Ministering Angels:

Discursive Representations of Women in Unofficial

War Propaganda, 1914-1918

by

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A Thesis

presented to the University of Waterloo

in fulfilment of the

thesis requirement for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

English

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 1999

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Abstract

This study examines the war propaganda directed at women during the First World War in a weekly paper for women, *The Family Journal*, published by The Amalgamated Press. I begin with the premise, proposed by Jacques Ellul, that propaganda is not a single entity but is rather a multifaceted, “sociological phenomenon.” Ellul distinguishes two basic types of propaganda, the propaganda of agitation and the propaganda of integration. Agitation propaganda functions as a call to action, while integration propaganda functions to acculturate individuals into their society. To understand the propaganda process, we need to examine its various facets, cultural, rhetorical, and linguistic. To do so I draw on the social theory Pierre Bourdieu, the rhetorical theory of Kenneth Burke, and the language theory of M.A.K. Halliday. Chapter One examines various theories of propaganda, particularly those of Ellul, and looks briefly at the history of the woman’s magazine to see how war propaganda mobilized resources already in place in the woman’s magazine. Epideictic is the structuring “meta-genre” for both integration propaganda and the woman’s magazine; because of this generic link, war propaganda can move easily into that medium. Chapter Two provides an overview of the theoretical perspectives of Bourdieu, Burke, and Halliday, and indicates how their theories augment those of Ellul and provide contextual and textual frameworks for examining actual instances of propaganda. Chapter Three discusses the resources that create consensus. Mythologies of the war, the combatants, and the women they are fighting for, the authority of the columnists and the ethos they create, and the familiar “modes of address” adopted by the paper, all serve to naturalize, and are naturalized by, the language of the magazines. Chapter Four discusses the ways in which hierarchies, created by the
discriminations we make through language, create enough tension and anxiety to move people to act, and simultaneously, offer ways of mitigating that anxiety. The Conclusion points to ways in which this integration of theoretical perspectives can be applied to a contemporary instance of propaganda.
Acknowledgements

I owe thanks to many people who helped me through every stage of this project.

Professor Brenda Cantar offered encouragement and help in the initial stages. My committee members, Professors Glenn Stillar, David Goodwin, and Catherine Schryer, helped me “through the war” with constructive criticism and advice; their careful and astute reading helped me to clarify my arguments. Professor Schryer, as my supervisor, always made sure I saw the “forest” and not just the interesting “trees.” I could not have completed this dissertation without the support, love, and good humour of my family, Marlin, Noel, Bryn, and, always, Mom.
Dedication

Dedicated to my father, William Norman Meikle, who couldn’t wait to see it completed.
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Introduction

When I was pregnant with my second child, my brother gave me a copy of Vera Brittain’s *Testament of Youth* for my birthday. The pregnancy was difficult, and perhaps it was the wrong time to read a book about the anguish of women who saw the young men in their lives, sons, husbands, fiancés, and brothers, leave for the front and not return. Even though I was separated in time from these people by seventy years, I was haunted by the sense of “impotent grief” (273) that the book so poignantly develops. As Brittain sat in church on Easter Sunday, 1916, four months after the death of her fiancé, she glanced at a picture of Hagar in the desert, and mused that Hagar was merely a human being without omnipotence, and a woman too, at the mercy, as were all women to-day, of an agonising, ruthless fate which it seemed she could do nothing to restrain. “Watchman, will the night soon pass?” ran the inscription under the painting, and I wondered how many women in the Cathedral that morning, numbed by blow after blow, were asking the self-same question. (264)

As the mother of a young son, I wondered how I would have faced those numbing blows.

Nine years later, when I entered the Ph.D. programme, I intended to continue my exploration of the poetry of Shelley. But *Testament of Youth* had so affected me that I could not quite leave The Great War behind. I thought I could perhaps satisfy the need created by the book by examining for a professional writing course some primary, archival resources on women’s attitudes to the war. I virtually stumbled on a treasure
trove of primary sources in the university’s collection of British women’s periodicals; this discovery, however, only served to intensify the need. In a course in contemporary rhetorical theory I was introduced to the work of Kenneth Burke, and when I began to apply his theories to the texts I had discovered, I knew that I would have to pursue the topic.

To collect the texts I have used in this study, I had to make my own selections and deflections. I selected *The Family Journal* because it was well established before the war and continued to be published long after; I could assume, then that it had an established readership. I began by selecting texts from each issue of *The Family Journal* for the war years that brought together both women and the war, but found that I needed to go beyond those boundaries to include broader considerations of gender and gender roles because they were ultimately affected by the exigency of war. The main sources for my collection of texts were the major columnists of *The Family Journal*, in part because they all give advice and editorialize, in part because their columns appear regularly and I could trace patterns over the four-year period. Their columns physically comprise only a part of the paper; the paper itself consists of very short fiction, longer, serialized fiction, recipes, household hints, dressmaking and knitting patterns, advertisements, games, contests, children’s pages, sheet music, short “tit-bits” of information, and poetry. However, the presence of the these columnists as personalities and the regularity of their columns makes their impact much more powerful than that of the miscellany. As I made my selections and deflections, I was aware that I was a very different reader than the women who would have read the paper at the time of the war; I was reading from a very different perspective in time and space; I was reading for
different reasons; I was transcribing as I read so that I could reproduce the texts, thus negating the ephemeral quality of the periodical. All these differences make me an "outside" reader. However, interpretation may require what Mikhail Bakhtin calls "outsideness" which creates a dialogic encounter between two cultures:

In the realm of culture, outsideness is a most powerful factor in understanding. It is only in the eyes of another culture that foreign culture reveals itself fully and profoundly (but not maximally fully, because there will be cultures that see and understand even more). A meaning only reveals its depths once it has encountered and come into contact with another, foreign meaning; they engage in a kind of dialogue, which surmounts the closedness and one-sidedness of these particular meanings, these cultures. *(Speech Genres 7)*

The things which one culture takes for granted and which become invisible in it may be more readily apparent to another.

The texts I had discovered, however, unlike Brittain’s memoir, did not express what women thought about the war, but instead represented an intriguing rhetorical situation; the texts purported to tell women what they should think about the war. As such, they were clearly propagandistic. It is a commonplace that official government censorship affected what the civilian population knew about the war, and a commonplace that ideas about the war held by both civilians and combatants, particularly early in the war, were imbued with the heroic ideals fostered by Victorian medievalism. But I was curious to discover what factors held these romanticized visions of the war in place.
The aftermath of the First World War drew attention to the powerful potential of propaganda (Jowett and O’Donnell 124-5), but most studies have concentrated on the official war propaganda as it occurred in posters and pamphlets (Buitenhuis; Haste; Sanders and Taylor; Culleton; Jowett and O’Donnell). This study looks at the insidious unofficial propaganda in one women’s periodical, *The Family Journal*, published by The Amalgamated Press. The unofficial propaganda in these “everyday texts” affected women week in and week out during the war. As Glenn Stillar says, “Everyday texts are, by definition, quotidian, yet this does not make them trivial. Because they both reflect and shape our attitudes toward our worlds and one another, the consequences that attend everyday texts are serious, complex, and often far-reaching” (195).

During the war, the British government mostly left homefront propaganda to the popular press which was only too eager to take up the cause of the war effort (Haste 22). In his fulsome history of the Amalgamated Press, George Dilnot says, “It would be difficult to over-estimate the part played by its journals in recruiting and the War Bonds campaign alone. As an instrument of publicity it [the Amalgamated Press] held unique advantages, not only by its overwhelming circulations, but by the ultimate hold of its journals upon all classes of the population” (44). Dilnot claims that the press had devoted “any and every method which keen and resourceful brains could devise” to the cause of the Allies: “Most obvious of these,” he proudly proclaims, “was propaganda in various directions” (44).

One of those “directions” was to women. In the first “total war” in history, attention had to be paid to the homefront, to women who suddenly found themselves in unfamiliar, and often contradictory, roles. Traditionally, women’s duty was
circumscribed by the domestic, the private concerns of family; now, women's duty was being redefined in terms of the political. As Claire Tylee points out, "part of the British Government's Great War propaganda campaign was designed to make both men and women believe that women in general supported the government's war aims and 'sacrificed' men gladly" ("Maleness Run Riot" 209). Yet women had to remain "women"; they had to represent home, so that men knew what it was they were fighting for. Propaganda sought to "mobilize people to unaccustomed roles" (Higonnet et al. 5); simultaneously, it needed to reinforce their customary roles. Propaganda had to negotiate the contradictions between these roles, and women's magazines provided a ready-made vehicle through which these negotiations could be disseminated.

Britain's Testament of Youth is in part a testament to the power of English propaganda; it is an attempt to warn the next generation, who were facing the spectre of another world war, not to be fooled by propaganda (Layton 78). We cannot assume, however, that Brittain and her contemporaries were any less clever than we are, any more easily duped. Instead we need to look closely at the texts they read, to "theorise both the activity of [the] social reader, a knowing and aware subject, and the complexity of the range of texts and discourses which constitute the social world [she inhabited]" (Ballaster et al. 4-5). We need, in other words, to look at the process of propaganda to ask, not, "'Who would have believed that?'" (Jowett and O'Donnell 157), but rather, "Why were these texts able to work so effectively? What are the resources that propaganda draws on to make the slogans and aphorisms so effective?" We need to look, as Pierre Bourdieu suggests, at "what creates the power of the words and slogans,"
at the ways in which words and the people who utter them become endowed with the legitimacy that makes them believable (Language and Symbolic Power 170).

Ellul argues that propaganda is not a single entity, but rather is a multifaceted phenomenon (Propaganda vi). From Ellul’s basic assumption of the plural nature of propaganda, and from his contention that propaganda is a “sociological phenomenon” (Propaganda 121), we can extrapolate the sense that propaganda is a process rather than an entity (Jowett and O’Donnell 263). We need to examine the various aspects of this process—cultural, rhetorical, and linguistic—if we are to come to an understanding of how it operates. Ellul’s examination of propaganda provides an intriguing starting point for an examination of the process; he distinguishes between two essential kinds of propaganda, “agitation propaganda” and “integration propaganda.” Agitation propaganda is essentially a call to action, while integration propaganda sets the stage for, enables, that call to action. Integration propaganda provides stability, out of which agitation propaganda periodically erupts. Because integration propaganda aims at “stabilizing the social body, at unifying and reinforcing it,” it is “a long-term propaganda” (Propaganda 75), while agitation propaganda is short term. Textually, agitation propaganda is of short duration because it very often takes the form of imperative slogans, which appear particularly at times of crisis. Early in the war, these slogans were meant to keep up homefront morale: “Be brave, band yourselves together, don’t listen to or repeat scare stories” (The Family Journal Sept. 5, 1914: 527) By 1917, when rationing, food shortages, and general war weariness were wearing down the civilian population, the slogans became more pragmatic: “WOMEN OF BRITAIN! YOU CAN HELP TO SAVE YOUR COUNTRY BY SAVING BREAD.” Your larder is
YOUR TRENCH—DEFEND IT” (June 2, 1917: 87). Integration propaganda is required to make these slogans make sense, to make them effective.

Ellul’s discussion, however, does not provide a model for analysis or critique of specific instances of propaganda but rather tends to make broad and general statements. My study offers a way of looking at the workings of language in a particular instance of propaganda. Drawing on the inventories of social theory, rhetorical and genre theory, and discourse analysis, my study provides a detailed reading of the language of the texts from *The Family Journal*. Primary and secondary historical texts provide some sense of the context in which these weekly papers existed.

Propaganda acts centripetally to draw disparate positions into a central one. It can do so by mobilizing the resources of the epideictic genre, one of the classical genres of oratory, because “[f]rom antiquity to the twentieth century, epideictic has been seen as a rhetoric of identification and conformity, whose function is to confirm and promote adherence to the commonly held values of a community with the goal of sustaining that community; [. . . ] epideictic rhetoric can be seen as both beginning and ending in agreement” (Sheard 766). Epideictic has splintered into a myriad forms between antiquity and the twentieth century, including both women’s magazines and integration propaganda; because of this generic link, women’s magazines provide a ready-made vehicle for the dissemination of war propaganda.

However, even though propaganda works centripetally, it is nonetheless always aware of the centrifugal forces that threaten the centrality it seeks and which act as a goad to encourage centripetal action. Bakhtin recognizes centripetal forces in both language and culture as those which effect homogenization and hierarchy, and
centrifugal forces as those which promote dispersal and decentering (**The Dialogic Imagination** 425). Bakhtin sees these forces operating in a “both/and” relationship; centripetal forces are necessary in order to shape what would otherwise be chaos, while centrifugal forces are creative and allow for adaptation and change. For propaganda to be effective, however, this centripetal impulse to centralize, “to make things cohere,” (Holquist, Introduction **The Dialogic Imagination** xviii), must appear to be the stronger of the two; creating this sense of strength in unity, then, is a significant function of propaganda. To perform this centripetal action, the propaganda in these texts draws on two very broad resources, consensus and hierarchy, which themselves then draw on a number of resources of their own.

The first of these two broadly defined resources of propaganda is a sense of consensus. “Consensus assumes that, for a given grouping of people, it is a matter of fact that the interests of the whole population are undivided, held in common; and that the whole population acknowledges this ‘fact’ by subscribing to a certain set of beliefs” (Fowler 49). Consensus formation needs to build on a “framework of ‘what everyone agrees’ to” (Hall 87); however, consensus is not automatically achieved or attained; it cannot be assumed and the sense that consensus occurs naturally must be created through the discourse itself. The texts must engage in the “dialectical process of the ‘production of consent’—shaping the consensus while reflecting it” (Hall 87). It is imperative that these texts from **The Family Journal** create a sense of consensus, which they can then use as the moral authority for their position. Through this process of “the ‘production of consent,’” epideictic operates as a “force for change” (Sheard 777), rather than simply in its more customary role of reinforcing commonly held values. By
incorporating centrifugal elements while reinforcing commonly held values, epideictic allows propaganda to negotiate the contradictions that arise when women are required to take on new roles while retaining their customary ones.

The second resource for propaganda in these texts is hierarchy, which, paradoxically, acts centripetally by creating divisions. The texts clearly distinguish between the “front” and the “homefront,” with the needs of the front taking precedence. The valuing of front over homefront, therefore, is essential to the propaganda: propaganda needs to create enough anxiety and tension to goad people into action, but not so much to create demoralization (Ellul, Propaganda 188). A hierarchy of kind, which compares women to combatants, creates anxiety and tension for women; because they cannot make the “ultimate” sacrifice, their patriotism is necessarily inferior. However, because men are making the ultimate sacrifice for them, women have to perform their own wartime duties well in order to be worthy of the sacrifice. In this case, the papers offer women advice on how to be “good women” in wartime, thereby setting up hierarchies of degree which can act to mitigate the demoralizing effects of hierarchy of kind.

Chapter One provides an overview of theories of propaganda, particularly those of Jacques Ellul, then looks at the historical factors that allowed women’s magazines to become vehicles of integration propaganda. At the base of Ellul’s theories about modern propaganda is the concept of the mass society and the place of the individual within that society: “modern propaganda reaches individuals enclosed in the mass and as participants in that mass” (Propaganda 6). Konrad Kellen, one of Ellul’s translators, notes that the mass media is one of the vehicles which makes integration propaganda
possible (Introduction Propaganda vi). This being the case, we need to place The Family Journal within the tradition of women’s periodicals, to examine some of the aspects of women’s periodicals generally that could be readily mobilized for war propaganda. Epideictic, as the structuring “meta-genre” of women’s magazines, both assumes and creates consensus; by providing advice for women, the columnists of the magazine become educators who employ epideictic by converting “into universal values [. . . ] that which has acquired a certain standing through social unanimity” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 51). We also need to see how the readers of the periodical form a group, and how the needs of the group sustain the propaganda.

Chapter Two provides an overview of the theory I have used to examine the resources of propaganda. The social theory of Pierre Bourdieu provides a large scale contextual framework which helps to expand Ellul’s idea of propaganda as a “sociological phenomenon” and to understand how, as Ellul contends, the propagandee becomes complicitous in the process. Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical theory, which sees language as symbolic action, argues that language creates division and identification and establishes and sustains hierarchies. His theory bridges both contextual and textual frameworks for viewing the texts. M.A.K. Halliday’s functional grammar provides a vocabulary and a system for textual analysis which allows us to see how texts and language function to create division, identification, and hierarchy.

Chapters Three and Four look specifically at the resources of propaganda, consensus and hierarchy, and at the contextual and textual resources that they in turn draw upon. Chapter Three looks at the assumption and creation of consensus. Contextually, mythologies, which reinforce cherished ideals, play a significant role in
the creation of consensus. These mythologies of the war, the combatants, and the
women they are fighting for, are disseminated by the columnists of *The Family Journal*,
who, as the legitimate spokespersons for the group, create the social realities of being a
woman in wartime. Textually, the "modes of address" (Hall qtd. in Fowler 48) adopted
by the paper also help create consensus; the proverb, the verse, and the short anecdote,
all familiar forms to the reader of the women's magazine, help to naturalize what is
being said.

Chapter Four discusses the workings of hierarchy of both kind and degree. Even
though hierarchies operate centrifugally by creating division and segregation, they
ultimately perform a centripetal function by realizing the epideictic aspects of praise and
blame. Because women in these texts are placed on two different hierarchies, the
hierarchy of kind and the hierarchy of degree, they are simultaneously both blameworthy
and praiseworthy; they inhabit a contradictory place. Hierarchies are created and
sustained by several resources, all of which emphasize difference and division. The way
we classify things, the discriminations we make through language, all contribute to the
hierarchic principle. The negative, a quintessential property of language, is a significant
resource for hierarchy because even its implicit presence can turn "praise" into "faint
praise." Mystery, which maintains divisions and difference, helps produce both the
anxiety that Ellul says is necessary to propaganda, and the expert advice offered to
women to help them become "good women" in wartime.

Dorothy Goldman has said that "[t]he anguish of the trenches, still reverberating
in Western culture, has meant that to pay attention to anything else appears to demean
that suffering" (2). And yet, a large part of the anguish of the trenches was the
combatants' sense of betrayal by a civilian population that was only too eager to repeat
"The Old Lie: Dulce et decorum est / Pro patria mori" (Owen, "Dulce et Decorum Est"
27-8). One of the most haunting aspects of Brittain's autobiographical Testament is her
sense of "the terrible barrier of knowledge by which War cut off the men who possessed
it from the women who, in spite of the love they gave and received, remained in
ignorance" (215). If the civilian population spoke "the language of newspapers," as
Robert Graves contends (188), then it is important to look closely at that language to see
how and why it was able to prevail, to see how it attempted to convince the civilian
population that it is "sweet and fitting to die for one's fatherland," to see how it left
women "in ignorance."

While this study looks closely at propaganda in one particular historical case, it
provides a way of looking at the propaganda process that could be used to analyze
almost any propaganda process. It brings together a theory of propaganda as a
"sociological phenomenon" that is enhanced and augmented by social theory, rhetorical
and genre theory, and language theory. In the study of any case of propaganda we need
to recognize "the propaganda environment" (Darnovsky 1), the social and cultural
context that enables the propaganda and that will be peculiar to each instance; we need
to investigate the rhetorical and linguistic strategies used; and we need to examine the
medium through which the propaganda is conveyed. By providing a reading of one
particular instance of propaganda, my study will begin to allow us to see if the structure
of the propaganda process remains the same, even if the elements vary, whether we are
investigating contemporary war propaganda, the attractions of a consumer society, or the
protest against a proposed development.
Chapter One

"An Instrument of Publicity": Propaganda and the Woman’s Magazine

To examine propaganda directed at women in their weekly papers, we need first to examine propaganda generally. This chapter examines various definitions and characteristics of propaganda, particularly those suggested by Jacques Ellul. Ellul sees propaganda as having many forms which work together both to create and satisfy a need in the propagandee. One of its forms, "the propaganda of integration," is structured by the classical genre of epideictic rhetoric, in that it is a stabilizing and unifying force (Propaganda 75). Because epideictic is also the structuring "meta-genre" of women’s magazines, we need to look briefly at the history of women’s magazines to see how the established patterns and forms of that medium could be mobilized as resources of propaganda. The readers of a particular women’s magazine or paper form a "rhetorical community" (Miller, "Rhetorical Community" 73), one which takes difference and dissent into account. Through epideictic discourse the community’s values are shaped, reflected, and reinforced; genre provides the resources by which epideictic can present those values as "common." By viewing epideictic as the structuring "meta-genre" of women’s magazines in general, and by bringing in Ellul’s ideas about the different types of propaganda, we can see how the propaganda works as a process in these texts.

Propaganda

There are many definitions of propaganda, most of them unsatisfactory in one aspect or another; they are either so vague and general that they can include almost everything, or so specific that much of what we intuitively recognize as propaganda will
not fit. Leonard Doob defines propaganda as "communication, verbal or non-verbal, that attempts to influence the motives, beliefs, ATTITUDES, or actions of one or more persons," but then goes on to say that a "clear-cut definition is not possible or desirable" because the word has come to be used "carelessly as a brand rather than a designation" (374-5). His assessment raises a crucial point that is often mentioned in discussions of propaganda: "propaganda" nearly always has about it a negative sense. What the other side says is "propaganda"; what our side says is "truth." Stanley Cunningham identifies the key concepts in most definitions of propaganda as "intent; the notion of system or organization; affective and epistemic impact; manipulation; and control of behavior" (236), all of which are evident in Garth Jowett's and Victoria O'Donnell's definition: "Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist" (4).

But if we argue that propaganda is "deliberate," then the problem of intentionality arises. How do we trace the source of historical or anonymous propaganda, and what useful information do we find when we get there? As analysts how can we determine the "intent" of the propagandist? Both Roland Barthes in "The Death of the Author" and Michel Foucault in "What is an Author?" question the concept of the "author." Barthes does so by privileging the reader over the author: "a text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, and contestation, but there is one place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, not, as hitherto said, the author" (171). Foucault does so by suggesting that the "author" is a function of discourse, and
he concludes his essay by asking, "What difference does it make who is speaking?" (210). If we cannot even determine "who" is speaking, we cannot pretend to know the intentions of the "author."

Cunningham (233-35) and Marlin (49-50) both discuss a theory that argues for the neutrality of propaganda and that recognizes the need to contextualize it: "Propaganda is not necessarily an evil thing. It can be evaluated within its own context according to the players, the played upon, and its purpose" (Jowett and O'Donnell 271). The neutrality stance, then, asks the analyst to evaluate the purpose. Doob says that a knowledge of propaganda devices "can alert audiences and analysts alike to the issues of truth and falsity or of goodness and badness that otherwise might be evaded" (378). But who then determines "goodness" and "badness," "truth" and "falsity"? The neutrality stance can also lead to the argument that "the ends justify the means," an argument that Jacques Ellul vigorously denies:

There is [. . .] no distinction to be made between the instrument, that would be neutral, and the cause, which would be good or not good. The instrument participates in the cause, and the latter is shaped by the instrument. [. . .] Propaganda, in reality, includes in itself both the "apparatus" and "techniques" of propaganda and the message which is transmitted. ("The Ethics of Propaganda" 162)

R.R.A Marlin provides a useful working definition of propaganda, a definition which he revises and expands as necessary. According to Marlin, propaganda is "the organized attempt through communication to affect belief or action or inculcate attitudes in a large audience in ways that circumvent or suppress an individual's adequately
informed, rational, reflective judgement” (50). Propaganda, he argues, contains deception of some sort, but he goes on to say that the propagandist provides “some false or unexamined premise in the picture of reality in the light of which the propagandee acts” (51; emphasis added). The deception, then, does not have to be considered deliberate. His definition appears to privilege rationality, implying that only that which is subjected to the cold light of rational judgement can be valid, an aspect of propaganda analysis that is quite common. Marlin, however, later discusses the value of emotional appeals, noting that emotional appeals are usually only considered objectionable when the issue is divisive. Appeals to the emotions engender hostility; “when one side sees the other’s as wrong, the emotive appeal is seen to compound the wrong” (54). On the other hand, “if a matter is not in serious dispute [. . .] no great resentment arises when emotive appeals [. . .] are used” (54).

Propaganda often seems to be cast in a negative light because it appeals to emotions. Terence Moran, for example, says that since these messages work on our unconscious rather than on our conscious minds, on our emotions rather than on our intellects, on our tribal rather than our individual attitudes, opinions, and beliefs, they provide fertile soil for those who would sow their seeds of propaganda in the fields of our minds. (183)

This statement valorizes the Cartesian self, a “fully autonomous agent” (Cunningham 241), vulnerable to the wiles of the propagandist through the unconscious and the emotions, yet able to withstand them through the conscious and the rational. It clearly associates the negative, propaganda, with the emotional and the non-rational. Neil
Postman makes a more helpful distinction between “language that says, ‘Believe this,’ and language that says ‘Consider this’” (130), language designed to evoke particular responses. While Postman does say that language that says “Believe this” asks us to respond emotionally, it is not emotion per se that he finds odious but rather the fact that “Believe-this” language offers no choice. The distinction he makes emphasizes the active participation of the audience in questioning, seeking further information, and being curious.

Jacques Ellul takes a radically different approach to propaganda; his intention is not to come up with a definition of propaganda but “to proceed with the analysis of the characteristics of propaganda as an existing sociological phenomenon” (Propaganda xii). Ellul’s conceptualization of propaganda as “sociological” allows us to view propaganda as a process rather than an entity. By viewing propaganda as a “sociological phenomenon,” Ellul eliminates many of the problems plaguing propaganda analysis; he can eliminate the need to assume a deliberate, top-down control, as well as the need for the analyst to try to determine the intentions of the propagandist; he can eliminate the need to determine the ethics of the ends of propaganda; and he can theorize the willing complicity of the propagandee, thus eliminating the need to defend the autonomy of the individual.

Like many other propaganda theorists, Ellul ties propaganda to action, but he does so in a different way; while others suggest that propaganda “manipulate[s] cognitions, and direct[s] behavior” (Jowett and O’Donnell 4), Ellul claims that modern propaganda “seeks [. . .] to obtain an orthopraxy—an action that in itself, and not because of the value judgments of the person who is acting, leads directly to a goal,
which for the individual is not a conscious and intentional objective to be attained, but which is considered thus by the propagandist" (*Propaganda* 27). "Orthopraxy" is the physical equivalent of "orthodoxy"; it is an "action-reflex" which, once engaged, "makes propaganda's effect irreversible" (*Propaganda* 28-29). Most propaganda theorists assume a linear movement from manipulated cognition to controlled behaviour; Ellul reverses the line from action back to thought: "He who acts in obedience to propaganda can never go back. He is now obliged to believe in that propaganda because of his past action" (Propaganda 29). Janice Winship cites the example of "appropriate conduct" that reinforces the ideology of women as "weak and passive"; women and girls "don't" fight in wars, they "don't" excel in certain sports, and they "don't" do physical labour (21). Hers is a good example of the point Ellul is making here; the ideology may not be articulated, but the behaviour says, in essence, "good girls don't do that."

For Ellul, modern propaganda is insidious and operates successfully because of the presence of "both an individualist and a mass society" (*Propaganda* 90). In such a society, the individual is cast adrift from "local" ties, such as those of parish, extended family, and village, and becomes part of the mass society; the individual becomes "the measure of all things, [...] clearly responsible for his own decisions, both personal and social" (*Propaganda* 92). Yet, paradoxically, this "individual enclosed in the mass" (*Propaganda* 6) is the one who is easy prey for propaganda because "the permanent uncertainty, the social mobility, the absence of sociological protection and of traditional frames of reference—all these inevitably provide propaganda with a malleable
environment that can be fed information from the outside and conditioned at will”

(Propaganda 92).³

Many definitions of propaganda imply that propaganda is somehow imposed by a
dominant or powerful source on a reluctant and powerless receiver. Ellul rejects this
idea:

For propaganda to succeed, it must correspond to a need for propaganda
on the individual’s part; […] one cannot reach through propaganda those
who do not need what it offers. […] To understand that propaganda is
not just a deliberate and more or less arbitrary creation by some people in
power is therefore essential. It is strictly a sociological phenomenon, in the
sense that it has roots and reasons in the need of the group that will
sustain it. (Propaganda 121).

Propaganda offers the propagandee ready-made values, a quick and easy morality, and a
sense of self-worth. For it to work, however, Ellul insists that propaganda, at least in
one of its forms, “is not the touch of the magic wand” (Propaganda 17). Many
discussions of propaganda see its function only as that of changing opinions; Ellul
argues that propaganda is used to inculcate ideas, to focus and reinforce them, so that
ultimately people read or listen to the press of their own group and “are constantly
reinforced in their allegiance. They learn more and more that their group is right, that
its actions are justified” (Propaganda 213). Ellul suggests two basic kinds of
propaganda, “the propaganda of integration” and “the propaganda of agitation.”⁴

Agitation propaganda is essentially a call to action; integration propaganda sets the stage
for, enables, the call to action. Integration propaganda provides the background out of
which agitation propaganda periodically erupts. Ellul's "propaganda of integration" "creates convictions and compliance through imperceptible influences" (Propaganda 18), making its effect more palatable, less noticeable, more "natural." Integration propaganda is a stabilizing force, a force for the reinforcement of values, a centripetal force that attempts to draw disparate opinions into a central position. Integration propaganda is, for Ellul, by far the more interesting of the pair that also includes the propaganda of agitation, the more "visible and widespread" and the one that "attracts all the attention" (Propaganda 71). As its name suggests, agitation propaganda is most often a subversive form of propaganda, but is used by governments, for example, to mobilize their nations for war (Propaganda 71). The more subtle processes of integration propaganda, however, employ the resources of education and the mass media. Bertrand Russell describes the propaganda inherent in his education: "When I was young, school books taught that the French were wicked and the Germans virtuous; now they teach the opposite. [...] This is only one of countless ways in which education is designed, not to give true knowledge, but to make people pliable to the will of their masters" (qtd. in Marlin 66, n. 27). Konrad Kellen points out the role of the mass media in the propaganda process in his introduction to Ellul's book: "integration propaganda is needed especially for the technological society to flourish, and its technological means--mass media among them--in turn make integration propaganda possible" (vi).

The techniques of integration propaganda, how it works, the resources it draws on, and the means of presentation, are therefore worth investigating. As Postman says, "[T]he distinction between language that says 'Believe this' and language that says
'Consider this' is, in my opinion, certainly worth making, and especially because the techniques of saying 'Believe this' are so various and sophisticated" (130). Moran adds, "Propaganda may be simple-minded in terms of content but never simple in terms of structure or impact on the receiver" (182). If Ellul is correct in saying that no one likes to "admit to being or consider himself simply a manipulated object" ("The Ethics of Propaganda" 160), then propaganda must do more than merely "achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist" (Jowett and O'Donnell 4); it must somehow justify itself, thereby engendering the willing complicity of the propagandee.

Here the close ties between integration propaganda and ideology become apparent (Burnett 131). If agitation propaganda is a call to action, then integration propaganda sets the stage for that call to action. John Thompson points out that "ideas' do not drift through the social world like clouds in a summer sky, occasionally divulging their contents with a clap of thunder and a flash of light. Rather, ideas circulate in the social world as utterances, as expressions, as words which are spoken or inscribed" (2). Integration propaganda is "a long-term propaganda" because it aims at "stabilizing the social body, at unifying and reinforcing it" (Propaganda 75). Nicholas Burnett defines ideology as "the study of the ways in which meaning serves to sustain or alter relations of domination" (125). Stuart Hall provides perhaps the best brief description,¹⁰ not of what ideology is, but rather of what it does: "This movement--towards the winning of a universal validity and legitimacy for accounts of the world which are partial and particular, and towards the grounding of these particular constructions in the taken-for-grantedness of 'the real'--is indeed the characteristic and defining mechanism of 'the ideological'" (65). Ellul says that integration propaganda's
main function is to make the individual “participate in his society in every way”

(Propaganda 75); integration propaganda produces and is produced by what Marcy
Darnovksy has called “‘the propaganda environment.’” a “pervasive cultural condition
[... which is] the outcome of large-scale social and historical trends” (1).

**Propaganda and the Texts in This Study**

The texts in this study combine the characteristics of both agitation and
integration propaganda in an attempt to make women an integral part of the war effort;
both kinds of propaganda were necessary for successful propaganda. And yet, the
combination of agitation and integration propaganda produces some contradictions. To
be part of the war effort, women had to abandon the personal in favour of the political,
they had to yield up those lives they had traditionally been entrusted to create and
preserve, and they had to do so with courage and bravery, not with womanly tears.
Women had to do their political duty, but they had to stay at home and be women so that
men knew what they are fighting for; they had to be convinced that they were “plucky”
and brave as all British women have ever been, yet they had to be reminded that they
were “the weaker sex” so that men could fight to vindicate their “honour”; they had to
be convinced to do their duty well, but they had to be reminded that their duty could
only be secondary to that of the men who were fighting. In sum, women were thrown
into the contradictory position of being “asked to support the War effort and to
represent the ideal of what was being fought for, while simultaneously [... taking] on
men’s traditional functions” (Goldman 11). It is precisely this conflict between personal
and political duty that women found so debilitating in wartime: “What exhausts women
in wartime is not the strenuous and unfamiliar tasks that fall upon them, nor even the
hourly dread of death of husbands or lovers or brothers or sons; it is the incessant conflict between personal and national claims which wears out their energy and breaks their spirit” (Brittain 422). Ironically, propaganda was needed to negotiate the contradictions that it had set up; it was needed to make women comfortable with their new, contradictory, positions.

The propaganda of agitation is, as Ellul notes, more visible than integration propaganda because it is somewhat frenzied; it tries to stretch energies to the utmost, obtain substantial sacrifices, and induce the individual to bear heavy ordeals. It takes him out of his everyday life, his normal framework, and plunges him into enthusiasm and adventure; it opens to him hitherto unsuspected possibilities, and suggests extraordinary goals that nevertheless seem to him completely within reach. (Propaganda 72)

This frenzy is certainly evident in the exhortations to women to do their duty by sacrificing food, coal, and their loved ones; it is evident in the texts that praise women for taking on men’s work in their absence; and it is evident in the texts that promise a shared glory when the men come home.

Integration propaganda, as Ellul notes, is more subtle, but it, too, is evident in these texts. The propaganda of integration is “a propaganda of conformity,” aimed at adapting “the individual to his everyday life,” and of necessity is long term and self-reproducing (Propaganda 74, 75). At work in integration propaganda are the vestiges of epideictic discourse, the “meta-genre” that seeks adherence to commonly held beliefs and values through the assumption of praise and blame. Epideictic discourse assumes consensus, yet consensus does not exist independently of the discourse; it must be
constructed by the discourse. Understanding how consensus is constructed can help us to understand how propagandees become willing participants in the process of propaganda. Because this study examines the women's magazine specifically as a vehicle for propaganda, it reviews the history of the women's magazine to see how some of its forms and patterns could be utilized for propaganda.

**Women's Magazines**

The periodical written specifically for women emerged late in the seventeenth century with the launch of *The Ladies' Mercury*.¹¹ and flourished in the eighteenth century. Initially, these periodicals were designed for aristocratic women, "ladies" who had the money, the leisure time, and the education to buy, read and contribute to them; while some early periodicals were written by one author, many relied on their readers to provide contributions (Beetham 19), establishing one of the magazine's most characteristic features, a "plurality of voices" (Beetham 20), both male and female. However, despite this multiple authorship, there was nonetheless a singular sense of what the periodical was to do: "across the plurality of voices there was a shared assumption that the project of the magazine was both to address 'the lady' and to define who she was" (Beetham 20-21). This project of defining "the lady" or "the woman" has remained pre-eminent in women's magazines even to the present, and yet the very tenacity of its presence indicates "that the meaning of femininity [. . .] is radically unstable" (Beetham 4) and needs to be continuously defined and bounded. However, "because women's magazines define their readers as 'women' they embody definitions of what it means to be a woman in a culture at any given historical moment" and we can "interpret them as evidence of the discursive constructions of femininity available to and
normative in their period” (Ballaster et al. 45, 46). This tendency to define the individual “in terms of what [she] has in common with others, such as [her] motivations, [her] feelings, or [her] myths” (Ellul, Propaganda 7) is a significant step in the process of integration propaganda, of enclosing the individual in the mass.

By the early nineteenth century, the dual functions of amusement and instruction were well established in women’s magazines. Linking appropriate social behaviour to femininity was a crucial part of the attempt to define femininity; yet it brings out another paradoxical aspect of women’s magazines: “whereas ‘amusement’ assumed this lady already existed and sought to address her pleasure, ‘instruction’ assumed that the reader was not yet the lady she ought to be and sought to make good the lack” (Beetham 24). By mid-century, the aristocratic “lady” was no longer the only targeted audience of women’s periodicals and magazines began to court the middle-class woman. The “ideology of domesticity which successfully related class, gender and nation under the idealisation of ‘feminine’ virtue, was crucial for periodical discourse” (Ballaster et al. 83). Samuel Beeton’s Englishwoman’s Domestic Magazine set the formula for these domestic magazines for the middle-class; it was “[d]edicated to ‘the improvement of the intellect, the cultivation of the morals and the cherishing of domestic virtues’” (qtd. in White 45). Behind this “improvement of the intellect,” however, was “the widespread anxiety about young women’s access to knowledge” which caused the magazines to collapse intellectual stimulation into moral wisdom; because of what “were perceived to be feminine interests [. . . ] everything became grist to the moralising mill” (Beetham 28-29).
By the end of the nineteenth century, several new magazines appeared to fill a growing market niche. Based on the formula of the *Englishwoman's Domestic Magazine*, they catered to lower-middle and working-class women, and adapted middle-class domesticity to them: "the equation of femininity with domesticity had become so pervasive that it could be presented as natural rather than essentially middle class" (Ballaster et. al. 98). For the middle-class woman of the nineteenth century, "domesticity" meant the management of the household. "Home," for the man, was a refuge from work, and therefore a place of leisure, but for the woman it represented work. However, "men's domestic pleasure depended on the illusion that home was maintained without any work other than his. Home, therefore, was both the site of women's work and of the denial of that work" (Ballaster et al. 89). To further complicate the idea of home, middle-class women, as domestic managers, were afforded leisure time to be spent in the home, and so home became for them both the site of leisure and of work (Ballaster et al. 89). This middle-class representation of domesticity migrated into the papers for the working class; home, for the woman who had to work actively in it all day, became both her vocation and her avocation. And her efforts were unpaid: "A wife's wages is her husband's loyalty, his devotion, his smiles, and his love" (*The Family Journal* Feb. 5, 1916: 408).

The periodical for the working class woman became a burgeoning business and one of the significant publishing entrepreneurs was Alfred Harmsworth, later Lord Northcliffe, who in 1891 established the Periodical Publishing Company, the parent of the Amalgamated Press, "for the sole purpose of publishing women's magazines" (White 75).
Harmsworth put magazines specifically for women at the forefront of his publishing business and his major rivals [...] followed him. [...] The category “woman” was itself divided into “mothers,” “girls,” “fashionables,” “women at home,” “ladies” and so on. What united this diversified readership [...] was a femininity defined implicitly in opposition to the New Woman.13

Harmsworth’s positioning of woman “at the heart” of popular reading mobilised the crucial metaphor of domestic femininity within the New Journalism (Beetham 122).

“The New Woman” and “the New Journalism” were mutually implicated at the fin de siècle. “The New Woman” was the term used by journalists to describe the “deviant” female figure who espoused feminist ideals of equality and emancipation (Wynne-Davies 745-6). “The New Journalism” was the term coined by Matthew Arnold to describe the journalism that appealed to a wide audience, including women; its one great fault, according to Arnold, was that it was “‘featherbrained’” (qtd. in Beetham 119). That Northcliffe’s women’s periodicals defined femininity in opposition to the New Woman is no accident. In 1917, fearing he would be killed by Germans as he crossed the ocean to the United States, Northcliffe wrote a letter summarizing his life and accomplishments, cast in a rose-coloured hue; what he says about his family could be taken as a motto for his women’s magazines: “Our family is a united one, with the Mother as the centre” (qtd. in Ferris 203).

Marjorie Ferguson contends that women’s magazines have always rested on “an implicit assumption [...] that a female sex which is at best unconfident, and at worst incompetent, ‘needs’ or ‘wants’ to be instructed, rehearsed or brought up to date
on the arts and skills of femininity” (2). Using a simple formula, comprised, as Cynthia White notes, of “romantic fiction, household hints, cookery and dress-making [. . .] and advice on personal problems, interspersed with tit-bits of news and gossip and introduced with a ‘plain talk’ from the Editor” (88),14 the magazines initiated women into what Ferguson calls “the cult of femininity” (5). This formula of “recipes, patterns, narratives, and models of the self” (Beetham 1) means that magazine “editors and publishers recognise[d] [and positioned] their readers as ‘aspirational,’” aspiring to be something more or better than they were (Ballaster et al. 11). This formula also betrays a paradox inherent in women’s magazines, the paradox that “‘natural’ femininity can be achieved only through hard labour”; women’s magazines “perpetuate this myth of femininity and offer themselves as a solution” (Ballaster et al. 14, 124).

Ferguson’s use of the term “cult” is overwrought with parallels to religious cults and thus implies a ritualized, almost conspiratorial, “regime of sexual repression” (Beetham 2) imposed from above. The magazines do represent themselves as “the place in which women shared with each other the secrets of their femininity” (Beetham 203; emphasis added), and could in that way be considered “cultish.” However, one of the factors that militates most strongly against a “regime of sexual repression” is the very form of the magazine itself. Margaret Beetham argues that the magazine as a “miscellany” (1) is characterized by “radical heterogeneity” in that it lacks “a single authorial voice” and in that readers can “construct their own text from the printed version” (12-13). Several columnists, each with her or his own voice, make up the magazine; they can and do disagree on issues. Even individual columnists may contradict themselves from week to week or from month to month, but the ephemeral
quality of the periodical makes such contradiction acceptable. Readers also have choices in how they read a periodical; they can pick and choose columns, they can skim or read carefully. This empowering form, says Beetham, argues against the idea of ideology as imposed by a dominant group on a subordinate one. While discourse may be “normative,” it is not “monolithic”; readers are “capable of negotiating the complexity of the representations and messages they read” (Ballaster et al. 4). Loyal and regular readers of a magazine, however, are comfortable with their particular periodical, or they would not continue to buy it (Fowler 232); rather than having ideology imposed upon them, they are complicitous in the acceptance of it. However, the prospect of the resisting reader, and the centrifugal elements she represents, must always be addressed. If the role and definition of “woman” were never in question, never “unstable,” then the magazines would not need to continuously redefine “woman.” This need to create a sense of consensus about the “real” and the “natural” that takes the resisting reader into the account becomes a significant part of the propaganda process as the texts use the “natural” and the “real” as points of departure.

While the magazine does not impose a dominant ideology, neither does it merely “reflect” the culture out of which it is produced. “The magazine as ‘text’ interacts with the culture which produced it and which it produces. It is a place where meanings are contested and made. For the way we make sense of our lives as individuals and social groups involves constant negotiations in which there is no single determinant” (Beetham 5). Beetham recognizes that the material aspects of the production of the magazines and the social web of economics and power relations are also implicated in the production of meaning:
These economic, technological and literary or visual formations were caught up also with the social formations and power inequalities of gender, class and nationality. Together these structured but did not determine the way readers and writers used the magazine to make sense of their society and of their lives. (Beetham 5)

The paradox of "natural" femininity as the result of hard work also meant that the "work of femininity" remained secret and cultish because it could not be recognized or acknowledged as "work" "outside the woman's world of 'chat' and 'gossip' without endangering the dominant definition of natural femininity" (Beetham 200), the definition that said, "I think God made girls to be as attractive as possible" (The Family Journal May 8, 1915: 59). The magazines offered a public forum for the creation of a private self, one created for the public—and particularly male—gaze. The "work of femininity" takes on two aspects. On the one hand, women's magazines "discursively [...] locked women more firmly into definitions as objects not subjects of desire. Feminine desire was the desire to be desired (by the man) and it was to create this self that the magazines instructed their readers" (Beetham 200).

Two examples will suffice to show how woman's physical appearance is implicated in domestic harmony: "The majority of women 'go to pieces' after they marry and have children. [...] It does not take more than ten minutes daily to have a simple beauty treatment, and I am sure you waste several times ten minutes in the day. [...] [W]ith management, a woman can keep her looks and her pretty ways, and her dainty home, and her husband's love" (The Family Journal Aug. 4, 1917: 214); and "Always appear fresh and dainty at breakfast. A bedraggled-looking wife at the first
meal of the day has often brought wretchedness to the household” (The Family Journal Aug. 24, 1918: 277). Domestic harmony and happiness require women to be “naturally” beautiful, even at breakfast. It is therefore incumbent on women to maintain their “natural” beauty through good “management.”

On the other hand, women’s magazines recognized the care of home and family as part of the “work of femininity,” and they offered tips and advice on “the practical skills needed to cook, keep a house clean and manage a budget” (Beetham 200), all of which also serve to make a woman desirable to a man. Within the “feminised space” (Beetham 3) of women’s magazines the worlds of work and leisure intersect; in providing domestic tips and recipes, women’s magazines recognize that, in women’s lives, “private time and space are precious, work and leisure merge, activities overlap” (Winship 13). Ballast et al. note that the processes of “defining femininity exclusively in terms of the domestic and strengthening the image of the magazine as ‘conduct manual,’ or guide to feminine existence” are linked (86); Beetham equates femininity with “appropriate social behaviour” (4). The definition of “appropriate social behaviour,” like the attempts to define and impose “taste” in late eighteenth-century rhetoric, is “largely apolitical in theory [but serves] a practical political agenda” (Thomas P. Miller 13). For example, as Winship points out, girls who are brought up to believe in the ideology of women as weak and passive will act accordingly (21); conduct manuals that tell women how to act “accordingly” will necessarily reinscribe the ideology of weak womanhood. The implication of socially acceptable conduct in definitions of self is pithily summed up in the aphorism, “Beauty is as beauty does.”
White omits the war years from her history of women’s magazines, arguing that their content during those years “would be unrepresentative of normal coverage during peace-time” (18). But it is precisely at a time of war, when a nation’s values need to be crystallized, that women’s magazines can be seen to be functioning as “conduct manuals,” telling women both who they are and how they should behave in an unfamiliar time. These two elements—defining women and coding appropriate behaviour—are the foundations for the propaganda in the texts. Integration propaganda defines women, makes them comfortable with their everyday lives by assuring them that cherished notions of “woman” are still true, still appropriate even though they have to be adapted to suit the changes precipitated by war. Integration propaganda takes on the role of epideictic discourse as “an instrument for addressing private and public ‘dis-ease’” (Sheard 766). Advice to women on how to make these adaptations is the role of agitation propaganda. “Propaganda preserves within people outdated structures of feeling and thinking whilst forcing new experiences upon them” (John Berger qtd.in Jowett and O’Donell 222).

**The Amalgamated Press and The Family Journal**

In 1909 The Amalgamated Press, owned by Alfred Harmsworth, bought several new papers, one of which was *The Family Journal*. Its popularity, which George Dilnot notes in his rather romanticized history of The Amalgamated Press (38), is verified by the fact that it continued to be published throughout the war while many other women’s weekly papers, including some from the same “family” of papers did not (White 90). 15 Although *The Family Journal* billed itself as “A Weekly paper for the Household” and although the editor boasted that “a great many” of its readers were men (July 7, 1909:
294), its very purpose, "to promote home happiness" (May 8, 1909: 7), places it in the domestic sphere. White provides a good definition of women's magazines in her study which would include The Family Journal:

For the purposes of the study, a "woman's magazine" is defined as any periodical intended primarily for female consumption, excluding only those journals which are the organs of women's societies, and those which are highly specialised in their content, such as publications dealing with maternity and child care, knitting and needlework. The term "periodical" includes all publications appearing regularly, from weeklies to annuals. (18; emphasis added).

The Family Journal contains some columns specifically for men, such as "Adam Outright's Straight Talks To Men and Boys," and the editor's "Special Message to Fathers." However, women are assumed to be concerned primarily with the family and home, and because the majority of the articles are directed to women, the paper is certainly intended primarily for female consumption. It could even be argued that the columns for men are actually intended for women, to give the pretense of including "the male" perspective, to atone for what one male columnist says is "the fact that woman as a rule knows very little about man" (Sept. 1, 1917: 273; emphasis in original).

From their very inception, women's magazines generally have functioned "as surrogate 'family,' providing an intimate and private space for the discussion of issues" (Ballaster et al. 43); it is certainly no accident, then, that The Family Journal exploits this familial connection. The main columnists are the editor, author of "Fellow- Travellers", "Bridget,"16 who writes "In Woman's Realm", "Y.Z." who
provides advice to the lovelorn in his column “Cupid’s Corner: A Weekly Chat With Sweethearts and Wives”; “Mother” who “conducts” “Our Family Club”; and Old Mrs. Wise whose columns are variously titled but who is portrayed as having a weekly “chat” with her readers. “Fellow- Travellers” serves mainly to introduce readers to the features of the paper, highlighting new stories and articles and announcing contests and offers; “Bridget’s” column provides recipes and tips for homemaking and childcare, but begins each week with a “thought,” a quotation on which “Bridget” can expound; “Y.Z.” offers advice on the love problems encountered by his readers; “Mother’s” column does several things, including answering letters and providing advice, editorializing on issues, and promoting “Our Family Club” which readers of The Family Journal can join; Mrs. Wise’s function is strictly editorial. There is also a “Special Message” to each of Mothers, Fathers, and Children, written initially by the editor but taken over in December 1916 by “The Rev. E.J. Austin, M.A. of Stoke, Newington.”

Not surprisingly, this familial pretense generates a sense of community through an “intimate tone,” a “cosy invocation of a known commonality between ‘we women’” which “enshrine[s] the fiction that any reader of the magazine may become a writer of it” (Ballaster et al. 9, 170). Indeed it is a fiction, even though Beetham maintains that “periodical readers are constantly being invited to become writers” (13). When a reader “writes” in The Family Journal it is usually as someone in need of help and advice, as is the case with “Mother’s” and “Y.Z.’s” correspondents; indeed, the very purpose of the paper is to “INSTRUCT-- AMUSE-- HELP-- AND COMFORT” (May 8, 1909: 7) its readers. At other times, readers’ voices are heard when their voices chime with what has been already established, as this comment by “Y.Z.” on one of his letters indicates:
"So writes my correspondent 'Trooper's Wife,' like the brave and clever girl that she is" (July 1, 1916: 188). The columns all exhibit some of the characteristics of the editorial, particularly those aspects which serve to position writer and reader; since these are regular columnists, the voice is salient, and implies a real person "with strong feelings and opinions"; they offer generic statements which "are inevitably authoritarian [and which] offer the comfort of closure as against the openness of enquiry" (Fowler 210-11). The reader is placed in a contradictory position: the editorial voice assumes authority, which presupposes a power-difference, yet the columns imply conversation and thus solidarity with the audience. The weekly "chats" by Mrs. Wise and "Y.Z." imply not only conversation and dialogue, but also an informality that belies power-difference. The editor suggests solidarity by being a "fellow" traveller, while "Mother" assumes a familial role and "Bridget" writes from within "woman's realm." The editorial and the lay sermon, frequently used by "Bridget" and Mrs. Wise, allow for what Pierre Bourdieu calls "strategies of condescension,"

those strategies by which agents who occupy a higher position in one of the hierarchies of objective space symbolically deny the social distance between themselves and others, a distance which does not thereby cease to exist, thus reaping the profits of the recognition granted to a purely symbolic denegation of distance [...] which implies a recognition of distances. (In Other Words 127)

The columnists can thus share the same social space as their readers while simultaneously rising above it in order to be in an authoritative position to give advice or to mete out praise or blame. Mrs. Wise uses such a strategy of condescension by
including herself in the "we" of this column, while assuming the superiority of one who can see beyond the immediate to potential problems:

We are faced at the present time with a great war. New duties have been given to us, and in the first burst of enthusiasm we have all gone and done these duties well. But now is the time when we need our real courage.

The newness of these duties has worn off. They are becoming common-place, irksome. This is the greatest test of our courage. Can we keep on performing these trying duties? (Sept. 26, 1914: 609).

The Rhetorical Community

Beetham suggests that "the woman's magazine evolved [...] as a 'feminised space.' It was defined by the woman who was at its centre and by its difference from the masculine world of politics and economics" (3). From this ideology of "separate spheres" a paradox arises for women:

The discourse which made femininity the signifier of the true, that is the inner self, [...] made any kind of definition of the self as part of a group other than the biological family, any politics of solidarity, not just marginal to true humanity but actually counter to it. (Beetham 207)

Magazines such as The Family Journal, in their very titles, of course try to capitalize on the idea of family itself. A magazine with a title such as The Family Journal provides women with a group other than the biological family to which to belong, but simultaneously keeps them rooted in that "feminised space" of the domestic, the private, the individual by masquerading as the biological family.
What kind of a “group” identity, then, is offered by the magazines? The idea of a discourse community suggests itself because the texts are the common factor between writer and reader. For John Swales a discourse community is a “sociorhetorical” group, the members of which “link up in order to pursue objectives that are prior to those of socialization and solidarity, even if these latter should consequently occur” (24). Swales’ conception of a discourse community, however, is rather rigid, particularly in his requirement that its members pursue common objectives and that it contain both novice and expert members (27); it is difficult to conceive of the readers of a women’s periodical moving from novice to expert in their field since the field is fluid and doesn’t comply with linear notions of “progress.” The raison d’être of women’s magazines is to give advice and they therefore depend on their readers never becoming “experts”; they depend on the recognition of “dissatisfaction with the social self” and its endless displacement (Beetham 14).

“Discourse community” usually implies equality of access to the “forum,” the “approved channel” through which the members communicate (Porter 38-9); the hierarchy of experts and novices is a hierarchy of degree, not of kind. All members ostensibly are able to speak, even if their discourse is “regulated” by rules (Porter 39). The readers of the texts in this study have no real access to the forum as writers; when their voices are heard, they are taken over by the columnists and subsumed into their texts.17 For example, “Y.Z.” rarely reproduces his correspondents’ letters in their entirety; rather, he paraphrases some parts and may or may not provide brief snippets from the actual letter before he addresses the problem, foregrounding his solution. Yet, even if they are silent, the readers of these texts must be considered part of the
community, as James Porter points out, the very survival of any community depends on knowing what is acceptable, what is valid, and what can be presupposed or taken for granted (43). Readers, even if they are less overtly powerful than writers, can “still accept or resist meanings the writer produces” (Beetham 2) so that the texts actually are dialogic, albeit in a more implicit than explicit way.

Allan Luke suggests that assuming that discourse communities are “benign, consensual social bodies,” with common goals that occur “naturally and unproblematically” (Genre and the New Rhetoric ix) is dangerous. Beetham’s main argument in A Magazine of Her Own? is that the attempt to define femininity is never fully accomplished but rather must be constantly reworked and reinforced; the potentially “transgressive daughter” in fact became the implied reader of the women’s magazine because “the figure of the daughter embodied the possibility of resistance to the construction of femininity as moral management” (Beetham 29). To acknowledge the centrifugal forces of difference, dissent and the “other,” Carolyn Miller proposes the idea of the “rhetorical community,” which is a “virtual entity, a discursive projection, a rhetorical construct. It is the community as invoked, represented, presupposed, or developed in rhetorical discourse” (“Rhetorical Community” 73 ). The “virtual” quality of the rhetorical community also addresses a problem that Amy Devitt notes about discourse communities. Swales and others suggest that the members of a discourse community have a tie that exists prior to membership in the discourse community. Porter, for example, says that a discourse community is “a group of individuals bound by a common interest who communicate through approved channels and whose discourse is regulated” (38-39). He gives examples such as alumni of a university,
employees of a large company, and engineers whose research interests intersect. The "approved channels" through which they communicate he calls "forums" (39). In each case, however, the forum exists because of the association of the individuals. With magazine readership, the community itself is created by the forum; as Devitt says, "rather than looking at human membership to define community, perhaps discourse membership [...] can better define the nature and constitution of a [...] community" (582). It can, of course, be argued that the individual readers are women, and that the forum exists to address their "common interest" as women. That argument, however, ignores the very "fractured" and diverse femininity that the magazines themselves actually represent while assuming that gender is axiomatic (Beetham 1). Moreover, "to read one title over another [...] defines the reader even more closely, as a participant, in the publisher's terms, in one lifestyle rather than another" (Ballaster et al. 29). It is the forum that creates the association, not the prior membership in a group.

Genre

While the centrifugal forces of difference and dissension are essential for the formation of the rhetorical community, Miller recognizes that rhetorical communities need unifying forces as well, and she identifies genre, narrative and figural language as "some centripetal forces that are rhetorically available to keep a virtual community from flying apart" (74). Genre plays a significant part in the operation of the rhetorical community as a way of "marshalling" (75) the other resources; genres are, for Miller, the structures which allow discourse and narrative, "the things that carry ideologies of individuals and communities" (Kress and Threadgold 216), to flourish and change.
Miller’s discussion of structure is influenced by Anthony Giddens’ “structuration theory,” which sees structure as “a virtual order” existing only in its “instantiations in [. . .] practices and as memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents” (qtd. in Miller, “Rhetorical Community” 70). As Wanda Orlikowski and JoAnne Yates have said,

a genre established within a particular community serves as an institutionalized template for social action—an organizing structure—that shapes the ongoing communicative actions of community members through their use of it. Such genre usage, in turn, reinforces that genre as a distinctive and useful organizing structure for the community. (542)

Structure, then, is both enabling and constraining: agents “bring structure into being,” but “structure produces the possibility of agency” (The Giddens Reader 3).

Periodical literature in general, and women’s magazines in particular, however, pose a problem for the genre researcher. Beetham provides an example of the problem in saying that, “as a genre [the periodical . . .] is marked by a radical heterogeneity. It refused, and still refuses, a single authorial voice [. . .]. It also mixes media and genres” (12; emphasis added). Is it the periodical itself that is the genre, or are the articles or columns genres? Even within individual columns there can be traces of more than one genre: Mrs. Wise might relate an anecdote which has the characteristics of the “teaching story” (Kirkwood 60); “Bridget” might present a lay sermon that has the earmarks of the self-help article. Bakhtin resolves this difficulty by proposing both “primary” and “secondary” speech genres. Secondary speech genres are more complex, having “absorb[ed] and digest[ed] various primary (simple) genres” during their formation
("The Problem of Speech Genres" 61-2). However, to accommodate the periodical, the women’s magazine, the various columns, and the multiple influences within even an individual column, it is perhaps most helpful to see the forms that the column take as the resources of genre and to take a very large step backwards to the classical concept of the oratorical genres to find a "meta-genre" large enough to accommodate the "radical heterogeneity" of the periodical; the middle ground can then be the domain of "genre."

Aristotle divided oratory into three genres: the forensic for legal arguments, the deliberative for political arguments, and the epideictic for assigning praise and blame. Deliberative and judicial oratory asked that the audience be a judge of future or past events, while epideictic asked the audience to be a spectator; because the speech itself was the important thing, the time of epideictic is the present, but it can recall past events and look to the future. His categories are perhaps paradoxically both too broad and too specific to be of much use in defining the boundaries of a genre; the lines between the three very readily blur and overlap: "[I]n praising someone, [ceremonial orators] were suggesting, indirectly at least, that the audience go and do likewise; and in thus suggesting a course of action, they were moving over into a realm of deliberative discourse" (Corbett 139). Epideictic itself has been criticized as being a "catch-all" category: "The definition of epideictic has remained a problem in rhetorical theory, since it becomes the category for all forms of discourse that are not specifically deliberative or judicial" (Aristotle ed. Kennedy, 48 n77).

However, current theories of genre, following Carolyn Miller’s article "Genre as Social Action," focus attention on the rhetorical nature of genre, of genre as a way of acting together rather than as a fusty taxonomical tool. The classical theorists tended to
see epideictic oratory as a means of displaying the oratorical prowess of the rhetor—hence its alternative title, "display oratory"—but Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca note that epideictic is significant in that it "strengthens the disposition toward action by increasing adherence to the values it lauds" (50); epideictic, then, is important in laying the groundwork for a call to action. In Kenneth Burke's terms, however, epideictic discourse, in creating an adherence to certain values, itself performs an action, a symbolic action. For Burke, language does more than convey information; language and thought are "modes of action" (Language as Symbolic Action 54). By creating adherence to certain values, epideictic performs the symbolic action of creating identity between the speaker/writer and the audience, and thus performs a community-building function. "A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B"; they become, in that one instance, "consubstantial" (A Rhetoric of Motives 20-21). Rhetoric's main function is "the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents" (A Rhetoric of Motives 41); rhetoric transcends and transforms the division that we experience as individuals. Burke says, "Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity" (A Rhetoric of Motives 22). Burke sees identification as essential to "persuasion," the key term of classical rhetoric:

As for the relation between "identification" and "persuasion": we might well keep in mind that a speaker persuades an audience by the use of stylistic identifications; his act of persuasion may be for the purpose of causing the
audience to identify itself with the speaker’s interests; and the speaker draws
on identification of interests to establish rapport between himself and his
audience. So, there is no chance of our keeping apart the meanings of
persuasion, identification (“consubstantiality”) and communication
(the nature of rhetoric as “addressed”). (A Rhetoric of Motives 46)

Because Aristotle was describing “epideictic only as a species of oratory as he
knew its forms in Greece” (Aristotle ed. Kennedy 77, n.48), it is in some ways too
specific to be used. However, as Catherine Schryer points out, genres are at best only
“stabilized for now”; genres are always subject to change, have “come from somewhere
and are transforming into something else” (“Records” 208). Changes in society, and
changes in technology, mean that genres cannot remain intact forever and the epideictic
“speech” is transformed in a print-dominated society and splintered into a myriad forms,
chiefly the editorial and the various forms it takes. Roger Fowler says that the editorial
has “a concern to highlight the judgemental character of discourse [. . .]. Various
techniques are deployed to make salient the illusion of utterance by an authoritative
speaker, addressing a particular kind of reader embraced in an ‘us’ relationship” (221;
emphasis added). If genre is social action, then what remains of the epideictic speech
as genre is, significantly, what it does; epideictic remains in its role as that which praises
and blames, is judgemental, and that which increases “adherence to the values it lauds”
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 50), creating an “‘us’ relationship.”

Theoretically genres may be separate and separable, but “genres, in use, are
rarely homogenous, [. . .] with particular communicative actions often being
characterized by several generic strategies” (Orlikowski and Yates 544). Epideictic may
be the structuring meta-genre of women’s magazines, but “members of a community rarely depend on a single genre for their communication. Rather, they tend to use multiple, different, and interacting genres over time” (Orlikowski and Yates 542). If genres are the “socially ratified text types in a community” (Kress and Threadgold 216), then identifying and examining the genre sets (Miller, “Rhetorical Community” 70), or “genre repertoire” (Orlikowski and Yates 542) of a community can provide useful clues as to how that community views itself:

Thus it seems we might characterize a culture by its genre set—whether judicial, deliberative, and epidictic, or experimental article, grant proposal, poster, peer review and the like. The genre set represents a system of actions and interactions that have specific social locations and functions as well as repeated recurrent value or function. It adumbrates a relationship between material particulars, instantiations of a genre in individual acts, and systems of values and signification. (Miller, “Rhetorical Community” 70)

Genre, then, provides a good lens through which to view historical texts. The genre sets evident in the texts, the selections made and not made, can illuminate for us the role that genre plays in transmitting ideology and in defending against the centrifugal forces that threaten hegemony.

Epideictic as meta-genre thus serves as a structure through which values can be circulated; the values of the rhetorical community, both positive and negative, are produced and reproduced within it. The genre set on which the community draws provides the resources that allow epideictic as meta-genre to function. In order to gain adherence to common values, indeed, in order to assert those values in the first place as
"common," in order to praise and to blame, epideictic needs the resources of a myriad genres. If a genre is "a socially standard strategy, embodied in a typical form of discourse, that has evolved for responding to a recurring type of rhetorical situation" (Coe and Freedman 137), then a text can borrow those "strategic" features of a genre that meet the needs of the specific situation. For example, William Kirkwood has defined "teaching stories" as "brief, oral narratives told primarily to instruct, guide, or influence listeners, rather than to entertain" (60). Mrs. Wise frequently draws on the strategies of the teaching story in her columns, recognizing the purpose of that genre, "to instruct, guide, or influence listeners," as more significant than its form, although the form--a "brief, oral narrative"--is still important. Formally, several genres overlap in her column (Orlikowski and Yates 544); the column begins as a letter with the salutation, "My dear Friends," but the column itself is called a "chat," indicating conversation, usually taking the form of the anecdote or "natural narrative" (Pratt 44).

The resources of genre, then, are best described as "adjectival" rather than "substantive"; certain features of specific genres are "selected" for the typical patterns they suggest, while other features of the genre are "deflected," to use Burke's terms (Language as Symbolic Action 45). Richard Coe suggests that "[g]eneric structures are prepared ways of responding, frozen in synchronicity. They embody our social memory of standard strategies for responding to types of situations we encounter repeatedly" ("Process Era" 183).

Following Miller's emphasis on genre as "social action," Orlikowski and Yates suggest that "the communicative purpose of a genre is not rooted in a single individual's motive for communicating, but in a purpose that is constructed, recognized,
and reinforced within a community” (543). However, if we take the example of the
conduct manual noted above, we can ask what the “purpose” of the conduct manual is
to the community that uses it, and then ask “what the genre signifies about the
[rhetorical] community that uses it” (Coe and Freedman 139). This type of questioning
leads us to view text not as an isolated thing or event in and of itself, but as an instance
of “discourse,” a site of activity that concerns “the social systems and structures that
bear upon how and what a text can mean to those involved” (Stillar 12). The purpose of
the conduct manual, for example, may ostensibly be to enable the audience to function
socially, but the genre itself implies a power differential which always reinscribes the
audience as inadequate and in need of instruction. Through the generic vestiges of the
conduct manual the discourse of women’s magazines can serve a normative function by
acting as a vehicle of surveillance. Giddens argues that a normative claim may be
binding not because the actor accepts the obligation as a moral commitment but
because he or she anticipates and wants to avoid the sanctions which will be applied
(107). While the sanctions are usually implicit, left to the “common-sense”
understanding of the audience, in the following example the intersection of conduct and
sanctions is stated explicitly:

Economy again! You are urged now to use less gas than you did last year,
and are threatened with penalties if you don’t. Ah well, anything to keep
the country going, and to help our boys to win the war. You are used to
economy now, and becoming an expert in it, so one economy more can
easily be faced. As to the penalty, you will never need to be forced to your
duty by the threat of a fine or even imprisonment. There is another penalty,
and one to be dreaded, and which, please God, you shall never have to pay, and that is the losing of the war and capitulation to the enemy. It is that thought, possibly, which nerves you to do your utmost. You are to be on the winning side, you shall yourself be actually engaged in winning, and since the extraordinary things of economy and contrivance which you are doing are the very things which are winning, you do them with gladness and contentment. (The Family Journal June 15, 1918: 115)

The use of the second person evokes the eerie sense of “I know what you are thinking,” a sense that reinforces the feeling of surveillance, of being watched.

Consensus, Hierarchy, and the Form of the Periodical

This example, with its curious intermingling of present tense and future sense, shows how epideictic provides resources for consensus formation, which is itself a resource for propaganda. The three characteristics of epideictic—the assumption of commonly held values, the assessment of praise and the assessment of blame—resonate with Ellul’s ideas about integration and agitation propaganda. In this example, the reader is being praised for her past economies for the war effort, with the expectation of future praise as she continues to make sacrifices. Because epideictic is both consensus-assuming and consensus-creating, integration propaganda in these texts establishes and reinforces cherished notions of womanhood; Ellul notes that the skilled propagandist must “know the sentiments and opinions, the current tendencies and the stereotypes among the public he is trying to reach” (34). Michelle Weinroth notes that these “idealist visions of society [. . .] are substantiated through an iconography and discursive imagery that is culturally and historically determined by the predisposition of
Agitation propaganda can then exploit these tendencies and stereotypes for its own purposes. “[E]xisting opinion is not to be contradicted, but utilized” (Ellul, *Propaganda* 35): although women’s duties may change with the exigencies of war, the ideals of womanhood have to be reinforced so that there is at least something old and familiar to which to cling. For example, when men are away at the front, the quintessentially feminine “desire to be desired” (Beetham 200) becomes transmuted into “being worthy”: “[W]e women of Britain must show ourselves worthy of [the] reverence and honour which our men have for us” (*The Family Journal* October 10, 1914: 660).

But “worthiness,” unlike desirability, necessarily implies hierarchy because it is premised on the assumption of superiority and indebtedness. In meting out praise and blame, epideictic creates hierarchies. Propaganda tends to strip away “nuances and refinements of detail or doctrine” (Ellul, *Propaganda* 219), so that there is only an “either-or” distinction (Postman 130). In these texts there are simple hierarchies of degree, hierarchies which compare like things, for example women who do their duty and women who do not, and simple hierarchies of kind, hierarchies which compare unlike things, particularly combatants and non-combatants. Hierarchies can be potent resources for propaganda. Propaganda can cause anxiety and tension, and Ellul notes that the propagandist needs to find the “optimum degree of tension and anxiety,” because “anxiety is a double-edged sword. Too much tension can produce panic [and] demoralization […]; too little tension does not push people to act” (*Propaganda* 188). A hierarchy of kind, in which the non-combatant is compared to the combatant, can lead to feelings of inadequacy; when men make the “ultimate” sacrifice, everything else
is necessarily inadequate in comparison. These feelings of inadequacy and
indebtedness, however, are necessary if women are going to be moved to take on new
attitudes, roles and responsibilities: “After all, it is so little that we can do for those dear
boys who have suffered so much” (The Family Journal April 29, 1916: 20). To mitigate
the effects of too much tension, the texts also create a hierarchy of degree, in which the
magazines offer advice on how to be a “good woman” in war-time. Propagandees
“must believe in what they are doing, must put all their heart and their good will into it;
they must also find their equilibrium, their satisfactions, in their actions” (Propaganda
23). In the example quoted above, about economizing and the potential sanctions for
failure to economize, the text tells women that in making these economies they are
personally “engaged in winning” the war, discursively providing them with reasons to
put “all their heart and goodwill into” economizing; that they do so “with gladness and
contentment” simultaneously gives them “satisfaction in their actions.”

The same example also illustrates another important aspect of propaganda
analysis. While the resources of propaganda—consensus formation, and hierarchy, of
both degree and kind—are separable and discrete for the purposes of analysis, in the texts
themselves they are intertwined and their effectiveness depends on this very
interconnection. Doing her duty “with gladness and contentment” is an iconic attribute
of “woman,” whether she is economizing in wartime or attending to her domestic
chores in peacetime. Although women are told that they are “actually engaged in
winning” the war, an earlier sentence suggests the hierarchy of kind that compares
non-combatants to combatants: “Ah well, anything to keep the country going, and to
help our boys to win the war” (emphasis added). Hierarchies of degree are present in
the suggestion of “penalties” for those who do not do their duty and in the verbal phrase “to do your utmost,” suggesting that there are levels of adequacy in being a “good woman.” Even the boundaries and categories of propaganda are not stable and absolute: advice on how to be a good woman in wartime can be seen as both integration propaganda, in that it promotes “adjustment to the environment” (Ellul, Propaganda 188), and agitation propaganda, in that it seeks to “obtain substantial sacrifices, and induce the individual to bear heavy ordeals” (Ellul, Propaganda 72).

The periodical is an appropriate vehicle for propaganda. Propaganda, according to Ellul, places us in “the instantaneous, […] the immediate present” (“The Ethics of Propaganda” 173, 174). We have already seen how the ephemeral nature of the periodical and the ways in which individual readers have control over the reading of it can combine to minimize the otherwise disruptive effects of contradictions. Propaganda itself “dissolves contradictions and restores to man a unitary world in which the demands are in accord with the facts” (Propaganda 159). In other words, propaganda negotiates contradictions by prioritizing for the individual the things that are in conflict. For example, the ideology of domesticity had always assumed that a woman’s place was in the home, yet as the war progressed and it became necessary for women to work in munitions factories and on the land, the propaganda dissolved the contradiction in the term “working woman” by prioritizing the needs of the country over those of the individual. Propaganda “gives man a clear and simple call to action that takes precedence over all else. It permits him to participate in the world around him without being in conflict with it” (159).
The women's magazine provides a ready-made venue for propaganda. Weinroth says that the propagandist “must assert his [or her] singular appeals as if they were authoritatively and objectively true.” He [or she] can do so by appropriation of rhetorical forms which demand assent, expect universal endorsement, and thus exempt him [or her] from the cognitive process of deductive or inductive proof. The propagandist has neither the time nor the space to engage in actual logical demonstrations; he [or she] has only condensed moments in which to foster an air of rational and objective truth.

(35)

The form that required “condensed moments” was in fact already established for the columnists of The Family Journal by the dictates of the New Journalism, which emphasized brevity and “tit-bits” of information rather than extended and in-depth articles. The magazine Tit-Bits, which was on the vanguard of the New Journalism, reputedly got its name as its founder read out “tit-bits” from the newspaper to his wife; such was her pleasure that he decided to create a paper for her consisting only of these little snippets (Beetham 119-24). Small articles, a format that broke the page up into columns, and the use of illustrations (Beetham 124) ensured that each columnist had very little opportunity for sustained argument. It was therefore all the more necessary for the columnists to appropriate “rhetorical forms which demand assent” and “expect universal endorsement” if they were to claim and maintain any kind of authoritative voice.

The British tradition of free speech meant that the government “relied on the patriotic press to counteract [the] pacifist propaganda” which it feared as “potentially
subversive” (Haste 140, 141). However, the government did promote the war through the imposition of censorship and the creation of the Bureau of Propaganda, and “by these means the government strengthened and institutionalised the management of ideas” (Tylee, The Great War 252). Early in the war, particularly, the official government propaganda was directed specifically at neutral countries rather than at the population at large, and the popular press enthusiastically took up the cause of the war. The women’s papers of the Amalgamated Press were no exception; they eagerly seized the opportunity of war and the new social problems it engendered to educate women about who they were and how they should behave in the unfamiliar time of war. The owner of the Amalgamated Press, Lord Northcliffe,22 was himself actively involved in the politics of the war; because of his reputation and influence, “there were few aspects of the war in which he did not involve himself” (Ferris 199). Early in 1918 Northcliffe was made “Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries,” after refusing the newly created post of Air Minister, arguing that a cabinet position would compromise his independence of speech (Ferris 211-16). Northcliffe had risen to success in publishing because “he was endowed to a pre-eminent degree with two of the journalist’s essential qualities: an intense interest in everything that was happening around him and an uncanny prescience of what was likely to attract the public” (Heren 75). His wartime publishing was no different. “He distilled the strange odours of fear, hatred, and love of country that filled the air; interpreting the mood of people before they were aware of it themselves [. . .]. What Northcliffe did [. . .] was to catch the mood and feed it back to the public” (Ferris 196, 217). Ellul claims that the “closure of discourse” operates in modern society by creating a world of images; “the reality lived by the individual or by a group is not
considered true unless represented and broadcast” (“The Role of Persuasion in a Technical Society” 151). Northcliffe’s “distillation” of public mood into images, and his re-presenting of that public mood is certainly a nascent example of what Ellul is talking about.

Northcliffe himself had a “megalomaniac belief in the power and influence of his papers upon public opinion” (Lovelace 317), and this sense of importance and influence is carried through in the obsequious history, The Romance of the Amalgamated Press, written after Northcliffe’s death:

The Amalgamated Press as an entity was less concerned for itself than for the cause of the Allies, and any and every method which keen and resourceful brains could devise was used to this end.

Most obvious of these was propaganda in various directions. It would be difficult to over-estimate the part played by its journals in recruiting and the War Bonds campaign alone. As an instrument of publicity, it held unique advantage not only by its overwhelming circulations, but by the ultimate hold of its journals upon all classes of the population. (44)

But even if Northcliffe “grossly over-estimated” the political influence of his newspapers (Boyce 39), his weekly papers were “more important economically and culturally than the political weeklies” (Lee 124). These “everyday” texts may be ephemeral, as Beetham notes, but in their seeming innocuousness they still “powerfully summon and propagate the social orders in which we live” (Stillar 1); as such their potential as purveyors of propaganda is significant.
Conclusion

Propaganda, then, is a multi-layered process which mobilizes many resources as it works centripetally to draw disparate opinions into a central position. Essentially, Ellul sees two basic types of propaganda, integration propaganda which attempts to acculturate individuals, to make them comfortable and content within their society, and agitation propaganda which “operates inside a crisis or actually provokes the crisis itself” (Ellul, Propaganda 72). The texts in this study exhibit those layers: foundationally, there is a layer of integration propaganda which re-establishes and reconfirms cherished notions of war, the men who fight, and the women they are fighting for; agitation propaganda works as a call to action, through slogans and injunctions which gain their legitimacy through the workings of integration propaganda. The women’s periodical provides a ready-made vehicle for propaganda: the ephemeral nature of the periodical means that the effects of contradictions can be minimized; information is dispensed in tiny increments rather than through long and sustained arguments; and the history and tradition of women’s periodicals naturalize the defining of femininity and the giving of advice.
Chapter Two
“Language as Symbolic Action”: Theoretical Perspectives

If Ellul is correct, if integration propaganda is insidious and ubiquitous, it is difficult, if not impossible, to provide an efficacious critique of it from within the “universe” it encompasses. From without, however, one can make “a very accurate, judicious, and exact moral (or intellectual) critique but one which will never begin to touch any structure erected by propaganda, whether on the psychological or sociological level” (Ellul “The Ethics of Propaganda” 164). However, despite its negative reputation, propaganda is nevertheless language in use, language in a social context; we can begin to “touch” the sociological structures of propaganda by viewing integration propaganda as an instance of the meta-genre of epideictic, by seeing that it employs certain strategies to create a sense of consensus and to create and sustain hierarchies. Ellul’s ideas about propaganda can be expanded to reveal some of the structures erected by propaganda by integrating the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu, the rhetorical theory of Kenneth Burke, and the language theory of M.A.K. Halliday. Bourdieu’s social theory allows us to investigate the orders that structure the social world, the social contexts for language use; Burke’s rhetorical theory allows us to investigate language as symbolic action, language as a symbol system through which we “construct a world of experience and orientation” (Stillar 61); Halliday’s functional grammar allows us to investigate how texts and the linguistic choices made work to “construct the world of experience and orientation.” Throughout this chapter I will use the text about economy quoted above
(46-47) to illustrate how these theories work.

The Social Theory of Pierre Bourdieu

Ellul insists that propaganda is a sociological phenomenon, not "the deliberate and more or less arbitrary creation by some people in power" (Propaganda 121). We can theorize this sociological phenomenon which is not a deliberate creation through what Bourdieu calls "constructivist structuralism or [. . .] structuralist constructivism":

By structuralism, or structuralist, I mean that there exist, within the social world itself and not only within symbolic systems (language, myths, etc.), objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representations. By constructivism, I mean that there is a twofold social genesis, on the one hand of the schemata of perception, thought, and action which are constitutive of what I call habitus, and on the other hand of social structures, and particularly of what I call fields and of groups, notably those we ordinarily call social classes. (In Other Words 122)

Bourdieu, like Giddens, proposes a "dialectical relationship between structure and agency" (Harker et al. 3), a reciprocal operation which privileges neither the structure nor the agent but rather which sees them working in tandem. Bourdieu argues that "the proper object of social science [. . .] is neither the individual [. . .] nor groups [. . .] but the relation between two realizations of historical action, in bodies and in things" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 126). Bourdieu has called the two parts of this dialectical relationship "field" and "habitus."
A "field" is "a socially structured space in which agents struggle, depending on the position they occupy in that space, either to change or to preserve its boundaries and form" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 17). Bourdieu cautiously allows the comparison between a field and a game, although a field is not deliberately created and the "rules" which govern it, which Bourdieu prefers to call "regularities," are not "explicit and codified" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 98). A game is structured by the rules, the way players are positioned, and the moves they are allowed to make, yet a game is also structuring in that its structure is "capable of generating sequences of actions [and] outcomes" (Stillar 100); it both enables and constrains the players. Continuing the analogy of the game, Bourdieu elaborates: "Nothing is simultaneously freer and more constrained than the action of the good player. He quite naturally materializes at just the place the ball is about to fall, as if the ball were in command of him—but by that very fact, he is in command of the ball" (In Other Words 63). Players also agree on the stakes of the game, what it is they are vying for, and in doing so they concur in their belief in the game itself: "Players agree, by the mere fact of playing, [...] that the game is worth playing, [...] and this collusion is the very basis of their competition" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 98).

Closely connected to the field is the "species of capital" that is "efficacious in a given field, both as a weapon and as a stake of struggle" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 98). Bourdieu identifies three "species" of capital, economic, cultural, and social (Bourdieu and Wacquant 119): economic capital, as its name implies, refers to money in its various forms; cultural capital refers to knowledge or technical skills (Thompson, Introduction Language and Symbolic Power 14); social capital refers to "a durable network of [...]"
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 119). Bourdieu adds “symbolic capital,” which he describes as “prestige, reputation, fame, etc., which is the form assumed by these different kinds of capital when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate” (Language and Symbolic Power 230). So connected are field and capital that “[a] capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 101). Yet capital is the very thing that is at stake: within a field “participants vie to establish monopoly over the species of capital effective in it—cultural authority in the artistic field, scientific authority in the scientific field, sacerdotal authority in the religious field” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 17). In the texts in this study, “womanhood” is the field, and being a good woman, and more specifically, doing one’s duty as a good woman, are the capital.

If field is like a game, then “habitus” is what gives individuals “the feel for the game”: it is “the social game embodied and turned into a second nature” (In Other Words 63). Habitus is “a set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways” (Thompson, Introduction, Language and Symbolic Power 12, 13). Bourdieu is careful, however, to distinguish between habitus and fate: “[habitus] is an open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences, and therefore constantly affected by them in a way that either reinforces or modifies its structures. It is durable but not eternal!” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 133). It is, in fact, improvisational: “the habitus goes hand in glove with vagueness and indeterminacy. As a generative spontaneity which asserts itself in an improvised confrontation with ever-renewed situations, it obeys a practical logic, that of vagueness, of the more-or-less, which defines one’s ordinary relation to the world” (In Other Words 78). The notion of habitus
recognizes the role of history in the production of social agents and therefore it mediates between pre-determination and self-determination; social agents, says Bourdieu, are neither “particles of matter determined by external causes, nor little monads guided solely by internal reasons, executing a sort of perfectly rational internal program of action” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 136). Put succinctly, “habitus is a socialized subjectivity” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 126); in Ellul’s terms, it is the result of integration propaganda.

In keeping with Bourdieu’s insistence on the “relational mode of thinking” (In Other Words 125), habitus, field, and capital are necessarily implicated: “the field structures the habitus” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 127) because habitus is the set of dispositions “acquired in social positions within a field and [implies] a subjective adjustment to that position” (Harker et al. 10). But at the same time habitus “contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world, a world endowed with sense and value, in which it is worth investing one’s energy” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 127). Bourdieu recognizes a “sort of hermeneutic circle: in order to construct the field, one must identify the forms of specific capital that operate within it, and to construct the forms of specific capital one must know the specific logic of the field. There is an endless to and fro movement” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 108). Although he is talking here about the hermeneutic circle encountered by the researcher attempting to tease out the boundaries and limits of a field, the idea of circularity, reciprocity, and interconnectedness is nonetheless essential to an understanding of his theoretical concept of field, habitus, and capital. If one wants to enter the field of womanhood and to excel in it, and thereby gain the symbolic capital of being a good woman, one needs to act in certain ways and
assume certain attitudes; at the same time, the symbolic capital that one brings to the
field ensures that the field is meaningful.

Because habitus constitutes the field as “meaningful,” monopoly over the
capital in the field grants the power to “represent common sense and above all the power
to create the ‘official version of the social world’” (Harker et al. 13). This is a symbolic
power, which refers as Thompson explains, “not so much to a specific type of power,
but rather to an aspect of most forms of power as they are deployed in social life”
(Introduction Language and Symbolic Power 23); symbolic power is “a power of ‘world
making’” (Bourdieu, In Other Words 137). This symbolic power must be
“misrecognized” as power: it must be made invisible as such, and thus, paradoxically,
“recognized” in the sense that those who submit to it recognize it as legitimate. They do
so, not through a “passive submission to external constraint [or] a free adherence to
values” (Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power 51), but rather because they agree
on the value of “the stakes of the game,” a “form of complicity” (51). “A symbolic
power is a power which presupposes recognition, that is, misrecognition of the violence
that is exercised through it” (Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power 209); for
Bourdieu, symbolic violence occurs with the imposition of the vision of the world, of
“world making,” on others, albeit with their complicity. Bourdieu says:

It is not a logic of “communicative interaction” where some make
propaganda2 aimed at others that is operative here. It is much more
powerful and insidious than that: being born in a social world, we accept a
whole range of postulates, axioms, which go without saying and require no
inculcating. […] Of all the forms of “hidden persuasion,” the most implacable
is the one exerted, quite simply, by the order of things. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 168)

Because habitus is the product of the social world, it makes the task of naturalization easier. "It is because this world has produced me, because it has produced the categories of thought that I apply to it, that it appears to me as self-evident" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 128).

Bourdieu's theory allows us to go beyond Ellul's explanation of why propagandees are complicitous in the process of propaganda. Ellul's assessment of the "majority" and their reasons for accepting propaganda is not very flattering:

The majority prefers expressing stupidities to not expressing any opinion: this gives them the feeling of participation. For this they need simple thoughts, elementary explanations, a "key" that will permit them to take a position, and even ready-made opinions. [...] [O]ne must also take into account the individual's laziness. (Propaganda 140)

Bourdieu would not necessarily make so pejorative an assessment. Rather, he recognizes that "[o]ne's feel for the game is not infallible; it is shared out unequally between players, in a society as in a team. Sometimes it is completely lacking [...] [T]he feel for the game [is] itself unequally distributed, because there are everywhere, in all groups, degrees of excellence" (In Other Words 63, 64). It is not "laziness," simple-mindedness, or stupidity that makes people susceptible to integration propaganda; rather, the reason for their submission "resides [...] in the unconscious fit between their habitus and the field they operate in. It is lodged deep inside the socialized body" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 24). Ellul's argument assumes the autonomy
of the agent, the autonomy of the individual, but Bourdieu points out that this assumption paradoxically allows for social determinism: "It is through the illusion of freedom from social determinants [...] that social determinations win the freedom to exercise their full power" (In Other Words 15). The "myth of free speech" (Fairclough 63) is a good example.

The relation between the habitus and field produces "practices"; Bourdieu once again emphasizes the necessity of this relation in arguing against "the tendency to describe the social world in the language of rules and to behave as if social practices were explained merely by stating the explicit rule in accordance with which they are allegedly produced" (In Other Words 76). The improvisational quality of habitus allows for responses to situations that are never completely identical, and which allows for transformations of practices. Habitus both produces and reproduces practices: "[h]abitus is both a system of schemata of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices" (Bourdieu, In Other Words 131).

However, not all situations allow for the improvisations of habitus to the same degree; in some situations, there is "a high degree of formalization of practices [...]. The more a situation is pregnant with potential violence, the more people will have to respect the conventions, the more behaviour freely vested in the improvisations of the habitus will give way to behaviour expressly determined by a methodically instituted, even codified ritual" (Bourdieu, In Other Words 78). Ellul notes the effects of propaganda in codifying "social, political and moral standards" (Propaganda 163); he also says that "ethics [...] dies when it becomes a rigid law imposed from without" ("The Ethics of Propaganda" 174). But Ellul comes closest to Bourdieu's idea of
codification in his use of the word “orthopraxy” (Propaganda 27). Ellul means this quite specifically as an action that “leads directly to a goal, which for the individual is not a conscious and intentional objective to be attained, but which is considered such by the propagandist” (Propaganda 27); once the action has been performed, the individual is implicated in the process of propaganda and his or her action now requires that he or she believe that propaganda (29). The reader in the sample text is praised for the economies she has already undertaken; to have done so, and to accept the praise implicates her in the process of propaganda. Ironically, Ellul sees this implication of thought and action as part of the more general problem of “the separation of thought and action in our society” (27; emphasis added). For Ellul this separation means that people who think for themselves cannot act and those who act cannot think first. However if we understand “orthopraxy” from its component parts “ortho” and “praxis” as “correct or corrective” “action or practice,” then we come closer to Bourdieu’s idea of codification, and we can perhaps see how it is that acting and thinking have become separated, yet implicated, through propaganda.

Codification results from the monopolization of the species of capital within the field which allows for the power of “world making.” “Codification goes hand in glove with discipline and with the normalization of practices. [. . .] Codification minimizes ambiguity and vagueness” (Bourdieu, In Other Words 80). Ellul recognizes that one of the most important functions of propaganda is to dissolve contradictions, to restore “a unitary world in which the demands are in accord with the facts. It gives [people] a clear and simple call to action that takes precedence over all else” (Propaganda 159).
Propaganda operates centripetally to draw into the centre any and all disparate elements, and codification is thus a significant resource for it:

To codify means to banish the effect of vagueness and indeterminacy, boundaries which are badly drawn and divisions which are only approximate, by producing clear classes and making clear cuts, establishing firm frontiers, even if it means eliminating people who are neither fish nor fowl. [. . .]

Codification makes things simple, clear, communicable; it makes possible a controlled consensus on meaning. (Bourdieu, In Other Words 82; emphasis added)

Codification, then, is a resource for propaganda which acts to preclude the vagueness and ambiguity of habitus, although the rules and conventions produced by codification ultimately allow habitus to develop.

Bourdieu is careful to point out that the analogy between “game” and “field” is not accurate when it comes to rules; a game is deliberately created and its rules are spelled out and explicit, whereas the “rules” that govern a field are best described as “regularities” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 98). Codification, however, replaces the reciprocal relationship between field and practice with a “formalization of practices” (In other Words 78). The conduct manual discussed above is a good example of this “formalization of practices.” “Formalization is what enables you to confer on practices, above all practices of communication and cooperation, that constancy which ensures calculability and predictability over and above individual variations and temporal fluctuations” (In Other Words 83). Formalization implies an explicit action, a deliberate
and specific act of making something official. Bourdieu sees this occurring particularly in "publication":

A certain number of acts become official as soon as they are [. . .] made public, displayed, proclaimed, before everyone's eyes, in front of everyone, as opposed to what is unofficial, or even secret, shameful; with official publication [. . .] everyone is both invited to be a witness and called upon to check, ratify and sanction, and he or she ratifies or sanctions even by staying silent. [. . .] Publication is an operation which makes things official and thus legal, because it implies divulgation, unveiling in front of everybody, and authenticating, the consensus of everyone regarding the thing which is thus unveiled. (In Other Words 82)

Publication, then, simultaneously creates and authorizes the validity of that which is published.

Not just anyone, though, is granted the authority to "publish" the official version. Bourdieu starts from the assumption that "authority comes to language from the outside," that institutions authorize certain persons to speak, and that the spokesperson's authority "is based not on his [or her] personal conviction or pretension [. . .] but rather on the collective belief, guaranteed by the institution" (Language and Symbolic Power 109). Like the Homeric orator, the spokesperson is endowed with the skeptron. As Thompson explains it, "the spokesperson avails himself or herself of a form of power or authority which is part of a social institution, and which does not stem from the words alone" (Introduction Language and Symbolic Power 9). Bourdieu argues that "only a hopeless soldier (or a 'pure' linguist) could imagine that it was possible to give his
captain an order,” because discourse has to be not only grammatically correct, “but also, and above all, socially acceptable, i.e. heard, believed, and therefore effective within a given state of relations of production and circulation” (Language and Symbolic Power 75, 76). The sample text is written by “The Rev. E.J. Austin, M.A.” In this “given state of relations of production and circulation,” he is trading on at least three levels of authority with this listing of credentials: first, he is a man, and “the literary and stylistic corollary [of the public/private sphere split] was that argument and documentary required the voice of masculine authority” (Goldman 8); second, he is invested with the authority of the church; and third, he is a learned man, invested with the authority of higher education. With this status as legitimate authority comes the power to name, the power to “impose a certain vision of the social world” (Language and Symbolic Power 106), what Bourdieu calls the “oracle effect.” The spokesperson, authorized and legitimated by the group, practices “usurpatory ventriloquism, which consists in giving voice to those in whose name one is authorized to speak. [. . . The oracle effect is] the trick which consists of producing both the message and the interpretation of the message” (Language and Symbolic Power 211).

Having power over the construction of reality can promote homogeneity and silence dissent. The violence underlying the oracle effect is felt in the “impossibility of producing a divergent, dissident speech against the enforced unanimity which is produced by the monopoly of speech and the techniques for creating unanimity” (Language and Symbolic Power 213). Bourdieu is here talking about the impossibility of dissident speech created by the very physical constraints of such things as voting by a show of hands in an actual assembly of people. However, enforced unanimity can be
created linguistically. "The institution of an identity [. . .] is the imposition of a name, i.e. of a social essence. To institute, to assign an essence, a competence, is to impose a right to be that is an obligation of being so [. . .]. [T]he indicative is an imperative” (Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* 120). In the sample text, the indicative “[You are] becoming an expert in [economy]” acts as an imperative by obliging the reader to live up to its declarative statement of fact. The indicative, however, can only be an imperative if the authority of the spokesperson is acknowledged by the group for which, and in whose name, the spokesperson speaks. Again, Bourdieu recognizes the circularity of the relationship: "it is the spokesperson who creates the group. It is because the representative exists, because he represents (symbolic action), that the group that is represented and symbolized exists and that in return it gives existence to its representative as the representative of a group” (*Language and Symbolic Power* 204).

The idea of the spokesperson who creates the group that creates him or her works particularly well with Miller’s idea of the virtual rhetorical community. As a “discursive projection, a rhetorical construct,” the rhetorical community can only exist “in human memories and in their specific instantiations in words” (Miller, “Rhetorical Community” 73). The spokesperson “gives voice to those in whose name he [or she] is authorized to speak,” and thus “creates” the group in the act of speaking. As the one granted the authority to produce the “official version” of things, the one granted the authority to “publish,” the spokesperson necessarily speaks the official language. However, the struggle to impose the legitimate vision of the social world is never fully accomplished, the monopoly is never fully realized: “In fact, there are always, in any society, conflicts between symbolic powers that aim at imposing the [legitimate vision of
the social world]" (Bourdieu, *In Other Words* 137). Even "those who dominate in a
given field [. . . ] must always contend with the resistance, the claims, the contention
[. . . ] of the dominated" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 102). This resistance and contention
are precisely what make a rhetorical community "rhetorical": "It is this inclusion of
sameness and difference, of us and them, of centripetal and centrifugal impulses that
makes a community rhetorical, for rhetoric in essence requires both agreement and
dissent, shared understandings and novelty [. . . ]. In a paradoxical way, a rhetorical
community includes the 'other'" (Miller, "Rhetorical Community" 74). While the
dominant may be aware of this resistance, the dominated are limited in their ability to
mobilize themselves into a separate group "unless they question the categories of
perception of the social order which, being the product of that order, inclined them to
recognize that order and thus submit to it" (Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*
131). The dominant, on the other hand, "endeavor to impose universally, through a
discourse permeated by the simplicity and transparency of common sense, the feeling of
obviousness and necessity which this world imposes on them" (Bourdieu, *Language and
Symbolic Power* 131). "Common sense" and "necessity" function to naturalize this
version of the social world.

The Rhetorical Theory of Kenneth Burke and the "Mythologies" of Roland Barthes

Bourdieu contends that symbolic power, "the power to constitute the given by
stating it, to act upon the world by acting upon the representation of the world"
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 148),

do not reside in 'symbolic systems' in the form of an 'illocutionary force'
but [. . .] is defined in and through a given relation between those who exercise power and those who submit to it, i.e. in the very structure of the field in which belief is produced and reproduced. What creates the power of words and slogans [. . .] is the belief in the legitimacy of words and of those who utter them. And words alone cannot create this belief. (*Language and Symbolic Power* 170)

Because it deals with language as a "symbolic system," the rhetorical theory of Kenneth Burke allows us to see how this belief in the "legitimacy of words and of those who utter them" is constructed; his theory of "logolgy" will help us to see how hierarchies are constructed and how sanctions help keep them in place.

Perhaps the easiest route into Burke’s thought is through his "Definition of Man" which condenses many of his ideas into a few lines; from each of the clauses of the definition we can then extrapolate some of Burke’s most significant ideas.⁴ For Burke,

*Man is*

*the symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal*

*inventor of the negative (or moralized by the negative)*

*separated from his natural condition by instruments of his own making*

*goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (or moved by the sense of order)*

*and rotten with perfection. (*Language as Symbolic Action* 16)*

The Symbol-using, Symbol-making, Symbol-misusing Animal

At the very heart of Burke’s thought is the question, "[C]an we bring ourselves to realize just [. . .] how overwhelmingly much of what we mean by ‘reality’ has been
built up for us through nothing but our symbol systems?” (Language as Symbolic Action 5). This relationship between “symbolicity” and reality permeates all of Burke’s thinking about the nature of humanity and language; language for Burke is “symbolic action.” His parenthetical addition of the adjectival phrases “symbol-making” and “symbol-misusing” to his first clause of the definition is significant. Symbols are not simply “there” for people to use; they have to be created and their “use” necessarily implies “misuse” as well. But if misuse is inevitable, it is not necessarily intentional. Here Burke’s idea of “terministic screens” comes into play: if language is a “reflection of reality, by its very nature as terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality” (Burke, Language as Symbolic Action 45). Burke likens the operation of terministic screens in language to that of colour filters in photography: even something as realistic and as “factual” as a photograph changes in texture and form depending on which filter is used (Language as Symbolic Action 45). However, while we can take a photograph without coloured lenses, we cannot avoid terministic screens:

We must use terministic screens, since we can’t say anything without the use of terms; whatever terms we use, they necessarily constitute a corresponding kind of screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the attention to one field rather than another. Within that field there can be different screens, each with its ways of directing the attention and shaping the range of observations implicit in the given terminology. (Language as Symbolic Action 50)
Terministic screens, then, involve choice, and so are attitudinal. Even in what Burke
calls the “scientistic” approach to language, language as definition, attitude is apparent.
“To call a man a friend or brother is to proclaim him consubstantial with oneself; one’s
values or purposes. To call a man a bastard is to attack him by attacking his whole line”
(Burke, A Grammar of Motives 57).

Augmenting the sense of definition as attitudinal is Burke’s notion of
“substance” and “the paradox of substance” which rests on the inherent paradox that
arises out of the word “substance” itself. While we think of the word as referring to
something’s very essence, or a characteristic that defines it, “sub-stance” literally means
a standing below, or outside of, the thing itself; etymologically, “sub-stance would be
something that stands beneath or supports the person or thing. [. . .] [T]he word
‘substance,’ used to designate what a thing is, derives from a word designating
something that a thing is not” (A Grammar of Motives 22, 23). Later Burke says that
“the ambiguity of substance affords [. . . ] a major source of rhetoric” (51) because any
assignation of substance, of what a person or thing is, is an assignation in terms of
something else; “[a]ssigning substance to an entity is not the way of its being, but a way
of its being” (Stillar 67), a selection of one set of terms and values and a deflection of
others. The very purpose of rhetoric is to attempt to compensate, symbolically, for
actual physical division: “If men were not apart from one another, there would be no
need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity” (A Rhetoric of Motives 22). In Burke’s
example quoted above, to assign someone the substance of “brother” is to identify with
him, to become consubstantial with him.
Burke recognizes several different ways of assigning substance. Most basically there is "dialectical substance," which "considers things in terms not of some other, but of the other" (A Grammar of Motives 33), what Bourdieu calls "the fundamental oppositions which organize the entire world-vision, night/day, inside/outside, etc." (In Other Words 77). There is also "contextual substance": "[c]ontextual definition might also be called 'positional,' or 'geometric,' or 'definition by location.' [. . .] [C]ontextual definition stresses placement" (A Grammar of Motives 26, 28). Burke notes the paradox involved in this particular type of definition because to define is to determine or mark boundaries, to place something in its context, spatially or temporally (Stillar 68). In the example I have been using, the women are contextually defined as being "on the winning side," a further spiralling into the symbolic, since "the winning side" is a metaphorical transformation of a physical space.

There are two other types of substance, familial and directional. Familial substance, as the name suggests, "stresses derivation," both literal as in biological descent, and "spiritualized" so that it includes "social groups, comprising persons of the same nationality or beliefs. Most often, in such cases, there is the notion of some founder shared in common, or some covenant or constitution or historical act from which the consubstantiality of the group is derived" (A Grammar of Motives 28,29). The mention of "the enemy" negatively provides familial substance in the sample text, because there is the assumption of consubstantiality inherent in the notion of a common enemy; this is not just any enemy, but the enemy, which also defines dialectically.

Directional substance asks not "Who are you?" or "Where are you from?" as familial substance might, but rather, "Where are you going?" and it is "often strongly
futuristic” (*A Grammar of Motives* 31). The sample text provides a good example of
directional substance: “You are used to economy now, and *becoming* an expert in it”
(emphasis added). Stillar points out the importance of Burke’s “paradox of substance”:

Burke’s assiduous treatment of the paradox of substance is not aimed at
claiming that all substantiation collapses into nonsense. Rather, it is a
reminder that although substance—as the ‘taken-for-granted’ of being—would
seem to be inalienable and natural, it is as much a social construction, as
much a selection and deflection, as any other speaking *in terms of*. (69)

**Barthes’ “Mythologies”**

Burke’s view of substance as a way of seeing, an assignation of essence “in terms
of” something else, is very similar to the way in which Barthes views “mythologies.”
For Barthes, myth is “a second-order semiological system” (*Mythologies* 123) in that it
springs from the already established semiological system of language; “that which is a
sign (namely the associative total of a concept and an image) in the first system,
becomes a mere signifier in the second” (123). Barthes notes that myths “are constructed
from a semiological chain” (123) and that they in turn chain out in other directions; the
“culturally enriched sign, itself, becomes the signifier for the next sign in a chain of
signification of ascending complexity and cultural specificity” (Turner 18). Because the
sign of myth has become “culturally enriched,” myth operates “to forestall
consideration of possible alternatives” (Elshtain, “On Beautiful Souls” 341; synopsis);
as Barthes says, “myth has in fact a double function: it points out and it notifies, it
makes us understand something and it imposes it on us” (*Mythologies* 126). In Burke’s
terms, mythology attempts “to stabilize the paradox [of substance], to make
identification and consubstantiation possible through persuasion and consensus” (Stillar 77).

Inventor of the Negative (Or Moralized By The Negative)

Substance, the definition of something in terms of what it is not, is not the only way in which Burke sees the negative operating in language. Language itself is premised on the negative because “the word is not the thing. [. . .] Hence, to use words properly, we must spontaneously have a feeling for the principle of the negative” (The Rhetoric of Religion 18). The negative is, then, quintessentially a property of symbol systems; “there are no negatives in nature, where everything simply is what it is and as it is. [. . .] The negative is a function peculiar to symbol systems, quite as the square root of minus-one is an implication of a certain mathematical symbol system” (Language as Symbolic Action 9). Humans, as symbol-users, have a dual nature, that of animality and that of symbolicity; “[m]an’s animality is in the realm of sheer matter, sheer motion. But his ‘symbolicity’ adds a dimension of action” (The Rhetoric of Religion 16). The distinction between “motion” and “action” is a fundamental one for Burke, and it hinges on the negative. “Though the concept of sheer ‘motion’ is non-ethical, ‘action’ implies the ethical” (The Rhetoric of Religion 41). The negative and the ethical are connected through this sense of action, which implies choice. While the negative can be used to define and determine what something is not, its primary purpose in Burke’s “dramatistic” scheme of things is to issue commands: “The ‘scientistic approach builds the edifice of language with primary stress upon a proposition such as ‘It is, or it is not.’ The ‘dramatisitic’ approach puts the primary stress upon such hortatory expressions as ‘thou shalt, or thou shalt not’” (Language as
Symbolic Action 44). Ethics, or the morality of choice, comes into play with the response to the command: "The word-using animal not only understands a thou-shalt-not; it can carry the principle of the negative a step further, and answer the thou-shalt-not with a disobedient No" (The Rhetoric of Religion 186-87). It is for this reason that Burke includes the parenthetical "moralized by the negative" in his second clause of the definition.

Burke says that the negative principle "is often hidden behind a realm of quasi-positives [... which are] improvised ways of responding to the negativity so basic to man as moral agent" (Language as Symbolic Action 11). In two of the words from the sample text, "duty" and "economy," there is a tension between positive and negative: while "duty" is usually construed as a positive, it is also "a 'command,' founded on 'obligation,' not 'inclination.' [...] Duty requires sacrifice" ("A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part Two" 451). "Economy," as it is used in the text, also requires sacrifice, but is recommended as a positive measure which will help win the war.

The idea of the negative also informs Burke's theory of "logology," or "words about words" (The Rhetoric of Religion 1), a "purely empirical study of symbolic action" (Language as Symbolic Action 47). Burke explains the difference between "dramatism" and "logology": "[dramatism] stresses what we are: the symbol-using animal. I call logology epistemological because it relates to the initial duplication that came into the world when we could go from sensations to words for sensations" ("Dramatism and Logology" 91). Because humans are symbol-using animals, our "world is necessarily insrpirited with the quality of the Symbol, the Word, the Logos, through which [we conceive] it" (Language as Symbolic Action 55). With language and
the principle of the negative, we can create “discriminations” (“Dramatism and Logology” 91); with discriminations, we create hierarchies; with hierarchies we create ideas of perfection. Logology “is concerned, very simply, with what transpires when we would live through—live in terms of—symbol systems” (Stillar 78). What logology “studies” is what Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress call “logonomic systems”: the term comes from the Greek logos, which means a thought or system of thought, and also the words or discourse through which the thought is presented, and nomos, a control or ordering mechanism. A logonomic system is a set of rules prescribing the conditions for production and reception of meanings; which specify who can claim to initiate (produce, communicate) or know (receive, understand) meanings about what topics under what circumstances and with what modalities (how, when, why). (4)

Logonomic systems are best seen as processes rather than entities, and it is through their instantiations in texts that we can tease out their properties. Hodge and Kress say that “[g]enre-rules are exemplary instances of logonomic systems” (7), and it is perhaps easiest to illustrate how logonomic systems work by using a well-known genre as an example. The rules that govern the writing of a eulogy, for instance, dictate what kinds of examples the writer will use; they govern the process of selection and deflection, so that a eulogy will feature the positive, successful, and benevolent aspects of the deceased’s life and ignore or deflect the negative. The very purpose of the eulogy is to restore order and a sense of equilibrium to the group which has been affected by the death, so that these rules exist not simply to help the eulogist find something to say but
to create a sense of solidarity; they point to another level of logonomic system, that of social expectation, which deems it necessary to create continuity within the group, which reassures the group that, even though one member is gone, there is still stability. A eulogy often contains euphemisms, again not simply because the genre demands it, but because death in our society is still a mystery and is treated reverentially; euphemism is a language resource through which the eulogist can rhetorically engage the audience. The age of the deceased and the reason for the death are also significant factors which determine the rules of production of the eulogy. The potent combination of youth and a just cause allow “Old” Mrs. Wise to make this rather tactless comparison in a eulogy for fallen soldiers: “[G]enerations yet unborn will remember the boys of twenty years who died for Right, when men who have clogged the earth for over three-quarters of a century are forgotten” (Nov. 28, 1914: iii). Logonomic systems, then, stretch from the basic level of language and its resources, to genre and the resources it draws on, to social expectations and the resources for order at that level.

The negative is a significant contributor to the efficacy of logonomic systems; without the negative, “rules” would have no validity, and the discriminations which allow one person and not another to produce meanings would be moot. As Stillar points out,

[e]very logonomic system has its resources for marking the negative and hence constraining symbolic action in terms of the “rules” of the system.

The negative, whether marked very explicitly as in the Decalogue, or implicitly [ . . . ] compels participants in the particular logonomic system to act accordingly because transgressing the negative courts guilt. (82)
In the sample text, the negative is stated explicitly, but in an ironically positive way:

"you will never need to be forced to your duty by the threat of a fine or even imprisonment. There is another penalty [. . .] which, please God, you shall never have to pay." In the first sentence, the use of "you will" in "you will never need to be forced to your duty" indicates a certainty about the future (Collins Cobuild 224). The shift to "you shall" in "you shall never have to pay," preceded by "please God," indicates less certainty, less control over the future event. Even when the negative is stated explicitly, there can be ironies, paradoxes, and "quasi-positives" which obscure the sense of commandment.⁶

Separated From His Natural Condition By Instruments Of His Own Making

If we return to the question that informs all of Burke's thinking, the question that asks whether we know how much of our knowledge of "reality" is implicated in our symbol systems, we can begin to see what Burke means by the third clause of the definition. "[I]n a language-using species 'language is ever-present'" ("A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part III" 81); nothing escapes being perceived through "the fog of symbol-ridden social structures that man has erected atop nature" (Language as Symbolic Action 378). Burke calls this separation "a secular analogue to the 'fall' from the state of Eden. [. . .] Logologically, there is a 'fall' from a prior state of unity, whenever some one term is broken into two or more terms, so that we have the 'divisiveness' of 'classification' where we formerly had a 'vision of perfect oneness'" (The Rhetoric of Religion 40, 175). Because humans are able to use words about words, are "reflexive" in our use of words, we create with them "social structures, systems of governance, and symbolic conceptualizations such as rights, obligations, powers,
authorities, awards, technology, and services” (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 198); we create “the different classes of society that arise through the division of labor and the varying relationships to the property structure” (Burke, Language as Symbolic Power 15). We are not only separated by words from our “natural condition” but also from each other; ironically, words are also our resource for becoming consubstantial: “[r]hetoric is concerned with the state of Babel after the Fall” (A Rhetoric of Motives 23). As Stillar says, “logonomic systems reflect, construct, and reproduce divisions and inequities in social systems” (84), and Bourdieu notes that the very “principles of division [. . .] are also principles of vision” (In Other Words 79). The sample text classifies penalties into “fine,” “imprisonment,” and “capitulation to the enemy,” each one increasingly ominous. The text implicitly divides women into those who do their duty and those, by implication, who do not and who would then be subject to the penalties. It sets up a “vision,” a way of seeing the world, and a “di-vision,” a way of seeing the world that deviates from the legitimate one.

Goaded By The Spirit Of Hierarchy (Or Moved By The Sense Of Order)

The principle of the negative, the discriminations and commandments it makes possible, also makes hierarchies possible; logonomic systems are, quite simply, words that create order. Socio-political order relies on divisions and stratifications made possible, ultimately, “by [. . .] ‘symbolicité,’ or terminology” (The Rhetoric of Religion 41) because humans have created story: “when STORY comes into the world there enters the realm of true, false, honest, mistaken, the downright lie, the imaginative, the visionary, the sublime, the ridiculous, the eschatological [. . .], the satirical” (“Dramatism and Logology” 90). Hierarchies form around the “relation of higher to
lower, or lower to higher, or before to after, or after to before [. . . and] in the 
arrangement whereby each rank is overlord to its underlings and underling to its 
overlords” (A Rhetoric of Motives 138). They also form around the ability to follow 
commandments. But like Bourdieu’s insistence that the “players” of the game have to 
believe that “the game is worth playing,” Burke insists that “[t]he hierarchic principle 
[. . .] is complete only when each rank accepts the principle of gradation itself” (A 
Rhetoric of Motives 138). Hierarchies themselves are not inevitable, but the hierarchic 
principle is: hierarchies form, crumble, and dissolve, but “[t]he hierarchical principle 
itself is inevitable in systematic thought” (A Rhetoric of Motives 141). In order to work, 
though, this ubiquitous hierarchic principle requires the principle of teleology, “a Jove 
principium, which might be ‘roughly’ translated: ‘from the top down’ (or, 
Logologically, ‘begin with an over-all ‘god-term,’ a title-of-titles, and view everything 
else in terms of that summarizing Word, considered as ‘source’ of the lot’)” (The 
Rhetoric of Religion 41). Those “god-terms,” or summarizing words, create order, 
create a sense of authority, a sense of the ultimate.

Implicit in the nature of order, however, is guilt; “[t]hose ‘Up’ are guilty of not 
being ‘Down,’ those ‘Down’ are certainly guilty of not being ‘Up’” (Language as 
Symbolic Action 15). Commandments also evoke guilt for, as Burke asks rhetorically, 
“[W]ho can keep commandments!” (The Rhetoric of Religion 4). Burke sees “a cycle 
of terms implicit in the idea of ‘order,’ in keeping with the fact that ‘order,’ being a 
polar term, implies a corresponding idea of ‘disorder,’ while these terms in turn involve 
ideas of ‘obedience’ or ‘disobedience’ to the authority implicit in ‘order’” (On Symbols 
and Society 279). He summarizes the cycle thus: “If order, then guilt; if guilt, then need
for redemption” (On Symbols and Society 280). “By the very fact of setting up an order, you make men potentially transgressors. For you give orders only to the kind of being who might possibly disobey them. Thus, order makes men in principle subject to temptation” (Dramatism and Development 44). Redemption is purchased through sacrifice, either in the form of victimage or mortification. Victimage is “purification by sacrifice, by vicarious atonement, unburdening of guilt within by transference to chosen vessels without” (“Postscripts on the Negative” 216); mortification is self-directed, “the deliberate disciplinary ‘slaying’ of any motive that, for doctrinal reasons, one thinks of as ‘unruly’” (The Rhetoric of Religion 190). Stiellar extricates the logological from what could be seen as a purely theological discussion: “logonomic systems create hierarchy ‘externally’ (project organization onto a social practice) and ‘internally’ (mark ‘good’ and ‘bad’ application of its resources/forms), and in doing so, move or ‘goad’ people to participate in the hierarchy accordingly” (87). In the sample text, “duty” is a “god-term,” representing the order that informs and then creates hierarchies; “economy” is beneath “duty” because it is a part of duty, but not in itself as complete as duty. Both terms combine to create a sense of mortification because “duty” implies sacrifice, and economy implies a “deliberate disciplinary ‘slaying’” of the “unruly motive” of spending lavishly on oneself. Mortifying the unruly motive of spending lavishly is essentially saying “Yes” to order, yet the fact that the columnist deems it necessary to encourage such behaviour indicates the very real possibility of saying “No” instead. On the other hand, the phrase “to do your utmost” goads the reader by presenting an image of what is at the top of the hierarchy, and more significantly, by suggesting that she can
reach that hierarchical pinnacle. The use of the infinitive, however, ensures that this pinnacle is only a potential.

And Rotten With Perfection

This potential of perfection is perhaps the most significant driving force of hierarchies. Burke says, "There is a principle of perfection implicit in the nature of symbol systems; and in keeping with his nature as symbol-using animal, man is moved by this principle" (Language as Symbolic Action 17). This "entelechial tendency" treats the 'top' or 'culminating' stage as the 'image' that best represents the entire 'idea'" (A Rhetoric of Motives 141), and that image then goads or moves humans to strive toward it; if we are capable of creating an image of perfection, we are bound to try to live up to it.

Burke warns against the tendency to reify hierarchies. A hierarchy of learning, for example, which Burke sees as arising naturally as a form of progression from one stage to another, "rhetorically reenforces the protection of privilege. Though in its essence purely developmental, the series is readily transformed into rigid social classifications, and these interfere with the very process of development that was its reason for being" (A Rhetoric of Motives 141; emphasis added). The entelechial principle argues for the perfection of the being according to the "finishedness [...] of which that [being] is capable" (A Rhetoric of Motives 14). If "master" is the final stage in the educational process Burke describes, then, logologically, "master" is the image of perfection. The danger here lies in "forgetting," or in Bourdieu's terms "misrecognizing," that the social classifications are created by logonomic systems: "forgetting that they are ultimately social constructs, born of practice, history, and
power, we engage with and through logonomic systems as if they had their own
teleology, their own internal motivational principles aimed at attaining perfection
proper to their kind” (Stillar 87).

Burke notes that the negative ensures that the idea of perfection can be used
ironically to create ideas such as the “‘perfect fool’ or [the] ‘perfect villain,’” and even
the “‘perfect enemy’”; the possibilities opened up by this ironic treatment of perfection
inform his phrase “rotten with perfection” (Language as Symbolic Action 18). We are
“rotten” with perfection because the teleological principle makes perfection only
potentially available to us, yet we are always striving toward it, “despite the fact that
such efforts cause us to experience guilt and to carry to resolution even those
terminologies detrimental to our well-being” (Foss, Foss, and Trapp 199). In the sample
text, the “perfect penalty” is capitulation to the enemy and it is held out in its ironic
“perfection” as the “highest” point on the hierarchy of penalties, which is necessarily a
negative. Again ironically, it is the possibility of reaching such a pinnacle of perfection
that goads the reader into doing her “utmost” to perform her duty of economizing.

The Functional Grammar of M.A.K. Halliday

One of the main tenants of Burke’s theories about language is that language does
not simply “represent” our world in an objective way but rather that language is action,
language is a way of getting things done in our world, and even our representations of
the world through language betray our attitudes and evaluations. One way of seeing how
we do things with language is to look at the choices we make in our language use.
Again, to borrow from Burke, any selection of terms we make is necessarily a deflection
of other terms. M.A.K. Halliday’s theory of functional grammar provides a vocabulary
and a way of examining texts for the choices made to discover not just what a text
means, but *how* it means. The patterns revealed by an analysis using functional
grammar should provide yet another resource for interpretation, another way of looking
at how the various positions within a particular rhetorical community are invoked and
realized.

The Metafunctions of Language

Halliday sees grammar as "functional in the sense that it is designed to account
for how the language is used" (xiii). As the editor of the *Collins Cobuild English
Grammar* says, "People who study and use a language are mainly interested in *how they
can do things* with the language--how they can make meanings, get attention to their
problems and interests, influence their friends and colleagues [...]. A grammar which
puts together the patterns of the language and the things you can do with them is called a
functional grammar" (v; emphasis added). Halliday also sees these patterns of making
meaning as functional, and he divides them into two broad categories, or
"metafunctions"--the "ideational" and the "interpersonal." As Stillar explains it, the
ideational metafunction "concerns language's resources for constructing content.
Language represents things, concepts, relations, and events and their circumstances"
(20). The interpersonal metafunction serves as a means of positioning both the
addressee and the addressee, of expressing attitude and evaluations of both the content of
the text and of the addressees. Halliday identifies a third metafunction, the textual,
which concerns the ways in which texts can be cohesive and coherent, the ways in
which parts of a text link to other parts, the ways in which parts of text are made more
prominent, the ways in which texts ensure "that what is said is relevant and relates to
[the] context” (Halliday and Hasan 45). While it is necessary to keep these metafunctions separate as concepts for the purpose of analysis, it is also necessary to recognize that with language in use they can, and often do, spill over into each other, blurring the analytical lines. Functional grammar is a theory, a step in the exegetical process, and Halliday cautions that it cannot be treated as an algorithm (xv-xvi).

Halliday would certainly concur with Bourdieu that it is impossible to elucidate any act of communication within the compass of linguistic analysis alone. Even the simplest linguistic exchange brings into play a complex and ramifying web of historical power relations between the speaker endowed with a specific social authority, and an audience, which recognizes this authority to varying degrees. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 142-3)

The Ideational

Although Burke stresses the “dramatistic” approach to language, which says that language performs symbolic action, he does not deny the “scientistic” approach, which stresses the more representational aspects of language. Through Halliday’s “ideational” metafunction this function of language is realized; the ideational serves a “content” function. The ideational is concerned with language “in its experiential function, its guise as a way of representing patterns of experience. Language enables human beings to build a mental picture of reality, to make sense of what goes on around them and inside them” (Halliday 106). The two most basic resources of language for the ideational metafunction are “transitivity” and “lexis.”
Transitivity

One of ways of focusing on “what is going on” is through verb processes: “Our most powerful impression of experience is that it consists of ‘goings-on’—happening, doing, sensing, meaning, and being and becoming” (Halliday 106). These processes are achieved by the grammatical system of “transitivity.” Transitivity is “a resource for construing our experience in terms of configurations of a process, participants and circumstances” (Martin et al. 102); transitivity therefore expresses who participates in what process under what circumstances.9

Stillar suggests three10 main categories for processes: actional, mental, and relational (22). Fowler gives three examples which illustrate the differences between the processes: his example, “John kicked the ball” is an action process; “Peter meditates” is a mental process; “Jane is tall” is a relational process (71). Action processes require a central participant, an agent who performs the action; often there is also someone or something acted upon,11 making the action process an “affective” one (Stillar 23). There are several other sub-categories of action processes, those that have to do with motion (“I went to Europe”); with transfer of things to different locations or to people (“I placed the envelope in the slot,” or “I gave the envelope to her”); and with processes that gain results (“I knitted a sweater”).

“Peter meditates” is a mental process that expresses a cognitive process. Mental processes require a processor, someone or something that does the “mentalizing,” and a phenomenon, that which is “mentalized.” Again, there are further sub-categories: of
perception ("I see the table"); of reaction ("I enjoyed the book"); of verbal expressions ("I asked a question"); and of creative processes ("I wrote the script").

"Jane is tall" expresses a relational process, a "description of a physical state" (Fowler 71) or an attribution. Relational processes usually contain a verb such as "be," "have," "seem," or "appear" which link the two grammatical participants in the process. There are processes of identification ("I am his mother"); of classification ("I am a student"); of possession ("I have a book"); and location ("I am at home"). Other relational processes involve only one participant, the existential ("There is a problem") and the ambient ("It is snowing").

As Stillar points out, we need not always break down processes into these sub-categories, while at times it may be necessary to be even more specific. Recognizing and identifying patterns of transitivity allows us to see "how a text constructs 'reality,' how it 'slices up' what is a continuum of phenomena into processes that reflect and construct particular perspectives on experience" (Stillar 25-26). Because "transitivity makes options available, we are always suppressing some possibilities" (Fowler 71), and identifying patterns of transitivity within a text becomes a significant part of the exegetical process.

Lexis

If the ideational metafunction expresses what a text is "about," then the vocabulary it uses is a key to its content. In Fowler's assessment, this is "an elementary, but fundamental" (82) task of analysis. "Lexical items ('content' words and phrases)" (Stillar 27) and the way they cluster contribute significantly to the ideational function. The vocabulary of a text "amounts to a map of the objects, concepts, processes and
relationships about which [it] needs to communicate. [...] Clusters of related terms are found to mark out distinct kinds of preoccupation and topic” (Fowler 80, 82). This tendency for terms and words to co-occur is called “collocation” (Halliday 333); the presence of superordinate terms means that there is an expectation that terms related to them will occur, and their presence often dictates how other lexical items will be read. For example, the presence of the superordinate term “Christianity” in a text leads us to expect the presence of “Jesus,” “God,” and “spirit,” and ensures that we read “spirit” as “soul” or “animating essence” rather than as “mood” or “state of mind,” or “intoxicating liquor.”

Analysis of Ideational Aspects

The sample text is “about” doing one’s duty by practicing economy; in Burke’s terms, “duty” is one of the god-terms of the war, and it becomes the superordinate term in the text around which others collocate. It is important to recall, though, that for Burke “duty” is a negative term, arising more out of obligation than inclination. In the first half of the text, the words “economy,” “penalty,” “threat,” “fine,” “imprisonment,” “losing,” and “capitulation” all cluster around the word “duty,” albeit in a negative sense; except for “economy,” these are all projected as the result of not doing one’s duty. Rising out of that low point, the possibility of capitulation to the enemy, the terms that cluster around “duty” in the second half of the text are positive: “utmost,” “winning side,” “winning,” “gladness” and “contentment.”

The patterns of transitivity indicate that the text is more about a state of affairs than it is about actually “doing” anything; the only action process in a main clause occurs in the final clause, “you do them with gladness and contentment.” The other
action processes are embedded in dependent clauses, "which you are doing," and "which are winning," taking the emphasis off the action processes. By far the predominant pattern of transitivity in the text is relational, describing states of affairs: "you are used to," "[you are] becoming," "there is," "that is," "it is," "you are to be," "you shall [ . . . ] be," and "the [ . . . ] things [ . . . ] are." The relational processes in the text allow the statements to be naturalized as a representation of "reality": they purport to present things as they are, without mediation. To foreground the sense of mediation, the columnist would have to say, for example, "I notice that you are used to economy now." Without such a foregrounding of mediation, the statements are offered as "objective," as statements that reflect "the way things are." But the predominance of relational processes, combined with the second person pronoun, also indicates that the text is being used to "re-present" women to themselves, to tell women what they are like, and where they will be ("on the winning side"). Halliday explains that relational processes are "those of being. [ . . . ] As the term 'relational' suggests, this is not 'being' in the sense of existing. [ . . . ] In relational clauses there are two parts to the 'being': something is being said to 'be' something else. In other words, a relation is being set up between two separate entities" (119). Relational processes, then, are used to express "substance," to temporarily stabilize substance and to deflect the paradox of substance by presenting as natural that which is necessarily constructed.

The Interpersonal

Halliday's second metafunction is the interpersonal, the function which constructs interaction between the writer or speaker and the reader or listener. The
interpersonal function can be realized through “modality,” “speech function,” and “attitudinal lexis” (Stillar 34).

Modality

“Modality can [. . .] be regarded as ‘comment’ or ‘attitude,’ obviously by definition ascribable to the source of the text, and explicit or implicit in the linguistic stance taken by the speaker/writer” (Fowler 85). In this sense, modality enables what Stillar calls “positional” resources, “those resources that enable speakers/writers to construct attitudes [and] evaluations” (33). But modality is also used “to make requests, offers, suggestions [. . . or] to be polite or tactful” (Collins Cobuild 217). This use of modality informs what Stillar calls “relational” resources, those resources that “construct relations between speakers/writers and listeners/readers” (32). Modality is most often expressed through modal verbs,13 “can, could may, might, must, ought to, shall, should, will [and] would “ (Collins Cobuild 217), essentially, in Fowler’s terms, those having to do with “truth, [. . .] obligation, [. . .] permission, and [. . .] desirability” (85). Stillar points out that possibility, probability, and desirability can also be expressed through verbs that usually express mental/cognitive processes, “think,” “believe,” “wonder,” and “suppose” because they encode “the speaker’s assessment of possibility,” probability or desirability (38). “I believe you’ve had enough cake” is equivalent to saying, “It is probable that you have had enough cake.”

Speech Function

Speech functions, also called “moods,” are the statements, questions, commands, and exclamations used in setting up “basic interactive roles for us in the language event” (Stillar 34). Like modality, speech functions can construct both
positional and relational meaning. A simple declarative sentence, “You are used to
economy now,” sets up a positional value, indicating the writer’s attitude by what
Fairclough calls “the expressive modality of categorical truth expressed by the present
tense” (183). But it also performs a relational function by constructing the writer’s
authority to make such a statement of “categorical truth.” Similarly, a question sets up
a relation between the asker and the person who is asked, but the nature of the relation
itself will depend on the context; for example, there is a vast difference in the relation
between asker and respondent in the questions, “Are you hungry?” asked of a friend and
“What is the circumference of the world?” asked by a teacher on a geography test.

“Speech function is as much determined by the social relationship between the
interactants, and the characteristics of the context, as it is by the grammatical structure
of mood” (Stillar 34). A rhetorical question, on the other hand, is far more likely to
express the attitude of the questioner, thus enacting a positional role: “Are you crazy?”
as a response to a suggestion does not require an answer, but it does convey the
speaker’s attitude about the suggestion and the person who made it.

Attitudinal Lexis

While lexis is a significant contributor to the ideational function, there are also
many ways in which it contributes to the interpersonal function. Stillar’s category
“attitudinal lexis” (35) is more specific than both Fowler’s and Fairclough’s
“vocabulary.” While Fairclough uses the idea of relational values (111), Stillar provides
a more specific discussion of adjectives and adverbs, and even some verb processes that
can be instrumental in constructing positional and relational meaning.
Qualitative and emphasizing adjectives contribute significantly to the interpersonal function. Qualitative adjectives, for example "busy," "hot," "short," and "weak," "identify a quality that someone or something has" (Collins Cobuild 65), and in so doing they can express the speaker's attitude, as in "a weak excuse." Emphasizing adjectives, such as "complete," "utter," and "pure," express strong feeling by intensifying a noun that already indicates opinion, for example, "I felt like a complete fool" (Collins Cobuild 69). Classifying adjectives, which assign things to categories, do not usually perform an interpersonal function. However, as Bourdieu says, "[N]othing classifies somebody more than the way he or she classifies" (In Other Words 131). In saying, "That was an emotional speech," we classify the speech in a specific way, but depending on context, that classification can be positive or derisive.¹⁴

Adverbs of degree and manner can also have positional value, even though manner is a circumstantial element and is also associated with the ideational function. "[W]hen we consider that acts, events, and relations do not necessarily have an inherent 'way' in which they may be conducted, we can see that the speakers' selection of certain manner adverbs will be a trace of their own positional attitudes and evaluations" (Stillar 37). In describing something as having been done "badly," or as being "radically different," we indicate our own attitude.

Analysis Using Interpersonal Aspects

What is most striking about this text at the interpersonal level is the use of modality. In the first half of the text there are two negative double modals, "you will never need to be forced," and "you shall never have to pay" which serve to realize, emphatically, the importance of the obligation, and which reinforce the negative sense
of the terms collocating around “duty.” In the second half of the text, when the terms around “duty” become positive, the modality becomes that of desirability and probability: “you are to be on the winning side,” and “you shall yourself be actually engaged in winning.” “You are to be on the winning side” uses the present tense to express “categorical truth,” and the infinitive “to be” to indicate futurity, so that together they construct a sense of certainty about the future. “Shall” is used to indicate certainty about a future event, particularly one over which the agent has some control (Collins Cobuild 225). The only time the text deviates from this pattern is with the curious use of “possibly,” indicating less certainty. This lack of certainty, however, is about the present, not the future: “It is that thought, possibly, which nerves you to do your utmost.” The addition of “possibly” here is also the only instance in which the author suggests that he may not know exactly what the reader is thinking. If so, the use of “possibly” could destroy his credibility. Another possibility, though, is that it is used to strengthen the relational value by giving credit to the reader for having other motives for doing her “utmost.” However, because it appears by itself, because there are no other attempts to create a sense of solidarity with the reader, or to soften the authoritative manner which characterizes the rest of the text, this attempt at creating solidarity seems false and somewhat forced.

The combination of relational processes with the second person is unusual, and it can be seen to be operating at the interpersonal level as well as the ideational. In ascribing attributes (“used to economy”) and locations (“on the winning side”) to a reader, the columnist assumes that he is qualified and authoritative enough to make such an assessment without qualifying it by turning it into a question, as would be the case in
"You are used to economy, aren't you?" "You are used to economy now" sounds very much like the clichéd statement of the hypnotist, "You are getting sleepy," in which a command is masked by a simple declarative statement; by stating what someone else is in the process of becoming, there is the force of a command for that person to comply, something that both Burke and Bourdieu recognize. Burke says that "an epithet assigns substance doubly, for in stating the character of the object it at the same time contains an implicit program of action with regard to the object" (A Grammar of Motives 57); Bourdieu says that to name is "to signify to someone what he is and how he should conduct himself as a consequence" (Language and Symbolic Power 120).

The text is marked by the notable absence of adjectives and adverbs that construct positional values, but those that do are significant. "Easily" in the first sentence expresses the columnist's attitude toward the task of economizing, but again because of the use of the second person, the text projects this attitude onto the reader. In the second half of the text "extraordinary" and "very" are qualifying and emphasizing adjectives modifying "things of economy and contrivance"; both are used to express strong feelings about those things of economy and contrivance. In the final clause the phrase "with gladness and contentment" realizes positional value through circumstance of manner, but the use of the second person projects this attitude onto the reader.

The Textual Metafunction

The textual metafunction is a "resource for ensuring that what is said is relevant and relates to its context" (Halliday and Hasan 45). It is the function that ensures cohesion and coherence within the text itself and which links text and context.

Thematic structure and cohesive devices are the two main resources for drawing
attention to one part of the text rather than another and for relating parts to each other (Stillar 45,46).

Theme

Theme is described as the “point of departure” (Martin et al. 21) for the message; as Halliday puts it, theme functions as “I’ll tell you about [...]” (Halliday 38). There is a difference in theme, for example, in sentences in the active and passive voices. In the sentence “You can easily face one economy more,” “you” is the theme, what the clause is going to tell us about. In “One economy more can easily be faced,” “one economy more” is the theme. Theme is easily identified by the position of prominence accorded it: “theme is realized by initial position in the clause” (Martin et al. 21). Themes can be marked or unmarked. An unmarked theme in a declarative sentence is also the grammatical subject, “you” in “You do them with gladness and contentment”; in an imperative it is the main verb, “do” as in “Do them with gladness and contentment”; and in an interrogative it is the querying word, the word that seeks the information, “what” in “What do you do?” A marked theme, however, has greater textual prominence (Martin et al 24). In a declarative sentence a theme is marked if it is not the grammatical subject, as in “So one economy more can easily be faced”; in an interrogative, theme is marked if something other than the querying word occurs initially, as in “Then what is another penalty?”

As Stillar points out, theme is “a major way through which a writer or speaker structures the text’s flow of information” (48). Identifying the theme of each clause in isolation is not the point of an analysis; rather, seeing patterns, noticing “what gets to be
theme," and whether themes are marked or unmarked helps in the analysis of thematic
development (Stillar 48).

Cohesion

The other textual resource is cohesion, achieved in part through reference and
conjunction, "the semantic relations that enable one part of the text to function as the
context for another" (Halliday and Hasan 48). Cohesive reference allows a word or
phrase "to function as the context" for a word, phrase, or pronoun replacement. For
example, "them" in the last sentence of the sample text would have no meaning if not
for the earlier phrase "the extraordinary things of economy and contrivance."

References may look back in the text (anaphoric), forward in the text (cataphoric), or
outside the text (exophoric) (Stillar 49). Conjunction allows a logical relation to occur
between clauses. Stillar lists the four basic types of conjunctive relations: "additive (e.g.
and, furthermore, in addition [...]), adversative (e.g. yet, but, however [...]), causal
(e.g. so, therefore, because [...]), and temporal (e.g. finally, first, meanwhile [...])"
(50).

Analysis Using Textual Aspects

The sample text is not particularly rich in its use of textual resources. However,
we can trace the patterns of thematic development and note that in eight cases the theme
of a clause is "you"; such a theme places the reader in the unusual position of being
told, essentially, "What I'm going to tell you about is 'you.'" Most of the themes in the
text are also unmarked, providing another resource for the information to be naturalized:
there is nothing remarkable, unusual, or unnatural about the way in which the
information is given, and therefore nothing, ostensibly, unnatural about the information
itself. The text also contains clauses with multiple themes which occur when sentence
adjuncts, words or phrases that serve as links, vocatives, attitudinals, or topics, take the
normal thematic position (Stillar 47-48). The second sentence of the text begins with
the topical adjunct, “As to the penalty,” indicating a shift in content; it therefore
functions ideationally, and because the theme is marked, the idea of “penalty” is given
prominence. Marked themes can also be “important in structuring the rest of the
discourse” (Martin et. al. 24), and this marked signalling of a change from “economy” to
“penalty” begins the move in the text down to the lowest point of “capitulation to the
enemy.”

Conclusion

By using the “interlocking operations” (Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 22) of
Bourdieu’s social theory, Burke’s rhetorical theory, and Halliday’s language theory,
we are able to “begin to touch [the structures] erected by propaganda” (Ellul, “The
Ethics of Propaganda” 164). The social theory of Bourdieu opens up the idea that the
columnists of The Family Journal, as the authorized spokespersons of the group, create
and sustain a sense of consensus through “symbolic power,” the power to make the
official and legitimate version of the social world. When readers “misrecognize”
symbolic power as power, when they recognize it instead as natural, then they become
complicitous in the process of world-making, or, in Ellul’s terms, in the process of
integration propaganda. However, because a rhetorical community embraces and
acknowledges difference, those who create the consensus must always contend with
resistance, whether it is implicitly or explicitly stated; they must continuously create and
sustain “common sense, the feeling of obviousness” (Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic
The columnists must therefore constantly define and classify women and their roles in the face of the ever-changing social conditions precipitated by the war.

Burke's rhetorical theory provides ways of understanding how this sense of consensus can be accomplished through the assignation of "substance" and the construction of hierarchies. When the columnists define "woman," they must do so analogically because any assignation of substance is necessarily an assignation in terms of something else, for example, "a good woman is an understudy to an angel" (The Family Journal Feb. 17, 1917: 274). Barthes suggests that when these assignations of essence become culturally enhanced, they become myths, which are so forceful that they operate to impose meaning; as such they are powerful resources for propaganda because they provide the propagandee with ready-made values.

Burke's theory also helps us to understand how hierarchies can become significant resources for propaganda in the texts. Because language allows the columnists to make discriminations, to create order with words, women are made to understand that their patriotic duty is only secondary to that of the combatants; Ellul argues that this sense of inferiority, this anxiety, is necessary to move people to action. However, mobilizing the tradition of women's magazines that provides "recipes" for success, the columnists are also able to give advice on how to be a good and patriotic woman, thereby assuaging the effects of anxiety by creating hierarchies that offer women, at least potentially, perfection as women.

Halliday's functional grammar provides a vocabulary with which to investigate the linguistic choices made by the columnists that enable the establishment of consensus and hierarchy. By tracing patterns of transitivity, lexical choices, thematic
considerations, and modality, we can see how the columnists "do things" with words to make meaning and to establish relationships; we can see how language operates as "symbolic action."
Consensus, the idea that “the interests of the whole population are undivided” (Fowler 49), is a significant resource for the centripetal action of propaganda. Ellul argues that integration propaganda inculcates and reinforces ideas because people read or listen to the press of their own group, and gradually become more convinced “that their group is right, that its actions are justified” (Propaganda 213; emphasis added). Consensus then becomes a moral force; to agree with the majority creates a sense of moral justification. Several significant contributors to the sense of consensus were already in place in women’s magazines. Women’s magazines were structured by epideictic, the meta-genre that assumes the presence of commonly held beliefs. But consensus does not exist independently of the discourse and must instead be created by it, and again the women’s magazine contained resources to be exploited. Cultural mythologies only needed to be redirected to include the war effort; the columnists who acted as spokespersons for the rhetorical community gave credence to these mythologies while reciprocally drawing authority from them. The “modes of address” adopted by the women’s magazine, proverbs, verse, and various forms of narrative, had already established a “‘normal’ style” which is “fundamental to the building of an assumption of consensus” (Fowler 48). But consensus, which “sounds like a liberal, humane and generous theory of social action and attitudes, in practice […] breeds divisive and alienating attitudes, a dichotomous vision of ‘us’ and ‘them’” (Fowler 16); it acts centripetally by creating division, or, in Burke’s terms, it engenders “congregation” by
creating "segregation" (*Dramatism and Development* 29).

**Epideictic as Consensus Assuming/Consensus Creating**

Consensus is a powerful resource for propaganda; it provides the propagandist with the apparent authority of the majority, which, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out, can easily be converted into universal truths: "Being in no fear of contradiction, the speaker [of epideictic discourse] readily converts into universal values, if not eternal truths, that which has acquired a certain standing through social unanimity" (51). Because epideictic discourse assumes agreement on beliefs or values, its resources can readily be mobilized for propaganda. Adopting the "consensual we," a position which can narrow and broaden depending on the subject matter (Fowler 49), epideictic discourse immediately creates a sense of consensus. In *Analyzing Public Discourse* Martha Cooper argues that no single "public" exists, that "the public" is created and recreated by the actions or ideas presented in any given context: "the public sphere is constantly in flux as actions and ideas change" (3). Each action or idea interpellates a different public, a different virtual community, that forms the collective "we" of the public. *The Family Journal* might use "we" to refer specifically to its readers, to British women in general, or to the entire Allied cause. Fowler points out that "we" need not be used directly to invoke the sense of the consensual "we" (214). The Rev. E.J. Austin directs his comments directly to "you," the reader, in this example: "Here is Christmas upon you and you are exercising all your wits to make your efforts for a happy time for your husband and children fit in with your patriotism" (Dec. 15, 1917: 113; emphasis added). However the underlying sense still implies the consensual "we" in the sense that "we" all agree that a woman's duty is to her husband and children
and that women can no longer spend extravagantly if they are to realize their patriotic duty.

Even though epideictic discourse assumes agreement on values and beliefs, consensus is constructed by discourse. Epideictic is both consensus-assuming, and consensus-constructing. Hall discusses this process: "[I]n orienting themselves in 'the consensus' and, at the same time, attempting to shape up the consensus, operating in it in a formative fashion, the media become part and parcel of that dialectical process of the 'production of consent'—shaping the consensus while reflecting it" ("The Rediscovery of 'Ideology'" 87).

The exigency of war tends to crystallize the needs of a nation and in itself creates consubstantiality within a group through the identification of a common enemy: the sense that "he that is not with me is against me" (Matt. 12.30) which is prominent in war tends to assign substance dialectically as "us" and "them," "allies" and "enemies." When a reader complains that "Bridget" has called them all patriotic Englishwomen, ignoring the fact that many of her readers are Irish or Scottish, "Bridget" downplays division and foregrounds consubstantiality: "WE ARE ALL BORN OF THE BULLDOG BREED—And that is why we are bearing trouble—and in some cases poverty—and in all cases anxiety, with a head held high and a brave heart" (October 17, 1914: 671). As Haste notes, the "spirit of the trenches" was absent from the homefront: the civilian population was not united by an "esprit de corps"; "what they endured, they endured singly, man by man" (73), and, we should add, woman by woman. In the form of integration propaganda, epideictic discourse was required throughout the war to create this esprit de corps on the homefront, to perform the centripetal function of pulling
people together. By 1917, when war-weariness had set in, the need for this *esprit de corps* at home was even more urgent than it had been in 1914. "Bridget's" early enthusiasm and assurance are tempered somewhat by her use of the conditional in this statement: "THE FOOD CONTROLLER TELLS US WE SHALL FACE EVEN THE SUBMARINE MENACE IF WE ALL DO OUR SHARE" (May 19, 1917: 61); nonetheless, the sense of consubstantiality created by the presence of an enemy and the need to pull together is present in the multiple first person plural pronouns, the consensual "we," and in the sense of the sharing of responsibility.

Epideictic discourse also acts to provide some sense of stability in uncertain times. Ellul notes that integration propaganda "seeks to obtain stable behavior" (*Propaganda* 75). Although in the England of 1914 war was expected and anticipated,² the declaration of war nonetheless catapulted the country into unfamiliar and uncertain social terrain. As young men rushed to join up, and food prices rose, the corporate sector adopted the slogan, "Business as Usual." Censorship and the "[e]xcitement and enthusiasm for the war [that] bordered upon derangement" (Marwick 38) spawned wild rumours. Recognizing the need to assuage this panic, the September 12, 1914 edition of *The Family Journal* attempts to promote stability as it cheerfully proclaims consensually that "EVERYBODY is determined to keep calm and cheerful come what may, neither unduly elated at news of victory nor panic-stricken at news of defeat. STEADY'S THE WORD—IN THE KING'S NAME!" (547). That the paper deems it necessary to announce that "everybody" is "calm and cheerful" belies the fact that they are, indeed, "calm and cheerful." Stability is also produced by the "rhetoric of reaffirmation" which invokes "inherited images of perfection" (Goodwin 27) or past
glory to increase the sense of consensus. "To do our duty in time of national Crisis has ever been the pride and glory of the British Nation" (Sept. 5, 1914: 524). Whether these national stereotypes are true or not is a moot point: they are presented as if they are true, then imposed as a standard.

Mythologies

One of the resources that can be mobilized for creating a sense of consensus and stability is the reinforcement of cherished ideals, what Weinroth calls "idealist visions of society" (33), and what Barthes calls "mythologies." In tracing Barthes' "semiological chain" (Mythologies 123) of myth, we can use war as an entry point because "the idea of war was intimately connected with many other values of Western culture" (Tylee, The Great War 20). The myth of war looks backwards to conceptions of Empire and Britain's imperialist mandate, then forges its own semiological chain when it is invoked specifically as the historical First World War. Barthes notes the connection between myth and history: "what the world supplies to myth is an historical reality [. . . ]; and what myth gives in return is a natural image of this reality" (Mythologies 155).

When war was actually declared, a number of myths were waiting to be filled in with this real, historical presence, and, reciprocally, the character of war "naturally" assumed the myths that were already there. Because myth provides an empty form of value which needs to be filled by specific images, "the fundamental character of the mythical concept is to be appropriated" (Barthes, Mythologies 129).

The war propaganda directed at women in these texts appropriates the mythologies of Empire and war from the nineteenth century, and those of the Crusades, of chivalry, and of the codes of behaviour for both knights and ladies, from the middle
ages. It appropriates them, then uses them as a way of assigning substance to the present
war, combatants, and women. Barthes discusses the ways in which cultural mythologies
arise, are reified, and become persuasive; myth makes propagandees “understand
something” in a specific way, then it “imposes” the view on them (Barthes, Mythologies
126). Barthes notes that “mythical signification [. . .] unavoidably contains some
analogy” (Mythologies 136). Like metaphor, myth places things “vividly before the
eye” (Quintilian, qtd. in Marlin 42). Like metaphor, myth is difficult to refute. Because
the sign of mythology has been “culturally enriched” (Turner 18), it is difficult to argue
that, for example, combatants are not Christ-like in the sacrifices they make, that women
are not angel-like in their responses to the wounded; to do so would be to appear prosaic
and literal, to “deny what nobody takes to be asserted” (Marlin 42). The analogy
performs the symbolic action of transformation, asking readers to see the combatants or
women in the terms the propaganda uses, to accept the analogy; once the propagandee
accepts that transformation, he or she becomes implicated in the identification it
assumes, and the transformation becomes part of what Ellul calls “orthopraxy.” Once
the propagandee has acted “in obedience to propaganda [she] can never go back. [She]
is now obliged to believe in that propaganda” (Ellul, Propaganda 29). Consequently,
myth becomes a potent resource for consensus.

The texts in this study very clearly appropriate the mythological aspects of war
from those propagated in the Victorian era by a renewed sense of Britain’s imperialist
mandate and “national purpose with high moral content” (MacKenzie 2). British
imperialism had necessitated a stronger military profile, and military sentiments had
begun to be infused into civilian life; missionary evangelism required a “more militant
and militaristic tone [and] the language of war entered into hymns, tracts, and sermons” (MacKenzie 6). Occurring in the far reaches of the empire, war itself “became a remote adventure in which heroism was enhanced by both distance and exotic locales” (MacKenzie 6). C.J. Keep discusses the ways in which “future war” fiction contributed to “the peace-time maintenance of the belief in war as natural and inevitable, even desirable” (4), in part because these future war stories were “staunchly conservative, their vision of war owing more to the glory days of Napoleonic Wars than to the possibilities of modern weaponry and rapid transportation” (7). “The Great War was taken by contemporaries in either a political or a metaphysical plane (‘the battle for civilization,’ ‘the war to end all wars’). It juxtaposed nationalistic goals with religious values (the war as apocalypse, bloodshed as purification)” (Higonnet and Higonnet 4).

These grandiose claims for the purpose of the war are apparent in the texts: England has entered the war “to save the world from anarchy and militarism” (Jan. 9, 1915: 271); Mrs. Wise notes that “the world has made one great resolution for 1915—that wars should cease for ever. The great war now waging is the last of all wars. It is the war which is to kill war” (Jan. 2, 1915: 249). It is apocalyptic in that “this great war is best looked upon as a birthday of a new world” (May 8, 1915: 61); and it will bring about the purification of the next generation who will lead “pure and fine lives because they cannot insult the memory of fathers who died for Right” (Jan. 30, 1915: iii). When Mrs. Wise uses the curious phrase, “the war now waging,” she invokes the myth of “the war itself,” the myth of “the independent agency of war” (Hanley 29). In her usage, “war” becomes the agent, and “wage” becomes an intransitive verb, one that “does not involve anyone or anything other than the subject” (Collins Cobuild 139); her phrase, then, both
creates the war as an entity in itself and elides any human responsibility for, or implication in, it.

However, while the Victorian mythology of war had melded militarism and Christianity, an inevitable conflict arises in a war that invokes Christian ideals; if Christ is "the Prince of Peace," a war fought in Christ's name causes an "incompatibility" between the ideas of war and peace. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca outline the strategy of "dissociation of concepts" used to resolve this incompatibility (413); by breaking one of the offending concepts into two, the incompatibility is resolved. Mrs. Wise demonstrates this strategy in saying, "Therefore, this Christmas we ought more than ever to celebrate the great truths that whereas wars, the production of men, can but last for a while, Peace, the son of God, is with us forever [. . .]. It is in order that Universal Peace may reign in the world that brave men are dying in the blood-stained fields of Europe" (Dec. 12, 1914: 162). "Peace" is here broken into two, the everlasting Peace of Christ and the intermittent peace of humans. The operation of dissociation, "by remodelling our conception of reality, [. . .] prevents the reappearance of the same incompatibility" (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 413). But in this case the dissociation does such a good job of "remodelling" that the new concept takes on the status of Barthesian myth: Universal and everlasting Peace, the "final term in the linguistic system," becomes "the first term in the mythical system" (Barthes 126), and the war becomes a holy war to bring about Christ's Peace.

If the war is a holy war, a crusade for "Right," then the men who fight this battle must be crusaders, "Just Warriors," men "engaged in the regrettable but sometimes necessary task of collective violence in order to prevent some greater wrong" (Elshtain,
"On Beautiful Souls" 343). The image of the "Just" or "Christian Warrior" is evoked by Mrs. Wise:

The real Christian has not in any way forgotten he is a man of action—that is his birthright—but he has knelt down in front of the Cross in the spirit of humility. But remember, he is still the warrior, the man of action. His sword is by his side, his spurs are buckled at his heel, and when action is required in the cause of Righteousness, he will arise and go forth to war.

The Christian was given his strong arm to defend the Right [...].

But friends, the Christian man must never forget his humility. That is his badge. That is the banner under which he fights. (April 10, 1915: 608)

The Christian warrior fights only when necessary, combining humility with Christian zeal for righteousness; "[s]acrilized, the sword was hallowed when wielded by a Christian knight" (Elshtain, Women and War 133), and mythologized, the modern infantryman becomes a medieval knight, trading rifle and boots for sword and spurs.

The death of a combatant is the death of a hero, and such a death has implications not only for the war effort but for humanity as a whole. The final stanza of a verse entitled "For the Bereaved" sums up the chivalric mythology of the war, what Robert MacDonald calls "the iconography of the good death," "dying well for Queen and Country" (23) that arose in the popular culture of the late nineteenth century:

Take comfort, ye who mourn a loved one lost

Upon the battlefield.

Thank God for one who, counting not the cost,
Faced death and would not yield.

Thank God, although your eyes with tears are dim,
And sad your life, and grey,

That, howsoever the battle went, for him

'Twas victory that day!

With armour buckled on and flag unfurled,

The heights of death he trod,

Transported from the warfare of the world

Into the peace of God. (May 20, 1916: 80)

As a "Just Warrior," the combatant is constructed as "one who places highest value not on killing but on dying—dying for others, to protect them, sacrificing himself so that others might live" (Elshtain, Women and War 206). But "dying well for [King] and Country" takes on more universal significance in the war; as Mrs. Wise says, "There is no waste about the life of a man, however young, who dies for Right and Truth. His life is perfectly complete. He dies in order that life itself may be a purer and finer thing. He dies, and in his very death conquers Wrong" (Feb. 6, 1915: 360). The Christological reference is obvious in Mrs. Wise's statement, and the sense of perfection elevates the soldier from the realm of the ordinary human being to a loftier one. Death as glorious sacrifice is evident in another statement by Mrs. Wise as she urges, "[L]et us remember the beauty of the death; let us ask ourselves: Could he have died more nobly?" (Dec. 26, 1914: 225; emphasis added).

Most of the preceding examples are taken from the early years of the war, 1914 and 1915. As the war progressed and wounded men returned home, it was not as easy to
portray the war and the sacrifices made by the combatants in chivalric terms; for the combatants themselves, the discourse of chivalry had become "a mockery" (Higonnet 208), although Fussell notes that "as late as 1918 it was still possible for some men who had actually fought to sustain the old rhetoric" (23). Certainly the "'high' diction" (Fussell 22) did not disappear entirely from the popular press; in 1917 The Family Journal was still talking about "this great, and indeed, holy war" (June 30, 1917: 147) and in 1918 there was still the belief that "RIGHT MUST AND WILL CONQUER" (May 25, 1918: 77). By 1916, however, the emphasis on dying had been replaced by an emphasis on killing. An advertisement urging women to buy War Savings Certificates to pay for ammunitions, announces that "One grenade can kill four or five men, so that, given luck, a fine day, a good bomber, and plenty of Germans, six grenades may account for thirty of the enemy" (June 10, 1916: iii).

The vocabulary of chivalry may have become less prominent in the later years of the war, but the mythology of chivalry remained, albeit somewhat subdued, because the meaning of the sacrifice had to remain constant. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca indicate the symbiotic relationship between the sacrifice and the ideal for which the sacrifice is made: "the sacrifice is the measure of the value attributed to the thing for which the sacrifice is made"; reciprocally, "the sacrifice, when realized and accepted, increases and enhances the reasons for the struggle" (248, 280). "Mother" says, "For these boys who have bled for us we can never do enough. We owe them our lives. Theirs are the bodies which receive the blows for us from a brutal enemy. They stand between us and — what?" (August 18, 1917: 250). "Bridget," not putting too fine a point
on it, says, “Yes, sisters, EVERY MAN WHO DIES, DIES FOR YOU AND ME. SEE YOU BE WORTHY” (April 28, 1917: 7).

Another significant factor in keeping mythology alive is the way in which the “signifying chain” of mythology is structured such that to deny one element is to set off a reaction that reverberates through the chain; to deny the metaphor of the war as a crusade would be to deny the sanctity of the death of the men who fought and died. “Medieval ideals of the spiritual value of war [. . .] proved hard to eradicate once rooted in the blood of young men who had apparently died in their belief” (Tylee, “Verbal Screens” 139). Having cast the combatants in a Christological role, it is tantamount to sacrilege to question the reason for their deaths. Peter Buitenhuis suggests that “[t]he curtain of evasions and misconceptions [about conditions in the trenches] was so thick that few serving soldiers could pierce it with the accounts of their own experiences” (101). One of the reasons for the persistence of these misconceptions is the way in which mythology imposes itself; in Ellul’s theory, a myth is a powerful “all-encompassing, activating image: a sort of vision of desirable objectives that have lost their material, practical character” (Propaganda 31). Even if “[t]he degradation of the trenches remained the best-kept secret of the war” (Buitenhuis 79), real stories of experiences could not compete with the “all-encompassing” quality of myths; because myths don’t have to deal with material and practical aspects, they can remain desirable and therefore “activating.” Real experiences could not compete with myth for another reason: Barthes argues that myths become “naturalized” because the “myth consumer” mistakes a semiological system, a system of values, for a system of facts and sees a relationship of equivalence as one of causality (Mythologies 142). The
commonly held value of "heroism in the abstract" (Brittain 129) ennobled death in
the trenches, and made it appear that those deaths, no matter what the factual reality,
were naturally noble. In the words of Mrs. Wise, "[I]t is a great privilege to have the
memory of such a noble death" (Dec. 26, 1914; 225).

Fussell points out that the clichés and euphemisms on which the mythologies of
war relied provided a prophylaxis in thought. But the use of this vocabulary is more
than an "intoxicating potion" (Tylee, The Great War 60) with which to soothe the minds
of civilians. As Tylee points out, it transformed the war and its causes from "imperialist
rivalry into a crusade" (The Great War 57). In Burke's rhetorical theory, transformation
is a way of creating identification, a way of seeking to "unite the audience in substance"
by having them accept the terms in which the object or person is presented (Stillar 74).
At the outset of the war the common soldier is transformed in Mrs. Wise's opinion from
a "coarse [. . .] loud" fellow into a "splendid fellow"; Mrs. Wise invokes the spirit of
the chivalric tradition and asks her reader to share this transformation: "Before this war,
I wasn't just over-fond of Tommy Atkins, somehow. He seemed to me just a wee bit
coarse and a wee bit loud. But what a splendid fellow he has turned out now that the
bullets are flying!" She then relates a story about Sir Philip Sidney6 and ends by
affirming that "our soldiers are knightly gentlemen" (Oct. 24, 1914: 701) because they
are all now identified with the noble spirit if Sidney. An examination of the syntactical
strategies used by Mrs. Wise shows how she manages to create a sense of consensus
about this transformation. Although she uses relational processes in the two clauses,
attributive in, "he seemed to me just a wee bit coarse," and classification in, "our
soldiers are knightly gentlemen," the two clauses have very different effects. The first
clause is clearly marked as Mrs. Wise's opinion only by the verb "seemed," and reinforced by the phrase "to me." The second clause represents the process as an "objective" description of a state of affairs; it is no longer her opinion only but the natural and legitimate one.

While male combatants are given a particular familial substance through their association with the glorious past and Christian ideals, women at home are given substance through their association with these modern crusaders:

Long ago the British man and soldier was just as he is today--brave, courageous, holding his womankind dear, and full of a belief in Right. [...] And so it is today, dear friends. We have the noble tradition of a race which has always stood for Right against Might. [...] Take the soldier in his khaki uniform; take the Crusader in his glittering armour, and before you stand two men, exactly similar, brave and fearless, going forth to fight for Truth and Right, and by the side of each stands a girl, with fearless, British true eyes, who belts his sword upon her hero, and tells him to go forth. (April 3, 1915: 580)

Here, the medieval maiden is made consubstantial with her "hero"; she becomes the Just Warrior's better half, the "Beautiful Soul" (Elshtain, Women and War 140), but in becoming consubstantial with her hero, the maiden gains her status in terms of him; she becomes "the hero's beloved" (Gorham 12). The contemporary woman, or "girl" in the text, is made consubstantial with her medieval sister, but their link again is forged only through their men; the myth of the Just Warrior transcends the differences in the men so that they are "exactly similar," but what the women have in common is that they both
stand by the side of their Just Warriors and tell them “to go forth.” Through identification and consubstantiation, the texts attempt to achieve the propagandistic goal that Tylee identifies of convincing both men and women that women concurred with the government’s war efforts by sending their men off to fight (“Maleness Run Riot” 209).

Being assigned a substance through that of the Just Warrior implicates women in the chivalric code. Even though the Victorians modified chivalry to suit their needs, “devotion, tenderness, courtesy and protection were essential parts of the original code [of chivalric love] which the Victorians could take over without qualms” (Girouard 198). “Mother” outlines what it means to be a “lady”:

To be a lady means rightly to be a gentlewoman who shows by her every word and action a sweet and gentle dignity, with a gracious charm of manner; a woman whose heart is pure, who is tender towards all suffering, who sympathizes with those in trouble, and is ever ready to give that which cost her some effort and self-denial. A lady thinks no work too menial, and no one is deemed too low to receive courtesy and kindness. She is pure and good in every detail of life, a true friend, and a “ministering angel” in sorrow and sickness. (May 5, 1917: 32).

The word “lady” itself has a contentious history in women’s magazines, being at times synonymous with “woman,” at other times referring exclusively to aristocratic women. In this context, however, “lady,” particularly with its tautological connection to “gentlewoman,” is meant to invoke medieval notions of courtly love, to correspond to the knightly role of “gentlemen,” thereby reinforcing the mythology of chivalry from a female perspective. The predominance of relational:attributive processes indicates that
this is a text designed to create substance, because in relational:attributive processes something is said to be something else, and the vocabulary of purity, gentleness, goodness, and tenderness that collocates around “lady” leaves little ambiguity at the ideational level.

Many women found that “the religious aura of chivalry gave some significance to their enforced dependence” (Tylee, The Great War 73). While the mythology of chivalry transformed the common soldier into a Christian warrior, it also transformed the ordinary woman into a “symbolic object of patriotic veneration” (Goldman 6), turning her into a “Beautiful Soul,” a “being defined by a mode of consciousness which allows him or her to protect the appearance of purity by cultivating innocence about the historical course of the world” (Elshtain, Women and War 4). This position is precisely that inhabited by women consigned to the domestic, private sphere by Victorian sensibilities. Remaining at home and becoming “symbolic object[s] of patriotic veneration” also tied women more closely to the principle of the “eternal feminine,” which Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar trace from Goethe to its Victorian representation as an “angel in the house.” The “eternal feminine” is contemplative, passive, reticent, and morally pure (22-23). It is selfless, but as such it “shines like a beacon in a dark world, like a motionless lighthouse by which others [. . . ] can set their course” (Eichner qtd. in Gilbert and Gubar 22). Feminine virtue sets off, inspires, masculine greatness, and war emphasizes this role, in part because of the physical distance between combatants and civilians. Even as late as 1918 “Y.Z.” is still able to assume that a soldier in his trench will find inspiration from his “girl” at home: “He thinks of his girl, patiently waiting for his return, and always anxious about him. ‘Dear little girl,’ he
whispers to himself, ‘There isn’t another like her.’ And this thought of home keeps him cheery and bright, and braces him for fresh effort, fresh endurance” (March 16, 1918: 332).

But if the mythology of chivalry “gave significance to women’s forced dependence,” it also actually helped construct that dependence. War as a crusade constructed not only women’s conception of the war, “but of themselves in relation to it”: the chivalric code implicitly assigned to women “the passive role of ‘damsels in distress’” (Tylee, The Great War 57, 64). This passivity, however, is of a specific kind; it is not physical passivity because agitation propaganda tells women what they must do to aid the war effort. The passivity created by the mythology of chivalry takes the form of “mental submissiveness” (Tylee, The Great War 57), laying the groundwork for the call to action of agitation propaganda. Mental submissiveness engenders feelings of helplessness, which in turn lead to “guilt at not being involved, at being merely onlookers” (Goldman 11) at the war, and guilt at their own inactivity leaves women open to suggestion about what it is they can do. “Protection” in the chivalric code applies not only to the physical protection that men provided for women by fighting, but also the mental protection of sparing women’s delicate psyches from the actual conditions of war. “Few soldiers wrote the truth in letters home for fear of causing needless uneasiness” (Fussell 87). This mental protectionism ensured that women were retained “in a world glamorised by veils of romantic fantasy” (Tylee, The Great War 52), just as official censorship ensured that the civilian population generally remained ignorant of the realities of war.
Mental submissiveness is also reinforced by the myth of the “eternal feminine.” Mrs. Wise reinscribes the difference between “the ‘ideal of contemplative purity’” which is always feminine and “the ‘ideal of significant action’” which is always masculine (Gilbert and Gubar 21) and which allows the life of its representative to “have a story” (Eichner qtd. in Gilbert and Gubar 22):

The man goes out to fight. He is with his fellows. The enemy is in front of him. The trumpet sounds. He thinks of his country, his wife, his children, and is inspired with courage.

But the woman sits at home. Hers is the fearful anxiety, the agony of not knowing. A hundred rumours come to her, a hundred panics assail her, and she has no trumpet to sound to inspire her, no flashing of arms, no shoulder-to-shoulder feeling such as helps the soldier so much.

The women must fight in the great battle as well. Their enemies are the demons of Fear and Panic, and they must fight them with weapons of calm courage. [. . . ] The men will do the outside fight; the women must do the inside one. (Sept. 12, 1914: 564)

Staccato rhythms characterize the descriptions of the man’s role; there are action verb processes in “the man goes to fight” and “the trumpet sounds,” and a mental:cognitive process in “he thinks.” The discussion of the woman’s role, however, is characterized by relational processes of identification, “hers is the fearful anxiety,” and location, “the woman sits at home.” One relational:location process that occurs in the section on the man’s role places him “with his fellows,” and the other places the enemy “in front of him”; these relational processes, then, place him in the action. The relational:attributive
process that concludes the first paragraph, "[he] is inspired with courage," serves to
code his action as "significant action" because being "inspired" suggests the operation
of a higher power. The woman, however, far from being "inspired with courage," is
instead assailed with "panic." She does not "think," as does the man, but rather is the
grammatical "patient" or recipient of the action in "a hundred rumours come to her, a
hundred panics assail her"; she is not even the theme of most of the clauses in her
section, which is appropriate for the representative of the principle of the "eternal
feminine" whose life has "no story" (Eichner qtd. in Gilbert and Gubar 22). Her section
begins with the adversative conjunction, "but," which intentionally sets it apart, marks it
as different, from the description of the masculine role. And indeed the description of
her role is a negative image of his: she has "no trumpet [...], no flashing of arms, no
shoulder-to-shoulder feeling." The modality in the last paragraph also differs for the
masculine and the feminine roles. "The men will do the outside fight" indicates a
certainty about future events, whereas "the women must do the inside one" indicates
modality of obligation, reinforced by two other uses of "must" in connection with the
women's role. The men are living up to the masculine "ideal of significant action," but
the women have not lived up to the feminine "ideal of contemplative purity" by letting
fear and panic assail them; they need to be reminded of their obligation to face their
"enemies" with "calm courage."

Barthes points out that "myth hides nothing: its function is to distort"
(Mythologies 131), making it a valuable resource for consensus. As Ellul says, existing
ideas should be used by the propagandist, even if they need to be distorted: "propaganda
cannot create something out of nothing. It must attach itself to a feeling, an idea; it must
build on a foundation already present” (*Propaganda* 35, 36). If propaganda is to convince women that their duties and concerns are now political rather than private, it must do so from the foundation of cherished notions of what it means to be a woman; having reconfirmed the foundational mythology that “a good woman is an understudy to an angel” (Feb. 17, 1917: 274), the propaganda can then establish the new terms of angel-like behaviour in the context of war.

**The Role of the Spokesperson**

While mythologies are significant for the propaganda process, they must be disseminated in some way. Mythologies have a reciprocal relationship to those who exploit and mobilize them; if myths are generally accepted and believed, then they give credibility to those who utter them; simultaneously, the authority of the group’s spokesperson lends credence to the myths themselves. As Bourdieu has argued, making something public is a way of assuming consensus; an author, he claims, “is someone who makes public things which everyone felt in a confused sort of way; someone who possesses a special capacity, that of publishing the implicit, the tacit” (*In Other Words* 82). The audience is then called upon to ratify and sanction that which has been made public, and they can do so “even by staying silent” (82). In a competitive market, readers of magazines ratify and sanction what has been made public by continuing to purchase the magazine, and we know that *The Family Journal* was able to survive the war while many similar weekly papers did not. In some instances, however, readers verbally indicate their ratification. After a particularly harsh condemnation of a “cad” who, instead of fighting for his country, stays at home and attempts to win the affections of young women, “Y.Z.” reports that all the readers who responded to his column agreed
that the usurper of the young women’s affections was indeed a cad. Of course we only have “Y.Z.’s” word for this, but the point is not whether or not he is correct; rather, the point is that “Y.Z.” is in a position to be making truth, to be making public what others have felt tacitly; making this “truth” public then gives it an official status. To have been passed the sceptron from the institution of The Family Journal makes “Y.Z.” into an authorized spokesperson, and as such he gives “voice to those in whose name [he] is authorized to speak” (Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power 211).

“Y.Z.” is in a position to employ “the oracle effect,” the “trick which consists of producing both the message and the interpretation of the message,” and it is this “trick” which “authorizes a move from the indicative to the imperative” (Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power 211, 212), or indeed, which gives the indicative of the spokesperson the force of the imperative. “Bridget” says, “[I]f you are a true patriotic woman, as I know each one of my FAMILY JOURNAL readers undoubtedly is, you will have said to yourself, when the first little gasp of sorrow is over, ‘WHAT CAN I DO TO HELP?’” (Sept. 5, 1914: 527); “Mother” says, “Like true members of my club, they have BORNE THE PARTING WITH SMILING FACES, turning a bright and cheerful countenance to their brave boys or husbands as they bade them good-bye” (Oct. 10, 1914: 660). If the reader sees herself as a “true” member of “Mother’s” club, if she sees herself as a “true patriotic woman,” if she takes the expected pride in the “essence [or] competence” given by that role (Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power 120), then she is obligated to act in a certain way; there is no allowable negotiation between the two. If the spokesperson is “an incarnation of the collective, of the group, and if this group is the group to which you belong, which defines you, which gives you an identity,
which means you are *really a teacher*, *really a Protestant*, *really a Catholic*, *really a woman* etc. you *really have no choice but to obey*” (Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* 212). It is in this way that the spokesperson is able to “speak in the name of something which he [or she] brings into existence by his [or her] very discourse” (Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* 211). If the spokesperson did not represent the group, speak for, or in the name of, the group, the group could not exist; in return the group legitimizes the spokesperson by ratifying and sanctioning his or her words. When the editor says, “STEADY’S THE WORD—IN THE KING’S NAME,” he becomes the spokesperson, not only for the “home-loving women,” which is the group created by his representation in *The Family Journal*, but also for the entire nation metonymically by invoking the king. 

*Ethos*

Even if the spokesperson is recognized as the legitimate representative of the group, he or she must still maintain the goodwill of the audience and make himself or herself appear trustworthy to the audience. In Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, “*ethos,*” the moral character of a person, is one of the means of persuasion, one that must be created by the rhetor and be established in the discourse itself. As Aristotle makes clear in Book 2, *ethos* is not comprised of fixed qualities but is culturally determined and varies by the audience to whom the speech is directed. *Ethos* manifests the virtues most valued by the culture to which one speaks; it is “the cultural dress [. . . ] of human character” (Baumlin xxviii, n 5). In Aristotle’s view, the speaker must show himself or herself to be a person of good sense, good character, good will, according to accepted cultural norms. All three qualities contribute to the establishment of consensus: if the speaker displays
good sense and good moral character, then the audience will more readily agree that he or she is simply making public what everyone thought; if the speaker is perceived as having good will towards the audience, that he or she has their best interests in mind, then again the audience will be more willing to accept what he or she has to say.

Appendix A contains two texts in which two very different ethical appeals are created by two very different columnists. Text 1 is by "Bridget," who, as a woman, bases her ethical appeal to women on the solidarity of sex; Text 2 is by The Rev. E.J. Austin who bases his ethical appeal on the power of his position as a learned clergyman.

In the first paragraph of Text 1, the verb processes are predominately relational:existential ("is," "are," "are"), with the exception of the relational:identification process in "this cloud [. . .] is a great danger. The combination of relational processes and present tense produces the effect of expressing "categorical truth" (Fairclough 183). Metafunctionally, the relational:existential processes purport to present things as they are, with no mediation; they reinscribe "Bridget's" symbolic capital as spokesperson, as the one granted the power to create the ""official version of the social world"" (Harker et al. 13). "Bridget" needs to establish her authority with these relational verb processes because the next paragraph is dominated by imperatives; establishing her authority to represent social reality allows her to move easily and "naturally" into the series of imperatives in the second paragraph. But "Bridget" is also careful to establish solidarity8 with her readers before she issues this series of imperatives: "Oh, sisters, I am so very sorry for you." The vocative "Oh, sisters," directly hails a particular addressee and therefore performs a relational function.

"[S]isters" is also an evaluative term and thus positional, in that it indicates "Bridget's"
regard for her readers: they are her equals, her “family.” The relational:attributive process, “I am so very sorry for you,” constructs both power and solidarity. Being “sorry” for someone implies empathy and thus solidarity, but it simultaneously creates hierarchy and power in that being in a position to be sorry implies being in the powerful position of determining what semiosic rules are in play. “Bridget’s” good sense, then, is the common sense of her readers; her good moral character is conveyed by her empathy for, and understanding of, her audience’s sorrow; her good will toward her audience is apparent in her readiness to provide an “antidote” for their pain and sorrow.

Text 2 creates a completely different ethical argument. It is written by “The Rev. E.J. Austin, M.A.” and we have already seen how that designation draws on three aspects of symbolic capital—masculinity, the church, and higher learning—to inscribe his authority. Text 2 is concerned with creating the sense of its author as a logical and learned man. He begins by placing “Christianity” in the prominent thematic position, and it becomes the superordinate term which determines how the other terms are read; significantly, it announces that this text is “about” a very serious and important matter. The first verb process in the text, “has proved itself,” is an action:designative process; the present perfect tense makes it an action already accomplished, but one which continues into the present, lending to it the credibility of durability. “Proved” is a term with associations to formal argument and the decisiveness of validity. But where Text 2 most clearly purports to create a logical argument is at the level of the textual metafunction through the use of conjunctions. In the third sentence, the construction “while [. . . ] yet none the less” uses a subordinator and a conjunctive adjunct to allow one reality to be moderated or modified by another; in this case “yet” is adversative,
indicating the paradoxical nature of the sentence because the verbs “exalts” and “wears” in the present tense establish the truth of each clause. The causal conjunctive adjunct, “So that,” begins the next clause, relating the new unit of information causally to the previous one; “but,” an adversative, appears twice to contrast the negative and positive ways in which women “are seeking to realise their vocation.” “That” is an ellipsis of “so that,” a causal conjunction that links the work that women do with the reasons for doing it. Many of these conjunctive adjuncts are part of multiple themes, and their prominent thematic position codes them as important and significant. Text 2, then, gives the impression through the use of conjunctions of being logically connected, of being the product of a logical and learned author. Rev. Austin’s good sense is thus constructed by his ability to put together a logical argument; his good character is evident in his devotion to Christian ideals; and his good will toward his audience is evident in his concern that women look beyond the fleetingness of political power to the permanence of spirituality. For the audience of both texts there is a vicarious sense of power and morality in agreeing with the powerful and the moral person. Bourdieu notes the “psychosomatic effects of the euphoria caused by the unanimity of adherence and aversion” which helps create the feeling of “esprit de corps” (Language and Symbolic Power 202); consensus carries with it the moral benefit of being right.

While Aristotle’s concept of ethos dictates that it must be created through the speech itself, a cumulative ethos can also be built up over a series of texts, as in the case of the columnists who develop and maintain a persona in their texts. Mrs. Wise is a “natural” spokesperson of common-sense, of commonly-held values, because her area of expertise is “common-sense,” wisdom gained through years of experience rather than
knowledge learned through official education. In Mrs. Wise's case, we actually see the process of *The Family Journal* passing the *skeptron* to her. In her inaugural column, Mrs. Wise refers to the symbolic capital she has acquired in many years of living and uses it as a means of showing her good sense: "You all know me well enough by now; just an old woman who has lived long enough and kept her eyes open" (Aug. 1, 1914: 404). Even though Mrs. Wise is just beginning her column, she is well known to her readers because until now she has been a character in a column, "HOW MRS. WISE HELPED HER NEIGHBOURS. CAN SHE HELP YOU?" There is no explanation given about why she has suddenly become a columnist rather than a character,9 but her wisdom and "common-sense" make her a perfect spokesperson for the values of *The Family Journal*; she, or rather her persona, has acquired the symbolic capital that allows her to become a legitimate spokesperson for the group, and she can now take an active part in the production of both "the message and the interpretation of the message" (Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* 211). Mrs. Wise promises in her initial column that "the things I say will not be ASSERTIONS," and she says that "if you don't agree with me, I'm not saying you're wrong. Everybody has a right to his or her opinion." She is ostensibly willing to accommodate "variety within consensus" (Fowler 52). Yet in her subsequent columns she asserts over and over again that her opinion is the right one; for example, she says quite explicitly in one of her anecdotes, "I am glad to say that I managed to put before her the right side of things" (Feb. 20, 1915: 420). If she did not present "the right side of things," there would be no point in writing a column in a paper whose very purpose is to be "the helping friend who enters at just the right moment with counsel and aid" (May 8, 1909; 7). In an attempt to gain solidarity
with her readers, to gain the good will of her readers and to demonstrate her own moral character, Mrs. Wise later comments on her own apparent infallibility: “After reading my chats week after week, you have said to yourself possibly, ‘This Mrs. Wise must be a bit of a marvel. She never seems to do anything wrong, and she’s always telling other people how to do everything right.’ But I am perfectly human, my dear friends, even as you are” (June 10, 1916: 140).

Fowler identifies the affectation of the personal voice, a “necessary, but accepted illusion,” as a significant strategy for gaining a sense of consensus. Oral models, he contends, give “the illusion of conversation in which common sense is spoken about matters on which there is consensus” (47). Friendliness and informality, the cultivation of an intimate tone, and the “cosy invocation of a known commonality between ‘we women’” (Ballaster et al. 9) all contribute to the sense of the consensus by naturalizing “the terms in which reality is represented” (Fowler 57). The columns are perceived as weekly “chats”; the familial relationship of columnist and reader is cultivated and exploited; “Mother” calls her readers “daughters,” and “Bridget calls her readers “sisters.” Mrs. Wise usually begins her column with, “My dear Friends,” which, while it does sound rather epistolary, is certainly more intimate than “My dear Readers” would be. Fowler points out the role of modality in creating the sense of “the presence of a subjectivity behind the printed text, who is qualified with the knowledge required to pass judgement, the status to grant leave or assign responsibility.” Modality, he continues, gives “the illusion of a ‘person’ with a voice and opinions” (64). The number of relational:existential verb processes in Text 1 of Appendix A, for example, indicate “Bridget’s” belief that she is speaking the truth; the imperatives she uses—“[D]on’t sink.
Don’t give way to grief. Don’t brood anxiously”--are all based on a negative modality of desirability which indicate that she knows what her “sisters” are feeling and knows what is best for them.

“The Public Idiom of the Media”

The spokesperson is legitimated by the group for whom he or she speaks, and, in the case of the popular press, the spokesperson speaks through the medium of the paper. If what the spokesperson says is to be ratified and sanctioned by the group, it needs to be presented in a way which will be acceptable to the group. Stuart Hall suggests that each paper has its own “mode of address” which “has to do with the way an item is coded by the particular media into a particular language form. [. . .] [W]e want to call this form of address [. . .] the public idiom of the media” (qtd. in Fowler 48). Fowler extrapolates from Hall’s idea of the “public idiom of the media” the sense that “the establishment of this ‘normal’ style is fundamental to the building of an assumption of consensus” because a familiar style “allows the unnoticed expression of familiar thoughts” (48).

Discussing the way in which femininity is represented in women’s magazines generally, Ballaster et al. note that these representations are offered “in a form which is, above all, easy to deal with, process, interpret. This means that our task is not only to analyse these representations, but also to look critically at how they work, and examine the conditions which give them this air of obviousness” (132). Bourdieu ties his discussion of form to what he calls “censorship.” By censorship, Bourdieu does not mean the type of suppression of information for political reasons, as is the usual sense of the word, and which certainly contributes to the process of propaganda in the war; Philip Taylor has said that “censorship and propaganda are Siamese twins, inseparable and inextricable”
(qtd. in MacKenzie 3). Rather, Bourdieu means a censorship imposed by the field itself, a censorship that regulates "the forms and formalities" that will make the discourse effective within that field (Thompson, Introduction *Language and Symbolic Power* 20). Because the field has pre-selected the forms that will be effective within it, the forms that it uses appear to be natural and the process of censorship itself becomes invisible. Because of this invisible censorship, "a work is tied to a particular field no less by its form than by its content" (Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* 139). A lengthy discussion of the political motivations of the war in the form of an academic essay, for instance, would be censored by the field of women's magazines because it would not be effective; the field selects and validates what forms make sense. What is effective in *The Family Journal*, what the field already has selected and therefore naturalized, is the self-help article, the "tit-bit," the personal anecdote, the lay sermon, and the confessional letter, all of which draw on a genre of advice-giving, which automatically positions both writer and reader, and all of which appeal to the personal, appropriate for the women's magazine. However, while form is generative, it also "constrains against the discovery of information that does not fit the form" (Coe, "Apology" 20). The "tit-bit," for example, is a form that can accommodate only a small amount of information, usually the most sensational or humourous, and it cannot, therefore purport to examine in depth all the aspects of the situation. The "tit-bit," as Beetham points out, is a form that has its origins in the pre-selection of appropriate "bits" of longer articles for the female reader (122), and the form itself was then selected by the field of women's magazines.
Genre theorists suggest that form is only one of the resources of genre, rather than being synonymous with it; formal features are the "traces" of genre, "but they do not define or constitute the genre" (Devitt 575). Genres are realized through discourse; they are "embodied in a typical form of discourse, that has evolved for responding to a recurring type of rhetorical situation" (Coe and Freedman 137), and so they encompass both textual regularities and the "underlying non-textual regularities that produce these regularities in texts" (Dias et al. 20). These formal, textual features, however, can lead us back to the social occasion of the production of the text, to see, in Bourdieu's terms, the censorship at work in the field.

Richard Coe points out that form coexists with meaning: "There is no meaning without form: information is formed matter ("Apology" 16). Bourdieu agrees: "By imposing form, the censorship exercised by the structure of the field determines the form [...] and, necessarily, the content, which is inseparable from its appropriate expression and therefore literally unthinkable outside of the known forms and recognized norms" (Language and Symbolic Power 139). If formal features are the traces of production, they also aid in reception; as Miller says, form is meta-information, helping to shape the response of the reader or listener by providing instruction about how to perceive and interpret ("Social Action" 159). Coe suggests that an examination of form can lead to "an analysis of genres as fossilized rhetorical processes [...] genres function to code (i.e. to guide and organize) our reading of reality" ("Process Era" 184). The reality coded by the genres used in these texts is one of consensus, accord, agreement, and the rhetorical process "fossilized" by this
overdetermination of consensus may be the staving off of centrifugal forces that threaten the consensus.

As both Bourdieu and Coe suggest, then, form is a significant means through which meaning is made. In *The Family Journal*, the familiar "modes of address," the proverb, the verse, and various narrative forms, all contribute to the sense of consensus. Bourdieu identifies the proverb as one of the “more or less ritualized strategies for the symbolic struggles of everyday life” (*Language and Symbolic Power* 106). Because a proverb sets out “a regularity that is thereby constituted as a ‘normative fact’” (*In Other Words* 66), its use allows “the consensus concerning the meaning of the social world which grounds common sense to be imposed officially” (*Language and Symbolic Power* 106); “proverbs encode what is taken to be common-sense wisdom” (Fowler 211).

“Bridget” is very fond of proverbs, and often uses one as the quotation with which she begins her column. For example, she uses the proverb “Help yourself, and Heaven will help you” as an introduction to a discussion of duty: “The only way to win this war is for each of us to do our bit with ALL OUR MIGHT” (June 16, 1917: 115). Commenting on the nature of proverbs themselves, she appears to agree with Fowler and Bourdieu: “I don’t know what it is about a proverb that is so interesting and so helpful. I think myself it is all the wisdom of many years’ experience bound up into a few short words, and those who read with the eyes of the mind as well as the physical eyes, can learn lessons of great value” (March 18, 1916: 565). She also says, “Every proverb is like a parable—-it has two meanings; one easily seen and one which has to be found out and lived, if we are going to be happy” (Jan. 22, 1916: 353). The latter quotation reinforces
the idea that happiness lies in following the status quo of common-sense wisdom. In Ellul’s terms, the proverb is one way of attaining a quick and ready morality.

Poetry is another form used to naturalize the sense of consensus. Peter Buitenhuis, D.G. Wright, and Paul Fussell all note the significance of literature to the propaganda of the war; English “men of letters” were so well respected that they were recruited by the war propaganda bureau to promote England’s cause. Fussell points to the “special historical moment” that allowed for the coincidence of the two forces that championed literature, the belief in the educative power of classical and English literature, and the appeal of popular education and “self-improvement” through the study of literature for those of “modest origins.” “The intersection of these two forces, the one ‘artistic,’ the other ‘democratic,’ established an atmosphere of public respect for literature unique in modern times” (157). Fussell’s book is essentially about the ways in which literature constructed the mythologies of war for the combatants at the time and for the rest of us for posterity. It should not be surprising, then, that civilians were subject to the same forces of literary mythologizing. Tylee mentions, for example, the way in which Vera Brittain retreated into the “sublimity” of Brooke’s poetic sentiment when imagining the death of her fiancé (The Great War 60). The popular press did not shrink from borrowing from the cultural capital of canonical literature; Mrs. Wise quotes Milton, Horace, Blair, and, most frequently, Tennyson, who, as Poet Laureate during the reign of Victoria, was immensely popular. But the popular press also created its own poetry, or more accurately, “verse,” which served to legitimize mythologies of war and women’s place in it:

The rich men gave their lands and gold,
The old the wisdom of the old,
The young and fearless, strong and bold,
Their lives as histories tell,
They gave that Britain's cause might win.
And when to praise them we begin,
Praise that devoted heroine,
Who bore her grief so well. (July 31, 1915: 368)

Such verse is particularly appropriate to epideictic because it "unites people by drowning their thoughts in popular sentiment" and strengthens their "stock responses to familiar values by emphatic rhymes and hypnotic rhythm" (Tylee, The Great War 56).

Although in the above example the verse doesn't always scan smoothly enough to become "hypnotic," it is essentially iambic; iambic is the most common foot in English poetry, and the one which most closely imitates speech (Scholes et al. 414). These two characteristics combine to make this verse appealing: it is rhythmic and recognizable as "poetry," yet it is not intimidating, not something beyond common experience. From Ellul's perspective, these "stock responses" are propagandistic because they provide ready-made opinions which simultaneously reinforce for the propagandee that his or her nation is "right, that [it represents] Good and Justice" ("The Ethics of Propaganda" 160). The spokesperson has made public "popular ideas or phrases, common ideas which most people [had] in their heads at the time, [which are] dished up to thrill by looking noble and lofty" (Tylee, The Great War 56) precisely because they are in the form of poetry. The lofty status of poets and poetry is attested to in the introduction to a volume of inspirational passages put out in 1916 by then Poet Laureate Robert Bridges
who claimed that, in times of difficulty, we should “look instinctively to the seers and poets of mankind, whose sayings are the oracles and prophecies of loveliness and lovingkindness” (qtd. in Fussell 11). What this quotation misrecognizes is that these “oracles” also perform the “oracle effect” of symbolic violence, of creating and imposing a vision of the social world. Bridges’ introduction and the contents of the volume insisted that “man is a spiritual being, and the proper work of his mind is to interpret the world according to his higher nature” (qtd. in Fussell 11). Poets, then, could create their vision of the world by reinforcing the mythologies of the war, and then impose this vision because of their status as bearers of “oracles and prophecies.”

Fussell notes that “if we are to understand the way ‘literature’ dominated the war,” we must understand that “amusement was largely found in language formally arranged, either in one’s own or one’s friends’ anecdotes, rumours, or clever structuring of words” (158; emphasis added). Poetry was certainly not the only literary form exploited by the popular press by being turned into its own “mode of address,” and Fussell’s observation helps to explain the consensual impact of these “modes of address.” Narrative, too, acts as a significant centripetal force in communities. The project of *Narrative and Social Control*, according to its editor Dennis Mumby, is to investigate “how narratives attempt to ‘arrest the flow of differences’ and ‘construct a center’ around which certain kinds of social relations flow” (6). Michael Toolan argues that

the way we tell just what stories we do tell is itself multiply “telling” or revealing: those choices of manner and matter indicate whom we identify
with, whom we distance ourselves from; what we approve of and what we abhor; [and] how confident we are that our listener shares our evaluations. (247-8)

Mumby points out that one of the aims of stories “is to present the listener with a ‘slice of life’ that exemplifies and animates some aspect of the culture in which the story is set” (Communication and Power 121). By exemplifying and animating culture, stories give us insight into the nature of the values to which we should adhere: “it is not enough to say that one ought to be good, for we also require insight into what the good might be” (Kerby 60).

Many of the stories told by the columnists are in the form of the anecdote. According to William Labov, every narrative, but particularly the anecdote, must have a “point”; otherwise, it meets with the response, “So what” (366). Although self-evident, this notion is worth mentioning because, in promising a “point,” the anecdote codes itself as significant, important, worth reading or listening to. The anecdote is informal, almost conversational, and, as we have already seen, conversational style implies a set of commonly held beliefs about the world; like a joke, the anecdote has to assume commonly held values if the audience is to get the point.

Mrs. Wise’s “chats,” however, are not dialogic as conversation should be. She does use direct quotation in the anecdotes she tells to give the illusion of an accurate representation of the events she narrates and to allow the other characters to speak in their own voices. But the readers, the “dear friends” to whom the chats are addressed, have no voice and the column itself is monologic: Mrs. Wise does all the talking and, significantly, her anecdotes are focalized through her so that she is the one who assesses
the situation. As narrator, Mrs. Wise is in charge of the selection of events to be narrated so that her explanations and assessments meet with no opposition in the narrated version of events. Narrative form immediately initiates positions for writer and reader:

narrators are typically trusted by their addressees. In seeking and being granted rights to a lengthy verbal contribution [. . . ] narrators assert their authority to tell, to take up the role of knower, or entertainer, or producer, in relation to the addressees' adopted role of learner or consumer. To narrate is to make a bid for power. (Toolan 3)

The first person narrator is traditionally more readily trusted because of the intimacy of the relationship. Because Mrs. Wise's anecdotes are narrated in the first person, they share some of the characteristics of the autobiography. Mary Gergen and Kenneth Gergen note that autobiographies "provide an idealized model of the life course," and that "the principle form of the autobiographical relationship is [. . . ] powerful to powerless" (194). The form of the anecdote thus allows Mrs. Wise to realize what Bourdieu calls a "double profit": "the profit of saying and the profit of denying what is said by way of saying it" (Language and Symbolic Power 143). By calling the column a "chat," Mrs. Wise "says" that there is solidarity with her audience and she realizes the profit of gaining that identification with them; the monologic form of the column, however, "says" that Mrs. Wise's opinion is the legitimate, correct one, and she simultaneously realizes the profit of authority. She is thus able to assert what is taken-for-granted reality while simultaneously asserting her right to do so.
Another story form used in the texts is the parable or “teaching story” which William Kirkwood defines as a “brief, oral ^14 [narrative] told primarily to instruct, guide, or influence listeners, rather than to entertain” (60); generically, then, the teaching story immediately encodes the authoritative position of the teller and the moral or spiritual impoverishment of the listener. The teaching story is designed “to provoke acts of self-confrontation” (59) in an audience “already committed to a particular spiritual discipline” (62), and to help them “identify and overcome obstacles to their own spiritual realization” (61). Although Kirkwood uses the language of religious discourse, he does recognize that “there is nothing inherently religious in the telling of brief narratives to guide or influence listeners” (59). Fowler recognizes that newspapers frequently carry stories that exemplify “[h]ow ‘we’ are supposed to behave” by illustrating qualities that are consensually accepted (16). Through an analysis of the two stories contained in Appendix B, “The White Feather--The Girl Who Tried to Make OTHERS do THEIR Duty--And the Girl Who Did HER OWN,” we can see how narrative functions as a centripetal force within the rhetorical community.

The titles and subtitles of the stories indicate that the stories are going to be instantiations of the mythology of the “eternal feminine”: “contemplative purity” does not mean complete physical inactivity, but rather that which is not “significant action.” “[A]ssertiveness, aggressiveness--all characteristics of a male life of ‘significant action’--are ‘monstrous’ in women precisely because ‘unfeminine’ and therefore unsuited to a life of ‘contemplative purity’” (Gilbert and Gubar 28). The divide in the two stories is therefore not simply between the “girl” who did her duty and the “girl” who did not do her duty,15 but, significantly, between the “girl” who did her duty and the
one who, acting aggressively and assertively, tried to make men do theirs. Women are to act as inspiration to men; their lives have no story to tell, because stories mean conflict. Significantly, the protagonist in the first story is Alice, the “girl” whose aggressive behaviour makes her unfeminine, while the protagonist in the second story is Bert who, as a male, is entitled to a story of his own. Bella, Tom’s sweetheart in the first story, is a “true woman,” who, by working “quietly” at her own tasks and performing charitable works, inspires Tom to enlist; Kitty and Mrs Young in the second story exhibit “quiet patience” and we are told three times that it is their “splendid example” that inspires “many a young fellow” to enlist because “such women made one proud to be a Briton”; they are, in “Mother’s” sense, “ladies.”

Because the purpose of the teaching story is to provoke acts of self-confrontation rather than to “point an accusing finger” (Kirkwood 68) at the reader, the stories present models and anti-models for the audience to emulate and reject respectively (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 362-8). Significantly, in the story about the “girl” who did her duty, there are only models to be emulated; Kitty, Mrs. Young, and Bert’s sweetheart all exemplify feminine virtue. In the story about the “girl” who tried to make others do their duty, however, Alice Penworth is the anti-model while Bella serves as the model, a necessary contrast because, even when writers create “heroes and monsters,” or in women’s texts, angels and monsters, it is still difficult “to extract a single clear rule of conduct” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 369); as Anthony Kerby says, we need insight into “what the good might be” (60). Women are constantly told to encourage their men to enlist, so Alice’s activity is, from one perspective, not without merit; from another perspective, however, it violates the codified rules of conduct for being a “lady” and
those of the "eternal feminine" which require women to serve as inspiration for men.

Toolan notes that how we tell stories indicates, in part, how confident we are that our audience shares our evaluations (247-8); this confidence, or more accurately the lack of it, is indicated by the presence in stories of internal evaluative comments designed to guide the readers' response. The two stories are filled with evaluative commentary designed to make sure that the reader will share the evaluation of the narrator. In the first story the narrator makes an explicit evaluation of the actions of Alice and her friends in saying, "[I]t was positively marvellous what an utter failure they were." But there are also internal evaluations made by characters within the story, both of them male, whose voices are therefore authoritative. The recruiting officer, who has the added authority of being a representative of the state, "privately thought that a man who joined under such conditions would be mighty little use for a soldier," and his assessment then reflects on the failure of Alice's actions; Alice's brother Tom is "righteously indignant" at her behaviour. In the second story there are fewer embedded evaluations and more explicit ones; because all the female characters are models of feminine virtue, there is little need to have other characters point to their exemplary nature. It is enough for the narrator to say, "There was no White Feather Brigade about them!" and "That and his sweetheart's letter did it. He went straight away and enlisted."

Male endorsement of Kitty's and Mrs. Young's behaviour is attested to by their recruitment success.

Narrative sequencing also helps to construct a consensus, to naturalize what is being said and make it palatable for the reader. In the first story the narrative itself is minimal and linear with no subplots to confuse the central issue, and there is direct and
obvious causality between the narrative events: Alice’s actions result in utter failure while Bella’s example causes Tom to enlist, concluding the narrative action. All that remains is the “coda,” which signals the end of action important to the narrative (Labov 365-6). The coda acts as evaluation as well, with the narrator explicitly stating the point of the story. Labov notes that a good coda “leaves the listener with a feeling of satisfaction and completeness that matters have been rounded off and accounted for” (366 n.8). While the narrative may be finished, there is little sense of completeness in the story of Alice, Tom, and Bella, but that may have little to do with the presence of a bad coda. What the coda implicitly tells us is in this narrative is that there is nothing more of interest to tell about these characters after Tom’s enlistment.

The second story, however, has a much longer duration; it does not end with Bert’s enlistment, but continues “months after” when Bert comes home wounded and is nursed back to health by his sweetheart, and it concludes with a double wedding. For readers of women’s magazines, this ending is much more satisfactory than the ending of the first story; a tradition of romance narrative made it appropriate that a faithful “girl” should be rewarded with marriage. Narrative structure, so entrenched as to be considered an “opiate” (Scholes 208), imposes coherence, order, and closure by linking events causally and sequentially; to “narrativize” (White, “The Value of Narrativity” 2) an account of events, then, is to impose a plot on them “so that a meaningful sequence is portrayed” (Kerby 39; emphasis added). By assuming a beginning, a middle, and an end, narrative “puts boundaries around disruptive processes and events, and often breaks them up further into discrete steps or stages” (Hodge and Kress 230). The war and the potential for death and maiming are summarized here in few sentences. The coda
assures the reader that in marriage, her “new life,” Kitty continues to be a good woman, and an internal evaluation asserts that the family meets with universal acclaim.

Kirkwood says that teaching stories describe “not what men [or women] do generally but what one man [or woman] did” (61). Particularity is not exclusive to the teaching story but rather is a quality of all stories; anecdotes, short stories, novels, fairy tales, even epics all tell the story of a particular character or characters rather than of people in general. What is significant about particularity in stories is that “stories function by making truth claims that are difficult to challenge” (Mumby, Communication and Power 114), a point that Kirkwood also makes: “it is [. . . ] difficult to dispute the highly particular events set forth in a parable [. . . ]; one can hardly ‘refute’ an admittedly invented, non-necessary sequence of unique events” (68). By providing illustrations of “how ‘we’ are supposed to behave” (Fowler 16), or not to behave, these two stories attempt to codify female behaviour, to subject it to the formalization which “makes possible the establishment of an explicit normativity” (Bourdieu, In Other Words 79). Formalization “is what enables you to go to from a logic which is immersed in the particular case to a logic independent of the individual case” (Bourdieu, In Other Words 83). Because these two stories are used to reinforce the mythology of the “eternal feminine,” they rely on the implicit metaphor of women as angels or monsters, metaphors which remain impervious to attempts to refute them rationally. “It is debilitating to be any woman in a society where women are warned that if they do not behave like angels they must be monsters” (Gilbert and Gubar 53).

Epideictic, the meta-genre of praise and blame, exploits the angel/monster split; no woman wants to be a monster and the voice of the spokesperson reaffirms rather
than *tells* women this. Nowhere are the angel and monster metaphors more clearly in
evidence than in the issue of “walking out” which lasts throughout the war. “Girls” are
exhorted to become ministering angels by bringing cheer to the wounded:

the girl who writes to them and helps to keep up their spirits, the girl
who visits them, and helps them forget their pain awhile, the girl who
walks with them and lets them see that there are still such things in
womanly hearts as gratitude and pity and admiration, untinged with
flirtation or “boldness”—these girls are acting as they *should* act. (June 19,
1915: 233).

But Gilbert and Gubar show that in Victorian literary imagery the monster may not be
separate from, “concealed behind the angel, she may actually turn out to reside within
(or in the lower half of) the angel” (29); ministering angels can become monsters if the
spectre of female sexuality is raised. The potential for the monstrous pollution of the
angelic acts of selfless caring by acts of selfish assertiveness and flirtation—masculine
“boldness”—needs to be censured; “gratitude,” “pity,” and “admiration,” all selfless,
“other-directed” qualities, are the ones that are praised here.

The form which most often precipitates a discussion of this issue is the
confessional letter, the letter which seeks advice and, by so doing, necessarily admits a
failing. Not surprisingly, “Y.Z.” is the recipient of most of these letters, which usually
ask permission to break an engagement with a man at the front for one at home. In these
instances we can see the centrifugal forces that threaten the apparent consensus of
epideictic discourse; confession provides a “safe” outlet for these centrifugal forces.

Barthes call this process “inoculation”: “One minimizes the contents of the collective
imagination by means of a small inoculation of acknowledged evil; one thus protects it
against the risk of generalized subversion" (164). Through the confession, the
columnists can acknowledge that dissension exists; they can censure that dissension, and
then codify the proper conduct.

Michel Foucault talks about the function of confession and the role of the
confessor in the first volume of The History of Sexuality. Confession and its
interpretation by the confessor work together to produce truth:

the work of producing truth was obliged to pass through this relationship
if it was to be [. . . ] validated. [. . . ] [T]he revelation of confession had to
be coupled with the decipherment of what it said. The one who listened
was not simply the forgiving master, the judge who condemned or acquitted;
he was the master of truth. His was a hermeneutic [sic] function. (66-7)

In The Family Journal, confession has a truth-producing function; confessions are
allowed to be heard, not as a means of absolving and healing the individual, but as a
means of producing and reproducing truth and creating consensus. According to
Bourdieu, when faced with heretical discourse "dominant individuals, in the absence of
being able to restore the silence of the doxa, [. . . ] endeavour to impose universally,
through a discourse permeated by the simplicity and transparency of common sense, the
feeling of obviousness and necessity" (Language and Symbolic Power 131). "Y.Z." needs to codify female behaviour and morality, to impress on young women the need for
fidelity, the need to cultivate their angelic rather than their monstrous side, because, as
Bourdieu had observed, the more serious the issue, the more there is need of
codification. Habitus has inclined women in this society to seek out marriageable men
because it is a woman’s highest achievement to marry and have children; but that goal is threatened by the possibility that their men might not return from war. The dispositions of habitus are “transposable” in the sense that they are capable of generating practices in fields other than that in which they were originally required” (Thompson, Ideology 53). Codification is here required because patriotism is a new field for women, and the dispositions of habitus from other fields do not necessarily work within it. The exigency of war means that to be disloyal to one’s man is now not simply a personal matter but a patriotic one as well. As Burnett notes, “it is necessary to delegitimize any threats to the existing order by casting them as unnatural or dangerous” (133); for women, it is paradoxically “natural” to be an angel but “unnatural” to be a monster (Gilbert and Gubar 29).

The Process of Consensus-Assumption/Consensus-Creation

The dialectical process that Hall identifies, the simultaneous shaping and reflecting of consensus by the media (87), can be seen at work in the texts that deal with the issue of “walking out” which are contained in Appendix C. As Schryer says, complex dialectical relations exist between individuals and their social groups, between language and thought, between normative beliefs and behavior. Each side of these binary oppositions affects the other but never in a totalizing or isomorphic fashion. Contradictions always exist. It is through contradictions, in fact, that change occurs. (“Records as Genre” 210)

The exigency of war changed many pragmatic aspects of daily life for women, but if they were to represent the values of “home,” the “ideology of domesticity,” which included the “idealisation of ‘feminine’ virtue” (Ballaster et al. 83), had to be
maintained through the insistence on the mythology of angelic women. And yet the issue of “walking out” is dealt with in the papers throughout the war, an issue which forces a conflict with the ideal of “woman as repository of the nation’s virtue” (Ballaster et al. 10). As Tony Trew suggests, papers often have to deal with events or situations which are “awkward” from their ideological perspective (98). “Walking out” is certainly one of those awkward situations for The Family Journal, and if we follow the issue throughout the course of the war, we can see how the texts adjust to accommodate the conflict between “normative beliefs and behaviour” (Schryer, “Records as Genre” 210).

Without exception, all the texts in Appendix C reinforce the notion of masculine significant action, and emphasize what men are doing for women and the sacrifices they are making “for their sakes.” Thematically, the texts support this representation of women as passive and in need of instruction; even though the texts purport to be about women and their behaviour, women are not usually featured in the thematic position. Overall, the thematic pattern in the texts emphasizes men and their actions, or the existential “there” which simply introduces a relational process, as in “There must be no thought of giving him up.” When women are the theme, it is often in a negative sense, or in a sense modalized by obligation: “No girl or woman should allow her heart to waver for a moment.” Modality of obligation, and themes that emphasize the significance of male action, make imperatives directed at women quite natural within the texts: “Let them think of the sacrifices that the boys who have gone over there have made”; “Remember what they are doing”; and “think before you act.”

Texts 1 and 2 use the inflated language, the “‘high’ diction” (Fussell 22) that is characteristic of the early years of the war: men are “facing death on the plains of
France,” and are going into France “perhaps to stain the plain of Flanders red with their blood.” Text 3 introduces the phrase “playing the game,” 18 albeit in a negative sense, with reference to “the girls at home,” a phrase which in the nineteenth century was exclusive to the public-school boy. “It speaks metonymically to the military caste, for the schoolboy rallying the ranks [in a specific poem] is an officer, with a slogan specific to his class and probably meaningless to the private soldier. ‘Playing the game,’ as discourse, distinguished the behavior of the Englishman from those who were ‘Other’: foreigners, women, or the lower classes” (MacDonald 19). “Y.Z.” encloses the phrase in quotation marks, to indicate an unusual or ironic use of the words, “to warn the reader that [the expression] is problematic in some way” (Fairclough 89). It is problematic here because “Y.Z.” has appropriated the phrase for women; not only are women “Other,” but as women they are not supposed to be taking any action. “Y.Z.’s” use of the phrase, then, opens up the possibility that women can act, but simultaneously recognizes that possibility as problematic. In the final text from 1918, “Y.Z.” again uses the phrase, but instead of enclosing it in quotation marks to code it as problematic, he bolds it for emphasis and uses it in a positive sense with a modality that expresses certainty about the future: “you will be playing the game.”

The normative beliefs about flirting change over the course of the war. Texts 1 and 2 do not refer specifically to flirting, but they do emphasize “loyalty” and the “duty” of a “girl” “to be true to her boy”; another text from 1915, quoted above, indicates that the purity of proper female behaviour should be “untinged with flirtation or boldness” (emphasis added). But by 1916, in part because the issue would not go away, in part, perhaps, because women could no longer be expected to be passive once
conscription was introduced and women had to take over men’s jobs, the attitude towards flirting begins to lose some of its rigidity. “Y.Z.” qualifies his use of the term in the two texts from 1916, Texts 3 and 4 in Appendix C: he talks about “flirting—as it would undoubtedly be called” and “the flirtation, for really it amounts to that.” He continues in Text 3: “We do not want to be too strait-laced, and there is plenty of room for friendly intercourse.” He then discusses why it is that to have affection for “more than one boy at a time” is wrong, and his reasons have nothing to do with unfeminine boldness and aggression; the earlier texts did not attempt to explain why flirting was wrong and instead simply took for granted the consensus that flirting was unfeminine. By 1918 “Y.Z.’s” text shows even more relaxing of the rigidity. Significantly, he uncharacteristically employs the narrative form of the teaching story, perhaps because, as Thompson points out, narrative is an effective means with which to legitimize ideology (Ideology 11), but also, perhaps, because the sermonic form he has used up to this point to address the issue has quite obviously failed; “Y.Z.” may recognize that a form that codes itself as less rigid—a “story” rather than a “sermon”—may be more effective. While he still maintains the notion that the soldier sweetheart is the true love, he is at least willing to entertain the idea that a woman could love someone else; he even suggests that “[i]t would be better by far if you flirted with your new friend while your boy is away rather than jilt your sweetheart,” a radical proposal given that early in the war to flirt was to be a traitor.

Conclusion

Fowler says that “[c]onsensus assumes, and in times of crisis actually affirms, that within the group, there is no difference or disunity in the interests and values of any
of the population, or of any institution" (49). The exigency of war and the existence of an enemy immediately create consubstantiality and propaganda can then easily mobilize the resources of epideictic discourse; consensus on the existence of “us” and “them” can be assumed. But consensus on other issues needs to be cultivated and created and there are many strategies for doing so. One is to draw on cultural mythologies that reach back to an earlier era and provide the comfort and assurance of former glory. Another is to rely on the ethos of the spokesperson, to cultivate the sense of good will toward the audience. Still another is to borrow from the cultural capital of literature by exploiting well established literary forms and converting them into the idiom of the particular medium. Ultimately, though, consensus operates by creating difference, by dividing, by blaming as well as praising. While mythologies of women as angels are potent resources for consensus, they cannot be consistently sustained if the paper is to carry out its mandate of dealing with problems of everyday life; the presence of columns such as “Cupid’s Corner” and “Our Family Club” which respond directly to readers’ problems, and the unsolicited advice offered by Mrs. Wise and “Bridget” indicate the presence of a conflict between the “imaginary ideal” set up by the texts and the realities of domestic life as it is actually lived (Ballaster et al. 10). That women cannot really be angels is made quite clear by this editorial comment on a poem: “The woman who is both beautiful and golden-hearted is indeed the perfect type we all desire to find; but in this imperfect world most of us have to be satisfied with something a little less than marvellous” (Oct. 9, 1915: 610).20 If epideictic is the genre of praise and blame, then polarization is the necessary outcome: someone or something will be praised, someone
or something will be blamed. By dividing, praise and blame create hierarchies which are another essential resource for the propaganda process.
Chapter Four
“See You Be Worthy”: Hierarchies

The main purpose of the propaganda in these texts, and perhaps the most difficult task faced by the propagandists, is to convince women to sublimate the personal in favour of the political, to mortify the individual in favour of the collective. The exigency of war means that the interests of the nation take precedence over those of the individual; as Genevieve Lloyd says, “Woman qua woman—as symbol of attachment to individual bodies, private interests and natural feeling—represents all that war and citizenship are supposed to contain and transcend” (76). Because war is “fundamentally at odds with the overwhelming love of one’s own” (Lloyd 65), because it goes against all the domestic notions of nurturance that have been inculcated in women, the propaganda in the women’s weekly papers had to try to persuade women in favour of the war effort. While the illusion of consensus acts centripetally by performing the epideictic function of creating a sense of values held in common, hierarchy performs the epideictic function of assessing praise and blame. Polarization results from this assignation of praise or blame, but hierarchies, which are necessary for the propaganda process, depend on this division and polarization.

Hierarchies, as Burke argues, form around differences of kind (“each rank is overlord to its underlings”) and degree (the “relation of higher to lower”).1 Hierarchies of either kind operate by goading us with images of perfection, and both are necessary in Ellul’s conception of propaganda. Hierarchies of kind can produce tension and anxiety in that the propagandee, being a different “kind,” can never attain the proffered

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perfection; hierarchies of degree offer some sense of compensation, in that the
perfection is, ostensibly, attainable, but, of course, "in this imperfect world most of us
have to be satisfied with something a little less than marvellous" (The Family Journal
Oct. 9, 1915: 610). The mythologies of women, as we saw earlier, depend on analogy
and metaphor, whereas the images of "womanly perfection" offered by the hierarchy of
degree are more pragmatic and concrete, and the columnists offer expert advice on what
constitutes womanly perfection and how it can be attained. The weekly papers
"instantiate and constitute a logonomic system of terms, rules, and procedures that
determine what kind of agent and what kind of acts are sanctioned" (Stillar 149).
Together, however, the two different hierarchies create contradictions: women, in terms
of men, are weak, "the weaker sex," whereas women, in terms of women, must be
strong, brave, "plucky," if they are to face the quotidian realities of life on the homefront.

Propaganda itself is not impervious to contradiction; indeed, Ellul notes that
propaganda "can indulge in sudden twists and turns," and that "the content of
propaganda can be so inconsistent that it can approve today what it condemned
yesterday" (Propaganda 18). Ellul uses the analogy of a person following a line; he or
she does not cease to follow it when it suddenly takes a sharp turn, but rather, "continues
to follow it because he [or she] is caught up in the system" (18). Because they provide
rules for both production and reception, logonomic systems help readers negotiate the
contradictions; according to Ballaster et al., readers of women's magazines are quite
used to having their femininity defined in a contradictory, fragmentary, and
multiplicitous way (12). But there are also cues at the textual level; readers know which
hierarchy they are dealing with when women are called the "weaker sex" because the
comparative indicates that they are being compared to the other sex; at the lexical level, "plucky" indicates a hierarchy of degree because it is rarely used to describe combatants and has about it a more diminutive, domestic sense.²

Hierarchies of Kind

The most basic polarization that occurs in the texts is that between "front" and "homefront," a polarization that subsumes those of male/female, public/private, collective/individual, and which affects everything associated with it. As Joan Scott notes, "the private-public distinction--families as compared to the nation, mothers' needs versus the needs of state, individual death as opposed to national survival--is critical in the formation of nationalistic or patriotic ideologies" (28). The terms define each other through "dialectical substance," which "considers things in terms not of some other, but of the other" (Burke, A Grammar of Motives 33). Linguistically, "homefront" is the term that is marked or understood to be an unusual or special case of the unmarked term, the standard, the normal. Because of that, anything that has to do with the "homefront" is tinged by its negative relationship to the "front": it is, quite simply, "not" the front. The two terms also provide definition through "contextual substance," which is "definition by location [. . . and which] stresses placement" (Burke, A Grammar of Motives 26,28). A line from a short verse provides an illustration of contextual definition: "Women of England, your place is at home" (Oct. 23, 1915: 649). By placing the vocative phrase "Women of England" in the thematic position, the line hails its audience directly; the relational function is emphasized with the use of the second person possessive, "your." The relational:location verb process yokes the located-- "women"--with the locator-- "at home"--in the present tense, creating a sense
of naturalness. The women of England, according to this line, have one place and one place only; "your place" indicates that home is not one among many possible places, but the only, and therefore the rightful and legitimate, place for women. "Home" describes both the micro level of the abode of the family and the macro level of the country itself, England; in either case it is comfortable, safe, and familiar. The front, on the other hand, is "over there," "over the water," "the fields of Flanders," or "the far-flung battle-line in the East"; it is unknown, dangerous, foreign. Bourdieu discusses the way in which "fundamental oppositions [...] organize the entire world-vision," so that, for example, "a crime committed at night is more serious than one committed during the day" (In Other Words 77). Similarly, the oppositions of "homefront" and "front" operate to "organize the world-vision" of these texts. Responding to a correspondent who wonders whether or not she should tell her "boy" who is set to go to the front that she doesn't really love him, "Y.Z." asks rhetorically, "What sort of message would this be to reach him on strange soil?" (March 11, 1916: iii; emphasis added). Bad news, it seems, is more devastating when received on foreign soil.

Throughout the war the contextual substance of front and homefront is clearly hierarchized: "We cannot all go to the front, but we can all help" (Sept. 5, 1914: 524); "This is a war in which the whole British people must bear their several parts—the women and the weaklings as well as the strong, fit, fighting men" (Nov. 18, 1916: 6); and "Although we cannot fight, we women can do more than some of us realise towards winning the war" (Feb. 2, 1918: 245). In all these examples, the activities and "substance" of those at the front are valorized. "Go[ing] to the front" in the first and third examples appears as a privilege offered to only a few while those at home can only
play a supporting role by “help[ing]”; in the second example, those at home are “women and weaklings,” while those at the front are “strong, fit fighting men.”

Besides the contextual, Burke recognizes other types of substance, the familial and the directional. Familial substance, as the name suggests, stresses family, both in the literal, biological sense, and in the metaphorical sense of a group with similar interests. “Our Family Club” in The Family Journal has a number of rules to which all members are expected to adhere. The first rule essentially summarizes the rest: “To do all in our power to keep sunshine in our homes; to place home first in our lives and thoughts wheresoever we might be” (Sept. 1, 1917: 278). Burke notes that familial and contextual substance are often interwoven and this club rule demonstrates such an interweaving: to belong to this “family” means to be integrally associated with “home.” More importantly, though, familial substance tends to be a backward-looking means of definition which stresses ancestry and rootedness, and attempts to answer the question “Who are you?” by asking “Where are you from?” (Burke, A Grammar of Motives 31).

“In every empire women have had an honoured post—as guardians of the homes of which that empire is built” (Nov. 6, 1915: 40). Women in these texts are often addressed by “Mother” and “Bridget” in familial terms as “daughters” and “sisters,” which defines them in this rooted way. Burke notes that “an epithet assigns substance doubly, for in stating the character of the object it at the same time contains an implicit program of action with regard to the object” (A Grammar of Motives 57). By assigning definition through these familial epithets, the columnists “proclaim [their readers] consubstantial with [themselves], [their] values or purposes” (Burke, A Grammar of Motives 57). Women are therefore limited by this assignation of familial and contextual
substance to "home" and the domestic virtue and morality associated with it. The containment of actual women within the confines of the homefront was therefore practical, because women, as the weaker sex, could not go to war; but the containment of idealized women was conceptual (Lloyd 66), because women had become "symbolic objects of patriotic veneration" (Goldman 6).

Directional substance, on the other hand, asks "Where are you going?" and it is "often strongly futuristic" (Burke, A Grammar of Motives 31). Directional substance is particularly apparent in the way in which the texts define combatants; by joining up, boys automatically become men, as is evident in this "Special Message to Fathers":

Yes, the war has taken your lad to the Front to face great peril, and you are full of anxiety about him. But it has enobled your lad. [...] [I]t has turned him from a boy to a man, from, it may be, a tiresome self-willed lad to a stalwart soldier, khaki-clad, smart, well-drilled, possessed by a wholesome pride and self-respect, resolved to do his bit to help his country. It has called out his best, and now you can look on him with fatherly pride and unfettered love. (Dec. 2, 1916: 41)

The Front provides "definition by location," and the transformation of the boy into the man is a result of directional substance, of the sense of "tendency" that occurs with directional substance. The "self-willed lad" submits his will to the larger cause of helping his country and in the process transforms self-will into "self-respect." "The idealised soldier has moved from the 'effeminacy' of debasing self-interest to a self-esteem that is bound up with attachment to universal principles" (Lloyd 68).
The term "homefront" subsumes the concepts of the private, the domestic, and the individual. Mythologized, "home" is the place of safe haven from the ravages of the public world of business and politics; it is the world of the private, the intimate. Women are the keepers of the home, and Mrs. Wise implores them, "Do no forget, then, sisters, how great a treasure you guard" (Oct. 31, 1914: iii). But because "the home is a miniature state" (Jan. 19, 1918: 203), homes are not worthy in and of themselves but rather in what they give to the masculine realm of national duty. "To woman it has been given to guard the inside of the home, to make it worthy to be loved, worthy to be praised, worthy to be worshipped, worthy that a man should die for it" (Oct. 31, 1914: iii). Home is the place where heroic values are instilled: "What is it that breeds British heroism? THE HOME-LIFE OF THE BRITISH RACE has a great deal to do with it. Our men are heroes because they have been brought up to be heroes" (Nov. 7, 1914: 29). Women, the wives and mothers who "guard" this "great treasure" (Oct. 31, 1914: iii), have no political power, but they are, paradoxically, the conduits through which patriotism and heroism are passed.

Women are not actually asked to "guard" their homes with their bodies, unlike men whose bodies are quite literally being given to the cause; however, women's bodies, too, become important for the war effort: 3

I noticed that over eight-thousand women were treated last year, for various diseases which afflict the life of woman. It is very sad and very serious, because never was there a time when healthy, and happy mothers were more valuable to the country than at the present day. Motherhood, which is always sacred, is unusually precious today. The soul of the homelife is the mother, and
the very heart and strength of the nation lie in the homelife. The health of the
mother, therefore, is in every way important and must be safeguarded from
every possible harm. (Aug. 18, 1917: 237)

Women's health is now a matter of national importance, of civic, rather than individual
significance, as this headline in the supplement for women war workers proclaims:
"YOUR HEALTH IS OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE" (Nov. 4, 1916: 549).

Individuality and the individual, as Scott reminds us, can only be dialectically
part of a patriotic ideology, and the patriotic or nationalistic ideology takes precedence
in war time. "The particularity by which we distinguish people, the peculiarities for
which we love each other, are of no significance to the modern state" (Tylee,
"Maleness Run Riot" 201), especially when that state is at war because "[w]ar
represents the ultimate mark and test of the capacity to transcend self-interest--whether
it be through the readiness to risk our own lives or [...] through the readiness to
sacrifice those we love" (Lloyd 65). Personal grief must be cast in the higher terms of
patriotism to be validated, and the grief felt by mothers must specifically be portrayed as
having a higher purpose:

The noble fortitude of the mothers, and the calm acceptance of their loss,
are wonderful. Each knows that her boy was so brave, that he patiently bore
his trials as a soldier, and was so bright in the face of danger, and met his
death like a hero. His mother remembers this, and she rejoices that her
country, in its need, found, in her son, a brave defender. She was required to
give him up for her country, and is thankful and proud that she had such a gift
to give. And, mother, the country is grateful to you for the noble sons you have borne and reared. (April 7, 1917: 370)

The calm acceptance of grief is transformed into a mark of patriotism, while “[s]urrendering sons to significant death becomes a higher mode of giving birth” (Lloyd 76). As Marwick points out, “the universal numbness [of reading of so many deaths] and the patriotic fervour kept private grief from becoming national outcry” (133); private grief had to be transformed into womanly sacrifice which corresponded, albeit inferiorly, to the masculine ultimate sacrifice. The editor tells the story of meeting “a poor old widow” who has just learned that her “only son had been killed in action.” When he asks her if she feels sad at the loss of her only son, she replies,

“Why should I feel sad? He did his duty when he joined the Army to fight for his King and country, and I did mine when I let him go. I knew that there was a possibility of his being killed. But don’t you think I should have been more unhappy had he lived, and shirked his duty?” (Nov. 11, 1916: 573)

Private grief has no function, but sacrifice helps keep alive the “patriotic fervour” that justifies death.

If Lloyd is correct, if “femaleness symbolically represents [an] attachment to private concerns [. . . and] individual bodies” (75, 76), then women are necessarily and automatically lower on the hierarchy informed by the term “war,” which stresses the national, the collective, and the patriotic. Margaret R. Higonnet sees “war as a discursive structure whose grammar disarticulates individuals, both men and women, in order to translate them into a uniformly polarized social system” (206). The hierarchization of “front” and “homefront” is apparent in the way in which the front begins to serve as
Buitenhuis notes the way in which the "myth of the romance of the trenches," encouraged by authors such as Kipling and Conan Doyle, served to make "the trench the moral as well as the physical bulwark against the Hun" (89). Mrs. Wise tells the story of visiting a friend whose son has returned, wounded, from the front. The war has changed him, she says:

He's still as cheery and bright as ever, but he seems to understand everything so much better. There's a difference in his eyes. They are wise and older, and sometimes he sits and looks away far past everything. He is way back in the trenches, and he sees his comrades fall and die bravely for the cause of Right, for their homes, their wives, and sweethearts across the sea.

All that has made Jim realise how much these things mean—how greatly to be prized are the people we love. That is the lesson it should teach you and me. […] We who have been left more or less comfortably at home must remember the lesson that men are learning in the trenches, and women in the hospitals—namely, how great a blessing is peace, and quiet human love, and how much we should all prize it. (Jan. 9, 1915: 271)

This anecdote raises some interesting questions. If this is indeed a "lesson" learned in the trenches, how is Mrs. Wise privy to it? How has she, a woman confined, physically and conceptually, to the homefront, learned it? Mrs. Wise assumes the role of omniscient narrator in moving seamlessly from an exterior description of Jim's eyes to an interior presentation of his thoughts and feelings, and in doing so she assumes the contextual substance of the front. She never mentions that Jim has told her these things,
nor does she adopt direct or indirect style to indicate that she is narrating what Jim has told her. She then moves out of the narration into the coda: “That is the lesson that it should teach you and me,” which also serves as the evaluation, the reason for telling the anecdote. To become consubstantial with her audience she assumes, like them, the contextual substance of the homefront; this is a lesson, she tells them, for both “you and me.” And yet, this “lesson” is a curious one for women to have to learn from men because the legacy of nineteenth-century women’s magazines was such that “the work of personal relationships and moral sustenance […] were perceived as woman’s most important domestic activity” (Ballaster et al. 101). By being “lessoned,” then, women are being “lessened”; the morality which was supposed to emanate from the domestic into the public has now reversed its flow from the front to the homefront. The trench becomes not only the moral “bulwark against the Hun,” but the moral arbiter of the nation. The men at the front, and, notably, the women in the hospitals at the front, are learning lessons firsthand, through bitter experience, while women who are “comfortably” at home have the lessons mediated for them; women at home are the beneficiaries of the men’s experience. Woman is still the keeper of morality, but it is a domestic morality that remains ignorant of larger, public issues; it is a morality that is not as significant as the great “lessons” occasioned by the war. It remains tied to the realm of personal happiness, as this example from “Mother” indicates: “Do you help to make the home so happy that the spirit of happiness remains all day with those who work away from it? […] When our sons go away to foreign lands, if mother has been the guiding star of the home, it is the thought of her that will keep them ever in the right path” (Dec. 8, 1917: 112).
Even the lessons that ask women to emulate the collective behaviour of the combatants, to “Stand united like your menfolk” (April 3, 1915: 560), serve to keep women in the private, domestic domain. Political issues are translated into private terms for women readers. Again Mrs. Wise provides an example. She discusses the way in which the war has united the nation and healed the “petty differences” that threatened to cause civil war in Britain, and how Britain’s men have gone out “shoulder-to-shoulder” to fight the common enemy:

And we women can bring the same facts into the sphere of our own daily life.

[...] Now is our time to band together with that “Mrs. Jones” and “Mrs. Smith,” to forget all the petty differences that existed between us, and to face the common danger as one united body. [...] And finally, when Peace has come into her own again, you will be on a new footing with your neighbours.

(Sept. 19, 1914: 588)

Mrs. Wise suggests that women should come together as “one united body” to face the problems occasioned by war, but ultimately the solution to the problem is a personal one, a reconciliation with individual neighbours. In women’s magazines generally, women are repeatedly told that their problems can only be dealt with through individual, rather than collective, responsibility. [...] Ultimately [...] women are informed that they must “help themselves” and thus, implicitly, that their problems are their own responsibility and may be of their own making. [...] Fundamentally, then, women’s magazines cannot recognise the collective noun “woman” as a political category, since the
interests of “woman” are always already conceived of as “personal.” (Ballaster et al. 174).

This is certainly the case in *The Family Journal*. Even though the rhetorical community formed by the readers of the paper forms a collective, readers are not encouraged to tackle problems as a collective but as individuals. Individual women are encouraged to ration food, rather than to band together to protest the war; the narratives discussed in the previous chapter discourage the collective White Feather campaign and encourage women to act individually.⁷

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca recognize that hierarchies are often layered, with “one hierarchy [serving] as criterion or definition for [another]. [. . .] For behind any hierarchy there may be discerned the outline of another hierarchy” (337). This idea of the double hierarchy allows for the presence of more nuanced hierarchies. It is perhaps easiest to see how the negative principle works to produce a double hierarchy in the example of “duty,” one of the “god-terms” of the war. The texts clearly inscribe a socio-political hierarchy. God, the ultimate perfection against which all others must be found wanting, is at the top; the editor says that “if our religion is true, we know that they [our dear ones] fell in a righteous cause, and that it was the will of God who knows all things” (Dec. 12, 1914: 165). After God comes King and Country, synonymous by means of metonymy, followed by man, followed by woman: a woman “owes her allegiance to her [man] every whit as much as he owes his allegiance to his King and Country” (Sept. 11, 1915: 514). Because women owe their allegiance to men, their efforts for King and Country are necessarily going to be diluted; women’s duties are consistently undermined by the insidious workings of the double hierarchy of values that
places men's duty above that of women. "Can we [women], in the face of such noble, unselfish acts, refrain from doing the work (small as it is in comparison) that lies before us?" (July 10, 1915: 312). The implicit negative, the negative that "is often hidden behind a realm of quasi-positives" (Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action* 11), also comes into play in this poetic example:

Women of England, your place is at home;

This is all that you're asked to do--

Bear your share of the war with grit,

And half the victory belongs to you! (Oct. 23, 1915: 649)

In both examples the negative is only negative if it is compared to something else, the "noble, unselfish acts" of male combatants. Both implicit negatives serve to undermine and belittle the nobility, the very nature, of women's duty; after all, being at home and accepting their lot with fortitude is *all* that they are asked to do and they will still get to share in the joys of victory with the men who have sacrificed their lives and bodies. As Stillar notes, the indeterminacy of the implicit negative makes it effective because it asks us to "yoke the negative and the positive, [...] to at least entertain the negative reading to 'believe' [...] the positive reading" (83). Even within the word "duty" itself, as Burke indicates, there is a tension between positive and negative because "duty is a 'command,' founded on 'obligation,' not 'inclination'" ("A Dramatisitic View of the Origins of Language: Part Two" 451). Yet "Y.Z." for one insists that the combatants have *willingly* and *cheerfully* gone to do their duty, erasing this sense of obligation in favour of inclination,⁴ while women must be cajoled and goaded into performing their duty.
The way in which a double hierarchy is nuanced by the values that inform another hierarchy is clarified by Margaret and Patrice Higonnet:

we can use the image of the double helix, with its structure of two intertwined strands. The image permits us to look at woman not in isolation but within a persistent system of gender relationships. The female strand on the helix is opposed to the male strand, and position on the female strand is subordinate to position on the male strand. The image of the double helix allows us to see that [...] the actual nature of [...] social activity is not as critical as the cultural perception of its relative value in a gender-linked structure of subordination. (34)

What women do, then, is validated and assessed in terms of what men do. The operation of the double helix is apparent in the way in which women’s work is valued. “Mother” says that everyone has a share of the war work to do, and urges women to make garments, send food and cigarettes to the men at the front, and to comfort those who have lost loved ones, in other words, to do the “women’s work” of the war effort. She then continues, “It is essential that we womenfolk, who are waiting and watching, should bear ourselves with fortitude” (June 12, 1915: 208; emphasis added), which transforms the work women are doing into passive inactivity. After conscription, when women were asked to take on the jobs vacated by men, “Bridget,” always the champion of the housewife, says,

Doesn’t it strike you as being splendid how women have taken up the work of men without faltering, how girls who have never done hard work in their lives now bend an aching back over weeding or hoeing? How girls who have
scuttled across a road, afraid of the traffic, now drive horse-vans or stand on
the platform of a tramcar? (April 8, 1916: 625)

“Bridget’s” comments betray surprise that women and girls could perform anywhere
outside the domestic sphere, having been so narrowly defined by the context of
“home” that they would be expected to “scuttle” across a public road; her comments
also imply that they would have been expected to falter in attempting any work outside
the home. “Bridget” praises women who work because they are doing men’s work;
“work” itself is a masculine occupation because what women do at home is not, in fact,
work but rather a noble avocation: “Housewifery is one of the most beautiful, the most
improving, the most gladdening arts . . . . Look on it as a pleasure, think of your little
house as the canvas which God has given you to paint a beautiful home on” (April 29,
1916: 9). Even when women are doing men’s work, they are still qualified as inferior:
“We want a word of cheer to say to . . . frail women who are doing strong men’s
work” (Feb. 2, 1918: 240). The supplement for women war workers offers advice for
women workers on diet and preventable ailments that women who have never “worked”
before necessarily need: “Experience, taught by generations of workers [i.e. men], has
shown them that they can’t [put up with ailments] if they mean to ‘get on’: but women
seem to regard them as necessary evils, and their efforts to come up smiling under their
physical trials just wears the poor martyrs out, body and mind” (Nov. 4, 1916: 549).

Again, women’s inferior status is reinscribed by the sense that men are capable of
looking after themselves, of doing the best for themselves, while women need to be
protected. This attitude, according to Marwick, was not new: “Britain had a long
tradition of factory acts designed to protect women and children, but qualified by the
persisting belief that to attempt to legislate for the adult male was to reflect upon his manhood” (114). When domestic duties are taken on by men, however, they become “work”:

In these days of shortage of labour, when our women-folk—God bless ‘em—are often the breadwinners as well as the men, the stronger sex should not despise helping their wives with the home. [. . .] One man of our acquaintance has lately taken to doing all the rough and really hard work of the house [such] as scrubbing, sweeping, carrying in the coals from the yard, and chopping wood. (Feb. 10, 1917: 235)

The congratulatory tone elides the fact that the “weaker sex” had been doing all the “really hard work of the house” all along.

That women are doing men’s work only for the duration of the war provides yet another way in which “in this social dance, the woman appears to have taken a step forward as the partners change places—but in fact he is still leading her” (Higonnet and Higonnet 35). “In the ticket-sorting rooms at the great railway offices, too, women have proved highly efficient substitutes for the men who have flocked to the colours” (May 6, 1916: 21; emphasis added). Even though they are recognized in the article as being “superior” to the men they have replaced, they are nonetheless only substitutes until the men return. Even in 1916 the “high diction” of the war has men “flock[ing] to the colours,” a phrase that invokes the mythology of the war as crusade and which thus sets up an implicit negative. The values implicit in the hierarchy of front and homefront keep women on the double helix even though they are doing men’s work because suddenly men have more important work to do at the front. That women’s “work,”
domestic work, is devalued in turn because its relation to the war effort is indirect is summed up in this comment by "Mother": "There is work for us ALL—on the land, in the factory, and if we cannot manage these, then looking after the children of our stronger neighbours who are patriotically employed" (April 28, 1917: 14; italics added). The qualifying adjective "stronger," and the adverb of manner, "patriotically," both convey positional value, expressing the attitude of the writer. By 1918 the earlier "We cannot all go to the front," becomes "We can’t all work in munitions factories" (April 27, 1918: 4).

The differences between familial and directional substance combine in the texts to produce the most egregious way in which women are limited by the logonomic system. By going to war, men automatically become heroes. Burke uses this very example in his discussion of the "act" and 'state' (actus and status)" pair: "A hero is first of all a man who does heroic things; his 'heroism' resides in his acts. But next, a hero can be a man with the potentialities of heroic action. Soldiers on the way to war are heroes in this sense. Their heroism resides in their status as soldiers" (A Grammar of Motives 41, 42). Because civilians saw "the glory, but not the sordid filth of trench life" (Marwick 135), every soldier can legitimately be portrayed in the texts as a hero; there are no shadings of hierarchy here, enshrouded as the men are in the mystery of their circumstances, of their contextual substance. Because of this, every mother knows "that her boy was so brave, that he patiently bore his trials as a soldier, and was so bright in the face of danger, and met his death like a hero" (April 7, 1917: 370). Burke recognizes "mystery" as a potent rhetorical force: "Rhetorically considered, Mystery is a major source of persuasion. Endow a person, an institution, a thing with the glow or
resonance of the Mystical, and you have set up a motivational appeal to which people spontaneously (‘instinctively,’ ‘intuitively’) respond” (“Mysticism” 105). Siegfried Sassoon’s “The Hero” ironically points out the importance of mystery. In it, an officer informs a mother that her son has died heroically, even though he knows “He’d told the poor old dear some gallant lies / That she would nourish all her days, no doubt” (8-9). Her son was, in fact, a coward, a “cold-footed, useless swine” (13), but encouraging mothers to believe that their sons are heroes provides a “motivational appeal” for women to do their own duty. Hierarchies of any sort, based on “the discriminations we make by language” (Burke, “Dramatism and Logology” 91), place people above or below each other, and they become “‘mysteries’ to each other” (Burke, Language as Symbolic Action 15). Tylee points out that for combatants the myth of chivalry was replaced by that of the “‘impassable gulf,’” the sense of division “‘between Us who have had the experience [of the trenches] and You who have not’” (“Verbal Screens” 134,135), a myth that served to alienate the combatants from civilians.

All the columnists, however, claim insight into the mystery of the front, and use it to create the tension which Ellul recognizes as necessary for agitation propaganda. Waiting and watching are well established as what women “do” in war time, yet Mrs. Wise uses the waiting of combatants to make women aware that their waiting is inferior:

In soldiers’ letters I have read how one of the greatest trials they have to bear is “waiting.” Lying there in the trenches silently for hours, waiting for orders or the enemy’s attack. You have probably been thrilled by the story of that brave British corporal who, mortally wounded in the trenches, knew that if he made any sound he would betray the position of his comrades, and
so there he lay quietly in his awful agony, no sound of pain passing his lips
till the tension was over, and then he died like a British soldier.

For us women, too, it is a time of awful waiting. We must wait to hear
the news—wait in anguish of heart and mind. But we are not asked to wait
silently. We may move about, and act. We are not asked to be still in agony
like that poor soldier. (Nov. 7, 1914: 48)

But more basically, Burke notes that “mystery arises at that point where different
kinds of beings are in communication” (A Rhetoric of Motives 115); contextual
substance effectively makes men at the front and women at home different beings, and
the mythologized portrayal of the war means that combatants remain idealized. The
principle of hierarchy itself “includes [...] the entelechial tendency, the treatment of
the ‘top’ or ‘culminating’ stage as the ‘image’ that best represents the entire ‘idea’”
(Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 141). When “Y.Z.” chastizes “girls” for not recognizing
what the men have given up in going to war, he begins by saying that women
“don’t—they cannot realise” the nature of the sacrifice made on their behalf (Sept. 11,
1915: 514). The correction he makes is significant: if women simply “don’t” know,
they can always learn, but if women “cannot” know, then they are shut out from that
knowledge, shut out from the “mystery” of masculine sacrifice. “Sacrifice” had long
been the purview of women: “Woman is born to be the better half. Her capacity for
sacrifice and ministry is the salvation of the race” (June 3, 1916: 120). In the Victorian
era there was an attempt to elevate this female “sacrifice and ministry” so that women
could be Christ-like redeemers, a role reserved in the Judeo-Christian tradition for men:

the concept of a “female Christ”—of woman as moral regenerator—was not
uncommon among Victorian female writers, especially as they perceived their maternal role as endowing them with the power to teach—and hence morally guide—the race. [...] In a basic sense this position is connected to that of Florence Nightingale [. . . whose] explicit reference to a “female Christ” reflects her belief that the traditional female role of nurturer may take on heroic proportions. (Casey 64)

But the “high diction” of the war has men making the “ultimate” sacrifice; hierarchically, there can be nothing above “ultimate” because it is the entelechy. The Christological associations of the nature of the sacrifice and its redemptive repercussions are apparent: “He gave his life for his Country, and for Right. Who can give more? Who else dare give so much? “ (Dec. 26, 1914: 225). The rhetorical questions, modalized by “can” and “dare,” and the use of upper case letters for the causes of “Country” and “Right,” emphasize the significance of this sacrifice. By making the ultimate sacrifice, combatants have moved up the hierarchical ladder; they have in fact transcended it. They have attained and then surpassed that worldly perfection that goads us, leaving the survivors uncomfortably aware of their own imperfection, their own indebtedness for the sacrifice that makes “life itself a purer and finer thing” (Feb. 6, 1915: 360). Women, by virtue of being women, cannot fight, they can only passively “wait and watch,” unlike combatants who “wait” as part of their active duty. “Some of us men are too old to go out and fight for [our country]; the women and children may not stand in the fighting line” (Sept. 12, 1914: 550). Women who cannot, or “may not,” go to war are incapable of progressing any further up the hierarchical ladder of patriotic duty that leads to the “ultimate” sacrifice, and this
hierarchical placement guarantees their silence and acquiescence: women “had no right to criticize the very system that protected [them]” (Higonnet 207).

Furthermore, women who cannot go to war must have their “honour” vicariously vindicated. Women are constantly reminded in the texts that “it is for the women’s sake that the thousands of brave fellows are facing death” (Oct. 24, 1914: 694), and through their deaths they are seen as “redeeming the corruption of their society by the noble sacrifice of their lives” (Tylee, “‘Maleness Run Riot’” 201): “[N]ever let us forget the debt of honour we shall ever owe to our glorious dead, to those brave and gallant souls who gave their lives to free us and ours from slavery” (Dec. 7, 1918: 99). More cryptically, women are told that men are facing death for the “honour of the women of Britain” (June 19, 1915: 233), and “to save the girls’ and women’s shame” (Aug. 28, 1915: 460; emphasis added). The words “honour” and “shame” used here raise interesting questions: if women have had no political power, how can their honour and integrity have been besmirched—how can they be held responsible for the war—and how can men redeem women’s lost honour and integrity? Jane Marcus suggests that “the ideology of war insists on a primitive call to women to construct themselves socially as mothers first and then argues that the war is being fought to protect those mothers and, by extension, that it is their fault that men are dying” (146). The “ideology of domesticity” (Ballaster et al. 83), with its insistence on women’s moral superiority, also calls upon women to construct themselves in a paradoxical way that implicates them in the characters of their men: “A woman can and should ‘manage’ her husband. She should manage to see that he is a man she can look up to and be proud of. She should see that, should he deviate at all from the ‘strait and narrow way,’ no one can point a
finger at her and say, ‘It was for you that he sinned!’” (Nov. 25, 1916: 24). A woman is responsible for creating and sustaining morality in her husband, yet that very morality makes him superior to her, makes him someone she can “look up to”; if he deviates from that morality, it is her fault and it becomes her shame because it was for her that he sinned. This paradox pervades the women’s magazine (Beetham 64), and it is an easy step for the propaganda to merge this paradox with the feminine “desire to be desired” (Beetham 200) into the idea of “worthiness.” Mrs. Wise says that the German soldier treats his wife as chattel because he has none of those qualities which have developed in the Briton’s heart owing to his reverence for, and his courtesy towards, women.

Because of their love and reverence for their wives, their sweethearts, their sisters, their mothers, the British soldiers are always gentlemen. While, having lost none of their bravery and bulldog courage, they have developed feelings of nobleness and courtesy which are unknown in the savage German heart.

Therefore, we women of Britain must show ourselves worthy of this reverence and honour which our men have for us, and at the same time we must show our menfolk we have gained some of their high-souled courage.

(Oct. 10, 1914: 660)

Logologically, women are not worthy of reverence because of who they are, but rather because men have shown reverence for them; women then have to make themselves worthy of this reverence. That men are going to war and dying for them makes women more indebted to them, more in need of being “worthy.” When “Y.Z.” says that “the
women of England must be brave and try to be worthy of their men” (Sept. 5, 1914: 520), or when “Bridget” issues the subjunctive injunction, “SEE YOU BE WORTHY” (April 28, 1917: 7), they essentially set up a double bind for women; the impossibility is built into the logonomic system it draws upon. Doing one’s womanly duty makes a woman “worthy” of her soldier son or husband, but that duty is hierarchically inferior to his. Being worthy, even if it is successful, implies hierarchy because one has to be worthy of something or someone who is therefore necessarily higher on the hierarchy. Stillar explains how the negative functions so effectively within logonomic systems:

The negative implies choice on the part of those subjected to it. The “paradox” or ultimately the “poison” of the negative, however, is made clear when we recognize that the negative itself is created by the logonomic system—something beyond “individual” choice. Being “moralized by the negative” [. . .] means to accept the shifting of burden, as it were, from the system to the agent. (83)

Combined with the predilection of women’s magazines to conceive of the interests of “woman” as “always already [. . .] ‘personal’” (Ballaster et al 174), there is a strong motive for female guilt.

Hierarchies of Degree

The ideology of patriotism, however, cannot completely obliterate the notion of individuality because the individual is necessary to provide substance dialectically to the collective. While war does bring into being “grand civic entities,” it cannot do so without implicating the individual: “[t]o create a grand civic entity, local identities must be shattered or muted; individuals must become entangled with the notion of a
homeland [. . .] as a vast entity symbolized by flags, [and] oaths of allegiance” (Elshtain, Women and War 107, emphasis added). The text quoted above about mothers and sons indicates how much the appeal to patriotism is “entangled” with the appeal to the individual; it is about “mothers” in general and the sacrifices they have made, but the second sentence immediately implicates the individual by referring to “each” mother and “her son”; thereafter the individual and the collective are interwoven. “Her son” is represented as an individual, yet the representation is paradoxically that of a type, the brave hero facing danger and death with patience and courage. An appeal to the individual is necessary if the propaganda is going to make sense to an audience which is not only confined to the homefront by the exigency of war, but which is also used to having issues and problems presented in its media in personal terms so as to be understood; “it is this ‘personalized’ politics that differentiates women’s magazines from other magazines and from the newspaper” (Ballaster et al. 174). This incompatibility of the personal is again resolved by the strategy of the dissociation of concepts, by casting the personal in the service of the collective. Burke discusses the “paradox of purity” which occurs when one term becomes a “transcendence of the other”; he notes that the paradox “may be implicit in any term for a collective motivation [. . .]. [T]echnically, it becomes a ‘pure’ motive when matched against some individual locus of motivation” (A Grammar of Motives 35, 37). As Lloyd says, a “self-esteem that is bound up with [. . .] universal principles” is purer than “self-interest,” (68) an individual motivation, and Lloyd, too, sees this self-esteem as a “transcendence.”
Similarly, homes are mythologized as symbols of patriotism and cannot therefore be completely mortified: “Away over there, where the shrapnel is bursting, and Death wanders at will, long lines of khaki-clad heroes are marching to conquer evil, singing that chorus ["It’s a Long Way to Tipperary"], and as they march that song takes their hearts back to the place they love dearest—HOME” (Oct. 31, 1914: iii). Home and hearth are precisely what the men are fighting for, so the propaganda has to balance between mythologizing home and all that it stands for—the personal, the individual, the domestic—and mortifying the desires that it engenders in its occupants who have been left, in Mrs Wise’s words, “comfortably” there (Jan. 9, 1915: 271).

Ellul notes that the propagandist has to find “the optimum degree of tension and anxiety” (Propaganda 188) which allows anxiety, or in Burke’s terms, “guilt,” to goad the propagandee into action, but does not cause panic and demoralization. Keeping up morale on the homefront was one of the major objectives of the war propaganda bureau. To offset the potentially demoralizing effects of the hierarchies of kind, the texts also set up hierarchies of degree by offering women advice on how to be good women in wartime; while this hierarchy offers a potentially attainable image of perfection, it is still informed by the hierarchy of kind because the superordinate term is “war,” which is necessarily masculine. Because of this overlap, the hierarchy of degree very often becomes “damnning with faint praise.” For example, Mrs. Wise says: “Day after day, since the war broke out, we have been reading in our newspapers of the tenacity and stubbornness of our brave soldiers. […] And the women of England have shown great strength and will and courage only second to our fine lads” (March 17, 1917: 335). The belittlement of women can be seen in the example of the “patriotic overall” offered to
women through *The Family Journal*. Jenny Gould outlines the controversy surrounding the wearing of khaki uniforms by women in the Women’s Volunteer Reserve that appeared in letters to the editor in *The Morning Post* in 1915. One woman expressed her disgust at these women and their “mannish attitudes,” and pointed out the irony that “[n]earby these ridiculous ‘poseuses’ stood the real thing—a British Officer in mufti. He had lost his left arm and right leg” (qtd. in Gould 119). She then suggests that these women instead put on “sunbonnets and print frocks and go and make hay or pick fruit or make jam, or do the thousand and one things that women can do to help. But for heaven’s sake, don’t let them ride and march about the country making themselves and, what is more important, the King’s uniform, ridiculous” (qtd. in Gould 119). Another woman argued that military uniforms “have become the symbols of death and sacrifice” because of “the men who have fallen on the blood-stained field of Flanders or in the trenches at Gallipoli” (qtd. in Gould 120). *The Family Journal* had not yet encouraged women to go out to work on the land but was still insisting that women at home could do their part by saving money, being cheerful, and encouraging their men to join up. Appropriately, they offered their readers their own “uniform,” because all the women who had sent their men to war with their blessing were “worthy of wearing some distinctive badge to show they are patriotic women” (May 15, 1915: 75). The khaki and blue “overall”—really a long bibbed apron—was a “visible sign of service and efficiency” (Gould 119) in the home; while it gave women a “distinctive badge” to announce their patriotism, it would only have been worn in the home; their own, unique uniform, then, confined them to the domestic sphere and was a further reminder that their service to King and Country was inferior.
Although women occupied the “homefront,” ostensibly a familiar and comfortable place, it was actually an unfamiliar place, with new and different experiences to which to adjust; among women’s “profound common experiences” were “bereavement; suddenly enforced independence; [. . .] dealing with a new and unsought identity as breadwinner; [. . . and] serving in new professions—policewomen, landgirls, munitions workers” (Goldman 6). Mrs. Wise notes how difficult it is to inhabit this “unfamiliar familiar” place: she asks, “Which is the braver—the husband, who leaves his wife, and the peace and happiness of his own home, and goes away to ‘do his bit,’ or the wife, who, though with the tears in her eyes, yet contrives to smile, bids him farewell, and settles down quietly to ‘carry on’?” (April 22, 1916: iii). She answers that it is the wife. Even though the husband knows that he may killed or maimed, he has the “excitement” of new surroundings and he becomes a “different man.” In these new surroundings he does not miss his wife because he does not associate her with them. The wife, however, is constantly reminded of her “loss” because she is surrounded by her husband’s belongings. Because she is defined contextually, she cannot become a “different woman” in these surroundings. Ellul says that although propaganda “profits from the structure of the mass, [it nonetheless] exploits the individual’s need for self-affirmation” (Propaganda 8); women may not be able to become “different,” but they can become “better.” One way to exploit this need for self-affirmation is to offer “self-help,” to offer women the means of becoming good, patriotic women.

The advice on how to be patriotic women is appropriate in the medium of women’s magazines which have always constructed their readers as “aspirational” (Ballaster et al. 11) and therefore in need of expert advice. As Ferguson says,
"Femininity as a career is a lifelong commitment. It requires frequent refresher courses and occasional updating of its central tenets" (8). The advice arises out of propaganda's ability to provide real satisfaction of artificial needs (Ellul, Propaganda 174); propaganda creates artificial needs, then generously supplies solutions. The practical advice offered by The Family Journal provides women with a purpose and allows them to help the war effort. Early on "Bridget" tries to mitigate the effects of the hierarchy of kind by saying,

There may be some who say to you: "There is nothing we can do. Other women have the privilege of going out as Red Cross nurses, but we can't leave our work, we can't leave our homes, we can't leave our children. Men must work and women must weep."

SISTERS, YOU MUST NOT WEEP! You CAN help your men who have been called away to fight for England's honour. "England expects every man to do his duty." And England expects every woman to be brave.

(Sept. 5, 1914: 527)

Because this was the first "total war," the first war in which the nation required all its resources, women had to avoid the impotence of weeping, traditionally one of the roles for women in wartime (Elshtain, Women and War 58). This was "a war in which the whole British people must bear their several parts" (Nov. 18, 1916: 6), and giving women an active role in the war effort rescues them from the futility of merely weeping. Hierarchy comes into play here as a goad to make women do their duty and do it well; the hierarchies of degree set up very simple binaries between women who do their duty and those who do not.
A representative anecdote by Mrs. Wise (see Appendix D) will serve to show how these simple binaries operate and how propaganda and ideology are implicated. Kerby’s suggestion that “narrative articulates what is of value to us and why, for it essentially defines who we are and what we want” (59) and that it provides an insight into what we define as “good” (60) indicates that narrative is a “primary vehicle of ideology” (Kerby 13). Mumby, borrowing from Goran Therborn, notes that ideology “engages [us] in a continuous process of inclusion and exclusion, defining what is, what is good, and what is possible” (Communication and Power 79); at the level of discourse, this process is regulated by the logonomic system (Hodge and Kress 4). Inclusion and exclusion, or in Burke’s terms “selection and deflection,” are crucial to the propaganda process that seeks to maintain some aspects of femininity while attempting to change behaviour. Most basically the story again provides models and an anti-model; Mrs. Wise is a model in that she has given up the habit of afternoon tea to economize; the “girls” are models in that they cheerfully work on the allotments. The acquaintance initially is the anti-model, the woman unwilling to bend voluntarily to the yoke of regulations, who is, in “Bridget’s” words, “a traitor to her country, unworthy to be a British woman, unworthy of the sacrifice of the splendid young lives laid down for her” (April 28, 1917: 7). However, she ultimately becomes the model for the audience to emulate. There is always the danger, though, that the anti-model may be taken as the one to be emulated.13 To forestall this possibility, Mrs. Wise includes a coda which, like the coda in all teaching stories, implicitly says, “Go, and do thou likewise” (Luke 10:37). Mrs. Wise’s coda says a great deal more: “Yes, that’s the secret of happiness in war-time, my friends—work—work that helps the country.” “Yes” positively reaffirms
what has gone before, what the story has “said.” “That’s” refers textually to the
acquaintance’s decision to “look round for a job.” A “secret” is something known by
someone that is not common knowledge, and here Mrs. Wise indicates that she is
willing to share this information, to let her readers in on the “secret of happiness,” a very
powerful secret that promises well-being. But “happiness” is not a singular entity, and
Mrs. Wise is careful to establish that her secret entails happiness “in war-time,” which
must, necessarily, be different from happiness in peace-time. She then interpellates her
audience directly, again establishing their solidarity as “friends.” Finally, she tells the
secret of happiness in war-time: it is “work,” but again, it is not just any work, or work
for personal gain, but specifically “work that helps the country.” The coda very
effectively sums up the dividing practices which the anecdote inscribes. There are those
who know the secret of happiness in war-time and those who do not; there are those who
are willing to follow the regulations, and those who are not; there are those who are
willing to work and those who are not. As a teaching story, the anecdote provokes
self-confrontation in the audience by asking them to chose on which side of the divide
they want to be; Mrs. Wise’s coda helps readers make their decision by telling them
which is the correct side.

Making distinctions “simple, clear, [and] communicable” is one of the aspects of
“codification” that Bourdieu discusses (In Other Words 82). Codification “makes
possible the establishment of an explicit normativity” through the “formalization of
practices” (In Other Words 78, 79). That there is only one right and one wrong side in
Mrs. Wise’s anecdote is deliberate. Because the anecdote functions as a call to action,
the moral categories have to be made very clear, making it easier for the audience to
chose the right one. Because aesthetics are not an important part of this narrative, characterization is minimal. The acquaintance and the "girls" are unnamed, and their motivations are very limited, making them types rather than individuals with multilayered histories; the narrative itself is minimal and linear, with no subplots to confuse the central issue; and there is direct and obvious causality between the narrative events, the most striking being the acquaintance’s conversion after watching the "girls." But a story, by its very definition, requires some kind of conflict, or there would be nothing to tell. As Joseph Rouse says:

Sharing a situation as a narrative field [...] makes possible meaningful differences along with convergence. The need to make differences intelligible and a common project possible compels an ongoing struggle to keep in check the divergence of the community’s story, even as the various actions of its members strain at the limits of coherent inclusion with one another. This struggle takes the form of a shared concern to construct, enforce, and conform to a common narrative which gives a common sense to everyone’s endeavors. The possibilities for failure, and the collapse into incoherence of a community’s sense of how to proceed intelligibly, are many. (85)

Mrs. Wise’s anecdote “makes intelligible” the heterogeneous and contentious impulses within the community—the acquaintance has good reasons to be peevish about the regulations—but Mrs. Wise turns them into a “common narrative which gives a common sense to everyone’s endeavors” by not allowing the possibility of failure—the acquaintance is won over in the end by the story she sees before her. The acquaintance
is convinced to mortify the desire for the lavish spending and consumption, which had come to be associated with wartime profiteering (Marwick 125). In this way the centrifugal forces of discontent are dealt with safely, not by ignoring or hiding them, but by making them intelligible and visible, yet surmountable by containing them within the confines of a “comic plot.”

Mumby uses Giddens’ three principal functions of ideology to view the ways in which ideology works in narrative: “(1) The representation of sectional interests as universal; (2) The denial or transmutation of contradictions; and (3) The naturalization of the present through reification” (Communication and Power 86). The first function can be seen to be operating in Mrs. Wise’s anecdote in that a well-to-do woman decides to eschew leisure for labour; if even she can accept the need to work, the need to ration and submit to regulations, then the interests served by the regulations must be universal. Mumby, quoting L.W. Grossberg, connects ideology to hegemony, “achieved via ‘the colonization of popular consciousness or common sense through the articulation of specific social practices and positions within ideological codes’” (Communication and Power 86). In other words, Mrs. Wise reveals to her acquaintance the new social practices and positions for women required by the exigency of war; the new ideological code of “patriotic duty” determines that happiness in war-time is achieved differently than it is in peace-time. And, according to Ellul’s idea of “orthopraxy,” the performance of specific social practices implicates the individual in the process of propaganda.

The new ideological code of “patriotic duty” also serves to transmute the inherent contradiction between the acquaintance’s “comfortable circumstances” and her decision to “look round for a job.” Leisure and the money required to support it are no
longer the way to happiness. Mrs. Wise shows her acquaintance that a simple cup of tea requires the labour of others. In the end she feels sufficiently chastened by that knowledge to refuse the cup of tea and to join the ranks of women workers, despite her financial security and her lack of a vested interest in the work itself. "Duty" and "patriotism" also transmute the inherent contradiction between women belonging in the home and women working, occupying male roles. The milk-girl touches "her peaked cap [. . .] in quite a masculine way," a detail that is meant in a complimentary way!" to show that the milk-girl has taken on a masculine role and is performing it professionally.

The anecdote serves, finally, to naturalize the "way things are" (Mumby, Communication and Power 87) by being presented as "a slice of life." The 1917 editions of The Family Journal are filled with injunctions such as this advertisement for National Service: "PUT YOUR HAND TO THE PLOUGH. MEN ARE FIGHTING FOR THEIR COUNTRY--WOMEN MUST WORK FOR THEIR COUNTRY! . . . OTHERWISE . . . The country may be THEIRS no longer!" (April 21, 1917: 404; emphasis in original); and this cover statement: "While our men FIGHT our women must WORK. Women are wanted! They are wanted URGENTLY! They are wanted AT ONCE!" (April 28, 1917). The words in upper case, the exclamation marks, and the modality of obligation all make these injunctions urgent and startling. But Mrs. Wise's anecdote, in taking the form of the story, makes itself unremarkable and therefore "natural." Hodge and Kress note that the features of the story "typically seem the 'unmarked' form of narrative, the type which is unremarked and unremarkable, so familiar as to seem the most 'natural' of all" (231). Within the anecdote itself, Mrs. Wise's explanation of the reasons for the rules and regulations meets with no opposition.
The anecdote’s model/anti-model argument works to support the process of hegemony: “the process of hegemony works most effectively when the world view articulated by the ruling elite is actively taken up and pursued by subordinate groups” (Mumby, Communication and Power 123). Although Mrs. Wise is not part of the “ruling elite,” she nonetheless espouses its worldview. By actively and willingly engaging in war work, the “girls” give the story more hegemonic impact by exemplifying a bottom-up rather than a top-down acceptance of ideology (Mumby, Communication and Power 123). Ideology, Mumby says, “functions through active consent” rather than through coercion or “passive acceptance of already articulated social forms” (Communication and Power 86-87), which resonates with Bourdieu’s idea of “complicity.” The “girls” working on the allotment are happy and smiling; the milk-girl is glad to be alive and glad she has taken this job; they all enact what Ellul recognizes as an important factor in propaganda—they are all finding “their equilibrium, their satisfactions, in their actions” (Propaganda 23). They are getting “real satisfaction of artificial needs” (Ellul, Propaganda 174).

Logonomic systems create and reinforce hierarchies by marking distinctions between “good” and “bad,” between actions which are sanctioned and those which are not; Stiller points out that

[e]very logonomic system has its resources for marking the negative and hence constraining symbolic action in terms of the “rules” of the system. The negative, whether marked very explicitly as in the Decalogue, or implicitly [. . .] compels participants in the particular logonomic system to act accordingly because the negative courts guilt. (82)
“Mother” provides a good example of the explicitly stated negative. She sets out what a home is, the “haven of rest and recuperation” for weary ones, “the rallying point of life,” then says:

At least this is what home should be. If your home is not that, there is something wrong with it, and it is your duty to put that something right. Never let the peace of home be disturbed by any selfish action or thoughtless word or petty jealousy of yours. Instead, do your part, give your best energies to help make it bright and happy, and you will make home what it should be.¹⁸ (April 27, 1918: 13)

Again, although we can see the “ministering angel” mythology behind this admonition, the advice it offers is practical and not metaphorical; it does not tell women that they must be angels. It does, however, set up an image of perfection for which women can strive. The modality of desirability, “that is what a home should be,” sets up the need for the imperatives, “never let,” “do your part,” and “give your best,” which then find fulfilment in the final truth modality, “you will make home what it should be.” These are simple rules to follow; at least they are simple in their textual form. The narrative form of the advice imposes the need for selection—do this and that result will follow—and makes the advice seem simple, easy, commonsensical; to follow such simple, commonsensical advice should be easy, but what the selections deflect are the real, messy conditions of life which make following the advice difficult, if not impossible; “the system of advice creates many opportunities for transgression, and consequently guilt” (Stillar 150). And of course, behind the advice is the mythology of home and all that it symbolizes for the nation and for the men who are gallantly fighting for it, the
men who are “staining the plain of Flanders” red with their blood, which enhances the
guilt of transgression; in not keeping a perfect home, a woman violates not only the
sense of womanly perfection, but also that of patriotic womanly perfection.

Mothers also are guilty of violating the system of perfection held out to them.
The “title ‘mother’ is honoured, and loved, and held sacred above all other names”
(April 21, 1917: 398). If soldiers, mythologized, are cast in Christological terms,
mothers, mythologized, are cast in Marian terms: “Motherhood was sanctified on this
day [Christmas Day], it was used by God to give a human body to the Redeemer. [. . .]
Through Motherhood not only is the world peopled, but the world is Redeemed!” (Dec.
23, 1916: 109). At the quotidian level, however, motherhood is simply common sense.
The Reverend E.J. Austin doesn’t pretend to be an expert in motherhood itself, but he
fomented guilt by placing himself above the process entirely and commenting on it,
pointing out the inadequacies of mothers. During “Baby Week,” a week set aside to
promote the health of infants, he says in his “Special Message to Mothers”: “The
serious charge brought against Mothers is that, speaking generally, they do not know
their business. The business of mothers is mothercraft, and mothercraft requires
commonsense knowledge of the simple laws of health for the mother and of the care she
should take of herself during motherhood” (July 7, 1917: 153). These inadequacies are
more damning because the “business of mothercraft” involves “commonsense” and its
laws are “simple.” The effect of the tautology that “mothercraft” is within the purview
of “mothers” is also potent because there is a sense that this knowledge should somehow
be innate and that mothers are choosing to ignore it. In the companion piece, the
“Special Message to Fathers,” Austin makes the guilt explicit:
It is safer to be a British soldier fighting in the trenches on the West front than to be a baby in England today. [. . .] There is a most awful slaughter of babies going on every day amongst us. Every year 90,000 babies die before they are twelve months old, and 750 out of every 1,000 of these deaths are believed to be preventable. (July 7, 1917: 153).

In this series on infant health, the articles assert that many of these infant deaths are caused by poor nutrition, poor sanitation, and inadequate heating or other unfavourable living conditions; what these articles choose to ignore, however, is that these conditions are exacerbated by the war, by the rationing of food and coal and the poverty in which many women had to live.19 Austin uses the term “slaughter,” usually associated with the battlefield rather than the nursery, to create a sense of the deliberate nature of these deaths; he transfers the nation’s guilt over the deaths of soldiers onto mothers by saying that it is safer to be fighting on the Western front than it is to be a baby in England. The guilt is intensified by the intertextual admonition by “Mother”: “Motherhood is the first and greatest task of womanhood, and it is war-work of the very best kind” (July 7, 1917: 166; emphasis in original). Again, to transgress is to violate the sanctity of motherhood and to default as a patriotic woman.

While women are not categorically shut out from the perfection offered by this hierarchy as they are shut out from the perfection of masculine sacrifice, there is still a component of mystery involved. As Stillar points out, the “lurking irony of all [. . .] expert systems of advice [. . .] is that in seeking to help readers transcend the mystery, they must reproduce it; otherwise they would have nothing to offer. If there is no mystery, no hierarchy to be transcended, there is no need for expert advice” (86).
Austin’s message to mothers about the commonsensical aspects of motherhood is somewhat ironic in this sense because he actually reproduces the mystery by demystifying it. The periodical form is again a significant factor in sustaining the hierarchy of “expert” and “non-expert.” The closure necessitated by a book or a pamphlet that offers self-help allows the reader to “become” an expert, although, as Stillar explains in his examination of self-help pamphlets, the gaining of such expertise is fraught with paradox and irony (150-51). But the periodical form is open-ended. Each column is subject to closure, ensuring a neat containment of the problem; but the system itself is exhaustive and precludes the possibility of the reader attaining the perfection promised by the system. The perfection is elusive; the reader will never be the one in control of the rules, and her inadequacy is therefore reinscribed. This week “Mother” may tell the reader how to create a happy home, but there will be a new problem next week of which the reader has no prior knowledge. There are also subtle shadings of advice offered, such as that by “Y.Z.” who finds it necessary to distinguish between “hero-worship” which is necessary and good, and hero-worship which leads “young girls” into the dangerous activity of flirting (Sept. 2, 1916: 375). Burke discusses the differences between the rectilinear and the circular in *The Rhetoric of Religion*: rectilinearity, he says, “points toward the promise of an end to the Hierarchical Cycle, even while reaffirming the hierarchical principle that characterizes the persistent problem of Order” (232). But the openendedness of the periodical form ensures both the principle of the hierarchical cycle and its continuation. The role of the expert who offers the advice is also significant for Burke: “The relation between the rectilinear and circular styles comes to a focus in this paradox: The priestly role as Mediator not only
proposes progressively to 'absolve' from guilt; it also serves circularly to intensify the very sense of guiltiness (or 'conscience') for which it provides the absolution" (The Rhetoric of Religion 234). Text 2 in Appendix C encapsulates this process of guilt, sacrifice, and redemption. After describing what men have given up in going to fight for their country, "Y.Z." reminds women that their duty is to be faithful and loyal to those men, surreptitiously reinforcing the sense of order that they violate by "flirting" with other men. He is suggesting that the young women need to "mortify" the motives that have been deemed unruly by the logonomic system of war-time duty. But "Y.Z." also manages to turn the situation into an act of redemption by finding a convenient scapegoat, the "cad" who violates the social code. The women are thus purged of their guilt because it is the "cad" who is guilty. Chastened, and now purged and temporarily freed from guilt, the women are again brought into the cycle; guilt can be "processed" but not "resolved" (Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion 236). Although the women may be temporarily freed from guilt, Burke notes the "negative lurking in the quasi-positive" of the word freedom, "which should always prompt us to ask, 'Freedom from what?'" ("A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language: Part One" 264). "Y.Z." has combined the "two primary and sometimes conflicting functions of religions (solace and control)" (Burke, On Symbols and Society 289) in a logological form. The sacrifice made by men on behalf of women now begins a new sequence of guilt, because, as Mrs. Wise says, "He gave his life for Right; who can give more? Yea, who else will give so much?" (Nov. 28, 1914: iii).

Ballaster et al. note that readers "may be able to identify quite clearly the contradictions inherent in the text's image of the 'ideal' woman, [...] but this does not,
on the whole, propel them into taking action to resist or reject the institutions that endorse such representations" (18). Rather, this image of the “ideal” woman may in fact be what causes women to embrace these institutions. To borrow Burke’s theological analogy, people do not abandon religion because they do not measure up to the image of the Divine; rather, it is that image of the Divine which goads them into continuing to believe and the institution of religion that offers a vehicle by which to attain perfection. Similarly, institutions such as women’s magazines both create the images of womanly perfection and offer the means to achieve it; they “perpetuate this myth of femininity and offer themselves as a solution” (Ballaster et al. 124).

Conclusion

Hierarchies are powerful resources for propaganda. Even though they are based on discriminations, on differences, they act centripetally by creating order and by offering images of perfection. As Bourdieu says, “Of all forms of ‘hidden persuasion,’ the most implacable is the one exerted, quite simply, by the order of things” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 168). The simple binaries produced by praise and blame, and the more nuanced “double hierarchies,” all goad us by their inherent perfection. Propaganda can exploit these feelings of inadequacy in a number of ways. In hierarchies of kind, usually simple binaries of “this”/ “not this,” one term is valorized and takes precedence over the other. In a discourse of war, the terms “combatant” and “front” take precedence, are imbued with more symbolic capital, than are the terms “non-combatants” and “homefront.” Non-combatants can never attain the perfection of combatants in this discourse, and their guilt goads them to do their own duty so that they may be worthy of the sacrifice made for them. Hierarchies of degree form around the images of patriotic
womanly perfection. Mrs Wise describes her neighbour who is perhaps the perfect patriotic woman and mother: she was happy to have missed buying margarine—it was gone by the time she got to the front of a long queue—because she could now spend her money instead on a war-savings certificate. She thinks that this is "little enough" for her to do, but Mrs. Wise knows that her husband and son are both at the Front, that her daughter is a nurse "far from home," and that she is leading "a lonely, anxious life at home with nothing but her separation allowance to live on" (Feb. 23, 1918: 284). This image of womanly perfection is fraught with opportunities for guilt, not the least of which is the vicarious nature of one of its components: women have to depend on others—sons, husbands, daughters—for a part of the perfection. The self-help aspect of the weekly papers offers a way for women to learn how to attain perfection, but the "expert advice" serves ultimately to confirm the hierarchical cycle.
“Send Me A Motto”: Conclusion

After her husband has been killed in action, one of “Bridget’s” readers writes, “Send me a motto to help me in my misery—a few words to turn my thoughts from the emptiness of the world!” (Sept. 4, 1915: 491). Her simple request encapsulates the process that enables propaganda. She asks for a motto, a short, pithy statement that will sum up a worldview or code of behaviour, and in so doing she recognizes that language performs symbolic action. Words do not simply represent the world, but instead create ways of making meaning about the world. The motto that “Bridget” sends in reply essentially tells her readers that we do not always know why things happen, but we should nonetheless praise God and have faith in Him. However, as Bourdieu says, words alone do not have the intrinsic power to create belief in their own legitimacy (Language and Symbolic Power 170). Because these words appear in the form of a motto, they encode what is assumed to be common-sense about the world. Moreover, they are conveyed by “Bridget,” who, as a columnist for The Family Journal, has been endowed with the authority of the institution and becomes a legitimate spokesperson for the group. She is one of the authorities who shapes and defines the social reality of being a woman in wartime. Her words appear in the medium of a women’s magazine, a medium that has historically attempted to define women, to codify their behaviour. The reader’s request for a motto to “help” her in her misery indicates that she accepts the role of the magazine as a source of advice; even though her request is phrased as an imperative, “Send me a motto,” contextually it functions more as a plea for help and advice.
The request and "Bridget's" reply are textual instantiations of the wartime logonomic system that seeks to mortify the private and to valorize the public. Women's private grief, private brooding, private misery cannot be indulged if women are to be encouraged in the war effort; private grief can too easily be mobilized as an argument against the war and it needs to be transformed into something more patriotic. "Bridget's" reply recasts "misery" as "mystery," the mystery of God's will which becomes the entelechial principle, quite literally the "god-term," in the hierarchy; the reader's misery may well be part of God's unfathomable plan, and neither "Bridget" nor the reader can pretend to understand it.

Propaganda mobilizes all these resources, the assumption of a common sense view of the world, the authority and legitimacy of the spokesperson, and the divisiveness of hierarchies which goad us by their inherent sense of perfection. Driving all these in this case is the very compelling exigency of war. Propaganda tells people what they should think; it provides them with ready made opinions, and, by fulfilling a need in the propagandees, it makes them complicitous in it. As outside readers we are able to keep these resources separate for the purpose of analysis, but in an actual instance of propaganda they all work together. As outside readers we are also able to step away from the propaganda because we are not part of the cultural milieu that drives it. But being outside readers does not privilege us to assume that those who have become part of that particular propaganda process are naive or stupid. Rather, it should alert us to the propaganda processes around us everyday. To test this idea, we can jump ahead over eighty years from the Great War to the present and use the analytical process
I have suggested to look at the propaganda on a web site created by a group protesting the building of a barn in rural New Brunswick.

The web site is structured by the "meta-genre" of epideictic: its purpose is to educate its "visitors" about the hazards of the development and to do so it relies on commonly held values about the culture of rural New Brunswick and concerns with health and the environment. We can see the presence of both integration and agitation propaganda on the web site (<http://www.mondata.com/action>). The slogan, TAKE ACTION AND JOIN THE "COMMITTEE AGAINST HOG FACTORIES" appears strategically at the bottom of the second page, and purports to follow "naturally" from the information given prior to it; it is the call to action, the agitation propaganda, that erupts out of the integration propaganda that sets the stage for it.

The series of statements that act as the enabling integration propaganda perform an educative function. The first page of the web site begins with the heading, "What do we know so far?" Phrased as a question, the heading immediately includes the reader in the information-gathering process; the use of the consensual "we" draws the reader into the ideological position taken, assuming consensus while simultaneously creating it. "Know" implies certainty, emphasizing the educational aspect of the discourse. "So far" implies, rather ominously, that there may be more bad news to come as "we" discover more about the project. The web page then provides several statements about what is "known" about the development.

The medium in which these statements are presented plays a significant role in their reception. The Internet is often perceived to be a source of current and valid information, with little sense of caveat lector. By creating the web site, the creator of the
web site becomes the legitimate spokesperson for the group, "The Committee Against Hog Factories." The process that passes the skeptron of legitimacy to him, however, is made invisible by the medium of the Internet. Whereas the editor of The Family Journal introduces each columnist, publicly announcing that columnist's legitimacy, the legitimacy of the web site spokesperson must be assumed by the visitor to the site. Like the columnists in The Family Journal, however, the spokesperson, as the legitimate representative of the group, is in a position to employ "the oracle effect," which produces both the message and the interpretation of the message (Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power 211, 212). He provides the message, the statements of information, then the interpretation of the message, the imperative, "TAKE ACTION."

The medium contributes in another way to the propaganda process. Weinroth points out that "the propagandist has neither the time nor the space to engage in actual logical demonstrations; he [or she] has only condensed moments in which to foster an air of rational and objective truth" (35). The web page format and the perception that the Internet provides quick and easy access to information naturalize the presentation of these statements as "condensed moments." Like the "tit-bit" format established by the New Journalism at the end of the nineteenth century, the web page format does not allow for extended argument or dialogic treatment of the issue.

One example of what is "known" is that "the open sewage cesspool at the site is half the size of the Exxon Valdez oil spill." Comparison to the Exxon Valdez oil spill is, quite obviously, designed to produce an association with one of the best known and most devastating environmental disasters in recent memory. While the analogy between an oil spill and a cesspool may not be credible-- a "cesspool" is "an underground
container for the temporary storage of liquid waste or sewage” (Canadian Oxford; emphasis added)—the use of the word “cesspool” is very effective at a different level. Metaphorically, a “cesspool” is “a centre of corruption, depravity etc.” (Canadian Oxford). A more technical term for the sewage container is “lagoon,” “an artificial pool for the treatment of effluent” (Canadian Oxford). The lexical choice of “cesspool” over “lagoon” expresses the propagandist’s attitude toward the development, and asks readers to see the development in these same terms, thus creating identification. Classifying the development itself as a “hog factory” similarly asks the reader to agree to view it in the same way by assigning it the same substance; as Burke says, “an epithet assigns substance doubly, for in stating the character of the object it at the same time contains an implicit program of action with regard to the object” (A Grammar of Motives 57). Assigning the epithet to the project is a way of attempting to “stabilize the paradox [of substance]” (Stillar 77), of asking the reader to forget that this assignation of substance is not natural but constructed.

To understand one of the other points of information contained under the heading of what “we know,” we need to look carefully at the cultural context. The web page proclaims that “[the name of the farmer] and [the name of the farm] are not exactly welcome anywhere.” The barn is being built in an Acadian area of New Brunswick; the web page statement is meant to cater to the web page creator’s perception that Acadians are xenophobic, that anyone from “away” is suspect and not welcome. Ellul says that the propagandist “must know the sentiments and opinions, the current tendencies and the stereotypes among the public he is trying to reach” (Propaganda 34). In this case, the propagandist is attempting to persuade his readers
that it is acceptable not to want this man or his barn in their vicinity because no one else wants them either, and simultaneously to cater to what he thinks is already an inherent distrust of outsiders. However, he qualifies his statement with the phrase “not exactly.” “Not exactly” is used colloquially to create ironic understatement. If something is straightforward and simple, for example, we would say, “It’s not exactly rocket science.” But any ironic statement can also be read literally, and in this case “not exactly” may be used to modalize the statement, to deflect the harshness of saying, “They are not welcome anywhere,” and thus to reflect more positively on the producer of the statement.

Propaganda strips away “nuances and refinements of detail or doctrine” to leave only “black and white, yes and no” (Ellul, Propaganda 219). The committee itself is defined dialectically by the development: it is “The Committee Against Hog Factories,” and so it must vilify the development in order to create solidarity among its members, to justify its very existence. The dual “god-terms,” “the environment” and “health” structure the simple binaries that arise out of praise and blame. The development is censured for being an “ecological scandal,” and for being a potential producer of effluent that is “known” to cause “miscarriages, mental illness, and [a] four times increase in respiratory problems”; the committee, on the other hand, is praiseworthy for valuing the environment and human health. Visitors to the web site are asked to participate in the hierarchy; they can become praiseworthy by joining the committee, by saying “Yes” to the imperative, or blameworthy by saying “No” to the imperative, thereby choosing to transgress against the perfection of “the environment” and human “health.”
This is a very cursory examination of this instance of propaganda, and yet it indicates the need to view propaganda not as an entity but as a process, a “sociological phenomenon.” I am not suggesting that the perspectives I have selected in my analysis be used as a template for an analysis of every instance of propaganda; every instance will require the analyst to make his or her own selections, and therefore deflections, of theoretical perspectives, and to use them in a different balance. However, in each instance of propaganda we need to analyze the cultural, rhetorical, and linguistic aspects of the process if we are to understand how it works. My study has brought together perspectives for analysis that can help us to see “what creates the power of words and slogans” (Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* 170), the words and slogans which, in the seemingly innocuous medium of a women’s weekly paper, helped shape and reflect attitudes toward the first total war in history.
Appendices

Appendix A

Text 1

There is a tremendous cloud of sorrow over the world at present, a black sunless thing, and this cloud, which casts the shadow of fear, anxiety, and bereavement, is a great danger.

[...] There are lassies among my readers who watch the papers daily for news of a loved one in the fighting-line. There are girl-wives who write to me, who were married one day and said “Good-bye” at the “train for somewhere in France” the next. There are dark-robied women among my readers who knew the blessedness of a man’s love, and a home together for a few short weeks—only to lose both.

Oh, sisters, I am so very sorry for you, but don’t sink. Don’t give way to grief.

Don’t brood anxiously over the beloved who is fighting for his country. It won’t help you.

And there is only one antidote for pain—work. I want all of you to work hard.

Some of you are not strong enough for munition work. There are plenty of other professions and trades waiting for a woman who has an original mind. (April 15, 1916: 645)

Text 2

Christianity has proved itself a free and intelligent spirit in its effect upon the life of women. There has been almost a “mysterious exaltation of weak womanhood
in the Christian religion.” While the wonderful birth of Jesus exalts it very near to God’s throne in the person of His mother, yet none the less it wears the priceless ornament of a meek and quiet spirit. So that for women to grasp at equal power with men is, perhaps, to forfeit unique influence and honour. It is to abandon “queenly dignity in order to attain second-rate masculinity.” But women, I think, are quite conscious of this and are seeking to realise their vocation, not in competition with men, but in faithfully carrying out the lowlier duties of life, ministering to children, for their health and happiness, and to men, for their strength and encouragement, that the work of
Appendix B

The White Feather--The Girl Who Tried to Make OTHERS do THEIR Duty--

[. . .] So Alice, neglecting all her household work, joined a few friends, and went along the street arm-in-arm with a few girls with white feathers in their hands, hoping to inspire the young men of the neighbourhood with fear and shame. Some of them carried a little Union Jack. This, in their eyes, was patriotism. But it was positively marvellous what an utter failure they were. They did harry one youth into going up to the recruiting officer, true, and accompanied him thither with many giggles; but the recruiting officer on duty did not seem to regard him with much favour. He privately thought that a man who joined under such conditions would be mighty little use for a soldier, and the recruit was not accepted.

The neighbours began to talk about Alice Penworth, and in none too flattering terms. It made Mr. and Mrs. Penworth ashamed. Tom was righteously indignant and furious with his sister. One day he came home and told them he’d enlisted.

"It wasn’t you who’ve made me do it," he said to Alice; "it’s Bella, my sweetheart. She’s just had a telegram from the War Office to say her brother is dangerously wounded. She didn’t cry and bemoan her fate, although he was the chief breadwinner. She went on quietly with her work to keep the home going and to make garments for the wounded. I’ve joined because she’s a true woman, and I want to have a smack at those brutes for what they did to her brother!"

So the girl who did her own part bravely got a recruit for the king while the girl who neglected her own duty in order to try to make other people do theirs, met with
nought but failure.

The Girl Who Did Her Own

[... ] His mother and sister were splendid examples of British heroines. They kept the home in perfect order, and devoted all their spare time to making garments for the wounded, and visiting the sick and the poor who were in very great trouble. There was no White Feather Brigade about them! But by their splendid example, quiet patience, and patriotism, they had inspired many a young fellow who had enlisted because, as he said to himself, of the splendid example of Kitty and Mrs. Young. Such women made one proud to be a Briton.

One morning Bert got a letter from his sweetheart. The letter told him that she had volunteered as a field nurse, and had been accepted.

There was no time to say good-bye. She was off immediately. Bert turned very white, but said nothing then. The papers that morning told of a British reverse, and heavy casualties. That and his sweetheart’s letter did it. He went straight away and enlisted. When he told them at home that night, they quietly informed him that they knew he would not be found wanting. And so he went away to fight for King and country, while his half wages at the shop were paid to them at home.

Months after, Bert came home badly wounded, and during the later stages of his convalescence he was nursed by his sweetheart, who had been sent back from the front. But neither he nor his sister’s sweetheart, who was also wounded, were fit for more active service during the war, so there was a double wedding from his father’s home.
In her new life Kitty Young still went on with her patriotic work and so did her mother. The neighbours say that the Young family are loved wherever they go.

(10/10/14:642)
Appendix C

Text 1

Her boy has gone to fight for King and Country; he is loyal to them. What a poor repayment for his sacrifice and patriotism if the girl he loves proves to be disloyal to him! This is one respect in which the women of England can do inestimable service to the country. It is for their sakes, for their protection, that the thousands of brave fellows—husbands, sweethearts, and sons—are facing death on the plains of France. Let the hearts of our womenfolk, then, be true and loyal. Let their letters be frequent and encouraging—the kind of letter that puts heart into a fellow and instils in him the courage to fight and win.

There must be no thought of “giving him up.” By doing so a girl is playing traitor to her lad and to the cause. Besides, the war cannot last so very long. And when we have passed through this, “the valley of the shadow,” when happy voices proclaim again the peace of the nations, the girls at home will welcome the brave fellows back into their arms and—sharing in their glory—will thank God for the love and loyalty which kept them true. (Oct. 24, 1914: 694)

Text 2

["Y.Z." says that he gets hundreds of letters from young women who “walk out” with other men while their sweethearts are at the front.] They don’t—they cannot—realise how much their boys have given up in going for King and Country. Do they think these boys have gone for fun—for love of the whole terrible business? No; they have gone because
they have a conscience, and that conscience has told them to go.

Why have they cheerfully given up all the sweet comforts of home? Why have they left those they loved far behind to live in strange country? Do they go singing into France, perhaps to stain the plain of Flanders red with their blood? Is it for fun they do it, girls? Save the mark! It is for your sake, and for your mother’s sake, and for the sake of the little ones! It is them you must thank that this England of ours has not been trampled underfoot, and our loved ones murdered and outraged as were the poor folk in Belgium!

And yet a girl can still be in doubt as to whether it is her duty to be true to the boy who has given up everything to go! No girl or woman should allow her heart to waver for a moment. She owes her allegiance to him every whit as much as he owes his allegiance to the King and Country.

It is not given for every man to serve under the military banner[. . .] But I say without apology, that any one of those young men who deliberately tries to steal from a girl the love already given to a boy at the front, who, in fighting Britain’s battles abroad, cannot fight the battle of love at home--I say that young man is a cad! I despise him; and all my young lady friends of the “FJ” must despise him too! (Sept. 11, 1915: 514)

Text 3

[“Marion” and her friend both have boys at the front. Both have lately been walking out with other boys because it is very dull where they are. “Y.Z.” replies:] Let them think of the sacrifices that the boys who have gone over there have made, and of the dangers they are facing. And then let them ask themselves what these boys would think of it if
they knew. I have a notion they would say that the girls at home were not “playing the
game.”

“Marion” and her friend may find things “dull.” But is it not often worse than
dull out there where the boys are, though they keep their spirits up grandly.

And there is another thing to consider. The boys are sure to hear of the flirtation,
for really it amounts to that. [...] We do not want to be too strait-laced, and there is
plenty of room for friendly intercourse. But there should not be any word or thought of
affection for more than one boy at a time. That would be to encourage and foster hopes
and desires to which we know the heart cannot answer, and would breed mistrust and
unhappiness. (April 15, 1916: 653)

Text 4

[Girls whose men are away at the Front [...] should remember that they owe it to their
brave lads “over the water” to do nothing which could possibly be
misconstrued—nothing which could be made to reflect upon their honour. There are
many, many things which girls can do to help cheer and brighten poor, suffering
“Tommies” without the risk of a serious quarrel with their boys, by flirting—as it would
undoubtedly be called—with wounded soldiers. So my advice to those [...] who have
boys fighting for King and Country, and who have been taking wounded soldiers for
walks [...] is—don’t! (Sept. 2, 1916: 375)
Text 5

My dear Friends—is there a tendency amongst some of our girls to think too lightly of the sacrifices that their sweethearts are making? I most sincerely hope that those who do seem to under-estimate the self-sacrifice and bravery of their lads, are in a very small minority. Yes, they must be! British girls, as a whole, have proved themselves fully worthy of the love of their soldier boys. They have been loyal and true, and have never ceased to think of their loved ones and the great sacrifice they are making. [Mrs. Wise then relates an anecdote about meeting a girl who is indeed walking out with another young man.]

"You don't really mean to tell me, Milly," I exclaimed, my indignation rising at the thought, "that you are amusing yourself by going out with another young man while your boy is out there fighting in France?"

"Why shouldn't I?" she replied somewhat sullenly. "I must have someone to go out with!"

I felt so annoyed that I swung around on my heel and walked away without another word. I simply could not utter another syllable. "Why shouldn't she?" indeed! Good heavens! Was it not enough that her lad had left his comfortable home, the girl he loved with all his heart, his parents, and his very freedom, to fight for his country and to fight for HER? Could she not remain loyal in the face of that?

Her lad was a fine young fellow, who made light of the hardships he had to undergo, who was always cheerful and full of hope. In all the letters I had read [. . .] he spoke of the time when they would be reunited. The only thing he really cared about, and longed for, he said, was that they should be together again. [. . .] Dear lasses, do not
forget for one moment those brave self-sacrificing lads of yours “out there.” Remember what they are doing. Every minute their lives are being risked that you may be kept safe! They are enduring everything that you may have to endure nothing! They sacrifice that you may be spared. Be loyal and true to them; it is the least you can do. (Aug. 25, 1917: 259)

Text 6

Week after week, almost from the opening months of the war, I have been receiving letters from girls who say that “they are engaged to a boy in France, but have since met someone else.” In fact, I am very tired of reading such letters. [...] I want to ask them, just for a few minutes, to put themselves into the places of those brave lads who have left all—their homes, their parents, their brothers and sisters, their sweethearts, and all that they hold dear—to fight for their country. Picture to yourself a young man who has been used to every home comfort standing up above the knees in slimy, filthy mud, crouching down in his trench as the shells whine over, and thinking of home and his loved ones. After a narrower shave than usual, his first thought is of “Blighty,” and of those in it who are thinking of him. He thinks of his girl, patiently waiting for his return, and always anxious about him. “Dear little girl,” he whispers to himself. “There isn’t another like her.” And his thought of home keeps him cheery and bright, and braces him for fresh effort, fresh endurance.

Then picture to yourself, my dear readers, that same soldier when one afternoon a letter is brought to him. He opens it with a smile, for he knows that well-loved handwriting in a million. He glances quickly at the letter, the smile still on his face. And
then the smile fades suddenly, and he turns white; he crumples the letter in his fist and shoves it into his pocket. His head, usually held so high, droops, his shoulders, usually so square, are bowed; and he stands there in the trench brooding, sullen, caring nothing for what may happen next.

His girl has played him false! She has “met someone else!”

Girls, I appeal to you from my heart, to think before you allow some passing fascination to warp your judgement and blind you. I appeal to you to think! Try to think of that brave lad “out there” fighting for you, and think what it will mean to him if you cast him off. Remember, that you may be the means, indirectly, of sending a man to his doom, for--reckless, with bitterness in his heart--he will not take care, he will take unnecessary risks, thinking all the time, “Who cares?”

If you “meet someone else” and think that you love him better than your boy in the Army overseas, think before you act. It would be far better if you flirted with your new friend while your boy is away rather than jilt your sweetheart, only to find that what you mistook for love was merely fascination.

And if you feel sure that you are in love with the new boy at home wait until your old boy returns before you choose. You will give yourself a better opportunity of making your own choice and, at the same time, you will be playing the game. (March 16, 1918: 332)
Appendix D

HOW TO BE CHEERFUL IN WAR-TIME. A Homey, Helpful, and Encouraging Chat to “F.J.” Readers by Mrs. Wise

My dear Friends,—The other day an acquaintance dropped in to see me during the afternoon. She looked most frightfully “fed-up” and depressed, and I wondered what could be the matter with her, for I knew her to be in quite comfortable circumstances, and, she had not, like most of us, a relative in the Army or Navy for whom she might be worrying.

“I was passing, so thought I would look in for a cup of tea and a chat,” she said gloomily.

“You can have a cup of tea and welcome, if you want one,” I replied. “I don’t take afternoon tea now myself, as I found it really quite unnecessary, while to give it up helps one to economise.”

“Oh, don’t talk to me about economy!” she cried peevishly. “I’m sick to death of the word. It’s drummed into one wherever one goes, and one can’t get a bit of pleasure these days. It’s nothing but regulations and orders and restrictions. If I go into a shop for tea, I shall be told that I can only have two ounces of flour in any form, and so on.”

“Do you read the papers?” I asked her.

“Yes,” she said. “Why?”

“You must have seen, then,” I said, “reports of how the Germans are faring just at present. How they are rationed in everything, even clothing, and can’t get enough of anything. How would you like to be in the same position as they?”

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"I shouldn’t," she said. "But we’re in Great Britain, not Germany. That makes all the difference."

"That difference only exists because Great Britain is on the winning side," I replied. "If Germany was once allowed to get the upper hand with her submarines, it would be we who would be rationed in everything and we who would get barely enough to keep body and soul together. And it is to prevent the enemy’s submarines from getting the upper hand that the rules and the regulations and the restrictions have come into force.

"No; I can tell you what’s really the matter with you, my dear," I continued. "You’ve got too much spare time. Come with me, and I’ll show you how to be happy in war-time."

I took her to the front door, and pointed across the road, where three girls were working on allotments. It was a very hot day, and the perspiration streamed down their faces: yet on each of those faces was a happy smile, and the girls called cheery, chaffing remarks to each other. I knew them all. Two were married and had their husbands at the Front, and the third was a war-widow with a young baby.

As we stood there watching them work, down the street came the rattle of a baker’s cart. A brown-faced girl of little more than eighteen sat in the driver’s seat, her lips pouting in her attempt to whistle a popular song.

"Here comes my milk," I said to my friend. "Now you shall have your cup of tea."

My milk-girl pushed her barrow up to the door and touched her peaked cap to me in quite a masculine way.
"Lovely afternoon, Mrs. Wise," she said. "Makes one glad to be alive, and it makes me glad I took this job."

My friend turned to me with rather a queer smile on her face.

"You have convinced me," she said. "I don't think I'll wait for that cup of tea; I'm going to look round for a job."

Yes, that's the secret of happiness in war-time, my friends--work--work that helps the country. (July 7, 1917: iii)
Endnotes

Notes to Introduction

1 North American and contemporary usage prefers “tid-bit” but “tit-bit” was the standard in Edwardian England. At that time a magazine entitled Tit-Bits published only brief snippets of information from various sources, with the idea that these little bits of information would appeal to the masses (Beetham 119-22).

2 According to Jacques Ellul, Britain’s efforts could only be in vain because “[p]ropaganda has [...] as its essential task, to reproduce innocence from generation to generation” (“The Ethics of Propaganda” 169). It does so, he claims, by reinterpreting facts and by obliterating history, so that each generation comes fresh to “the propaganda environment” (Darnovsky 1).

3 Ellul identifies several kinds of propaganda, but, as Konrad Kellen notes, “the most trenchant distinction made by Ellul is between agitation propaganda and integration propaganda” (Introduction Propaganda vi).

4 John MacKenzie uses this idea in discussing the “centripetal effects of Empire” (2) for Britain in the nineteenth century.

5 In classical rhetoric, the three oratorical genres are deliberative, used for political arguments, forensic, used for legal arguments, and epideictic, used for ceremonies and for assigning praise and blame.

6 Roger Fowler identifies “‘consensus and hierarchy’” as “general values about society” (13). I am not suggesting that consensus and hierarchy are unique to propaganda, but rather that the propaganda in these texts draws on them in unique ways.
Notes to Chapter One

1 Bourdieu comes out in favour of “intuition,” at least as a starting point for analysis; intuition can recognize differences, for example, but Bourdieu warns that the analyst must be aware of using intuition and not do so unconsciously (Bourdieu and Wacquant 108).

2 Marlin provides a good sample of negative definitions (47-48).

3 My intention is not to come up with a definition of propaganda that will be all-inclusive; like Doob, I don’t think it can be done. It is also much easier to be critical of what other people have written than to generate a new definition. The original French title of Ellul’s book is Propagandes, the plural indicating that there are many and various “propagandas,” and that one definition will not cover all the permutations. However, I think that it is important and necessary to have at least a working definition from which to depart if necessary.

4 Neil Postman says that Ellul “is generally regarded as the world’s leading authority on propaganda” (editor’s note, Ellul, “An Aspect of the Role of Persuasion” 145). A different view is taken by Thomas Steinfatt who concludes his evaluation of Propaganda: the Formation of Men’s Attitudes by saying, “Ellul’s position […] is one of equivocation, overstatement, internal inconsistency and selection of evidence. Given that the translation is accurate, Ellul’s book should be regarded as the personal opinions of someone who has spent some time thinking about propaganda” (177). While I agree with several of Steinfatt’s criticisms of some superficial aspects of the book—Ellul does tend to speak in hyperbole and to contradict himself on occasion—I disagree with
Steinfatt’s major assumption that Ellul writes about propaganda “as though the term ‘propaganda’ referred to a real entity, an existing class of phenomena which has an essence to be discovered” (166). By viewing propaganda as a “sociological phenomena,” Ellul provides, I think, a corrective to the existing assumption that propaganda is an entity with an essence. He avoids defining propaganda, and when he does, he does so reluctantly and with the proviso that his definition is a partial, and not an exhaustive, one. Steinfatt further criticizes Ellul for appearing “to write under the assumption that he has discovered what there is to be discovered, and that being in possession of the true knowledge about propaganda, he will expose past errors of previous writers on the subject and deliver the truth unto us” (166). I suggest that anyone who undertakes the study of an issue or problem that has been written about by others writes under the assumption that he or she will expose and correct previous errors; why else would one undertake the study? I find Steinfatt’s tone unnecessarily facetious.

5 Jowett and O’Donnell discuss propaganda as a process in their final chapter (263-71), but they do not suggest that Ellul’s ideas lead them to see propaganda as a process.

6 Ellul uses the masculine pronoun throughout; the original French edition of Propaganda was published in 1962, at a time when even English usage did not require inclusive language. Because the “propagandees” in my study are women, it is rather jarring to use the masculine pronoun whenever I quote Ellul. However, rather than emend each “he” to “[she],” and risk disrupting the flow of the text, I prefer to make a note here and to quote the original as it appears.
7 Winship is careful to divorce “ideology” from “propaganda” in her discussion. She is using propaganda, however, in a very narrow way: “i.e. what ‘they’ (often the Russians) inflict on a people who are given no freedom to know otherwise” (21).

8 Ellul is not here betraying a nostalgia for a golden age of organic groups of people who were happier or freer; rather he is suggesting that the individual in a smaller society was closer to the sources of influence and control. “As a member of a small group [the individual] was fairly well protected from collective influences, customs, and suggestions. He was relatively unaffected by changes in the society at large. […] This does not mean that he was freer, but only that he was determined by his local environment and by his restricted group, and very little by broad ideological influences or collective psychic stimuli” (92).

9 Ellul makes several distinctions, one between direct propaganda and sociological propaganda (15), one between covert and overt propaganda (15), and one between political propaganda and sociological propaganda (62-71). His most useful distinction, however, is that between the “propaganda of agitation” and the “propaganda of integration” (70-79) which generally covers all the other differences.

10 Thompson’s dense and erudite book, Studies in the Theory of Ideology, is perhaps the best testament to the fact that there is no one universally acknowledged definition of ideology.

11 Since my dissertation is not meant to be an historical treatment of women’s magazines, I have relied on the discussions in Ballaster et al., Beetham, Ferguson, White, and Winship to construct the historical context. With very few exceptions I found that their discussions accurately portrayed what I read in The Family Journal.
This statement sounds very much like classical theories of literature which suggest that the function of literature is to “teach and delight.” There were magazines that assumed a “general readership” at this time, and they, too, could teach and delight. However, that the combination is particularly salient in women’s magazines is attested to by Ballaster et al.: “Publishers sought out new markets, principally by targeting what we would now call ‘consumer groups.’ [...] However, by a curious, but very familiar, asymmetry, publishers defined women as a distinct, gender-specific target group while men were not. [...] The general reader, like the general category of human being (or man), was assumed to be male. Women were a ‘special interest’ group by virtue of being ‘not men,’ but men could not similarly be defined as ‘not women’” (79).

The New Woman and the New Journalism were very closely associated. The Penguin Guide says that The New Woman was largely a literary and journalistic phenomenon, emerging “in the press and in novels (though to a lesser extent in real life)” (746). Beetham, however, points out that viewing the New Woman as “an invention, a myth which did not correspond to reality,” was “in part a strategy of containment” which was used to deny her effectiveness in the “real” world (117). Like the New Woman, who was defined only “in relation to an implied ‘true’ woman,” the New Journalism was defined by Matthew Arnold against “a set of implicit oppositions. Persons and journalism which were ‘reasonable’ ‘fair’ and ‘serious’ were set against the unreasonable masses, the new ‘democracy’ with a press appropriate to it. If contemporary society was poised between ‘Culture and Anarchy,’ as Arnold had argued, then it was clear on which side New Journalism lay” (Beetham 119). In summary,
Beetham suggests that "the New Journalism, like the New Woman, was taken as both manifestation of and symbol for a more general crisis" (116).

14 White is describing the formula used in *My Weekly*, not one of the papers of The Amalgamated Press, but one also "intended for working-class women" (87) which fits the formula used in *The Family Journal*.

15 For example, *My Paper*, one of the papers of The Amalgamated Press was only published until 1915 when it was absorbed by *The Family Favourite* which lasted only one more year. *The Family Journal* was last published in 1941. Ballaster et al. are disdainful of the type of historical approach which catalogues the ""births, marriages and deaths"" of women’s magazines, and the "triumphalist tone in celebration of the entrepreneurial and creative business of periodical journalism and publication, fixated on ‘success’ (signified by a magazine which lasts) and mournful about ‘tragedy’ (the magazine that folds)"" (5). However, as they also point out elsewhere, "Until the establishment of the Audit Bureau of Circulations in 1931 there was no central record of the gross circulation figures of periodical publications" (44), and "success" and "tragedy" alone must be a witness to popularity.

16 "Bridget," "Mother," and "Y.Z." are always enclosed in quotation marks while the others are not. Following Northcliffe’s vision, "Mother" is very central in this "family"; her column is the only one that both gives advice to those who seek it and editorializes.

17 Ballaster et al. comment on this: "A crucial feature of women’s magazines is the readers’ contributions in the form of letters, true life stories, the ‘make-over.’ The voice of the readers in all these contexts resonates with exactly the same register of
intimacy as that of the professional producers of the magazine. It matters not at all whether this is because, as readers frequently suspect, all such contributions may be written by the professionals themselves. The effect is to make producers and reader one group” (9).

18 Porter recognizes the importance of audience expectation in text creation and says, “We might then say that the audience in [a text] is as responsible for its production as the writer. That, in essence, readers, not writers, create discourse” (38).

19 For Miller, if not for Kress and Threadgold, genre itself carries ideology. As cultural artefacts, genres are “bearers of culture” which “incorporate knowledge—knowledge of the aesthetics, economics, politics, religious beliefs and all the various dimensions of what we know as human culture” (“Rhetorical Community” 69). Catherine Schryer agrees: “Genres are inherently ideological; they embody the unexamined or tacit ways of performing some social action” (“Records” 209).

20 See Orlikowski and Yates for a discussion of how a genre repertoire is established and changed within a community.

21 Norman Fairclough identifies this as “the myth of free speech,” and he says that this myth, “that anyone is ‘free’ to say what they like, is an amazingly powerful one, given the actuality of a plethora of constraints on access to various sorts of speech, and writing” (63).

22 Northcliffe himself had less to do with the running of the Amalgamated Press than with his newspapers, the Times, the Daily Mail, and the Daily Mirror. George Sutton was chairman of the Amalgamated Press, but Northcliffe’s brother, Harold, later Lord Rothermere, was “mainly responsible” for “the business side” of it (Northcliffe,
qtd. in Ferris 203). However, while Northcliffe may not have had much to do with the
day-to-day affairs of the Amalgamated Press, he had a reputation as a capricious and
malicious tyrant, who enjoyed humiliating senior executives in front of juniors and
arbitrarily singling out individuals for blame (Ferris 208-210). Anyone who disagreed
with him might expect to meet with "permanent exclusion from a whole series of
publications" (Heren 76), such was the extent of his publishing empire. Northcliffe had
also developed what one editor of the Daily Herald (not one of Northcliffe's papers)
called "a 'mystical belief that he was the man appointed to clear up the chaos into which
the world had fallen'" (qtd. in Heren 87). Even if he did not run the Amalgamated
Press, Northcliffe kept his eye on it; he refused an advertisement for The Family Journal
because the paper, he said, had "'higher ideals [...] Quite apart from the moral aspect,
it is foolish to take such matter because it keeps good advertising out of the paper'"
(Northcliffe, qtd. in Pound and Harmsworth 362).

23 George Sutton, chairman of the Amalgamated Press, was appointed Honorary
Director of Publicity for War Bonds, and he did not shrink from using The Family
Journal as a vehicle for promoting them.
Notes to Chapter Two

1 Both Bourdieu and Burke, like Ellul, use the masculine pronoun generically. Bourdieu does not do so exclusively, however, as does Burke. Again, rather than emend each "he" to "he [she]" when I quote directly, I will note the use of the generic masculine here.

2 Bourdieu uses the word "propaganda" here in its "common sense" meaning. Judging by the context, he is assuming the deliberateness that often occurs in definitions of propaganda. What he is describing, though, is very close to what Ellul calls "integration propaganda." Ellul's theory lacks the relational sense of Bourdieu's theory, while Bourdieu's use of the word "propaganda" lacks the studied consideration of Ellul's use; Bourdieu's comments are made in the context of a question-and-answer session, a genre which he himself notes can lead to "abrupt statements, peremptory pronouncements, and simplifying assessments" (viii). Ellul would certainly concur that integration propaganda is "powerful and insidious." For Ellul, modern technologies and the mass media make this "inculcation" into "propaganda."

3 Although Ellul discusses propaganda as a "sociological phenomenon," his emphasis is still on how propaganda affects the individual, how propaganda turns the individual, as he contends, into an unthinking being with no opinions of his or her own. Ellul is careful to point out that propaganda is not necessarily made voluntarily by some mad or evil genius with an insatiable hunger for power, and imposed on those who are less powerful; instead, he argues that propaganda can only be successful if it fulfills a need in the propagandee. However, his theory does tend, implicitly at least, to valorize
the individual, to view the ideal of the individual as a noble one which has been eroded in the technological age. Bourdieu’s social theory which sees the individual and his or her society as working reciprocally, is a necessary corrective to Ellul’s individualism.

Burke himself uses this approach, expanding each clause as he gives it. Stillar uses a later form of the definition as a vehicle for extrapolation.

Burke uses “field” here in a general way, not in the specific sense in which Bourdieu uses it. However, what Burke is saying about selection and deflection certainly applies in Bourdieu’s specific sense of “field,” for example in his discussion “Censorship and the Imposition of Form” (Language and Symbolic Power 137-59).

The four articles that comprise Burke’s series, “A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language” and “Postscripts on the Negative,” discuss in depth the ironies and paradoxes that are created by the principle of the negative. Elsewhere Burke even claims that “we cannot use language maturely until we are spontaneously at home in irony” (Language as Symbolic Action 12).

Burke is careful to indicate that The Rhetoric of Religion is not a theological treatise: “This investigation does not require us to make any decisions about the validity of theology qua theology. Our purpose is simply to ask how theological principles can be shown to have usable secular analogues that throw light upon the nature of language” (2). However, it is not always easy to make the connections, perhaps because of the primacy of the “terministic screens” of the theological over those of the logological.

Halliday’s self-described “short” Introduction to Functional Grammar is nonetheless a very lengthy, detailed work and I cannot hope to summarize it adequately here. Since my purpose is not to concentrate on functional grammar per se, but is rather
to use functional grammar as one of the theoretical perspectives in the interpretation of texts, I can only discuss the most basic aspects of Halliday's system and indicate how they function in the texts I am studying. Even Roger Fowler finds Halliday's terminology "rather forbidding" (68). Glenn Stiliar's adaptation of Halliday's system, combined with that of Michael Gregory, maintains the spirit of Halliday's functional grammar in a condensed version; because of spatial constraints I will use his classifications and terminology, and, when necessary, those of Roger Fowler, Norman Fairclough, and Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress, all of whom also acknowledge their enormous debt to the work of Halliday.

9 Circumstances are included in the ideational function because they provide more information about the process. For the most part they express "time, place, manner, reason, purpose, contingency, and role" (Stillar 26). Fowler all but dismisses them: "Finally, circumstances are easily dealt with: they are simply expressions indicating the time and place of the event described in the clause" (76; emphasis added), while Halliday provides an extended discussion (149-61). I will reserve my discussion of circumstances for the section on the interpersonal metafunction.

10 Halliday identifies six process types: material, behavioural, mental, verbal, relational, and existential (107). My discussion of process types is based on Stiliar 22-26.

11 Fowler points out that Halliday's use of the term "transitivitv" is different from the use of the terms "transitive" and "intransitive" in traditional formal grammar which indicate whether or not a verb takes an object.
There is one mental process in the text, occurring in the sentence, “It is that thought, possibly, which nerves you to do your utmost.” It is a mental:reactive process, but it is complicated by the use of a relational:identification process, “It is that thought” which acts as “theme,” what the initial clause is going to tell us about. (Theme is discussed in the section on the interpersonal metafunction.) If we paraphrase and simplify the sentence, “That thought nerves you,” we eliminate the complication of the relational process, but we are still left with the problem that this clause appears to act more like an action process, with “thought” as the agent and “you” as the acted upon, which doesn’t make sense; it makes even less sense, though, to see “thought” as the processor and “you” as the phenomenon, which again is what is suggested by the structure, and what we would have to conclude if we were to treat functional grammar as an algorithm. Halliday notes that in some attributive clauses “the attribute denotes a quality equivalent to a mental process” (121); using the clause “it pleases me” as a type, Halliday notes that the “carrier,” the entity to which the attribute is ascribed, becomes “equivalent to phenomenon” in a mental process (121).

Hodge and Kress do not limit modality to the “function of modal verbs,” as Stillar does (35). For them, “modality is pervasive, appearing everywhere in an utterance or text, pressing all aspects of the verbal code into the service of modality” (127). They credit Halliday with seeing modality as part of the interpersonal function, rather than as part of the ideational function, which is where it is placed if it is seen as having to do with propositions: “Halliday’s theory recognizes that modality is a matter of the relation of the participants in a verbal interaction, hence squarely in the domain of the social, and that modal forms are traces of the activity of speakers acting in a social
context” (124). Hodge and Kress discuss modality as a means of expressing “affinity,” or lack of it, “about the status of the mimetic system” (123), which is in the realm of Halliday’s ideational function. Their treatment of modality captures the sense that “the modality of a message [...] is not a single or simple truth value. It is nearly always a complex, even contradictory package of claims and counter-claims” (127). While all the metafunctions can and do overlap, in Hodge and Kress’ system modality tends to override everything else; because their system is so “complex [and] contradictory,” an analysis using it can appear to slip into relativism because the analyst can bring anything and everything to the analysis. Stillar’s classifications allow for the complexity of analysis while providing clearer categories for it.

14 According to Collins Cobuild, “emotional” is an adjective that can be both qualitative and classifying; it is perhaps this association with the qualitative that allows it to express attitude when it acts as a classifying adjective.

15 I have chosen to discuss only these two elements. Halliday and Hasan include ellipsis and substitution and lexical cohesion; for my purposes, ellipsis and substitution can be included in reference, and lexical choices will probably be more significant as a resource for the ideational function.
Notes to Chapter Three

1 The *Canadian Oxford Dictionary* defines propagandist as “a member or agent of a propaganda organization,” which suggests that propaganda is both deliberate and organized. I have argued that it need not be either, and I use the word “propagandist” here simply to refer to someone who writes propaganda.

2 Marwick says, “War was widely expected as an eventual probability, but it was scarcely visualized as an immediate contingent” (29).

3 Keep points out that “the penny dailies like Alfred Harmsworth’s [Lord Northcliffe’s] *The Daily Mail* [. . .] played an important role in creating the patriotic consensus among the lower middle class” through the publication of future war stories which kept the populace in a state of preparedness by “making the very phrase ‘the next war’ a common-place” (7,14).

4 That “brave men” here refers only to the British and their allies is axiomatic. Intertextually, the Germans are “the veritable offspring of the Hun, [. . .] brutal, coarse, degraded” (April 3, 1915: 580), “bullies in victory and cowards in defeat” (June 29, 1918: i).

5 Brittain suggests a very pragmatic reason why the civilian population may have been ignorant of the horrors of mustard gas: “The only thing one can say is that such severe cases [of mustard gas] don’t last long; either they die soon or else improve—usually the former; they certainly never reach England in the state we have them here” (395).

6 The story about Sir Philip Sidney must have had common currency. Tylee
mentions a manual that was "reprinted several times during the Great War. It defined the 'essence of manly character' in terms of the gentlemanly virtues of chivalry. These were exemplified by the heroic self-denial of Sir Philip Sydney [sic]" (The Great War 71). As he lay mortally wounded, Sidney is supposed to have given his cup of water to another whose need, he said, was greater than his own.

7 See, for example, Beetham 158, Tylee, The Great War 16, and Ballaster et al. 93-4.

8 Hodge and Kress recognize that "social relations in semiotic acts and in social formations are constituted by relations of power (order and subordination) and solidarity (cohesion and antagonism) with these dimensions typically both complimentary and opposed" (266).

9 Mrs. Wise begins her column on August 1, 1914, as war is imminent. The editors could very well have recognized that Mrs. Wise's ability to act as a centripetal force, a force for consensus, would be greater as a spokesperson than as a mere character. Mrs. Wise, as an elderly woman, is also an appropriate spokesperson for the Victorian ideals that inform much of the mythology of war.

10 Not only did these "men of letters" endorse the cause, but "private publishing houses were used for the publication of books and pamphlets to make it seem that British propaganda was solely the creation of private citizens" (Buitenhuys xvi-ii).

11 Mrs. Wise naively quotes Horace's line "dulce et decorum est" in translation, the line which Wilfred Owen was later to use in a highly ironic and critical way.

12 In making the point that form "constrains against the discovery of information that does not fit the form," Coe says that "literary history is filled with examples of
writers who needed to invent new forms to communicate new messages” ("Apology"
20). The poet/combatants who wrote about the war had to try to find new forms to
express what was essentially ineffable; the lilting rhythms of the poetry of Rupert
Brooke, for example, could not possibly be used to express the horrors of war that
Wilfred Owen, Siegfried Sassoon, and Isaac Rosenberg experienced. The poetry that
expresses opposition to the war or to the civilian attitudes to the war is very different
from the verse that expresses the romanticized view of the war in the popular press.

13 Toolan uses “stories” specifically, rather than “narrative,” indicating an
important difference between them. The term “story” is used by narratologists in a
number of overlapping ways (see Toolan [11] and Gerald Prince, A Dictionary of
Narratology), but for my purposes the distinction made by Hodge and Kress between
“narrative” and “story” is most useful. For them, narrative is “a culturally given way of
organizing and presenting discourse” (230) while story is a form of narrative, “ordered
in particular formal, textual ways, contingent on the social organization of participants
in the situation, where or for whom the story functions” (229). In other words, narrative
provides the basic structures of sequencing and linking of events, while story provides
more “specific social meaning” (231). But narrative per se is not devoid of meaning or
significance. Hayden White calls this significance “the content of the form”: narrative,
far form being merely a form of discourse that can be filled with different contents,
[... ] already possesses a content prior to any given actualization of it in speech or
writing” (The Content of the Form xi).

14 Again, Mrs. Wise’s column purports to be an oral narrative and works within
that illusion.
15 Alice, of course, has been “neglecting all her household work,” and has thus been guilty of neglecting her duty as a woman to keep the home a place of refuge. Although I have not quoted this part of the story, the Penworth household is a shambles; Mrs. Penworth snaps at her daughter, Tom is sarcastic, the house is a mess, and breakfast is not ready for the men. The Young household, in contrast, is in “apple-pie order,” and everyone politely compliments each other. The implication, of course, is that in a house where women keep good order, things will work out for the best.

16 “Quietly” here could simply mean not obstreperously, but an earlier column by “The Parlour Philosopher,” a male columnist who does not appear during the war years, says, “There is nothing more beautiful in a man’s eyes than a silent woman” (Jan. 13, 1912; 283).

17 These stories were published on October 10, 1914, barely two months after war was declared. The sense of futurity in the second story, with Bert’s return being “months after” he had joined up, followed by a lengthy convalescence and a wedding, implicitly belies the commonly held opinion that the war would be over by Christmas.

18 “Playing” figures prominently in these texts. In the first text, “Y.Z.” idiosyncratically uses the phrase “playing traitor to her lad and to the cause.” His phrase serves to lighten the offence because it is only “playing.” In Text 6 the phrase “His girl has played him false!” adds a touch of melodrama to the text.

19 Given the context, this is a good example of the innocent use of language that Fussell says was to vanish as the war progressed.

20 By hailing its audience as male, this comment clearly makes woman the object rather than the subject. It is, I think, intended to be consolatory in reassuring
women that no one can live up to an ideal of perfection, yet its effect is instead quite condescending and reinscribes woman’s inadequacy; men have to be “satisfied” with less-than-perfect women but there is nothing in the statement to indicate that men are also less than perfect. There is another curious aspect of the comment, though. It is no secret that the editor is male, yet this is primarily a paper for women. Why, then, does the editor address men so obviously in this statement? Janice Winship discusses the ways in which the cover model on contemporary women’s magazines appeals to women, and I think her comments pertain to this situation as well. “[T]he gaze between cover model and women readers marks the complicity between women that we see ourselves in the image which a masculine culture has defined” (11). It is the same process that Beetham identifies as “the desire to be desired” (200).
Notes to Chapter Four


2 One example in which it is used to describe combatants comes early in the war: "British soldiers are justly famed for their pluck and endurance" (Sept. 5, 1914: 532). The *OED* gives an example from 1889 in which the more diminutive sense is apparent, and it is this connotation which the word tends to have in the texts: "You are the pluckiest little woman I ever knew."

3 Both men's and women's bodies must be disciplined during war. Men's bodies are very obviously disciplined by military service, by confinement in barracks or trenches, by the routines of military drill, and, of course, by combat itself. One of the most significant campaigns of homefront propaganda was that which promoted the rationing of food, particularly meat and bread. Rationing is one point on which civilians and combatants can be equal. Mrs. Wise says, "To eat less than the ration is the highest form of patriotism" (June 2, 1917: 95). The editor says, "He who saves bread is helping his country, and he who wastes bread is putting a weapon into the hands of the enemy. [. . .] You know, and I know, Fellow Travellers that no one is healthier or stronger than the British Tommy of today. And that British Tommy has lived on war rations for nearly three years now!" (May 12, 1917: 50). The most subtle appeal to women, however, is that which argues that the beauty of the Irish and West Country girls has little to do with climate, as is usually claimed, and more to do with the fact that they eat fruits and vegetables "and not nearly so much meat as the people who live in other parts of the
This is not a concept unique to the First World War. MacDonald discusses the "motif of war-as-lesson" that arose during Britain’s imperial wars of nineteenth century. The enemy, who in the New Imperial age was typically a rebellious native, had to be taught how to behave. The imperial army acted as schoolmaster, the native as unruly pupil. The plot was the simple sequence of misdemeanor, followed by warning, followed by a further act of disobedience, followed by punishment" (25). However, in the case MacDonald describes war teaches lessons to the enemy; the Great War was thought to be teaching lessons to its own citizens.

The mythology of the Just Warrior maintains that the cause is so noble that war doesn’t change the soldier for the worse but actually ennobles him.

The “petty differences” she is probably referring to is threat of civil war in Ireland (Marwick 26).

Perhaps the best example of this entrenched individualism in the paper is the recurring problem of men who abandon or abuse their wives and/or children; in many cases the wife expresses concern because of her husband’s alcoholism. Although the situations vary, the advice is always the same. “Mother” answers her correspondent, whose husband has been beating her, in this way: “But there is only one thing to do. Your husband must come first in your heart and in your life. You married him of your own free will, and thereby took upon yourself a certain responsibility. [...] I do not advise your putting up with bad usage, but I do advise your trying, by kindness, sympathy, and forbearance, to teach your husband to be a better man” (Dec. 15, 1917: 136). There is no suggestion that women as a collective should lobby for better divorce
laws or for legal protection; rather, it is the woman’s individual responsibility to reclaim her husband. Interestingly, while all the female columnists give this advice, “Y.Z.” alone says, “I would like to warn my girl friends [...] against placing too great faith in their own ability to reclaim a man” (July 28, 1917: 200).

8 Marwick quotes from Gilbert Murray’s How Can War Ever be Right? published in 1914; in it, combatants are portrayed as “‘quiet, orderly and wonderfully cheerful.’” Marwick comments: “Once this idea had been enunciated by men of intellect, it was easily perpetuated by countless mushy stories in book and newspaper; long after the first enthusiasm of the early volunteers had evaporated, their decimated ranks replenished with less enthusiastic conscripts, people at home went on believing in the ‘happiness’ of the men in the trenches” (47).

9 Sandra Gilbert says that “[f]or four years [...] a sizeable percentage of the young men in England had been imprisoned in trenches and uniforms, while the young women of England had been at liberty in farm and factory. Paradoxically, in fact, the war to which so many of them had gone in the hope of becoming heroes ended up emasculating them, depriving them of autonomy, confining them as closely as any Victorian women had been confined” (448). Claire Tylee, in “‘Maleness Run Riot’--the Great War and Women’s Resistance to Militarism,” and Jane Marcus in “Corpus/Corps/Corpse: Writing the Body in/at War” both take exception to Gilbert’s idea that women felt “exuberance” and “sexual glee” along with their new-found freedom. Tylee says that Gilbert “obscures the fact that women are as dehumanised by the modern technological state as men are. It is a point that women made clearly at that period” (100). Mrs. Wise’s comment appears to be governed more by the mythology of
war than by a sense of the dehumanization of women by the modern technological state.

10 Cobley discusses the irony that confronted war memorialists: "[T]he difficulty of writing about the war was compounded by the realization that the narrative had to be addressed either to those who already knew and did not need to be told or to those who did not know and could never be made to understand" ("History and Ideology" 39).

11 A little more than a year before Mrs. Wise's column, "Charlie Strong," who wrote the advice column for My Paper, another of the Amalgamated Press's weekly papers for women, addressed the same issue. "The men are so busy fighting, or getting ready to fight, that they have no time to think of their troubles and hardships. [...] But a woman's duties remain the same, except that they become even harder than before. All that makes life worthwhile is taken from her, perhaps forever, when her man goes away, and there is no glory or excitement to compensate her for her loss" (Feb. 13, 1915: 21). His column is an interesting intertext to Mrs. Wise's because it marks more starkly the ideas of gain and loss that hers only hints at.

12 As the word "privilege" indicates, women who are at the front as nurses are higher on the hierarchy than are women at home, even if they are below combatants.

13 For example, Milton created such a powerful anti-model in Satan that the Romantic poets found him more attractive than God.

14 "Complicating action and resolution are, of course, the core of the narrative" (Pratt 45).

15 Interestingly, Mrs. Wise doesn't actually "tell" the story to the acquaintance as she has told her what was "the matter with" her, but rather "shows" her; Mrs. Wise tells
the *readers* the story of the three “girls,” why they have a vested interest in working on
the allotments, but she and her acquaintance only stand “there watching them work.”

16 MacDonald uses the idea of the comic plot to discuss the narratives of
imperial conquest that set the tone for narratives of war (25).

17 Jenny Gould notes that the use of the term “masculine” to describe women’s
behaviour was often ambivalent: “But, confusingly, *masculine* as applied to women’s
behavior was not always a term of abuse--especially during the war, when it was often
considered the highest praise to say of a woman that she had ‘behaved like a man’”
(121).

18 This section is in bold face in the original. However, by the end of the war the
quality of the paper used in the periodicals was poor, and the bolding is often erratic. I
have assumed that the bolding often has more to do with the quality of the paper and
how it took the ink than with the editorial need for emphasis and have chosen not to
reproduce the bolding here.

19 Marwick says, “At no time during the First World War was there any
widespread privation in Britain, and what might justly be called ‘shortages’ were only
really apparent in 1917” (191). He goes on to say, “When the Working Classes Cost of
Living Committee reported in 1918 that the working classes, as a whole, were in a
position to purchase food of substantially the same nutritive value as in June 1914, this
was perhaps almost as much a condemnation of pre-war conditions as a tribute to
wartime reorganization” (199). However, Marwick quotes the same committee report
for 1917-18 which describes the living conditions at one particular munitions centre as
“‘a crying scandal,’” with overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and the river polluted
by refuse from the factories (205). As she returned home at one point, Brittain, who had been used to facing "death and horror at first hand for months," realized that she had "under-estimated the effect upon the civilian population of year upon year of diminishing hope, diminishing food, diminishing light, [and] diminishing heat" (427).
Notes to Conclusion

1 The motto that “Bridget” sends, comprised of three lines of poetry by Elizabeth Barrett Browning, is:

Perhaps the cup was broken here
That Heaven’s new wine might show more clear.
I praise Thee while my days go on.

The paraphrase I have given of its interpretation is essentially how “Bridget” presents it to her readers.

2 The creator of the web site is male so I have used masculine pronouns.

3 I am emphasizing that this is his perception of Acadians. An earlier attempt to say very directly that the people of the nearby village did not want this man there because he was German resulted in an angry backlash. Many local residents resented being portrayed as bigots. The farmer is from Germany but has lived in New Brunswick with his family for five years. However, that this idea still appears on the web page indicates that the propagandist wants to cater to this sentiment if it does exist.
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