the consistent observations of critics like Arthur Reaume, Bruce West and Frank Tumpane. As Valverde observed for government control systems generally, prohibitions like the one-glass-at-a-time rule coexisted with ‘imperatives’ to drink. For example, drinking was one of the only activities not banned in public houses. She concluded that this approach revealed the state’s lack of concern with the health of society.70 This conclusion clearly underestimates the sincerity of Frost’s intentions to promote ‘human betterment.’ The unintended consequence of his liquor restraints was a tendency for ‘binge drinking’ or ‘gulping,’ which the press consistently illustrated but which failed to promote much attention around the issue of alcoholism rates at this time. This ‘gulping’ behaviour coincided with increased consumption rates in Canada in the 1950s and also existed in a post-war context of increased public indulgences of all kinds such as movies.71

Another wartime policy caught the attention of critics incensed over the continuation of these measures into peacetime. In 1943 the Board instructed beverage rooms to close their doors in the late afternoon and open again in the early evening in order to sustain reduced beer supplies over a longer
period of the day and to leave enough beer for war workers after their shifts. Ten years later Chief Commissioner Welsh employed a very different rationale than the one that originally inspired the supper hour closure, when faced with criticism over the continued measure before the legislative Committee on Commissions. Echoing Judge Robb’s paternalistic argument in the immediate post-war period, Welsh defended closing public houses from 6:30-8 pm, arguing, it sent many drinkers home for dinner who might otherwise have stayed for the evening.\textsuperscript{72} While patrons of Hepburn’s original beverage rooms enjoyed uninterrupted service throughout the day, the government of the middle decade of the century assumed not only that Ontario drinkers needed to go home for dinner, but that they did not have the moral fibre to make this decision on their own. Therefore, it regulated drinking times to encourage this behaviour, a classic characteristic of Taylor’s paternalistic liquor control system and a clear indication that the pendulum of liquor control policy in the 1950s continued to swing overwhelmingly in the direction of paternalism. This dinner hour closure often encouraged similar consumption behaviour as the one glass at a time rule: patrons raced to drink an evening’s worth of beer before the 6:30 deadline. Although criticisms of these rationing measures reached a crescendo by the end of the decade, Frost’s adherence to incrementalism preserved the regulations Drew passed on to him. His deeply held belief that Ontarians already drank more than was good for them.\textsuperscript{73} reinforced this approach and prevented him from loosening controls on access to liquor even if in practice these controls actually promoted drinking since they were never intended as anything more than stop-gap rationing measures.

These war measures (the watering of spirits, the ban on room service, the one glass limit and the supper hour closure) focused attention on the shortcomings of the province’s liquor control system in the post-war era. Rationing policies became objects of derision and brought the entire system of government control, especially those rules regulating public drinking, into disrepute. For critics, these problematic laws were symptoms of the ailing public house, a creation of the Depression. Critics attacked another characteristic of the public house during the early 1950s, a feature instituted in the earliest months of its creation in 1934: the ban on food. Upon returning from his European tour in 1950, Rev. John Foote promoted the idea of expanding the role of the public house beyond the sale of beer to include among
other diversions, the service of food.\textsuperscript{74} The Board originally banned the sale of food in beverage rooms in response to the widespread fear surrounding the reintroduction of public drinking into the province. The Board outlawed anything that might be construed as ‘promoting’ consumption, such as the availability of food. The Board also feared an even more sinister enemy: the so-called free lunch. Prohibitionists argued at the time that if food were allowed, greedy proprietors might be tempted to offer free food to lure unsuspecting and perhaps hungry Depression-era Ontarians into their beverage rooms. Even though the circumstances that promoted such a ruling, namely the Depression and the novelty of reinstated public drinking had long since dissipated, the ban on food in beverage rooms remained a feature of the beer-dispensing outlet. When Foote’s experience in English pubs inspired him to propose the revocation of this ban, similar prohibitionist arguments surfaced again, reminding Ontarians of the endurance of these sentiments.

The Anglican Church initially agreed with Foote’s proposal, arguing in a May 1950 report by its Social Service Council that better amenities in public houses, rather than excessive regulations, encouraged moderate drinking.\textsuperscript{75} A week later the Church’s Synod rejected the report saying that its proper role was not to encourage greater amenities but instead to recognise the “evil of drinking.”\textsuperscript{76} Like most of Foote’s suggestions for improved public drinking, the Board ignored the idea and continued to prohibit the sale of food in public houses.

Despite the Anglican Church’s reversal, others joined in the criticism of the public house. An early 1953 Ottawa Citizen editorial attacked the government’s regulation of “beverage rooms...where food is prohibited.”\textsuperscript{77} Making drinking the sole activity, the editorial argued, resulted in insobriety. Regardless of such criticisms and Foote’s earlier suggestions, it took a force outside the province to prompt the government to action. In late January 1953 the LLBO announced that it was looking into the possibility of allowing public houses to sell food. The reason, Chairman Robb revealed, was the recent report of British Columbia’s Stevens Commission, an inquiry into that province’s liquor control system that recommended, among other improvements, that food be available in beverage rooms.\textsuperscript{78} In March the government amended the LLA to allow the sale of full meals in public houses. While proprietors in the
past often provided snacks or sandwiches for sale without complaint from inspectors. The Board forbade the sale of full meals.79 Chief Commissioner Welsh explained that there had been “considerable demand” for meals in public houses and that “both Judge Robb and I are of the opinion that food should be served with alcoholic beverages whenever possible.”80 This move received praise in the press as it would “remove a stupid restriction,”81 one Kingston editorial claimed. The Globe and Mail lauded the amendment as an end to a “lunatic provision” that must have been instituted in the first place due to the “belief that drinkers deserved no amenities and that, if they were to be allowed to drink at all, they might as well be allowed to do so in the grossest manner.” “Fortunately,” the editor sighed, “such twisted thinking is now out of date.”82 The editor spoke too soon. On the preceding page of that same newspaper long-time prohibitionist Ben Spence, expressing the traditional temperance opposition to anything viewed as improving the drinking environment, proclaimed that the amendment would “increase drunkenness, disorder, destitution and crime.”83 The following week he demanded a delay in the amendment allowing the sale of meals in public houses since it was “such an important and far reaching measure.”84 The government went ahead with the amendment, though few realised that it would be anything but “far reaching.”

While the headlines and the government press releases led Ontarians to believe that the change amounted simply to the availability of meals for sale in public houses, the reality quickly became evident. Welsh found it necessary to clarify the intention of the amendment a few days later. It did not allow patrons to purchase full course meals in public houses. Instead, it allowed proprietors to open a licenced dining room without the necessity of being reclassified as a tavern. The full course meals could be served with beer in these separate dining rooms, but not in the public houses themselves.85 It will be recalled that after Drew reclassified all outlets in 1946, beverage rooms were renamed public houses and could serve beer only. Taverns, outlets with somewhat superior amenities, could hold more than one licence such as a public house licence and a dining room licence. Instead of making a clean break with this complex system, Frost’s government confused matters even further. This 1953 amendment proved meaningless, as the Ontario public house remained, according to its critics, a “hog trough” and “a beer mill.”86 This
resulted from Frost’s adherence to the incremental approach to policy change. Because Ontario policymakers believed in the superiority of their sense of public sentiment rather than poll results or recommendations from their bureaucrats, public perception remained paramount. Therefore, the government tried to portray an image of “doing something,” which tended to produce policies “for show” rather than “for real.” It would be many years before the government realised that “a large sheaf of government regulations” could never prevent excessive consumption and that the “many strings attached,” most of them morally motivated, more often than not actually promoted “feverish” drinking.

ONTARIANS QUESTION FUNDAMENTALS OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL

With the war years finally safely behind them, many Ontarians argued that war rationing liquor policies had no place in their lives. In the process of identifying these increasingly irritating regulations, they began to attack the very fundamentals of the government control system itself with a ferocity never seen before. When Howard Ferguson initiated the return of legalised alcohol retail in 1927, he emphasised that control of the heretofore prohibited trade would be assured through three fundamental institutions: the liquor permit, the order form and the local option system. Although they had been questioned before, they retained basically the same function and format that Ferguson instituted. Over two decades later Ontarians vehemently criticised their existence in a province very different from Ferguson’s. Ontarians condemned the province’s liquor laws in a post-war context in which they desired “leisure” and “refinement” in their social pursuits like drinking. Furthermore, the tremendous impact of American mass culture influenced a simultaneous condemnation of other restrictions perceived as impeding a “richer” post-war experience such as the divorce laws and Sunday closing laws for entertainment facilities such as movie theatres. Like his predecessor, Frost desired an image of control over the sale of liquor, particularly in the early years of spirits by the glass and after war-inspired excesses. As a result, he refused to revert to pre-war conditions such as in the case of room service and made only a half-hearted attempt to reverse Depression-inspired regulations such as the ban on food in public houses. These actions fanned the flames of these attacks.
In the previous decades public drinking in the province usually captured all the headlines and underwent the most radical changes from no public drinking, through the beverage room and finally the cocktail lounge. The retail side of government control, on the other hand, received little press and remained fundamentally unchanged from Ferguson’s original stores. Liquor store customers continued to fill out order forms, show their permits, and have them endorsed just as they did in 1927. With the war measures appearing increasingly inappropriate and irritating in peacetime, the time-honoured ritual of buying bottled liquor took on a new light as well in the 1950s. More mobility among Ontarians also made them question customs at home, as we saw with the ban on room service. In many ways, this also constituted a reaction against wartime changes. When Drew legalised the sale of spirits by the glass in 1947, he refused to discontinue the liquor permit in the same way that Hepburn ended the beer and wine permit when the government made these beverages available by the glass.

Liquor Permits and Order Forms under Fire: In October 1950, a man with experience of the Quebec system complained of the “obtuse and time wasting ceremony” involved in purchasing a bottle of liquor in Ontario. He argued that it was an insult to his intelligence to be forced to sign his name and address to an order form and show a permit indicating his occupation. By early 1954. Opposition members at Queen’s Park joined in the criticism. Albert Wren, while campaigning for the leadership of the Liberal Party, attacked liquor permits as an “expensive novelty and nuisance.” Echoing the complaints from correspondents to the government, Wren noted that Quebec’s stores functioned well without them. Wren’s public comments set off a barrage of editorials across the province denouncing permits. The Kingston Whig-Standard agreed that the argument for permits was compelling when government control was untried but argued that the government should have learned by now that such regimentation was unnecessary. “But,” the editorial explained, in an indictment of incrementalism, “government bureaus have a habit of clinging to regulations long after they have served their useful purpose.” This complaint mirrored Valverde’s contention that ‘administrative habit’ accounted for the endurance of moralistic controls in government monopoly systems. Clearly, her explanation requires further contextualisation, particularly to account for the breaking of such habits. In the Ontario case this type of habit flourished
within a policymaking process that favoured caution and the status quo to be changed incrementally only when a large majority favoured it. At the other end of the province, The Windsor Star editorialised, "by and large a liquor permit is a little booklet that permits the LCB to add handsomely to its annual net." Instead of replying to these varied criticisms by studying if permits really continued to have a useful purpose, the Board reinforced the existing laws to the letter. Throughout 1954 and 1955 the Supervisor of Stores sent notices to store vendors reminding them to correctly and legibly record the required information in each customer's permit book. A recent "exam of permits," he scolded, "discloses that endorsements by certain Endorsers are disgraceful and can only be attributed to gross carelessness." In early 1955 he sent all stores a similar memo stressing the "importance of proper care in issuing permits." Perhaps this evident carelessness on the part of store employees in carrying out the labourious task of recording the type, price and quantity of liquor purchased revealed the general attitude that such 'regimentation' really had become meaningless.

The Board's constant scolding proved to be warranted as critics of the permit and the order form relished an embarrassing revelation regarding similar 'carelessness' at a beer store. In March 1955 evidence released to the press revealed that a man walked into a beer store, signed his order form as 'Rover Collie,' provided his address as '44 Kennell Row,' and walked out with a 12 pack of beer. This rather humorous test of the order form system followed criticisms by MPPs that it no longer served any useful purpose. Many private members contended that the procedure was archaic, annoying and useless with the government member for Wentworth, Arthur Child, arguing that order forms were so meaningless that someone could buy beer using a dog's name, hence the above experiment. The Globe and Mail responded to the whole debate by predicting that if the government did end the necessity of the beer order form, the move would be "regarded as an act of grace and benevolence on the part of the authorities." According to the editorial, this provided "proof of the public's bovine and indeed cretinous acceptance of bureaucratic nonsense."

Hope for eliminating the beer order form and the liquor store procedure requiring a permit and a form, originated among MPPs, especially government members, due to the appointment of "a young
aggressive commissioner," as Arthur Child called new LCBO Chief Commissioner William Collings. Collings, the 56-year-old MPP for the Beaches area of Toronto, replaced Welsh in the post in January 1955. A member of the United Church, Collings served in local politics before being elected to the provincial Legislature. He brought to the position his experience as a small businessman, owning two Toronto paint and wallpaper stores. While he became head of the Board, he did not gain a position in Cabinet. The Provincial Secretary, previously Welsh, now William Nickel, continued to answer to Cabinet for Board business. While some people expressed concern that the new Chief Commissioner was not in Cabinet, it was pointed out that LCBO heads in Cabinet were more the "exception." with people like Welsh becoming Commissioner after already being established in the Provincial Secretary post.

The government members' optimism surrounding the appointment of a new Chief Commissioner proved to be ill founded. In response to the 'Rover Collie' incident, Collings replied that it was better that a 'dog' and not a boy purchased the beer. He declared that "no change was considered" in beer order forms. Eliminating them would require an amendment to the LCA, he explained, since it stipulated that a "written order" was needed to purchase alcohol in Ontario. Collings' refusal to act on his fellow members' requests should have been no surprise. As a non-drinker and non-smoker, Collings represented a perfect choice for Frost as head of the Control Board. Although Collings assured Ontarians that his decision not to drink was a personal choice rather than a judgement on drinking in general. it undoubtedly coloured his decisions and attitudes in his new post.

As in the case of other liberalisation demands, the government finally agreed to consider amending the necessity for forms and permits in response to other provinces' actions. In August 1955, Manitoba announced it was abolishing the liquor permit in response to recommendations from its own liquor inquiry, the Bracken Commission. A matter of days later. Collings announced that the government would "study" the Manitoba situation, though he cautioned Ontarians that there was only a "remote possibility" that permits would be abolished completely. A card-type permit could serve as an intermediate step since it was government policy that "liquor purchasers be licenced." Throughout the fall rumours swirled regarding the possibility permit books could be replaced with a wallet-sized card or
even abolished all together, though not all the press was favourable. For example, in late September The Sudbury Daily Star editorialised that the issue was an important one that required caution, not hasty action. It also contended that the permit book served to cut down on bootlegging and helped prosecute crime cases. On the other hand, some newspapers denounced the ‘caution’ demonstrated by the government. The Hamilton Daily News called the “political pussy footing” by the government “absurd.” Its editorial accused the government of trying to keep the dry vote happy in a “very wet province.” And like so many other demands for change, this debate surrounding permits and forms expanded to include other points of irritation. “If permits can be changed,” the editorial argued, so too can other “silly” regulations such as the fine for liquor bought outside the province. This referred to the LCA’s stipulation that Ontarians must prove that they purchased their liquor through the LCBO.

Editors were not the only ones pronouncing on the fate of liquor permits and order forms. A Toronto resident declared in a letter to the editors of The Globe and Mail that “among the worst...of the stupid and irritating features of the Ontario liquor laws...is the silly, time-wasting custom of entering sales into the purchaser’s permit book.” The writer went on to criticise the limited number of liquor stores in the province’s capital and the poor conditions in public houses. Perhaps the strongest denunciation of the liquor purchasing procedure came from The Telegram’s Frank Tumpane. This procedure, he argued, amounted to the government telling customers: “line up here. sign here. shut up and be glad about it.” He went on to question why stores did not bring the bottles out from behind the counter where the customers could see them. The reason, he explained, was that the government feared that if people “saw all those potables lined up they would become unbalanced and hysterical.” The suggestion that liquor stores display their wares was not a common one at this time, illustrating that critical journalists like Tumpane tended to be ahead of major public sentiment in their use of sensational language to attract readers. Nevertheless, his argument challenged Ontarians to question the moralistic rationales behind particular aspects of their liquor laws.

While all these debates and rumours swirled in the public domain, Collings privately weighed his options regarding the liquor permit. He set out the pros and cons of eliminating the permit in a mid-
November letter to the new Provincial Secretary. Ottawa area MPP George Dunbar, a 77-year-old Anglican and veteran of the First World War replaced Nickel after less than seven months in the portfolio.\textsuperscript{113} Collings pointed out to him the two main criticisms against the present system: the public objects "to carrying with them a record of their purchases." and to the amount of "time spent in government liquor stores upon endorsement of permits." Critics argued, he explained, that the liquor permit discriminated against purchasers of bottled spirits since the Board did not require a permit for purchasers of beer or wine. Also, he went on, the fact that the permit did not afford a great measure of control since purchasers could forge their names, constituted another argument in favour of abolishing the permit.\textsuperscript{114}

He also set forth the arguments for keeping the permit. He anticipated public outcry that removing this attempt at control would reduce the Board to simply an agency of sale. This concern illustrated the underlying need for the Board to justify its monopoly on the basis of moral control. The government also feared the loss of revenue from the sale of permits, revealing the other goal of government control: being a successful business enterprise. Finally, abolishing the permit required an amendment to the LCA, and the word 'permit' appeared in the Act 129 times. After taking all this into consideration, especially "the two main criticisms against the present system," Collings recommended to Dunbar that the present permit book be withdrawn and replaced by a modified form such as an ID card. This recommendation, for Collings, represented the ultimate compromise between the two opposing goals of his Board. On the one hand, it retained a degree of moral control and therefore placated the dry voters. On the other hand, permit revenues would not be harmed and customers would perceive the change as a positive service resulting "in improved public relations between the Board and prospective purchasers."\textsuperscript{115} This latter assertion proved to be less persuasive to Dunbar than the realisation of the work involved in changing the permit. As a result, a little over a month later, Collings announced that because the government had no time to make the over 125 legislative changes needed to modify the permit book before the current ones expired in early 1956, the requirement would remain for the upcoming year.\textsuperscript{116}
Although Collings made the announcement unpopular to many, other press reports hinted at what his letter to Dunbar made abundantly clear: that Collings favoured changing the permit to an ID card.117

In early 1956, a new legislative session presented itself, free of the time pressure that prevented the government from acting on the permit issue in December. Regardless, before the Legislature's Committee on Commissions in February, Collings again announced that liquor purchasers required permit books, not only for the current year but also for the following year.118 This reluctance, even refusal, to modify the liquor permit, let alone abolish it, again pointed to the conservative character of the Frost administration. In this policy area, as in others, Frost's "conservatism seemed to have combined in itself the general sense of the province."119 Frost exemplified the character of his province's political culture in much the same manner that his predecessor Howard Ferguson did. In this case, despite his Chief Commissioner's compelling argument for modifying the permit book into an ID card. Frost and his Cabinet refused to make the necessary, if numerous, adjustments to the legislation, believing the permit book to be an effective moral control against excessive purchases. Until he was certain of an overwhelming desire for change. Frost preferred the status quo, concluding it satisfied the majority.

The government had good reason for wanting to avoid the entire process of changing the liquor laws. Although referring to the matter of criminal convictions under the LCA, the Attorney General's Deputy Minister made a strong argument for avoiding liquor-related amendments less than a month after Collings' announcement. "As you know it is not thought wise to bring down amendments to the LCA when they can be avoided because it reopens the whole liquor question for debate in the House."120 As had become clear for Frost, every time a liquor policy came up for discussion in the Legislature, the Opposition members, the press, and even his own backbenchers, took the opportunity not only to attack the policy in question but also to point out other long-overdue changes. Lindblom identified this tendency of governments to purposefully avoid debating and studying policy issues as a further incentive to follow the cautious, incremental approach to change.121

This approach bought the government another year of freedom from debating the merits of the permit book in the Legislature. As will become clear below, many other contentious liquor policy issues
challenged the government in 1956 and early 1957, temporarily diverting attention away from the permit controversy. These other problems prompted action by the government on this particular issue, one that other provinces had already faced head-on. This is not to say that critics stopped attacking the Ontario permit system. In early February 1957, Albert Wren complained during the debate on the Throne Speech that customers in liquor stores “are pushed from one signing place to another. Surely this type of regimentation isn’t necessary.” By March the government was finally ready to embrace Collings’ recommendation of 15 months earlier. Provincial Secretary Dunbar introduced the amendment to the LCA “to simplify the procedure which arises from the use of liquor permits. It abolishes some of the process which has grown completely unnecessary, and which is cumbersome and annoying.” In response to arguments for completely abolishing the permit, Dunbar pointed out that “the liquor permit has its own particular value and use. It is desirable to retain the elements of control which are within the Act.” Nothing in his statements identified this value or control. Later, he told a reporter that he could not end the permit completely since “it establishes the right of the would-be purchaser to buy liquor.”

**Table 19**

**Number of Permits Sold in Ontario 1949/50-1959-60**

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<td>150000</td>
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*Note: Temporary permit discontinued in 1957*

Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1949/50-1959/60
A Globe and Mail editorial attacked Dunbar for this statement, arguing that if the permit established the right to buy liquor, Ontarians should not have to pay for this right. The real reason the government retained the permits, the editorial contended, was the more than $1 million profit gained from their sale.\textsuperscript{125} Dunbar reinforced this point in the Legislature in his reply to Liberal Harry Nixon’s inquiry why Ontarians had to purchase this ‘right’ every year. “The longer one lives,” Dunbar explained. “the better it is for the hon. Provincial Treasurer of this province. It will be a $1 million income every year and who would throw that into the lake?”\textsuperscript{126} As the number of permits sold steadily increased, as Table 19 shows, this income became increasingly significant. Overall, Dunbar reinforced the idea that the amendment represented a compromise: while it removed the cumbersome process of endorsing the permit books, which annoyed many, it preserved public safety, although he failed to mention how it would do this. The true compromise, one which Dunbar himself partially revealed, was between keeping some form of moral control over purchasers of alcohol and ensuring the continued permit revenue.

Like so many other policy revisions attempted by the Frost administration, such as the convoluted amendment allowing food in public houses, this so-called compromise pleased few and angered many. For example, by spring 1957 Ontario was the only province west of the Maritimes to require a liquor permit of any kind. British Columbia\textsuperscript{127} and Alberta\textsuperscript{128} abolished their permit systems completely in April 1957, Saskatchewan required no permits since at least 1955,\textsuperscript{129} and Manitoba, the impetus for Ontario to consider the issue at all in 1955, ended its permit requirement that year. For many Ontarians, this was shocking to realise in the province that had been an innovator in liquor policy with the opening of cocktail lounges in 1947. Globe and Mail columnist Scott Young acerbically pointed this out after the amendment’s first reading.

It is quite a blow to have to admit that anything in Manitoba is better than the equivalent in Ontario...The hundreds of thousands of Ontario residents who will be standing in line in our liquor stores in the next few weeks to get their new permits will find small comfort. I am sure, in the knowledge that those weed-benders in the west have discarded this barbaric tribal custom.\textsuperscript{130}

Critics of Ontario’s liquor laws now looked enviously not only at Europe and many American states but at their own Canadian neighbours as well.
Once the end of the year approached, signalling the beginning of the new ID-type permit in early 1958, critics of the change expressed their grievances. *The Toronto Star*, revealing its prohibitionist past, criticised the replacement of the permit book, arguing it eliminated the original goal of government control: to limit purchasers to a “reasonable amount.”

Echoing the protests that Collings predicted to Dunbar two years before, *The Cornwall Standard-Freeholder* editorialised that the end of the permit book meant increased bootlegging and liquor abuse. Despite the critics on either side, the amendment meant little to most Ontarians as they still had to produce permits and fill out liquor forms when purchasing spirits. Robertson Davies emphasised this situation in his role as editor of *The Peterborough Examiner*, before going on to become a renowned Canadian novelist and playwright:

> Ontario has what must be the most perfect monopoly ever known to history: it sells a popular product at wildly inflated prices. It pretends to a highly moral reluctance to do so, and it manages to induce a mild sense of guilt in the purchaser by involving him in red tape as he spends his money. What could be sweeter?

In this editorial and others he wrote over his long career with *The Examiner* from 1942-1963, Davies expressed a penetrating analysis of the government’s approach to liquor control. In doing so he influenced public opinion by challenging his readers to scrutinise their liquor laws in the same way.

The struggle to make sense of the government control requirement of ‘licensing’ purchasers with a permit in the context of the post-war years was representative of Frost’s entire approach to liquor policy change. Caution, delay and half-hearted change were the watchwords of the era. This approach did not rationalise the Prohibition, Depression and war-inspired policies that still endured in a very different province nor did it meet the increasing demands of Ontario drinkers. While Frost attempted to provide the minimum change required to keep the majority of Ontarians placated, if not satisfied, it became more apparent that this was not enough as the public increasingly questioned the moral rationales behind so many of the liquor laws.

The Liberals offered little in the way of an alternative vision. While Liberal Leader John Wintemeyer attempted on several occasions to attack the Premier’s lack of action in responding to the public’s demands for more liberalised liquor laws, he discovered that his party’s dry legacy was not easy
to dodge. Every time he attempted to clarify his stand on liquor policies, he received a deluge of mail from the party's dry voters. A change indicated itself when the province's Young Liberals came forward boldly in September 1958 in favour of complete abolition of the liquor permit. Nevertheless, a complete transformation of the party would be slow in happening.

While the Board did not issue the new permit cards until March 1958, the amendment declared that purchasers would no longer need to have their permit books endorsed beginning in November 1957. Regardless, the Board stressed the continued importance "of permits being shown at each purchase." Spragge himself reminded store employees that despite this change, "permits are still a necessity" and "should be carried at all times." Despite these instructions, problems continued at the store level with employees undertaking their permit-inspection duties in a "perfunctory manner," resulting in reprimands and reminders similar to the ones issued from the Board in the early 1950s. By the end of the decade, matters had deteriorated so much that the Board issued the following alert after the usual reprimand regarding employees failing to properly check permits: "THIS IS THE FINAL WARNING CONCERNING THIS MATTER." Clearly the new ID card did little to dispel the reproach permits inspired in both customers and employees. One Collingwood customer expressed his view of the permit to Chief Commissioner Collings in September 1959. "Plainly these permits are a joke, a nuisance and a waste of time." Certainly the government gained a profit from them, he argued, but the Board's "annual profit and loss statement shows you could well forgo this stupid nuisance. Your whole liquor laws are far enough behind neighbouring provinces and states without the thorn of the permit jabbing every customer." By the end of the decade, the liquor permit remained a major issue for an increasing number of Ontarians and the compromise the government felt it had struck between control and revenue proved unsatisfactory.

**Local Option in a Post-war Context:** In the post-war years Ontarians also began to attack the third fundamental of government control: local option. Ferguson did not create local option for his government control system, rather he extended the existing institution, created in the first decade of the century, into the post-Prohibition era. The 1927 LCA preserved all local option areas pre-dating
Prohibition so that dry municipalities desiring a government liquor store or a brewery warehouse were required to hold a local option vote first. When Hepburn reintroduced public drinking in 1934, local option was extended to cover the new beer and wine outlets. Because liquor and beer stores had established themselves across the province and because public drinking outlets tended to attract the most criticism, from this point on local option activity focused predominantly on Ontario's licenced premises. Each new addition to the government control system attracted most of the local option agitation and in the 1950s, the cocktail lounge represented the novelty in government control.

For many Ontarians, this undemocratic relic of turn-of-the-century prohibition fervour was out of place in a post-war society dedicated to individual freedom of action. For the small 'dry core' of prohibitionists in the province, though, it represented their only tool to limit access to alcohol. Consequently, dedicated members of the United Church tended to spearhead local option votes opposing new outlets, especially lounge licences and dining lounge licences across the province. Unlike all other types of outlets, those selling spirits by the glass required a local option vote before they could be opened, regardless of the wet or dry status of the community in question. The only exceptions were the five largest cities in the province, where lounge and dining lounge licences could be granted at will by the Liquor Licence Board. Not only did Drew extend a pre-Prohibition system to cover a new post-war outlet, but he confounded the situation further by setting certain areas of the province apart, a consequence of the fears surrounding the return of spirits by the glass. This anomaly became the focus of much criticism and consternation during the 1950s.

As with so many other contentious liquor policies of the era, the issue of local option, especially in relation to cocktail lounges, appeared particularly problematic to Ontarians after visiting other areas. After experiencing the Quebec drinking scene, a man questioned why cocktail bars only existed in Ontario cities with more than 50,000 people in a letter to the editor in the fall of 1950. He pointed out that American visitors wondered this too.142

A reading of the press of the early 1950s reveals two predominant themes: first, the mounting criticism, especially in editorials, of what were described as antiquated and irritating liquor policies: and
second, the concern over a perceived increase in consumption linked with cocktail lounges, especially in Toronto. These leave one with the impression that the province was “overwhelmingly alcoholic,” as one editorial put it, with strong forces working for radical and immediate liberalisation of the liquor laws. As the same editorial pointed out, a significant dry sentiment endured in the province, as evidenced by two noteworthy dry votes in late 1953, one in the Sudbury area and the other in the Brantford region.\textsuperscript{143} The reality was that the province remained rather ‘dry’ since cocktails by the glass were available only in the five largest cities and as of mid-1950 500 municipalities were officially dry, including every municipality in Huron and Perth Counties, the traditional southwestern Ontario area of temperance support.\textsuperscript{144}

While the editors and disgruntled customers who vented their disapproval of the government control system in the province’s newspapers in the early years of the decade certainly represented a certain vocal segment of the population. Frost’s overwhelming election victories in 1951 and 1955 justified his belief that his liquor policies pleased the majority of Ontarians. The very nature of the local option system made change slow in coming. Opponents of liquor outlets needed to register only 41\% of the vote to block a prospective store or licenced premises. For example, between 1945 and 1953 Ontarians in various municipalities voted on 374 local option questions (ie. one local option ballot might ask several questions regarding different types of outlets). The result was a net ‘wet’ gain of 83 outlets. If a straight majority were required instead of a three-fifths majority, a further 88 contests would have been decided in favour of the wet option.\textsuperscript{145}

Frost sought not only to preserve this system but to extend it as well. For him, the local option system represented many things. It was the legacy of his predecessor Whitney, after whom Frost endeavoured to model his liquor policies.\textsuperscript{146} Failure to respect the tradition of local option proved the downfall of Drew, in Frost’s opinion. He vowed early in his premiership “to listen to the large and important section of the population” who felt there were too many outlets.\textsuperscript{147} The preservation of local option went a long way in ensuring this. Increasingly, though, criticisms began to mount, questioning how ‘large’ this portion of the population actually was and attacking the undemocratic nature of local option. The first test of the local option system to determine if a cocktail lounge could be opened outside of the
five largest cities occurred in May 1954 in Niagara Falls and observers regarded it as a barometer for other smaller centres.\textsuperscript{148} While supporters of the new outlet registered a slim majority vote, they did not produce the 61\% required under local option.\textsuperscript{149} Even though every local option contest for nearly 50 years had been waged according to these rules. the undemocratic and one-sided nature of it all appeared increasingly obvious to many.

Columnist Frank Tumpane complained in September 1954 that “the principal reason liquor laws are absurd in many respects is because the drys are better organised, better led and more vociferous than the drinkers...who form the majority of the adult population.”\textsuperscript{150} Later that fall he charged that “the laws of this province regarding drinking will be framed—in large measure—to meet the demands of people who never take a drink because they believe it’s wrong for anybody to take a drink.”\textsuperscript{151} Drinkers did constitute the statistical majority of Ontarians with 70\% of those questioned by Gallup in 1954 responding that they used alcoholic beverages,\textsuperscript{152} the same proportion a government commissioned study revealed in 1948.\textsuperscript{153} Yet an increasing number of disgruntled drinkers criticised laws, such as local option, as fashioned to please or favour a minority dry element in the province.

Instead of responding to these concerns and re-evaluating the role of local option in the context of the middle decade of the century, Frost actually extended the system further. In March 1956 the government passed an amendment to the LLA stipulating that even when municipalities reached the 50,000 mark they would still be required to hold a local option vote before a cocktail lounge licence could be issued. Provincial Secretary Dunbar explained that the government made the change to deal with the growing areas not anticipated in the original legislation.\textsuperscript{154} Certainly the urban make-up of the province had changed dramatically since Drew originally exempted the five largest cities. By this mid-point of the decade five Toronto suburbs as well as Sudbury, Kitchener, Sarnia, Oshawa and Peterborough had more than 50,000 residents or were nearing that mark.\textsuperscript{155} While The Toronto Star charged that the original law “foist[ed] cocktail bars and taverns on five Ontario cities [and] was an undemocratic infringement on the rights of the people of the five cities concerned.”\textsuperscript{156} Critics of Frost’s amendment pointed out the undemocratic aspect of local option itself. A Kitchener hotel proprietor complained to Dunbar that “the
whole Act is undemocratic.” He questioned why five cities had “extra rights” and why 61% was required in a local option vote when 51% was enough for a regular election. The result, he explained, was that local entertainment dollars gravitated towards Toronto and Hamilton and American tourists, accustomed to a drink with their meals, avoided his community.\footnote{157} Reflecting on the liberalisations made in the western provinces, many of which improved upon the Ontario system they imitated, a July 1956, \textit{Globe and Mail} editorial bemoaned the continued existence of “local option...paramount among the anachronistic features of drinking in Ontario.” Citing several recent wet victories in long-dry municipalities, the editorial argued that “a change in sentiment regarding local option is evident.” Therefore, the editorial proposed, local option should be reviewed and discarded as a policy since it caused “subterfuge” in the officially dry areas and since many of these areas “have changed markedly in character” since they originally voted themselves dry.\footnote{158}

Other critics expanded on \textit{The Globe and Mail}’s argument regarding ‘subterfuge’ as a result of the local option system and its most recent expansion. In a late 1956 article, \textit{Liberty} informed its readers that “police are kept busy cracking down on illicit operators of ‘blind pigs’ and ‘bottle clubs’—especially in areas that prohibitionists have made allegedly ‘dry.’” The reason for these dry areas, the author explained, are “the prohibitionists [who] have built an inflated reputation for size and power on a narrow base.” He concluded with the argument:

\begin{quote}
Bootlegging in Canada has become widespread because of our outdated liquor laws. It has made criminals and abettors in a criminal act of many of our citizens...It is a social phenomenon that was spawned by prohibition, and remains a legacy of it, along with the restrictions still put upon our drinkers by the die-hard efforts of the prohibitionists.\footnote{159}
\end{quote}

Clearly Ontario drinkers, 70% of the population, resorted to bootleggers only when their demands for liquor outlets were not met in their local communities. When prohibitionist laws such as local option declared certain pockets of the province dry, Ontarians resorted to Prohibition-era behaviour, learned first hand by older drinkers or passed down as folktales to younger Ontarians. In late 1959, in the midst of a local option contest in Burlington, an Anglican minister blamed his counterparts, “the silly clergy” for playing into bootleggers’ hands by battling for dry communities.\footnote{160} While circumstances such as higher
incomes, more leisure time, and cultural influences through immigration and travel promoted more liberal attitudes towards alcohol consumption and availability, the existence of a prohibitionist law like local option, created half a century earlier, made it difficult for local drinking services to match local demand.

The nature of the local option system favoured those desiring to block new types of liquor outlets, especially cocktail lounges which required votes all across the province, except in the five largest centres. Therefore, editorialised The Port Arthur Chronicle in August 1959, the pace of change was slow and “cautious.” with only 36 communities voting to accept cocktail lounges in the first ten years of legal spirits by the glass. In a significant display of changing attitudes towards consumption and liquor availability, the pace of change quickened with another 37 areas adding cocktail bars to their local drinking scene during the next two years.¹⁶¹

The government refused to loosen or eliminate local option in response to mounting criticism and instead enlarged the application of the law. Regardless, individuals opened more liquor outlets, in quantity and variety, across the province as Ontarians used their local votes to gain the services that they desired in their communities. This of course was the intention all along of the local option system. In creating the measure in the first place, Whitney hoped to deflect mounting prohibitionist pressure away from his government and towards the local arena.¹⁶² In Frost’s case, he vowed to respect the wishes of local communities, hoping to avoid Drew’s fate. Voters eventually received the types of drinking outlets that they demanded while the provincial government suffered few negative repercussions, except to bring the issue of local option to the forefront for critical analysis along with many other liquor laws increasingly identified as irritating and outdated. This approach responded to the characteristics of the province’s political culture that valued fair treatment for all in the context of stable and cautious change.

After the turmoil of the war rationing, the resultant excesses in drinking, and the controversy surrounding the reintroduction of spirits by the glass, Frost vowed to re-impose control over the system of liquor sale in the province. One unforeseen problem with this approach was that, by demanding the enforcement of the letter of the law, Frost inadvertently opened up for criticism all sorts of laws and policies, created in the aftermath of Prohibition, which when followed in the post-war era appeared out of
place and even absurd to many. Once peacetime and normaley established themselves in the province, for the first time since government control was established, Ontarians really took a long hard look at their liquor laws.

**Liquor as a Gift:** When the government originally created the LCA, it ensured that any attempts at bootlegging would be strictly and specifically outlawed. Therefore, the Act contained several clauses specifying who could possess liquor (the permit holder) and where it could lawfully be possessed and consumed (residence of the permit holder). This strict moral control over Ontarians’ buying and consumption behaviour revealed the anxiety lawmakers felt in 1927 with the return of legalised sale and their desire to keep it as free as possible from the bootlegging that had tainted Prohibition. These specific rules regarding the possession and consumption of liquor remained intact into Frost’s regime. As liquor consumption grew to hold a significant place in many temperate drinkers’ lives, especially on social occasions, correspondents began to request services of the Board that it was not accustomed to, and that, moreover, were illegal. For example, in February 1955 a Montreal man wrote to the LCBO requesting that a bottle of liquor be sent to his friend in Toronto. The head of the Board’s Stock Purchasing Department replied, it “is against the Board’s regulations to deliver liquor or wines as gifts.” He went on to explain that liquor could only be delivered if the person to receive the liquor ordered it. The Board further emphasised this ban on giving and receiving liquor as a gift just prior to the Christmas season in 1958, reflecting perhaps the increasing popularity of that type of gift giving. The Board issued a public warning against accepting a gift of liquor as the law placed the onus on the person with the liquor “to prove his claim and his right under this Act and the regulations to the possession of the liquor.” Four other provinces, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, PEI and Newfoundland also banned gifts of liquor.

This reminder sparked a pointed argument from **Ottawa Citizen** columnist Bob Blackburn against not only the particular law regarding gifts of liquor but the entire Liquor Control Act. “This horrendous piece of legislation,” he claimed, “is so fraught with dangers that a quick look through it is enough to make anyone with the slightest yellow streak rush out and sign the pledge!” In reading the Act to verify the Board’s contention regarding gifts of liquor, Blackburn discovered several other pitfalls for
drinkers. For example, if another person “happen[ed] to be in the house” when the gift of liquor was discovered, he or she would be “guilty too.” Here he referred to the province’s infamous ‘found-in’ law. another post-Prohibition attempt to anticipate any bootlegging. “Upon proof of the fact that an offence against this Act or the regulations has been committed...any person [who] remain[s] in or upon such...premises...shall prima facie be deemed to be a party to the offence.”¹⁶⁷ He also pointed out that Ontarians could not legally store part bottles of liquor. “No liquor shall be kept, or had by any person in Ontario unless the package...in which the liquor is contained is...sealed with the official seal prescribed by this Act.”¹⁶⁸ Ferguson intended this law to facilitate the differentiation between illegal bootleg alcohol and the new government control bottles. But by framing the laws to avoid infractions of the spirit of the laws in the immediate aftermath of Prohibition, he made temperate drinkers, who consumed only small quantities at a time, offenders against the letter of the law. Finally, Blackburn alerted readers that they were required to have “baggage and personal effects”¹⁶⁹ in order to legally possess liquor in a hotel room. This requirement represented Ferguson’s attempt to establish that a hotel room was a bona fide temporary residence, and therefore a legal place to possess liquor and not merely a place to drink. In the 1950s, with the growing popularity of business meetings and conventions in hotels and the increased association of social drinking with business dealings, the luggage requirement appeared out of date. Blackburn concluded that “a law that is broken everyday, usually in ignorance needs to be looked into.”¹⁷⁰ He echoed the many calls for a liquor law review in response to the growing realisation of the continued existence of outdated laws, regulations and policies such as the ones outlined above.

FROST ROLLS BACK SERVICES

Shorter Store Hours: In an effort to promote ‘human betterment’ by limiting access to alcohol, the Frost government rolled back services enjoyed in previous times in addition to resisting liberalisation of the existing laws. Because liquor stores opened on Saturdays, since the beginning of its operation the Board closed stores a full or half day during the week, except during the holiday season. to ensure sufficient time off for employees. With his concern for service and especially tourism, Chief Commissioner Welsh announced in spring 1949 that stores would remain open six days a week. “as a
goodwill gesture” to the thousands of tourists who visited the province. He argued that their lack of familiarity with government store hours caused them “considerable inconvenience.”171 A little over a year later, Comptroller Spragge reversed this decision announcing that all stores would now close one full day per week due to staff shortages.172 Two months later, the Board relented somewhat and decreed that in communities with more than one liquor store, weekly closing days would be staggered to provide at least one open outlet every day.173 In communities with only one liquor store this policy inconvenienced customers and irritated tourists. For example, in early 1954 the Dryden Chamber of Commerce asked the Board to keep its local store open on its weekly closing day due to the many complaints from American tourists unable to buy supplies before leaving for wilderness camps.174 In communities with more than one store, the policy caused long lines and tremendous traffic congestion at the only open outlet. In September of that year, future Premier John Robarts complained of this situation in his London constituency.175 It took the Board four years to respond to Robarts’ concern, allowing all London’s liquor stores to open 6 days per week in November 1958.176 Furthermore, customers in other parts of the province continued to be bothered by this continued lack of consistent service. For instance, a Toronto dentist complained to the Board’s Supervisor of Stores in December 1959 that the system of closing each store one day per week “is a great and annoying inconvenience” to thousands who patronised liquor stores. His local store held its mid-week closing time during his office’s half-day holiday. Therefore, he “wasted valuable time in heavy city traffic” to visit another store. He instructed the Supervisor of Stores to demonstrate his undoubted “desire to provide maximum convenience to customers”177 by rotating staff to enable all stores to open all week. While Supervisor McIntyre replied with a perfunctory note that he would pass the concerns onto the Board, store customers would continue to experience inconvenient hours for several years to come.

**Banquet Permits Limited:** Ontarians also suffered reduced options and services when it came to banquet permits. The original 1946 regulations allowing banquet permits outlined the general conditions under which such permits could be issued. The provisions were rather vague, only stipulating that the banquet could not be conducted for the sole purpose of gain or profit.178 As Ontarians increasingly
included the consumption of alcohol in their social occasions and as the licenced premises in the province could not always meet the demands of social events, banquet permits became extremely popular. Acting on its impulse to be a moral guardian to the population and to placate the dry concerns regarding the proliferation of banquets, the Board further restricted the conditions under which a banquet permit could be issued. In February 1951 Spragge announced that, as of the beginning of April, licenced banquet permits could only be granted “where a regular meal is served...at tables where an adequate supply of flatware, china and other table service is available and used.”

He justified the move as a way to eliminate banquets given just to make money. These restrictions recalled the Board’s earliest attempts to regulate all aspects of liquor consumption, right down to the utensils used to eat the accompanying meals.

A further restriction in banquet permits came the following year when the Board declared that it would issue banquet permits in dry areas only for wedding receptions. Previous to this, Ontarians living in dry municipalities could obtain banquet permits for all sorts of events. The only stipulation was that “liquor under this permit...shall NOT [sic] be sold directly or indirectly.” When the Board restricted such permits to weddings only, it explained that these permits represented a form of “home entertainment” for events that were too large to be held in one’s own residence, the only legal place to consume alcohol in a dry district. The Board also admitted that it sought to reduce the number of permits issued in dry areas, undoubtedly a reaction to the realisation that many such dry areas were so in name only. This explanation failed to justify why Ontarians living in dry areas lost rights that they earlier enjoyed. As social habits changed and widened with new experiences, those living in dry areas relied on banquet permits to entertain and celebrate with alcoholic beverages. After the Board restricted these permits to weddings only, many resorted to subterfuge and bootlegging to satisfy their desires to consume alcohol at social events. This undoubtedly was not the result that the government sought when it instituted the restrictions.

As tourism became more popular in Ontario and as the province’s dry areas grew and developed from the small communities that first rendered them so, many people began to question the limitation of
banquet permits to weddings in dry areas. Liberal MPP and liquor policy critic Arthur Reaume cited this restriction in support of his argument that the government sought to please both wets and drys to the detriment of the majority. Before the Legislature’s Committee on Travel and Publicity in March 1957, he urged the government to licence tourist resorts across the province and to allow banquet permits for events other than wedding receptions in dry areas.\textsuperscript{183} Appearing before the same Committee, Lawson Markle of the Association of Tourist Resorts of Ontario commented that in view of the government’s restrictive policies, “some of our members are liable to procure themselves a fake bride and groom.”\textsuperscript{184} Appearing the following year before the Gordon Commission investigating the organisation of government. Liquor Licence Chairman Judge Robb also faced questions regarding the Board’s policy of issuing banquet permits in dry areas only to weddings. One of the commissioners asked him why the Board showed “discrimination” in this manner. Instead of offering a defence of local option or a justification for this combination of service and prohibition, Robb replied only that it was one of the “peculiar ideas” that the Board harboured. With 50,000 banquet permits issued in 1957/58, their popularity across the province was obvious.\textsuperscript{185} By the next year critics, pointed out another type of discrimination that the Board practised in issuing banquet permits.

With the support of the two opposition parties, Toronto area Conservative MPP and future Chief Commissioner of the LCBO, Allan Grossman appeared before the Legislature’s Committee on Commissions to ask Judge Robb to widen the scope for the issuance of banquet permits. Grossman appealed to Robb to consider issuing banquet permits on Sundays for those Ontarians, like himself, who did not celebrate Sunday as the Sabbath. He cited the case of Jewish couples, wedded by custom on Sundays, being unable to serve their guests alcohol under Ontario’s liquor laws.\textsuperscript{186} Grossman went on to say that such laws only encouraged “subterfuge”\textsuperscript{187} when they prevented people from celebrating according to their customs and habits. CCF leader Donald MacDonald agreed, noting that Ontario had become more “cosmopolitan” and the laws should not “discriminate against those living in accordance with their own beliefs.”\textsuperscript{188} The lone dissenting voice came from Conservative High Park MPP Alfred Cowling, who supported his adamant refusal to consider the idea with the claim that it “has always been
the law.” While this statement echoed years of Conservative resistance to liquor law change, fellow Tory and chairman of the Committee, York Centre MPP Thomas Graham reminded Cowling that “times do change.”

Times certainly had changed, with MPPs questioning two of the cornerstones of government control: service on Sundays and in local option areas. The key, of course, lay in a complete review of the laws to determine if statutes drawn up decades ago were still applicable in the Ontario of the late 1950s. On the same day that Grossman appealed to Robb for Sunday banquet permits, the OHA presented a brief to the Gordon Commission calling for this type of review. The Association argued “the spirit of the legislation under which the sale of wine, beer and spirits is permitted still reflects the imprint of the days when all dealings with such beverages were illegal.”

Supported by the bureaucrats and Cabinet ministers that he surrounded himself with, Frost resisted such a review, adhering to the incremental model, which valued consensus over a study of fundamental policy goals, since that might produce unnecessary political conflict.

**Drinking Hours Reduced:** A third area where Ontarians suffered a decline in service in this era concerned the hours of sale in dining lounges. When Drew first introduced these outlets for the service of spirits as well as the usual wine and beer with meals in 1947, he instituted a somewhat surprising closing hour of 2 am. He explained to his critics that this late hour would ensure a decline in bootlegging and wean drinkers away from their earlier reliance on blind pigs for the sale of spirits by the glass during the days when such sale was illegal in Ontario. This late closing hour aroused concern among many critics of the new dining lounges, prompting Frost to place his own stamp on this aspect of liquor policy.

Beginning in July 1950, all new dining lounge licences came with a midnight closing clause. Rumours quickly spread that this signalled the government’s intention to institute earlier closing times for all licenced outlets. According to *The Guelph Mercury*, the move caught many government members off guard. Nevertheless, the reporter noted, it should not be a surprise “given Frost’s well known attitude” toward the “liquor problem.”

This policy resulted in some dining lounges closing at midnight while the older ones remained open for another two hours. While this appeared unfair to many, Licence Board Chairman Robb explained at a 1954 meeting of the Committee on Commissions: “Well, we had to hold
the line somewhere.” Committee members debated the usefulness of such a ruling since in practice drinkers often just moved from one licenced premises across the hall or across the street to one that stayed opened later. Committee member John Robarts suggested that a compromise closing hour for all outlets such as 1 am might be the answer. Robb replied: “I think that a midnight closing hour would be better all round.”

In response to this conclusion, columnist Frank Tumpane observed that “the theory that sobriety can be promoted by shortening the hours of sale of liquor has been dusted off and put on display again. this time by Judge W.T. Robb.” Tumpane reminded readers that during war rationing the government reduced drinking hours. The result “was more visible drunkenness during this period than before or since.” Therefore, Tumpane reasoned, if Robb desired this type of sobriety, why not close all outlets even earlier “or reach the pinnacle of altruism by opening only for one hour in the morning.” Of course, he explained, that scenario would result in increased bootlegging. Finally Tumpane concluded that.

this business of guiding the drinker by the hand and telling him a) he doesn’t know enough to go home; and b) he’s lucky to be allowed to drink anyway seems a silly way of dealing with people, all of whom are presumed to be free Canadian adults of 21 years and over!

In his sarcastic and inflammatory manner Tumpane identified the moral and paternalistic attitude guiding liquor policy decisions. Because Frost believed critics like Tumpane did not represent the majority of voters, he defended the status quo and even reduced access to alcohol further when he felt ‘human betterment’ required it.

By early 1957 the government sought to address the differentiation in closing hours between old and new dining lounge licences. As a result all dining lounges began to close at 1 am, one hour earlier for some and one hour later for others. Robb explained that the change would “bring about uniformity of hours of sale throughout the province.” While this brought uniformity in closing hours for dining lounges, it preserved the overall distinction between different types of licences since dining rooms (for the sale of wine and beer only with meals) closed at 10 pm and lounges and public houses closed at midnight. Musicians opposed the move as detrimental to their incomes as entertainers in dining lounges.
Typically, licence holders complained that the change would cost them customers and revenues. One proprietor, however, remarked with some insight that,

the province had unwittingly played into the hands of illegal operations: we're going back ten years to when only beer parlours operated, and they closed at midnight. After that hour, some customers went to bootleggers or had bootleg liquor delivered.198

Others had reminded the government years before of these lessons learned from bygone days. Regardless, it instituted this change, reducing service enjoyed by drinkers for the past decade. Pointing perhaps to Robarts' influence over liquor policy, his compromise of a 1 am closing hour was instituted rather than Robb's original preference for midnight.

Critics charged that the reduction in service hours for dining lounges resulted from "arbitrary actions" on the part of the Liquor Licence Board. This "whiskey whimsy," as a Globe and Mail editorial called it, guided policy changes and produced "anomalies...[that] bear scant relationship to a logical and enlightened policy." If the Board needed to "tidy up" its bookkeeping, the editorial wondered, why not adopt a uniform 2 am closing hour? The editorial went beyond the issue at hand to criticise many other examples of this 'whimsy' including the ban on liquor by room service and inconvenient hours at liquor stores with their hidden bottles, numerous queues and bureaucratic forms.199 As with so many other aspects of the liquor laws that sparked criticism from Ontarians, once the government reduced services, as in this case, or preserved policies clearly meant for an earlier era, the entire liquor system was laid bare for scrutiny, a scrutiny the policies could rarely pass.

**LIQUOR LAWS 'SO FraUGHT WITH DANGERS'

As many critics made very clear, the LCA was 'so fraught with dangers' that the only way to steer clear of any violation of the law was to drink your own bottle, purchased on your own permit, in your own residence. In the summer of 1956 three Cooksville men discovered that to deviate in any way from this practice was to invite trouble. In what would become a celebrated case, these men were fined for drinking together in the house of one of the three.200 The presiding judge cited those LCA clauses that clearly proved the illegality of their actions.201 The Board's own solicitor, C.E. Woodrow, disagreed with
the judge’s ruling. He argued that the men would only have been breaking the law if they were drinking their own liquor in someone else’s residence. Instead of clarifying the law for people, Woodrow’s explanation only made it clear that the law was not only vague and convoluted, but also ill suited to everyday practice. The case set off a new round of complaints about this particular law and the province’s liquor laws in general.

A *Kitchener-Waterloo Record* editorial observed that “serving alcoholic refreshments to friends who call at one’s home is common and any attempt to make it an offence would be asinine.” It went on to call for an amendment to make the law conform to “what is now a general social practice.” For *The Globe and Mail* editors, this incident revealed other dangers in the law. The editorial warned readers that no liquor could be legally kept unless the official seals were intact so “if the crock cannot be killed on the spot, heave it into the alley.” The editorial also exposed the fact that under the LCA, Ontarians’ homes could also be searched without a warrant. While the government originally devised this provision to deal quickly with bootleggers, the realisation that law enforcement officers could violate one of their most cherished rights must have shocked Ontarians in the 1950s. A *Belleville* editorial also criticised the law forbidding friends to drink together. “Any law which makes thousands of people lawbreakers but which can be broken with impunity by the vast majority is a bad law.” The editorial quoted a lawyer saying, “it is only the leniency of the authorities that allows drinking among friends.” As with every other complaint of a specific liquor law, the editor went on to criticise other aspects of the LCA. “It is almost certainly illegal to enjoy a drink in your own garden.” Little did this editor know that this issue would be the next major crisis surrounding Ontario’s drinking laws, a crisis that would go a long way in sparking action on the part of the provincial government.

The following summer a Waterloo man was convicted for drinking in his own backyard. The magistrate in the case reluctantly made the ruling since, although the man was clearly in violation of the law, the magistrate was certain that another 1,000 Kitchener-Waterloo residents were enjoying the same activity. The LCA defined a residence as “any building or part of a building or tent in which a person resides but does not include any part of a building that is not actually and exclusively used as a private
residence. While this definition suited the government’s intention to control and define the legal places of consumption as specifically as possible, as a delineated ‘space’ of regulation, it failed to reflect the practices of thousands of suburban Ontarians during the summer months. To satirise the situation even further, a Toronto editorial pointed out that if the man had been drinking in a tent, which was his residence, in his backyard, he would not have broken the law. The incident sparked an outcry similar to the one witnessed the previous summer over the issue of friends drinking together.

The convicted man’s own local newspaper argued that the case proved that Ontario’s liquor laws were still “unintelligent” and “unreasonable.” Globe and Mail columnist Maggie Grant took a more tongue-in-cheek approach. She offered her “condolences” to the man and “to my lucky star many thanks for allowing me to escape like prosecution all these years.” She admitted, “at my place, any summer sipping has always been done out-of-doors, because it seemed the logical site of operations.” And when she entertained guests in this manner, “they have sipped their drinks in these pastoral surroundings without the slightest evidence of guilty consciences.” For her future parties she vowed to respect the law by “rig[ging] up rope barricades and directional signs,” guiding guests as they made their way through the house, finishing their drinks before they reached the back lawn, only to be forced back around the front of the house to begin the process again. An Anglican minister also commented on the incident.

So, it is unlawful for a man and his wife to sit under a tree in his own backyard and have a glass of beer! The pity of it is that practically every paper in Canada has published the incident with Dickensian comment. ‘The law’s a ass.’ It is a pity because this sort of law leads to a broad contempt for all law.

In being confronted with this revelation, he criticised another aspect of Ontario’s drinking scene, the public house.

If I want a soft drink or ice cream soda, I have it in a bright cheerfully decorated place with clear glass windows open to the view of passersby. If I want beer, I go through swinging doors into a dark, dingy place, usually with opaque green windows so that nobody can see me at my nefarious pleasure! If it isn’t wrong to drink a glass of beer, why on earth make it appear so?

He concluded that Ontario’s laws needed revision to instil common sense and eliminate hypocrisy.
This is just what the government did the following year. It amended the LCA to address the two
current issues of the previous two years in one of the decade’s rare instances of direct action in response to
outcry for change. As of March 1958, an Ontarian could legally “be out on his verandah or out on his
lawn, and have a bottle of beer without breaking the law,” according to Provincial Secretary Dunbar. He
goes on to explain that presently, “if an hon. member came into my house and I were sociable enough to
offer a drink, and he accepted that, he could be prosecuted, but I could not. We are going to have it so that
a person accepting a drink at his host’s residence cannot be prosecuted.”213 In redefining the concept of
residence, one that had remained virtually unchanged since Ferguson’s day, the amendment also allowed
a householder or tenant, and his or her guests, to drink legally in a motel room, trailer, or boat.214 This
amendment not only responded to the celebrated court cases of the previous years but also to the
increased popularity of travelling and recreational activities such as camping and boating among
Ontarians.

The amendment received relatively little press attention. Certainly the uproar sparked by the
original prosecutions for drinking in one’s yard and in a friend’s house had died down. Regardless, the
amendment changed little in terms of actual practice besides reconciling the province’s laws with current
drinking customs. One of the few editorial reactions to the change was The Toronto Telegram’s
announcement to drinkers that “It’s Safe to Come Out Now.” The editorial went on to predict that in
response to the amendment, the province’s “vocal minority of drys will make a savage onslaught.”215
Significantly, little was heard from this quarter. In fact, a month later, the OFT, at its annual meeting,
emphasised that it was not prohibitionist. The members recognised that the people who drank alcohol
socially were not all bad and they acknowledged that people had a right to drink and that that right should
be respected.216 If the dry reaction proved to be so benign why then did Frost and his government delay
the resolution of these specific issues and completely ignore calls for change in many other areas such as
liquor order forms, gifts of liquor and room service? Perhaps, as many critics have argued, Frost’s fear of
the dry forces may have been ultimately unfounded but it was real enough to him. A Brockville
Recorder editorial argued, for example, “that the drys in the province receive consideration all out of
proportion of their real numbers and influence simply because they are well organised and to put it bluntly, loud of mouth. Dry protests confronted politicians in other provinces with very different outcomes. When the Bracken Commission toured Manitoba in 1956 investigating that province's liquor laws, delegations from the provincial WCTU monopolised the Commission at every stop with its protests against liberalisation. Finally, a Commissioner asked the WCTU how large a membership the organisation had to justify taking up such a large proportion of the Commission's time. While the Union spokeswoman assured the Commissioner that its work was supported by thousands of Manitobans, she finally admitted having an official membership of just over 200. "The truth was startling to everyone," the columnist reflecting on the incident later concluded, and "they weren't allowed before the Commission again." This number reflected the general decline in WCTU membership across the country as noted above. In the end, the Bracken Commission resulted in far-reaching changes to Manitoba's liquor laws, making them, according to many, more "tolerant" and "realistic" than Ontario's. Ontario, on the other hand, responded directly to calls for change only on these two issues during the decade of the 1950s. So, perhaps the question should not be 'why the delay?' but rather 'why now?'

Journalist Jonathan Manthorpe offered an explanation for the "cautious pace" of change evident in social policy during Frost's tenure in the areas of hospital insurance and discrimination in housing and employment, for example. "It was generally at the final hour, when the political penalty for inactivity outweighed the penalty for doing nothing, that such measures were taken." A similar argument can be made for Frost's attitude toward change in liquor policy. Frost firmly believed that to ensure the "health of the body politic," he could "not neglect [the state's] traditional preventative and punitive role against practices flouting generally shared standards of morality." His refusal to allow room service of alcohol to permit dining lounges to continue opening until 2 am, and to end the supper hour closure in public houses, for example, served this role in his mind. By relenting on the issues of friends drinking together, drinking in backyards and the ID permit card, Frost did not see himself contributing to immoral practices like excessive drinking. The first two policy changes merely reflected general consumption behaviour (as the Kitchener-Waterloo judge's comments about 1,000 other drinkers consuming in their backyards made
clear), and preserved the overall concept of 'residence' as a space of regulation. Similarly, the Board's repeated warnings to liquor store clerks regarding permit endorsement illustrated that these employees viewed the task as an irrelevant chore and not the surveillance mechanism that Ferguson originally intended. With his successful re-election a little over a year after these three liquor policy changes, Frost's caution and timing proved justified. As Manthorpe argued, Frost's caution in the social policy field differed dramatically from his efforts in the physical and economic development of the province.\textsuperscript{232} The business activities of the LCBO throughout this period reflected this and provide further insight into the timing and nature of Frost's limited liquor law liberalisations as chapter 5 will demonstrate.
Notes to Chapter 4

10. Graham, p. 120.
11. Graham, p. 35.
Notes to Chapter 4

40 McNenly, p. 50.
48 Garner. p. 17.
50 Schull. p. 342.
58 Schindeler. p. 237.
61 RG 8-5 Container 144. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. File “H. Glen Gordon Re. LCBO.” February 15. 1958 to Frost from Ontario Temperance Federation.
68 Carmichael. p. 4.
Notes to Chapter 4

87 See Bothwell. Drummond and English, pp. 169, 175.
101 Please see Appendix 1.
Notes to Chapter 4

115 Recommendations November 16. 1955 sent to Dunbar from Collings re. Individual liquor permit.
119 Schull. p. 375.
136 RG 41-1 Box 2. LCBO Central Registry Files Correspondence. File 17-C-1 "Permits. Banquets. Licence Holders." memo December 5. 1957 to all vendors from Beaton.
137 RG 41-1 Box 2. LCBO Central Registry Files Correspondence. File 17-C-1 "Permits. Banquets. Licence Holders." memo November 8. 1957 to all vendors from Comptroller Spragge.
138 RG 41-1 Box 2. LCBO Central Registry Files Correspondence. File 17-C-1 "Permits. Banquets. Licence Holders." memo February 17. 1958 to all vendors from Beaton.
Notes to Chapter 4

140 RG 41-1 Box 2. LCBO Central Registry Files Correspondence, File 17-C-1 "Permits. Banquets. Licence Holders." memo March 26, 1959 to all vendors from A.J. McIntyre, Supervisor of Stores.
141 RG 8-5 Container 153, Provincial Secretary Correspondence, File #28 "Liquor Control Board. W.H. Collings." (restricted) September 2, 1959 to Collings from J.H.M. Collingwood.
159 Garner. p. 17.
163 RG 41-1 Box 2. LCBO Central Registry Files. Correspondence 1954-55. File 7-L-1 "General." February 22, 1955 to Mr. Lieberman, Montreal from J.R. Hartley, Stock Purchasing Dept.
Notes to Chapter 4


179 The Ontario Gazette. vol. 84. February 8, 1951. Regulations under the Liquor Licence Act. O. Reg. 31/51.


184 “Ontario Caters to Wets. Drys. MPP Charges.”


201 Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1950 c. 210, s. 89 (2), 43 (1).


207 Revised Statutes of Ontario. 1950 c. 210, s. 1 (s).
Notes to Chapter 4

212 Swanson. p. 10.
219 Young. p. 29.
221 Graham. p. 252.
222 Manthorpe. p. 50.
“COURTESY AND SERVICE TO ALL CUSTOMERS”

The government spent most of the energies it dedicated to the liquor policy field during the 1950s in rolling back services for Ontario drinkers or holding the line on restrictions that had long since outlived their original purpose. Its commitment to moral control over the liquor trade determined these actions. While Frost could not countenance the perception of increased access to alcohol, particularly in the form of public drinking, the government’s commitment to good business practices and customer service in liquor retail meant that the LCBO placed increased emphasis on efficiency and innovative marketing during Frost’s premiership. This apparently contradictory approach to liquor policy reflected not only the opposing goals of government control but also Frost’s overall approach to governing. While he devoted tremendous attention to the physical development of the province in terms of schools and hospitals, for example, he remained extremely cautious in promoting qualitative changes in areas like the quality of education or hospital insurance. Similarly, under his leadership the physical expansion of the liquor retail system advanced at an unprecedented pace while the quality of the public drinking environment suffered from neglect and even decreased customer service. The province’s ‘progressive conservative’ political culture, “embedded deep in [Frost’s] bones,” favoured stability and the status quo peppered with cautious incremental reform. For Frost, the enhancement of the business enterprise aspect of government control and the strict moral regulation of consumption behaviour represented the best compromise.

The most obvious evidence of this increased emphasis on business practices emanated from Comptroller Spragge’s office. Spragge and his Assistant Comptroller, J.S. Abra, corresponded with various other provincial and state liquor boards comparing laws, policies, and practices and sharing information, research and experience. As a result of this type of communication, the Board compared its
own operations to those in other jurisdictions, often with unfavourable results. For example, Spragge acknowledged to the head of the Ohio Department of Liquor Control in the late summer of 1958, “a lot of our present system is habit and out-dated.” More significantly, the Comptroller’s office corresponded frequently with private enterprise with the Board gleaning information about human resources practices, up to date quality control procedures and merchandising strategies. For example, in the fall of 1957 the Board’s chief accountant thanked IGA food stores for showing him and his staff their new IBM installation and system of invoicing and shipping. In late 1959 Spragge thanked the Royal Bank for its newsletter and planned to circulate a bank booklet regarding the communication of ideas among his store supervisors. The Comptroller’s office also subscribed to various business, materials management, hospitality and liquor control related periodicals.

NEW LCBO WAREHOUSE AND HEADQUARTERS

The Board’s move in September 1954 into a brand new three-story warehouse on Fleet Street in Toronto represented one obvious expression of this increased emphasis on business practices and efficiency. Described by the Dominion Brewers’ Association, an industry lobby group, as a “mammoth distribution depot,” the seven million dollar ten-acre property housed the Board’s own bottling plant, warehouse, laboratories, headquarters and flagship liquor store. Designed to handle 2.3 million cases of liquor per year, the warehouse and accompanying complex promised huge financial savings for the Board due to economies of scale, reduced insurance rates and lower breakage costs. Believed to be the largest such complex in the world, the Board’s innovative and state of the art warehouse gained a great deal of attention from interested observers such as the American materials management journal Distribution Age. The new building resulted from a great deal of consultation and research including visits by Board staff to liquor board warehouses in Cincinnati and Seattle. Spragge himself even admitted with pride that the Board had “come a long way” with the new building. While the government was certainly not prepared to view or treat its liquor retail responsibilities as any other business, the Board, during this period, was clearly influenced by innovations and attitudes in the private retail sector.
This emphasis showed up most clearly for consumers in the province’s liquor stores. Even Chief Commissioner Welsh in 1951 had likened a liquor store to a private retailer. “Liquor stores do not cause trouble,” he replied to United Church opponents of a new store’s location. “They are no different than grocery stores.”14 Like any other savvy business, The Globe and Mail reported in 1952, the LCBO “without fanfare…has been running a January White Sale” on slow moving brands of liquor. The Board reasoned with typical business sense, that it was cheaper to reduce the prices than ship the merchandise back to the Toronto warehouse.15 The Board continued its well-demonstrated emphasis on customer-related service at the store level. In January 1954 Spragge congratulated store vendors and employees for carrying out the main aims of the Board to the public: “courtesy and service to all customers.”16 Although the Board received many complaints regarding stores being closed during the week as we have seen, it endeavoured to reduce customer inconvenience in this matter to a minimum. Accordingly, the Board instructed vendors to clearly display signs in their windows outlining for customers closing times and the nearest alternate government outlet.17

The Board paid special attention to tourists and travellers as they made up an important component of the LCBO’s customers, a niche that could potentially be increased in an otherwise ‘captive’ customer base, at least for legal alcohol supplies. As Table 19 in chapter 4 illustrated, between 1950 and 1955 the number of temporary liquor permits sold to non-residents of Ontario increased from 95,590 to 110,987.18 In an effort to maintain this tourist traffic, and even increase it, in 1954 the liquor stores began to dispense road maps and tourist information about the province provided by the Department of Travel and Publicity “as an added gesture of good will to the travelling public.” The Board went so far as to instruct store employees to familiarise themselves with the literature so they could “converse…intelligently” with the customers.19 The Board paid close attention to this tourist traffic throughout the mid-1950s in a joint study with the Department of Travel and Publicity regarding the volume and value of tourist business in Ontario and their relationship to sales through government liquor stores.20 The development of Ontario’s highway network throughout the decade helped attract hundreds of thousands of tourists yearly.21 By 1957, the last year the Board sold special temporary permits for
tourists, these efforts were demonstrated through an increase of over 18,000 temporary permit sales in only two years.22

The physical aspect of liquor stores preoccupied the Board as it did in the past. The Board reminded store staff of the importance of the cleanliness of stores and products and the tidy appearance of employees themselves. The Board introduced an employee handbook in 1957, a clear sign that business practices permeated store operations at this time. Although it contained the same sorts of rules and policies that the Board had been enforcing since its earliest days, employees now had a formal “guide” outlining their duties.23 Finally, in March 1959 in explaining to the Legislature the Board’s new policy of owning liquor store properties rather than leasing them. Chief Commissioner Collings stressed the need for parking to provide for customer convenience. The Board arrived at this policy decision, he said, after consulting “one of the large chain organisations,” and reviewing their valuable research and experience.24

The Board also showed its commitment to customer service by lengthening the hours of liquor and wine stores. In the late fall of 1955 the Board experimented by allowing one retail store of each winery to remain open to 9 pm in communities having a designated shopping night. The experiment proved successful as the Winery Supervisor explained, the “public would be better served by extended hours.”25 The press interpreted this change as the Board’s move to “quietly make it easier” to buy wine, while the Board explained it was in response to “customer demands that evening shoppers should be able to obtain wine as easily as other merchandise.”26 What most people failed to realise was that the Board was merely reinstating the later retail hours that customers had enjoyed from the mid-1930s until war rationing forced shorter hours. For example, during the 1934 Christmas season, winery retail stores remained open until 10 pm and in 1935 they began closing at this hour every Saturday.27

The Board also experimented with later liquor store hours, allowing the store in one Toronto suburban shopping mall to remain open on Fridays to 9 pm beginning in 1957.28 This followed British Columbia’s lead in opening stores later and the Board’s desire to have closing hours for stores located in malls coincide with the malls’ hours.29 By 1959 all liquor stores located in Toronto malls closed at 9 pm on Thursday and Friday nights. Collings announced at this time that the Board was studying the
possibility of extending store hours in other large cities and even small communities according to local bylaws, though he quickly reassured the Legislature that “not all stores would have longer hours.” As in the case of extended wine store hours, the Board, unbeknownst to most Ontarians and perhaps even its own members, merely returned a service that customers enjoyed during the Depression. In 1930, while most stores operated from 10 am-6 pm, as they did in the 1950s, several outlets in Toronto served their customers until 8 or 10 pm. Despite all these customer service efforts, many of which amounted simply to a resumption of earlier services, the Board steered away from qualitative changes to the fundamentals of its liquor retail system. Therefore, complaints about forms, permits, hidden bottles, numerous queues and inconsistent hours only mounted as the decade wore on. Nevertheless, nothing prompted and enhanced the Board’s commitment to customer service more than a direct threat to its control over alcohol sales.

GROCERY BEER: A DIRECT THREAT TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Calls for greater access to liquor retail, especially for beer sales through private vendors, had been made with varied frequency and intensity since the beginning of government control. The period of Frost’s rule proved no exception. Opposition members, such as liquor policy critic Albert Wren, continued to promote grocery sale of beer. During the February 1954 Throne Speech debate, Wren argued that this type of availability would promote temperance. Later that spring, an organisation of Ontario retailers, the Retail Merchants Association, spearheaded a survey of 9,000 independent grocers on their opinions regarding the possibility of selling beer in their stores. The survey literature impressed upon the grocers that, regardless of their own personal views, a licence to sell beer would enhance the resale value of their properties. A separate poll conducted by The Toronto Star discovered a majority of grocers favoured the idea of selling beer. While the Retail Merchants Association survey eventually showed that grocers favoured the concept six to one, the Association ultimately dropped the issue due to a split in opinion at the executive level of the organisation. Still, the survey sparked an outburst of debate on the topic that endured for years and led a more determined organisation to take up the reins and lobby for widened access to retail beer in the near future.
Following the publicity surrounding the Retail Merchants Association survey, a government official assured an agitated group of United Church members gathered in Toronto for a conference that "there isn't the remotest chance" that beer or wine would be sold in Ontario grocery stores. In March of the following year, the Attorney General received a petition from the Canadian Branch of the Women's Society of World Service of the Evangelical United Brethren protesting the Merchants Association's efforts to promote the grocery sale of beer. Later that fall, Chief Commissioner Collings received a letter from F.G. Robertson, the parliamentary assistant to the federal Minister of Health and Welfare, expressing concern over the idea of beer in grocery stores and passing on protests that had been sent to him from the WCTU. Collings replied "let me assure you that the sale of beer in grocery stores has never been considered by the government and is not in line with government policy. We have no intention of broadening the sale in any way." Clearly the issue had touched a nerve with temperance groups and others concerned with any liberalisation of liquor availability. The government maintained its staunch opposition to the concept of grocery sale of beer. Nevertheless, this stance failed to stem the new forces promoting the idea.

In the spring of 1956 a new organisation took up the reins of the campaign for beer in grocery stores begun by the Retail Merchants Association in 1954. Retired businessman S.J. Daly established the Retail Grocers Association of Ontario, an organisation dedicated to rallying independent grocers in the face of severe competition from large chain stores. The organisation viewed the sale of beer through independent grocers as a way to curb the trend towards bankruptcy. Daly employed salesmen to tour the province signing grocers into the organisation for a $25 membership fee. In enticing grocers to join his organisation. Daly stressed that Quebec's 3,200 licenced independent grocers used the profits from their beer sales to meet fixed operating costs and this helped many stay in business. Besides the obvious financial bonus for the individual grocer, Daly emphasised the temperance benefits of this type of sale. He argued that it reduced consumption and encouraged drinking at home rather than in public houses since a drinker could buy a single bottle or two for home consumption. In March Daly predicted grocery beer within two years. citing surveys and the general popularity of the idea. He based this
prediction on the belief that the Ontario government "wants to get out from under it." While Daly's optimism and confidence served his strategic purposes, other sources also argued that the government was at least favourable to the concept.

In 1955, D.P. O'Hearn, a journalist specialising in Ontario politics began publishing "Ontario Newsletter," a "medium through which responsible leadership in the community could keep in contact with the provincial government which was expanding greatly not only in size but in control over day to day life." In the May 8, 1956 issue, he reported that a province-wide campaign for the sale of beer in grocery stores was underway and "the campaign shows signs of being determined and well organised." While he contended that "the government would not be adverse to instituting such sale," he went on to explain that it would first want a clear expression of public will before it made a move. "The most likely time to make it would be next winter," since it would still be far enough from an election to "take bold steps." Despite these strong statements affirming the government's support of the idea of grocery sale of beer, nothing could be further from the truth. Small, marginal policy adjustments rather than 'bold steps' characterised Frost's approach. His resolute stand against the very concept of grocery sale and the steps he would eventually take to curb even a hint of sale outside government stores would no doubt surprise O'Hearn.

While these assertions about the government's opinion of grocery sale did not alter Frost's position, they did set off a moral panic during the summer of 1956 among the province's temperance supporters. Although the government had received no formal applications from independent grocers or the Retail Grocers Association to sell beer, the Frost administration did receive many letters protesting the idea. One man wrote personally to Provincial Secretary Dunbar in June, one of the very few non-form letters the government received opposing the idea. He explained that he did not oppose beer as a beverage but believed it should only be available under certain conditions and in the "proper place." He did not want Ontario to become like the United States and believed grocery sale of beer would result in higher delinquency. Most of the protests, however, came under the guise of form letters or standardised petitions from WCTU locals and women's groups, which opposed the exposure of minors to beer at
neighbourhood grocery stores. Daly quickly reassured his supporters that, despite the reports of protests directed at the government, opposition to grocery sale centred on a “small group of prohibitionists in one church.” To emphasise his point and echoing the contention of other critics of the government’s liquor laws, he claimed “there are not enough of them to elect a dog catcher.”

The idea did prove popular in many circles in fact. A self-described “responsible voting citizen” from Whitby wrote to Dunbar in June “strongly” supporting the proposed sale of beer in grocery stores because of the shopping convenience. In a letter to the editors of The Globe and Mail, one woman said grocery beer could work out positively since proprietors of neighbourhood stores knew their customers, thereby preventing underage buying. The prospect of having beer retailed at corner grocers would certainly have been popular with some Ontarians given the close proximity of Quebec and New York state with their more liberal retail systems. The demands for improved liquor facilities clearly coincided with the general Canadian pursuit in this era for better cultural and social institutions, which compared poorly with their American counterparts. Regardless of these signs of public support, Frost made his government’s position clear near the end of July while the government was under attack over the convictions for drinking at a friend’s house. “I say quite emphatically that the sale of beer or liquors, or both in grocery stores has never been considered and is not in line with present government policy,” he declared. In one of the government’s rare outright defences of the concept of government control itself he further contended “if beer is sold under such conditions the whole theory of government control would go out the window.”

Responding to Frost’s strong words Daly maintained his resolve in gaining public support for the new type of sale by circulating a petition. He vowed to keep the issue constantly before the public and, in a vague reference to future activity, promised to “take action” as directed by consumer demand. In one of the only editorials in support of the idea, The Sault Daily Star argued that the public “alarm” over the proposal resulted from a misunderstanding. The editorial observed that many American states allowed the practice with no harm or misuse, and concluded that grocery sale of beer in Ontario would promote “saner and more moderate consumption.” By the early winter of 1956 the Great Retail Grocers Association, as
it was now called, represented 3,800\textsuperscript{32} independent grocers who amassed 100,000\textsuperscript{53} signatures from their customers. Although the organisation collected only a fraction of the 500,000 signatures Daly predicted in the fall,\textsuperscript{54} he continued to press his point with the government. In a letter to Dunbar in December, Daly quoted statistics arguing Quebec, with beer available in its neighbourhood grocery stores, had a rate of drunkenness below Ontario’s. In Ontario’s case, sale at neighbourhood food stores would take away the glamour of drinking and therefore decrease consumption.\textsuperscript{55}

Daly began the new year by presenting Frost with an official brief calling for the sale of beer in grocery stores and for a study of public opinion on the issue.\textsuperscript{56} Chief Commissioner Collings replied to the brief in great detail. He attacked Daly’s arguments that grocery sale would decrease consumption by turning them back around on the organisation itself. If this contention were true, Collings asked, then how could the sale of beer help struggling independent grocers? He assured Daly that the government adjusted its own system of sale throughout the history of liquor control to take into consideration the difficulties and complexities involved. Collings concluded, “the government has no intention of changing the present system” and dismissed the brief by asserting that from his own experience, he could say with assurance that the “proposal would be of no assistance.”\textsuperscript{57} Collings was clearly echoing the government’s official position on the issue. Dunbar repeated similar phrases to a concerned Ottawa realtor in January, assuring him that the government “has never considered the matter of beer in grocery stores in any way,” and he “would not want to be a member of a government that would pass such legislation.”\textsuperscript{58} Not surprisingly, the Dominion Brewers’ Association also opposed the proposal, citing to the Attorney General in early 1957 the results of its own survey. It reported that 92% of those asked rated Brewers’ Warehouse store operations as fairly satisfactory or very satisfactory.\textsuperscript{59} The arguments against grocery beer sale advanced by Collings and Dunbar illustrated the pervasive nature of the paternalistic beliefs among Frost’s members.

In early April Great Retail announced the sale of beer at independent grocers within a matter of weeks, despite the government’s ban on such sale. In making the announcement Daly hinted at a loophole in the Liquor Control Act allowing this to happen.\textsuperscript{60} He also hinted that while the product would
be called 'beer,' it might have a low alcoholic content. "Rest assured we will not be breaking any laws." he said. "We may test a few, but we won't break any." Daly's change in course resulted no doubt from the lack of decisive support by his organisation's members. They collected only one-fifth of the petition signatures originally predicted and a March Gallup poll revealed only 52% of Ontarians asked supported grocery sale of beer. While this represented a majority, it did not amount to the overwhelming support that this type of protest required for success. Having failed to secure legislation to allow his members to sell beer, he therefore set out to embarrass the government and test its reaction to the sale of 'near beer' in grocery stores. The government's extreme reaction represented the administration's attitude towards any perceived loosening of the liquor laws and more importantly, it revealed the lengths it would go to protect its system of government control.

**Near Beer**

Frost responded quickly, decisively and predictably to this perceived threat to the government's own domain. According to press reports, Frost told a close friend in a letter that beer would never be sold in grocery stores as long as he was Premier. Furthermore, he declared that he would hold a special session of the Legislature if necessary to plug any possible loopholes in the LCA. The loophole that Daly hinted at centred on the Act's definition of 'beer' as any beverage with an alcoholic content of more than 2.5% by volume. Therefore, in Daly's interpretation, the Board only wielded authority over this 'strong' beer. In May an Ottawa delicatessen began selling 'near' beer. While Great Retail denied any connection to the incident, in the midst of all the hype and anticipation, Provincial Secretary Dunbar quickly issued an official statement. This type of beverage required government control, he argued, to prevent children from bragging that they had tried it. Otherwise, he reasoned, "parents would certainly believe that we were remiss in our duty." This duty, part of the moral impulse behind government control, comprised protecting citizens, especially minors, from unregulated exposure to a dangerous product like beer, regardless of its alcoholic strength.

Despite Dunbar's strong words, Great Retail's experiment began in earnest. By June grocery stores in Toronto sold near beer along with their fruits and vegetables, often at a higher price than regular
beer from the beer store. The government vowed to analyse the alcoholic strength of the beverages to determine if they were intoxicating. While some samples contained only 0.5% alcohol, most of the near beer on sale in the province that summer was a 2.4% variety imported specially from a New Brunswick brewery. Because this strength put the beverage just below the percentage regulated and controlled exclusively by the Board, the government found itself in a difficult position. Therefore it appealed to the federal government to use its powers over inter-provincial trade to stop the importation from New Brunswick of the offending beverages. Another tactic was to prove that the beverage was intoxicating and therefore deserved to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. Interestingly, this proved to be the government's primary argument against Great Retail's experiment. Almost completely missing from the debate which inflamed the province that summer, at least from the government's perspective, was any discussion of government control itself and whether the local grocery stores had any legitimate claim on the retail job that the government currently bestowed exclusively on Brewers' Warehousing Company through the LCBO.

Once the Board satisfied itself that the near beer available in grocery stores was indeed intoxicating, Chief Commissioner Collings declared that he could not approve its "uncontrolled sale." He outlined several arguments supporting his decision to ban the sale of near beer in grocery stores: it was intoxicating, grocery sale provided no protection against sales to minors or on Sundays and its sale had also spread from grocery stores to cigar stores, delicatessens and butcher shops. Further, he informed the offending retailers that he was prepared to call on the government to outlaw the sale of those particular products. He hinted that the government might even go so far as to introduce new legislation "to make certain that situations such as the present one are not created in the future." The Board's tough response to the near beer crisis touched off a backlash.

While few editorials or individuals, save the outraged temperance forces, voiced an opinion on Great Retail's original crusade to put regular beer on grocery shelves, this new scenario, coupled with the Board's harsh reaction, touched a few nerves. A Hamilton Spectator editorial, for example, attacked Collings' arguments against the sale of near beer in grocery stores. The editorial doubted whether the
offending brew was actually intoxicating and contended that minors currently obtained regular beer with little trouble. It also wondered whether Ontarians really needed to be morally protected by the government from this type of sale and concluded that it was actually the government’s own revenues that were being guarded. The Sault Star took a different approach. Its editors argued that temperance societies should actually welcome the sale of beer with a lower alcohol content. The editorial reasoned that these societies should be perturbed at a government that decreed Ontarians could only legally purchase full strength beer. While most temperance groups continued their vigilant protests against any loosening of availability, a United Church minister from Cobalt supported the idea of beer in grocery stores as a more “convenient” and “friendly” way to retail brewed beverages. As far as the near beer controversy was concerned, he explained that his United Church conference was “more amused than shocked.” Given these remarks and the editorial criticisms, the actions and words of the government and Board began to appear increasingly defensive, excessive and even paranoid.

In response to the Board’s threat to change the law to prevent the sale of near beer, Daly unleashed a threat of his own. He bragged that since early July grocers sold 360,000 bottles of near beer in three districts of the province. He argued that the sale proved popular, induced no intoxication and went a long way toward reducing drunkenness and alcoholism since the public could now choose the new product and not the “overly strong brews to which heretofore they were restricted.” He claimed that the LCBO realised that the independent grocers worked within the law but the Board “is willing to violate the terms of its own Act, however to hamper the sale of light beer.” Finally Daly invited the Board to prosecute the grocers or let the matter drop as a perfectly legal enterprise. The Board’s legal counsel cautioned the Attorney General against prosecuting, arguing that Daly wanted to embarrass the government by having it take action against small Toronto storekeepers. Collings took this advice, publicly asserting that the Board refused to take up Great Retail’s challenge to prosecute grocers and only sought to stop the flow of near beer from New Brunswick. Despite Collings’ denials, the press enflamed the controversy further by reporting that the Board threatened to prosecute grocers selling near beer in Toronto.
By curbing the deliveries of near beer from the east coast, the Board temporarily remedied the problem. Yet in September, new weaker brews began to appear on grocers' shelves. In response to this scenario and reflecting on the entire issue, the Deputy Attorney General advised Attorney General Kelso Roberts on a course of action. He recognised that Chief Commissioner Collings opposed recognising near beer in any form. He therefore proposed that the LCA be amended to define liquor and beer in such a manner as to prevent uncontrolled sale and "put the matter beyond question." In response to the new beverages tested at below 0.5% alcohol content, he pointed out, the Board's attitude was "if there is any content whatever...it is opposed to permitting the retail sale." "On this extremely low alcohol content," he cautioned, "the Board's position may not be sound." He concluded by saying:

I have been opposed to any prosecutions in regard of the sale of this near beer in view of the uncertainty as to the intoxicating qualities of it and I think it is advisable to deal with the matter from an administrative level rather than have the matter dealt with in the courts, until such time as the legislation can be put beyond question."78

In the immediate aftermath of two highly publicised and embarrassing court cases regarding drinking at a friend's house and drinking in one's backyard, the Board sought to avoid the same scenario with the sale of near beer. Therefore at the next opportunity the government amended the Liquor Control Act to give the Board exclusive control over all beverages containing even trace amounts of alcohol. When introducing the amendment in March 1958 Provincial Secretary Dunbar explained the Board now had "control over all beverages containing alcohol, that are made from barley, malt or hops, in order that it will include all so-called beer. That would cover the subject of 'light' beer."79

What did Great Retail's experiment accomplish? It clearly did not gain grocers the right to sell beer. Failing this, the Association set out to force the government into either permitting the sale of near beer or prosecuting small shopkeepers. Faced with these options, the government chose neither. Instead it tightened its own laws to prevent the possibility of near beer ever being sold outside government control again. Why was the government able to relax its laws slightly to legalise the social practices of drinking with friends and in one's yard, yet it went so far as to take control of very low alcohol beverages so as to prevent their sale outside government stores? This grocery beer crisis represented the first genuine threat
to the government’s policy of government control. While the debates centred largely on the intoxicating features of the product and not on where it was being sold, the threat to the system of government control was unmistakable. The government’s reaction revealed that it identified the possibility of grocery sale of beer, strong or light, as the thin side of the wedge opening up government control. Unable or unwilling to articulate its desire to preserve government control, its actions indicated clearly that government control continued to represent both a moral barrier against unrestricted access to an intoxicating product and a consistently important revenue generator.

WINE DISPLAYS

Just months after the government asserted its control over the sale of all types of alcoholic beverages regardless of strength, the LCBO demonstrated an unmistakable commitment to customer service and won public accolades for its marketing innovation. This enhanced responsiveness to customer desires represented the government’s desire to safeguard its retail monopoly after the threats of grocery sale. This threat provided the impetus needed to direct the government toward the resolution of a policy issue that had been building since early in the decade. Post-war immigration, resulting in over 1 million Europeans in Ontario by 1961 out of a total population of 6.2 million, contributed to a greater diversity of tastes among Ontario drinkers, particularly regarding wine. As early as August 1951, a Saturday Night columnist bemoaned the fact that while British drinkers “put themselves under the guidance of the best [wine] merchant in the neighbourhood,” Ontario drinkers faced “a clerk who looks at wine as a commodity with a price and a list number.”^21 The author blamed Prohibition for the disappearance of the neighbourhood wine merchant who handled wine with care and sought to educate customers. Along similar lines, a November 1954 Peterborough Examiner editorial criticised the Board’s failure to provide the vintage date on the wine it sold. The editor complained of this “buying a pig-in-a-poke principle”^22 and denounced the Board’s poor storage and handling methods of such a delicate product. Enough people bought and enjoyed wine in Ontario, the editor argued, to warrant better treatment by the Board. A year later, when confronted with a similar complaint, the Board replied that Ontarians demonstrated little demand for vintage wines. Furthermore, the Board explained, it purchased wines
without vintage dates more cheaply from the wineries. While business practices dictated that the Board should do all it could to purchase merchandise at the cheapest price, the argument that there was no demand for vintage wines among Ontario drinkers was not entirely true. For example, in early 1955 the Board received a request for wines from the 1920s and 1930s. The Stock Department simply replied, "the LCBO does not carry vintage wines."  

Apart from lengthening wine store hours, the Board did not make it a priority to cater to the province's wine drinkers during the first half of the decade. Ontario wine sales decreased over that period. Between 1950 and 1954 the amount of domestic wine sold through Board liquor stores declined by 21% and through Ontario winery stores by 6.5%. The amount of imported wine sold, on the other hand, increased by 82%, along with alcohol generally, as Tables 20 and 21 show. The province's new European immigrants and other Ontarians showed a great deal of interest in the retailing of wine. While the Board previously received correspondence from people interested in setting up wineries or wine stores in the province, this interest escalated during the 1950s. For instance, in June 1954 Chief Commissioner Welsh received a request from an Ottawa man of Italian background for a licence to produce wine. Welsh replied that "since the inception of the Board in 1927 no new wine licences have been granted" and he did not see any indication that this would change in the future. Welsh further explained that the man's only recourse was to purchase one of the existing wineries. The Winery Supervisor replied in a similar manner a few months later when another man inquired about obtaining a wine licence. The following year, a lawyer representing two German Canadians approached Comptroller Spragge explaining that, because of complaints from fellow German Canadians about the poor quality and selection of wines in Ontario, the two men wanted a licence to import and sell German wine in the province. Spragge replied in the same way the other Board representatives did, adding that wine could be legally imported or sold only through the LCBO.
Table 20
Total Alcohol Sales in Ontario and LCBO Profits Paid to Provincial Treasurer 1949/50-1959/60

Table 21
Total Alcohol Gallonage Sold in Ontario 1949/50-1959/60

The standard response that no new winery licences had been issued since the Board's inception resulted, it will be recalled, from an early 1930s decision to reduce the number of small and inferior
quality wineries by capping the number of licences at 51, the original number in 1927. The Board also
allowed larger wineries to buy up smaller ones, thereby gaining their share of retail outlets, one per
licence. As a result, by 1957 only eleven wineries operated in the province.89 In reaction to declining
sales of domestic wines, Ontario wineries, led by the Ontario Grape Growers’ Marketing Board, began to
lobby the Board for a greater number of wine stores. In early 1957 Chief Commissioner Collings replied
by recommending to Provincial Secretary Dunbar that the Board lift the ceiling on the number of wine
stores, still frozen at 51 and slowly phase in more outlets allowing the small manufacturers to expand and
obtain new capital investment.90 Despite this argument, the government and the Board eventually rejected
this plan to “add...a store here and there.”91 Instead they ultimately favoured a more inventive idea to
courage the grape and wine industries in Ontario: wine displays in Ontario liquor stores.

The idea of displaying wine bottles and wine-related literature in government liquor stores
originated with Ontario’s Jordan Winery, when its vice president, Philip Torno suggested the concept to
Board Winery Supervisor L.K. Brown in July 1956. Torno was clearly interested in promoting sales of
his products, particularly given the high winery production costs relative to other alcohol producers, and
the generally poor image Canadian wines suffered during this period.92 He envisioned the displays as a
“means of providing wine purchasers with sufficient information to enable those unfamiliar with the
products to select wisely.” Echoing complaints from customers, he promoted the necessity of the displays
by citing liquor store employees’ lack of familiarity with wine, making it impossible for them to assist the
uninformed customer. Undoubtedly, his most pressing reason for wanting the displays was to promote the
sale of Ontario wines through government stores since they had fallen in recent years below the sales of
liquor and imported wine.93

Although Torno first suggested the concept of wine displays, the main driving force behind
promoting wine knowledge and encouraging the Board to be more actively involved in the marketing and
sales of wine was Winery Supervisor Brown himself. Involved with the province’s wine industry since
1930, Brown exuded his passion for wine as a special commodity in all his correspondence with
Comptroller Spragge. After returning from a tour of European wineries in 1955, which he called “a rare
privilege.”

he energetically promoted among Board employees, especially liquor store clerks, the knowledge and literature he acquired there. With wine sales through Ontario wine shops rebounding by mid-decade, the wineries’ calls for more stores no longer appeared convincing. At the same time, with Brown’s enthusiasm, Frost and Collings saw an opportunity to capitalise on the increased popularity of wine at the liquor store level. With government control threatened by grocery store beer, this innovation in wine marketing represented an attempt to reclaim authority not only over liquor sales but over new concepts in retailing as well.

In June 1958 the Board unveiled “an ultramodern ‘U.S.-style’ liquor outlet.” This “posh store—complete with self-opening doors, an all-glass, entirely draped front, terrazzo floors and Scandinavian-style furniture.” was located at the Board’s new headquarters. The store, “inundated with business since it opened.” featured a “wine salon,” making it the “first LCBO outlet to contain a wine display—or any display of any spirituous liquors.” Now, “instead of struggling with printed price lists, [a] customer can inspect first-hand, real honest-to-goodness bottles...[and] sit down in a plush chair at a mahogany reading table and read up on what he’s buying...[from] a fairly substantial reference library.” The display, featuring a majority of Ontario products, was staffed by two wine “advisors,” who, while forbidden to recommend any specific brand, answered questions regarding menus, cooking with wine, and the wine making process. The concept gained the attention not only of Torontonians but also of people across the province. A Kingston Whig-Standard editorial admitted previously criticising the “ignorance and indifference” with which liquor store employees handled wine. The opening of the new wine display at Board headquarters signalled “a step toward better living” the editorial acknowledged. By early the next year, the Board had ten such wine displays. A Kitchener liquor store vendor boasted that his new display had created a whole new class of consumers. “Women, who used to wait outside for their husbands, are now entering the store to study the display and the literature.”

In the first year the Board opened 13 wine displays with Brown crediting them for the increased wine sales. Philip Torno noted in late summer 1959 he was “encouraged” by the displays especially “now that Canadians are showing a much greater interest in wines.” Customers also voiced their
satisfaction with the new displays. A Toronto man, admittedly “no admirer of the manner in which liquor is distributed in Ontario,” deemed it a pleasure to find “merchandise attractively displayed,” in the new “wine salons.” With one merchandising initiative, the government took advantage of the increased popularity of wine, widened its customer base and solidified its control over liquor retail. Significant in and of itself, this innovation in wine marketing could not divert the public’s attention away from the many perceived defects and shortcomings in the government’s handling of liquor policy.

Opponents to government control itself, rather than critics of particular laws, were rare at this time. In one example, a Financial Post article in early 1958 advanced a strong argument against government control and may have helped solidify the government’s resolve against any perceived threat to its system. While the article happily noted the recent relaxation of the liquor laws in the western provinces, author J.B. McGeachy observed that that, despite these changes, all Canadian drinking laws tended to be formulated to please the prohibitionists. “To criticise prohibition at this late date may seem to be beating a very dead horse. Not so, I argue because our laws still show a hangover” from our Prohibition experience. To make drinking laws to appease the dry vote, he argued, “is rather like regulating the livestock industry to please the vegetarians.” He concluded, “the wine and spirit business is the last business a government should engage in.” These products should be sold from specialised boutiques by knowledgeable staff. He argued, not by “persons in a hurry who know one end of a bottle from another but accept no responsibility for the contents. Then there is the foolish business...[of] government liquor stores with their absurd closing hours, tedious forms, crowds, queues and inhumanity.” This article summed up many of the complaints surrounding government control that had been advanced throughout the 1950s. This direct attack on government control itself. only hinted at the level of criticism that would characterise the next decade.

The March 1958 amendments to permit drinking among friends and in backyards failed to quell the ever-louder calls for change. The new laws altered little in terms of drinking habits and committed temperance advocates continued to fight in local option contests and send petitions to the government opposing any perceived relaxation of the laws. In showing that it was capable of responding to these
particularly contentious issues, the government actually intensified critics’ desire for change and above all a complete review of the province’s liquor laws. Calls for a complete review of the Liquor Control Act and the Liquor Licence Act, as well as their regulations, were nothing new. In early 1953, after the release of British Columbia’s Stevens Report, the result of that province’s liquor study, many began to wonder if Ontario needed a similar inquiry. Columnist Don O’Hearn complained that Ontario’s laws lacked guiding principles like the ones infused into the legislation proposed for the Pacific province. Consequently, he argued, Ontario’s liquor policies tended to be haphazard.\textsuperscript{103} The following year, on the seventh anniversary of cocktail lounges, a \textit{Globe and Mail} editorial reflected on the outcome of Drew’s then-innovative legislation. The editorial concluded that the immediate post-war changes “did not clean up the beer-parlours” and did not promote moderation. Therefore, “after seven years Ontario would do well to take a new searching look at its drinking laws and habits.”\textsuperscript{104} Finally, in an even more direct attack on the province’s laws, a late 1957 \textit{Globe and Mail} editorial called the LCA, “vindictive and obsolete. It stays on the books, unreformed and sacrosanct.”\textsuperscript{105}

Frost’s commitment to the status quo in liquor policy resulted from his belief that the present laws enhanced the province’s moral fibre as well as from his fear of reforming the laws too radically and suffering Drew’s electoral fate. This, combined with directives from legal staff to avoid bringing amendments forth to prevent debate on the province’s liquor Acts, resulted in statutes originating in the post-Prohibition, Depression and Second World War eras continuing to direct and inform the drinking habits of Ontarians. The bureaucrats and government members involved in liquor policymaking and implementation largely shared and reinforced his views. Collings served in his post since 1955 while Robb and Spragge were appointed under Drew. This longevity and the resulting lack of “far reaching reforms” mirrored that in the bureaucracies of other provincial departments such as Welfare.\textsuperscript{106} To illustrate this, a news report noted just weeks after the government announced the March 1958 amendments. “Ontario’s liquor laws have been recently attacked in the Legislature as archaic and hypocritical. There has been no basic change in the laws since cocktail bars were introduced after World War Two.”\textsuperscript{107} This observation resulted from Frost’s admitted joke that John Bracken study Ontario’s
liquor laws in the same way he did Manitoba's. As the decade of the 1950s drew to a close on a province larger and more diversified than when these laws were conceived, calls for change echoed even more loudly than before. When a highly respected public figure openly questioned the province's liquor laws, the criticism of Frost's refusal to liberalise laws that had been building since early in the decade exploded.

ROYAL CRITICISM OF ONTARIO'S LIQUOR LAWS

During a trip to Canada with Queen Elizabeth in July 1959, Prince Philip bluntly asked London area Conservative MPP Harry Allen when the provincial government was "going to change these obsolete and old-fashioned liquor laws." Reporters speculated that the Prince's remark may have been prompted by an incident at the Stratford Festival when police ordered the bar closed at 11:30 pm, thereby shortening a reception following the royal couple's visit to the theatre. When asked about the Prince's remark, Chief Commissioner Collings pleaded ignorance. "That's quite a statement he made and I'm not sure I know what he means." Many others knew exactly to what the Prince referred. Judy LaMarsh, vice-president of the Ontario Liberal Association and future federal health minister, argued that our liquor laws are antiquated and silly...Most people from the old country—even princes—who come to Canada immediately notice the difference in public and official attitudes towards liquor. In England and most European countries liquor isn't treated as an evil. It's one of the amenities of life, to be used and enjoyed in a reasonable way. Here we have a terrible fear of it. It's probably the pioneer hangover.

Rev. Foote had provided Frost and his government with these sorts of impressions and conclusions ten years earlier. They elicited little public scrutiny at the time and even less action on the part of the government. After the turmoil of the continued criticism of the province's liquor laws and a public rebuke by a widely respected figure, Ontarians attacked the government's handling of liquor policy like never before and called for that ever elusive liquor inquiry.

But several groups reacted angrily to the Prince's criticisms. The general secretary of the Canadian Temperance Foundation said that Philip should mind his own business and turn his concern to the plight of alcoholics in his own country. The head of the Canadian WCTU also denounced the Prince's comment, complaining that Ontario's liquor laws were "plenty liberal." Finally, echoing Frost's own
beliefs regarding ‘human betterment’ and the moral fibre needed to fight the Cold War, the acting secretary of the OTF argued that the recent relaxation in liquor laws did not encourage Ontarians to be self-disciplined and fit in the competitive modern world.\textsuperscript{111} Nevertheless, these negative reactions only solidified the resolve behind support for Philip's criticisms. A North Bay Nugget editorial argued that complaints about the province's liquor laws from a "reputable source," such as Prince Philip, proved "everyone who advocates change in the liquor laws is not an inebriate as some extremists would have us believe."\textsuperscript{112} A Globe and Mail editorial similarly argued that when people displayed anger at the Prince's remarks it only revealed feelings of "guilt" surrounding the province's liquor laws. These laws, the editorial explained, "are based upon a public attitude toward liquor which may have existed once, but no longer exists today," since the province had "undergone a transformation almost without equal in the world" during the past 25 years.\textsuperscript{113} The Sarnia Observer continued the same argument, noting that the province's liquor laws were formulated at a time when all but the largest cities "were mere boom towns."\textsuperscript{114}

Ultimately, these reactions to the Prince's criticism underlined the need for a complete review and revision of the province's liquor laws similar to the ones conducted in the western provinces over the past few years. Prince Philip's vocal criticism justified and legitimised the arguments that editors, tourists, immigrants and Ontarians had been voicing for years in a way that any of these individual grievances could not. In spite of the pressure, Frost "stuck to his guns,"\textsuperscript{115} as his biographer described his general approach to liquor policy change, and declared that he "won't alter liquor laws."\textsuperscript{116} This declaration obviously revealed his consistent approach to the issue but his refusal to even study the laws pointed to an even more significant aspect of liquor policymaking. Overall, according to The Globe and Mail's Harold Greer, "the Government has never received any methodical analysis from the Liquor Control Board which would enable it to evaluate the effects of the policy." The reason for this, Greer concluded, was that "the crux of the matter appears to be that Ontario's liquor control legislation cannot be repaired, but only reconstructed. A little tinkering here and there, and the whole system is likely to disintegrate." We saw this in the government's reluctance to abolish the liquor permit since it appeared so many times
in the legislation. The result, as Greer argued and as we have seen with Frost, "has been a fascinating disinclination on the part of Ontario politicians to discuss liquor in realistic terms." With a few exceptions, the Liberals tended to say "as little as possible about liquor" and to let "sleeping dogs lie," and the "Government's attitude appears to be to leave the liquor control system alone."117 As Valverde observed generally for government control systems, because the government saw the issues as moral rather than statistical, it did not see any need for 'methodical analysis.'118

Unable or unwilling to advance a consistent defence of its government control monopoly during the grocery beer crisis, the government preferred to avoid the issue altogether. Instead it chose to placate the customers by incrementally meting out carefully measured 'services,' which in most cases amounted to the minimum that the government could politically afford and often constituted less service than drinkers enjoyed in earlier decades. As Frank Tumpane argued late in the decade, "in return for monopoly the government should be willing to provide a standard of service."119 In light of the Prince's words and the successive crises that unveiled anomalies and anachronisms in the law, this trade-off proved unfair to most, as many Ontarians began to question the moral and paternalistic justifications behind many government control regulations. The government's careful balancing act between monopolistic control and service that it had been practising since 1927 teetered increasingly in favour of control during this period as social habits and tastes changed more quickly than Frost was willing to meet.

While Frost, in keeping with his commitment 'to leave the liquor control system alone,' reasoned that it was not presently a "hot issue,"120 critics lambasted the system, emboldened by Prince Philip's audacity. For the Ontario Federation of Labour, lobbying for a study of the liquor laws, "it's a question of whether the Liquor Act is out of tune with the times or not."121 Noting that during the first week of November the Ontario Federation of Labour, Metro Toronto Chairman Frederick Gardiner and the Young Progressive Conservatives all criticised the liquor laws, Don O'Heam insisted that, "surely Frost will agree to review"122 them. Finally, with its characteristic bluntness, The Toronto Telegram unleashed a string of adjectives summing up a decade of grievances against the province's liquor laws. "The farce that
passes for liquor legislation...is stupid, hypocritical, obsolete, sanctimonious, uneconomic, juvenile, ludicrous [and] humiliating."^{123}

LIQUOR CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS

_Liquor as a Gift_: Before leaving office Frost made one last adjustment to the province’s liquor laws. In March 1960 the government amended the LCA to legalise the giving of a bottle of liquor as a gift. Kelso Roberts, the 61-year-old Attorney General ushered the amendment through the Legislature since he assumed responsibility for the Liquor Boards from George Dunbar in late 1958. The Toronto area MPP and Anglican Church member admitted during second reading, "everybody knows that from time to time—especially at Christmastime—a bottle of liquor may be given by one person to another. This in itself is not offensive, and is made legal, as is the consumption of this liquor in the recipient’s residence." The amendment also made clear "that there is nothing illegal" in two people sharing a drink in a residence. It also cleared up the "oddity" of having American tourists pass Canadian customs with a bottle of their own liquor only to have them "in technical breach of the Act for having brought a bottle that was not bought under a permit in the province of Ontario." Further, the amendment declared that "it will no longer be technically illegal to convey liquor lawfully purchased or obtained from one residence to another, even though there be a break in the transit." Attorney General Roberts also quite proudly proclaimed that his government intended to abolish "a throwback to the medieval period," namely the so-called 'squealing section' of the Act, taken directly from the Ontario Temperance Act. This provision required persons found intoxicated in public or in possession of liquor to "state the name of the person from whom, and the place in which, he obtained the liquor." Such "tyranny" had no place in Ontario in 1960, since, as Roberts declared, "we are living in another generation...Thank God, I think we are going to get rid of it in this Legislature today."^{124}

Few shared Roberts’ excitement over the amendments to the Liquor Control Act. In reaction to their initial introduction, columnist Bruce West sarcastically warned: "Get the women and the children off the streets! Protect the eyes of our youth! Get prepared for another ugly orgy of drinking and carousing and maybe even singing!" All of this West predicted in the face of the new provision to "permit us to
carry a jug to the office on our way home—provided we don’t open it.” “Can you imagine the liquor authorities of Ontario going hog-wild like that?” These changes, he concluded, represented “tinkering” as the government made it clear that “sweeping changes were not being proposed. Which is just about one of the finest understatements of the year.”125 The government had previously enforced the ban on transporting liquor except directly home from the store so strictly that the LCBO correspondence in the 1950s contained official forms from Comptroller Spragge permitting people to transport their home liquor supplies when they moved to a new house.126 This resulted since the ‘residence,’ as opposed to the car or the street, represented the only ‘space’ delineated for legal possession or consumption. Rather than engendering any positive feelings about the changes, this particular amendment served to remind Ontarians that such paternalistic control mechanisms had existed in their liquor laws.

West’s critical response to Frost’s last round of ‘tinkering’ with the liquor laws mirrored the general disappointment felt across the province. A London Free Press columnist interpreted the announcement regarding people drinking together in a residence to mean that a husband could now legally give his wife a drink in their own home, an activity that apparently had not been included in the March 1958 amendment.127 This interpretation followed the highly publicised criticism of this and other aspects of the province’s liquor laws at an early February meeting of the Canadian Bar Association.128 While most observers welcomed the changes as merely legalising common practices,129 Roberts’ proud boasting of bringing the laws more in line with the present ‘generation,’ served to point out that such ‘tyranny,’ to borrow his description, ever existed in the province.

In debating the amendments, Liberal Vernon Singer thanked Roberts “upon delivering a very fine Opposition-style speech in attacking sections in an Act that he has had the job of keeping there for a great number of years.”130 He went on further to question the government’s entire approach to liquor policy change:

I suggest that anyone who has considered the Liquor Control Act, and considered it as a whole—because it has to be considered as a whole—will recognise and understand that it is not just a series of sections added one to the other. It is a whole pattern of control procedures. It is just as though a house has been built, and you start from the bottom and you
build all the way up to the top...[T]hat by nibbling away at this, the government pretends the problem is going to go away.\textsuperscript{131}

What was needed, he concluded, was a complete review in the form of a Royal Commission, "which will bring these laws up to date as a whole group and as a whole package."\textsuperscript{132} Calls for such a study had been made since at least the late 1940s though Frost consistently denied the need for an independent review, in keeping with his refusal to debate the issue of government control and its goals and motivations at all. Nevertheless, this 'nibbling away' at the laws resulted in an increasing number of contradictions and hypocrisies. For example, in 1958 the government altered the LCA to permit friends to drink together in a residence. By early 1960 members of the Canadian Bar Association pointed out that this did not necessarily legalise drinking between spouses, hence the necessity of another amendment.

These amendments also highlighted those aspects of the laws that the government chose not to change, particularly the permit system. During what was described as a "turbulent,"\textsuperscript{133} and "no-holds-barred"\textsuperscript{134} debate on the government's refusal to further liberalise the laws, Frost reiterated the approach, which had guided him for the past decade. He explained that he was "concerned at the quantity of liquor consumed in the province."\textsuperscript{135} "I am loath to remove restraints," he said. "I have my own values and I hesitate to remove them."\textsuperscript{136} Frost had reason to be concerned. In 1950 Ontario's per capita consumption of absolute alcohol for those aged 15 and over was 7.3 litres. This was higher than British Columbia's per capita consumption for 1953 at 7.18 litres and significantly higher than Canada's at 6.5 litres for 1953. The 'gulping' behaviour noted early in the 1950s signalled the beginning of a steady increase in Ontario's consumption rate until the 1970s. For the post-war period generally Ontario and British Columbia had among the highest consumption rates in the country.\textsuperscript{137} Frost clearly demonstrated that his own beliefs surrounding the consumption of liquor prevented him from removing restraints like the ban on room service or the liquor permit, which he perceived as preventing or at least lessening excess and the possibility of moral corruption. For him, therefore, a Royal Commission was irrelevant. Interestingly, one of the first things his newly appointed Provincial Secretary and Toronto area MPP John Yaremko did when he assumed responsibility for the Liquor Boards from Kelso Roberts in late 1960, was suggest to
Chief Commissioner Collings that Ontario set up a Royal Commission “like Manitoba’s.” Collings dismissed the idea on the basis that the spring 1960 amendments removed “much criticism.” Yaremko believed differently, seeking to study the liquor laws in the same intense manner as in Manitoba with the intention of doing away with some of the most irritating moral restraints.

Along with 49-year-old Allan Grossman, the son of Polish Jews, appointed Minister without Portfolio later in 1960, Yaremko’s appointment represented a significant opening up of the Cabinet’s ethnic composition. According to his biographer, Frost expected Yaremko, a 41-year-old lawyer and son of Ukrainian immigrants “to advance the party’s interests...among the Ukrainians, and perhaps other ethnic groups, to help the party shed its image as the exclusive preserve of the old WASP society.” This image proved accurate as the 1960 Canadian Parliamentary Guide noted Yaremko and Grossman as the only Ontario Cabinet ministers, besides two Catholics, to indicate backgrounds that were not British and Protestant. In endeavouring to fashion a Cabinet that was more “representative of the province’s various regions and social groupings,” Frost chose as minister responsible for the Liquor Boards a member with a Eastern European background from a multi-ethnic urban constituency. Therefore, Yaremko’s appointment represented a significant step for Frost, an indication that change was necessary and that the province’s widening ethnic diversity would play an integral role.

In keeping with this attitude Frost established a Cabinet Committee on Liquor Matters in the early spring of 1961. During Frost’s premiership Cabinet committees “became an integral part of Cabinet organisation,” helping Cabinet function more efficiently and grapple with the details of policy issues. While Grossman originally suggested the committee to Frost, he did not initially take part in the group which was chaired by Yaremko and included both rural and urban Cabinet members as well as Comptroller Spragge and Chairman Robb. This form of study, unlike an independent public review of the liquor laws, fit in with Frost’s adherence to incrementalism as it promised to keep the debates private and free from the political repercussions that Frost feared from dry activists. This format also limited the potential options and allowed him the freedom to ignore any Committee recommendations with which he did not agree. Despite his efforts in appointing Yaremko and the Cabinet Committee, Frost remained
committed to the controls over consumption that he had inherited in 1949. Therefore, the Cabinet Committee struggled between past controls and future change in the same manner that Frost had for the previous decade. Although the first few meetings resulted in recommendations for banquet permits in dry areas for events other than weddings and the reinstatement of liquor by room service, for example, the Committee members spent most of their time contemplating the many interrelated problems that would result from any one change. Consequently, the result was much talk and little action. Moreover, as was becoming increasingly clear to the Opposition and to critics outside the Legislature, despite Frost’s best intentions, the ‘nibbling away’ at the Act resulted in lessened moral control over the purchase and consumption of liquor in the province. Without moral control the government lost its justification for its monopoly, leading to accusations that its policy “has been changed from government control of liquor to government sale.” With his commitment to business efficiency during the previous decade, Frost inadvertently helped advance this transition. Nothing illustrated this more than the steady increase in profits the LCBO paid to the treasury, depicted in Table 20.

Frost clearly influenced liquor control in this era by leaving it very much the way he inherited it from Drew. While his initial challenges resulted from the backlash against war rationing policies in a peacetime society, criticisms quickly turned to the very fundamentals of the system. The more Frost resisted change as he adhered to his own moral and paternalistic code, the louder the cries for review and liberalisation became. Since he faced little or no political opposition, unlike Henry for example, he could afford to ‘stick to his guns’ politically. The economic prosperity of the times also afforded him the luxury of foregoing ‘service’ initiatives like more varied outlets that earlier premiers such as Hepburn turned to out of economic necessity. With Ontario society, and its residents’ demands and desires changing more rapidly than ever before, Frost’s cautious approach appeared increasingly out of tune with popular opinion as the decade came to a close, particularly as the pendulum swung more in favour of a paternalistic liquor control system. Popularly regarded for his sensitivity to the province’s needs, by the end of his era observers began to question his sense of timing in failing to implement the progressive aspects of the political culture needed to balance the predominant conservatism. In no area was this
more evident than in liquor policy. The government’s traditional incremental approach to lawmaking limited his ability to respond to and anticipate changing social demands. Clearly his compromise in favour of strict moral controls at the expense of expanded customer service aroused tremendous criticism. Nevertheless, he put in place for the future the policymaking body and the personnel conducive to achieving change.
Notes to Chapter 5

1 RG 41-1 Box 2, LCBO Correspondence. File 17-C-1 “Staff.” memo January 11, 1954 to all vendors from Spragge.
3 Schull, p. 332.
4 See for example RG 41-1 Box 2, LCBO Correspondence 1954-55, File 1-0-1 “Ontario Liquor Control Board General File 1955,” January 5, 1956 to Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board from J.S. Abra Assistant Comptroller.
5 RG 41-1 Container 5, LCBO Correspondence 1957-58, File 7-0-1 “General,” August 8, 1957 to George Moon, Chief, Division of Store Management. Ohio Department of Liquor Control from Spragge.
7 RG 41-1 Container 8, LCBO Correspondence 1959-63, File 1-R-1 “Royal Bank of Canada.” November 3, 1959 to J.M. Bankes, Manager, Royal Bank, King and Yonge, Toronto, from Spragge.
8 See RG 41-1 Container 7, LCBO Correspondence 1959-1963, File 14-P-1 “Periodicals 1958.”
9 RG 41-1 Box 1, LCBO Correspondence 1954-55, File 7-D-3 “Dominion Brewers’ Association 1954.” Dominion Brewers’ Association Bulletin November 30, 1954.
11 Cole, p. 4.
12 RG 41-1 Box 2, LCBO Correspondence 1954-55, File 7-G-1 “General 1954.” September 30, 1954 to LCBO from correspondent of Distribution Age.
16 RG 41-1 Box 2, LCBO Correspondence. File 17-C-1 “Staff.” memo January 11, 1954 to all vendors from Spragge.
17 RG 41-1 Box 2, LCBO Correspondence. File 17-C-1 “Premises Equipment and Supplies.” memo March 11, 1954 to all vendors from A.J. McIntyre Assistant Supervisor of Stores.
19 RG 41-1 Box 2, LCBO Correspondence. File 17-C-1 “Instructions.” memo February 18, 1954 to all vendors from McIntyre.
20 RG 41-1 Box 3, LCBO Correspondence. File 12-P-1 “Provincial, Dominion Departments 1955.” May 10, 1955 to Mr. Crowe. DM of Department of Travel and Publicity from Spragge.
21 Schull, p. 342.
23 RG 41-1 Box 4, LCBO Correspondence. File 17-M-1 “Miscellaneous Circulars 1956.” memo February 12, 1957 to all vendors from R.S. Parrett. Personnel Department.
27 RG 41-3 Temp. Box 8 Acc. 24776, LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File “Circulars 1601-1700.”
Notes to Chapter 5

31 RG 41-3 Temp Box 8 Acc. 24776, LCBO Correspondence General Manager. File “Circulars 1101-1200.” circular no. 1110 October 8, 1930 to all vendors from Comptroller McGechie.
37 RG 4-2 Box 75.1. Attorney General Correspondence. File “1955 Liquor Control (Liquor Licence).” (restricted) petition March 27. 1955 to Attorney General Porter from Canadian Branch of Women’s Society of World Service of Evangelical United Brethren.
38 RG 4-2 Box 75.1. Attorney General Correspondence. File “1955 Liquor Control (Liquor Licence).” (restricted) October 3. 1955 to Collings from F.G. Robertson, parliamentary assistant to the Minister of Health and Welfare.
43 RG 8-5 Container 143. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. Dunbar 1956-59. File “Re. Sale of Beer in Grocery Stores—LCBO.” (restricted) June 21. 1956 to Provincial Secretary Dunbar from W.S.
44 See the many form letters and petitions directed at Dunbar especially in July 1956 in RG 8-5 Container 143. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. Dunbar 1956-59. File “Re. Sale of Beer in Grocery Stores—LCBO.” (restricted).
Notes to Chapter 5

64 Revised Statutes of Ontario, 1950, c. 210, s. 1 (a).
68 "Liquor Board Adamant Won’t Permit Near Beer." The Toronto Star, August 2, 1957, p. 3.
72 See RG 41-1 Container 5. LCBO Correspondence Files 1957-58, File 7-C-1 "General 1957." June 14, 1957 to LCBO from Bay of Quinte Conference, United Church of Canada; and File 7-D-1 "General 1957." September 6, 1957 September 6, 1957 to Frost from Recording Secretary Toronto District Union of WCTU.
74 RG 4-2 Box 102.1. Attorney General Correspondence. File "Liquor Control Board. Liquor Licences. 1957." (restricted) August 6, 1957 to Roberts from S.J. Daly.
84 RG 41-1 Box 1. LCBO Correspondence 1954-55, File 7-B-1 "General 1954." January 24, 1955. to Mr. Bisson of Ottawa from J.R. Hartley, Stock Purchasing Department.
86 RG 41-1 Box 1. LCBO Correspondence 1954-55, File 7-B-1 "General 1954." June 3, 1954 to Mr. Bartoli, Ottawa from Chief Commissioner Welsh.
87 RG 41-1 Box 1. LCBO Correspondence 1954-55, File 7-D-1 "General 1954." October 25, 1954 to Mr. DiSilvestro from Winery Supervisor.
88 RG 41-1 Box 3. LCBO Correspondence. File 7-T-1 "General 1955." November 28, 1955 to Mr. Thomsen from Spragg.
Notes to Chapter 5

90 RG 8-5 Container 143, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. Dunbar 1956-59. File Liquor Control Board.”
(restricted) January 22, 1957 to Dunbar from Collings.
Notes to Chapter 5


126 See for example RG 41-1 Box 3, LCBO Correspondence. File “General 1955.” June 21, 1955 to whom it may concern from Spragg.


138 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary’s Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “LCBO 1960-61.” (restricted) November 17, 1960 to Collings from Yaremko.

139 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary’s Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “LCBO 1960-61.” (restricted) November 21, 1960 to Yaremko from Collings.

140 Graham. p. 394.


147 Mankorpe. p. 56.

"SOMETHING MUST BE DONE"¹

I am sure our liquor laws will continue to provide what our people desire in the way of service and control, keeping in mind that we in this government will always be alert to the need for improvements and modernization in tune with the times and commensurate with the best interests of the people as a whole.²

When Allan Grossman, Chief Commissioner of the LCBO, uttered these words in the Legislature in the spring of 1962, he signalled the beginning of a new era in liquor policy, an era characterised by modernisation, responsiveness to public demands and attempts to grapple with over 30 years of accumulated government control policy. Leslie Frost’s retirement announcement in the late summer of 1961, just months after the sudden death of Chief Commissioner Collings, made this transition to a new era in Ontario politics, not just liquor politics, possible. These events prompted speculation regarding the future direction of liquor policy in the province. The election of John Robarts as Conservative leader and Premier and the appointment of Grossman as Chief Commissioner later that fall, gave rise to public expectations for liquor policy change, unseen after any previous transition in political leadership.³

Robarts, the 44-year-old lawyer and World War Two naval officer, began his political career in London’s municipal council. Raised in a disciplined Anglican home he nevertheless developed an interest in cards and petty gambling and even sampled liquor for the first time during his high school years. All his life Robarts “would see no reason not to enjoy himself as long as he got his work done the next day.”⁴ He earned a seat in the provincial Legislature for London in 1951 and went on to become Frost’s Education Minister. Robarts’ selection as leader and Premier represented change for Ontarians in many areas, although liquor control stood out as one area in particular need of attention after more than a decade under Frost’s unwavering commitment to the status quo. The transition from Frost to Robarts
began what would become a tradition during the Conservatives' 42 year reign. According to Jonathan Manthorpe, "Regeneration' is the word the Conservatives use for their once-a-decade public extravaganza to choose a new leader... It is a marvellous spectacle... of old bulls and young bulls, the death of kings, springtime and harvest."5 While Manthorpe concluded that this image of rejuvenation was nothing more than a "sham"6 since few real changes materialised with the new leader, this criticism was not entirely accurate in the case of liquor policy. Robarts, who gained a reputation as a hard drinker while a backbencher,7 brought to the office of Premier a framework for looking at liquor consumption that was different in several important ways from Frost's. While he remained fundamentally committed to a conservative and incremental approach to change, he was not opposed to altering laws or policies after thorough examination demonstrated the need for action.8 Consequently, he recognised the need for significant reform to reduce the government's strict regulation of all aspects of liquor consumption behaviour in order to respond to what he perceived to be public demand.

Robarts' choice of Grossman for head of the Liquor Control Board also spoke volumes about his desire for a more pragmatic approach to liquor policy. His background as a Jewish son of Eastern European immigrants and an MPP for a multi-ethnic Toronto constituency sent a clear message about the future thrust of liquor policy. Grossman brought to the position his experience as director of the Toronto Hotel Association in the early 1950s when he owned a small interest in a dining lounge, enabling him to appreciate the impact of liquor policy in practice. He also lent his "political courage" and his desire to emphasise "the positive economic and cultural impact of immigrants" to the position of Chief Commissioner.9 While Grossman's speech above made clear that the impulses of service and control continued to guide policy change, both he and Robarts increasingly rejected many of the moralistic justifications for the controls regulating liquor buying and consuming behaviour. Their influence began the slow transition in the pendulum away from a paternalistic and moralistic liquor control system towards a more equitable balance between customer service and 'reasonable' controls.
"A NEW FACE WAS NECESSARY"

Upon appointing Grossman to the position of Chief Commissioner, Robarts made it clear to the new LCBO head "that a new face was necessary for Ontario's liquor laws." Grossman responded by "setting the forces of modernization irretrievably in motion." But what sort of environment was Grossman thrust into when he took on the responsibilities of Chief Commissioner? Collings began his term in that role in the mid-1950s yet much had changed in the province in the intervening years, especially regarding attitudes towards liquor consumption, changes with which Collings and the entire Frost administration were unable to come to terms. Just days before Collings' death, a Toronto Star news report reflected on these changes, noting that while Ontario's population rose 50% since the end of World War Two, consumption of alcohol rose 100% in the same period. Various studies attempted to account for the apparent discrepancy. The Ontario Alcoholism Research Foundation (the early name for the Addiction Research Foundation), for example, pointed out that during the "good years" of the post-war economic boom, consumption of all products like cars, houses and alcohol increased. As well, the values of thrift and sobriety that had been cherished by many in rural communities "were ignored in suburbia's free-spending, social drinking, keep-up-with-the-Jones atmosphere," that was created as Ontario became predominantly an urban industrial society. Moreover, the studies showed, the composition of this population changed due to the post-war wave of over 800,000 immigrants to Ontario, mostly from southern and eastern Europe, "where drinking was taken for granted." Grossman, himself the son of eastern European immigrants, noted in his first presentation of the Board’s annual report that "here in Ontario we now have people of dozens of old cultures, whose traditions and customs and traditional way of life are different from each other's." According to The Toronto Star's Pat McNenly, immigration and urbanisation undermined the impact of the "stem religious zealots of other generations," whose views were reflected in the province's laws governing liquor retail and public drinking.

These forces were nothing new in Ontario but their impact intensified throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, resulting in a very changed society from the one Ontarians first elected Frost to govern. This heightened commercialism and multiculturalism faced Grossman in late 1961 as he took over the reins of
the Board. Echoing earlier criticisms of the government's failure to achieve a compromise between moral control and customer service that was satisfactory to most Ontarians, a spring 1961 Peterborough Examiner editorial argued that in return for such high liquor revenues, the government owed the customers better service.\textsuperscript{18} As Toronto Telegram columnist and liquor policy critic Rosemary Boxer proclaimed in late May 1961: "No sensible person will argue against reasonable regulation of the sale and serving of liquor."\textsuperscript{19} Clearly, she went on, "the hypocritical administration of Ontario's licencing laws seem to be aimed at treating consumers like incorrigible children...even though they are returning a handsome profit to the provincial treasury." Grossman therefore set out to maintain the 'reasonable' controls over liquor while eliminating the 'hypocritical'.

The Committee on Liquor Matters, created by Frost on the eve of his retirement, became Grossman's main arena to accomplish this. Before Grossman's appointment as Chief Commissioner, the Committee, under Provincial Secretary John Yaremko spent the first few months of its existence speculating on the ramifications of changing particularly contentious policies. This represented one of the objectives of Cabinet committees: to undertake a detailed examination of certain policy issues.\textsuperscript{20} Committee member, Licence Board Chairman Judge Robb, made his voice heard on matters under his jurisdiction. For example, he made no recommendation for eliminating the supper closing hour for public houses on the basis that "wives would complain."\textsuperscript{21} He also dismissed the reasoning that the one-glass-at-a-time rule in public houses be eliminated since lounge patrons could order a double scotch or two bottles of beer. He contended that the Liquor Licence Board received no complaints on the matter. Despite the fact that his department's mail and the local press regularly reflected complaints on this issue, as we have seen, Robb dismissed that type of public input. His deeply held suspicion regarding the public's ability to judge such matters illustrated that Ontario remained in Taylor's 'paternalistic' stage of liquor policy.\textsuperscript{22} This paternalism also influenced Robb's refusal to consider changing the ban on room service of alcohol and he recommended only that the Committee study the issue further.\textsuperscript{23} On the matter of the liquor permit, members agreed to continue the licencing of liquor purchasers but to institute unnamed changes to
"eliminate irritants." As late as September, under Robb's paternalistic influence, the Committee recommended continuing the liquor permit and the ban on room service.

These aspects of Ontario's liquor policy represented two of the most derided elements of government control. While this criticism was nothing new, it took on a harsher edge in the early 1960s as many newspaper editors and columnists attacked liquor policy as part of the emergence of anti-establishment rhetoric and as an easy symbol for more systemic paternalism. The Toronto newspapers kept up a constant pressure in the last months of Frost's administration, from the time the Committee was created in late winter until the early fall. For example, in reply to the OTF's March contention that a reinstatement of liquor by room service would only accentuate "social and moral problems," Frank Tumpane attacked this type of moral justification as never before. He argued that the only thing that the prohibitionists behind the OTF feared stemmed "from a short, three-letter word spelled s-e-x." He explained that the term hotel 'bedroom' drinking took on a sinister connotation during the years when hotel rooms were the only legal place, besides a person's residence, to consume liquor. The stigma, he argued, "has largely disappeared," except of course among the most vocal prohibitionists. What these prohibitionists failed to realise he argued, "is that the majority of drinking done in hotel rooms, or anywhere else is done by perfectly respectable people in perfectly normal circumstances." The following month Rosemary Boxer ridiculed liquor permits as "gestapo-like," arguing that they, along with other regulations like the ban on Sunday sale, had no place in Toronto, "a great metropolis now, not a hick village." Even Liberal leader John Wintemeyer concluded, "government liquor policy starts from the proposition that liquor is evil...It does not differentiate between the normal use...and the abuse of liquor." As a result, these moral regulations forced hotel guests to bring in whole bottles of liquor since single drinks through room service were banned, a hypocrisy that critics revealed years before.

These vigorous rejections of the moral justifications behind so many liquor policies, which in many cases actually resulted in excessive drinking, appealed to Grossman and his own pragmatic way of looking at policy. Furthermore, Wintemeyer's vocal pressure for change lessened any fear the government might have harboured about sparking controversy in the Legislature by liberalising the liquor
laws. After Grossman’s November appointment as Chief Commissioner, he joined the Committee as Chairman and immediately changed the tone and direction of the fledgling organisation. By this time, members recommended the elimination of both the permit and the ban on room service, two moral regulations that Frost’s administration had been unwilling to relinquish. Grossman’s impact on liquor policy in the province was swift and far-reaching. As the representative for Toronto’s multi-ethnic and working class St. Andrew’s riding, Grossman needed to be highly sensitive to public pressure in a way that Robb, a bureaucrat, did not have to. Furthermore, the selection of Robarts as Premier and his appointment of Grossman as Chief Commissioner signalled a generational shift from the cautious and paternalistic manner of Frost and Robb, to a more dynamic approach to liquor policy change.

The Liquor Permit Abolished: The Committee’s recommendation to end the liquor permit and the ban on room service of liquor, along with several other recommendations, formed the backbone of the policy changes that Robarts announced beginning in February 1962, many of which had been demanded since early in Frost’s reign. The Premier’s active participation in the announcement of these changes indicated the importance he attached to them in demonstrating his sensitivity to public demands in an area of policy where Frost had favoured the status quo. It also represented one of the first opportunities for Robarts to differentiate his leadership presence from Frost’s—especially after 12 years under the same Premier.

The first instalment of changes included the abolition of the liquor permit, an announcement that garnered Robarts loud applause in the Legislature. This change affected the nearly 1.4 million Ontario permit holders.30 While the Premier explained that the change removed the long-standing “irritation” many customers felt at having to produce a permit, he quickly reassured critics that the elimination of the permit did not remove safeguards against purchases by minors. The penalty provision for making a false declaration on a permit application now appeared on the liquor order form, which, according to Robarts, actually enhanced the control mechanism, forcing customers to swear that they were legally entitled to purchase liquor each and every time they did so. At the same time he also emphasised that a new policy of rounding up the price of liquor would compensate for the revenue lost from the elimination of the
permits. In one policy move, Robarts eliminated a major irritant for customers while simultaneously preserving moral control and safeguarding revenue. Although the press hailed Robarts and Grossman for infusing "fresh thinking," "common sense" and a "progressive element" into liquor policy, their adherence to the twin goals of government control stayed constant. What is clear is that the moral component of government control was so intrinsic to the system that even when aspects of the system were altered, the built-in values remained.

Although the MPPs greeted Robart’s announcement with loud applause, the elimination of the permit, especially in light of the accompanying provisos—a price hike and a sworn affidavit at each purchase—roused little happiness in the general population. The long waited for change took on the appearance of housecleaning after years of Frost’s defence of the status quo. Reactions ranged from The Kingston Whig-Standard’s lukewarm “it isn’t much,” to The Niagara Falls Review’s “the new system will be just as formidable as the antiquated permits.” These reactions clearly illustrated that much of the province’s press was supportive of liberalised liquor laws. Not surprisingly, Frank Tumpane’s article “Kick Them Again” concluded most forcefully: “the government will continue to make everything as inconvenient as it likes for [drinkers]. The Government will tell them that they are sinful people who are lucky to be allowed to drink at all.” As the Board’s continued badgering of its store staff to properly check permits into the early 1960s made clear, customers and staff alike viewed the licence to purchase liquor as a troublesome nuisance. Its elimination merely heightened calls for even more changes such as the end of order forms and service on Sundays. Because the arrival of a new administration inspired so much hope for change, anything short of an entire overhaul of the government control system would have disappointed many. Liberal leader Wtermeyer expressed this sense evocatively in the aftermath of the announcement. “One might say the government has laboured and brought forth a mouse.”

Perhaps, then, Toronto Star columnist William McGuffin posed the most significant question: “Out go the permits: But why did we keep them so long?” Grossman shed some light on this question when discussing the decision to end the permit in the Legislature. “The dropping of the permit is one
change that has been effected now because we feel that it can be done with the maximum of acceptance by the people of Ontario. While many accused Frost of refusing to make any change to the liquor laws that might offend the temperance supporters in the province, Grossman made it clear that the Conservatives continued to work by that gauge. The difference was that the government was now convinced that eliminating the permit would not be electorally dangerous.

Moreover, perhaps the government also realised that, as a Globe and Mail editorial argued, restrictive controls do not inspire sobriety:

After a long and unsatisfactory history of restrictive legislation in the liquor field, it must now be agreed that it is not sufficient to make liquor awkward to obtain. Ontario’s experience shows that the misuse of alcohol is not eliminated by prohibition, rationing or red tape; and that absurd regulations, of themselves, may lead to bad habits.

This conclusion followed the publication of statistics revealing Ontario had the highest adult per capita consumption of pure alcohol in the country. The government revealed its belief in the editorial’s contention by not only eliminating the permit but by increasing the budget for the Alcoholism Research Foundation and its research into alcoholism treatment. Given Grossman’s direct and no-nonsense approach to liquor policy, he made the elimination of an irritant that provided doubtful control and may have actually accentuated consumption his first priority. The short answer to why it had remained a feature of government control for so long was ‘Frost.’ The permit system perfectly satisfied his desire to meet the twin goals of government control: place what he believed to be moral barriers between liquor and consumers and collect permit revenue while doing so.

In answering his own query, McGuffin argued that Robarts’ decision to boost liquor prices to offset the loss of permit fees revealed that the government’s main interest in permits was purely financial. While Frost defended the permit on the basis of its moral restraint function, Robarts’ only concern in eliminating them, he argued, centred on “depriving the provincial treasury of a much-needed source of revenue.” As Table 22 shows, LCBO profits paid to the treasury grew steadily over the period. Therefore, with the newly instituted provincial sales tax causing problems with odd-numbered prices at
the liquor store cash register, Robarts saw the rounding up of prices as a perfect solution and an opportunity to end the permit. While these two Premiers seemed to favour opposing sides of the government control coin, moral control versus business revenue, both impulses continued to inform policy decisions as the new sworn affidavit on liquor purchase forms testified. While this new order form perhaps represented only a transition between the permit system and the complete elimination of point-of-purchase moral restraints, at this point in the early 1960s, the sworn affidavit represented a significant aspect of the government’s continued attempts at moral control. In striving to bring “innovations, improvements, refinements and changes” to the province’s liquor laws, Grossman found himself caught up in this struggle between moral and business motivations, a struggle that could not be settled in such a short time following the reliance on moral controls in the previous decades. Instead, a gradual approach to policy change appeared the most feasible.

Table 22

LCBO Profits Paid to Provincial Treasurer 1960/61-1969/70

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*Note Quebec LCBO Sales 1959/60*

*Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1960/61-1969/70*

*Residence Redefined Again*: Besides declaring the elimination of the liquor permit, Robarts also announced the re-definition of residence to include the area directly surrounding tents and trailers. This
change resulted from Grossman's own recommendation through the Committee on Liquor Matters. The impetus for his recommendation came from a celebrated court case the previous summer after police charged a Sault Ste. Marie man for consuming liquor in an illegal place: the grass in front of his tent. Adding to the notoriety of the case, an American tourist witnessed the incident, causing widespread debate about the impact of Ontario's liquor laws on the coveted tourist trade. The province's own Travel and Publicity Minister expressed surprise and irritation at the incident, while a Kitchener-Waterloo columnist expressed more than merely concern: "It's an old Ontario tradition that liquor laws shall be lunacy run rampant." Of course such an indictment from a Kitchener-Waterloo columnist was not surprising given the very similar scenario in the summer of 1957 when police charged a Waterloo man for drinking in his own backyard. Just as Frost altered the law to include backyards in the definition of residence in the aftermath of that case, Robarts took the first legislative opportunity to amend the law once again to widen the concept of residence further. In anticipation of the traditional incremental approach to liquor policy change, an Oshawa editor argued that "piecemeal change was not enough," and called for a major overhaul of the province's drinking laws. If there was nothing shameful about drinking inside a tent, the editorial wondered, then why so outside? While Robarts remedied the situation with an amendment, he followed the piecemeal approach to liquor policy change of every Premier before him. As the Oshawa editorial made clear, critics wanted the government to rethink its entire approach to controlling consumption, not continually redefine the buildings and areas of grass where the government deemed drinking acceptable. Though Robarts remained tied in many important ways to the traditional approaches of the past, particularly the regulation of 'spaces' like residences, he made clear that these two announcements, the end of the permit and the redefinition of residence, "covered only the first of several planned changes regarding liquor control and sales." With the Committee on Liquor Matters' detailed recommendations for change and Grossman's guidance, the government's move away from the time-honoured moralistic policies began in earnest.

Where the end of the permit and the redefinition of residence required amendments to the Liquor Control Act, the issues Robarts addressed two months later in his next round of changes represented
predominantly modifications to the Boards' written and unwritten policies, particularly to those regulating public drinking. When the government created the original laws establishing government control, it left a great many policy areas deliberately ambiguous with enormous discretionary powers devolving to the Control Board and then the Licence Board in order to cope with unanticipated policy issues. This resulted in a myriad of policy directives guiding the sale of liquor in the province, many surviving from the Depression and Second World War eras. Frost largely avoided the area of public drinking policy, believing that the directives Drew passed on to him served the province well. Consequently, for Robarts this created pent-up demand, making liquor policy reform "a government priority."51

Room Service Re-instated: In order to meet this priority, Robarts announced a large package of policy changes in April, which closely mirrored the recommendations of the Committee on Liquor Matters. On the issue of liquor by room service, Committee discussions evolved throughout the fall of 1961 from no recommendation for change,52 to a recommendation for room service "with stringent regulations"53 regarding accompanying meals, to finally room service in hotels with current room service facilities with or without meals.54 Cabinet adopted this final recommendation, a policy Robarts believed would help "rationalize Ontario's liquor control system," and bring about "sensible and practical liquor arrangements."55 The ease with which he announced the change belied the struggle to reach the recommendation at the committee level.

As government policy, the ban on room service had become so embedded in the government control system that before eventually coming to the recommendation that it should be reinstated, Committee members initially argued "that it would stir up a hornets' nest," and that Ontario residents were "acclimatized to the present system."56 The impact of the arrival of Robarts and Grossman on the scene cannot be underestimated in breaking the "habit"57 of defending a policy that had remained two decades beyond its original purpose as a war rationing measure. Despite many protest letters from the province's traditional dry supporters,58 Robarts remained committed to achieving reforms in "line with the modern day situation"59 that "will bring more into the open some things, which have been hidden."60 The abolition of the permit and the reinstatement of room service, two changes demanded consistently
throughout Frost's regime, represented two of the most significant policy decisions of Robarts' early premiership. They not only eliminated two irritants that Frost resisted on the basis of morals but they clearly marked the 'new face' he sought for government control and the modernisation that he sought for the province as a whole.

Licences for Clubs in Dry Areas: Several other changes made up Robarts' April policy announcement. The government opened up local option to allow the licencing of veteran, union and other 'bona fide' clubs in dry areas, provided they operated full meal services and had been in active existence for at least three years. This represented a major alteration of the local option system, a system Frost actually further expanded during his premiership. As late as January 1962, Provincial Secretary Yaremko, imparting the government's official line, informed a golf club manager that he could not obtain a liquor licence since the club was located in a local option area. Nevertheless, he went on to hint at future changes, explaining that if local option was overturned by a vote, 'or if present statutes changed, a licence could be issued.' The Committee on Liquor Matters originally discussed broadening banquet permits to allow them in clubs in dry areas for "affairs for which the public could not come in off the street." This amounted to a reinstatement of the banquet permit policy for dry areas before Frost restricted them to wedding receptions only in 1952. By the time the government announced the changes the proposal had been altered to allow clubs in dry areas, fulfilling certain criteria, to apply for licences. This was certainly a welcomed change particularly for recreational clubs such as golf and curling.

Again, the influence of Robarts and Grossman can be seen in pushing changes beyond merely reinstating past services. For Robarts, this change did not in any way interfere with the overall policy of local option since it only remedied the "illogical" situation "that while people living in 'dry' areas may drink in their own homes, they cannot have alcohol in their private club." In reply to a critical letter from the president of the Kingston Conference of the Free Methodist Church, Robarts explained his approach to liquor policy change. "We [are] recognizing modern conditions while retaining the traditional controls." In other words, he retained the overall policy of local option, a system at the bedrock of Conservative liquor policy since James Whitney. At the same time, he opened it up for sale in certain
clubs, responding to the vocal demand for liquor outlets in local option areas. The result, as usual with a policy comprised of the 'half measure of prohibition' that Drew abhorred, was hypocrisy and displeasure on many sides.

The 'traditional controls' that Robarts had in mind centred around the provision that in order for clubs in dry areas to be considered for licences they must provide full meal services and they must be in existence for at least three years. In order "to prevent a rush of persons into dry areas to establish clubs," these provisions would ensure that the prospective outlets were 'bona fide' clubs and not merely drinking places. These concerns mirrored those of the mid-1930s when the government first licenced clubs. Many clubs found themselves unable to fulfil such criteria, with club members concluding the new provisos an arbitrary way in which to measure the genuine nature of a club. At the end of May Yaremko informed a London golf club representative that it could not qualify for a licence since it had not been open for the requisite three years. He explained that the provision served to protect "the local option bylaws which have long been one of the basic principles respecting the sale of liquor within our communities." Many veteran and union clubs located in dry communities complained that the new rules "favour[ed] the rich" and discriminated against them since most of them could not afford to operate fulltime kitchens. In anticipation of this type of complaint, Judge Robb argued in a March meeting of the Committee on Liquor Matters that without the provision requiring clubs to serve regular meals, there would be the "temptation to open fly-by-night clubs." As with so many past liquor policy decisions, the government and the Boards assumed the worst in the public and framed regulations to anticipate and attempt to curb the undesired behaviour. This approach of trying to respond to 'the modern-day situation,' while imposing arbitrary moral controls only complicated further the patchwork that local option had woven in the province. Instead of removing the half-century old policy of local option, as many critics including the Opposition Liberals proposed, Robarts chose instead to 'tinker' with the system, an approach well entrenched in his party's past dealings with liquor policy change.

The province's dry supporters, who clung desperately to local option as their last defence against the menace of demon rum, opposed any erosion of the system. The Toronto Conference of the United
Church of Canada asked Robarts how he justified licencing clubs in communities that had democratically voted themselves dry under local option. He rationalised the new policy on the basis that local option governed public sale, while the law viewed labour, veteran and other bona fide clubs as an extension of the private residences of their members. Robarts used a different approach in replying to the OTF's moralistic opposition to this change in local option. He explained that the licencing of private clubs in local option areas would not increase consumption but would only bring into the open consumption which tended to occur surreptitiously, with the accompanying excesses that often occurred with such hidden drinking.

The change, therefore, would remedy the situation reported by a study of mid-1950s 'Crestwood Heights,' the pseudonym for Forest Hill, an affluent Toronto neighbourhood. Several women interviewed for the study recounted the drinking and socialising that went on among their husbands in the locker room of the local country club, where the "law was completely ignored." The men kept bottles in their lockers and drank and socialised sometimes for hours after their rounds of golf. Conservative MPP James Auld made the same conclusions in 1959, when he argued that golf and curling club members kept bottles in their lockers. This activity clearly broke the liquor regulations, yet the hidden nature of the activity left club authorities unable to exercise control over the liquor consumption. It was this type of secret drinking that Robarts intended to bring into the dining rooms of these clubs and thereby reduce the excessive consumption associated with a forbidden activity. This example also proved the legitimacy of the arguments of the labour and veteran groups regarding the class bias of the changes, since only country clubs could afford to operate full meal services and only the rich could afford to belong to such clubs.

*Motels and Summer Resorts Licenced:* Robarts' announcement also provided for the licencing of motels, summer resorts and lodges on the same basis as hotels. Previously, the Licence Board refused to grant licences to these types of facilities on the basis of its unwritten policy that in order for an outlet to be licenced, its dining facilities, lounge area and all guest bedrooms had to be located under one roof. This policy dated from the time when the only licenced premises were traditional hotels. The continuation of the policy well beyond that period underlined the endurance of these stringent controls. In early 1957
Liberal-Labour MPP Albert Wren argued in the Legislature that this policy forced resort operators to act like “glorified bootleggers” in order to provide for the demands of their guests, particularly American tourists. In an attempt to prevent the type of ‘bootlegging’ that Wren reported, the government enforced its refusal to expand the definition of a hotel to include resorts and other tourist accommodations to the highest degree. As the LCBO Supervisor of Stores reminded his staff in early 1959, government policy forbade proprietors or managers of tourist camps, who resided on the premises, from being issued an individual liquor permit for their own personal use. In June 1961 The Telegram’s Rosemary Boxer noted the experience of one frustrated resort owner:

When Americans drive 400 or 500 miles on a Saturday and they have to be told that they must wait until 10 am Monday and drive to a town 10 miles away to get a drink, some of them aren’t likely to return.... They aren’t drunks. They’d simply like to be able to have a drink at the end of their journey and the law says I can’t give them one.

With tourism increasingly constituting a significant industry in many parts of the province and the traditional hotel no longer the only option for tourists, the government began to respond to the hospitality industry’s call for change.

In January 1962 the president of the Association of Tourist Resorts of Ontario congratulated Grossman on his appointment as Chief Commissioner and looked forward to his role in framing more realistic and sensible legislation. In particular the president sought changes to allow tourist resorts and lodges to be considered for liquor licences. He argued that while liquor played a minor role as a revenue producer for resort owners, it played a large role in the eyes of tourists especially when proprietors could not satisfy their “modest requests” for a glass of beer or wine with dinner. As Yaremko emphasised to Grossman, in the context of the matters before the Cabinet Committee studying the liquor legislation, “the criterion of a physical attachment of portions of buildings is not a logical basis” on which to decide whether a licence should be granted or not. One frustrated licence applicant responded sarcastically to this ‘illogical’ policy in a letter to the Licence Board. “If it is necessary for my lodge to qualify as a hotel with the beds beside the dining room tables, please outline the current requirements so that I may review them and plan future facilities to be compatible.” Robarts also echoed this sentiment in reply to R.F.
Moulton of the OTF. He called the requirement that all amenities be under one roof “an anachronism,” which caused “much irritation” without really being much of a “restriction.” While he did not explain what the original requirement was intended to ‘restrict,’ this change represented part of the slow retreat from the many controls over consumption behaviour.

**Remote Areas Exempted from Local Option System:** The government altered another policy in order to respond to the tourist industry’s changing needs in the most remote areas of the province. To qualify for a licence to serve cocktails, namely a lounge licence or a dining lounge licence, communities had to first hold and win a local option vote favouring that type of sale. In the most remote areas of the province, such as the north west which were being increasingly opened up for wilderness tourism, the traditional municipal structure that formed the basis for such votes did not exist in the way it did in the more populous south. As early as 1948 small communities such as the mining town of New Red Lake petitioned the government for licences despite the fact that they could not hold local option votes since they were unorganised territories without assessment rolls. Attorney General Blackwell discovered from his legal counsel that nothing restricted the Licence Board from legally considering such applications from unorganised territories for any type of licence. Therefore he concluded it was a matter of policy and left the issue to the consideration of LLBO Chairman Robb. Robb, following his desire to restrict access to alcohol, established the policy of refusing such requests. Fourteen years later, Robarts altered this policy to allow facilities in these unorganised areas to apply for licences without the need for any kind of vote.

This change recognised the increasing importance of the remote areas of the province for tourism and resource industries. More importantly, in exempting one area of the province from local option, the government admitted that a policy conceived in the first decade of the century with only the southernmost areas in mind was no longer appropriate for the vast and diverse province of the 1960s. In the Legislature Grossman admitted the difficulty in legislating for a province “as large as many countries of Europe combined.” By preserving local option as official policy while exempting certain remote areas, the government only exacerbated what Wintemeyer described as a province “pockmarked and pitted with
exemptions.” While the Liberal Party had come a long way in promoting more liberal liquor laws, even to the point of denouncing the local option system, other traditional temperance supporters, such as United Church members, voiced their displeasure at any relaxation of liquor controls. For example, Westside United Church in Owen Sound sent a resolution to Yaremko opposing any further increase in the number of outlets for the sale of spirits, “regardless of the population of the municipality,” referring to the sparsely populated and unorganised communities of the north.

Private Agents to Retail Alcohol in Remote Areas: A third policy change to respond to the increasing needs and demands of tourists and their outfitters constituted arguably one of the most significant, yet most underrated, of Robarts’ announcements. From the time Ferguson opened the first government-run liquor stores and government-regulated beer stores, the only place to legally purchase packaged alcoholic beverages, besides the already established winery outlets, were these stores. Since the early 1950s, with tourism in the province’s more remote areas becoming increasingly popular, resort owners consistently complained to the Board about their inability to provide their guests, especially American tourists accustomed to more accessible liquor outlets, with the alcoholic beverages they desired. Because local option and the requirement of having all amenities under one roof previously prevented most tourist outfitters from qualifying for liquor licences, proprietors had to instruct their tired and thirsty guests to drive many miles to the nearest liquor or beer store. Many resort operators therefore sought the right to sell packaged liquor for off-premises consumption as was the case in rural Quebec and many western provinces. It was this request that the government sought to address.

The change therefore allowed the Control Board to appoint certain tourist operators and outfitters as agents to sell packaged liquor and beer for consumption off the premises in remote areas without government stores. The change in policy followed a recommendation by the Committee On Liquor Matters, which noted that Manitoba allowed off-premises sale in remote areas through drug stores. In response to Robarts’ announcement, Grossman quickly pointed out that “the LCBO will move slowly in this direction,” and give full consideration to the issues of “control, location and the administrative changes involved.” Aside from this note of caution on Grossman’s part, little else pointed to the
magnitude of this change in policy with regard to government control, a change which Grossman’s biographer Peter Oliver argued “symbolized the image of an LCBO no longer hamstrung by old taboos.” The appointment of agents to sell liquor in what amounted to private businesses received much less press attention than the reinstatement of room service or the licencing of clubs in dry areas, for example. This revealed the press’ propensity to focus on the controversies in liquor policy rather than undertake any detailed analysis of individual changes. Furthermore, this particular change would have affected or been of interest to a very small number of readers of the major southern Ontario newspapers. While many traditional temperance supporters opposed the changes, they tended to voice their objection in a general way and few pointed to this particular change as a threat to government’s control over the trade. In one notable exception, the Cornwall WCTU voiced its concern in early February over the OHA’s proposal to allow off-premises sale in remote areas. This local Union opposed the idea as it traditionally did any expansion in the number of outlets in the province and argued it would “degrade youth” by having them “constantly exposed” to alcoholic beverages. Nevertheless, in recommending the policy change to allow private tourist outfitters to sell liquor for a commission of the amount sold, the Committee on Liquor Matters reasoned that the move would give “better service to the public in certain out of the way areas in the province.” This argument not only downplayed the significance of this change in policy to allow private retailers to sell liquor, but it also constituted a classic expression of the Board’s commitment to good business practices by expanding the market.

*Hours Extended in Licenced Premises:* Other changes included in this announcement affected the hours of sale in the province’s licenced outlets. For example, lounges, currently open until midnight, saw their hours extended to 1 am to match the closing hour of dining lounges. Robarts explained that he intended the change to prevent the movement of patrons from one outlet to another with longer hours. The changes also granted greater flexibility to proprietors, allowing them to open earlier in the day if they chose as long as the total hours did not exceed 12 continuous hours and they did not stay open past 1 am. Robarts continued to differentiate between the public house and other outlets, however, by stipulating that for the beer-dispensing outlet, the 12 continuous hours had to include the supper hour closing, which
remained intact, and could not go beyond the midnight closing hour. This continued discrimination against the public house went against the Committee's recommendation that all licenced premises close at a common hour, 1 am.93 On the one hand, Robarts provided flexibility and extended hours for most of the province's drinking facilities. On the other, he persisted in preserving the war-inspired distinction between beer drinkers and others, embedding another class bias into this package of policy changes and illustrating the endurance of paternalistic and class biased beliefs among the province's leaders.

*Mandatory Snacks in Public Houses and Lounges:* Another aspect of policy change permitted beer drinkers for the first time to purchase snacks in public houses. The law now required public houses—along with lounges—to sell snacks.96 Nine years earlier, Frost's administration announced that food service would be permitted in public houses, a seeming reversal of a 1934 Board policy against the sale of food in beverage rooms. That 1953 policy announcement amounted simply to the addition of a dining room licence to an existing public house, not the actual sale of food in public houses themselves. This 1962 announcement, therefore, constituted a major change in policy, one that The Hamilton Spectator's Don O'Hearn called a "significant step."97 Again, the Committee looking into the liquor laws served as the catalyst. It recommended that to "promote temperance," the Licence Board should make mandatory the sale of snacks in public houses and lounges, currently the only two types of drinking outlets forbidden to sell food.91 Critics of the liquor laws had been arguing this for years, but staunch opposition from the province's dry supporters against any improvement in drinking conditions provided a formidable barrier to change.

By the early 1960s, change was evident even in this quarter. In the fall of 1960 the United Church of Canada, at its annual meeting in Edmonton, issued a policy statement following its three-year commission on temperance. While the report continued the Church's tradition of referring to the "evils of the liquor traffic," and promoting voluntary total abstinence as "the wisest and safest course," it advanced a significant change in attitude. It officially recognised differing attitudes and practices towards the consumption of alcohol, even among its own members and acknowledged that "many who use it can do so with self-control."99 For The Globe and Mail's Joan Hollobon, this announcement meant "moderate
drinkers are no longer second-class Christians in the United Church of Canada." Reflecting this change in Church policy, a Stirling, Ontario United Church minister resigned his pastorate in late 1960 to dedicate himself fulltime to ministering to the drinkers of Toronto's bar scene. Rev. Arthur Packman, affectionately known as the 'padre of the pubs' among the bars' clientele, shared his experiences and views in a United Church Observer article. Contradicting traditional United Church views regarding the questionable morality of even moderate consumption, he said "I'm not concerned with the fact that people drink...but I am concerned with why they drink and why they drink to excess." This philosophy led him to conclude that drinkers should be able to buy food with their beverages or even sing if they were so inclined, a conclusion The Financial Post called "a sign of the times."

In the style typical of liquor control policy to date, the change came with stipulations and paternalistic overtones. The Committee's recommendation called for the sale of nuts, pretzels, chips, cheese, popcorn "and nothing else" in public houses and lounges. This very specific list served to address the Licence Board's concern that allowing full meals would cause a deterioration of food service in dining lounges and dining rooms, the outlets required to serve full meals in order to sell alcohol. By endeavouring to define a snack in contrast to a meal, the Board instituted an approach to policy that would cause many headaches for itself in the years to come.

Rev. Packman's reference to singing in licenced establishments constituted another policy change adopted at this time. The Committee on Liquor Matters recommended that singing be allowed in drinking outlets. While authority holders could currently apply for permission from the Licence Board for background music and entertainment, the Committee acknowledged that there was widespread belief among Ontarians that audience participation such as singing was not only not permitted but was illegal. In order to erase this false impression, the Committee recommended that singing be allowed as long as it was "kept properly under control." While the Committee did not explain what it feared might happen if the singing became too boisterous, its attempt at social control was unmistakable. In a further attempt to keep such entertainment and audience participation 'under control,' the Committee also recommended that there be no public announcement of this policy change. While inspectors would be instructed to no
longer stop such activity, the Committee ensured that customers would not be informed of this new dimension of the public drinking environment. While the Committee and the Board attempted to open up the range of activities acceptable in licenced premises such as eating and singing, they continued in many ways to operate with paternalistic attitudes towards drinkers by keeping them in the dark as far as certain policy changes were concerned.

**The Right to Appeal LLB Licence Cancellations:** A final aspect of the policy changes addressed concerns regarding the arbitrary nature of the power wielded by the Liquor Licence Board. In what The Toronto Star referred to as a “significant change,” proprietors who had had their licences cancelled by the LLBO would now be permitted to appeal the decision in the courts.107 When Drew initially created the Board, he invested it with a great many powers. In response to Frost’s request for comments on the liquor legislation from his ministers shortly before his retirement, Robert Macaulay, a member of the Cabinet Committee on Liquor Matters for its first few meetings, called the LLA “one of the most undemocratic acts on our books.” He went on to argue, “remember Mr. Frost, there is no appeal. And with a change of government to one of Mr. Hepburn’s type, this could produce the greatest damage.”108 Macaulay, recognising perhaps that the Conservative dynasty could not go on forever, also echoed, although in private, the complaints against the Board’s excessive powers that had been voiced over the last decade. For example in 1954 the president of a local ratepayers’ association charged that the Liquor Licence Act “sets up Judge Robb as a demi-god from whom there is no appeal.”109 A 1956 Globe and Mail editorial recounted OHA members complaining of the Licence Board’s “persecution” and “gestapo-like methods.” The editorial concluded, “there ought to be, as there is not now, the right of appeal to a court against an order cancelling a licence.”110

*“Forbids the Sale of Liquor on Sunday*”: As significant as this amendment package was, the things that the government chose not to change, especially the Committee recommendations it chose to ignore, revealed that this administration had its own boundaries that it could not cross. While making his announcement, Robarts quickly assured his listeners that the government “has no intention of changing its policy which forbids the sale of liquor on Sunday,” and “there will be no change in present local option
provisions." These two bedrocks of government control, consistently guarded since the days of Howard Ferguson, represented areas of policy that Robarts could not trespass upon.

Like Frost before him, Robarts staunchly defended the retention of the local option system. In reply to a Kincardine hotel proprietor's suggestion that the government "throw out local option," Robarts explained: "I am sure that you realize that after this legislation has been in the statutes for so many years, it would be impossible to end what most of our citizens consider to be one of their rights." His defence of local option rested on an accurate analysis of the province's political realities. In recommending against removing local option completely from the statute books, the Cabinet Committee discussed the political dangers involved. Since the populous area of southern Ontario contained the majority of the province's dry townships, the Committee noted, the voters in those regions represented a serious threat to the government if it ever decided to remove local option. The reason for this, one member pointed out, was that the people who would be pleased by the removal would not bother to vote, while all the temperance supporters would turn out to defeat the government.

Robert Macaulay advanced a similar argument to Premier Frost during the last months of his premiership, in relation to the political dangers involved in allowing beer sales through grocery stores. Macaulay argued that a move such as that "would alienate a small but powerful segment of society who, unlike the large moderate middle group, go to the polls to express their dissatisfaction." These arguments clearly demonstrated the government's real fear of the electoral strength of the province's temperance supporters, even 35 years after the end of Prohibition. They also illustrated the contention that critics of the liquor laws had been advancing for many years: that the government crafted its liquor laws to suit those who thought drinking was a sin. In his first LCBO annual report address in the Legislature, Grossman admitted that even he adhered at least partially to that philosophy. In explaining the timing for the end of the liquor permit, he argued "it can be done with the maximum of acceptance by the people of Ontario." Under the assumption that politically active people, such as temperance workers, voted in greater number and with more aggressively targeted goals than the average voter, Grossman realised that to make a potentially controversial policy change like ending the permit he needed to be assured of the
support of a large majority of the population. With a constituency distribution that did not yet take into account the province's urban growth, this sensitivity to the older rural areas was a wise political consideration.

While Robarts and the Committee remained committed to the concept of local option, they had no trouble 'nibbling' away at its provisions. Clubs could now qualify for licences in dry areas and large tracts of the remote north were exempt from the requirement of having a local option vote before applying for a lounge or dining lounge licence. Nevertheless, wedding receptions remained the only occasion possible for a banquet permit in a local option area. As well, the Cabinet Committee recommended against licencing tourist resorts in dry districts because it would cause "too many problems," which remained unexpressed but certainly centred on the political reaction of the local dry supporters. This seemingly contradictory action on the part of the government reflected its desire to be both a moral watchdog and an efficient business enterprise providing liquor services to those requiring them. As an editorial from a northern Ontario community embroiled in a local option contest complained, "What, in other places is an accepted social amenity, is for us something that must be contested as the gravest of moral issues." While Robarts loosened the provisions of local option somewhat to allow a greater number and variety of liquor outlets for the residents of those particular areas, most people living in local option areas remained captive "of that good old Ontario political barn dance—the liquor plebiscite. The routine called for in this strange social antic goes something like this: Grab your ballot, vote as yer [sic] please, the outcome's fixed in a 6-4 squeeze."

Robarts also defended the traditional ban on the sale of liquor on Sundays, despite the slow erosion of limits on other Sunday activities like professional sports and horse racing. He informed a worried Lutheran minister, "you may be assured that the government has not taken any steps towards permitting the sale of liquor on Sunday, and that this will continue to be government policy." The desire for liquor services on Sundays among certain segments of the public had been evident since earlier in the previous decade and this particular minister wrote to the Premier expressing his concern over rumours concerning the upcoming policy changes. For example, both the OHA and the Ontario Travel
Association, appearing before the Legislature's Committee on Travel and Publicity in mid-March 1962, urged the government to permit the sale of alcoholic beverages with meals in licenced dining lounges on Sundays. 122 With the Cabinet Committee on Liquor Matters also firmly behind the ban on Sunday sales, such a request was sure to be ignored in Robarts' April 1962 round of policy changes. Nevertheless, with the tourism and hospitality lobby groups continuing to press their arguments for later Saturday night closing hours and sale on Sunday itself at conventions and with meals, the traditionally dry Christian Sabbath was under attack.

The many controls over consumption behaviour in public houses also remained intact after this round of amendments despite the struggles within the Committee on Liquor Matters to address them. For example, in early March 1962 the Committee recommended that the restriction against double servings of beer be removed. 123 Ever since the government implemented this war measure, editorials and critics had complained that the continuation of the practice only encouraged excessive drinking. While Chairman Robb denied that there were any protests about that restriction, in October 1961 for example, the president of the Port Arthur United Pulpwood Farmers' Association complained to Attorney General Roberts of being told "how much [beer] you may have in front of you" 124 in a public house. Despite these types of complaints and the Committee's initial recommendation to end the restriction on more than one beer at a time, Robb's insistence that the restriction remain carried tremendous weight. Therefore, the Committee's final report before the April 1962 announcement adhered to his wishes. 125 While much had been made in the press about Grossman's liberalising influence on government liquor policy in general and this Committee in particular, the influence of Judge Robb cannot be underestimated. Grossman himself quickly learned of Robb's uncompromising attitude towards incursions into his realm of the LLBO, which he "ruled with an iron hand." 126

In late 1962, Grossman voiced his concern over this in a confidential letter to Provincial Secretary Yaremko. He expressed his consternation over an embarrassing situation at his riding association's recent ball when the bar was unexpectedly forced to close at 11:30 pm. "I sense that there may be some resentment on the part of the Judge about my making inquiries into these matters," Grossman wrote.
While the permit department later informed Grossman that in rare instances banquet permits could be issued for later closing hours, Robb explained to the Cabinet Committee that banquets could serve liquor until 1:30 am as long as the entire duration of the banquet did not exceed four hours. Grossman complained to Yaremko that "banquet permit applicants should not be kept in the dark as to their rights and privileges."\textsuperscript{127} The fact that his name as Chief Commissioner appeared on every banquet permit exacerbated the embarrassment and anger Grossman felt after finding out that his banquet organisers were given incorrect information. Robb's tendency to keep the workings of the Licence Board as low keyed, and even as secret, as possible became increasingly evident to Grossman, especially through the deliberations of the Cabinet Committee on Liquor Matters.

The government also preserved another war-inspired characteristic of the public house: the supper hour closing. Critics had repeatedly called for the end of this 20-year-old rationing measure during the previous decade. With Grossman's appointment as Chief Commissioner and Frost's retirement, many critics of the liquor laws hoped for change in what they regarded as a particularly paternalistic and outdated regulation. As late as mid February 1962 journalists predicted that the changes Robarts had recently hinted at would include the end of this rule.\textsuperscript{128} The Committee on Liquor Matters clearly had other ideas. On the eve of Robarts' policy change announcement, Robb emphasised to Yaremko that although the issue of ending the supper hour closure had been discussed at several meetings, "I am sure that all are conscious of the fact that this is a good policy, which should be preserved."\textsuperscript{129} Robb had been defending the continuation of this war measure since 1946. The summary report of the Committee's deliberations reflected Robb's beliefs and recommended against ending the supper hour closing with veiled reference to the moralistic impulse guiding liquor policy.\textsuperscript{130}

While other types of drinking outlets experienced expanded hours (cocktail lounges) and gained wider exposure (cocktail-dispensing outlets in remote unorganised areas), the public house became even more of a relic with the retention of the supper hour closure and the one-glass-at-a-time ruling. This became truly apparent with the realisation that, as Robb informed the Committee in March 1962, the LLB had not licenced a new public house for over 12 years.\textsuperscript{131} Therefore, the public house remained much as
it had been when Hepburn first created it in 1934 and continued to carry with it the war measures imposed under rationing and preserved on the basis of moralistic justifications.

The government used its paternalistic view of liquor consumption in refusing to enact one of the Committee's recommendations. The Cabinet specifically turned down the Committee's recommendation to allow licenced premises to open after the polls closed on election days. In making its original recommendation, the Committee responded to the OHA's request that licenced premises be allowed to open one half hour after the polls closed on municipal and provincial elections, the types of elections under provincial authority. Although the Committee minutes noted that the recommendation was not unanimous, the majority of members felt that these establishments should be available "so that those interested in the elections" would have some place to gather. A week after this report Robb even hinted to the Legislature's Committee on Commissions that change might be forthcoming on the issue.

The ban on the sale of liquor on election days dated from the original Liquor Control Act, an obvious reaction against the notoriety surrounding the use and abuse of liquor during nineteenth century elections. Candidates regularly used alcoholic libations to ensure the loyalty of their supporters with the result that Ontario elections were rowdy, often violent events. Furthermore, pioneer inns often served as the setting for elections as the only community buildings available. In drafting the LCA, Ferguson took the opportunity to impose moral control over the democratic process by banning the sale of alcohol on election days. This not only ensured control over election day events for his incumbent party but also heightened the image of control that he wished to portray in the aftermath of Prohibition. Although election day behaviour in the province had certainly become more subdued in the century since the mythology was first established, Robarts clearly sought to continue the image of control that his predecessor instituted 35 years earlier. His decision not to implement this particular recommendation illustrated the tremendous executive power over liquor policy change that Ferguson inaugurated. Nevertheless it also demonstrated that the Cabinet Committee fulfilled its functions of relieving the whole Cabinet of the detailed examination of policy issues, of airing conflicts between opposing interests, and of
co-ordinating the work of the Boards and the government. Above all, it worked according to Grossman "as a sounding board for the government as it worked its way towards new policies." Observers reacted to this extensive package of policy changes with swift and predictable conclusions. The Toronto Telegram pronounced it an "advance" that would bring the law into "greater conformity" with the wishes of the people. The editorial particularly praised the changes to room service and motel licencing as control measures which would prevent abuse as opposed to the previous prohibitory measures which forced consumption underground. The Guelph Mercury favoured the changes as making legal behaviour that had been going on undercover for years such as drinking in clubs in dry areas. In a similar vein, columnist Don O'Hearn saw the changes as a sign of the Robarts administration's "new outlook" towards liquor policy. He articulated what many Ontarians believed: "that the Frost administration would not have gone nearly so far." Indeed, O'Hearn related that Robarts' policy announcement reflected nearly every change that had been asked for by the public, the press, and the hospitality industry. As a result, the OHA voiced tremendous satisfaction with the changes. Its managing director concluded that in Ontario "now we are more mature in our thinking." The manager of the Royal York Hotel in Toronto likewise applauded the new policies. "It is nice to see the law modified in keeping with the changing times. It should be highly beneficial to the tourist trade." For the most part, these changes pleased the majority of Ontarians, reflecting as they did demands that had been made since the early 1950s. Not surprisingly, a small and dedicated group of dry supporters loudly denounced Robarts' policy announcement.

The Toronto Star revealed its temperance stripes in the aftermath of these policy changes. It accused the government of "acting irresponsibly" for embarking "on a deliberate policy to promote the consumption of liquor in this province." The editorial denounced Robarts for favouring liquor revenue and the tourist industry over the welfare of Ontarians. Calling the changes a "sweeping relaxation" the editorial argued that "in order to pour more money into his treasury...Robarts' new amendments virtually abolish control." Other temperance advocates expressed their predictions in a much more alarmist fashion. Focusing almost exclusively on the changes affecting room service and motels, the province's
dry supporters attacked Robarts’ announcement with an energy that had not been witnessed throughout the Frost years. OTF secretary, R.F. Moulton charged that these changes will mean more alcoholism, more fatalities on our highways, more juvenile delinquency, more tavern and hotel bedroom brawls and murders, more broken homes, more children under institutional care, more sex crimes, more illegitimate children, and more mental hospitals and jails.\textsuperscript{145}

Rev. J.R. Mutchmor, the newly appointed Moderator of the United Church, similarly focused on these particular policy changes. He expressed “shock” at the announcement since “some of them [motsels] are simply drinking places with bedrooms for promiscuous purposes.”\textsuperscript{146} Clearly, Robarts’ rejection of the paternalistic and social control values that had prevented Frost from making similar policy changes when they were repeatedly called for, upset the province’s traditional temperance supporters.

Observers debated whether this round of policy changes constituted “an about turn”\textsuperscript{147} according to Rev. Mutchmor or nothing more than “a cautious approach”\textsuperscript{148} to bringing the law in line with public demand as a Guelph Mercury editorial argued. In the chronicle of liquor policy change from 1927, Robarts’ announcement clearly represented a ‘catching up’ after a decade of stagnation in liquor policy development. Favoured a more rational approach to policy change, Robarts, with a couple of exceptions, embraced the recommendations of his Cabinet Committee and addressed pent-up demands. As Grossman made clear in his comments on the end of the permit, the government only liberalised liquor policy after assuring itself of the support of an overwhelming majority of Ontarians. The almost complete lack of public opposition to these announcements, save a limited number of vocal condemnations, proved Robarts’ accurate reading of the public mood and his ability “to achieve reform with a minimum of political upheaval.”\textsuperscript{149} While Robarts’ changes adequately met public demands, once the novelty of the new policies wore off, critics once again called for changes in those areas of government control that Robarts did not touch: local option, Sunday sale, and liquor forms.
A LIQUOR STORE ‘FACELIFT’

While Allan Grossman featured prominently in the Committee that helped formulate the policy changes discussed above, as LCBO Chief Commissioner his primary responsibility rested with the government stores, which he intended to modernise. He signalled this change in attitude and approach in his first LCBO annual report, covering the period April 1961-March 1962. Altering this document to better reflect his hands-on approach to leadership, Grossman greatly expanded the personal letter of transmission from the few sentences that introduced previous annual reports. In it, he explained the Board’s program of replacing or renovating older stores and building new ones in order “to provide our citizens with first rate facilities.”¹⁵⁰ For Grossman, the physical appearance of the liquor store reflected both the government’s attitude towards its control responsibilities and the customers’ feelings about the process involved in purchasing alcohol. He explained this to the Legislature in April 1962:

we are continually brightening up the appearance of our stores, making them more attractive places in which to make purchases, as well as more pleasant places in which to work...we have outgrown any lingering guilt complex that there is anything sinful about going into a liquor store. There is no reason then, why our stores should have a drab, gloomy or unattractive appearance. Our new stores are indicative of our modern progressive approach along these lines.¹⁵¹

When the government first opened liquor stores in the late 1920s they served a purely functional purpose. Not only were aesthetics not considered but the image of control that the Board sought to project in the direct aftermath of Prohibition dictated that a liquor store would be “a grim, businesslike place,”¹⁵² as one 1929 detractor pointed out. Prior to the 1960s, with the exception of wine displays, the government and the Board altered nothing in the original style of stores. This style, complete with hidden bottles and the dauntingly numerous queues, exemplified the control aspect of government control. Just as important, the style of store designed to move purchasers in and out with the minimum number of distractions contributed to the Board’s other goal: the business of selling liquor.

Eliminating the liquor permit certainly altered the social control image that stores previously exuded. This removed one line-up, while the new liquor order form, which allowed customers to list several brands instead of the old form which required a separate sheet for each brand, would speed up the
process of buying liquor and as Grossman argued, “be of more convenience to the public.” Not surprisingly, a representative of the WCTU quickly condemned the new form, proclaiming, “we are against anything that will speed up sale.” After the elimination of the permit, Grossman turned his attention to the number of liquor stores and their utilitarian appearance.

Grossman made it one of his priorities as Chief Commissioner to meet with all the store vendors. At one such meeting in Hamilton, Grossman proposed a “facelift” for the province’s liquor stores. “People should be entitled to go into them without having the taint of sin attached,” he argued. In order to avoid this, he proposed more modern and attractive stores without the high brick walls and small windows. Besides eliminating the permit, he did not mention altering the interior of the stores with their impenetrable counters and hidden wares. British Columbia, on the other hand, recently opened a new style of store “where the customer can actually see and choose what he buys.” Although the Ontario government retained its belief in the moral benefits of hidden bottles, Grossman’s commitment to the demands of retail customers paved the way for future self-serve liquor retailing. For the time being, according to a Toronto Telegram editorial, customers remained dependent upon a system of “retailing of liquor... based upon the principle of institutional shame and customer inconvenience.” In order to place this particular conclusion into perspective one has only to read Rev. Mutchmor’s complaints about Ontario’s new “posh outlets in shopping centres.” In attempting to give the province’s liquor store system a ‘facelift,’ Grossman found himself in the unenviable position between the temperance supporters who opposed any improvement in the retailing of liquor and the critics, who opposed the stores’ moralistic and paternalistic controls.

Despite these opposing perspectives, the Board’s policy to replace old stores and build new ones resulted in an astounding increase in the number of liquor retail outlets in Ontario. During Grossman’s short tenure from 1961 to 1963 the Board opened 64 new liquor stores across the province. This began a growth trend culminating in 423 stores by the end of the decade, an increase of more than 150 new stores for the 1960s, as Table 25 in chapter 8 shows. This compared to an increase of just under 100 stores over the decade of the 1950s. Clearly, this growth did not please everyone. When Grossman officially
announced this program of development in the presentation of the Board's annual report in December 1962, critics accused him and his government of taking too much pride in the growth of stores and profits, while downplaying the Board's role in promoting the consumption of alcohol. According to a Guelph Mercury editorial, he "piously emphasised that the increase in the number of stores in no way indicated any attempt on the Board's part to promote the sale of liquor."\textsuperscript{161} Again, Grossman found himself caught between government control's two competing priorities: social control and business success. By relinquishing some of the control mechanisms conceived in 1927 to limit and control consumption such as the permit and grim, inconveniently located stores, the Board opened itself up to criticism as simply a sale agency. Furthermore, as Grossman continued to emphasise modern approaches to retailing, as any savvy business enterprise should do, he walked the fine line between enforcing reasonable controls and losing the rationalisation for government monopoly altogether. As the opposing comments from The Toronto Telegram and Rev. Mutchmor made clear, there would always be people displeased with policy decisions as too liberal or not liberal enough. Although Grossman himself recognised that with such opposing views "utopia in liquor legislation will never be attained,"\textsuperscript{162} his challenge was to minimise the dichotomy.

Grossman also attempted to improve the LCBO's image by reducing the political influence over hiring for liquor stores. From the time of the first liquor stores, the ruling party enjoyed the patronage opportunities government control presented. While the creation of the Liquor Authority Control Board in 1944 removed licencing patronage from the direct influence of politicians, local Conservative Party organisations continued to determine the candidates for liquor store jobs. As Grossman argued though, "after thoroughly studying this matter, it is my opinion that this system is outmoded and actually loses us more votes than it gains. Public attitudes are changing rapidly and it is necessary to move with the times." Grossman believed that the political recruitment process often resulted in "a poor calibre of employee...[which] is unfortunate since the Government liquor stores are in many cases the only Government agencies with which the public comes in contact." Grossman recognised the present and future importance of LCBO employees particularly with their increased number over the period, as Table
23 depicts. As a result of Grossman's efforts, the government devised a procedure whereby the Civil Service Commission announced vacancies and the final decision rested with the Control Board. While MPPs still made recommendations, Grossman made certain that those from the Opposition "received fair treatment."163 His efforts coincided with an overall improvement of the Civil Service recruitment process,164 and illustrated his determination to make the LCBO a more respectable and efficient business even if that meant interfering with his party's traditional reliance on political patronage.

Table 23

LCBO Employees 1960/61-1969/70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>2800</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>2900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1960/61-1969/70

"BLIMEY WHAT HORRIBLE PUBS!"

After the excitement dissipated over the seemingly extensive package of policy changes Robarts announced in April, displeasure once again set in, with critics focusing as they had done in the past, on the policy areas that had not been revamped. Public houses essentially remained outlets for drinking draught beer one glass at a time while seated at a table. The public generally believed that any type of entertainment—even singing—was illegal in such premises. The Licence Board did little to clarify its stance in this area as the Cabinet Committee on Liquor Matters' decision to keep a policy change on
singing in public houses secret made clear. Therefore, as lounges and dining lounges continued to open across the province and improve their services and surroundings, public houses drew only increasing criticism. An English pub owner visiting Hamilton in the fall of 1962 was “stunned” by the local public house and pronounced it “pathetic” and “horrible.” When he approach the bartender behind the counter to “exchange views,” a waiter told him “You can’t walk around in here.” Then he endeavoured to chat with his waiter but the harried man brusquely rebuffed him. Finally, the Englishman glanced around the room for a congenial person to converse with. Finding none, he complained “Well, what do they come here for? Don’t they talk?” Clearly the Ontario public house failed to measure up to the “glories” of his local pub.165 Similarly, post-war English immigrants to Ontario reported that they stopped going to Ontario public houses when they failed to find the informal sociability of English pubs.166 While newspaper editors, tourists such as this Englishman, and new Ontarians like these English immigrants had been castigating public houses for years, it took a brewery president to bring the issue to the fore.

At an OHA meeting in January 1963, O’Keefe Brewery president W.D. Whitaker severely criticised the condition of Ontario public houses. He rejected the standard argument of some proprietors that their patrons wanted none of the comforts or amenities available in lounges or dining lounges. “They just don’t want to sit and guzzle beer in a race with the clock and a truculent waiter,” he argued.167 Whitaker laid the blame entirely at the door of liquor policymakers. “It is difficult to satisfy customer demands within the existing confusion of rules and regulations,” he explained. He concluded that lawmakers had ignored the desires of the “broad-based groups of people with moderate means.”168 His comments gained wide press coverage and solicited much commentary since, as The Toronto Telegram editorialised, “it didn’t take the representative of a brewing company to tell us that…Ontario’s public houses are slop shops…But now that he has, let’s do something about it.” The ‘something’ that The Telegram editorial proposed was to change the laws dictating behaviour and amenities in Ontario’s public houses to make them “more in keeping with the times.”169 A Guelph Mercury editorial, much more forthrightly, suggested the government change its regulations to allow entertainment and full meals in public houses.170 In order to do that the government would have to let go of its paternalistic and class
biased attitudes toward the province’s beer drinkers, attitudes that had been embedded in the laws since the mid-1930s and preserved since the mid-1940s when liquor by the glass was legalised.

This type of paternalistic attitude towards all drinkers, not only the beer drinker of more modest means, remained an integral aspect of government control, if only in a more subtle manner than during Frost’s reign. In a highly publicised reversal of policy, Premier Robarts personally rescinded a Licence Board ruling that licenced outlets could remain open until 10:30 pm on Christmas Eve 1962. In announcing the new 6:30 pm closing time, he expressed the most forceful paternalistic argument of his premiership:

I am taking this action to ensure that not only those who work in licenced premises but the general public as well will have the opportunity to spend Christmas Eve with their families. The Ontario government is more interested in the safety of its people and the proper observance of the greatest religious festival of our year than it is in providing extra time for entertainment.  

A Lindsay Post editorial praised him for his ability to act quickly upon sensing public opinion. It can be easy to assume that the 1960s represented a complete rejection of the values that had traditionally guided the province, those of family and religion. As Robarts made clear with this passionate declaration, such values continued to thrive and be officially protected by the state. Robarts not only represented the hip young age group but he also answered to an older, more rural generation. While this older rural generation may have represented an increasingly shrinking voice, as a Peterborough Examiner editorial made clear in early 1963, it retained tremendous electoral power due to the overrepresentation of rural seats in the provincial Legislature. This explained politicians’ reluctance to liberalise the liquor laws. Though conceding that it was a “simplistic” answer, the editorial maintained that the argument was “generally true.” A month later an Orillia Packet editorial took the explanation even further, arguing “blame for Ontario’s degrading drinking habits lies with the militant temperance movements and the spineless legislators who are bullied by them.” Like Frost before him, Robarts respected the political power of the rural ridings and took very seriously the responsibilities of his office to protect and safeguard the well being of all Ontarians, even if that meant over-riding an LLBO decision.
In response to the comments by O'Keefe president Whitaker, the Cabinet Committee on Liquor Matters took up the issue of public houses in February and specifically discussed the two licencing changes suggested by the late January 1963 Guelph Mercury editorial: meals and entertainment. Because of the Committee members' fear that permitting full meals would jeopardise the restaurant industry, they reaffirmed their April 1962 recommendation that snacks such as nuts, pretzels, chips "and nothing else" be supplied in lounges and public houses. When it was revealed that "some establishments have already gone beyond these items," it was agreed that such establishments would not be disciplined, "as long as reasonable bounds were maintained." In typical committee meeting style the minutes did not define these 'reasonable bounds.' Furthermore, the Committee continued its tradition of keeping certain policy issues secret as it decided that it was "not necessary to make an announcement." This significant decision resulted from the Committee members' paternalistic attitude towards drinkers and their fear of sparking controversy by publicising policy changes. Therefore, very little changed in practice in the provision of food in the public house and the lounge.

As far as singing was concerned, the Committee took a similar approach in working out a policy. Some of the members expressed support for liberalising the types of entertainment permitted in licenced premises and leaving the regulation, and therefore the blame, with the individual proprietors instead of the LLBO. While the Committee did not go this far in its recommendation, it agreed that singing, piano playing and darts should be permitted in public houses, provided the establishment was "suitably equipped." Nevertheless, the Committee could not come to a decision on the issue of a public announcement. If one were to be made, it decided that such an announcement should omit any reference to singing and refer only to a stricter enforcement of controls on entertainment in licenced premises. This last statement undoubtedly represented a reaction against an incident that was brought to the attention of Chairman Robb. A resident of Thorold sent him a newspaper clipping reporting public house brawls resulting from singing inside the premises. The desire to avoid any violence in the province's drinking establishments certainly dictated that the Committee would recommend strict control over any type of entertainment believed to contribute to this type of behaviour. Therefore, the Committee's
recommendation regarding singing, piano playing and darts in public houses received no public attention and seemingly went no further than the Committee itself.

This became evident to the government and the Board later in the fall of 1963 when Kitchener-Waterloo witnessed another public outcry over a controversial liquor policy. In October a public house fired its pianist when the LLBO instructed the proprietor that Board policy permitted only organs for background music. As with the mid-1950s case of a Kitchener-Waterloo resident being charged for drinking in his own backyard, this incident gained province-wide attention. The Port Arthur News Chronicle pointed out the class discrimination involved in the Board's attempt "to grade musical taste by liquid consumption." While the Board limited public houses to organs, it allowed various types of instruments in lounges. The editorial further wondered by what reasoning the Board decided if you drink beer you must prefer organ music, "an instrument associated in the public's mind with funerals and church."178 For The Kitchener-Waterloo Record, the reason was clear: the government feared that piano music might encourage patrons to sing.179 When Waterloo North MPP Keith Butler asked Licence Board Registrar Hugh J. Browne for clarification, Browne did not mention that the matter of singing and pianos had been discussed at a February 1963 Cabinet Committee meeting. He simply informed Butler that the matter would be on the agenda of the next LLBO meeting.180 Clearly, for many issues, the policy discussions of the Cabinet Committee on Liquor Matters remained merely that, discussions. While the Committee's recommendations formed the backbone of policy changes announced in April 1962, the ongoing meetings simply provided a forum for discussion. As The Kitchener-Waterloo Record pointed out, this incident underlined the shortcomings of Robarts' approach of changing the liquor laws a little at a time. Instead, the editorial argued, the province urgently needed "a full scale review" of the liquor laws.181

As with previous notorious incidents, critics took this opportunity to point out the many other outdated and hypocritical aspects of the liquor laws. Continuing The Port Arthur News Chronicle's criticism of the law's discrimination against public house patrons, The Peterborough Examiner exposed several more "double standards." Calling them "regulations that linger from more puritan days," the
editorial noted that while it was illegal to give a public house customer more than one glass of beer at a time, it was perfectly legal to order a triple shot of liquor in a lounge. Similarly, the editorial went on, a lounge patron could choose to drink sitting down or standing up but a public house beer drinker had to remain seated at all times.  

As for the ban on more than one glass of beer at a time, the situation resembled that surrounding the ban on pianos and singing. In late February 1963 the Cabinet approved a Committee recommendation that public house patrons be allowed to order another glass of beer before the first was finished, but the Committee report made clear that this change did not mean that a patron could “get two full glasses at once.” This partial measure of change resulted from the disagreement among the Committee members regarding the policy. As late as February 4, 1963 Robb vocally opposed permitting double servings of beer “as it leads to drunkenness.” At the next meeting, other Committee members pointed out the discrimination between lounges and public houses and contended that the government’s position on the matter was difficult to explain to the general public. Other members even went so far as to argue that the present system of serving beer in public houses was “not an encouragement to sobriety,” an argument many critics had been advancing for years. With the change to allow a second beer before the previous one was completely drained, the Board slowly relinquished its much-coveted control over consumption behaviour. Because it preferred to keep most of its policy changes secret, the public perception, as well as the public practice, continued to be a ban on more than one glass of beer at a time, as The Peterborough Examiner editorial made clear. Interestingly, no one noted during the discussion on this particular policy that the original impetus was war rationing. The debates instead centred on whether it was the right “time to introduce double servings” and whether it would encourage drunkenness or actually lessen it. The Committee members relied on inspectors’ reports, public complaints and most importantly, their own instincts to develop policy rather than undertake an independent review of the province’s drinking laws, consult scientific evidence or commission surveys. Furthermore, the government’s own research body, the Alcoholism Research Foundation, focused the majority of its resources on the treatment of alcoholism, not research into policy issues. Because the issues were viewed in moral terms, the
members saw no need to consult experts, as Valverde observed generally for government control systems. Therefore, the Committee continued to rely on an incremental and instinctual approach to policy development, with incidents such as these continuing.

The two areas of liquor policy that the government chose not to change, local option and election day drinking, continued to spark criticism from affected Ontarians. As the province continued to grow and expand, especially in the areas surrounding the existing cities, the local option system from the first decade of the twentieth century appeared increasingly out of touch with current realities. Peterborough's city clerk complained to Provincial Secretary Yaremko in November 1962 that local option rendered his city a "patchwork" of wet and dry with various shades in between where only certain types of outlets were permitted. As urban areas like Peterborough annexed the surrounding townships, this patchwork expanded. The clerk pointed out the expense and complexity involved in holding local option votes in each annexed area. Therefore, he proposed two changes to the local option system to promote consistency across the entire municipality. The first involved allowing the annexed areas to obtain the liquor privileges of the annexing area. The second necessitated an amendment to the Liquor Licence Act to allow cities, which were wet, to obtain cocktail bars by a two-thirds vote of the city council in order to avoid the expense of a local plebiscite.

Yaremko's reply revealed that he recognised the shortcomings of the local option system in the context of the early 1960s. In response to the suggestion that annexed areas assume the same status as the annexing area, he agreed, with one stipulation. Yaremko noted that even the annexing city might be under several different shades of local prohibition due to previous annexations. Therefore, he suggested that the new areas take on the regulations in force in the original section of the municipality. While this suggestion went a long way to recognising the expense and confusion involved in simplifying liquor regulations through the process of the local plebiscite, Yaremko still clung to the general concept of local option. As well, the process involved in discovering the 'original' section of a municipality and the liquor laws that applied to it, especially in large centres such as Toronto, proved almost as daunting as carrying out all the necessary local option votes. As for the suggestion that city council votes replace local
plebiscites, Yaremko remained committed to the policy of local option if in a somewhat liberalised form. He emphasised that to allow municipal councils to vote for or against permitting certain types of liquor licences would completely eliminate the local option system, a move that he could not support. Instead, he suggested that if a local petition of 25% of the voters calling for a local option vote was not filed within a specified time period, then the vote of the council would be good enough. He went on to make these recommendations before the Cabinet Committee on Liquor Matters in February 1963. The members responded by emphasising the “difficulties” involved in tampering with local option in any matter. Yaremko’s suggestions, though clearly not rejecting the overall system of local option, represent the government’s first attempt to come to terms with that fifty-year-old policy.

Peterborough’s city clerk greeted Yaremko’s reply favourably, commenting that those changes to the local option system would prove tremendously helpful to the province’s growing municipalities, while still providing the opportunity for public opinion which the local option system was intended to foster. As with so many previous policy debates, the clerk highlighted another policy area in need of amendment so “we should no longer be thwarted by hoary regulations.” He argued “seriously” that the sale of liquor on election days would “in no way injure or harm good election procedures.” He explained that election officials found great difficulty in obtaining qualified volunteers to work at the polls during the weekdays. Saturday would be a much more suitable day for elections, he argued, but the opposition of liquor licence holders, who complained at the prospect of losing their best day for sales, consistently prevented it. He strongly urged Yaremko to reconsider the ban on liquor sales on election days “since in this day and age I am convinced that where liquor is sold in the ordinary way on election day it would have no bearing whatsoever on the successful conduct of the election.” Yaremko made no reply to this request, although as the Cabinet Committee’s recommendation for this change made clear, the ban on election day liquor sales was a policy increasingly under fire from inside and outside government circles.

As with previous policy changes, many of the criticisms following the April 1962 announcement focused on those amendments that had not been made. The moralistic aspects of government control, that so many critics condemned, remained essential to the system and endured despite tinkering with specific
aspects of the policy. A long history of incremental policy change only exacerbated this situation. While Grossman consistently promoted service as his main objective for the LCBO, as his biographer revealed, he underestimated the difficulty involved in bringing about service-oriented policy changes. "The problem was more subtle and the process of achieving change more difficult than Grossman had imagined." Several years later, in early 1964, Robarts identified this challenge of liquor policymaking. Recognising that the April 1962 changes represented only the first step towards "streamlining" and updating the liquor laws, Robarts announced that further alterations were being studied. He also acknowledged that the process would be a long and ongoing one since the Acts had "been amended so often" that they were "unwieldy." A government official revealed at the same time that many problems resulted because "many amendments in the two Acts were written hastily before sessions of the Legislature." With this admission, the Premier committed his government to addressing directly the creation and amendment of liquor policy. Because Robarts continued to perceive the need for caution in this still-controversial policy area, he followed a gradualist approach. Nevertheless, he initiated the process for a more rational liquor policymaking structure, as he did for all areas of policy, in response to the administrative studies and modernisation going on in Quebec and Ottawa.

The Committee on Liquor Matters, established to address some of these problems, suffered the same challenges. While under Grossman’s leadership and beyond the Committee engaged in valuable debate and created comprehensive recommendations, it also found itself encumbered by the moral arguments behind so many of the province’s liquor policies. Instead of focusing on proactive initiatives, its debates often revolved around the anticipated ‘problems’ inherent in any type of change. The moral control impulse guiding government control ruled so strongly at times that polices conceived as war rationing measures such as the supper closing time took on a whole range of moral justifications decades after their original creation.

In this atmosphere, Grossman sought to promote customer service as not only an important goal of the government control system but as the primary goal. He emphasised this in all his speeches and public correspondence. Before a July 1963 Progressive Conservative meeting in North Bay, he defended
the public's right to good customer service "if only because that portion of the public that drinks pays a good share of our taxes."¹⁹⁷ This represented an old argument in defence of customer service, though not since Chief Commissioner Goggin roused the Board staff in the late months of World War Two had the issue been raised so forcefully by a government official. Grossman acknowledged, "we could make more money giving less service. The LCBO is a monopoly and does not have to worry about dressing things up to make a profit."¹⁹⁸ As was abundantly clear to all of his predecessors, in order to justify the monopoly on political grounds and insulate it from illegal competition, a certain minimum standard of customer service was required. For Grossman, the minimum standard that had sufficed in the past no longer met the needs of the second half of the twentieth century.

In promoting customer service, Grossman responded to the complaints of an increasingly vocal number of Ontarians tired of the moral overtones and resulting lack of customer service inherent in the liquor retail system. For example, in May 1962 Brockville's county assessor complained to the LCBO that, while most free enterprise businesses strove to attain the good will of customers, the LCBO took advantage of its monopoly position and disregarded customers' wishes.¹⁹⁹ A year later, a Globe and Mail editorial similarly observed that "governments find themselves snared in...absurdities when they attempt to enforce morals by law." In order to strike a compromise between the "puritanical tradition in Ontario" and the public's desire for alcohol, the editorial argued, the government compromised by allowing liquor retail but only through government control. "In a free society," the editorial contended, "people should be at liberty, without the direction of Government, to set their own moral standards—to drink or not to drink."²⁰⁰ A series of editorials in January 1964 took the argument one step further, arguing that in exchange for the government charging "all that the traffic will bear"²⁰¹ for its alcoholic wares, the customer should "be freed from hypocrisy and archaic restrictions."²⁰² These complaints came to form the basis for the most persuasive arguments against the lingering moralistic overtones in liquor policy.

In his 20 months as Chief Commissioner, Grossman struggled to undo decades of liquor policy intended in many instances to make liquor inconvenient and even demoralising to purchase. Nevertheless, the correspondence from his office revealed the entrenched nature of the paternalistic and moralistic
arguments for justifying policy. For example, in reply to an April 1962 letter questioning the reasoning behind the ban on the sale of single bottles of beer, Grossman’s office replied that while there was no public demand for it, the most important reason was that “it encourages and makes illegal consumption in public easier.” While this detailed reply regarding Ontario’s beer selling laws as compared to Quebec’s showed a genuine commitment to providing clear and straightforward policy statements, it still contained the traditional assumption that, when given even the slightest opportunity, Ontarians would break the liquor laws. Therefore, despite Grossman’s best efforts to promote service and address complaints in a direct manner, paternalistic thinking remained ingrained within the government control structure.

We must also remember that in promoting customer service and convenience as the primary goals of the LCBO, Grossman held himself up personally to the wrath of the province’s prohibitionists. Rev. Mutchmor, for example, blamed Grossman’s “active policies” for the increase in liquor sales reported for 1962. The Toronto Star, a Liberal supporter, and “fanatically dry,” even at this late date, turned Grossman’s argument about the government’s need to justify its liquor monopoly and the resulting profits with generous customer service on its ear. In a late 1962 editorial, the newspaper argued that the recent amendments in liquor policy “only promote sales” in order to boost badly needed government revenue. Ascertaining which actually came first—the revenues as a result of monopoly or the customer service initiatives, which The Toronto Star equated with sales promotion—is rather like the old chicken and egg question. While customer service remained an integral aspect of government control since 1927, when Grossman vocally promoted it, the prohibitionist arguments against widened liquor availability weighed upon him as they did all his predecessors. As The Globe and Mail perhaps more thoughtfully observed: “Mr. Grossman naturally shares the Government’s pride in this affluence—until it results in more citizens spending more money on the commodity that Mr. Grossman has sworn to control. Then it can become embarrassing.” With an economic recession from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, the government certainly endeavoured to maintain or even bolster revenue through government control, one of its most reliable sources. Indeed, the volume of all alcohol sold rose from over 98 million gallons in 1958 to nearly 104 million in 1962. These volumes translated into $66 million for the Provincial Treasurer in
1958 and $82 million four years later, as Table 22, above, and Table 26, in chapter 8, depict. Trying to maintain an equitable balance between an emphasis on business and the resulting revenue and reasonable control proved to be Grossman's greatest challenge.

Several policy issues during Grossman's tenure tested this balance as his struggle to eliminate the neck seals required on every bottle of spirits illustrated. These provincial government seals represented an official stamp of approval indicating that the bottles bearing them had been sold legally through the LCBO. Initially conceived in 1927 to set the new legal bottles apart from their illegal bootleg counterparts, the neck seals had long since outgrown their usefulness in curbing bootlegging. Since at least the late 1950s, distillers had lobbied the Board to eliminate the costly procedure of sealing every bottle. In November 1962, Grossman asked Comptroller Spragge for an opinion on the feasibility of eliminating the seals and encouraged a quick reply as legislative action would be required to eliminate them. Several months later Grossman reported to Cabinet that the seals were no longer necessary to curb bootlegging and that the new manufacturers' seals would serve the same purpose. Also, he emphasised that the move would save taxpayers $50,000 a year, thereby giving the monopoly the image of an efficient enterprise. Later that spring, Grossman publicly announced the elimination of the seals that had "outlived their usefulness." Grossman later recalled, "I had a fight when I took the seals off the liquor bottles. I had always figured it was a good protection against bootlegging but that problem had pretty well disappeared. The system just hated to give up some power." His struggle to end a clearly outdated procedure, originally conceived to control what liquor Ontarians could legally purchase, highlighted the bureaucratic intransigence that had grown up around the government control system.

FREE BEER: "FLAGRANT" BREACHES OF THE LCA

While Grossman spent most of his tenure as Chief Commissioner promoting liberalised liquor laws, another incident revealed his willingness to enforce moral control over liquor distribution when he felt the situation called for it. After becoming Chief Commissioner, Grossman realised that "dubious practices," such as breweries illegally giving away free beer as a sales gimmick, "were rife" in the brewing industry. Because the maximum penalties for these offences, such as small fines or short
closures of stores located directly at the breweries, were “grossly inadequate,”\textsuperscript{216} when another “flagrant” breach of the LCA occurred, Grossman took what he called “drastic action.”\textsuperscript{217} In June 1963, Carling Brewery left complimentary beer outside the doors of 60 apartments. Because the Act required beer purchasers to sign an order form and forbade manufacturers from giving away their wares, this constituted an illegal act. Grossman’s executive assistant happened to live in this particular building, and when his boss heard of the infraction, he vowed to investigate further. When the Chief Inspector of Breweries reported that this type of illegal activity constituted a significant aspect of Carling’s sales system, Grossman feared that the whole system of beer distribution “lent itself to a dangerous situation” on the road to becoming ruled by gangsters, like in the United States.\textsuperscript{218} Therefore, he took the drastic action of closing Carling’s retail outlets, not at the remote brewery location as the law required, but throughout the entire Metro Toronto area for a full week at the height of the summer season.\textsuperscript{219} As expected, this action garnered Grossman the wrath of prominent Canadian businessman E.P. Taylor, who held controlling interest in Carling Breweries. Robarts stood fully behind his Minister, instructing him “we must show them that the government is in charge, not the brewers.” Further, immediately after the incident, the head of the self-discipline council of the Brewers’ Institute told Grossman “this crackdown was the best thing that could have happened. The industry now took the government seriously with respect to the liquor laws.”\textsuperscript{220} Not everyone so heartily agreed with Grossman’s actions.

Many critics opposed what they viewed as a severe and uncompromising attitude by the Chief Commissioner. This criticism existed in a particular context. A month before Grossman instituted the Carling ban, a scandal erupted regarding a small stock interest that his wife owned in a hotel company holding several liquor licences in the Toronto area. The specifics of this case have been well documented by Grossman’s biographer, Peter Oliver. For the purposes of this argument, critics took offence at Grossman punishing a brewery for questionable activities when his own ethics had been so recently called into question. For example, The Globe and Mail’s Scott Young satirically criticised Grossman for riding “on a horse that recently has been painted white,” chasing down beleaguered beer sales people merely trying to earn a profit. Young argued “that any law which prevents a company from giving away samples
of a legal product is discriminatory and unfair.” He went on to contend that “free beer can’t hurt a human any more than the same beer bought and paid for.”

For Grossman, this argument carried no weight. Although he spent his brief tenure as Chief Commissioner battling against moralistic and paternalistic liquor policies, he also held a deeply felt responsibility to protect Ontarians from the dangerous product that he had sworn to control. In his mind, free beer was more dangerous than beer that a customer visited a beer store to purchase. In one free beer delivery, a brewery left a case of beer at the door of a woman belonging to Alcoholics Anonymous because “they think she is buying it elsewhere.” For Grossman, this was an unacceptable and dangerous situation. Because of its addictive properties, alcohol was not a retail product like “corn flakes, aspirin tablets, lemon extract, or tickets to the Victory burlesque,” that companies should be legally permitted to give away, as Young argued. Beyond this, Grossman may also have reacted so strongly in enforcing the Board’s moral view of alcohol distribution in reaction to the recent attacks on his personal ethics. With charges of conflict of interest levelled against him, the sensitive and conscientious Minister sought to reinforce his commitment to controlling all aspects of the liquor industry and stamping out even a hint of questionable activity. Even while questioning the paternalism behind treating free samples of beer differently from other free products, critics credited Grossman with continuing to lead the province in “slowly groping its way out of a fog of minority-rule in all matters affecting alcohol.”

In leading this process of change Grossman encountered such obstacles and challenges in endeavouring to balance the moral and control impulses of government control that he was tempted to abandon the entire system to the private sector. He resisted this urge because of his deeply held fear that the unique nature of the product made it vulnerable to organised crime. This fear was based on the real concern in the province about the spread of organised crime from the United States. Throughout the first years of Robarts’ premiership, this represented one of the over-riding political issues, reinforced consistently by Liberal revelations of widespread illegal gambling. Even though the Roach Royal Commission, established by Robarts in December 1961, later reported in the spring of 1963 that only a
minor element of organised crime operated in Ontario, the issue and the accompanying fear influenced all aspects of provincial politics in this era, including liquor policy.

The free beer incident proved to be one of the last major activities Grossman participated in as Chief Commissioner of the LCBO. When Robarts shuffled his Cabinet in August 1963, just prior to calling a provincial election, he shifted Grossman from the LCBO and appointed him Minister of Reform Institutions. While this change might have otherwise been interpreted as a promotion, most people agreed, Grossman included, that Robarts removed him from the sensitive liquor post because he had embarrassed his government through the conflict of interest scandal. This certainly proved to be the case as two more scandals erupted immediately after the Cabinet shuffle involving charges that Grossman favoured his friends in the winery business by having their products chosen for the liquor store shelves in the highly competitive and complex listing process. As well, a distillery representative implicated him in the infamous ‘Melchers Affair’ involving large payoffs to the Conservative Party in return for having the distillery’s products sold by the Board.

Oliver has extensively analysed these events in the context of Grossman’s career. What is clear for our purposes is that after less than two years as Chief Commissioner Grossman found himself at the centre of a storm of accusations, innuendoes and misinterpretation. In a position known for the longevity of its holders, Grossman, much like his similarly outspoken and proactive predecessor Victor Goggin, was removed after only a short tenure. Nevertheless, he began a process of change in attitude towards liquor policy unparalleled by any previous Chief Commissioner. Grossman’s legacy is significant for many reasons. Because of the controversy inherent in amending liquor policy and the government’s heightened emphasis on the business aspect of government control, Grossman would be the last elected Chief Commissioner of the LCBO. The government thereafter reverted to its past tradition, initiated by Ferguson, of having an individual from private business head the system. More significantly, as Oliver argued, Grossman’s initiatives, especially those through the Committee on Liquor Matters, “demonstrated that the Robarts’ administration had turned a major corner in liquor-law administration in Ontario. The way had been opened for more extensive changes in the late sixties and the seventies.”


The 1962 amendments represented Robarts and Grossman’s attempt to address pent-up public demand. While they did not personally believe in the necessity of coercive ‘social control,’ there was a certain rural constituency that was concerned about liberalising the liquor laws. As a result, rural temperance supporters looked increasingly towards the Liberal Party. Therefore, Robarts and Grossman implemented a gradualist approach to change as the politically safe way to manoeuvre in a difficult policy area. As Grossman’s short, scandal-plagued tenure reminded both men: “Frost had been cautious for good reason.”  

But because so many of those changes merely represented policy initiatives that had been delayed from the Frost years, and even the World War Two era, the public demanded more extensive changes as the initial excitement of the 1962 amendments abated. As one letter to the editor illustrated, there was much more to be done. Just weeks before Grossman’s removal from the Chief Commissioner’s post, a Windsor writer complained of useless beer order forms filled out by “A. Hitler, Berlin,” reminiscent of the ‘Rover Collie’ incident of the 1950s. He charged class discrimination when the only place one could buy cheap beer was a “filthy beverage room,” while expensive cocktail lounges welcomed spirit drinkers continuously throughout the day until 1 am. The “better-class groups” enjoyed “cocktail cruises” on Lake Ontario ferries, he explained but “let some poor working stiff take a six-pack of beer with him to a picnic on the Island... and see how long before he is in the jug.” The only hope, the writer argued, was that the Robarts’ government would “come to realize that the Ontario of today is not the Ontario of the UFO and the OTA or even the Ontario of Mitch Hepburn... then they are going to decide to scrap the whole stupid law and replace it with one more in keeping with a modern, cosmopolitan society, in the middle of the Twentieth Century.”  

After paving the way for this to even be considered, Grossman would now have to leave the job to someone else.
Notes to Chapter 6

6 Manthorpe. p. 6.
7 McDougall. p. 39.
8 McDougall. p. 274.
10 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. pp. 121-22.
11 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 129.
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38 See RG 41-1 Box 2, LCBO Central Registry Files Correspondence. File 17-C-1 “Permits, Banquet, Licence Holders.” memo February 18, 1960 to all vendors from A.J. McIntyre, Supervisor of Stores.
41 Ontario Debates. April 17, 1962, p. 2468
47 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “Liquor Committee 1961,” (restricted) December 4, 1961 Minutes of Meeting of Meeting on Liquor Matters.
51 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 121.
52 September 5, 1961 Meeting on Liquor Matters.
54 December 4, 1961 Minutes of Meeting on Liquor Matters.
56 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. no file name.
58 See for example RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “14 LLB 1962,” (restricted) May 1, 1961 to Robarts from Ontario Temperance Federation; and June 9, 1962 to Robarts from Toronto Conference of the United Church of Canada.
60 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “14 LLB 1962.” (restricted) May 2, 1962 to Ontario Temperance Federation from Robarts.
65 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “14 LLB 1962.” (restricted) June 18, 1962 to A.B.M., President Kingston District Quarterly Conference of Free Methodist Church from Robarts.
68 See for example RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “Liquor and Canadian Legion 1962-63.” (restricted) November 19, 1962 to George Gordon, MLA Brantford from G.J.S. Secretary of Canadian Legion Branch 90.
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70 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “14 LLB 1962.” (restricted) June 9, 1962 to Robarts from Toronto Conference of United Church of Canada.
72 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “14 LLB 1962.” (restricted) May 2, 1962 to Royal F. Moulton of Ontario Temperance Federation from Robarts.
76 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 13. LCBO Correspondence General Manager. File “Miscellaneous 1955-60.” memo February 18, 1959 to all vendors from Supervisor of Stores A.J. McIntyre.
81 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “14 LLB 1962.” (restricted) May 2, 1962 to Ontario Temperance Federation from Robarts.
82 RG 4-2 Box 59.8. Attorney General Correspondence. File “1948 LLB.” (restricted) memo October 14, 1948 from New Red Lake Hotel Company Ltd.
83 RG 4-2 Box 59.8. Attorney General Correspondence. File “1948 LLB.” (restricted) memo November 19, 1948 to Robb from Blackwell.
87 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “14 LLB 1962.” (restricted) letter received February 26, 1962 to Yaremko from Westside United Church, Owen Sound.
89 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. no file name, (restricted) loose papers in front of box. March 14, 1962 Report of Cabinet Committee to Consider the Province’s Liquor Legislation.
91 Oliver, Unlikely Tory. p. 126.
92 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “14 LLB 1962.” (restricted) February 7, 1962, to Robarts from Cornwall WCTU.
93 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. no file name, (restricted) loose papers in front of box, undated memo Cabinet Committee on Liquor Legislation.
95 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. no file name, (restricted) loose papers in front of box, undated memo Cabinet Committee on Liquor Legislation.
98 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. no file name, (restricted) loose papers in front of box, undated memo Cabinet Committee on Liquor Legislation.
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103 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2, Provincial Secretary Correspondence, John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “Liquor Committee 1963.” (restricted) summary of April 1962 meeting found in Minutes of Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Liquor Legislation, February 4, 1963.
104 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files, no file name. (restricted) loose pages in front of box, memo November 13, 1962 to Yaremko from R.A. Farrell, Premier’s Executive Officer.
105 RG 8-5 Acc. 15-45 Box 2. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files, no file name. (restricted) loose papers in front of box. undated memo Cabinet Committee on Liquor Legislation.
108 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence, John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “LCBO 1960 and 1961,” (restricted) undated memo to Frost from Hon. R.W. Macaulay.
113 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “14 LLB 1962.” (restricted) undated to R.L. Proprietor of Windsor Hotel, Kincardine from Robarts.
114 March 14, 1962 Report of Cabinet Committee to Consider the Province’s Liquor Legislation.
124 RG 4-2 Box 164.5. Attorney General Correspondence Files. File “1961 LCBO and LLB.” (restricted) October 21, 1961 to Attorney General Roberts from J.H., President Port Arthur United Pulpwood Farmers’ Association.
125 March 14, 1962 Report of Cabinet Committee to Consider the Province’s Liquor Legislation.
126 Oliver, Unlikely Tory. p. 122.
127 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. no file name. (restricted) loose papers in front of box. confidential December 1, 1962. to Yaremko from Grossman.
131 March 14, 1962 Report of Cabinet Committee to Consider the Province’s Liquor Legislation.
132 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. no file name. (restricted) loose papers in front of box. memo November 13, 1962 to Yaremko from Premier’s Executive Officer R.A. Farrell. List of Matters Recommended and not Recommended by Liquor Committee.
133 March 14, 1962 Report of Cabinet Committee to Consider the Province’s Liquor Legislation.
135 Statutes of Ontario. 1927. 17 Geo. V. c. 70. s. 35 (b).
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138 Schindeler, pp. 55-56.

139 Oliver, Unlikely Tory, p. 123.


144 "Editorial: Is This Liquor Control?" The Toronto Star, April 14, 1962, p. 6.


146 "No Joy in OTF Camp at Liquor Act Change," p. 5.


149 Oliver, Unlikely Tory, p. 122.


151 Ontario Debates, April 17, 1962, p. 2469.


156 "Editorial: BC’s New Liquor Store.


162 Phyllis Griffiths, "So You Think OUR Drink Laws Odd…" The Toronto Telegram, November 28, 1962.

163 Oliver, Unlikely Tory, pp. 128-29.

164 McDougall, p. 89.


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176 February 4, 1963 Minutes of Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Liquor Legislation.

177 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “Liquor Committee 1963.” (restricted), see untitled newspaper clipping from Feb 7, 1963 sent anonymously to Robb from resident of Thorold.


181 “Editorial: Bla Bla Law.”


185 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “Liquor Committee 1963.” (restricted) February 20, 1963 Minutes of Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Liquor Legislation.

186 February 4, 1963 Minutes of Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Liquor Legislation.


189 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “15/5 LLB Votes 1963.” (restricted) November 7, 1962 to Yaremko from City of Peterborough City Clerk E.A.O.

190 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “15/4 LLB Votes 1963.” (restricted) November 30, 1962 to E.A.O City Clerk for City of Peterborough from Yaremko.

191 November 30, 1962 to E.A.O City Clerk for City of Peterborough from Yaremko.


194 Oliver, Unlikely Tory, p. 123.


196 McDougall, p. 128.


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205 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 126.
208 McDougall. p. 58.
214 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 125.
215 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 130.
216 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 131.
218 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 131.
219 “Brewer Barred From Selling In Metro Area For One Week.” p. 1.
222 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 130.
224 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 127.
225 See McDougall. pp. 80-81.
226 McDougall. p. 97.
227 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 130.
228 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 121.
"A LARGE, IMPORTANT AND COMPLEX BUSINESS"¹

In August 1963 Premier Robarts replaced Allan Grossman as LCBO Chief Commissioner with the chairman of the board of IBM Canada, G. Harry Sheppard. Unlike Grossman, Sheppard was an "outsider"² to the politics of liquor policy. Followed by controversy throughout his short but active tenure as Chief Commissioner, Grossman was:

almost continuously under fire...on one hand from the wets who complain of the ringmarole [sic] they must go through to purchase liquor and on the other side from the drys who complain liquor is too easy to obtain.³

"Convinced that liquor and politics do not mix,"⁴ Robarts believed that a private sector businessman would be able to operate the LCBO without the controversies inherent in politics. Sheppard's business background was perhaps even more significant than his status as an outsider free of the conflicts of politics. When Robarts announced his selection as Chief Commissioner, Sheppard declared, "this appointment was offered to me because I am a businessman."⁵ Although he quickly emphasised the business enterprise aspect of government control, he also articulated the other important goal of the system. "It is a large and complex business and must operate as such. Remember, it is the Liquor Control Board of Ontario and the word control is important."⁶ Obviously, the twin impulses of moral control and business efficiency remained critical to the system even with this new businessman at the helm.

Sheppard brought to the position of Chief Commissioner a long history of business experience. The 58-year-old Toronto native worked his way up from salesman to chairman of the board at IBM Canada. He also served as a director of several businesses including Imperial Life Assurance, the Bank of Montreal and Canadian Surety Co. Sheppard also dedicated his time to various boards and councils of the United Church.⁷ Although he admitted to being acquainted with the Premier, he added that he "was not an
active Conservative supporter." When asked about his drinking habits, Sheppard emphasised "I'm not a teetotaller... but I don't drink very much." His appointment represented an expression of the government's long and deeply held commitment to the business enterprise aspect of government control that had been evident throughout the entire history of the LCBO.

Appointing a private businessman as Chief Commissioner was not a novel move for the government. Premier Ferguson established the practice in 1927 and it continued until 1939 when Premier Hepburn appointed MPP Arthur St. Clair Gordon to replace Edmond Odette, a private citizen. The last non-elected Chief Commissioner before Sheppard was Gordon's successor, Victor Goggin, who served effectively, though briefly, from 1944-45. Although most of the press coverage of Sheppard's appointment incorrectly reported on the history of private citizens serving in the position, a great deal of significance was attached to Robarts' decision to appoint a businessman as Chief Commissioner. Donald C. MacDonald, leader of the New Democratic Party (NDP), the recent amalgam of the old CCF and organised labour, regarded the appointment of someone not involved in politics as "a good thing." He went on to add, "liquor policies are so fraught with overtones that more than the normal pressure is brought to bear on commissioners who are active in politics." Rev. Mutchmor welcomed the appointment of someone "clear of political involvement" and hoped Sheppard would "major in the control part of his LCBO job." Described as a sincere man and a "non-flamboyant salesman convinced that successful sales depend on quality being built into the product," Sheppard himself emphasised the importance of the change in approach to appointing the head of the LCBO. "I think it was a wise move to make it non-political," he told reporters. Without the added responsibilities and difficulties of elected life, the implication was that Sheppard could dedicate all his time and expertise towards running a business that in 1962/63 sold more than $370 million in products, as Table 24 illustrates.
Sheppard's appointment also served to reduce the confusion inherent among the public and even the politicians regarding which Cabinet minister was responsible for which Liquor Board. As a Minister without Portfolio, Allan Grossman reported to Cabinet for the Control Board while Provincial Secretary Yaremko reported for the Licence Board. In September 1962 Grossman found it necessary to clarify the situation in a letter to each Cabinet minister. With Sheppard's appointment, Provincial Secretary Yaremko now answered for both Liquor Boards.

While the public events surrounding liquor control in the early 1960s revolved primarily around Grossman's dedication to undoing some of the moral controls regulating liquor sale, business success remained an important goal of government control. For this reason, while Sheppard's appointment prompted the press to contrast him with previous politicians in the post, his business background fit ideally with the ongoing focus of the LCBO. For example, in early January 1962 the Board hired management consultants from Price Waterhouse Ltd. to carry out a study "to ensure that satisfactory service is being provided by stores at a minimum cost." The same consulting firm recommended that the Comptroller's office modernise its personnel titles in keeping with changes occurring in the business sector. Brigadier Spragge adopted the title of General Manager while the Chief Accountant assumed his
previous title of Comptroller. This study of liquor store operations reflected an ongoing commitment to serving customers not only efficiently but also effectively. Correspondingly, as the Board endeavoured to satisfy customer tastes, even those that could not be met at the local store level, special orders and private stock shipments of spirits and wines increased from year to year throughout the early 1960s. The Board also continued its emphasis on educating the public and its own employees about wine production and consumption. In the summer of 1962 Wine Supervisor L.K. Brown reflected on the Board’s program of wine education saying that there was “no more effective method of instruction and would earnestly recommend it be continued.” He further encouraged the Board to be more responsive to the public’s tastes and demands. “Experience thus far indicates that future planning of product education should include all members of store staffs [sic] because it is the man on the counter that has the most contact with the purchasing public.” With wine sales through LCBO stores outstripping those through winery sales outlets, notably as a result of the Board’s 87 wine displays as of March 1963, Brown’s advice was well heeded. By the following year this was even more evident, as the Board boasted 120 wine displays and saw sales of Canadian wines increase by 229,000 gallons while sales through winery retail stores decreased by 70,000 gallons. These figures reflected the impact of the wine education initiatives begun under Chief Commissioner Collings in the 1950s. Sheppard’s business experience complemented this commitment to market wine and the Board’s other products effectively.

As these few examples illustrate, the Board’s commitment to sound business practices was not a creation of its newly appointed Chief Commissioner with an accomplished business background but instead a long-standing tradition. What Sheppard’s appointment did was to re-emphasise it after so many years of public controversy over the moral control aspect of liquor retailing. The struggle between the control and business goals of government control that was waged throughout the late 1940s and 1950s necessitated premiers relying on elected Chief Commissioners with sound public policy backgrounds. By mid-1963, especially after the personal controversies involving Allan Grossman, Robarts reversed this policy to better reflect the balance that he would like to see in government control: less moral control and more business emphasis. This is not to imply that the struggle to come to terms with the moral overtones
behind so many of the province's liquor policies was over. If anything, Sheppard's appointment as Chief Commissioner signalled the continuation of a tremendous wave of liquor law change initiated by his elected predecessor.

“YOUR METHOD OF SELLING IS REPULSIVE”

While Sheppard's appointment did promote the belief that change and a general cleaning up of the Board policies would occur after the aura of scandal left by Grossman's departure dissipated, this did not stop the public from criticising the practices surrounding liquor sale. In November 1963 one Toronto writer complained to General Manager Spragge that "your method of selling is repulsive and I avoid the indignity of a purchase as often as possible." The writer specifically objected to the necessity of the liquor order form and wondered why Ontario did not have a "simple counter system" like Quebec.21 Brigadier Spragge replied that the Liquor Control Act specified that purchasers must sign for their liquor and he went on to justify order forms as a system to speed up customer service, especially on busy Friday and Saturday evenings.22

The regulations surrounding public drinking also continued to attract severe criticisms. A Toronto English teacher, John McMurtry, expressed his complaints in a Toronto Telegram opinion article entitled “Liquor: The Law Is A Ass.” He criticised the lack of windows or outdoor seating in Ontario’s drinking outlets. He reasoned that “apparently the exposure of such sinners to the outside world might corrupt the public mind.” McMurtry took particular aim at what he described as class biased regulations that dictated segregation by sex, limited entertainment and shorter hours for public houses. On the other hand, “those who can afford to patronise the more expensive places” enjoyed greater freedom in their drinking environment. He concluded, “the powers that be in Ontario don’t mind giving in to the teetotalers as long as they aren’t affected. If their own pocketbooks, or drinking privileges are threatened, however, it appears that they have kept legislation more in line.”23 Here, McMurtry asserted an argument that had been hinted at in criticisms of Ontario’s liquor laws for decades. While past critics condemned the biased rules of the public house, few took the argument further to implicate the lawmakers in taking steps to preserve their own class privileges. These discriminatory laws arose out of the sense of
paternalism that the province’s politicians and bureaucrats felt towards the working class, a paternalism with deep roots among Canadian lawmakers, as Loo and Strange demonstrated. Increasingly, Ontarians, like McMurtry, questioned this paternalism that assumed the working class were incapable of regulating their alcohol consumption, and revealed the negative consequences of limiting drinkers’ choices. “For when establishments which serve liquor are forced by law to close early and prohibited by law from diverting their customers, the customer, with little time and nothing to do but drink, feels compelled to get as systematically and quickly drunk as possible.”

One week later, another Toronto Telegram liquor law critic pointed out an additional regulation which contributed to this ‘systematic drunkenness.’ In a colourful description of “an ordinary beverage room on an ordinary night,” Wessley Hicks observed that “an imbibers...is permitted to have one glass of draft beer on the table at a time.” Because provincial laws could not measure the steadiness of a drinker, he pointed out, they regulated the number of glasses on the table which “are easier to measure and count.” Nevertheless, Hicks’ vivid description of the ‘ordinary night’ made clear that drinkers managed to become ‘unsteady’ while all the time staying within the law. Like the observations made by McMurtry, critics had been linking the one-glass-at-a-time rule to excessive drunkenness since it was instituted during World War Two. Hicks went one step further in observing that this ruling represented the government’s choice of the easier quantitative policy compared to the qualitative measurement of drunkenness. Although this policy originated as a war rationing measure, after the war people such as Chairman Robb began to defend the policy as a way to reduce drunkenness. By the early 1960s critics increasingly emphasised that they would no longer tolerate this type of moral reasoning behind regulations that dictated where, when and how much Ontarians could drink.

“STREAMLINE LIQUOR LAWS”

As a result of this increasing chorus of complaints, Premier Robarts announced in early January 1964 that the province’s liquor laws would be rewritten “to bring them up to date with the times.” At the same time, he emphasised that this would be only a streamlining of the laws. “We have no intention of loosening things up.” Despite the government’s continued and vocal commitment to the moral
regulation aspect of government control, most commentators welcomed Robarts’ announcement as a sign of the government’s pledge to liberalise the liquor laws in keeping with the wishes of the majority of Ontarians.²⁸ Perhaps just as significant as Robarts’ announcement to update both liquor Acts was the wider context surrounding the statement. He revealed the government’s intention to streamline the laws at a press conference concerning Toronto’s plans for Canada’s upcoming Centennial celebrations in 1967.²⁹ Ontario’s liquor laws had been criticised repeatedly over the years based on the hypocrisies and contradictions embedded in the laws themselves but also in comparison to more liberal laws in operation in other provinces and other countries. Now a new variable was introduced into the debate.

Organisers and the public alike began discussing Canada’s Centennial celebrations from at least early 1964. The anticipation this planning process created fuelled a great deal of anxiety concerning how the many expected visitors would perceive Ontario’s liquor laws. While the editorial critics created the most vocal sense of anxiety, liquor producers, the hospitality industry and the general public all contributed to the build-up to July 1967 and intensified the demand for liquor law change like never before. Canada’s 100th birthday as a country, as well as Montreal’s Expo ’67, promised to attract visitors to Ontario from other provinces, especially to the nation’s capital, Ottawa, but also from other countries, most notably the United States, en route to Quebec. These two major events, therefore, prompted a heightened demand for liquor law change not only to satisfy and perhaps even impress the many visitors but more importantly as an expression of Ontario’s maturity as a society by the mid 1960s. As the country approached an important milestone in its history, residents reflected on their standing in the world and looked at their liquor laws as one outward sign of maturity and sophistication. These concepts appeared more frequently in criticisms about the liquor laws, with many Ontarians viewing the freedom to decide when and where to drink as an important symbol of modern life. It was not that more Ontarians drank than ever before. A June 1963 poll showed 70% of adults drank,³⁰ the same percentage that surveys in 1948 and 1954 revealed. What was different was how people felt about drinking, particularly their rights surrounding the activity.
These demands began just months after the novelty of Sheppard's appointment wore off. In early December 1963 Toronto Telegram columnist McKenzie Porter complained of the early closing times announced for the province's drinking outlets on Christmas Eve, calling the move "puritanical and despotic." The year before Premier Robarts overruled the Licence Board to institute an earlier closing hour for that festive occasion. Porter argued that Toronto was the only major city in the world where drinking hours were curbed on these holidays. He contended that the moral reasoning behind the ruling, that drinkers and workers alike should instead spend the time with their families, represented an unacceptable "intrusion on individual freedom." The political establishment, he recommended, "needs to become more worldly," in its attitude towards drinking. Later that same month Porter pointed out the lack of licenced live theatres in the province similar to the kinds enjoyed in Britain. In Ontario, he concluded, the "ridiculous complexities of our drinking laws make such civilized service impossible." Later in the spring of 1964 a Toronto Telegram editorial echoed his demands. "Nothing has subjected the capital of Ontario to more ridicule than liquor laws." The editorial argued that even though the Licence Board "hasn't the nerve to reform itself," it was time that the Board "grew up" and realised that a bar in a theatre was a "perfectly normal and mature amenity for the public's pleasure." This preoccupation with the maturity and worldliness of Ontario, particularly its capital, was clearly a product of the anticipation building towards the celebrations of 1967.

SUNDAY SALE: "MOST DAMNABLE THING POSSIBLE"

The demand for Sunday sale of liquor gained renewed prominence at this time. Critics had been chastising the government for refusing to allow sale on Sunday since the highly anticipated change was not included in the 1962 package of liquor law amendments. Now the call took on greater intensity in the context of the anxiety surrounding the province being on display for the world and other provinces in 1967. In November 1963, a Fort Erie man corresponded with Premier Robarts promoting the extension of Saturday evening drinking hours beyond the current 11:30 pm closing time. He based his argument on what he called the "institution of the weekend." He further reasoned that most Ontario residents would not view such an extension as "profaning the Lord's Day." LLBO Chairman Robb, responding on
Robarts' behalf, and refusing to acknowledge the writer's differentiation between late Saturday evening and Sunday proper, stated simply that liquor sale had never been permitted in Ontario on "the Sabbath."35

By spring 1964, the Ontario Hotel and Motel Association petitioned the Legislative Committee on Highways and Tourism to allow liquor sale with meals on Sundays. Responding to this suggestion, committee member, Conservative A.B.R. Lawrence called Sunday sale the "most damnable thing possible."36 While he used a religious term to condemn the idea of Sunday sale, the arguments against the concept revolved around the heavy traffic flow on Sundays and the anticipated increase in accidents. The hotel and motel lobby group also petitioned for the licencing of tourist resorts and banquets in dry areas, currently available only for wedding receptions. While such demands directly attacked the local option system, the concept of Sunday sale garnered the greatest attention, certainly from MPP Lawrence but also from the press37 and the public. The Toronto Telegram's Frank Tumpane, always prepared to contribute to the province's ongoing debate over liquor law reform, argued: "If the drinking of liquor is bad, it should be prohibited on all seven days of the week in this province, and not only on the Sabbath. If it is not bad, why are citizens denied liquor with their meals?" Promoting the individualistic reasoning used more frequently in the 1960s to counter perceived moralistic impediments to freedom, Tumpane declared that no one has the "right to tell me or anybody else that I can't serve liquor in my home on Sunday; and whether I drink it in a hotel dining room on Sunday should not be any of his affair, either."38

The 1960s witnessed the rise in importance of these "situational ethics," replacing previous moral judgements rendering certain behaviour absolutely right or absolutely wrong.39 Outspoken journalists like Tumpane were at the leading edge in promoting them with the liquor laws a particularly fitting target. He also took the opportunity to reiterate a theme popular with his working class readers. Pointing specifically to the supper hour closure of public houses, he pondered. "Why is it that the beer drinkers of this province are considered less able to manage their own affairs than the whiskey drinkers? I can only conclude it must be because the Ontario government believes the beer drinker is poorer, less responsible, and less intelligent than his neighbour who can afford 80 cents for a glass of scotch." This neighbour, unlike the
public house beer drinker, "isn't chased home like a recalcitrant child" from a cocktail lounge, which remained open uninterrupted throughout the day.  

Drinkers and municipal officials alike also hoped to reinstate the freedom of selling liquor on election days. Critics since at least the 1950s pointed to this restriction as an outmoded regulation in the context of the modern mid-twentieth century. In the summer of 1964, a St. Catharines delegation appealed to the Legislative Committee on Municipal Affairs to keep liquor stores and public drinking outlets open on election days. Several Toronto aldermen also approved of the proposal, noting that Ontarians were "more mature" today than when election day excesses and corruption prompted the ban. While some aldermen expressed concern that such sale "could lead to problems," most described the law as "archaic" and a "throwback" to the time of public voting. Although this proposal for election day liquor sale offered no new arguments, the appeal revealed continued pressure for the idea as well as a heightened self-awareness of the 'modernity' and 'maturity' of the 1960s.

For many, no liquor policy area required more immediate ‘modernisation’ than the drinking conditions in the public house. In the late summer of 1964 Labatt president John Labatt instigated another round of condemnation for the beer outlet before a Labatt annual meeting in London. He called the public house “drear" and in need of modernisation in order to provide “pleasant conditions" for the consumption of beer, the “moderate” alcoholic beverage. These remarks touched off a flurry of criticism in the same way that the January 1963 criticisms of O'Keefe president W.D. Whitaker did. The only real change the Board made to the public house in the intervening year and a half was to allow pianos, but only with permission, a change that an early September 1964 Toronto Telegram editorial highlighted. Besides this one relaxation, the editorial argued, the "civilizing trend" for the public house was "oh so slow." The editorial maintained that the public house was the same "cheerless" and "inhospitable" place that lawmakers deemed it should be when they introduced it almost 30 years before. The editorial concluded that politicians anticipated political danger in any attempt to make drinking conditions more pleasant. Nevertheless, the editorial challenged the government to eliminate such "slop houses" before the expected wave of tourists arrived in 1967.
The assumption that politicians refused to modernise the public house due to their continued fear of the wrath of the province’s traditional prohibitionists no longer carried the weight that it did during the Frost years. Before the September 1963 election, the government added ten new seats to the Legislature, helping to rectify the rural overrepresentation that had resulted from increasing urbanisation. The election increased the majority Robarts inherited from Frost by six seats and signalled the public’s strong support for his 1962 liquor policy changes. Furthermore, at a March 1964 meeting of the OTF, members voiced differing opinions on the issue of the public house, revealing in a public fashion the divisions that had been plaguing the organisation and others like it for years. While some members continued to echo the Federation’s traditional attitude, maintaining that public house owners “should not paint them up” since this would “attract more drinking,” many others complained that public houses were “filthy” and required musical and entertainment diversions. This opening up of opinion, coupled with the lessening of the rural voice in government, the traditional source of temperance beliefs, certainly paved the way for changes to public house regulations and other liquor policies. Clearly critics targeted the 20-year-old war rationing measures like the supper hour closure and the two original cornerstones of government control, local option and the ban on Sunday sale in their quest for a complete modernisation of Ontario’s liquor laws to more accurately reflect the 1960s. Besides these enduring complaints, one new policy change suggestion reflected the unique context of this particular decade.

Lowering Ontario’s legal drinking age had been commented upon in past years in isolated instances of condemnation of the province’s liquor laws. With the influential pressure of demographics the issue gained great prominence in the mid-1960s. The proportion of the population under the age of 20 rose significantly as a result of the baby boom. In 1961 it constituted 40%, up from 33% in 1951 and contributed to a societal preoccupation with youth throughout the decade. By 1964 Ontario’s first baby boomers, those born immediately following World War Two, began to turn 18 and 19 years of age. This ‘peak’ in the province’s demographic make-up began to influence this particular aspect of liquor control as well as others, an influence that would only increase as these baby boomers’ younger siblings reached
their later teens and early 20s in the years ahead. While they could not yet vote, they represented an important and unprecedented pool of potential future supporters for the government.

The province’s legal community initiated the vocal criticism of the minimum drinking age of 21, as lawyers and magistrates ridiculed the law in highly publicised court cases across Ontario throughout 1964. For example, a lawyer defending an 18-year-old Whitby resident charged with underage drinking pronounced the law “absurd.” The law, the lawyer argued, considered this defendant a man for the armed forces but a minor when it came to drinking.48 In November, an Ottawa magistrate called the charge of underage drinking “unfortunate” for a 20-year-old air force man, especially when the minimum drinking age across the Ottawa River in Hull, Quebec was 20.49 Politicians also began talking about the issue of age of majority, the wider concept governing not only the age at which one could drink but also vote or enter into legal contracts. While many politicians viewed the issue of lowering the voting age as currently in “vogue,” according to Globe and Mail columnist Vincent Devitt, they quickly avoided any discussion of lowering the drinking age. NDP leader Donald MacDonald called it “a controversial issue,” while Liberal leader Farquhar Oliver referred to it as “a very large social question.” Appreciating the complexity as well as the controversy of the issue, Premier Robarts promised “public discussion of the whole question” because of the “many angles to be considered” 50

Not everyone practised such diplomacy on the issue. The Toronto Star, showing its belief in restricted access to alcohol, ridiculed the idea of lowering the drinking age. Just because news reports revealed that many Ontario teens drank illegally, the editorial argued, that was no reason for the Legislature to consider lowering the drinking age. “Why not give them a funnel and pour it down their throats?”51 This rather alarmist reaction to the suggestion that the province’s minimum drinking age be lowered represented an increasingly isolated attitude towards regulating consumption. In this age when many people began questioning with impunity things they previously accepted as normal or natural,52 the province’s liquor laws and their moral justifications provided fertile ground for such questioning.

While the politicians remained wary about openly discussing the idea of lowering the drinking age, fearful perhaps of the type of wrath shown by the above Toronto Star editorial, another similar
matter presented itself, putting further pressure on them to address the controversial issue. The Globe and Mail, editorialising about Robarts' recent promise "of a complete overhaul of Ontario's grotesque liquor laws," singled out one particularly "fatuous restriction:" the law making it illegal for parents to serve their minor children alcoholic beverages in their own homes. This law, the editorial argued, rendered many Ontario residents "lawbreakers unreasonably and probably in unawareness of it." Even more problematic than that, this law "attempts such a questionable invasion of private rights that common sense positively urges disobedience." This questioning of the province's liquor laws based on arguments of individual freedom echoed recent similar criticisms. The editorial urged Ontario to emulate European traditions, which accepted moderate alcohol consumption as a "normal part of living," especially in the family context. "It makes no sense," the editorial maintained, "for a community to forbid its young people absolutely all experience of something they will be regularly exposed to as adults." Finally, the editorial warned the government to concern its liquor laws only with the excesses associated with alcohol consumption and "respect the right of any responsible citizen to use alcohol as he wishes." Otherwise, the implication went, citizens would come to disrespect all laws, not just the particularly absurd ones.

Past criticisms of the liquor laws employed similar rhetoric in countering hypocritical and discriminatory policies. The emphasis here on freedom of choice and individuality, especially in regards to the never before mentioned issue of minors drinking at home with their parents, represented a new and heightened sensitivity to any perceived breaches of individual freedom. The pervasiveness of this attitude revealed itself in a 1964 Addiction Research Foundation study that argued the goals for liquor policy should not only adhere to public health concerns but "should give proper attention to the concept of civil liberties and basic rights of the individual in a democratic society."54

This editorial prompted an Oakville mother to voice her unqualified agreement. Revealing the sense of superiority so prevalent in the middle decades of the twentieth century, she urged that "we must rid ourselves of these encrusted remnants of an antiquated judicial system if we are to benefit from our increased knowledge of human behaviour patterns and motives." By doing so, she explained, parents can expose "our young people to as many of life's experiences as can be encompassed in the home where
parental influence and guidance is manifest, and where there is greater chance that discrimination and reason can prevail." Calling the law preventing parents from offering their minor children a drink, "a piece of meaningless boondoggle," she maintained that she would treat her children in her own home as she decided, "law or no law." With the baby boomers reaching their late teenage years the issue of the minimum drinking age and minors drinking at home took on a significance never before imagined. Ontario's law appeared even more problematic since all four western provinces as well as New Brunswick had no such restriction on parents serving liquor to their minor children at home. To politicians ingrained with the fear of the prohibitionist lobby, especially on an issue as sensitive as minors drinking, delaying any policy change, like in so many past instances, until the pressure to act was irresistible seemed the only course of action.

An institution concerned with Ontario's youth joined the chorus begun by parents, editors and magistrates in questioning the minimum drinking age. A December 1964 Toronto Telegram series entitled "Drinking on the Campus" explored the issue of drinking among university students. Reporter Sylvia Sylvie concluded that "whether the public wants to admit it or not... most university students drink. Most drink illegally... with a developing contempt for a law they consider hypocritical and Victorian." Not only were many university students below the minimum drinking age of 21, but even those students of legal age regularly broke the liquor laws when they drank on campus since the province's laws did not provide for drinking outlets on university campuses. Sylvie noted the "alarm" arising among parents and administrators in the wake of several incidents of drunk driving, public drunkenness and violence among underage university students. Sylvie also discovered that among these students, enveloped in the free spirited atmosphere of campus life in the 1960s, "drinking has become part of campus life. They make no apologies. They make no excuses for the reasons why they drink."

For many university administrators, the rise in problems associated with drinking among underage students pointed not to a problem with the drinking itself but to the unrealistic minimum drinking age. Sylvie discovered "many [university administrators] do not agree with Ontario's liquor laws that forbid a student drinking until he is 21, and say so quite openly." Many of these administrators took
their post-graduate degrees in Europe, where they learned "that legal drinking in a university atmosphere" did not corrupt university life. Furthermore, Ontario universities looked to licenced pubs on British campuses and demanded the same sorts of services. Many Ontario professors reported to Sylvie that making drinking among students illegal actually created "disastrous" problems of excess.\textsuperscript{60} She also quoted an American psychologist who substantiated the views and experiences of Ontario professors and administrators. Dr. Herman Goldberg of New York's Hofstra University argued "it is unrealistic to write minimum drinking laws that ignore the customs of young people and ignore adult customs which young people imitate." He went on to report that 18 "is the realistic age at which young men and women assume adult responsibilities, voluntarily or involuntarily."\textsuperscript{61} The Addiction Research Foundation also conceded that the province's minimum drinking age appeared strange to immigrants not accustomed to such restrictions and recommended that the policy be studied.\textsuperscript{62} This pressure from students, university administrators and researchers to lower the drinking age added to the demand for change from many quarters.

Following a year of this type of public pressure regarding the drinking age and many other aspects of the liquor laws, Robarts' January promise of change culminated in an early December 1964 Progressive Conservative caucus meeting. Members discussed issues such as ending the supper hour closure, extending public house hours to 1 am, like all other outlets, opening retail stores and public drinking outlets after the polls closed on election days and promised changes for the next session of the Legislature.\textsuperscript{63} Such changes could not come quickly enough for many liquor law critics. The Ottawa Citizen's Queen's Park correspondent Robert Campbell, reflected on the proposed changes and overall history of Ontario's system in a December series of articles. He pointed out the anomalies and class discrimination in Ontario's laws. For example, the law required dining lounges and rooms to sell full course meals in order to also serve drinks. In reality, many served "just potato chips and the like" and called it a meal. Public houses, on the other hand, were not supposed to serve full meals with their draught beer, only pretzels or popcorn, but in reality many served sausages, sandwiches and meat pies.\textsuperscript{64} Despite these anomalies and the "class-ridden requirements" of the public house which caucus promised to
change, Campbell argued that Ontario’s laws were far from being “antiquated” or “out of step with the times.” He maintained that “ever since Prohibition ended in 1927, with few exceptions, every major change in liquor legislation has been to the advantage of the drinker; and in recent years the changes have become more and more frequent.” The problem, he explained, was that no matter how hard succeeding governments tried to make the liquor laws seem sensible, they “have failed.” The failure was “in perpetuating enough of that which is anomalous to leave themselves open to pockets of continuous criticism.” This observation underlined the struggle that politicians had been experiencing throughout the history of government control in balancing the moral control and business enterprise goals of the system. In every instance that has been chronicled here, policymakers implemented changes incrementally, preserving just enough of the moral control justification behind the liquor laws to irritate successive generations of Ontarians. The proposed changes in public house hours and election day sale reflected a slow retreat from such moralistic and paternalistic policies and an attempt to eliminate the remaining irritants of the system.

Many aspects of liquor policy, especially those regulating public houses, irritated not only Ontario drinkers, but also visitors. In January 1965 a New York man related the experiences of his otherwise pleasant holiday in Toronto in a letter to the editors of The Toronto Star. He arrived at a public house at 6 pm and ordered three glasses of beer. “I was told I could have three, but I must consume the present glass first—only one to a customer at a time.” While the New Yorker assumed such a regulation must be “a joke,” a nearby drinker suggested “I drink it down because in half-an-hour the bar would close until 8 pm.” With the anticipation for the Centennial year increasing, Ontarians became preoccupied with reducing this type of negative experience for visitors.

“DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE LIQUOR PRODUCT”

Although public drinking continued to receive the majority of complaints and attention as has been the case throughout the history of government control, with this heightened anticipation for change critics also targeted the retail side of government control. Toronto magazine writer Frank Haarhoff voiced his criticism of the process involved in buying a bottle of liquor in an opinion article in The Toronto
Telegram in late December 1964. He complained of the "grotesque and degrading" situation where "we are being denied the opportunity to see the liquor product to make a choice before we actually purchase it." While past critics pointed out this shortcoming of Ontario liquor stores, the recent Christmas season prompted the ferocity of this particular criticism. He argued it was important to see the liquor bottles "especially at this time of the year when one wants to surprise a friend or relative with a fancy bottle or shapely decanter." Clearly, the recently granted privilege of giving gifts of liquor had repercussions on the liquor store set up. Haarhoff concluded with a general rebuke of the government's monopoly and a pointed suggestion for a future policy change.

If it is erroneously felt that we are not yet mature enough to be permitted to purchase liquor the European way in grocery stores, regular supermarkets or department stores, we should at least be allowed to have a look at the bottles before we buy them.67

With British Columbia opening its first self-serve liquor store two years earlier, Ontarians such as Haarhoff had a model to look to.68 Virtually unchanged in operating style since they first opened in the late 1920s, Ontario's stores could not long stand up to the comparison.

In a similar article less than a week later, Toronto Telegram columnist and Tory activist George Hogan voiced his complaints about the sale of wine in Ontario liquor stores. Hogan also found the recent "festive season" an appropriate time to ride his favourite "hobby horse": complaining about the government's monopoly control over liquor retail and the resulting poor selection of imported wines. While he argued that it was "rarely possible to buy really outstanding wines in this province," he did concede that the one benefit to government control was that it was similarly impossible "to buy really bad ones" because of the quality control efforts of the LCBO. Noting the increased use and appreciation of imported table wines among Ontarians as "one of the pleasant consequences of the massive immigration from Europe since the war," Hogan commended the Board for its selection of wines from many countries of that continent. Yet he bemoaned the recent decline in the quality and the selection of such wines after great improvements in the late 1950s coinciding with the introduction of wine displays and wine consultants. He also complained that the Board no longer allowed customers to order single bottles from a
special wine list as it did in the late 1950s but required them to import entire cases through the LCBO, clearly "a sport for millionaires."69

Referring to Robarts' promise of upcoming liquor law amendments, Hogan chastised the Premier:

> if the sale of wines in this province is to be completely controlled by government monopoly, surely the people have the right to expect a variety and service comparable to that available in other jurisdictions under private enterprise.

Hogan went on to suggest two specific policy options to facilitate this: the sale of wine from private enterprises such as hotels and restaurants for off-premises consumption; and the simplification of the importation process. Such changes, he argued, would "be a measure of our province's maturity."70 While the government was not contemplating such policies for this upcoming round of liquor law changes, this article, as well as Haarhoff's, represented two significant condemnations of the government control system. While the Board had made notable improvements in liquor retail, such as the elimination of the permit and the greater emphasis on wine, as these two articles pointed out, they were not enough to satisfy a society now measuring its 'maturity' according to variables such as the province's liquor laws. What these particular articles also made clear was that, until the government relinquished the moral standards that prevented the display of liquor bottles and until it catered more carefully to the tastes and desires of drinkers, especially wine drinkers, government monopoly would find itself increasingly under attack.

Chief Commissioner Sheppard emphasised the importance of meeting customers' demands in a speech to the LCBO and LLBO Employees' Association just a few weeks after the above complaints. Although his general message echoed sentiments of his predecessors, the detail and directness of his speech represented a new determined focus. "Service to the public is tremendously important," he said. "We are a monopoly and therefore we are judged more harshly than an ordinary business," as the Haarhoff and Hogan articles made clear. Therefore, "we must do everything in our power to provide the purchasing public of Ontario with really outstanding courtesy and service." He went on to stress the overall importance of the business of the two Boards since the revenue "we provide goes to meet the tax bill" for education, health and social services,71 as Table 22 in chapter 6 illustrated. After only a few
months in the new position, Sheppard expressed an appreciation for the unique organisation under his control. The government control system was expected not only to serve its customers to the utmost of its ability but also to maximise the profits it turned over to fund government social programs. As he explained, however, the system was not 'an ordinary business' due to its monopoly status and the addictive properties of the goods it sold. Emphasising 'courtesy and service' was no longer enough in a society preoccupied with questioning established institutions and promoting individual freedoms. While the Board under Sheppard advanced Grossman's initiative in keeping liquor stores open later, building new ones in conveniently located shopping plazas and promoting a public relations program among employees, the public revealed its seemingly insatiable appetite for liquor law liberalisation.

Sheppard failed to mention the other prominent goal of government control: using moralistic regulations to protect society from the excesses associated with liquor consumption. However much he may have hoped that his heightened emphasis on the business enterprise aspect of government control would overshadow the moralistic aspect of the system, the often hypocritical and irritating regulations remained, albeit in reduced numbers due to successive rounds of amendments. As Robert Campbell argued in his December 1964 newspaper series, the government preserved just enough of these moralistic laws to continue to irritate the electorate. The reason for this was two-fold: the lack of a complete overhaul of the laws to eliminate the hypocrisies, but more importantly the fact that monopoly itself was ultimately justified on the basis of the dangerous and addictive properties of alcohol. Nevertheless, as Campbell pointed out in another series he wrote for The Hamilton Spectator in February 1965, in terms of liquor policy "the government is inflexible in an ever-diminishing number of areas." The Robarts' government revealed this flexibility in its 1965 liquor amendments.

Ontarians anxiously anticipated the changes hinted at in early December 1964 and directed many suggestions at the government. A Peterborough Examiner editorial later that month called for a "complete revision" of the liquor laws to rid them of their many anomalies, blaming past "tinkering" with the laws for their existence. In January 1965, the members of the Windsor Innkeepers Association asked the Attorney General instead for liquor law changes conducive to better business. Pointing out that
‘social habits’ had changed since the creation of the public house, the Association called for the end of the supper hour closure and sex segregation, and a 1 am closing time on par with other drinking outlets.75

A few days later Globe and Mail columnist Richard Needham took an entirely different approach in making suggestions to the government. Referring to Quebec’s two-month old Liquor Board employees’ strike, he questioned whether ‘the right to be the only supplier of a commodity presuppose[d] the duty to supply it, come what may?’ Comparing the government monopoly over liquor to that over roads, power and law enforcement, he reminded his readers that during the 1952 Toronto Transit Commission strike, the government refused to provide alternate public transportation for the public in the same way that the Quebec Liquor Board refused to provide an alternate liquor supply for Quebeckers. Instead, the Board actually fined those smuggling liquor in from Ontario. The solution, Needham argued, was to turn liquor retail over to private retailers such as those in Europe and many American states who had to compete with other private retailers ‘on price, service, courtesy, knowledge of the product, hours and locations to suit the public.’ The Ontario government would never do this, he explained, for two important reasons. The first was that the government ‘sells booze in order to make money for schools and highways.’ Nevertheless, Needham argued, the government could make even more money for these services by turning the retail business over to private enterprise and continuing to collect the taxes. It would never do this, he contended, because of the second reason: ‘they fear they may lose three votes in North Dreary Township.’ Fear of the dry vote, combined with the fear of losing the tremendous revenue created by the liquor retail monopoly, prevented the Ontario government from relinquishing control to private business. The only recourse for Ontarians, he sarcastically concluded, was to wait for the government to fulfill rumours that Ontarians may be allowed to drink with their meals on Sundays for a few specified minutes ‘between 11:59 am and 1:37 pm.’76

The Kingston Whig-Standard took an even more direct approach in its editorial the following day. Referring also to the Quebec liquor strike, the editorial argued that while certain areas of public interest required government control as opposed to private control, liquor retail did not qualify as one of these areas. Past critics had certainly questioned the government’s ability to meet the public’s demands
for liquor retail and had offered suggestions for improvement and even scenarios of a combined public-private approach. None had so directly and forcefully questioned the government's right to a monopoly over liquor retail. Certainly the context of the protracted Quebec liquor strike placed the concept of government control under fire, but even during Ontario's two beer strikes during the 1950s critics did not attack government control itself in this direct manner, only specific policies or laws. Clearly, the 1960s ushered in a new era of sustained attack on government institutions as this editorial and the above articles illustrated. Combined, they placed tremendous pressure on the government to deliver significant changes that amounted to more than just "a little concession here and there," since, as was becoming evident to the government "this form of paternalism is one that will no longer be tolerated." 

In response to these pointed attacks against government control, the government continued to discuss and debate changes to the liquor laws throughout the early months of 1965 in preparation for the promised amendments later that year. As the general issue of the minimum drinking age and the related question of minors drinking at home under the supervision of their parents captured the public's attention during the early 1960s, the government also studied and debated them. When in late March NDP leader MacDonald pointed out that minors regularly violated the minimum drinking age, Sheppard replied to the Committee on Commissions that the government was currently studying whether the drinking age should be lowered. When Sheppard also reported that the issue of allowing parents to serve alcohol to their minor children within the home was being assessed, he received many diverse responses. David Archibald, Director of the Addiction Research Foundation concluded that a law limiting how parents could act in their own homes was "unenforceable" and had "no business on the statutes." Rev. J.R. Hord of the United Church Evangelical Board agreed, saying families should be free "to run their own households." Rev. F.W. Smalley of the OTF disagreed wholeheartedly arguing that "just because some other cultures allow it" that did not make "it right." He went on to predict that by permitting minors to drink, the government would be glamorising drinking and that "no good can come out of allowing it." Clearly the issue of allowing minors to drink at home aroused both traditional paternalistic conclusions and individualistic arguments.
Complicating the issue and causing rising emotions around this already contentious question was the highly publicised January death of a Ryerson Polytechnical Institute student after a night of heavy drinking. Although the student in question was 26 years old and therefore well above the existing minimum drinking age, his death prompted an inquest concerning drinking among students on Ontario campuses. Under particular scrutiny were brewery-sponsored beer drinking contests among fraternity members. As a result of the inquest, the LCBO banned breweries from soliciting universities and fraternities. Chief Commissioner Sheppard emphasised that "any sale within fraternity houses is completely illegal." This death and the resulting inquest heightened the concern surrounding drinking among Ontario's youth, not just those below the minimum drinking age. Although long-time prohibitionist J.R. Mutchmor bemoaned the "affluence and permissiveness," of early 1960s society, the moral protection of youth, as illustrated in the concern over this student's death as well as the debate over the minimum drinking age, remained a prominent preoccupation of Ontarians as well as politicians. Therefore, lowering the drinking age remained an open question.

Regardless, many cities and municipalities, anticipating a change in policy, wrote to the Attorney General in the spring of 1965 protesting such a move. The city of Guelph, for example, argued that traffic accidents would increase if the minimum drinking age were lowered. Despite the great number of such protests from Ontario municipalities, the Attorney General's Office seemingly granted them little attention. Attached to one such protest was a memo to a department secretary from the deputy minister. The memo instructed the secretary to prepare simple acknowledgements in response to these "lobby" groups since "they really don't merit the Attorney General's time." This apparent disregard for public sentiment undoubtedly revealed a great deal about the volume of correspondence bombarding the Attorney General and other ministers on a daily basis. Nevertheless it also mirrored a similar disregard witnessed previously on the part of Judge Robb, revealing a tendency by bureaucrats and politicians to value their own instincts on policy matters over those of the general public. Ontario's municipalities' concern over a possible policy change illustrated that it was not only the traditional prohibitionist groups who worried about the welfare and safety of society.
As the unique demographic circumstances of the early 1960s pushed the issue of lowering the minimum drinking age to the forefront, so another liquor policy issue gained prominence in the years leading up to the anxiously anticipated Expo and Centennial celebrations. Critics of the province's liquor laws had been pointing out over the past several years the hypocritical logic that required the public consumption of alcohol to take place in dark, often dingy, rooms and prevented the same from occurring outside in the sunshine. With the prospect of American and European visitors judging Ontario's drinking environment against their own more liberal traditions and those of Quebec, the host for Expo '67, the Ontario government addressed the policy of open-air drinking. In April 1965, the Cabinet Committee on Liquor Matters proposed an amendment to allow the licencing of open-air premises, "but only in places not visible to the general public...[since] Ontario people were not ready for general open-air drinking." Therefore, it proposed that "some way might be devised for permitting drinking in open-air places" such as the "open-air portion of rooftop dining lounges." Like so many past policy changes, this proposal represented the government's response to both the guiding impulses of government control. As a business in competition with Quebec for tourist dollars, it sought to provide the types of drinking environments desired by patrons. Its moral control impulse dictated that the policy change would impose control over where this drinking could take place based on the paternalistic belief that Ontarians were not yet "ready" to be exposed to the implied immorality of consuming alcohol in sidewalk cafés.

Liquor policy critics had been proposing another amendment as a gesture of good will for customers forced to endure the monopoly of government control. Self-serve liquor stores complete with liquor bottles lined up for customers to view and touch represented this type of gesture. When questioned before the Legislative Committee on Government Commissions in late March 1965 about the prospect of self-serve liquor stores in Ontario, Chief Commissioner Sheppard replied that there would be no such stores opened in the province. He contended that British Columbia discovered theft a problem with its new self-serve stores. Avoiding theft certainly represented the Board's desire to function as an efficient business enterprise, although Sheppard revealed another very different reason for favouring the traditional format where customers received their bottles only after filling out and signing the requisite order forms.
Sheppard argued that self-serve stores would make it "too hard" for employees to spot those Ontarians on the interdicted list. This list boasted the names of 4000 people prohibited by law from purchasing liquor, including 500 from Metro Toronto alone.\textsuperscript{44} Preserving the Board's moral control over who could purchase liquor remained a major priority for Sheppard. By not changing the traditional liquor store set-up, he also ensured that liquor order forms, another much maligned aspect of government control, remained a constant aspect of the system for Ontario liquor purchasers.

The policy issue which garnered the greatest amount of attention and anticipation in the build up toward the promised 1965 liquor law amendments was the sale of liquor with meals on Sundays. Emboldened by the anxiety surrounding the upcoming 1967 celebrations, lobby groups continued their pressure on the government to allow this type of service in Ontario. For example, in a March 1965 brief to the Legislative Committee on Highways and Tourism, the Joint Board of Ontario Travel Associations argued that nothing confused and frustrated tourists more than the inconsistent and antiquated liquor laws they encountered in the province. Sunday service with meals represented the organisation's major demand along with the elimination of local option. Provincial Secretary Yaremko fuelled the anticipation surrounding his government's upcoming liquor law amendments when he revealed before the April Legislative Committee on Government Commissions that after two years of study, the changes "could be sweeping."\textsuperscript{45} With some form of Sunday service of liquor available in every other province except Newfoundland, Saskatchewan and British Columbia, Ontarians desirous of the same sort of service in their province seemed assured of the upcoming change. Before the same Committee, LLBO Chairman Robb also added to the expectations for change with his own hints regarding Sunday service with meals.\textsuperscript{46}

All these hints and rumours regarding upcoming extensive liquor law changes, especially from prominent politicians and bureaucrats such as Yaremko and Robb, not only heightened the expectations for policy amendments but also aroused criticism of the process and pace of change itself. For example, after Robb's hints before the Committee on Government Commissions, a Kitchener-Waterloo Record editorial dismissed them as merely "another trial balloon" sent up by the government. The editorial further criticised the government for using "dull instruments" to test public opinion, which had voiced
itself loudly in favour of ending the province's outdated liquor restrictions. Others also criticised these numerous hints as an insult to Ontarians waiting two years for significant changes to their liquor laws. NDP leader MacDonald accused Robarts of keeping the process of change unnecessarily secret when the Premier refused to disclose the names of the Cabinet ministers studying the liquor laws. Many editors and other critics opposed this aura of secrecy and mystery surrounding the makeup of the Cabinet Committee on Liquor Matters. The editor of The Ottawa Citizen proposed instead a public all-party study to achieve timely and appropriate amendments. Yet as political scientist Timothy Plumptre explained in Beyond the Bottom Line, his study on management in government, British tradition dictated that the composition of Cabinet committees should be secret. While this secrecy garnered no complaints in the first few years of the Committee's existence, in this charged atmosphere of the mid-1960s with suspicion of government and expectations for change running high, British parliamentary tradition meant little to critics of the province's liquor laws.

Just as the parallel anticipation for change and criticism of process reached a fever pitch in the spring of 1965, cracks in the government's hints for upcoming amendments began to reveal themselves. Sunday service with meals proved to be more contentious than either Yaremko or Robb anticipated. In late May, the Progressive Conservative caucus found itself "embroiled in its stormiest debate of the session" over the proposal to allow restaurants and dining facilities to serve drinks with meals on Sundays. While some caucus members contended that Sunday traffic would only be rendered more treacherous with this new type of service, others argued "it was slightly immoral to sell liquor on Sunday." Both these arguments against Sunday liquor sale represented the government's attempt to impose moral and paternalistic control over the actions of its constituents. Many critics interpreted this roadblock in caucus as a "retreat" from the government's earlier commitment to significant liquor law change. The Windsor Star's Bill Prager, for example, argued that, while the government originally talked of undertaking a "complete rewriting" of both liquor Acts, it now appeared that it would merely amend them. An unnamed Conservative MPP choose more direct words to describe the outcome of the split in his caucus over Sunday service of liquor. "The amendments won't amount to a row of pins."
“KEEP PACE WITH THE TIMES”

When the government introduced its amendments several days later, both predictions turned out to be correct for many observers. This was especially true in the context of the first half of the 1960s with the tremendous anticipation for significant and meaningful change in the liquor laws. When he introduced the amendments in the Legislature on June 2, 1965, Provincial Secretary Yaremko emphasised the significance of the proposals. He began by asserting “as always this government is anxious that legislation keep pace with the times. It is in this spirit, therefore, that we propose these amendments so that our administration will be in keeping with the needs of the people in this second half of the twentieth century.” He went on to contend that “there has not been such a general overhaul of the Acts since they were first passed.” Such pronouncements certainly seemed to justify the hints and rumours that Yaremko and others had been revealing regarding the momentous changes to come. Unlike the 1962 amendments, which Robarts announced in an effort to place his personal stamp on liquor policy, this round of changes followed the traditional procedure of having the responsible minister introduce them.

Baggage Requirement in Hotel Rooms Removed: Yaremko outlined changes to both the licencing and retailing aspects of government control brought about through amendments to the legislation, the policies and the regulations governing the sale and consumption of liquor. For clarity these changes can be divided into two categories: those intended to address and overcome the prohibitionist emphasis of the original Acts; and those that represented new directions in liquor policy to meet current and future needs. Before Yaremko could attempt to address the ‘needs of the people in the second half of the twentieth century’ as he promised, he had to remove the lingering remnants of the prohibitionist era that gave rise to government control. For example, the government eliminated the requirement that in order to legally keep liquor in a hotel room “persons must have baggage or personal effects.” Yaremko admitted the changed function of hotels from the time when Ferguson first instituted that requirement. “In a great number of cases persons engage suites at hotels for business meetings and social functions.” Critics of course had been alerting the government to this reality from at least the mid-1950s.
War Rationing Measures Lifted on Public Houses: Where the end of the baggage requirement represented the removal of a Prohibition-era regulation, the government also focused its attention on removing war measures instituted over two decades earlier. Yaremko announced that the Licence Board would now permit public houses to remain open from 6:30 pm to 8 pm. He admitted that the measure was originally instituted to deal with "wartime shortages" when public houses, and their dining counterpart, dining rooms were the only public drinking establishments. Now, he explained, public house patrons merely go "across the street to a lounge" during the closing period to continue their drinking. He made no direct mention of the moral control function of the supper closing period that people such as Judge Robb had emphasised since just after World War Two. Yaremko's reference to the fact that beer drinkers now merely moved to a nearby lounge, instead of going home for dinner, revealed the government's belated realisation that the measure no longer served either intention: to conserve beer or protect drinkers.

The government also announced that public house patrons could now order more than one glass of beer at a time, thereby ending another World War Two rationing measure. This announcement represented the public expression of a policy change that the Committee on Liquor Matters recommended in early 1963. At that time, the Committee discussed only the serving of a second glass before the customer completely drained the first, but agreed that the time was not right for the introduction of actual "double servings." After deliberating the issue, Cabinet agreed that a second beer could be legally served before the first was finished, although it recommended that no public announcement be made regarding the alteration in policy. Therefore very little changed in terms of the public perception of the drinking behaviour required of public house patrons.

While the press coverage of these 1965 changes made it appear that two glasses could be ordered at once, as later correspondence within the Licence Board made clear, the reality remained that two could not be served at once, only a second served before the first was drained. While in reality this amounted to only a half-measure of change, along with the reinstatement of continuous hours of service throughout the day, this amendment represented the restoration of service that beverage room patrons, the public house's predecessor, had enjoyed before World War Two. These changes also represented the
government's belated, if only partial, recognition that beer drinkers required no more moral regulation than their spirit drinking counterparts. As the first public drinking outlet created after Prohibition, the beverage room attracted more moral control than any of its later competitors on the province's drinking scene. Even after successive rounds of liquor law changes, the public house remained virtually as it had been when Hepburn created it in 1934 and as it had become after the impact of war rationing. These two amendments then amounted to the most significant policy changes affecting this particular institution in the past two decades.

**Bigger Signs:** Another amendment altered the size of external signage permitted on licenced premises. The original Liquor Licence Act stipulated that a licenced premise could sport a sign on the outside of the building stating in two-inch high letters what type of licence it held. These amendments increased the letter size to five inches.¹⁰¹ This change addressed complaints levelled by critics such as Robert Campbell in his December 1964 *Ottawa Citizen* article series. "Drinking in Ontario for the uninitiated is still a mystery game," he explained. "Hotels cannot advertise cocktail lounges or bars, except for a notice of licenced premises in two-inch letters over the entrance. The visitor, therefore, must enter and ask before he knows what he can have under Ontario law."¹⁰² This reference to the visitor undoubtedly revealed the impetus behind this particular regulatory change. In anticipation of the large number of Centennial year visitors, the government clearly wanted its licenced premises to be as accessible and welcoming as possible.

**Jargon Modernised:** Yaremko also announced the modernisation of the jargon surrounding government control. The amendments replaced the 1927-era expression 'vendor,' referring to the person in charge of running an individual liquor store, with 'store manager.'¹⁰³ The licences issued for banquets became known as 'special occasion permits.'¹⁰⁴ The government also lifted the strict moral controls that had previously regulated these banquet permits. Hosts no longer had to serve "regular meals" only "food" and it removed the references to having tablecloths and flatware. Finally, the government adopted more straightforward language in replacing the phrase 'grant the application' with 'issue the licence' in the relevant sections of the Liquor Licence Act.¹⁰⁵ These changes represented the modernisation of the
language surrounding government control to enhance the customer service image of the system and to remove some of the intimidating jargon intended to arouse compliance and even fear in the early years of government control.

"Extraordinary Procedures" Repealed. The last aspect of the amendments concerned with reversing the prohibitionist emphasis of the Acts dealt with the discretionary powers of both Boards. Finally admitting what critics had been pointing out for years, Yaremko acknowledged that certain sections of the Acts that had been "designed initially to meet a particular situation," namely Prohibition, were actually "an infringement upon the ordinary rights of a citizen." As The Globe and Mail's Eric Dowd explained, "the Minister said many of the requirements in the old legislation resulted from prohibitionist sentiments popular at the time it was introduced." Yaremko then went on to list the "extraordinary procedures" and "unfair provisions" embedded in the LCA and LLA that his government intended to repeal. For example, orders of interdiction whereby a judge ruled that a person was prohibited by law from buying, consuming or having liquor for a specified period could now for the first time be appealed to a higher court. The amendments also altered the search and seizure powers of the Liquor Control Board. Where previously inspectors could proceed with a search simply on "suspicion or belief," the law now instructed that they take action only on "reasonable grounds," a modification which Yaremko referred to as "a basic change of principle." Further, Yaremko declared the provisions of the LCA, which placed the onus of proof on the accused, to be "contrary to normal criminal justice" since "under the general principle of our laws...a man is innocent until he is proved guilty." He therefore repealed the provisions that declared "unless the accused person proves he did not commit the offence, he may be convicted." The Liquor Licence Act also contained similarly "improper procedures." For example the Act held liquor licence holders legally responsible for the actions of their employees, a provision that Yaremko declared "contravenes the basic principles that a person should not be responsible for those acts of which he has no knowledge." The amendments also repealed those sections of the LLA that gave the Licence Board powers "greater than the power of our courts." These powers, for example, permitted the
Board to force witnesses appearing before it to "answer any question" even when the responses might incriminate the witness. 108

By implementing these particular amendments the government addressed some of the longstanding concerns critics expressed about the discretionary powers wielded by both Boards. Even when the government so proudly ended the so-called 'squealing section' of the Liquor Control Act in 1961 and introduced the right to appeal a Licence Board cancellation in 1962, many arbitrary powers had remained. As Yaremko so readily admitted, when the government first created the LCA in 1927 it had invested the Board with many 'extraordinary' powers in response to the previous decade of Prohibition and its inherent excesses of bootlegging and secret drinking which the government hoped to overcome. Likewise, when the government reintroduced the public drinking of beer in 1934 and then spirits in 1947, it reserved many discretionary powers for the LCBO and then the new Licence Board in anticipation of the challenging transition to public drinking after such a long absence. Because of the government's traditional reliance on an incremental approach to policy change, these procedures, many of which contradicted 'normal criminal justice,' remained on the statute books long after any adjustment period may have rendered them necessary. Finally, after years of criticism and almost 40 years after Prohibition, the government felt safe in removing these infringements on individual rights.

A deepening public concern throughout the 1960s "that governments were the real menace to the freedoms of the individual" 109 also prompted the changes. In response to this fear, Premier Robarts appointed a Royal Commission in the spring of 1964. Headed by Chief Justice J.C. McRuer, Robarts instructed the Commission to define the status of individual rights in Ontario and recommend changes "necessary and desirable to safeguard the fundamental basic liberties and freedoms of the individual from infringement by the State or any other body." 110 Liberal MPP Elmer Sopha then immediately submitted a brief to McRuer calling the Liquor Licence Board a "dictatorship" and its actions "arbitrary." 111 While the Commission did not issue its first report for several years, this emphasis on the protection of individual rights, especially the preservation of the basic aspects of criminal justice certainly revealed itself in these particular liquor law amendments.
**Licensed Premises in Live Theatres**: Besides altering these aspects of liquor policy deemed inappropriate for 1960s society, Yaremko also announced a series of amendments designed to fashion a drinking environment for the future. The upcoming Centennial year and the aura of modernisation and coming of age that the accompanying celebrations promised, served as the impetus for these particular changes. In anticipation of the dramatic arts emphasis of the Centennial celebrations, Yaremko announced the licencing of lounges and dining lounges in conjunction with live theatres. "The Canadian Centre for the Performing Arts, the federal government's major Centennial project in the capital area," requested the change, he explained. Yaremko found it necessary to also point out that this "does not include a motion picture theatre." While this change carried the residue of moral control that differentiated between a live theatre that was appropriate for liquor service and a movie theatre that was not, it clearly represented the first expansion of public drinking into the realm of entertainment facilities.

**Beer and Bowling**: In a similar vein Yaremko announced that the dining lounge which formed part of a recreational facility such as a commercial curling establishment or a bowling alley would now be considered for a liquor licence. He went on to caution "that it is not the bowling alley per se which could be licenced, but the dining facilities within a complex that included a bowling alley." Again the government felt it necessary to strictly differentiate between those areas appropriate for liquor consumption like the separate dining lounge adjacent to the bowling area, and those areas not appropriate like the lanes themselves. Nevertheless, for the first time in Ontario history the patrons of such entertainment and recreational facilities could now enjoy alcoholic beverages on the same premises as the amusements themselves.

"**Reasonable Open-air Drinking**": Yaremko also announced a third new type of licenced environment. In anticipation of visitors from other countries and provinces with a more European approach to liquor consumption, the government intended to licence outdoor lounge and dining areas. Yaremko explained that this meant "reasonable" open-air drinking "where there is some element of privacy." For Yaremko, this restriction limited the new licences to rooftop dining lounges but "rule[d] out the licencing of sidewalk cafés." This change, and the accompanying constraint, represented the
recommendation made to Cabinet in April 1965 by the Committee on Liquor Matters, since the Committee judged that Ontarians were 'not ready' for open-air drinking that was actually 'open.' Regardless, it signalled a willingness on the part of the government to reduce its moral control over where drinking was permitted even if the new provisions remained significantly constrained.

**Drinking on Planes**: A final area now eligible for liquor licencing rounded out the new drinking environments. Airline flights from Ontario now qualified for liquor licences in the same manner as passenger trains passing through the province. While the time constraints involved with most flights originating and concluding inside the province rendered the new licences meaningless, this change allowed passengers flying from Ontario to Europe or the United States to be served liquor legally throughout their entire flights. Inter-provincial flights proved more problematic since not every province allowed liquor to be served on flights within their air space. An Air Canada spokesman described the difficulties that this would entail. "Technically you would have to remove the glasses from the table. How would you know when to do this? It would be very awkward." Nevertheless, Ontario's change in policy signalled the possibility of future uniformity in provincial liquor laws governing in-flight liquor service. With these four new drinking environments: live theatres, recreational facilities, open-air areas and planes, the government certainly demonstrated its intention to fashion the drinking laws around the needs of the people in the second half of the twentieth century. However, even with the emphasis on the future and modernisation, especially surrounding the upcoming Expo and Centennial celebrations, the government continued to impose a degree of moral control over the provisions of these new areas for consumption. Because they were new and carried with them the weight of decades of prohibitions against public drinking, the government practised its traditional approach of implementing untried policies with a cautious and controlling hand.

The government also eliminated the ban on women serving alcohol in licenced premises to adjust the province's drinking laws and environment to the reality of the 1960s. Previously, women served alcohol only in those establishments where food was also served: dining rooms and dining lounges. Yaremko explained that now "there will be no limitation on women serving in licenced premises and at
banquets where women can be present." In reply to a reporter's question he admitted "that this would permit Bunny Girls," a prospect surely unfathomable under Frost. This change reflected the wider societal recognition of women in the workplace. As historian Doug Owram explained in his history of the baby boom generation, women's workplace participation throughout the traditional child rearing years remained steady at approximately 25% from post-World War Two until 1960 when it began to rise. Despite this recognition, the government continued the sex segregation in the 'men only' public houses, including even the workers.

"To Extend Entertainment Generally": The final change in Yaremko's package of amendments intended to create a drinking environment suitable for the decade of the 1960s and beyond responded to years of criticism levelled at the Ontario drinking scene. While the Licence Board previously permitted entertainment in licenced premises with permission, as Yaremko explained, "there has been some misunderstanding as to the range of instruments." This of course referred to the 1963 controversy over pianos in public houses. The government, therefore, intended "to extend entertainment generally" to allow different musical instruments, dancing, audience participation as well as games such as darts, billiards and cards. In order to emphasise his point Yaremko went on to list such exotic instruments as the "oboe, xylophone [and] lute" that could now be played in any licenced premises. As with all the previously mentioned amendments, this change also carried with it several moral controls. The Licence Board still required proprietors to apply for permission to add any of these types of entertainment to their premises. Yaremko explained that while "permission will be given for all types of instruments and all types of entertainments [sic]...if the proprietor does not have control...[and] allows things to get out of hand, the Liquor Licence Board will step in." This precaution responded to the lack of control that the Cabinet Committee members and Premier Frost feared would occur when liberalising entertainment in public drinking outlets was discussed but not recommended in the past. Overall this change represented a major step in modernising the province's drinking establishments and was a direct response to years of criticism and suggestion.
No Changes: Drinking Age, Sunday Drinking, Local Option: After explaining the changes the government intended to carry out in the area of liquor control, Yaremko then outlined for his legislative audience those changes the government did not intend to make. Firstly, he announced "there is no lowering of the legal age of 21 in respect of liquor." He went on to add that this also applied to "the consumption of minors in the home." Secondly, "the sale of liquor on Sundays" would not be permitted. Finally, the government intended "to maintain the local option principle throughout the province." These three areas of policy, but especially Sunday sale, represented areas that critics had continually targeted. For Yaremko, expressing the sentiments of his government, refusing to alter the status quo in these areas fulfilled its desire "to safeguard the individual and public good." Nevertheless, the decision to preserve the ban on Sunday sale also revealed the continued influence wielded by the cautious and paternalistic members of the Tory caucus, particularly the rural members, as the 'stormy' May 1965 caucus meeting illustrated. As one disappointed urban MPP explained, "the rural members felt it would lose them more votes than it gained." Despite the efforts of Robarts and Yaremko to pass a package of significant liquor policy change, the traditional views held by many party members and the constituents they represented continued to inform the nature and the timing of change, particularly on the morally-sensitive issue of the Christian Sabbath.

Reaction to the government's package of liquor law changes was generally favourable, with critics focusing primarily on those changes that had not been made. Inside the House, while the Opposition parties agreed generally with the changes, they nevertheless took the opportunity to attack the government on particular points. Liberal leader Andrew Thompson sarcastically argued that in repealing the discretionary aspects of the Acts the Provincial Secretary "must have felt embarrassed and shamefaced" because "time after time [he] had to say that this was not Canadian justice." Thompson gave little credit to the Conservatives for making these changes at this time since "they let this disease fester for over 20 years." He went on to rebuke the government for not recognising "that the people have arrived at a sense of maturity" by preserving the "patchwork" of local option and denying Ontarians a drink with Sunday meals.
Liberal MPP Elmer Sopha, a vocal critic of the government’s liquor policies, proclaimed that he would “heartily endorse this bill,” mainly because it contained the fruition of so many of the suggestions that he had made over the years. He expressed his disapproval, though, with the government’s overall approach to liquor control, an approach he characterised as “panic measures” intended “frantically to deal with...the problem of alcohol within our community.” This characterisation of the government’s policymaking style resembled Valverde’s concept of ‘panics’ in her study of moral regulation in early twentieth century Canada. Liquor control similarly presented the Ontario government with various ‘panic’ situations such as the bootlegging associated with Prohibition and the excessive consumption witnessed with the reintroduction of legal public drinking. To deal with the potential problems of vice, abuse and violence surrounding the use of this addictive drug at these particular times, the government therefore instituted ‘panic measures’ such as the 1927 police search powers and the 1934 ban on beverage room entertainment in order to control the behaviour of drinkers. Even decades after these ‘panic’ or crisis points in the history of liquor control, the moral control reflex asserted itself as the government imposed moral restrictions on the ‘new’ policies of outdoor drinking and licenced bowling alleys, for example.

NDP member Kenneth Bryden refused to attach any significance to what he called “housekeeping amendments.” “One can only say that the mountain has laboured and brought forth a mouse.” Ironically, this is the same phrase used by Liberal leader Wintemeyer to demean the government’s 1962 announcement ending liquor permits. The situations resembled each other in terms of the tremendous “rumours and stories” regarding the “substantial plans” the government intended to implement as Bryden recounted. Like his Liberal counterparts in this legislature, Bryden condemned the government for failing to permit Sunday service of liquor with meals. While he noted his party’s agreement with Yaremko’s assurance that the minimum drinking age would not be lowered, Bryden took offence at the government’s persistence “in maintaining the myth that it can prevent parents from permitting their own children, underage, to consume alcoholic beverages in their own home.” Echoing the arguments that had been made in favour of permitting this in the previous years and months, Bryden noted the customs of the
many Ontarians of European descent. Unaffected by “the extreme puritanical customs under which some of us were brought up,” these particular Ontarians regularly served wine with meals to all in attendance, even the children he explained. To keep such a meaningless and unenforceable law on the statute books of the province only brought all the laws into disrespect, he argued.\textsuperscript{127}

The press generally had a more favourable view of the changes. The Globe and Mail’s Eric Dowd called them “the most sweeping overhaul of the province’s liquor legislation since sales for home consumption were made legal in 1927.”\textsuperscript{128} The same newspaper editorialised that the changes yielded to “public demands for a more liberal approach” to government control and represented the “belated recognition of the public’s moral acceptance of strong drink as something other than a source of tax revenue or a sure road to hell.” The government recognised this by relinquishing some of its moral control over liquor consumption and permitting a wider range of public drinking environments. The editorial went on to advise the government that “public morality is in constant flux” and therefore the laws required study and amendments more often than “every 20 years.”\textsuperscript{129} The Toronto Star reacted less approvingly, though not as critically as might have been expected from past experience. Calling the new legislation “an experiment,” the editorial wondered whether trying to “civilise” Ontario’s drinking habits was an appropriate goal. If the “different and more relaxed outlets” failed to promote the more moderate consumption of the European outlets they were intended to emulate, the editorial argued, then they should be abandoned since “no liquor policy can be considered sound unless it promotes moderation.”\textsuperscript{130}

Besides these general editorial impressions, the press reported opinions on the specific provisions of the amendments. The changes related to the public house garnered a great deal of attention. A Globe and Mail editorial cartoon perfectly summed up the general conclusion of most observers. The cartoon featured two drinking companions seated at a dirty table in a dark public house complete with a naked light bulb suspended from the ceiling, a ‘men only’ sign on the wall and a grim-faced waiter hoisting a tray laden with glasses of beer. One fellow then asked the other, “I don’t suppose you’d care to dance?”\textsuperscript{131} The cartoon featured the same two men that appeared in a similar cartoon five months earlier.\textsuperscript{132} The public house appeared exactly the same in both cartoons with one exception: in place of the sign reading
“no singing, no laughing, no smiling, just drinking” on the wall of the public house in the January cartoon, the June cartoon featured a sign proclaiming “new regulations: singing, dancing, games.” These cartoons humorously depicted the irrelevancy of the changes to the public house since the behaviour of the employees and customers as well as the overall ambience had been ingrained since it was created in the 1930s.

As these cartoons illustrated, it would take more than just ‘permission’ to introduce entertainment and games to substantially alter public houses. As The Toronto Star’s Arnold Bruner concluded after studying the drinking scene in downtown Toronto in January 1966, public houses would sooner die out than change after more than 30 years in a kind of time warp. No new public house licences had been issued since 1951 and there were over 140 fewer such outlets in 1966 than there were in 1947, the year their cocktail counterparts opened for business. Despite the recent changes intended to turn public houses into places “for socialising,” Bruner concluded, “they won’t change.” Because of the optional nature of the new regulations, most public houses continued to be “dingy and frill-less,” he discovered. As one proprietor explained “We’ll never have darts in here. They’d be throwing darts at each other. We’re selling beer here, not ginger ale.” Regardless of Yaremko’s amendments, the public house seemed destined to remain as it had been after so many years of escaping round after round of legislative change.

Despite this conclusion, most observers welcomed the changes to the public house, especially the repeal of the war measures. Calling the regulation a “hang-over on the way out,” The Hamilton Spectator’s Don O’Hearn recounted the history of the ban on “double servings” in public houses. Although it began as a war rationing measure, the Licence Board kept it “as a most handy tool.” Whenever that Board wanted to discipline a licence holder but could not obtain solid evidence, O’Hearn explained, “it could always get grounds for double servings.” As he speculated and the records substantiated, “probably more than half of the disciplinary hearings it has held have been on the grounds of ‘double servings.’” This discussion led O’Hearn to castigate what he described as the last remaining war rationing measure in effect in Ontario: the watering of spirits. Actually the absence of 40-ounce liquor bottles represented another war measure, one that he failed to mention but would later inspire many
critical comments. The government refused to lift the regulation allowing it to water down spirits, “the most unpopular” war measure “of all,” he explained, because “it means revenue.” Because this war measure, unlike the other ones such as the supper closing and the ban on double servings, satisfied its desire to protect the public from the dangers of excessive consumption and to turn a profit, the Ontario government, along with all other provincial governments, gladly retained it.

Other observers gave more unqualified praise to the government’s legislative announcement. Not surprisingly, the Stratford Festival’s manager greeted the prospect of serving liquor at the theatre with “It would be wonderful... it is a little more civilized on the part of the province.” Curling club and bowling alley proprietors also welcomed the enlarged licencing possibilities, noting the existence of bars in many American recreational establishments. The dry supporters in the province, not surprisingly, tended to oppose this type of relaxation of the licencing laws. Rev. Eric Smalley of the LTF argued “bowling was a family sport. It’s too bad to bring drink into this sport.” While he reiterated his organisation’s longstanding view that “anything that tended to increase the sale of intoxicating beverages was a backward step,” he conceded that the proposal to open up entertainment in licenced premises was “reasonable” as it might actually lessen consumption. This attitude revealed itself generally among the province’s traditionally dry groups. For example, the United Church failed to pass a motion opposing the sale of alcohol on airplanes at its September 1966 annual meeting. Overall, Smalley concluded, “I’m much happier than I thought I would be.” He referred undoubtedly to the government’s decision to maintain the minimum drinking age and the ban on Sunday sale. While the government felt the pressure to make both changes in the years previous to these amendments, the hints and rumours pointed to the relaxation of Sunday sale. Even though The Globe and Mail editorialised that “there was no large-scale public demand” for Sunday service, many critics noted the disappointment felt especially after the months of rumour and speculation. While the caucus previously doubted the public’s opinion on the issue, an intense disappointment quickly set in which the build up to the 1967 celebrations only heightened. This set the agenda for the next year and a half for a constant clamour for Sunday service of liquor.
After its longest legislative session in history to date, the government ushered in "a great deal of legislation" including a medical insurance plan, a system of community colleges, and a mechanism to participate in the Canada Pension Plan. The package of liquor changes, therefore, represented part of Robarts' overall legislative program to meet the changing needs of a modern society. His desire to modernise the province coincided with his role as leader and statesman in the "national destiny" of the country which culminated in his hosting the 1967 'Confederation of Tomorrow' premiers' conference. Nevertheless, the government persisted in waiting until the very end of the session to introduce the liquor changes to limit the time for any politically damaging debate. The overall consensus appeared to be as The Hamilton Spectator editorialised "Ontario's great liquor glacier still melts, but slowly." The editorial acknowledged that while the changes were useful, they were made on the backdrop of a "regulated morality" that was out of place in a "modern" and "mature" society. While the government broadened the drinking environments available to Ontarians, it did so in a manner that tightly regulated the variables such as specific location and food availability. As a Timmins Press editorial argued, the government reacted to problems caused by past policies rather than acting on a new approach to liquor policy. The moral regulation emphasis remained a component, though an increasingly less important one, of the government's overall system of government control and therefore became infused into new types of licencing such as outdoor patios. The government's continued differentiation between Sunday and the other six days of the week demonstrated "another echo of the tortured conscience of Ontario" between control and service, a Guelph Mercury editorial argued.

"NEVER ON SUNDAY"

Moral regulation guided not only the policies that the government implemented but also those it chose not to alter. And as with previous liquor law changes, critics focused their attention, not on the new policies that many deemed "a let-down," but on those particular issues not dealt with, especially Sunday service. While Yaremko maintained that the opposition within the Conservative caucus focused not on the religious issue of Sunday sale, but on the fear of greater traffic problems, most critics dismissed this argument as an attempt to hide the urban-rural split within the government, and the rural members'
fear of their dry constituents. This argument echoed previous politicians’ beliefs and fears that the province’s temperance forces voted in greater number and with more attention to the issue of liquor control than their more moderate yet more numerous counterparts. As columnist Richard Needham argued, this logic continued to prevail in the Conservative caucus since the argument about traffic problems proved faulty. He revealed that provinces such as Nova Scotia, along with five other provinces, had Sunday service with no increase in traffic accidents on their less sophisticated road systems. Convincing certain caucus members to relinquish their fear of the dry forces and the government to lessen its reliance on moral controls proved a challenge for those desiring Sunday service of liquor.

The Ontario Chamber of Commerce endeavoured to accomplish this by submitting a brief to Cabinet in October 1965 calling for Sunday service with meals and a 1 am closing time for Saturday nights. Pointing to the expected influx of tourists in 1967, the Chamber revealed that the early Saturday closing time and the lack of service on Sundays constituted the greatest criticisms from tourists that it received. This drive for Sunday service also brought with it complaints regarding those other policies the government refused to change. Despite numerous applications from various groups and concerned Ontarians the government did not remove the ban on service or sale of liquor on election days during its June amendments. The prospect of closed liquor outlets on the upcoming federal election day, prompted columnist Richard Needham to greet his readers with “All aboard for Gloomsville.” Although the Ontario government’s ban covered only provincial and municipal elections, Needham still wondered “is such a precaution really necessary in this day and age? If the bars and booze stores were to open in Toronto next Monday, would anything dreadful occur?” He argued that politicians instituted such restrictions to protect humans from their own inclinations even when those restrictions interfered with citizens’ liberties in an otherwise modern and sophisticated society. While Needham’s arguments resonated with many Ontarians, citizens continued to look to government to control their liquor consumption behaviour as one Stratford woman’s letter to Yaremko illustrated. She complained in November 1965 that, because of the new continuous public house hours, her husband stayed and drank through dinner. As Yaremko’s reply revealed, the government relinquished its moral control in this particular area after much consideration.
Critics also attacked local option as conflicting with liberty and democracy. The debates surrounding a particularly contentious local option vote in West Toronto scheduled for January 1966 revealed the shortcomings of this early twentieth century policy. Municipal representatives complained to the LCBO that the antiquated wording of the ballots, asking voters if they favoured local option or not, was confusing since those voting for local option were actually voting against liquor sale and vice versa.150 While early twentieth century voters widely understood the terms involved, the confusion the terms created in the mid-1960s revealed the unsuitability of the entire system for the second half of the century.

By 1966 any contentment that may have been achieved with the June 1965 liquor law amendments had eroded with critics focusing even more vociferously on the unfulfilled policy directions. The approaching Centennial year celebrations fuelled the demand for change further. After hospitality industry associations appealed to the Legislative Committee on Travel and Tourism for Sunday service in April, the debate reached a fever pitch with editorials appearing across the province. Criticising the government's incremental approach to policy change, The Globe and Mail wondered "Why must Ontario always move so slowly and by inches?" The public clearly voiced its support for Sunday sale, the editorial argued and the government's refusal to permit it for "the festivities of 1967 will put Ontario badly out of step with Quebec and the United States, for those many tourists we hope will pause between the two."151 The Welland Evening Tribune echoed these sentiments arguing that the provincial government seemed to "drag its heels out of force of habit." Its refusal to permit Sunday service left an otherwise "modern and progressive" province behind others like Nova Scotia and New Brunswick during the Centennial year.152 These arguments and others like them focused on the slow pace of change. When the government first took on the responsibilities of government control of liquor it applied a heavy regulatory hand in morally controlling consumption behaviour. As it tried in more recent years to equalise the balance between controls against abuse and service for moderate drinkers, it found itself hamstrung. The complexity of the legislation, the incremental nature of policy change and the political culture of the province and its leaders that favoured timely change only when a very large portion of the population
favoured it, all conspired to slow down the pace of policy change. Therefore, as the pace of change in morals and attitudes quickened—especially with an ever-younger population—the government found itself unable to keep up. Every policy change denied became a source of irritation or even a blow to provincial pride, as the following example demonstrated.

To illustrate the tourism industry's insistent argument that the lack of Sunday liquor services harmed Ontario's image for tourists, Richard Needham recounted the experience of three American visitors in the provincial capital in the summer of 1966. After being repeatedly refused service in restaurant after restaurant these tourists "eventually found out that Ontario's crazy liquor regulations prevent you from having a drink with your meal on Sunday." He explained how the government's own tourism department extolled Toronto "as a swinging, sophisticated city whose 600,000 post-war immigrants have brought a delightful international flare." This hardly rang true, he argued, when "you can have a beer with your brunch on Sunday in Moncton, N.B. but not in Toronto, the hub of the universe." The history of criticisms against liquor control policies in Ontario is rife with similar sarcastic comments about Canada's other provinces. This revealed not only the sense of superiority that Ontarians felt about their place of economic and social dominance in the country, but more importantly for our purposes, the intense sense of embarrassment and disbelief that their liquor laws could possibly be more restrictive than the smaller, and implicitly, more backward provinces.

Despite this type of pressure, the government kept up its resolve against Sunday service at least in public. When faced with the Canadian Restaurant Association's requests for Sunday sale with meals and later Saturday hours, Yaremko replied that the government contemplated no change on the issue. In his report to Cabinet on his meeting with this and other hospitality associations, however, Yaremko recommended that any policy change "be deferred," implying that change of some sort was being considered. Perhaps, then, the question should not be why was the government refusing to implement change but why was it delaying any action? The answer certainly lies in the reason the measure for Sunday service failed to pass caucus in the spring of 1965 in the first place. The dry lobby continued its pressure on the government in a very direct if limited manner. Rev. Smalley of the OTF wrote Premier
Robarts personally to oppose the licencing of restaurants for Sunday service. He argued the government needed to preserve outlets for the “family unit” and people “who do not wish to be associated with drink.” The women of a London United Church also wrote their MPP, objecting to Sunday sale of liquor and any lowering of the drinking age. These protest letters represented the traditional prohibitionist groups of the province: temperance organisations, women’s groups and the United Church, although such letters crossed the Premier’s desk, and those of his ministers, less frequently than they did in the days of Drew or Frost. One group was also missing from this list, the WCTU. An April 1966 Globe and Mail study pondered “What ever happened to the WCTU?” The author concluded, “the WCTU, if not dying, has lost its punch.” In an era of changed social values, membership dwindled and the press no longer covered its activities with the attention that it did as late as the 1940s and early 1950s. While individual members continued to pay attention to the concerns of their vocal dry constituents, as the heated spring 1965 caucus debates demonstrated, the continuing decline of the temperance movement meant that the increasingly insistent voice of the moderate drinker began to reach even the most cautious politicians.

The government grappled with these various pressures as it faced the daunting task of implementing the policy changes passed in June 1965. Although the government announced its new policy of licencing outdoor dining areas over a year before, the Licence Board failed to issue one new licence. When questioned about this by the other members at its October 1966 Cabinet Committee meeting, Robb replied that the Licence Board found “difficulty in delineating” areas for the new outdoor licences and needed further clarification from the government. Robb further argued that he could “see difficulties” in implementing the new patios so the Committee agreed to leave the matter for further study. The Committee reached this ambiguous conclusion despite the fact that Yaremko had repeatedly asked Robb over the previous months for information and interpretation on the Board’s policy regarding open-air licences because he had to defend the delay before the House. Robb continually avoided Yaremko’s pointed and insistent requests for clarification, arguing that he was busy with meetings and could not comment until applicants formally submitted specific applications. This lack of communication
and clarification between the bureaucratic and political arms of the liquor control system illustrated a significant problem that Grossman struggled with during his short tenure as Chief Commissioner. Grossman recalled that Robb complained of the government’s failure “to take a firm hand in matters of policy.” Even with both men in agreement about the problem, “little seemed to change,”160 as the struggle between Robb and Yaremko several years later illustrated.

While the government announced changes allowing new types of drinking environments like open-air patios, it attached stipulations about ‘privacy’ and ‘reasonable’ locations that rendered the Licence Board, the body charged with implementing the new policy, helpless as to how to proceed without specific standards to follow. So instead of granting the highly publicised application for a roof top cocktail lounge at the Toronto-Dominion Centre in downtown Toronto, the Board did nothing. Robb cited the problem of delineating the distance between the building and the patio and the fact that the government’s announcement strictly limited the new licences to dining lounges.161 Instead of implementing vague policies, he preferred to force the government to clarify its intentions. This was a difficult task given the simultaneous attempts to control and serve and the inherent contradiction of licencing ‘open-air’ areas within a framework that regulated physical ‘spaces’.

This inactivity did little to improve the image of liquor policy in the eyes of many Ontarians. Others with a stake in the issue opposed even recent press rumours that the Board might issue a lounge licence where it had previously stipulated only dining licences. Restaurateur George Boukydis complained bitterly in a letter to the editor about the government’s contradictory and discriminatory rules regarding liquor and food consumption. “To the food service operators in Ontario it has always seemed like a strange bit of whimsy that they should be required to tack on 50 rooms to their premises before becoming eligible to serve a beer to a thirsty customer without first making him eat a sandwich.”167 This ‘whimsy’ resulted from the Board’s desire to associate liquor consumption with food. Therefore, it enforced regulations concerning the number of bedrooms required to qualify for certain licences and forced people to eat full meals when drinking in certain outlets and forbade them from doing so in others.
The Cabinet Committee recommended two changes in response to this complaint and others regarding the trouble of explaining to customers that they must order a meal before getting a drink and then the problem of meeting the requirement of a ‘meal’ which the LLA did not explicitly define. The first allowed dining lounges to open lounges on the premises without needing a further licence. The Committee stipulated, though, that the lounge have a number of chairs equal to only 10% of the number in the dining lounge to make for “easy enforcement.” Secondly, the Committee recommended that, to help ease the problem of meeting the meal regulation while still enforcing the association of food with drinks in dining establishments, 25% of expenditures must be on food, a ratio that would be slowly increased and phased in over 3 years. Clearly even when the government tried to lessen the moral control that irritated customers, it complicated matters further by adding new provisions within the framework of the moral control/customer service dichotomy.

Even while the Committee grappled with the implementation of the 1965 changes, the public continued its barrage of complaints through the summer and fall of 1966 about those areas not changed. A Stayner man complained to Robarts about Quebec’s impressive ski resorts compared to Ontario’s local option area resorts which were “retarded by lack of proper modern day liquor legislation.” A Toronto man asked Yaremko: “isn’t it time we grew up and accepted Sunday as a day of the week like the other six?” A Windsor man added to this chorus by protesting the lack of self-serve stores to Robarts. He argued that the government allowed Ontarians to buy liquor but not to see it. He pointed out that the Ontario in which Ferguson first established liquor stores was much different that the one he lived in today. This same man went on to write to Chief Commissioner Sheppard later in the fall of 1966 urging him to lower the drinking age. Prince Charles now aged 18, could be King of Canada, he pointed out, but could not buy a drink in Ontario. The upcoming events of 1967 prompted all of these appeals. As the president of the Association of Tourist Resort Operators sarcastically asked in a brief to the Licence Board, “will we charm them with rustic revivals and space-aged gimmickry and bore them dead with our hospitality?” By directing this overwhelming number of complaints at all areas of the government control apparatus, these Ontarians helped form an unmistakable picture of public sentiment. Another
significant anniversary facing the province also placed the entire liquor policy debate into a unique context.

As the editor of the Beverage Alcohol Reporter pointed out, September 1966 was the 50th anniversary of the beginning of Prohibition in Ontario. He questioned how far the government had come since 1916 in recognising the maturity of society. He urged the government to “realise that we are getting to be big boys” by making more liquor changes, especially in view of the editors’ “monotonous” criticisms. Clearly this ‘monotony’ continued. Summing up months of protest, The Toronto Star’s Ron Haggart concluded the year with a series of articles satirising ‘How to drink in Ontario.’ He used as his main theme one of the seemingly half-hearted June 1965 changes. Asking “why Ontario has no ‘Harry’s Bar,’” he pointed out that while the name of a drinking outlet may be in large lighted letters, “the description of what kind of place it is will be in rather stilted language and in smaller letters” beneath. A drinking outlet could indicate its licence in five-inch letters but not what type of drinks it sold. Before 1965 the letters were only two inches high. “In Ontario, you just have to know what a ‘Lounge’ means.” Haggart’s sarcastic ‘guide’ to negotiating the province’s liquor laws highlighted that enough residue of moral control remained in the laws that, with tinkering, they appeared even more ridiculous. As he illustrated, the extra three inches added to the size of the letters only emphasised the reality that outlets were bound to euphemistic phrases coined in the 1930s and 1940s and could not clearly indicate what they sold. Haggart went on in this vein to criticise all aspects of the liquor laws from the rules stipulating where one may drink or transport packaged liquor to the drinking age and the absence of Sunday drinking. Although his litany of complaints seemed to offer little hope for change, the government soon alleviated at least one of these hardships involved in drinking in Ontario.

SUNDAY DRINKING WITH MEALS

In response to this tremendous public pressure, the Licence Board announced Sunday sale in early January 1967. Unlike 1965, caucus approved the Cabinet Committee’s October 1966 recommendation to permit the sale of liquor on Sundays. Chairman Robb explained the specific stipulations: only with permission from the LLBO, only with meals in licenced dining establishments, and
only from noon to 3 pm and 5 pm to 9:30 pm. For the first time the government endeavoured to define a meal by outlining that items such as pretzels, cheese, crackers or sandwiches did not constitute one.\textsuperscript{173} The aim of these provisos, Globe and Mail reporter John Dafoe explained, “is to ensure that liquor is really being served with meals and that licencees are not merely serving Sunday drinks accompanied by a crust of bread and a piece of sausage.”\textsuperscript{174} While the government cautiously retained significant moral control over this new type of licencing, this change represented its greatest departure from the Prohibition-inspired framework that had consistently informed policy over the years.

What had prompted the Conservative caucus to accept a recommendation for Sunday service that it rejected a year and a half earlier? Several factors influenced the reversal. Most observers attributed the change to the expectations surrounding the upcoming Expo and Centennial celebrations, which must have appeared much more immediate to the caucus members.\textsuperscript{175} Furthermore, the early 1960s environment fostered a belief in change and a new willingness to test new boundaries. The volatility of American society with its race riots, anti-war demonstrations and youth militancy contributed to this overwhelming pressure for social change in Ontario and a shift towards more permissive attitudes towards personal behaviour and the law.\textsuperscript{176} Beyond general expectations, the government had a more specific reason for permitting Sunday service in anticipation of Expo. The restaurants at the Ontario Pavilion at Expo would have been faced with two choices on Sundays: remain open like the rest of the Montreal outlets or close in deference to its own laws back in Ontario. Either way, The Globe and Mail’s Richard Needham concluded, the Ontario Pavilion would have been “the laughing stock of Expo.”\textsuperscript{177} Another, less tangible factor influenced the decision to implement Sunday sale. The public disappointment after the 1965 changes failed to include this particular service finally convinced caucus that a very large majority of Ontarians favoured it. James Auld, Tourism and Information Minister and member of the Cabinet Committee on Liquor Matters, noted a “changing attitude” to drinking among all sectors of the public, while Provincial Secretary Yaremko believed Sunday service would be “acceptable to most of the people in the province.”\textsuperscript{178} The government, therefore, demonstrated its traditional approach of waiting patiently, despite the intensity of criticism, to institute change only when assured of a large majority of support.
The government accurately predicted this result. Ontarians polled by The Toronto Star universally praised the new service as "commendable," "long-awaited," "a wonderful Centennial gift," and "good for one's morale."\textsuperscript{179} Similarly, the hospitality industry greeted the amendment with joy, predicting that Canadian and American tourists on their way to Montreal for Expo who might otherwise not have visited Ontario would now patronise licenced restaurants and resorts.\textsuperscript{180} The change would also improve Toronto's ability to attract large conventions, which traditionally began on Sunday evenings with cocktails and dinner. The province's ban on Sunday drinking previously discouraged conventions as the manager of the Royal York lost 1000 customers in October 1966 when he informed a large Chicago company of Ontario's laws.\textsuperscript{181}

The small minority of temperance advocates characteristically opposed the new policy. Expressing his Church's traditional prohibitionist beliefs, Rev. H.C. Slade of Toronto's Jarvis Street Baptist Church exclaimed "Liquor is all bad and it's worse on the Lord's Day."\textsuperscript{182} Rev. Mutchmor believed this "end to Sunday sanctity" would place Ontario on par with "unbelieving Communist countries."\textsuperscript{183} Finally, Mrs. F.H. Hobson, past president of the WCTU complained "Wives who have to put up with drunks all through the week will have them on Sunday too."\textsuperscript{184} The "ho hum"\textsuperscript{185} reaction that greeted the licencing of 500 Ontario dining outlets to serve liquor with meals on Sundays\textsuperscript{186} not only illustrated the tremendous decline in influence of these religious-based temperance forces but also justified the government's delay.

Ushering Sunday sale through the Committee and caucus proved to be one of Yaremko's last duties as Provincial Secretary. In late November 1966 Robarts undertook a major Cabinet shuffle moving the 48-year-old Yaremko to Public Welfare. During more than six years in the post Yaremko helped guide liquor policy through one of its most turbulent and active eras. His tireless work on the Cabinet Committee produced some of the most significant changes in liquor policy to date to reflect the desires of a multicultural society such as the elimination of the liquor permit, the expansion of entertainment in licenced premises and the widening of licencing to recreational facilities. Intending to infuse the new Cabinet with youth and vitality,\textsuperscript{187} Robarts appointed 38-year-old Robert Welch of St. Catharines to
replace Yaremko. A lay Anglican preacher and lawyer, Welch brought to the position of Provincial Secretary tremendous energy as well as a dynamic speaking ability.188 These attributes would help him advance his predecessor’s changes and place his own unique mark on the position.

While Ontarians drank wine in the sidewalk cafés of Expo '67, enjoying the European ambience of Montreal, many pondered their own liquor laws back home.189 Although the pressure for amendments throughout the early and mid-1960s largely originated from a desire to attract and impress visitors during the Centennial year celebrations, the experience of the generally more sophisticated Quebec drinking scene for Ontarians themselves served as a catalyst for further changes. Ontarians returned home from Montreal unimpressed by the large number of amendments passed in the first half of the 1960s and determined for more, not just for tourists but for themselves. Provisions such as public outdoor patios, election day opening, self-serve stores and a lower drinking age constituted the changes they would demand in the aftermath of that pivotal 1967 experience.
Notes to Chapter 7

1 "Liquor Post to IBM Chief,” The Toronto Telegram, August 20, 1963, p. 2.
3 Peter Bruton. “Next LCBO Chief Won’t Be An MPP Or Cabinet Member,” The Toronto Telegram, August 15, 1963, p. 44.
4 Bruton, p. 44.
5 "Liquor Post to IBM Chief,” p. 2.
7 "New Chairman of LCBO,” p. 7.
8 "Liquor Post To IBM Chief,” pp. 1-2.
9 The only newspaper of Toronto’s major dailies to correctly identify Goggin as the last private citizen in the post was The Globe and Mail. See “IBM Chairman Named to Head Liquor Board,” The Globe and Mail, August 21, 1963, p. 1. However in the same issue another article on the subject incorrectly reported that MPPs had filled the position since 1938. See “New Chairman of LCBO,” The Globe and Mail, August 21, 1963, p. 7.
10 "Liquor Post to IBM Chief,” p. 2.
12 "New Chairman of LCBO,” p. 7.
25 McMurtry, p. 7.
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34 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence, John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “15 LLB 1963.” (restricted) November 20, 1963 to Robarts from J.F. Mc. of Fort Erie.
35 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 1, Provincial Secretary Correspondence, John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “15 LLB 1963.” (restricted) December 20, 1963 to J.F. Mc from Robb.
40 Frank Tumpane. “Sincerely Yours,” p. 35.
47 Owram, p. x.
52 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 212.
54 RG 8-5 Acc. 15045 Box 2, Provincial Secretary Correspondence, John Yaremko Liquor Files. File “LCBO Alcohol Addiction Research Foundation 1964-1965,” (restricted) Paper by H. David Archibald, Executive Director ARF. “Legislation to Control Alcohol Problems.” May 1964. presented to University of Western Ontario course on Alcohol and Problems of Addiction.
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70 Hogan, p. 7.
72 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 21, LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File “SO 1-200.” memo May 4, 1964 to store managers and district supervisors from A.J. McIntyre, Director of Store Administration.
87 “Editorial: No Need For Further Delay.”
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100 RG 8-5 Container 204, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. File "LLB Ontario." (restricted) memo January 26, 1966 to Robb from Yaremko.
110 McDougall, p. 126.
120 Owram, p. 251.
121 Ontario Debates, June 2, 1965, p. 3570.
133 Arnold Bruner, "What Have Saloons Done to Toronto the 'Good'?" The Toronto Star, January 8, 1966, p. 44.
134 See for example RG 8-5 Container 159, Provincial Secretary Correspondence. M. Phillips 1960, File 31, "LLB Activities." (restricted).
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149 RG 8-5 Container 204. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. File “Liquor Licence Board Ontario.” (restricted) November 18, 1965 to D.P. of Stratford from Yaremko.
158 RG 8-5 Container 203. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. File “LCBO.” (restricted) October 24, 1966 notes on meeting of Cabinet Committee on Liquor Legislation.
160 Oliver. Unlikely Tory. p. 127.
164 RG 8-5 Container 203. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. File “LCBO.” (restricted) October 24, 1966 notes on Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Liquor Legislation.
165 RG 8-5 Container 203. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. File “LCBO.” (restricted) August 11, 1966 to Roberts from F.P.O of Stayner.
166 RG 8-5 Container 203. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. File “LCBO.” (restricted) received September 1. 1966 to Yaremko from R.H.Q of Toronto.
167 RG 8-5 Container 203. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. File “LCBO.” (restricted) October 24, 1966 to Roberts from J.D.K of Windsor.
168 RG 8-5 Container 203. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. File “LCBO.” (restricted) November 14, 1966 to Sheppard from J.D.K.
172 RG 8-5 Container 203. Provincial Secretary Correspondence. File “LCBO.” (restricted) October 24, 1966 notes on meeting of Cabinet Committee on Liquor Legislation.
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184 “Church, WCTU React with Dismay. Anger to Sunday Drinking.” p. 5.
187 McDougall, p. 178.
A "SIGNIFICANT EVOLUTION" IN THE SALE OF LIQUOR

The experiences of Expo '67 and the Centennial year were important as both a cause and a symptom of 'significant' changes in the late 1960s. According to Bothwell, Drummond and English in their history of post-war Canada, the mood of the Centennial year was that, "the buttoned-up past of our ancestors" was fast disappearing. Changing the liquor laws was certainly part of this. While the anticipation leading up to the Centennial year celebrations encouraged the government to implement important liquor policy changes such as Sunday sale with meals, the experience of Expo itself created a powerful and long-lasting legacy for Ontario society. The Oakville Daily Journal Record argued in a January 1968 editorial that the outdoor cafés and family drinking scenes enjoyed by Ontarians in Montreal gave rise to a "more liberal attitude towards alcohol" in the province. The editor went so far as to predict that the outcome of this altered attitude would be more liberal liquor laws. Arguably the heightened expectations for change and the severe criticism of Ontario's laws that resulted from the Expo experience provided the momentum needed to swing the pendulum of liquor control away from the paternalist stage into the more balanced approach of the early 1970s.

The immediate aftermath of Expo '67 undeniably witnessed an increase in the frequency and intensity of criticism surrounding the liquor laws as many Ontarians saw their great Expo-inspired expectations were not yet realised. Interestingly, while Expo provided unique public drinking experiences for Ontarians, and therefore prompted demands for outdoor patios and a lowered drinking age for example, its legacy influenced views towards the retail side of government control as well. For example, in early January 1968 a Clarkson resident recently relocated from Alberta complained to the LCBO, "we find it annoying and rather silly to have to sign an order slip at the liquor store." A week later NDP liquor critic Pat Lawlor proposed private boutique-style liquor stores. Calling beer and liquor store order slips
"ridiculous," he likened that particular form of paternalistic control to surveillance by the "Great White Father."\textsuperscript{5} Lawlor publicly expressed the type of criticism that the government and the Boards increasingly received after Expo, complaints, longstanding in nature that would only intensify as future catalysts placed the demands in a new light.

**BREWERS' WAREHOUSING STRIKE**

A Brewers' Warehousing strike in the early summer of 1968 represented one such catalyst. Occurring in the atmosphere of this post-Expo agitation for change, this strike came to symbolise much more than the closing of beer stores. On finding their local outlets closed Ontarians called for beer sale in corner stores and grocery stores.\textsuperscript{6} *The Globe and Mail*'s Bruce West predicted this demand as a "by-product of the great beer drought," especially since "many civilized lands" sold beer in corner grocery stores. This strike, in conjunction with another one at Quebec liquor stores, prompted Ontarians to question not only the system of beer retail but government control itself. West noted the "depressing atmosphere of monopoly about the whole business of selling liquor in this province." While he condemned "those prim and niggling little regulations" controlling drinking behaviour, West refused to go so far as "those liberty-howlers" determined to create anarchy by eliminating even "our basic and vital laws."\textsuperscript{7} A *Globe and Mail* editorial the next day drew no such distinction, arguing that government monopoly over liquor retail fulfilled none of the very few justifications for government to enter into private commerce. Noting both the Quebec and the Ontario strikes the editor argued that the times had changed since yesterday's "moralists and custodians of public order" dictated that government should be the only liquor shopkeeper.\textsuperscript{8} On July 19, the day after the Ontario strike ended an Oakville editorial placed the strike and the demands it provoked in the overall context of the post-Expo era. Arguing that 1967 promised to be a turning point for liquor laws in Ontario, the editorial explained that when denied beer sales Ontarians felt disappointment and evinced disgust at the lack of significant change even more acutely. This disappointment extended not only to the lack of independent beer and liquor retailers but to the continued "hypocritical ritual of the rubber sandwich," which dining outlets forced customers to
purchase if they desired a drink. Once again, one seemingly isolated incident, a strike, prompted a critical questioning of the entire government control system.

**SELF-SERVE STORES**

These criticisms, built up since before the 1967 celebrations and amplified by the 1968 beer strike, affected the government in a significant way. In late July just four days after the end of the strike Provincial Secretary Robert Welch announced that the Board would open three self-serve liquor stores in the Toronto area on an experimental basis. While the strike prompted calls specifically for beer in grocery stores, this announcement certainly addressed the general criticisms about government control. This announcement also followed the LCBO’s recent visits to study the self-serve systems in British Columbia, Oregon and Washington. Board representatives returned generally “impressed” with the décor and operations of the various stores. Welch’s announcement also represented the realisation of years of complaints about the particular irritation of hidden bottles and addressed the general argument that in order to justify monopoly sale the government needed to provide the buying atmosphere that customers desired. In making the announcement Welch admitted as much. The change, he said, responded to criticisms of “not being up to date, not using modern merchandising techniques.”

This proposal signified a dramatic change in policy from the one that had informed liquor retail for over 40 years. Welch’s remarks revealed that the business concerns of merchandising liquor in a manner similar to other goods on open shelves now replaced the moral control philosophy that dictated for decades that liquor bottles must be hidden from view. The government also demonstrated a quickened pace of change to more closely mirror the public’s heightened demands for amendments. Before the 1965 Legislative Committee on Commissions, Chief Commissioner Sheppard explained that the Board was not considering joining British Columbia in opening self-serve liquor stores. As late as December 1967 General Manager Spragge admitted that while “the easy-travelling jet-age” of the late 1960s prompted Ontarians to shun the old “peek-a-boo” style stores and demand later hours and more exotic labels, the problems of theft and shelf space prevented the Board from changing. The Brewers’ Warehousing strike and the unprecedented expectation for change following Expo accounted for the relatively quick
reversal in policy for a government often criticised for habitually dragging its heels on liquor law change. Above all, Robarts responded to the reduced majority he earned in the fall 1967 election. As his party organiser Ernie Jackson argued, voters had become much more sophisticated, seeking “action and efficiency” instead of remaining lifelong supporters of one party. Therefore, while the cautious incremental approach secured him a majority, Robarts realised that he had to respond to that aspect of the province’s political culture that demanded timely reform in order to prevent any further erosion in his majority.

Besides announcing self-serve stores, Welch revealed that the Cabinet Committee would begin to scrutinise issues like the drinking age, expanding Sunday sale, and government’s involvement in personal habits such as drinking. Such a prospect prompted a Chatham Daily editorial to predict: “Ontario liquor control legislation, a stolid fortress of feudal imperium glowing over the twentieth century may be about to lower the drawbridge.” The Brantford Expositor, more reserved in its reception, pointed out that the Committee had no specific deadline and represented the government’s “customary cautious approach” to liquor policy. While the Cabinet Committee stimulated numerous, though minor, amendments to the laws over the first half of the 1960s, the editorial noted, in the interim Ontario residents had the “eye-opening experience of Expo.” In this very different environment of the late 1960s, the editorial dismissed proposals like self-serve stores or further studies as meaningless until the government instituted grocery sale, ended local option and further liberalised Sunday sale. Despite calls for more change in response to the self-serve announcement, Welch’s promise of further study of the liquor laws created a general sense of optimism in the future fulfilment of the promises of 1967. Certainly many observers credited Welch as the “sparkplug” behind any future changes. The Windsor Star editorialised that the 40-year-old minister himself reflected the “fresh new ideas” of the youth and immigrants making up a significant part of Ontario society. Clearly his emphasis on individual responsibility, rather than government paternalism, revealed his determination to tip the balance towards customer service and away from moral control. Self-serve stores and a commitment to future changes represented not only a traditional
defence of the government’s monopoly, but a genuine change in attitude towards liquor control and the government’s role in it.

Nevertheless some critics continued to focus on the shortcomings of Ontario’s drinking and retail scene. A late July Hamilton Spectator editorial pointed out the hypocrisies inherent in making it a crime for a 20-year-old to buy alcohol when he could legally join the army. The editorial also urged greater flexibility in the sale of food and different types of alcohol in all licenced outlets and the licencing of sidewalk cafés. A second Hamilton editorial that same day ridiculed the “monopolistic, over-regulated marketing methods” of the LCBO: the forms, the “severe mauling” of wines, and the hidden bottles. Obviously unimpressed by Welch’s recent promise of experimental self-serve stores, the editorial called for grocery sale of beer and independent retailers of wine and liquor. This continued demand for beer in grocery stores, spurred on by the recent beer strike, ironically gained momentum from Welch’s July announcement rather than being muted by promises of improved liquor merchandising. When faced with questions regarding the topics of study for the Cabinet Committee, Welch’s “head nodded” as one reporter noted, to the possibility of beer sales in grocery stores. Later that fall Premier Robarts found himself confronted with his young Provincial Secretary’s grocery sale hints. While his earlier leadership style permitted ministers more initiative in policy formation, incidents such as these forced Robarts to exercise more control over his Cabinet. Calling the liquor laws a “troublesome subject” due to so many “conflicting views,” Robarts expressed his own personal objection to the sale of beer outside the present structure. While Welch enthusiastically sought to improve and expand his own particular policy area, Robarts represented the entire electorate and endeavoured to reflect the majority’s opinions.

Another policy area predicted for review by the Cabinet Committee also revealed a difference of opinion between Premier and minister. The lowering of the minimum drinking age continued to be a major area of debate in response to the greater perceived maturity of the province’s youth, an increasingly significant proportion of society. By 1966 half of Canada’s population was under age 21. At an early November 1968 dance for the Young Progressive Conservatives (PCs) during the party’s annual meeting, Robarts told the young crowd that his government was considering lowering the drinking and voting ages
from 21 to 18. In response to Welch’s announcement that the Cabinet Committee would study lowering the drinking age, and this speech to the Young PCs, Toronto’s Inter Church Temperance Federation wrote to Robarts in November urging him not to lower the drinking age. In a reply reported in the Toronto press, Robarts assured the temperance group that he would not consider it. That Robarts felt it necessary to personally reassure this group revealed his continuing desire to placate the province’s dry forces as well as his belief in government’s responsibility to protect citizens, particularly youth, from potentially dangerous products like intoxicating and potentially addictive alcohol. His reply to a Hamilton man’s call for a lowered drinking age the following month further revealed this stance. He explained that the issue was not one of depriving youth of the privilege of drinking at 18 or 19 but “of insuring society will provide for their wellbeing.” Robarts found himself caught between the demands of a young electorate and his own concern over their wellbeing. His biographer, A.K. McDougall, depicted this challenge with Robarts dancing to rock music with the younger members of his party one night and the next day delivering a sombre speech to his peers in the role of a “prime minister accounting for his stewardship.”

Robarts’ concern over the effects of liquor policy change on the wellbeing of youth revealed continuity between him and Frost, one that is easily missed given the great diversity in the decades that each man dominated. For all the liquor law change over which Robarts presided, his responsiveness to public demands had certain limits in much the same way that Frost resisted calls for room service or ending the permit. While Frost’s critics accused him of bowing to the wishes of the strong and well organised temperance groups, his personal dedication to paternalistic public administration remained steadfast, albeit less recognised. The same argument cannot be made for Robarts. The symbolic, if not official, signal of the death of organised temperance in Ontario came in December 1968. The Ontario Temperance Federation changed its name to Alcohol and Drug Concerns Inc., reflecting its concern with the problems of abuse and excess and not with consumption itself. The group’s president explained the change as part of an overall updating of the organisation “akin to a car’s new model for the year.” This change made Robarts’ belief in the protective role of government even more significant, a belief that
caused him to struggle with the idea of lowering the drinking age in the face of pressure from his ministers and the public.

Criticism certainly continued both inside and outside Robarts’ caucus. Repeating its past role in spearheading specific policy changes, the Ontario Hotel and Motel Association sent Welch a brief in November in response to his invitation for suggestions for the liquor law study. The Association’s lengthy list of demands included the implementation of past policy changes as well as new innovations in liquor control. The brief called for action on outdoor licences and a clear policy on games and entertainment. In June 1965 Provincial Secretary Yaremko had announced the introduction of outdoor licences and permission for all types of entertainment, even going so far as to list exotic instruments like the oboe and the xylophone. Over two years later the Association’s members working in the field still had no open-air licences and experienced confusion over the entertainment policy. The brief also called for further liberalisation on Sundays to include later Saturday or early Sunday hours which were promised in early 1967 but never materialised. entertainment, and convention cocktail parties without meals. The Association included correspondence from Toronto’s Four Seasons Hotel indicating that it had recently lost significant business because of the illegality of the traditional Sunday evening convention cocktail party. Finally, the brief called for the desegregation of public houses, noting that the three Prairie provinces either never had segregation or recently integrated and upgraded their beer parlours.

This call for desegregation of public houses echoed a similar brief submitted by the Windsor Innkeepers’ Association three years earlier. Several rounds of liquor law amendments in the intervening years failed to address this specific issue or the general atmosphere of that beer-dispensing outlet. The two notable exceptions were in late 1967 and early 1968 when the Licence Board removed the regulation dictating the price and glass size for beer in Ontario public houses, controls that had been in place since 1934. Now, as The Globe and Mail’s Ron Haggart explained, proprietors could “charge what they liked” for beer “in any kind of container they chose, from a pony to a stein to a jug to a yard.” While Haggart noted the government no longer exercised its “stifling” control over these aspects of beer consumption, he revealed that the average public house remained “an environment of the most stupefying
sleaziness.” In promoting desegregation and upgrading along the lines followed in the western provinces, the hotel and motel lobby sought to address this situation.

Criticisms of the liquor laws emanated from within Robarts’ own caucus as well. Prescott-Russell MPP J. Albert Belanger complained that the November Throne Speech failed to mention the results of the Cabinet Committee liquor review. Echoing the hotel and motel lobby group’s brief, he specifically pointed to the early Saturday evening closing hour as “highly annoying.”\(^{36}\) A *Toronto Telegram* editorial called this criticism from one of Robarts’ own backbenchers a “pointed reminder to the government of our ridiculous laws.”\(^{37}\) Even after almost two years of legal Sunday sale the government failed to extend Saturday hours into early Sunday morning (i.e. to 1 am), a move that had always been resisted as infringing on the Sabbath. Despite the relatively short period of time since Welch’s liquor review announcement, critics like Belanger expressed irritation at the realisation that his government had failed to implement later Saturday hours so many months after the introduction of Sunday sale.

Welch revealed a personal understanding of these liquor policy shortcomings in a December speech to London’s Young PCs. While 80% of the population consumed alcohol responsibly and therefore expected liquor services without undue encumbrances, he explained, the abuse and accidents related to excessive consumption presented the government with a dilemma: to provide customer service while minimising the health impacts of abuse. Welch of course articulated the twin, though often contradictory, goals of government control. He made a significant distinction, though, between the government’s responsibility to prevent health problems and past prohibitionist policies, which he argued failed to prevent excess. Welch’s expression of the government’s liquor policy dilemma underlined a slow evolution away from a reliance on moral controls, based on the belief that drinkers’ behaviour required significant regulation and towards greater individual responsibility on the drinkers themselves to make reasonable choices. This evolution advanced through the 1960s, spurred on by the initiatives of Allan Grossman and the general environment of personal rights and freedoms. Welch also pointed to one of the most significant reasons for the slow pace of this evolution: an incremental approach to policy change, an approach responsible, for example, for the ‘annoying’ Saturday closing hours criticised above.
Welch urged that this traditional way of making policy be replaced by a “total” and “complete” approach that took into consideration the “whole picture of alcohol in society” in order to reach a “mature policy.” With Welch representing the youthful side of Cabinet and his audience representing the future of the party, the evolution towards a more balanced liquor policy promised to advance even further.

By early 1969 expectations ran high for significant amendments as a result of the ongoing Cabinet Committee study. Hopes and criticisms solidified around several very specific aspects of the drinking laws. These represented not only longstanding irritants but also the last remaining conspicuous moral controls over drinking behaviour. One of the most frequent complaints at this time focused on the meal requirement in dining outlets. As The Toronto Telegram’s Peter Thurling explained, if you want a drink in a dining lounge or dining room “you’re going to get hit with a plate of plastic celery and crummy cheese, want it or not.” Being told that in order to drink one must purchase a full meal in dining establishments, often at inflated prices, clearly offended the sensibilities of a generation that prided itself on personal freedoms.

Being told where one could legally drink also provoked a similar outrage. The sidewalk patios enjoyed in Montreal during Expo, and even the rooftop dining areas promised in 1965, had yet to materialise in Ontario. While Chairman Robb continued to blame the delay on the lack of clear government policy guidelines, Ontarians craved outdoor drinking even if they had to resort to the unlicenced variety. Summer picnics were especially popular as Ron Haggart observed, for example, among “the working-class, and largely immigrant population” of Toronto who flocked to Toronto Island. The popularity of wine and beer in Ontarians’ picnic baskets proved itself in the recent number of fines for such illegal activity. For example, 1966 saw several highly publicised cases of fines and even jail time levied against picnickers for having alcohol in a public place. A Scarborough man wrote to Premier Robarts on behalf of a recent Dutch immigrant who faced jail time for not paying a fine for having beer on a picnic with his family. He argued that the law against beer at a picnic had no place in a province that considered itself progressive. It “makes us all out to be fools,” he exclaimed. In his short reply Robarts quoted the LCA’s definition of a residence and explained that to allow possession and
consumption on a picnic left the Act vulnerable to opinion. This reply revealed the government’s challenge in permitting drinking in places such as outdoor patios or parks. The entire government control system was predicated on the definition of ‘residence,’ the only legal place to have or consume alcohol from the time the system was created in 1927 until beverage rooms were opened in 1934. At that time certain very specific public ‘spaces’ were added to the legal consumption locations. From that point on, the government amended the laws and expanded the definitions, but the main framework of government control remained one into which outdoor patios or parks could not easily be incorporated.

Critics also echoed the demands contained in the Hotel and Motel Association’s brief concerning Saturday closing hours and sex segregation in public houses. Quoting the Canadian Restaurant Association’s similar list of suggestions Ron Haggart argued “most people believe Sunday begins when they get out of bed.” When the government doled out “that little goodie.” Sunday sale as a “patina of progress” before the 1967 election, he argued, it failed to extend Saturday hours into Sunday, a law “absurd even within the context of the Puritanism from which it flows.” Haggart recognised that the ‘absurdity’ stemmed from the “patchwork” approach of “half-hearted change which for so long has passed as liquor ‘reform’ in Ontario,” an observation that Welch recently highlighted. By preserving enough of the old moral prohibitions such as the ban on Saturday night sale as profaning the Christian Sabbath, the government left itself open to a continued barrage of criticism. This criticism expanded to include all policies perceived as impinging on individual choice. Haggart labelled the sex segregation in public houses “class discrimination” and “so clearly out of date and absurd.” A Toronto doctor similarly described the drinking age as “insane,” arguing it forced older teenagers into dangerous patterns of underground drinking. While some critics clearly continued to expect further limited initiatives from the Cabinet Committee, Welch’s recent revelations about his hopes for changes in policy development forecasted an entirely new approach to liquor control.

The retail side of government control received its share of complaints focused primarily on hours and order forms, though some ‘liberty-howlers’ like Haggart continued to press for the most extreme suggestions. As part of Welch’s promised “whole new structure of liquor law.” Haggart proposed the
abolition of the LCBO, "that Holy Roman Empire of the Provincial Government which neither controls anything nor sits as a board." Questioning the need for government liquor retail, Haggart echoed the assertions of opinion articles appearing throughout the 1960s. Arguing that the Board did little to control consumption "except for placing the occasional person on the interdicted list," a significant power which he interestingly mentioned as an aside, Haggart implied that it no longer fulfilled the role the government presumably intended it to carry out when it originally created the LCBO. Nevertheless, in making his argument against government monopoly, he demonstrated that in the interim the Board became "a sales agency...concerned with administration and business."48 Earlier generations, infused with temperance attitudes, found this idea of a government operation offensive. In the 1960s atmosphere of efficiency and customer service few found government monopoly necessarily problematic, except extreme critics like Haggart, as long as the government fulfilled the public's wishes. By addressing this demand the government hoped to offset such attacks on its monopoly system.

A “SIGNIFICANT EVOLUTION” IN THE SALE OF LIQUOR

Seven months after the announcement, the Board opened its first self-serve liquor store in Toronto in February 1969. Welch described the new store, where customers could browse the aisles, select their bottles and present them to the cashier for payment without the necessity of an order form, as a "significant evolution" in the sale of liquor in Ontario. "I can remember the old liquor stores with all the mystery and the high, painted green windows and wire cages," he reminisced.49 He placed the move in the context of the government's intention to provide service for the large majority of the population that used alcohol responsibly while still concerning itself with countering the abuse of alcohol. While he did not express it explicitly, presumably countering this abuse no longer necessitated hidden bottles and order forms. This certainly did represent a 'significant' step along the evolution from moral control towards a system of liquor retail that resembled more an "innocent gourmet shop than a liquor outlet."50 Customers marvelled at the thousands of bottles lined up "on shellacked plywood shelves, with no sense of shame."51 Compared to the old "buying-by-numbers" ordeal, the new shopping experience provided "a cornucopia of browns and reds...[a] fairyland of colour."52 The new marketing style also introduced women
employees into the liquor stores for the first time since 1957 when the new ID permit card eliminated the need for endorsers. When questioned in the interim about the absence of women employees in government stores, the government always referred to the heavy lifting involved. Now that the new system necessitated the role of full-time cashier, the Board opened up its hiring to women for this position only.

Most observers thankfully noted that the new system removed the "sin image" and the "humiliation" inherent in the old highly regulated system. Customers enjoyed viewing unusually shaped bottles and liqueur colours previously unknown to them when they simply ordered from lists of stock numbers. Most customers responded with "well, it's about time," according to the manager of the first self-serve store. Putting the change in perspective, a Hamilton Spectator editorial reminded readers that only a decade earlier obtaining liquor necessitated the "shameful procedure of buying a permit." In this sense the new marketing concept deserved the description of one reporter as "the most dazzling reversal in psychology and concepts of service to come out of the Liquor Control Board of Ontario." In many respects, though, the shift to self-serve liquor stores represented the conclusion of Allan Grossman's crusade to modernise and humanise the liquor buying experience early in the decade. While he did not specifically promote this particular retail style, the improvements he initiated in eliminating the permit, modernising store architecture, extending hours and locating stores in convenient locations like shopping malls provided a transition from the store system first created by Ferguson to the supermarket-style shops of the 1970s.

As with past policy changes, the aura of paternalistic control remained for many critics intent upon a complete break with the past. While customers in the new self-serve stores simply presented their bottles to the cashier for payment, the Board still required those in the older stores to fill out the much derided order form. In recognition of the new stores, the Board ruled that customers in the conventional stores as well as beer stores no longer had to sign their names and addresses, but they still had to indicate on paper the particular products desired. General Manager Spragge justified the retention of the order form "as essential in efficient operation of the stores" since it forced customers to make up their minds
before reaching the counter and it minimised the potential for misunderstandings over size or brand.⁵⁹ Therefore there would be no more ‘Rover Collie’ incidents as in 1955 with customers flouting the law by forging phoney names. The liquor and beer slips now became true order forms as in any other business: they no longer represented a way for government to monitor the morality of liquor consumption. The government slowly relinquished this control first with the conversion from the permit booklet, which recorded all purchases to the permit card and now from the order form with an address and a signed affidavit to a simple order form of products desired. Because this transition took place over such a long period of time, most critics failed to recognise the lessening of moral control and focused instead on the retention of the order form which for years had symbolised all the most detested paternalistic aspects of liquor control. Therefore the majority of the press and opinions following the opening of the new self-serve store urged the complete end to order forms. The editor of The London Free Press William C. Heine called them “annoying,” “silly” and “bureaucratic.”⁶⁰ As Spragge’s reasoning made clear, the continuation of order forms in conventional liquor stores and all beer stores represented a sound business decision rather than any effort at moral control.

In response to the new stores, the government found itself congratulated on the one hand and bombarded with suggestions for further improvements on the other. Representative of most of the press reaction, a Globe and Mail editorial praised the move to establish self-serve stores and abandon the signed order form. It then sarcastically suggested that Welch’s ‘significant evolution’ could “degenerate into such things” as faster service, a more civilised atmosphere, beer in grocery stores, all-night liquor stores and the complete elimination of order forms.⁶¹ While these proposals focused on the retail side of government control, others saw the change to self-serve as an opportunity to promote amendments to liquor licensing. Less than two weeks later the Young PCs appealed to Welch for later Saturday and Sunday drinking hours in addition to the private sale of beer in grocery and corner stores. These younger representatives of the government party also voiced their support for lowering the drinking age, certainly spurred on by Robarts’ personal revelation to them a few months earlier that the government was considering such a move.⁶² The province’s Joint Board of Travel Associations also appealed for resort
licences in dry areas, a further erosion of the local option system to respond to the growing demands of the tourism industry. The government therefore faced tremendous pressure to continue its demonstrated commitment to lessening control over liquor retail from not only the press across the province but also from the Young PCs and the tourism lobby.

While the overwhelming reaction to the new self-serve stores was positive, there were a few isolated examples of displeasure at the new retail system. A Sarnia Observer editorial accused the government of loosing sight of the original purpose of the LCBO, “to control consumption of liquor for the greatest good of the greatest number.” By speeding up service with self-serve, the editorial argued, the government revealed its predominant concern: to increase profits rather than “uplifting the morality of the people.” The Port Hope Guide similarly argued against the government’s initiative in “making the purchase of liquor too attractive.” While the editorial reinforced that it was not advocating prohibition, it argued the government should maintain more “stringent controls at the store level.” Critics concerned with the amount of alcohol sold in the province definitely had the statistics to back them up. Over the past decade sales increased 224% while profits paid to the Treasurer rose 234%. as Table 22 in chapter 6 and Table 24 in chapter 7 illustrated. While an increase of a million and a half Ontarians over the decade certainly contributed to this rise, the liberalisation in the number and type of liquor outlets also contributed to the expanded consumption. By the early 1970s Ontario’s per capita consumption of absolute alcohol for those age 15 and over was 11.45 litres, up from 7.3 litres noted for 1950. Rates across the country were generally over 10 litres with the Canadian average just below Ontario’s at 11.14 litres. Ontario had the third highest consumption rate after British Columbia and Alberta. These two editorials represented the sort of argument that encouraged the government to maintain the conventional type of store with its moral controls like order forms and hidden bottles for so many years. In abandoning that set-up over 40 years after its establishment, the government demonstrated the final stage in its long but, as Welch argued, ‘significant’ evolution away from the moral restraints that originally justified government monopoly. As the government slowly removed these moral restraints, the only way to justify its monopoly in the face of repeated calls for private sale was to regularise liquor retail with self-serve stores.
Brigadier Spragge's communication with liquor store managers regarding the continuation of order forms in conventional stores represented one of his last actions as General Manager of the LCBO. At age 61 he retired at the end of the fiscal year on March 31, 1969. His longstanding Assistant General Manager, J.S. Abra, a World War Two veteran, replaced him in the position. Spragge served the Board for 22 years guiding it through two post-war decades of growth and expansion. His longevity in the position pointed not only to a party long in power but also to his own competency and dedication. He led as the Board's top bureaucrat during those years when the Chief Commissioner was an elected MPP, from the time he was hired in 1947 until Sheppard was appointed in 1963. Therefore, although he gained little public attention, he played a crucial role in infusing the Board with the goals of efficiency and modernisation, especially throughout the days of rapid growth in the early 1950s. When he joined the Board it ran 134 liquor stores. Upon his retirement he oversaw the operation of 418, including one self-serve store. As Table 25 shows. Above all Spragge represented the business side of government control, steering the system from a utilitarian monopoly to a modern and complex enterprise dedicated to serving its customers according to their tastes and wishes.

Table 25
Total Liquor and Beer Stores in Ontario 1960/61-1969/70

![Graph showing the total number of liquor and beer stores in Ontario from 1960/61 to 1969/70.](image)
RESULT OF THE CABINET COMMITTEE REVIEW

*Extended Sunday Drinking Hours:* Nothing illustrated the success, as well as the conclusion, of Spragge's era more than the government's liquor law changes announced by Provincial Secretary Welch in late April, just a few weeks after his retirement. Representing the results of the Cabinet Committee's study of the liquor laws, these changes concerned themselves exclusively with public drinking. First, the changes addressed weekend licencing hours. They extended Saturday closing time to 1 am thereby making the hours of sale for all outlets uniform from Monday to Saturday. This represented the realisation of a change anticipated since 1967 when the government first legalised Sunday drinking. The changes also ended the split in Sunday drinking hours around the lunch and dinner hours making them continuous from noon to 10 pm. Drinking on Sundays still required full meals including "the usual assortment of foods commonly ordered at regular meal hours." The government also legalised sale on Good Friday and Christmas Day "under the same circumstances as Sunday." While the moral control that associated Sunday drinking with dining remained, these two changes represented a significant advancement away from the moralistic attitude, which dictated in 1955 to hotel proprietors that sale on Good Friday, one of the holiest days in the Christian liturgical calendar, "of course, is forbidden." These two changes also pointed to the secularisation of Ontario society, particularly with the increase of non-Christian immigrants.

*Sunday Banquets Without Meals:* The government also addressed another recently attacked licencing area. The Licence Board could now issue special occasion permits for the sale of liquor without meals on Sundays "for international, national and provincial conventions." Other types of gatherings could qualify for these permits for Sunday sale provided they met "the Sunday regulations with respect to meals." The manager of the Special Occasion Permit Department reinforced this meal requirement later in the year warning banquet organisers "tidbits don't count as meals." Many Toronto hotels had recently complained to the Board of the significant convention business lost because they could not provide Sunday evening cocktail parties. This change, with its distinction between specific types of conventions and other gatherings, clearly represented a direct response to this problem. More importantly, it also
served as the first opportunity for Ontarians, albeit a specialised group, to drink in public on Sundays without the requirement of a full meal. Furthermore, it symbolised the continued erosion of the moral control that the government exercised over when and where Ontarians consumed liquor and opened the door for further extensions of Sunday drinking.

"Consideration to the Licencing of Patios": Welch concluded his statement of these regulatory changes with two general policy announcements. "With the upcoming summer season," he explained "the Board will now proceed to give consideration to the licencing of patios." Four years earlier Provincial Secretary Yaremko first announced that the LLBO would consider applications for the licencing of private outdoor dining areas like courtyards or rooftops. The Cabinet Committee recommended this type of outdoor licencing as a type of interim concession since it concluded Ontarians were not yet 'ready' for true open-air drinking. In the intervening years, miscommunication and lack of policy guidelines resulted in no outdoor licences. After many Ontarians experienced sidewalk patios in Montreal during Expo the desire for this type of drinking environment only intensified. Therefore, Welch’s announcement, if only a brief reference to upcoming licences, represented a recognition that perhaps Ontarians were finally ready to drink outdoors in public. Finally, and almost as an afterthought, Welch announced, "also, Mr. Speaker. I should mention that in the near future necessary changes will be made to provide for unrestricted seating of male and female patrons in...public houses on application to the Board." This indicated the government’s intention to eliminate one of the final vestiges of Depression-era regulation over beer consumption.

"A MISER DOLLING OUT PENNIES"

The press greeted the changes with wildly divergent commentaries. A Hamilton Spectator editorial lauded Welch’s announcement as "the single biggest reform" since the 1930s. While the provision for special occasion permits for Sunday service without meals under very specific circumstances signalled a major advance in Sunday drinking, this praise certainly represented a significant overstatement. Tinkering with hours of sale and restating past policies like open-air drinking constituted the bulk of the announcement. At the other end of the spectrum, The Windsor Star
editorialised “with all the abandon of a miser dolling out pennies, the Ontario government has announced another baby stride in its policy of liberalizing the laws that govern the sale of liquor.” Most observers expressed opinions somewhere in between, welcoming the modest changes and noting the need for more. Local option, the drinking age, order forms, drinking on picnics and the meal requirement in dining outlets and on Sundays represented policy issues that critics identified as requiring the government’s attention. A Sarnia editorial likened the remaining moralistic regulations informing the above aspects of government control to remnants of the nineteenth century. In the latest round of “spring cleaning,” the editorial argued, “the dust of Victoria’s day” proved difficult to wipe off. While Welch’s April changes responded to years of criticism and lobbying efforts, they only served to fuel the public’s seemingly insatiable appetite for amendments, especially to eliminate those laws perceived as infringing on Ontarians’ freedom to decide when, where and under what circumstances to consume alcohol. In a twist on Prime Minister Trudeau’s famous quote about the state and the bedroom, a Brockville editorial promoted this type of freedom of choice by demanding that the provincial government “take the state out of the barroom.” Clearly Trudeau represented a new public style with his liberal attitudes towards personal freedoms. In this context, beliefs changed quickly as the tremendous pressures of a “boisterous youth uprising” questioned the traditional attitudes towards sex, marriage, and drugs. This environment also fostered liberal attitudes towards drinking and a serious suspicion of the state’s role in regulating it.

“Full Cocktail Lounge Privileges” for Dining Outlets: The following month Provincial Secretary Welch made another announcement aimed at fulfilling these demands. In late May he explained licenced dining outlets, currently required to serve a full meal with every drink, could apply for “full cocktail lounge privileges.” meaning that they could serve drinks without full meals or just with snacks if the customer desired. This represented the conclusion of the Cabinet Committee’s 1966 three-year implementation period on this policy. The change came with two important stipulations. The first required licence holders to ensure the total volume of alcohol sales did not exceed the total volume of food sales in a single month and to provide records to substantiate this 50/50 ratio. The second, as Welch outlined, restricted the new system to Monday to Saturday. “I don’t think we’re ready for Sunday drinking | without
meals] yet. This is an evolutionary thing.\textsuperscript{84} He clearly demonstrated his government’s incremental approach to policy change. In keeping with this approach he continued to defend the preservation of meal requirements on Sundays, despite the fact that a month earlier he announced the legalisation of cocktail banquets without meals for certain types of Sunday conventions. Regardless, removing the meal requirement in dining establishments, even with the necessity of the 50/50 ratio, represented a significant departure from the government’s past insistence that diners must purchase full meals in order to drink. While this insistence certainly contributed to moderation in theory, in practice both customers and restaurant employees circumvented the law with the infamous ‘rubber sandwich’ and other pretences so as to bring the entire licencing system into disrepute. Furthermore, the meal requirement appeared hypocritical and symbolised the government’s inconsistent efforts at moral control when drinkers in other outlets like a lounge or a public house were forbidden from ordering a full meal. Therefore, this change represented a crucial aspect of Welch’s overall strategy of placing “responsibility where it belongs—on the individual.”\textsuperscript{85}

The April legislative announcement only magnified the public’s expectations for outdoor licences. By late May a \textbf{London Free Press} editorial complained that no such licences had yet been issued.\textsuperscript{86} In early June Joe McClelland, a columnist with that newspaper, reiterated the complaint, noting that it had been four years since the government first announced it would permit open-air licences in enclosed areas such as courtyards and rooftops. Complementing his article with a large photograph of a German beer garden, McClelland observed “the contrast between covert Ontario beer drinking establishments and the institutional German beer garden is obvious in this photo of Hofbrauhaus Garden in Munich.” The reason for the delay, McClelland discovered from talking to Licence Board Registrar Hugh J. Browne, stemmed from the difficulty of defining a patio or courtyard. “It looks simple enough to the innkeeper.” Browne explained, “but in terms of liquor legislation...What is it?” Chairman Robb complained of this problem to Provincial Secretary Yaremko in the period immediately following the 1965 announcement. But as Browne revealed, the government simply announced the policy decision in 1965 and then left it up to the Board to find ways to implement it. Following greater clarification with the
government's most recent announcement of outdoor licences. Browne promised to expedite the process of issuing such licences.97

Browne's prediction proved to be accurate. Just a month later the Board issued Ontario's first outdoor café licences for two hotels in Toronto.88 This represented a long awaited legacy of the Expo '67 experience. After four years of delays and tremendous anticipation, Ontarians now had the opportunity to experience at home the same sort of drinking environment they increasingly sampled while travelling to places like Europe and Quebec. Ontario's closest neighbour also formed an important influence as Ontarians frequently visited the large American cities near the border to sample the nightlife and the more sophisticated drinking scene. This type of close association with these American cities reveals the continuation of the 'intimate' relations across the border that Angus discovered in his 1930s survey: weekend trips, business meetings and family gatherings.89 The long build up to the new type of licence determined that the novelty would soon wear off, as would the public's acceptance of the continued imposition of moral controls over consumption behaviour. As liquor policy critic Ron Haggart took great pleasure in pointing out in early 1970, the Licence Board imposed its "shamefaced attitude" on the new licences stipulating that they be screened from public view in courtyards or other such private areas.90 He called on government to stop tinkering with the laws by adding new opportunities onto old frameworks and instead re-evaluate why the province had liquor licencing. Clearly, after four years of debate and delay on the issue, the Board continued to adhere to Yaremko's 1965 restriction that open-air drinking be private. Obviously the government and the Licence Board continued to conclude, as the Cabinet Committee did in 1965, that Ontarians were not yet 'ready' for truly public outdoor drinking. This reasoning did not stop Ontarians from demanding this type of licencing. Later in 1970 the Director of the Royal Ontario Museum, Peter C. Swann expressed his desire for more attractive outdoor cafés in an opinion letter to The Toronto Star. Like McClelland, Swann accompanied his letter with a large picture of a Paris café featuring drinkers seated at tables and chairs directly on the public sidewalks. He noted the friendliness and relaxation inherent in this type of setting and bemoaned the lack of such opportunities in Ontario. When a customer lined up "at the antiseptic Brewers' Retail outlets...as the case comes hurtling
towards him, he can hardly discuss local events or common interests."Interestingly Swann, like most other critics of the province’s liquor laws, managed to include the shortcomings of the retail system in a letter dedicated to the lack of outlets conducive to interaction and communication like the Parisian outdoor cafés. Clearly Welch’s 1969 announcement, like Yaremko’s in 1965, created just as much criticism as it endeavoured to eliminate.

Welch’s announcement also caused an intensified lobby effort for those policy areas not addressed. The drinking age remained the most prominent liquor issue now consistently before the public throughout most of the decade. In an official declaration of its support for lowering the drinking age (evident on university campuses since at least 1964) the University of Waterloo sent a brief to Welch in July. With the unanimous support of its Board of Governors, the University’s brief called for the lowering of the drinking age to 18.\textsuperscript{92} Conservative MPP Allan Reuter also publicly urged his government to undertake the “formidable” task of creating a single “age of accountability.”\textsuperscript{93} He noted the disparity between the ages at which Ontarians were deemed legally responsible to drive, drink, marry without parental consent, join the army and be responsible for debts. He urged action since half of the population was under 25 and therefore personally affected by this disparity. This statistic, accepted as the reality for all of North America and not just Ontario in the second half of the 1960s,\textsuperscript{94} formed the impetus for many arguments for a lowered drinking age. A Port Arthur news report similarly pointed out that the percentage of Ontario youth necessitated a resolution of the age of accountability issue, including the drinking age.\textsuperscript{95}

Welch’s vague April reference to future desegregation of public houses also created a tremendous amount of anticipation. While the traditional public house with its drab décor and lack of diversions remained, some observers noted a hint of improvement. A late July Hamilton Spectator editorial explained that several area public houses used the extra income derived from the end of the government’s price regulation to update conditions for a more “comfortable” and “homy” atmosphere.\textsuperscript{96} Many therefore viewed ending sex segregation as the last hurdle in creating a true replica of the British pub.

To achieve this, Welch informed licence holders in July that they could apply to convert their men only rooms into fully integrated public house licences on an optional basis. Therefore, because the
Robarts' government trusted the hospitality industry with this information and not the general public. Critics continued to deride the public house since little seemed to change in practice. One London man questioned the existence of men only rooms in a letter to the editor in late October. "Are we so uncivilized that we can't sit in the same room together?" he wondered.97 By the end of 1969 Welch acknowledged that the informal invitation he issued to public houses to convert to fully integrated licenses did not accomplish the goal he intended. Therefore he promised action on the complete end of segregated public houses in the new year. This announcement provided the Opposition the opportunity to engage the Provincial Secretary in what The Ottawa Journal described as "a side splitting exchange." The debate between Welch and Dovercourt Liberal MPP Dante DeMonte degenerated into a double-meaning discussion about the existence of "joint beverage rooms" in Ontario.98 That such a topic even needed to be discussed exemplified for the Opposition and for many Ontarians the absurdity of separating the sexes for the activity of consuming alcohol on the eve of the 1970s.

Perhaps nothing illustrated more clearly the end of one decade and the promise of another than the outcome of an October 1969 study on the future of the LCBO warehouse and head office in Toronto. The study concluded that the Board could only hope to "get by" at the present location for another four years due to the lack of suitable space for the new automated storage system the Board planned to acquire. Therefore the Board faced the difficult decision to move or stay and improve the old premises.99 The Board began to outgrow a facility that epitomised modern retailing and inspired envy in materials management experts across North America when it was built in 1954. In 15 years the volume of liquor sales outgrew a facility designed at the time for the needs of the future. In 1954 the new head office oversaw the sale of 88.4 million gallons of alcohol.100 By 1969 the amount increased to 138 million.101 As Table 26 depicts. While a population increase of approximately 3 million people102 over this period certainly accounted for some of this increase, other factors also influenced the Board's booming business.

When asked to account for the rise in wine sales at year's end, the Board's Public Relations officer, Frank Duggan attributed it to prosperity: "everybody has more dough." The Chief Wine Consultant, Robert Galichon, referred to other factors such as the cultural tradition of having wine with meals among
Ontario's many new ethnic groups and an increasingly well travelled public who visited the wine producing regions of the world. Galichon summed up his impressions by arguing Ontarians wanted the "fuller life" with wine playing an important role.\textsuperscript{103} Clearly, affluence, higher education levels, and fads helped account for increased consumption of wine in Ontario.\textsuperscript{104}

Table 26

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<th>Total Alcohol Gallonage Sold in Ontario 1960/61-1969/70</th>
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Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1960/61-1969/70

The experiment with self-serve liquor stores also contributed to the increased demands on warehouse capacity. After only two months in operation, the popularity of the first such store prompted the Store Operations Manager to report "sales to date I feel have been greater than anticipated."\textsuperscript{105} He also related "the store has been a success" according to feed back from customers, staff and supervisors. Bottle breakage from customer handling proved to be "very low" contrary to the Board's earlier fears, theft was equally inconsequential and customers and clerks enjoyed the closer communication that the new set-up afforded them. When these observations combined with the valuable experiences gained by the Board in studying self-serve systems in New Brunswick and Pennsylvania that fall,\textsuperscript{106} the move beyond the experimental stage in self-serve proved certain. Consequently, in late December Sheppard announced the
Board’s intention to embark on a long-term program of converting the province’s 425 liquor stores to self-serve and building only new self-serve stores. This move would not only necessitate greater warehouse space as a Board report indicated but it would dramatically change the face of liquor retailing in the province from the one familiar since 1927.

The prospect of self-serve stores all across the province prompted reaction in many quarters. As so many past critics coupled the demand for self-serve liquor stores with grocery sale of beer, the government as well as Brewers’ Warehousing, perceived a serious public desire for that type of beer retail in response to the extension of self-serve liquor stores. Brewers’ Warehousing acted quickly with two studies early in 1970. The first, carried out in January by the Canadian research company Market Facts, studied public attitudes towards beer stores “in response to the discussion in various media regarding the possibility of beer being available in grocery stores.” From a sample of 690 men and 690 women from various Ontario communities, the study concluded that the majority of adults favoured beer in grocery stores “as a freedom.” Further, the study revealed that “no matter what the company has done” the public’s assumption remained that more could be achieved to “improve service.” Therefore, the study advanced numerous recommendations to “minimise the danger of a vocal minority putting the question of grocery sale to a vote.” The first recommendation focused on “removing all symbols and symbolic activities...that suggest control, regimentation and government intervention.” The study singled out order forms as the most obvious example. The other recommendations centred on convenient store locations, improved décor, enhanced staff communication with customers and the company’s impressive bottle recycling record. This study proved both valuable and timely as the pressure for grocery beer intensified by the early spring prompting Brewers’ Warehousing to commission yet another study.

In late May the president of the Loblaw food chain, Leon Weinstein, announced his intention to lobby the government for permission to sell beer in his grocery stores. He argued that his outlets could offer beer more cheaply and conveniently than the present system. The retorts quickly followed. The president of Brewers’ Warehousing, Earl K. Brownridge, not surprisingly dismissed the suggestion as “the biggest mistake the government could ever make.” He boasted that other provinces looked to the
Ontario beer retail system “as a model of efficiency for both brewer and consumer.”¹¹⁰ The government’s response reflected a detailed brief prepared for Welch by his staff the day of Weinstein’s announcement. The brief argued that under the present system the government and not the brewers set the price of beer. Therefore, grocery stores could not possibly offer lower prices. The brief further listed the many challenges that grocery stores would face in even meeting the present level of service provided by Brewers’ Warehousing: warehouse space, distribution network, packaging, empties, and prompt service to customers. If beer were introduced onto their shelves grocery stores would have to limit employees to those 21 and over. Finally, the brief noted that the recent British Columbia liquor inquiry, the Morrow Commission that reported in March, made no recommendation for the removal of beer from government control.¹¹¹ Therefore, when questioned in the Legislature Welch maintained the position of ministers responsible for liquor control before him. “The government has no plans to permit beer to be marketed in grocery stores.” While he earlier contended that the government was at least studying the concept, he now explained “to accommodate changing buyer practices,” the government concluded “these alterations can and should be made within the existing government controlled merchandising system.”¹¹² This strong defence of government control, coupled with a wholehearted commitment to customer demands, directly resulted from the threat of private alcohol retail.

For Brewers’ Warehousing Welch’s assertions led to a second study, one that looked to the government’s recent innovations in liquor store service. A week following Weinstein’s lobby effort, the beer distribution company’s own marketing service carried out a survey of 120 customers at a newly opened self-serve liquor store in Scarborough. The study concluded the new store to be “a success,” noting the “overwhelming satisfaction and pleasure” expressed by the customers. A large majority of those interviewed (84%), liked not having to fill out order forms and the relaxing atmosphere that encouraged browsing. The report also included verbatim comments from customers which pronounced the new store “more civilized,” “not limited to jail atmosphere” and conducive to “more service and help.”¹¹³ While this report certainly illustrated the success of the LCBO’s new stores, it also revealed that Brewers’ Warehousing felt it worthwhile to study this innovation in liquor retailing in order to assess the
reaction of customers, many of whom also shopped in its own stores. With the government maintaining its commitment to improving customer service within the government control structure, Brewers’ Warehousing therefore asked the LCBO later in the summer to lift the order form requirement in beer stores.\textsuperscript{114}

Despite the government’s vocal opposition to the idea of grocery sale of beer, Weinstein’s request for it nevertheless prompted various opinions on the subject. The government continued to receive letters from Ontarians noting the more convenient locations and hours of grocery stores compared to beer outlets. One man for example demanded the right for “grown adults” to purchase beer at “reasonable” hours. In reply General Manager Abra informed the critic that many liquor and beer stores remained open until 10 pm while the hours of private businesses like grocery stores came with no guarantee.\textsuperscript{115} The public debate focused on similar issues. In an opinion article in \textit{The Toronto Star}, assistant professor of English at the University of Toronto, Dennis Duffy, mounted an argument for grocery sale of beer from the perspective “I am only a consumer.” He compared the more convenient hours and locations of neighbourhood grocery stores with the present system of “relatively few outlets designed with the grace and warmth of a prison house maintained by small staffs with the customer helping to maintain inventory control (what else are those crazy slips for?)” He also challenged those who cited the problem of preventing sales to minors as an argument against grocery sale to find higher rates of adolescent drunkenness in Montreal, a city with private beer retail. Duffy expanded the debate beyond the usual arguments by introducing the interesting concept of “urban ecology.” He explained that, unlike the institutional Brewers’ Warehousing outlets, small and numerous neighbourhood grocery stores could police litter, violence and general well-being in their own communities.\textsuperscript{116}

A \textit{Toronto Star} editorial discussed the benefits of convenience, price and a “healthier approach” to consumption inherent in grocery sale where families bought their food as opposed to the “furtive” atmosphere engendered at the government outlets. After using these arguments to build a strong case for grocery sale, the editorial ultimately concluded that the most important issue was “those empties.” The editorial praised the efficiency of the present bottle return system and feared that grocery stores were so
distracted with other responsibilities that they might even contribute “to further serious littering of our countryside.” With Brewers’ Warehousing and the government committed to improving customer service within the present government control system spurred on by threats of private sale it seemed that, as The Toronto Star editorial concluded, no private businesses could do the job of retailing beer as well as a system dedicated exclusively to the task. While the issue of opening up beer sales to private retailers prompted much agitation in the press and the correspondence of the government as it had done in previous decades, perhaps The Globe and Mail’s old barroom cartoon characters from past policy debates pronounced the true public feeling on an issue that tended to raise tempers but in actuality was probably strongly supported by only a minority. Seated in their familiar dingy public house discussing the recent demands for grocery sale of beer, one fellow said to the other “when they start bringing it to us in shopping carts. Dooley, I quit!”

Where the Provincial Secretary’s staff looked to the recent Morrow Commission in British Columbia to justify the government’s refusal to permit grocery sale of beer, it failed to respond to another aspect of the Morrow Report, an aspect that prompted much public agitation for change. In mid-April British Columbia announced that as a result of its recent liquor inquiry it would lower the provincial drinking age to 19, making it the first province to permit drinking among teenagers. Two days later, responding to concerns about patterns of covert drinking among older students, a Winnipeg school board announced that it would study the feasibility of lowering Manitoba’s drinking age to 19 as well. The Telegram’s Ron Haggart attributed British Columbia’s changes and the Winnipeg study to the “straightforward” and “clearly worded” Morrow Report. He also expressed his hopes that such thinking would “spread to Ontario.” Critics also wrote to the government voicing such demands. One man wondered why Ontario’s drinking age remained unchanged at 21 while British Columbia, Quebec and New York had lower ages. General Manager Abra replied that the question of the legal drinking age was “under consideration.” Pressure to lower the drinking age now took on a national context with other provinces lowering or studying their minimum drinking ages.
LIQUOR LICENCE BOARD CHAIRMAN JUDGE ROBB RETIRES

In this context of grocery sale threats and the heightened demands for change the most significant events of the first year of the new decade occurred: the retirements, within two months of each other of the two most prominent bureaucrats in Ontario’s government control system. In late July Premier Robarts announced the retirement of 81-year-old W.T. Robb after 26 years as Licence Board Chairman, effective September 1. Robb served as the Board’s only Chairman, beginning his career in liquor control in 1944 as head of the newly formed Liquor Authority Control Board and then two years later commenced his current position with the Authority Board’s successor the Liquor Licence Board. In 1944 he oversaw the licencing and inspecting of 1,732 licenced outlets, all of which were designated as hotels or private clubs. 26 years later he regulated 3,339 premises including public houses, taverns, restaurants, theatres, air planes, railways, and motels.123 Calling him the “scrappy little man from Orangeville.” The Toronto Telegram’s Robert Sutton noted the unrelenting criticism Robb faced throughout his long career. To the temperance forces upset at new licences Robb represented a “high handed dictator.” On the other hand disgruntled licence applicants accused the devout United Church member and teetotaller of being unfair and prejudiced. Looking back the only charges to which he pleaded guilty concerned his religion and his drinking habits. “I haven’t had a drink since 1946.” he admitted. “I used to like a rye and water now and then and I think now that I would again.” As to the other charges Robb explained that his job left him in “a vulnerable position, but I enjoyed it.” hence the ‘scrappy’ description. He noted that recently the temperance forces in the province looked more favourably upon him and his decisions, a change he attributed to the Ontario Temperance Federation’s 1968 name change and its subsequent emphasis on a moderate use of alcohol rather than total abstinence.124 Regardless of the controversy and complaints surrounding Robb throughout his career, Sutton pointed out the irony of a teetotal United Church member overseeing reforms over a quarter of a decade that resulted in a greater number and variety of drinking outlets.

Robb’s retirement announcement also prompted discussions regarding his long tenure. Indeed many such as Windsor Star’s Bill Prager only half jokingly marvelled that he “is not a permanent fixture
[with the Board] after all." Prager also noted Robb’s generally “accepted high reputation for integrity,” a characteristic that helped explain why “Robarts was satisfied to keep Robb long past any normal retirement age,” even though the Dufferin County Court forced him to retire at age 75. The Conservative Party’s long reign in power certainly contributed to Robb’s longevity with the Licence Board. Interestingly though, no commentators at the time seemed to appreciate this significance, especially given J.G. Spragge’s retirement only a year before after 22 years with the Control Board. While both men exemplified hard work and dedication, the absence of political upheaval in the province over the post-war period surely contributed to the continuity experienced within both Boards at the bureaucratic level. British Columbia experienced a similar tendency with its Liquor Control Board Chairman Colonel D. McGugan retiring a year before at the age of 80 after 18 years with the Board under one Social Credit government. The press instead tended to concentrate on the degree of liquor law liberalisation that had occurred over the course of Robb’s tenure. Besides the obvious increase in type and number of licenced drinking outlets, Robb oversaw the reintroduction of the sale of spirits by the glass after a three-decade absence. Sunday sale, outdoor licences and drinks without meals in dining establishments represented just three liberalisations unimaginable in the early years of Robb’s term.

More importantly, while Robb’s retirement clearly prompted many to reminisce about past reforms, it simultaneously inspired anticipation regarding his successor and future changes. His retirement represented a concrete sign that an overall modernisation of the liquor laws could now be achieved, a hope building since at least the Expo experiences of 1967. The Sudbury Star, for example, editorialised that although Robb “supervised a gradual but striking change in social attitudes towards the use of alcohol...progress in the ‘modernization’ of Ontario liquor regulations has been far too slow.” The editorial called on Robb’s as yet unnamed successor to eliminate many of the “unjustifiable battalions” of inspectors and the “nit-picking though shalt not” type of regulations they enforced. Illustrating the great hopes many Ontarians held regarding the future of liquor control in the province the editorial concluded:

It is to be hoped Judge Robb’s successor will come into office with the clear instruction of the Cabinet that Ontario’s liquor laws and the
methods of administering them are to be brought into the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{127}

Unfortunately, Robarts' choice disappointed many in the context of these heightened expectations for significant change.

At the end of August Premier Robarts announced the appointment of James Mackey as the Licence Board's next Chairman. The 57-year-old retired Chief of the Metropolitan Toronto Police force and United Church member represented a "controversial choice" for many as a \textit{Hamilton Spectator} editorial argued.\textsuperscript{128} While perennial critic Ron Haggart complained about Mackey's police background and his cagey responses to questions about his drinking habits, the Hamilton editorial accurately pointed out that Mackey's job entailed the enforcement of the liquor laws, not the creation or the amendment of them. As the editorial argued, Mackey's forthright advocacy of law enforcement, certainly a product of his former career, in an "age of reckless disregard for law," (a prophetic remark just weeks before the FLQ crisis), earned him and his appointment as Licence Chairman many critics. The problem, the editorial so accurately forecasted, centred not on Mackey himself but the laws that had been changed "in detail" but not "in spirit" since Prohibition. Regardless of this prescient caution, critics like Haggart continued to focus on Mackey's appointment, lamenting that the government did not appoint a "chairman who is representative of ordinary, decent drinkers who know and enjoy their subject."\textsuperscript{129} Mackey represented for Robarts the same qualities of integrity, respectability and judicial experience that Premier Drew sought in Judge Robb in 1944. This appointment illustrated Robarts' desire for continuity with the past and for cautious incremental change to satisfy his caucus and his belief in the fundamentally conservative nature of the electorate. Few could anticipate the furor the appointment would cause in the very different context of the early 1970s.

One of the first things that Mackey announced upon his appointment was that the licencing laws "will be strictly enforced." While he added that he was "as broadminded as anyone on the subject,"\textsuperscript{130} his primary objective proved to be the enforcement of the laws to the letter. In one of his first actions as Chairman, Mackey ordered removed from Kitchener streets 1000 Oktoberfest posters advertising
“Canada’s great beer festival.” The poster featured a woman outfitted in traditional Bavarian dress carrying several steins overflowing with beer. It clearly contravened the province’s advertising code. Mackey argued. Regulations prohibited the word ‘beer’ in any advertising, the holding of beverages or the use of “the female face or figure…as the primary theme.” This action sparked a wave of criticism hurled at the new Chairman from newspapers across the province for his paternalistic and overbearing views. While the drastic removal of the posters ultimately served to give a fledgling regional festival provincial or even national exposure, at the time critics viewed Mackey’s decision as just one in an emerging pattern of strict enforcement unlike the province had seen before.

“MASSIVE CRACKDOWN”

The differences between Robb and his successor soon emerged. NDP liquor policy critic MPP Morton Shulman argued that Mackey made “Robb look like a swinger” by comparison. Shulman noted not only the removal of the Kitchener Oktoberfest posters but also Mackey’s strict enforcement of the admittedly vague and often-contradictory licence laws, especially those regulating food consumption and the posture of drinkers. For example, in his first two months as Chairman, or ‘Czar’ of the Licence Board as the press took to calling him, Mackey suspended more licences than Robb did in any six month period in either of the previous two years. This characterised what Toronto Star columnist Marci McDonald described as “the most massive crackdown on provincial liquor laws since Prohibition.” McDonald chronicled Mackey’s ‘crackdown’ throughout these first controversial weeks resulting in the above suspensions. On Mackey’s very first day at his new post, he ordered the stand-up bar removed from one Toronto drinking establishment. He later decreed that four bar maids be fired from a Hamilton men only public house. “To the assembled customers’ shock.” he also ordered that some 20 chairs be removed from a Toronto dining lounge. Further, he warned the same dining lounge to enforce the service of food with drinks and decreed at another upscale dining outlet that a 25 cent hotdog did not constitute a meal although the same outlet had been “dishing up cheese, crackers and olives at 50 cents without a Board ruffle.” While these actions inspired fear and compliance in the licence holders, they also resulted in the “blossoming…like springtime, cheese sandwiches…on dining lounge tables where before rested no more
than a token olive.” The infamous ‘rubber sandwich,’ thought to have been banished forever by the May 1969 announcement of cocktail lounge privileges for dining establishments, returned with a vengeance as the licencees’ historic defence against undercover inspectors. This 1969 announcement proved problematic, as the ‘privilege’ to serve drinks without the previously required meal was not automatic as establishments had to apply to the Board for permission. Further, the definition of a meal for outlets without such permission remained vague with only the Sunday meal, still required with drinks, being specifically defined in the regulations.

While McDonald, the customers, and the general public expressed disbelief at Mackey’s actions, he only enforced the laws as they were presented to him or interpreted them himself where details were vague. For example, while customers became accustomed to women cashiers in self-serve liquor stores and bar maids in drinking outlets, the June 1965 amendment allowing women to serve alcohol in all licenced premises did not extend to the segregated men-only public houses, hence the firing of the four Hamilton women. Mackey’s decision to remove a particular number of chairs from a dining outlet, even while the patrons looked on, resulted from the Cabinet Committee’s July 1966 recommendation that dining lounges be allowed to open lounges on the premises without the need of a further licence with a number of chairs equal to 10% of the total in the dining area. This complex ratio, created several years earlier to address the problem of forcing drinkers to eat in certain establishments, resulted in the above much publicised scenario. Instead of simplifying enforcement, as the Committee hoped at the time, this ratio, and other rules like it, highlighted the absurdity of the entire system, which was predicated on regulating ‘spaces’ with prohibitions and paternalism.

Few drinkers or liquor law critics understood these complicated reasons behind Mackey’s actions, actions that appeared drastic, even draconian after the now longed-for but previously unappreciated “good old days when Judge Robb was growing more lenient.”

This conclusion appeared surprising given the intense criticism that Robb endured even to the end of his career about the hypocritical and arbitrary nature of his decisions, based on the same vague laws and half-measures of prohibition that Mackey now followed. Mackey’s actions should not have been surprising given his police background. Further, upon
his appointment a Hamilton Spectator editorial predicted this very outcome based on the argument that, while the government had repeatedly made changes to the details of the liquor laws, the spirit of the laws remained as they had been since the end of Prohibition: prohibitive instead of permissive. In the midst of Mackey’s crackdown, an Ottawa Journal editorial, recognising the significance of the above argument reflected that in the long run the Chairman’s continued “unbending” attitude would result in change. The editorial did not oppose control over consumption behaviour but urged that it be “intelligent,” inferring that the laws Mackey was enforcing and the way he was doing it were not. The editorial concluded that with Mackey’s strict enforcement highlighting the shortcomings of the present laws, it “shouldn’t be too long until it embarrasses” the government into making the changes that Welch first promised after his initial round of amendments in 1969.

The editorial proved accurate as only a little more than a week later Welch announced licencing amendments, but not before Ontario’s liquor bureaucracy witnessed its second retirement in as many months. At the end of October Premier Robarts announced the retirement of G.H. Sheppard, at the age of 65 after seven years as Chief Commissioner of the LCBO. His retirement only added to the expectations for change building from Robb’s retirement. Sheppard’s appointment, following the dramatic—though short and scandal plagued—tenure of Allan Grossman as Chief Commissioner, signalled a more overt business emphasis at the Control Board, an emphasis that had always been evident to some degree but which gained heightened prominence under the former IBM Canada chairman. Sheppard not only continued Grossman’s policy of later liquor store hours and more numerous and convenient locations but he also oversaw the implementation of self-serve liquor stores, the most dramatic advancement in Ontario’s liquor retail history. Sheppard pointed to the “trend towards self-service stores as an example of growing flexibility” in liquor policy. This flexibility followed significant threats to the government control system in the form of yet another round of industry strikes and pressure for grocery sale of beer in the late 1960s. As a further sign of this flexibility, Provincial Secretary Welch introduced changes to the licencing side of government control just days after Sheppard’s retirement announcement.
“IT IS TIMELY THAT CERTAIN CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE”

Desegregation of Public Houses: These November 2, 1970 changes addressed several longstanding problems. clarified past policy changes and also responded to some of the more immediate crises experienced during Mackey’s short time enforcing the licencing laws. First, Welch announced that, upon application to the Board, public houses could allow “unrestricted seating of male and female patrons.” This ‘desegregation,’ demanded for years and forecasted by Welch in April 1969, amounted to the voluntary elimination of ‘men only’ and ‘ladies and escorts only’ sections of public houses, instituted soon after the beverage room, the public house’s predecessor, was created in 1934. Further, Welch admitted that it was “essential that the image of the public house...should be upgraded” since it was “obvious that in some locations our people are entitled to and should expect better facilities than now exist.” In order to achieve this “upgrading of the image of the public house,” the government proposed that the Licence Board consider applications to convert public houses into full lounges. This meant that the last of the Depression and war ethos surrounding the public house would be wiped away, namely the sex segregation and the beer only stipulation—if only on a voluntary basis. This process promised to be anything but smooth as Welch reinforced the point that the Board would consider applications for upgrading and desegregation “subject to all relevant rules and regulations.” The regulations guiding this transformation dictated that the rejuvenated outlet would be “well decorated,” with “carpeted floors,” and “adequate lighting.”

Clarification of Past Policy Changes: Patios and Entertainment: Welch noted that “progress has been made in the licencing of certain outdoor areas, such as patios,” alluding to the first outdoor licences granted in the summer of 1969. Further, he explained, the “Licence Board has been asked to prepare policy guidelines to provide for an expansion of this development so that other types of outdoor facilities can be considered.” The Cabinet Committee studying the implementation of these changes indicated the next month that the ‘other’ types being considered included true sidewalk cafés. After five years, the government and the Licence Board were beginning to move beyond the private type of outdoor drinking that Yaremko first announced in June 1965. Included in those same 1965 amendments
Yaremko also announced the general opening up of entertainment in all licenced premises. Yet in his November 1970 announcements Welch declared that “the Board will develop a clear policy with respect to entertainment” in licenced establishments such as the newly upgraded and integrated public house. Since proprietors still experienced tremendous uncertainty in practice regarding what games and diversions the Board permitted, a further announcement with another set of policy guidelines was necessary to clarify matters and overcome the inertia produced by habit and unwritten but entrenched policies.

**Licenced Resorts in Dry Areas and More Flexible Advertising:** Third, Welch announced two new policies. The first represented a further liberalisation of the local option system to allow resorts in dry areas to apply for liquor licences “during their seasonal operations.” This responded to the March 1969 tourist industry brief that called for this type of service as an extension of the tourist’s home even in an otherwise dry area. The second policy change addressed one of Mackey’s first major controversies as Chairman. According to Welch “it is timely that certain changes should be made with respect to regulations dealing with alcoholic beverage advertising.” He specifically referred to creating a new flexibility envisioned “to accommodate requests from groups sponsoring special events.” Although he did not mention the Kitchener Oktoberfest poster incident by name, this desire to “produce a new advertising directive consistent with government responsibility and present-day practice” certainly stemmed directly from it.145

The majority of the press surrounding these announcements focused on the proposed changes to public houses as an area of anticipated change accompanied by several policy restatements. “The end is in sight for the men-only room in Ontario pubs.” The Globe and Mail’s Michael Moore concluded.146 Because the government’s guidelines for upgrading and desegregating these rooms remained voluntary, Moore’s pronouncement may have been premature. According to the numerous public house owners interviewed by The Toronto Star, many intended to keep a room for male drinkers because according to one licence holder “some customers have been coming in for 20 years and we want to keep it like it is.”147 By leaving the decision to change up to the individual owner, the government demonstrated its
commitment to leaving more of the responsibility for drinking behaviour up to the licensee and the drinker. If certain proprietors wanted to make the investment, the government then provided a framework for upgrading.

Taking a more general view of the early November amendments and failing to recognise the above argument, Ron Haggart pronounced the changes "little more than tinkering and tampering" with the liquor laws. He went on to conclude that the government had a tremendous opportunity to achieve real change through a complete rewriting of the laws after the retirement of the heads of both Boards within such a short period of time. "They had a chance," he argued, "and they muffed it." He hoped that the government would have taken the opportunity to "decide what the role of the state really is in regulating conduct associated with the consumption of liquor." This argument certainly had merit, especially his conclusion that the changes involved merely tinkering—resulting in the laws being "in such a hopeless mess after years of patching and fixing that no sane man can understand what they mean." In his determination to critique all aspects of government liquor policy, he failed to recognise that Welch's announcements represented the continuation of the slow evolution towards placing more responsibility with the individual drinker and the hospitality industry and less with the state. While the government had not yet fully come to grips with the implication of this evolution in terms of its role in controlling consumption, the efforts to liberalise the advertising code, especially in such a "timely" manner following the Oktoberfest poster crisis, demonstrated a commitment to change that Haggart failed to appreciate.

The president of the Canadian Restaurant Association, George Boukydis voiced a similar disappointment in Welch's announcement. Unlike Haggart, Boukydis offered up a specific reason for the lack of action he perceived. Pointing out that a majority of the government MPPs were Anglo-Saxon Protestants he argued that their own beliefs, as well as their fears of their likeminded constituents, prevented them from pressing for changes responsive to the increasing number of Ontarians of European descent, like himself, who desired more liberal liquor laws. Boukydis' observations regarding the Robarts' government certainly rang true. Taking Robarts' 1970 Cabinet for example, out of a total of 22 members only four ascribed to a religion outside Protestantism. Two members were French Catholic
while Allan Grossman was Jewish and John Yaremko was Ukrainian Orthodox. In terms of ethnic background, of the 14 Cabinet members who provided this information in their Canadian Parliamentary Guide biographies two indicated a French background, one a Ukrainian background, while the rest claimed ancestors originating in the British Isles.\textsuperscript{150} This mirrored almost exactly the types of observations made in chapter 5 regarding Frost’s 1960 Cabinet. How accurate was Boukydis’ reference to a changing ethnic and religious face in Ontario? Over the previous decade from 1961-1971 the proportion of Ontarians noting their ethnic origins in the British Isles on their census forms remained almost exactly the same, falling only one tenth of a percent from 59.5\% to 59.4\%.\textsuperscript{151} In terms of religious denominations, Anglicans and United Church members, the largest Protestant groups in Ontario saw a decline in adherents over the same decade from 17.9\% to 15.8\% and 26\% to 21.8\% respectively. Roman Catholics, the largest religious denomination in the province on the other hand, increased from 30\% in 1961 to 33.3\% in 1971.\textsuperscript{152} Therefore, while there was some shift in the religious groups of Ontario during the period, the ethnic make-up of the population remained surprising static, given that over 22\% of Ontario’s population in 1971 was born outside Canada.\textsuperscript{153} Nevertheless the high proportion of the Cabinet with roots in the British Isles represented the admittedly smaller majority of the overall Ontario population with similar backgrounds. Many of the other 40\% of the population, for whom Boukydis of Greek ancestry endeavoured to speak, felt that the so-called Anglo-Saxon Protestant ethic that informed liquor policy did not represent their tastes and desires.

The legislative Opposition focused instead on another aspect of Welch’s changes. NDP leader Donald MacDonald called the provision to allow the licencing of resorts in dry areas the government’s “usual back door approach” to policymaking. Instead of seizing “the tiger by the tail and abolish[ing] local option in Ontario entirely” as Liberal MPP Vernon Singer proposed, the government chose instead to proceed “covertly as usual” according to NDP member P.D. Lawlor. Certainly the licencing of resorts in dry areas represented another erosion to the local option system. In 1962 the government permitted the licencing of private clubs in dry areas and also exempted the large unorganised territories of the province from the provisions of the local option system. Despite these erosions, the government continued to
defend the policy with Welch informing his legislative opponents that "the government's position with respect to local option is quite clear." Even with the relentless political and public complaints regarding local option, this position represented a savvy approach by the government. On the one hand, by expanding the types of outlets allowed to operate in dry areas, the government gained the support of the tourist industry, disgruntled local option residents as well as some liquor law critics. On the other, it recognised that local option as a significant aspect of local politics was dying a slow death as illustrated by three Toronto area contests in late 1969 where the "ho hum" attitude of voters resulted in new licences.

NEW CHIEF COMMISSIONER APPOINTED

Before the final debates on these changes concluded Premier Robarts kept the liquor issue before the public by announcing the appointment of Sheppard's successor, Major-General George Kitching. Born in China where his father served in the British army and educated in England, the 60-year-old distinguished veteran recently served as Commissioner of the Ontario Pavilion at Expo '70 in Japan. Described as a "blunt, outspoken" military man, Kitching continued to reveal his strong personality, even in the earliest hours in his new post. For example, when asked by reporters about his opinion on the drinking age he forthrightly revealed "I think 21 is a little late." If 18 year olds could drink legally in the army, why not in civilian life he questioned. He further cautioned that, before any changes could be considered, the public would have to make "sufficient noise" to persuade the government to lower the age. On the issue of his drinking habits he was similarly frank, unlike his counterpart at the Licence Board. The "self-admitted wine lover," explained laughingly "you have to sample the wares." Kitching also expressed his feelings on the general state of liquor retailing in Ontario. He admitted he had "grumbled like anyone else" about some of the shortcomings of the LCBO. He explained, "sometimes you feel a little queer when you come back from places like London, Washington or Paris" with fewer buying restrictions. While he told reporters "generally, I feel a fairly free use of liquor lessens alcoholism," in his opinion fewer restrictions did not extend to grocery sale. As way of justification he added, seemingly as an afterthought, "in some ways, a degree of control is necessary." Therefore, even
the new bold and outspoken Chief Commissioner continued to express a belief in the necessity of both service and control in liquor retailing, though with much less emphasis on the latter.

George Kitching’s appointment represented the realisation of several important changes within the LCBO. His predecessor Sheppard symbolised the Board’s overt emphasis on business and customer service. Kitching, with his outspoken advocacy for a lowered drinking age and fewer buying restrictions, for example, illustrated that the Board had evolved beyond just an emphasis on business towards an acceptance of freer sale tempered by only ‘a degree’ of control. His open attitudes towards liquor sale and consumption, certainly a product of his military experience and his well-travelled background, could not have been a surprise to Robarts. By appointing Kitching, Robarts indicated in an overt manner that the retail side of government control, as the older component of the system, had nearly completed its evolution away from moral control towards customer service regulated by reasonable controls for health and safety. In appointing Mackey to head the licencing side of government control, Robarts admitted that in regards to the somewhat newer and certainly more controversial issue of public drinking, he was not prepared to totally break with the past and its reliance on moral controls. By appointing such contrasting individuals to such sensitive posts Robarts revealed the continuing ambivalence he and his caucus felt about the government’s role and responsibility for liquor control, and the ambivalence he sensed in the electorate.

The issue of the drinking age illustrated this argument. Immediately after his appointment Kitching expressed his belief in the wisdom of lowering the minimum drinking age. When press reports began to argue the success of Manitoba’s recently lowered drinking age. Mackey voiced to Welch his fierce objections to any such action in Ontario. He argued that, contrary to the “apparent” success in Manitoba, he believed lowering the drinking age in Ontario would cause more problems, not reduce them. Besides their different personalities and backgrounds, Mackey and Kitching’s conflicting attitudes on the issue also illustrated their distinct responsibilities. As head of the retailing side of government control one of Kitching’s major roles was to earn money for the provincial treasury, something that would be advanced with a new youth market. On the other hand, Mackey’s main job
revolved around regulating public drinking, a job that would certainly be complicated if not necessarily crisis ridden, as he believed, by the addition of a new generation of drinkers. What was certain was that, with Manitoba now also permitting teenagers to drink, a new Chief Commissioner in favour of the move and disgruntled youths vowing never to vote for the Conservatives when given the chance if they did not lower the drinking age, the issue of the drinking age, one of the last of the major public demands, took centre stage.

The continuation of this demand and others, fuelled in many ways by Mackey’s resolute enforcement of the licencing laws, only gained momentum with Robarts’ retirement announcement in late 1970. Later pronouncing himself “a has-been” Robarts followed the pattern set by Frost before him of serving for a time and then passing the torch on to a successor. His Provincial Secretary, Robert Welch, though initially an admitted long shot for the position, proved to be a “formidable candidate” in the race for a new leader and premier. Because he was best known for his role as minister responsible for liquor control. Welch voiced his opinions on the issue forcefully during the leadership campaign. “I’m preaching the gospel of personal responsibility,” he proclaimed to The Toronto Star’s Tom Hazlitt in a profile on the leadership hopeful. “I don’t think it’s the role of government to act as big brother in this area.” While such pronouncements did not ultimately win Welch the leadership race, they did sum up Welch’s entire philosophy towards government control. As he pointed out, under his direction as Provincial Secretary the government introduced Sunday drinking with meals, established self-serve liquor stores and experimented with outdoor drinking establishments. These changes would not have been possible within a belief system that government should protect citizens from seeing liquor bottles on open shelves or drinking in restaurants on Sundays.

**Beer Order Forms Eliminated:** For Welch, eliminating the ‘big brother’ aspect of government control did not extend to an elimination of the government monopoly itself. As the above reforms illustrated, he focused on improving and expanding the types of drinking and retail outlets available within the government control system. As he argued in late 1970 during a period of renewed pressure from grocers for beer sales, he would “rather revise the merchandising methods” of the present system
than put alcohol on the open market. He believed that, because alcohol was a drug, the government’s role entailed some control over its use, although this control would not preclude the government from introducing changes to make the system more convenient.\textsuperscript{161} Consequently, in late January 1971, Brewers’ Warehousing received a favourable response to its September 1970 request, as the LCBO announced that order forms were no longer required in beer stores. As a \textit{Kingston Whig-Standard} news report entitled “I’ll have 12 pints please” explained, for the first time under government control Ontario beer drinkers could verbally order cases of beer.\textsuperscript{162} Chief Commissioner Kitching cautioned that non-self-serve liquor stores still required order forms to speed service at the counter. While the elimination of the beer form garnered little public attention save some sarcasm and the retention of the liquor form some derision,\textsuperscript{163} the move signalled the removal of moral control over liquor buying behaviour.

The government intended to lessen complaints about government-run stores by eliminating beer forms. The move failed to accomplish that objective as several weeks later the Ontario branch of the Retail Merchants’ Association published an open letter in \textit{The Toronto Telegram} calling for support for the sale of beer by independent retailers.\textsuperscript{164} This was strongly reminiscent of its 1954 campaign and the spring 1970 Loblaw lobby effort. Humber Liberal MPP George Ben also joined the fight by appealing to both the provincial and federal governments to protect the small family grocery by opening up Brewers’ Warehousing’s legal monopoly. While he conceded that the government regulated beer stores were “undoubtedly efficient,” he argued that sale through independent grocery stores would increase convenience of location and hours for customers and also profit for the struggling stores.\textsuperscript{165} On the other hand, NDP member for Sandwich-Riverside, Fred Burr, expressed his concern over the proposal to the government. He argued that grocery sale would make access easier for minors and “surely” he contended, “drug problems are alarming enough.”\textsuperscript{166} While the Opposition forces in the Legislature formed no united front in favour of grocery beer sales, the pressure for this type of opening up of government control encouraged the LCBO to quietly study the off-premises system of sale practised in Alberta and British Columbia in late January 1971.\textsuperscript{167} This system involved the sale of whole bottles of liquor or whole cases of beer from licenced public drinking outlets, especially in remote areas with few government stores.
While the study failed to result in any changes in the Ontario system, it demonstrated the government’s recent willingness to explore options and study other systems.

More importantly, the pressure for grocery sale prompted Brewers’ Warehousing to conduct another study into customer desires later in 1971. It argued that over its 44 year history it “consistently changed” its system “to respond to the needs and desires of the people.”168 The study concluded that 91% of adults surveyed preferred Brewers’ Warehousing stores to the concept of grocery sale because of “superior service,” efficiency creating lower prices and protection against underage buying. Further, the study found that since the last survey in 1969 public opinion in favour of grocery sale of beer dropped by 8% while support for beer stores increased by 9%. Brewers’ Warehousing attributed the change to the end of the order forms, expanded hours to suit customer needs and its ongoing program of opening new stores,169 as Table 25 above showed. These service initiatives resulted not only from the consistent threat of private alcohol retail but more importantly from the government’s commitment to improve the government control system to eliminate the allure of private sale. As a result, the retail side of government control, immersed in its transition to self-serve stores and service initiatives at the beer stores, received increasingly less public attention and criticism in the early 1970s. With LCBO solicitor Basil Clark arguing at a late February 1971 Canadian Restaurant Association seminar that the Control Board was “mainly...a marketing board”170 and Brewers’ Warehousing hiring a Vice-President of Trade Relations to improve and expand the company’s “merchandising activities,”171 the retail side of government control was clearly endeavouring to run its enterprises as service-oriented businesses free from most of the moral restraints that had hampered this goal in the past.

On the other hand, liquor licencing continued to attract the majority of the public criticism, especially in light of Mackey’s resolute enforcement of the laws. In the context of the Licence Board’s highly publicised ‘crackdown, the London Chamber of Commerce sent a detailed policy proposal to Welch in late January 1971, prompting a vocal and widespread debate on the future of the liquor laws in Ontario. The proposal argued that alcohol consumption was “not evil” and therefore it opposed “excessive restrictions” on its sale and consumption. The Chamber proposed the drinking age be lowered
to 18, that parents be permitted to serve their minor children at home and that children be permitted to accompany their parents into licenced premises. In the area of public drinking the Chamber suggested that the licencing of sidewalk cafés be simplified and extended, that food requirements be relaxed particularly on Sundays and that beaches and picnic areas be included as places for legal consumption. Finally, in its only proposal concerning liquor retail, the Chamber called for private importers and sellers of alcohol. These proposals represented most of the remaining issues continuing to attract criticism across the province from drinkers, editors, tourist operators and the hospitality business. They not only prompted debate within the government, the bureaucracy and the public but they also established the context within which the liquor issue would be viewed by Robarts’ successor.

Robarts served through an important though tumultuous transition between Frost and the immediate post-war reconstruction and the modern era of the 1970s and beyond. His initiatives in liquor policy constituted an aspect of this transition, achieving change in areas long delayed by Frost. He instituted significant changes to liquor policy by ending the liquor permit, introducing Sunday sale and pioneering self-serve liquor stores, for example. While his policies proved progressive, his manner of implementation remained essentially conservative as his biographer observed in his overall approach to policymaking. Robarts followed the incremental approach established by his predecessors that historically satisfied the progressive conservative political culture of Ontarians. For instance, he introduced Sunday drinking gradually, first with meals at designated dining hours, then with meals throughout the day and finally without meals at certain types of banquets. The loss of seats in the 1967 election hastened the pace of change particularly when coupled with the intense expectation for change following Expo ’67 and the renewed threat of private beer sales. Nevertheless, Robarts remained committed to gradually shifting the emphasis of government control towards customer service and away from moral control. In grappling to find the appropriate balance he paved the way through a challenging decade for further changes in the early 1970s.
Notes to Chapter 8

26 McDougall, p. 221.
29 McDougall. p. 221.
Notes to Chapter 8


37 “Editorial: Overdue Liquor Law Reform.”


41 See for example “Picnickers Face Liquor Charges.” The Galt Evening Reporter, August 8, 1966.


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83 See Bothwell, Drummond and English, pp. 333-344.
94 See Owram, p. 192.
99 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 1. LCBO Correspondence General Manager. File “Warehouses.” memo October 3, 1969 to General Manager Abra from P.A.K. Wood. Assistant General Manager; see also memo January 8, 1971 to Abra from Wood.
Notes to Chapter 8


104 See Bothwell. Drummond and English. p. 372.


106 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Box 1. LCBO Correspondence General Manager. File “Store Operations.” memo October 14, 1968 to Abra from W.D. McLeod; and memo November 25, 1969 to Abra from F.A. MacInnis. Assistant General Manager of Finance.


108 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Box 1. LCBO Correspondence General Manager. File “Store Operations.” undated report “Self-Serve Stores.”

109 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Box 3. LCBO General Manager Correspondence. File is entire report “Research Report Public Attitudes—Retail Beer Stores Prepared for Brewers’ Warehousing Co. Ltd. by Market Research Facts of Canada Ltd. Toronto and Montreal.”


Notes to Chapter 8

135 Marci McDonald, p. 65.
136 Marci McDonald, p. 65.
140 Valverde noted that she could not find evidence to account for the endurance of sex segregated public drinking in Toronto in the mid-1970s. This announcement signalled the beginning of a slow and voluntary transition away from this type of division. See Mariana Valverde. Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 151 and footnote on p. 233.
150 Information taken from Canadian Parliamentary Guide. 1970. Please note Allan Grossman did not highlight his Eastern European background, only that he was Canadian born.
159 McDougall, p. 260.
Notes to Chapter 8


167 RG 41-3 Acc. 24776 Temp. Box 15, LCBO Correspondence General Manager. File “John Yaremko, Provincial Secretary and Minister of Citizenship,” January 29, 1971 to Welch from Abra.


173 McDougall, p. 274.
"LIQUOR LAWS: A NEW ERA?"¹

When The Kingston Whig-Standard published its October 6, 1972 editorial entitled "Liquor Laws: A New Era?" it expressed its cautious belief that liquor regulation in Ontario had crossed a significant watershed. Before such conclusions, even tentative ones, would be possible the government had to institute further policy changes to move the pendulum away from the most overt moral controls that had dominated government control since its creation and towards the customer service that Ontarians desired. Ontario's new Premier, William Davis, assumed the responsibility of continuing and advancing the transition towards an approach balanced between controls and service that his predecessor achieved throughout the 1960s.

Davis, Robarts' Education Minister, won a hard fought leadership campaign to become the next premier, effective March 1, 1971. Born into a strict Presbyterian and Methodist household (though his parents later joined the United Church), Davis was heavily influenced by his mother's and maternal grandmother's temperance advocacy. According to a biography by Claire Hoy there was never any alcohol in the house when Davis was growing up. He was 27 years old when he took his first drink and he rarely drank as an adult. His father was a Crown Attorney and his mother was from a wealthy shoe-making family. Raised in an affluent but strict household in Brampton, Davis became a lawyer like his father, represented his beloved hometown in the provincial Legislature, and assumed the province's highest elected office at age 42. Although in public he liked to emphasise his 'rural' roots in Brampton, by the 1970s a sprawling Toronto suburb, in private, as Hoy reveals, Davis exhibited liberal social attitudes.² His local newspaper welcomed his success with the suggestion that one way to leave his mark on that office was to achieve social change particularly in the area of the liquor laws. The editorial argued that, despite the economic and industrial progress in Ontario, "we still haven't accepted the death of last
century's prohibition complex." Consequently, the editorial urged Davis to undertake a full review of the liquor laws. This revived demand arose out of the expectation for change following the succession of a new Premier as well as a new Cabinet. In a show of support and solidarity Davis promoted his leadership opponent Robert Welch to the Education portfolio. In his place, after an absence of over four years, John Yaremko resumed his position as Provincial Secretary and therefore minister responsible for the two Liquor Boards. Originally appointed Provincial Secretary as part of Robarts' plan to infuse youthfulness into the Cabinet, Welch certainly made his mark in promoting and delivering liquor law reform. With his experience, Yaremko demonstrated a renewed energy for advancing Welch's work as well as many of the changes he himself initiated in the early 1960s.

One of the very first things Yaremko did upon resuming the post was write a long letter to Premier Davis, voicing his concerns and making liquor policy proposals. He pointed out that over the years the government's role in government control had followed a patchwork of legislation, regulation and policy, which evolved without any "guiding philosophy." As a result, he argued, the Boards experienced tremendous difficulties in interpreting and implementing policy changes made without reference to clear underlying principles. The only answer, he explained, echoing the Brampton editorial, was to conduct a "comprehensive review of the entire field" of liquor policy including the laws, administration and the broader social questions associated with liquor sale and its consumption. The beginning of a new decade necessitated such a review, he argued, especially since one had never been undertaken in the history of government control. He pointed out the changes that had occurred in society in the interim: veterans returned from World War Two appreciating the way Europeans dealt with beverage alcohol, and in the post-war period Ontarians travelled widely and observed different drinking customs and habits. For Yaremko, the review therefore would take into consideration Ontario's mosaic of ethnic and cultural groups and also acknowledge the strong and stable roots from which the province had grown. Finally, he suggested to the Premier that the review start at the beginning of June 1971 and report at the end of January 1972.\textsuperscript{4}
Significantly, Yaremko had made a similar request to Chief Commissioner Collings at the beginning of the last decade when he was first appointed Provincial Secretary in 1960. While both appeals failed, Yaremko’s observations to Davis were significant. He showed an appreciation for the challenges that a ‘patchwork’ approach to liquor policy change placed on the implementation of the new policies resulting in the delays and half-measures of change that dotted the history of government control. From a political point of view, the resulting public criticism distressed Yaremko even more. Without the benefit of a comprehensive independent review like Manitoba’s 1955 Bracken Commission, British Columbia’s 1969 Morrow Commission or Quebec’s May 1971 Thinel Commission, Ontario managed to rid itself in a slow and evolutionary manner of most of the moral control elements of its liquor system. As Yaremko observed, by the early 1970s Western societies like Ontario demanded individual freedoms and challenged “old ways” and “old institutions.” Clearly the last remaining remnants of paternalism in the government control system offended these sentiments. The government remained dependent on the incremental approach that had served it so well, especially in the face of a weak and divided political Opposition. The lack of guiding principles proved a consequence of this approach, since governments tended not to “regularly re-examine...fundamental purposes” as it would induce unnecessary conflict. While this letter did not result in the type of study that Yaremko desired, it placed before the new Premier a framework for understanding the shortcomings of past approaches and an outline of challenges to be overcome.

**CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING PAST POLICY CHANGES**

*Resorts in Dry Areas*: Before Davis and Yaremko could address the remaining contentious policies, such as those contained in the January 1971 London Chamber of Commerce brief, the changes announced in November 1970 under their predecessors required implementation. In late March Yaremko received a complaint from the chairman of the Joint Board of Travel Associations of Ontario regarding the lack of liquor licences for resorts in dry areas for the upcoming tourist season despite the announcement the previous fall. Chairman Mackey replied to Yaremko’s inquiry about this delay that his Board would have licences in place at some resorts by late May. He qualified this statement by informing
Yaremko that these would include only dining licences due to the many letters former Premier Robarts received against the establishment of 'cocktail bars' in local option areas. The problems of implementing this recent policy change illustrated the shortcomings that Yaremko outlined to Davis. Without an overall framework to guide the licencing of resorts in dry areas, the Licence Board fell back on its old reliance on moral control measures which dictated that dining outlets were somehow more appropriate in otherwise dry areas than were lounges. Further, this continued distinction disregarded the significance of the May 1969 change allowing the service of drinks without food in dining establishments as long as proprietors maintained a 50/50 ratio between food and alcohol.

Outdoor Licences: The implementation of outdoor licences, first announced in 1965, experienced similar delays and confusion due to the lack of any guiding principles. From 1965 onward the Provincial Secretary's office continually appealed to the Licence Board to proceed with the licencing of such outdoor areas. A small number of licences materialised but only in completely secluded areas like rooftops and courtyards. After years of criticism, Chairman Mackey informed Yaremko in May 1971 that his Board issued 18 outdoor licences for more public areas like sidewalks for the upcoming season. He explained that the Board received many requests to serve drinks on patios and balconies adjacent to existing licenced premises but "it is not the Board's philosophy to increase the use of alcoholic beverages [only] to allow those who wish to have a drink with their meals...to do so in the open." He further outlined that, while doing so, these drinkers would "in no way inconvenience the public at large" since every licenced patio "will have a divider around the licenced area." This followed from Mackey's contention that without such barriers it would "look like people are drinking on the sidewalk," an unacceptable situation in a province that regulated consumption by delineating legal 'spaces.'

The lack of guiding principles sustained attitudes that dictated outdoor drinking should be at least partially blocked from public view, presumably to please the lingering critic such as the London woman who complained to Yaremko that outdoor cafés would lead to alcoholism. When Yaremko announced in May that public areas like sidewalk cafés would be licenced, most critics tended to oppose the idea of barriers such as fences or hedges around outdoor areas. The Ontario spokesman for the Canadian
Restaurant Association, Jim Demeroutis, for example, called the policy change "a ridiculous compromise." Echoing Yaremko's arguments to the Premier, Demeroutis maintained that calling such "childish steps" a policy change demonstrated the need for a complete re-examination of the government's whole philosophy towards liquor control. A Toronto couple also expressed disappointment over the requirement that licenced sidewalk cafés be partially hidden since no such requirements prevailed in Europe. When Ontario's first true sidewalk café opened a few days later in Toronto few dwelt on any remaining paternalism. One customer concluded, "it's one more thing Toronto is growing up on finally" while another said, "people will no longer say Montreal is ahead of Toronto." Perhaps that statement more than anything else illustrated that the province's liquor laws had finally advanced to the stage coveted by Ontario visitors to Montreal's Expo '67. Even without a complete liquor review, the government managed to manoeuvre beyond the most glaring examples of paternalism to please the majority of Ontarians.

If the government ever doubted the popularity of outdoor drinking, Toronto's Yonge Street Mall dispelled all questions. For one week in early June 1971 temporary sidewalk cafés served beer and wine on a downtown section of Yonge Street, transformed into a pedestrian mall to attract customers and experiment with the future of the downtown. Customers and business owners alike demonstrated their pleasure at the new drinking environment with one outlet making its highest sales ever. While the Board allowed outdoor Sunday drinking for the first time, it balanced its permissive attitude in this one area with paternalistic control in another. One Mall patron complained of being forced to buy a sandwich in order to "enjoy a beer" at one of the outdoor cafés. Despite the retention of certain moral controls, once the parameters of outdoor drinking had been settled the government endeavoured to integrate such drinking experiences into special events like the Yonge Street Mall, an event unimaginable in 1967 when Ontarians compared their drinking environment to Quebec's.

**Upgrading and Desegregating Public Houses:** Removing the Depression-era and war rationing policies from public houses proved the last and most troublesome of the November 1970 changes to implement. After Provincial Secretary Welch's announcement, many owners renovated their outlets in
anticipation of receiving full lounge licences. Because of the lack of clear guidelines governing this conversion, many experienced difficulties meeting the Licence Board’s interpretation of what upgrading entailed and hence enlisted the help of their MPPs. Treasurer Darcy McKeough, MPP for Chatham-Kent, took up the cause of proprietors in his riding in an effort to respond to local issues and wrote a series of letters to Chairman Mackey throughout the spring and fall of 1971. For example, in response to the Licence Board’s stipulation that public house floors be carpeted to qualify for conversion, McKeough retorted, “surely a carpet on the floor isn’t the be all and end all...sometimes I must say that I think the Board is a little unreasonable.”19 McKeough also expressed his concern about the costs associated with installing carpeting when the outlet in question already laid new linoleum in an attempt to upgrade its facilities. By way of reply Mackey sent an inspector to that particular public house to obtain a sample of its floor covering.20

McKeough objected to this type of over-regulation which flowed from the LLBO’s continued adherence to idea of a ‘moral architecture’ of drinking, seen in the 1930s and 1940s, that linked the type of building material and furniture to the behaviour of drinkers.21 Therefore he then directed his objections to Provincial Secretary Yaremko, even blaming the Licence Board’s delays and obstinacy on Yaremko’s personal disagreement with his predecessor’s upgrading and desegregation plan. Calling on Yaremko to clear up the government’s apparent “backtracking” on the issue and to force the Licence Board into action, McKeough argued “The Board has been fighting this ever since the beginning. Are they going to follow government policy or are they going to run their own show?”22 Action followed quickly from these harsh words. Yaremko’s Cabinet colleague provided him with the opportunity to insist on clear government policy guidelines on the issue of upgrading public houses, guidelines Mackey refused to proceed without, as Robb earlier refused to proceed with outdoor licences without policy clarification.

Five days later, in late September, the Cabinet secretary officially informed Yaremko that the Cabinet reconfirmed as government policy the November 1970 announcement of former Provincial Secretary Welch regarding the upgrading and desegregation of public houses. The Cabinet also directed Yaremko to instruct the Licence Board to draw up regulations granting permission for conversion to full
lounges if the public houses renovated and provided food. The secretary also told Yaremko that Cabinet agreed there should be no public announcement but that the hospitality industry should be “quietly” informed.23 By November Chairman Mackey alerted all licenced establishments that his Board would now consider applications from public houses for lounge licences if they provided a “congenial lounge-like atmosphere” with appropriate lighting, decorations and food available at regular meal times.24 And by early December the Licence Board issued a press release that public houses would be upgrading and could sell all types of alcohol.25 Coupled with the July regulatory change that permitted stand-up bars in public houses,26 this signalled the end of a very drawn out process to modernise a Depression-era creation.

In response to McKeough’s vocal criticism, the government sought to rectify the shortcomings in its approach to policy implementation. Without clear directions as to how the government intended its new policies to work, the Licence Board refused to implement vague policies it was duty bound to enforce. Instead it employed standard operating procedures to restrict the granting of new types of licences such as converted public houses by focusing on floor coverings which in turn forced the government to clarify its policies. Even though the government continued to liberalise and expand its liquor laws to allow new and more numerous drinking and retail outlets, it did so in an incremental manner and without a guiding philosophy, resulting in confusion and a reliance on old moralistic approaches to government control. Only relentless public, as well as political, criticism, even from government members, forced the government to specify and then implement policy changes in a manner pleasing to the majority.

“A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT”

In the midst of the arduous task of implementing the November 1970 policy announcement Yaremko made his first round of liquor changes in his second term as Provincial Secretary on June 21, 1971. Unlike Robarts, Davis felt no need to take a personal role in announcing the first round of liquor law changes under his premiership and instead left them in the capable and experienced hands of his Provincial Secretary. Where Robarts desired to show a clear sign of change following Frost’s adherence
to the status quo in liquor policy, Davis saw these changes following logically from those his predecessor instituted. As with past announcements, these changes responded to a variety of pressures including long-standing complaints, more recent crises, as well as the need to adjust the laws to future needs. According to Hamilton Conservative MPP John Smith, the changes also resulted from a favourable caucus meeting in late May regarding "the need for liquor reform in Ontario." Yaremko attributed them also to the constant internal review that the liquor laws had received.

**Return of the 40-ounce Bottle:** Accordingly, Yaremko revealed that the Control Board would now stock 40-ounce bottles of liquor. Along with the reinstatement of 80-ounce bottles of wine in liquor stores later that year, this move lifted one of the last war rationing measures still practised in Ontario, with the reduction in spirit strength being the only remaining one.

**Election Day Sale:** Another aspect of this policy announcement addressed a longstanding moral restraint on liquor licencing. Because of changed federal rules Yaremko announced that licenced premises could now open after the polls closed on federal election days. He explained that now Ontarians could visit drinking outlets after polls closed on all election days since, "some time ago," his government made amendments regarding municipal and provincial election days. "Some time ago" turned out to be in late 1967 in a little publicised change to the licencing regulations, although the Cabinet Committee on Liquor Matters recommended the change five years earlier. The first provincial election after the 1967 change followed several months after Yaremko's announcement concerning federal elections. Observers noted "business was brisk" in Ontario outlets in the hours after polls closed on Davis' first "big Conservative victory" in late October. Allowing public drinking after the polls closed on election days represented a further loosening of moral controls designed to protect drinkers from themselves and the corrupting influence of alcohol during a democratic exercise. Nevertheless, the federal and provincial governments refused to trust the electors enough to allow public drinking during voting hours.

**Dancing On Sundays:** Yaremko also made several policy announcements that responded directly to recent liquor law enforcement controversies in much the same way that highly publicised charges in the late 1950s resulted in prompt policy change. In the spring of 1971, licence inspectors warned several
Toronto Greek restaurants to stop permitting dancing and other entertainment on Sundays. The warnings gained publicity prompting the Board's Chief Inspector to explain: "The question of dancing and entertainment never came up when the Sunday drinking laws were changed. Sunday was supposed to be for family dining and that's all." Chairman Mackey further added that the "law is clear," and thus licensees must seek permission for dancing on Sunday. In order to simplify the procedure and to respond to different cultural attitudes towards entertainment and the Sabbath that were not considered in 1967, Yaremko announced that dining outlets could now provide music for dancing on Sundays.

Liqueur Chocolates Legalised: In another controversial move the Control Board fined a retailer $5000 in March 1970 for selling $12 worth of chocolates filled with a higher alcohol content than permitted by law. A Hamilton Spectator editorial deemed the incident proof of the "epic absurdity" of Ontario's liquor laws. In response Yaremko announced that the maximum alcohol content of such "famous European liqueur candies" would be doubled to 5% by weight for the enjoyment of "our residents." That the government found it necessary to spend its legislative time amending the Liquor Control Act's definition of what types of products containing alcohol could be sold outside the government control structure, only highlighted for many that prohibitionist residue remained on the statute books. The March 1970 fine did not represent an isolated incident prompting the government to act on a little known aspect of its laws. Fines for the sale of liqueur candies proved a consistent occurrence during the history of government control with intense public attention focused on the issue after inspectors levied charges in January 1958 and again in November 1968. The absence of an independent review of the laws meant that the restrictions on strong liqueur chocolates, born of the Board's original desire to control all forms of intoxicating alcohol, remained in force long after the sarcasm of correspondents to The Globe and Mail prompted the newspaper to declare it would no longer print letters on the topic in January 1958. Only the publicity surrounding the $5000 fine, the minimum for any infraction of the LCA, prompted the government to address the issue. Revealing its continued reliance on incremental change, the government chose to increase the minimum alcohol content rather than completely do away with restrictions on the sale of alcohol-filled chocolates.
Drinks Without Mandatory Meals: Further Clarification: A second minimum $5000 fine prompted action in another policy area of long-standing concern to critics. In March 1971 an undercover inspector bought a drink without a meal in a Windsor area dining lounge, resulting in the very large fine.\textsuperscript{39} In a letter to the editors of The Hamilton Spectator, the Canadian Restaurant Association’s George Boukydis denounced the excessive fine and called for the removal of such arbitrary and unrealistic restrictions.\textsuperscript{40} He expressed his concerns further in letters to Premier Davis and Provincial Secretary Yaremko. Boukydis argued all the past reforms that the government had made, while appreciated by his industry, had been “superficial,” and based on “value judgements involving the interpretation of a hodgepodge of unnecessary rules and precedents.”\textsuperscript{41} This highly publicised fine served to solidify support that had been building around the London Chamber of Commerce’s January list of demands, which included the removal of the food requirement in dining establishments. For example, a London solicitor complained to Mackey in February that in a “democratic society” customers should not be forced by “vicious and unfair” legislation to purchase a meal when they only wanted a drink.\textsuperscript{42} These complaints illustrated that, despite the May 1969 announcement that dining outlets could apply for permission to serve drinks without meals while maintaining an equilibrium between liquor sales and food sales, in practice few dining establishments possessed such permission.

Consequently, this forced the government to clarify a past policy change with a further announcement. As Yaremko explained, since “our society is becoming an eating out one…the strict requirement that liquor be served only with meals in a dining lounge or dining room has led to some unrealistic situations.”\textsuperscript{43} Therefore, he went on, under new amendments “a person may eat as much or as little as he wishes” with a drink in a dining outlet as long as the establishment maintained the 50/50 food and alcohol ratio. While these changes made automatic what previous changes had provided only with permission, he cautioned “we are not converting our dining lounges into lounges.” Furthermore, “on Sunday, service will continue to be only with a meal.” In response to concerns from the hospitality industry about the difficulty involved in ensuring the 50/50 ratio, Yaremko suggested dining establishments offer discounted meals or two for the price of one.\textsuperscript{44} This response demonstrated not only
Yaremko’s efforts in advancing his predecessor’s goal of providing drinkers and proprietors greater responsibility in the area of consumption, but also how far the government’s attitudes towards liquor licencing had advanced since 1934. When the government first permitted public drinking after Prohibition, it forbade the service of food in certain outlets because it feared proprietors would use discounted or even free food to lure drinkers. Now 37 years later, the government promoted discounted food in drinking establishments. In spite of the continued restrictions on Sunday drinking and the food and liquor ratio, the government moved further away from its stringent control over the consumption behaviour of Ontarians.

Liquor Store Hours Extended to Midnight: While the above changes restated past policies, Yaremko also announced changes intended to serve the future needs of Ontario drinkers. In the area of liquor retail he proclaimed the extension of liquor store hours to midnight in certain high-traffic areas. This move responded to years of complaints regarding the early closing times of many of the Board’s stores. Despite a progressive extension of store hours throughout the 1960s, many customers, especially in smaller centres, continued to complain. In fact as an LCBO memo to Yaremko on the eve of the June 21 announcements demonstrated, the Board contemplated an even later closing hour. “We feel that midnight will be suitable although we will make it 2 am if you would prefer it that way.” Clearly the pressure from critics advancing private sale of alcohol prompted the government and the Board to reform its retailing system beyond anything the most reasonable critic could desire.

Duty Free Liquor Store Opened: Further, Yaremko announced the establishment of a duty free liquor store at Toronto’s Malton airport in recognition of its “international stature…and as a convenience to Canadians travelling abroad.” Ontario’s increasingly well-travelled citizens, as well as many foreign travellers to the province, complained in the past about the absence of this service, interpreted as a symbol of a mature and sophisticated society. Combined with the opening of mobile liquor stores in remote areas in May these extensions of liquor retail coincided with a steady increase in the number of liquor stores, as Table 27 illustrates. They also not only demonstrated a willingness to serve the public in new and innovative ways but also opened up government control to a larger market as any good business
would endeavour to do. Yaremko made no effort to hide this goal of government control in his reply to a Scarborough man's opposition to midnight liquor stores as failing to exercise appropriate control over access to alcohol. "We try to run the LCB just like a private business so that a profit accrues to the people of Ontario and taxes are kept as low as possible," as Table 29 shows.

**Table 27**

Total Liquor and Beer Stores in Ontario 1970/71-1972/73

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Liquor Stores</th>
<th>Beer Stores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/72</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1970/71-1972/73

"A New Age of Shelter": Finally, Yaremko announced another change for the future responding to "a new age of shelter." The government "broadened significantly" the definition of residence to include nursing homes, mobile homes, and all the common facilities of a condominium or apartment building such as the pool, the recreation room, and even the laundry room. He explained that the traditional definition of residence was based on the concept of a private home and left apartment dwellers and others in more non-traditional residences in doubt as to the legality of having and consuming alcohol in the common areas of their dwellings. While the changes could be criticised as only a further tinkering with the 1927 concept of residence as a 'space' of regulation, this announcement included so many
variables that it took into consideration the predominant desire for individual freedom. As Yaremko explained in reply to a Don Mills woman’s complaints about these widened provisions, “it is not the intention of the government to force alcohol on anyone, rather it was to permit responsible people to have a choice in such use.”

Yaremko’s announcements prompted mostly sarcasm, especially those changes that highlighted behaviour that was previously illegal or at least questionable such as the sale of liqueur-filled chocolates or the consumption of liquor in one’s apartment recreation room. With the succession of a new Premier and a new Cabinet, many expected more significant change. Liberal leader Robert Nixon argued that while his party favoured reducing the age of majority to 18, the Conservatives “talk about putting liquor in chocolates and that sort of thing.” Yaremko revealed that the government rejected requests for even greater liberalisation. His government favoured preserving local option “in the interests of democracy” and found there was “no significant demand” for grocery sale of beer, two policies targeted for change. Further, he explained that the drinking age would not be altered until the government finished its consideration of the entire issue of age of majority.

Even with these shortcomings, Yaremko insisted that the changes represented “a fundamental shift” in the liquor laws enabling “the people of Ontario to drink reasonable amounts of alcohol at reasonable times of the day.” From his perspective this conclusion appeared persuasive. These changes were ‘fundamental’ compared to the degree of moral control initially imposed on the system. Yet his government achieved this ‘shift’ slowly over time with its steadfast commitment to an evolutionary and incremental approach to policy change. What the critics failed to appreciate was the continuing pressure on the government to preserve paternalistic control over liquor retail and consumption. In a letter representative of the type the government continued to receive until the early 1970s, although in much smaller numbers, the president of the Ontario Christian Labour Association opposed the June relaxation of the liquor laws. Cautioning that his group was not prohibitionist and admitting that liquor revenue provided “many of the good things” in the province, the man argued that it was the “duty of government to look after the health and welfare of the people.” This type of reasonable expectation for a certain
degree of paternalistic control over the liquor trade not only appealed to the government's desire to please all areas of the electorate but also engaged Davis' own values concerning his role in safeguarding the welfare of society.56

_Drinking Age Lowered to Eighteen:_ Less than a month later Davis made an announcement that served in his mind to answer both of these goals: please a large portion of the electorate and advance the welfare of society. Responding to long-standing demands for a lowered drinking age, Davis proclaimed that Ontario's age of majority would be set at 18, the age at which individuals received the right to vote, drink, serve on juries, hold elected office and sign legal contracts.57 According to A.K. McDougall, Robarts made the decision to lower the drinking age and left the announcement to his successor.58 Nevertheless, Davis still had to overcome some strong reservations among his caucus members. As caucus opposition to Sunday drinking in 1965 demonstrated, the government MPPs wielded significant influence on the pace of liquor policy change. With the help of several unnamed Cabinet members, Davis allayed caucus members' fears and ultimately gained their support.59 The decision to lower the drinking age and the overall age of majority resulted from several different pressures acting simultaneously.

First, the government received appeals for a lowered drinking age from groups as diverse as the London Chamber of Commerce, the Young PCs, the Dundas police force60 and a group of Etobicoke housewives.61 Each group argued from its own unique perspective that lowering the drinking age would prevent abuse and excess by removing the allure of illegality surrounding liquor consumption. Many Ontarians, such as the group of Etobicoke housewives interviewed by The Toronto Star and one particular mother who wrote to the LCBO, were concerned about the perceived prevalence of drug use among youth. They viewed lowering the drinking age as a way to encourage youths otherwise lured by illegal drugs to use alcohol, a more socially acceptable drug.62 With the bulk of the baby boomers reaching their late teens and early 20s, Western society found itself in the grasp of a youth oriented culture. In 1971 40% of Ontarians were under age 21,63 with over 400,000 of them affected by the lowering of the drinking age from 21 to 18.64
Davis recognised the significance of this demographic shift. "I do not believe that there has ever been a generation which has been committed to progressive change, so involved in public issues, and so active in the expression of argument and opinion on them." His Provincial Secretary further emphasised the government's belief in the unique maturity of this particular generation of young people. In reply to a letter opposing the lowered drinking age, Yaremko explained that while he did not expect the initial shift to younger drinkers to be without difficulties, the government preferred "to rely on the maturity and sophistication of 18 year olds in Ontario." The government and its Liquor Boards, like the rest of society, initially struggled against the perceived rebelliousness of youth in the late 1960s and early 1970s symbolised particularly through unconventional styles of dress and grooming that seemed to flout accepted morals. For example, in December 1970 the Control Board fired a young man from his liquor store job for refusing to trim his long hair and goatee. Chief Commissioner Kitching explained that employees must show a "normal appearance that is acceptable to the general public." As if to symbolise what Owram described as the drawing together of "the culture of youthful rebellion and the adult mainstream" in the early 1970s, by August 1971 the LCBO drew up new guidelines regarding the physical appearance of employees. They stipulated that as long as employees followed "reasonable and controlled grooming," they could still sport the "modern look." With the number of employees steadily increasing, as Table 28 shows, the importance of good employee-management relations took on greater significance. These new guidelines illustrated that the LCBO adjusted its own internal operations to coincide with government policy changes such as a lowered drinking age, in order to take into consideration societal changes wrought by the youth culture. The impact of this culture, characterised by "change and chaos" cannot be underestimated, particularly because it exuded the image that "all hell broke loose," across university campuses and the country.
Second, the influence of this youth culture also had a significant political component. Since the government felt it necessary for consistency to combine all adult rights and responsibilities in one age of majority, the decision to lower the drinking age also increased the number of eligible voters in the province by 10%. While all three parties embraced the lowered age of majority and certainly looked at the new voters as potential supporters, Davis revealed that studies in other jurisdictions found that, when given the vote, youths tended to vote following the same pattern as the electorate as a whole. With the Conservative government well into the fourth year of its mandate and with Davis undoubtedly anxious to have his position as Premier endorsed in the polls, the possibility of increasing the party’s support by upwards of 10% must have been appealing at this time.

Third, Davis had several other models to follow in lowering the age of majority. The federal government recently lowered the voting age from 21 to 18 for the next federal election and all other provinces except Nova Scotia and both territories had already lowered their provincial voting ages. As a Hamilton Spectator editorial argued in early July, with the federal government lowering its voting age and the three jurisdictions bordering Ontario (Manitoba, Quebec and New York state) having lower
drinking ages it was not a matter of ‘if’ but ‘when’ Ontario would follow suit.73 By the spring of 1971, all provinces except Newfoundland, New Brunswick and PEI had drinking ages lower than Ontario, with Nova Scotia and Quebec announcing their changes just a matter of months and weeks before Davis’ statement.74 Therefore, in keeping with the traditional Conservative style, Davis implemented this policy change when he was assured of a large majority of support.

After the new drinking age had been in effect for several months, the positive response justified his timing. While the novelty of drinking legally among this new younger group resulted in some increases in property damage and disorderly conduct, overall commentators noted the maturity of Ontario’s youth.75 The Windsor Star’s Bill Prager argued that the government had no reason to regret lowering the drinking age, especially since even Chairman Mackey, vocally opposed to the idea when he was first appointed, revealed that “they have not caused too many problems.”76 Further, in their short time drinking legally, these youths began to influence the entertainment and atmosphere in Ontario’s public houses, a process initiated by the desegregation and upgrading of these outlets, but advanced by the influx of new beer drinkers.

The decision to lower the drinking age must be understood in the larger context of Davis’ first “meaty” legislative session as Premier. While lowering the drinking age certainly followed years of pressure from various groups and the example of other provinces, the policy change formed part of Davis’ overall attempt “to implement the wishes of a people that had begun to question old values and recognise new values,” according to a Globe and Mail editorial.77 The decision to stop the Spadina Expressway in the face of overwhelming urban opposition and to establish a Department of the Environment represented just two examples of Davis’ willingness to respond to public sentiments.

The lowering of the drinking age also fit into an overall liberalisation of the liquor laws. Less than six months after the London Chamber of Commerce issued its detailed list of policy suggestions, Davis’ government addressed a large majority of them. Besides lowering the drinking age, the government expedited the issuance of sidewalk café licences, relaxed the food requirement in dining outlets, permitted the licencing of outdoor special occasion events and removed the restrictions on Sunday dancing. As
comments by Kitching and Mackey to Yaremko in late 1971 made clear, the recent amendments achieved action in almost every area the Chamber suggested in January. The only areas not changed included the service of minor children, drinking on beaches or at picnics, Sunday service without meals and private alcohol retailers. While Manitoba recently permitted minors to consume alcohol in licenced outlets with their parents, the Licence Board opposed such a move due to the “possibility of abuse.” Both Boards similarly opposed drinking on beaches or at picnics as “difficult to police.” In terms of Sunday service the Licence Board noted that the hospitality industry seemed “content.” In reply to the call for private alcohol retail the Control Board, exhibiting its fierce commitment to government control, cautioned Yaremko “from moving hastily down that path.” Extolling the efficiency of its present system of retail, the Board did highlight one area of potential improvement: expanding the number of winery retail stores, frozen at 51 since 1927. By the end of 1971, therefore, Davis’ government wiped away the last major remnants of moral control while preserving the government control system intact, thus setting liquor policy on track towards a future of customer service tempered only by intelligent control against excess.

GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING AND THE FUTURE OF THE LIQUOR BOARDS

To complete the transition towards this future Davis had to implement one last major liquor policy. Like the responsibility to lower the drinking age Robarts also left his successor the task of implementing the recommendations of the Committee on Government Productivity (COGP). Robarts established the Committee in 1969 out of his personal concern for the efficiency, as well as the public responsiveness, of the government’s policymaking ability. Charged with inquiring “into all matters pertaining to the management of the Government of Ontario and to make such recommendations as in its opinion will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Government of Ontario,” the COGP, headed by John Labatt Ltd. director and senior vice-president John B. Cronyn, also served Robarts’ desire to modernise the Ontario government structure to mirror changes he witnessed in neighbouring Quebec. The Committee’s recommendations ultimately resulted in the creation of three ‘policy fields,’ Justice, Resource Development and Social Development, under Davis in early 1972. Davis explained that by grouping departments under broad fields with common goals ministers “may concentrate their time and
energy on broad policy questions.” The shortcomings of the traditional Cabinet structure for creating an overall policy of liquor control as opposed to perennial tinkering with the system certainly illustrated the need for this type of government restructuring. Ultimately, according to NDP MPP Kenneth Bryden in a Canadian Public Administration article, the COGP served as Ontario’s vehicle in a search, common to many governments in the early 1970s “for a more rationalistic approach to policymaking.” For political scientist George J. Szablewski, the COGP provided government with the tools to anticipate change rather than merely react to it, as the history of liquor control illustrated.

After this restructuring the Liquor Boards found themselves temporarily without a permanent responsible minister since the transformation eliminated the Provincial Secretary’s department. John Yaremko, now Solicitor General under the new framework, suggested several ministries to Davis in July 1972 to take responsibility for his former charges. Even while he suggested options Yaremko argued the drawbacks of each. Placement of the Boards under the Industry and Tourism Minister or Revenue Minister “would be criticised for emphasizing the exploitation of a substance which has harmful social aspects.” Likewise “the revenue aspects” of the Boards, illustrated in Table 29, “would not be compatible” with the Health Ministry while Government Services was “neutral” but the activities of the Boards did “not fit with the general concept relating to” that Ministry.
Table 29
Total Alcohol Sales in Ontario and LCBO Profits Paid to Provincial Treasurer
1970/71-1972/73

Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1970/71-1972/73

Table 30
Total Alcohol Gallonage Sold in Ontario 1970/71-1972/73

Source: LCBO Annual Reports 1970/71-1972/73
AN "APPROPRIATE" MINISTRY FOR THE LIQUOR BOARDS

Given the shortcomings of each of Yaremko's suggestions, Davis decided on an entirely different ministerial home for the Boards that perfectly represented the goals of government control as the COGP suggested that agencies be incorporated into "appropriate" ministry portfolios. Created in April 1972 as part of the overall reorganisation of government, the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations represented a modernised form of the old Department of Financial and Commercial Affairs. Under the Justice policy field, the new Ministry held responsibility for a wide range of concerns affecting the licencing and inspection of businesses including the insurance and credit union industries, for example, as well as the protection of consumers. On October 1 an Order-in-Council transferred the LCBO and the LLBO from their temporary position under Solicitor General Yaremko to the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations on the recommendation of the COGP.

By placing the Liquor Boards in the Justice field, Davis continued past administrations' association of liquor control with law and order reflected in Ferguson's original decision to give the Attorney General responsibility for the LCBO. The Ministry's overt emphasis on consumer issues and commercial enterprises reflected the Control Board's business goals as well as the customer service commitment evident in licencing and retailing. No previous department responsible for the Liquor Boards had the capacity or the mandate to promote this important aspect of government control in such a forthright manner. Therefore, the Ministry exemplified both the control and customer service goals of government control in a direct and specific way. Culminating 45 years of evolving liquor policy, the creation of the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations and the placement of liquor retailing and licencing under its purview firmly established customer service as the primary goal of Ontario's government control system. It symbolised the conclusion of the government's challenge to achieve reasonable balance between freedom of choice and the consequences of excessive consumption, according to Ellen Dolour France's analysis of the development of the LLBO in the 1970s. After years of being shuffled among ministries as diverse as Attorney General, Treasury and a long period under the
'catch-all' department of the Provincial Secretary, the LCBO and LLBO finally found a home within a Ministry dedicated to the service and protection of the Ontario consumer.

Davis' choice for the minister to carry out these goals further determined how, and in what proportion, they would be administered. He “elevated from the backbenches” his fellow Osgoode Hall Law School classmate, 44-year-old John Clement. A United Church member, Clement represented Niagara Falls where he previously worked with the grape marketing board. After being sworn into Cabinet “Ontario's new liquor boss sipped a glass of sherry,” making no pretence about his drinking habits. Arguing “people are a little more sophisticated today and I think we should reflect that,” Clement proposed a wider availability of liquor especially in recreational facilities and tourist areas. At the same time he acknowledged that the government had to control liquor “very adequately.” His reference to ‘adequate’ control reflected past demands for ‘intelligent’ and ‘reasonable’ control over consumption behaviour. Coupled with his recognition of the ‘sophistication’ of society, observers concluded that his appointment signalled the end of the last of the moralistic liquor restrictions. Certainly, Clement's installation in his new post in a new Ministry indicated the conclusion of a long evolution away from moral regulation of consumption behaviour towards more reasonable or ‘adequate’ control to safeguard general public welfare.

In order to complete that evolution, Clement realised that, as the newspaper editorials reminded him, with more amendments “Ontario’s liquor laws might yet be dragged into the twentieth century.” Soon after taking office Clement told reporters, “I am not going to sit here and look you in the eye and tell you that I think it’s [liquor] being marketed and controlled in a method that’s acceptable to the public in all areas.” Several highly publicised incidents in the months leading up to his appointment illustrated to Clement that years of ingrained paternalistic liquor law interpretation and implementation could not be reversed instantaneously. For example, in March and then again in September, Chairman Mackey maintained that darts and pool tables were too “dangerous” and inappropriate for licenced premises despite the general opening up of entertainment in 1965. In April the Licence Board closed the outlet in Ottawa's National Arts Centre on Sundays because it failed to serve full meals with drinks on Sundays.
Finally, in September, Mackey ordered Stratford’s Avon Theatre to close its outlet during a film festival since the laws restricted theatre liquor licences to live performances only. These incidents indicated that while liquor retail had evolved towards a significant commitment to customer service, particularly with the opening of self-serve stores, licencing remained controversial. The reason for this was that the moral restrictions made in the second half of the 1960s on the opening up of new types of opportunities, such as Sunday drinking and the licencing of entertainment facilities, continued to inform enforcement rulings. Clearly Clement had his work cut out for him but armed with a new and more appropriate ministerial framework, the completion of the evolution toward ‘adequate’ control and Taylor’s ‘balanced’ liquor policy, characterised by an equilibrium between customer choice and consumption controls to minimise specific excesses, appeared assured.

“IN LINE WITH ACCEPTED SOCIAL STANDARDS AND CUSTOMER PREFERENCES”

The Ministry’s new statement of goals and objectives for the Liquor Boards reflected this evolution. Throughout the fall of 1972 the new Ministry debated and brainstormed over this statement, an outward symbol of the purposes of the Boards that had never been undertaken before. The final statement expressed the objectives that the Boards had been working towards over the past four and a half decades: “to provide for effective control and licencing and efficient marketing of liquor in line with accepted social standards and consumer preferences.” In an explicit and public manner this statement signified that only customer desires and society’s expectations would influence the type of control the Boards exercised over retailing and licencing.

This statement also went a long way towards answering the frank and pointed issues raised by LCBO solicitor Basil Clark on the eve of Clement’s appointment. In a long confidential memo to Yaremko, Clark highlighted years of complaints directed towards the government’s handling of liquor policy. “What precisely are we trying to do by regulating the use and availability of liquor in Ontario?” he asked. “In the absence of clear government directions, control seems always to predominate as if by divine right, except in isolated cases decided on an ad hoc basis... The accumulated effect of years of legislative patching is becoming obvious.” He went on to conclude, “There is some doubt that this is an
appropriate emphasis in view of today's changing social attitudes." He noted the "frequently incompatible" goals of control and customer service. "They compete with each other for pre-eminence and require constant balancing." In one memo Clark managed to articulate the significant issues of the entire history of government control in Ontario. He highlighted the issues yet to be resolved, such as the continuation of local option, despite the system's many exceptions and the arbitrary restriction on the number of winery licences and wine stores. He also demonstrated the bureaucracy's function in grappling with the very fundamentals behind the system of liquor retailing and licensing: the government's role in legislating morality, its continued ambivalence over the millions of tax dollars raised through liquor retail and the justification behind a government monopoly if service and not morality was pre-eminent.

The new Ministry, with its statement of goals, provided a framework for the government as it continued to grapple with these basic issues that went to the heart of government control. An incremental approach to policymaking, supplemented with ad hoc responses to societal crises, created the system that existed at the end of 1972. Largely as a consequence of the efforts begun by Allan Grossman and John Robarts and continued by Robert Welch, John Yaremko and Bill Davis, Ontario's government control system evolved from the paternalistic and moralistic emphases of Frost's era to the customer service-oriented organisation under John Clement's Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations. After the government wiped away most of the "old annoying blue laws" and directly addressed the challenges of the control and service impulses within the system, the conclusion that "civilisation dawns over liquor laws" appeared an appropriate ending to government control's first four and a half decades.
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56 See Hoy, pp. 13-14, 28.
Notes to Chapter 9

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Notes to Chapter 9

CONCLUSION

"IN LINE WITH ACCEPTED SOCIAL STANDARDS"\(^1\)

The new Ministry’s statement of goals emphasized the formation of liquor policy according to what it perceived to be ‘accepted social standards.’ As we have seen, social standards demanded customer service from the time of the original 1927 liquor retail system. Give the recent repeal of Prohibition, this service could only manifest itself within an overall framework of moral control over the consumption behaviour of Ontarians. Therefore the Control Board provided courteous and efficient liquor retail in a legal manner for the first time in eleven years while simultaneously exerting moral regulation over who bought liquor, where it was kept and under what circumstances it was consumed. This was primarily accomplished by the regulation of specifically defined spaces, initially the ‘residence.’ In the intervening 45 years, the government’s intensive moral regulation of liquor retail, and later public drinking, slowly gave way before public demand and political will. Reasonable control replaced moral regulation in an evolutionary manner as the only acceptable impediment to customer service. The three overarching themes of the era encouraged this evolution: the pressure for private retail, the consistent comparisons with services and approaches in other regions; and the lobbying efforts of the tourist industry. However these forces impelling change were in constant tension with other forces resisting it. For example, habit, the incremental nature of policy change, and the endurance of prohibitionist beliefs in society made this evolution an extremely slow one. Also, the longevity of bureaucrats in powerful positions as well as the longevity of the ruling Conservatives fostered caution and the status quo. This evolution at times exhibited almost imperceptible movement, making it hard for contemporaries to appreciate the significance of change over time. The piecemeal nature of change determined that small pockets of moral control remained after every amendment, stimulating constant irritation and therefore criticism. One political party created a liquor control system based on a significant degree of moral control. Then, over
nearly half a century, with one brief Liberal interlude, the same party managed to guide the system, by responding to the province’s political culture, to one reasonably balanced between customer freedom of choice and the prevention of abuse. And they did so without any significant political upset.

Despite the perennial, and at times insistent, denunciations of government control, by 1972 Ontarians by and large seemed to have grudgingly accepted the system now free of most of its moralistic impediments and prohibitions. With the government on the road to limiting its role largely to the promotion of healthy consumption choices and the prevention of abuse, the majority of responsible drinkers found themselves faced with a multitude of options in an increasingly free atmosphere of liquor retail and public consumption. Such freedoms, including whether to eat or not in any type of outlet, to drink publicly on Sundays, to view liquor bottles or even to give liquor as a present, were unfathomable in the immediate aftermath of the province’s decade-long experience of Prohibition. Almost half a century later, several isolated instances of this prohibition mindset remained such as local option, election day opening only after the polls closed and the meal requirement for Sunday drinking. However, the fact that Sunday and election day drinking were even permitted, along with the other liberalisations in the liquor laws, illustrated to most that an important corner had been turned.

Nevertheless there was nothing natural or expected about this evolution. Clearly customer service emerged as a key goal from the very creation of the LCBO in the same way that moral control played a predominant role in shaping government control. While these two forces, control and service, would at first appear to be diametrically opposed impulses, they functioned simultaneously—albeit uneasily—for nearly half a century. Since the shift from the dominance of one towards the dominance of the other occurred slowly and incrementally over the period, it presents a picture of natural evolution but that transition is specific to Ontario. British Columbia, for example, opened its liquor stores until midnight during the 1920s and all night during the Depression, and sold packaged liquor for off-premises consumption from licenced drinking outlets in the early 1970s, revealing much less moral regulation over liquor retail. In the realm of public drinking, on the other hand, moralistic and paternalistic attitudes prevailed to an even greater degree than in Ontario. For example, most British Columbia beer parlours
banned women completely throughout the late 1920s and 1930s and the Pacific province did not permit the sale of cocktails until seven years after Ontario opened its lounges.\textsuperscript{2} Therefore, different jurisdictions experienced change at different rates and according to different priorities.

Ontario’s experience was overwhelmingly shaped by a political culture that favoured cautious reform and slow, incremental change. As Lindblom argued, ideological conservatism fostered political incrementalism.\textsuperscript{3} Unlike the British Columbia experience, where moral control informed some decisions like the delay in cocktail lounges but not others like lengthy store hours, Ontario’s system was consistently informed by moral control, a product of Ontario’s deep temperance roots, political commitment to the status quo and a deferential political culture. While the British Columbia experience exhibited similar tensions between control and service and between regulation and promotion, the overall transition in its government control system shifted unevenly and rapidly between the opposing forces. Arguably, the most important factors that account for the pace and nature of change in Ontario are the political stability witnessed generally for the period and the policymakers’ adherence to the type of policy process that reflected the dominant values of society. By comparison, British Columbians employed civil disobedience to demand public drinking almost immediately after the creation of its government liquor stores.\textsuperscript{4} There is little evidence of this degree of lawbreaking in Ontario. Only at the height of the Depression was the pressure great enough to ensure the reintroduction of public drinking, and even then the pressure was largely economic. With a political culture that favoured order and stability, Ontarians largely deferred to the strict moral controls of the early government control system. However, after decades of such control, significant post-World War Two shifts in drinking tastes and expectations rendered the old system incompatible with most customers’ demands. Only then did Ontarians’ desires for fair play and timely reform necessitate loud protests in the late 1950s and 1960s.

In Ontario then, political success in this policy area rested on an equitable balance between moral control and business efficiency according to the accepted social values of the day. Policymakers carefully gauged these social values in a number of ways. Clearly the letters written by constituents, letters written to the editors, and the editorials and opinion pieces in the press combined to express the dominant views
of Ontarians. At times these voices were at odds, and in those cases caution and slow, incremental change proved the savvy choice. The policymakers also looked to their own deeply held beliefs and values in shaping policy, believing they mirrored society at large or at least that they knew what was best. Balancing control and service was not achieved once and for all, but required constant readjustment and re-evaluation.

Ontario’s political culture dictated that political leaders take a firm hand in controlling and guiding this process. Unlike British Columbia, where politicians preferred interest groups to take the lead in promoting plebiscites to achieve liquor policy change right up to the 1952 vote on cocktail lounges, Ferguson used the 1926 general election to seize direct political control over this controversial issue. The aura of scandal and corruption attached to the British Columbia Liquor Control Board and its responsible ministry during its first few years of operation undoubtedly influenced Ferguson’s decisions regarding the makeup of his proposed system. He not only desired a strong image of control to ensure the success of the new enterprise but he also wanted real control over the functioning of the new Liquor Board. Therefore, the new Board was created as an independent and ‘arm’s length’ agency, which served Ferguson’s political agenda as well as those of future premiers. In practice, the agency was not a classic independent agency and evolved within the overall growth of the government throughout the twentieth century. The enduring temperance sentiments in society made the image of independence important. But for this same reason, the government wanted close control over the Board’s activities and therefore, the divisive and even politically dangerous debates over access to liquor. As a result, the Board became closely tied to the ruling government with several Chief Commissioners coming from the ranks of the elected members, including one of the most pro-active LCBO chiefs, Allan Grossman. Furthermore, the government appointed the non-elected Chief Commissioners and Licence Board Chairmen. The endurance of the Conservative dynasty fostered the longevity of these bureaucrats in positions of power, which in turn served to preserve the status quo and the control emphasis in liquor policy well into the post-war era. As J.E. Hodgetts has argued for the federal Liberals, during long periods of one-party rule the line between politics and administration blurs. As its name suggests, the history of government
control reveals the propensity for strong leadership and direct political control over policymaking in Ontario.

Ferguson demonstrated the province's desire for strong central authority as he set the tone and direction for future leadership over the issue of liquor policy. He realised that the only politically acceptable system to replace Prohibition, after over ten years of perceived excesses associated with hidden drinking, was one based on strict moral control of the purchase, possession and consumption of liquor. Voters overwhelmingly endorsed the fundamental components of his plan: sealed bottles hidden from view, permit booklets to record purchases, strict definition of a residence, the interdicted list and wide investigative police powers. These controls, based on the moral view that liquor was a dangerous and potentially corrupting substance that required government's direct intervention into not only commerce but also personal consumption behaviour, were widely accepted in Ontario society in the late 1920s. Although his electoral support is not necessarily an accurate gauge for the acceptance of his policies, for him and his successors the belief that Ontarians endorsed the idea of government control was a powerful factor in preserving the foundations that Ferguson established.

As social standards changed, particularly once the novelty of the new system wore off, the government lessened its strict regulation of consumption behaviour. Initiatives such as the sale of smaller bottles of spirits, single bottles of beer and ultimately beer by the glass tended to advance the business side of government control in the face of the Great Depression. More importantly, they revealed that the government never intended the system of government control to remain as it had been created in 1927, since Ferguson referred to his policy as an 'experiment' to be given a fair trial before it could be re-evaluated and reshaped. Once the crisis of the Depression influenced the creation of beverage rooms and the crisis of World War Two influenced the creation of cocktail outlets, the government's ability to respond to direct public demands was hereafter hampered. Social crisis produced dramatic change. Prosperity and political stability, on the other hand, encouraged the preservation of the status quo. Preoccupied with post-war reconstruction and prosperity, and guided by a moralistic view of liquor consumption that was preserved by the incremental approach to policy change, Frost committed his
administration to preserving and even enhancing the control mechanisms handed down to him from Drew.

The striking feature of the Frost era was the absence of any real change in liquor policy. Campbell reached a similar conclusion for British Columbia under the Social Credit government of W.A.C. Bennett. Like Frost, Bennett held strong temperance beliefs that prevented him from making alcohol more easily available. Over the same era British Columbia also witnessed a strong-willed and authoritarian counterpart to Licence Board Chairman Judge Robb, who favoured the status quo and closely controlled the still-controversial area of public drinking. As public tastes began to expand faster than the traditional incremental approach to change could satisfy, Frost found himself and his government under constant fire to liberalise access to alcohol. A divided and often unimpressive Opposition protected Frost from severe political consequences from his adherence to the status quo. Instead, he valued the cautious approach in preserving his power, a lesson he gleaned from Drew's personal political defeat.

By the 1960s the public's displeasure with liquor laws formed a constant backdrop to the turmoil of that decade. Robarts continued his party's traditional respect for the province's dominant political culture by delivering timely reform only when an overwhelming majority of society demonstrated its support. A more determined Opposition and a restless electorate encouraged his liberalisation efforts. Furthermore, the public's heightened demands coincided with sustained press attacks on the merits of government control itself. Coupled with privatisation threats in the form of grocery sale of beer, these attacks encouraged customer service initiatives, including a significant shift away from moral control with Sunday sale and self-serve stores. This shift culminated in Davis' placement of the LCBO and the LLBO under the new Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations.

Ontario Premiers after Ferguson followed his example by controlling and directing a policy issue known for its controversial and divisive nature, with a minimum of political upheaval. While these leaders overwhelmingly chose a cautious and incremental manner of shifting liquor policy away from paternalistic and moral control towards an approach balanced between service and public health, the results proved dramatic. Few contemporaries could perceive the significant evolution that had occurred
over a 45-year period since the pace of change advanced slowly and sometimes reversed course to adopt stricter moral regulation. In 1972 a Toronto Life Magazine columnist bemoaned how little progress he saw in Ontario liquor laws since Prohibition. Clearly this observation resulted from the press' traditional tendency to focus on controversy rather than undertake a long-term perspective on policy. Nevertheless, as Lindblom argued, incremental changes accumulated over time.

Ontarians in 1972 enjoyed greater freedoms in their choices surrounding the purchasing of alcoholic beverages and when, where, with whom, and under what circumstances to consume those beverages than anyone would have imagined in 1927, and more than in many American jurisdictions, where Ontarians had earlier looked with envy. Where the original Liquor Control Act embodied what Ferguson believed to be the generally accepted values of the day, so too did the laws, regulations and policies that the Boards functioned under in 1972 in the context of the new Ministry. In the interim, successive governments removed layers of moral control that valued the permit booklet as an overt attempt at community surveillance, that regulated consumption behaviour between friends in a private residence, that implied public drinking on Sundays and election days was immoral, and that divided men and women in public houses for fear of sexual improprieties between consenting adults. These moral controls and others represented the beliefs and values of lawmakers and many Ontarians at the time they were instituted. As society began to vehemently question the appropriateness of these controls in the post-war period, particularly in the context of a self-consciously 'modern' province, policymakers struggled to accommodate shifting social values within the context of government control. Unsure of the consequences of abandoning the moral controls that had remained such a significant aspect of the system, the government moved cautiously. While the business and customer service goals of government control functioned consistently from the beginning, the government steadfastly refused to make market forces the sole guiding force over liquor availability. Instead, it manoeuvred warily, adopting new service initiatives and slowly substituting moral and paternalistic controls with the promotion of healthy consumption choices in an environment of personal responsibility.
As the government slowly relinquished moral and paternalistic control over alcohol availability, alcohol sales and therefore LCBO profits steadily increased. At the same time, the relative significance of these profits to the provincial treasury steadily decreased as Table 31 illustrates. Clearly, social, economic and political circumstances fostered increased consumption, particularly in the post-war years. At the same time, liquor profits were becoming less important to provincial revenues. The reasons for this have much more to do with the overall growth and diversification of the provincial economy, the complex tax system and the beneficial financial arrangements with the federal government negotiated after World War Two, than they do with liquor sales. Nevertheless, this graph is important for two reasons. With the exception of an immediate post-war spike in the proportion of provincial revenues made up by LCBO profits, undoubtedly influenced by the pent up consumer demand and the end of rationing, LCBO profits paid to the treasury as a percentage of overall provincial net ordinary revenue declined steadily from 13% in the first full year of government control to less than 5% by the end of the period. Interestingly, British Columbia revealed a strikingly similar trend with its liquor revenues as a percentage of net general
revenue falling from 13.8% in its first year of government control to 4.6% in 1970.\textsuperscript{10} While each province experienced the transition away from Prohibition towards more consumer-driven service in distinct ways, the similarity in the relative importance of liquor profits points to some common influences on drinking patterns and provincial growth across Canada during this period. If LCBO revenues had ceased to be very significant for the provincial government by the early 1970s, why was government control preserved? While these revenues proved important over the course of the first 45 years of government control, their decreased significance illustrates that reasons other than profits continued to encourage the preservation of the system. As we have seen, government control was a valuable patronage tool. It allowed the government to control as well as to appease the powerful alcohol producers. Most importantly, the system continued to satisfy the government’s long-held belief in the state’s responsibility to restrict market forces in order to protect society from potentially dangerous products like alcohol.

Despite the strength and the endurance of calls for elements of private alcohol sale, Ontario arrived at this balanced system of liquor control by maintaining many of the key foundations for government control established in 1927. In the late 1980s, British Columbia on the other hand, permitted the sale of liquor from private retailers attached to licenced premises.\textsuperscript{11} In 1993 Alberta privatised its entire liquor store operation while several provinces permit the sale of beer and wines by local grocers and convenience stores. Ontario instead remained committed to one of the original assumptions behind government control: that government has a responsibility to regulate and control the sale and consumption of a dangerous substance like alcohol. As Ellen Dolour France argued in her study of the development of the LLBO, even after the removal of significant regulations, government control endured as an important feature of Ontario’s liquor laws. Government continued to control and regulate public sale and consumption of alcohol as an expression of the state’s role as guardian of its people.\textsuperscript{12} While policymakers initially framed the controls to protect Ontarians from a perceived moral danger, by the early 1970s these controls predominantly concerned themselves with threats to public health and the most vulnerable in society. Instead of making alcohol difficult for everyone to obtain, as had been the case for the preceding decades, the government slowly retreated from such controls as the permit and the ban on
Sunday sale, for example, and instead focused primarily on protecting youth and alcoholics by controlling price levels, hours and employee training. Policymakers concluded that the government and not the private sector would best achieve these goals while still serving the wider society effectively and efficiently. This evolution occurred over a 45-year period as Ontario balanced what was inherently unbalanceable, according to the province's desire for order, stability and deference for authority.

Ferguson's initial reason for championing government control was to achieve control over not only the actual retail of beverage alcohol but control over the political debates on the divisive issue and over the symbolic image of the liquor trade. To abandon government control would necessitate the ascendancy of an even more powerful and persuasive symbol.\textsuperscript{13} The tremendous social upheaval of the 1960s, the waves of European immigrants and the free-market rhetoric of consumer-driven post-war society, proved unequal to the task of reversing a policy with deep roots in the province. His successors succeeded in managing the controversial political issue in order to achieve balance between control and service in keeping with their interpretation of dominant social values.
Notes to Conclusion


2 Robert A. Campbell, Demon Rum or Easy Money: Government Control of Liquor in British Columbia From Prohibition to Privatisation (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991), pp. 81, 120.


4 Campbell, Demon Rum, pp. 47-49.

5 Campbell, Demon Rum, pp. 60-61.


7 Campbell, Demon Rum, p. 192.


9 Lindblom, 1979, p. 521.

10 Campbell, Demon Rum, p. 201.

11 Campbell, Demon Rum, p. 176.


13 Alberta's Ralph Klein, some have argued, achieved this task in 1993. See Dean Neu, Duncan Green and Alison Taylor, "Privatising the ALCB: Ideology and Symbolism or Efficiency and Equity?" Policy Options, 18, no. 3 (1997), pp. 28-31.
## APPENDIX 1

### Important Government Control Personnel 1927-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LCBO COMMISSIONERS</th>
<th>APPOINTMENT DATE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Blythe Hanna</td>
<td>April 5, 1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sir Henry Drayton</td>
<td>April 24, 1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewart McClenaghan</td>
<td>April 27, 1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmond G. Odette</td>
<td>July 11, 1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. A. St. Clair Gordon</td>
<td>April 29, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Trevelyn Goggin</td>
<td>February 18, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. William Gourley Webster</td>
<td>January 3, 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. W. Griesinger</td>
<td>May 6, 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. G.A. Welsh</td>
<td>May 5, 1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Wm. Henry Collings</td>
<td>January 20, 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Allan Grossman</td>
<td>November 9, 1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Harry Sheppard</td>
<td>August 30, 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General George Kitching</td>
<td>December 1, 1970</td>
</tr>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>LLBO CHAIRMEN</th>
<th>APPOINTMENT DATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judge Walter Robb</td>
<td>October 28, 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James P. Mackey</td>
<td>August 31, 1970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>LCBO COMPTROLLERS (AFTER 1962 GENERAL MANAGERS)</th>
<th>APPOINTMENT DATE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J.A. McGeachie</td>
<td>1927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier J.G. Spragge</td>
<td>March 31, 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.S. Abra</td>
<td>April 1, 1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2

Reporting Relationships Between LCBO and Cabinet
1927-1972

1927-1934
Chief Commissioner ——— Attorney General ———— Cabinet
| Commissioners
| Comptroller

(H. Price)

1934-1943
Chief Commissioner ——— Treasurer ———— Cabinet
(Minister Without Portfolio)
(M. Hepburn)
| Comptroller

1943-1946
Chief Commissioner ——— Attorney General ———— Cabinet
| Comptroller

(L. Blackwell)

1946-1949
Chief Commissioner (as Minister without Portfolio) ———— Cabinet
| Comptroller

1949-1955
Chief Commissioner (as Provincial Secretary) ———— Cabinet
| Comptroller
1955-1958

Chief Commissioner ——— Provincial Secretary ———— Cabinet

(W. Nickel, 1955)
(G. Dunbar, 1955-58)

Comptroller

1958-1960

Chief Commissioner ——— Attorney General ———— Cabinet

(K. Roberts)

Comptroller

1960-1961

Chief Commissioner ——— Provincial Secretary ———— Cabinet

(J. Yaremko)

Comptroller

1961-1963

Chief Commissioner (as Minister without Portfolio) ———— Cabinet

Comptroller (after 1962 General Manager)

1963-1972

Chief Commissioner ——— Provincial Secretary ———— Cabinet

(J. Yaremko to 1966)
(R. Welch 1966-71)
(J. Yaremko 1971-72)

General Manager

1972

Chief Commissioner ——— Consumer and Commercial Relations — Cabinet

(J. Clement)
APPENDIX 3

Reporting Relationships Between LLBO and Cabinet 1944-1972

1944-1949
(From 1944-46 called LACB)
Chairman — Attorney General — Cabinet
   (L. Blackwell)

1949-1958
Chairman — Provincial Secretary — Cabinet
   (G.A. Welsh 1949-55)
   (W. Nickel 1955)
   (G. Dunbar 1955-1958)

1958-60
Chairman — Attorney General — Cabinet
   (K. Roberts 1958-60)

1960-1972
Chairman — Provincial Secretary — Cabinet
   (J. Yaremko 1960-66)
   (R. Welch 1966-71)
   (J. Yaremko 1971-72)

1972
Chairman — Consumer and Commercial Relations — Cabinet
   (J. Clement)
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