

Whose Parks?  
A Qualitative Exploration of the  
Governance of BC Parks

by  
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A thesis  
presented to the University of Waterloo  
in fulfillment of the  
thesis requirement for the degree of  
Master of Arts  
in  
Recreation and Leisure Studies

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2009

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## AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

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## ABSTRACT

Good governance is of paramount importance to the survival and success of parks in achieving the dual mandate of conservation and recreation. However, there exists a lack of research on governance regarding the implications of outsourcing visitor services to private companies. The case study research explored the perceived implications of British Columbia's Provincial Parks' outsourcing model on the nine UNDP criteria for good governance. Interviews were conducted with six government employees, three private contractors, and six members of conservation and recreation non-governmental organizations. The findings revealed distinct variations in satisfaction with governance principles based on stakeholder group. The participants were all deeply passionate for parks yet felt powerless to influence the direction and management of BC Parks due to the high level of political control which prioritized the focus placed on each governance principle. Future parks governance research must also investigate the relationship between politicians and public administrators.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to equally thank my co-supervisors, Dr. Paul Eagles and Dr. Troy Glover for your guidance and the continued cultivation of my critical thinking skills. Dr. Eagles – thank you for igniting my passion, understanding and experience in park management; you've had an immensely positive impact on my life. Dr. Glover – thank you for your patience and counsel in helping me become a qualitative researcher and an incisive writer. Thank you to my committee members, Dr. Mark Havitz and Dr. Heather Mair, for your support and insightful suggestions that strengthened the quality of my thesis.

Thank you kindly to the employees of BC Parks, the Park Facility Operators, and the members of the NGOs for sharing your stories with me. Without your time and help, this thesis could have never occurred.

I would not be the person I am today without the wonderful friendships I have developed over the past few years. To my grad girls – Andrea Flack, Amy Chapeskie and Ann Gillies – thank you for all of the love, support, and precious memories. I feel so grateful to have shared this experience with you three lovely ladies of leisure and academia. To Darla Fortune and Colleen Whyte – your kindness, friendship and words of wisdom have encouraged me throughout this entire process, thank you so very much. And thank you to Windekind Butueau-Duitschaever, my cheerful parks governance buddy, who was always ready and willing to discuss the research project.

Thank you to all the faculty and staff in the Department of Recreation and Leisure Studies for this wonderful opportunity, and for creating a rich and supportive academic community.

After twenty-two years of school, I'm finally ready...

## DEDICATION

To my loving and supportive family: Mom, Dad and Heather.  
You mean the world to me.

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# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Delivery of Public Services

Since the mid-1970s, North American government agencies have faced increased scrutiny by proponents of privatization to address ostensible inefficiencies in their operating structures and to inject competition into the public sector (Crompton, 1999). The political pressure associated with these criticisms of government led public managers to seek alternatives to the traditional model of direct delivery of public services by government agencies, alternatives that sometimes include the commercial sector (Glover & Burton, 1998). Forms of privatization, therefore, have become increasingly commonplace in the public sector (Crompton, 1998).

Outright privatization refers to the sale of public services, buildings or land to the private sector, including the not-for-profit and commercial sectors (Crompton, 1999). More generally, however, privatization is understood as a multitude of alternatives that involve private organizations, including cross sector alliances, regulated monopolies, and divestiture (Glover & Burton, 1998).

The shift in the role of government in the delivery of public services and the public sector's increasing adoption of business principles has been demonstrated by provincial parks in Canada. On the one hand, Ontario Parks embodies the traditional role of government in terms of both arranging and producing visitor services in provincial parks. On the other hand, British Columbia (BC) Parks has adopted an outsourcing model with visitor services provided by private, for-profit

contractors. The variety of management arrangements has stimulated discussion among many academics, practitioners, and citizens. How were decisions to adopt an outsourcing model made? What are the implications of these new, more commercial management models? What are the implications for governance?

## 1.2 Governance of Parks and Protected Areas

Governance is regarded as a process concerning the interactions in society regarding how decisions in society are made, by whom and in what capacity, and how decision-makers are held accountable (IOG, 2007). The Fifth World Parks Congress (Durban, 2003) identified governance as "central to the conservation of protected areas throughout the world" (WCPA, 2003, p.32). Moreover, good governance is of paramount importance to the survival and success of parks and protected areas in achieving their goals of conservation and recreation (Dearden, Bennett, & Johnston, 2005).

Based on good governance criteria developed by the United Nations Development Programme (1997), Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (2003) articulated five principles of sound governance for parks and protected areas: Legitimacy and Voice, Direction, Performance, Accountability, and Fairness. Hannah (2006) applied the principles to evaluate private protected areas in Canada and found overall good governance, with Direction and Legitimacy as the highest ranked principles and Performance as the weakest principle. Hannah's research serves as evidence that Graham et al.'s principles can be used to evaluate governance of protected areas.

Further analysis of the governance of public protected areas in Canada was recommended as a noteworthy future research direction.

There exists a worldwide trend of an increased role of the private sector in parks and protected area management, yet “the nature of that involvement remains only partially known” (Dearden, et al., 2005, p.98). Given the increasing presence of private sector involvement within the profession of parks and protected areas, Eagles (2008a) argued that

greater understanding is needed on the role of government and the private sector in the provision of parks, recreation and tourism services and the inclusion (or exclusion) of private-type services and management models... and [an overall] understanding of the governance of protected areas (p.56).

No comprehensive study has yet been undertaken to assess the repercussions of an outsourcing model on governance. Furthermore, to my knowledge, no studies have focused on how different stakeholders perceive the effects of outsourcing services.

Clearly, a decision to privatize has implications for many stakeholders. Stakeholders connected to governance-related issues include: elected officials, public administrators, private citizens, civil society, and the for-profit and not-for-profit partners (including the media). My interest in this study is in government employees of the park agency, private contractors from the commercial sector and members of conservation and recreation-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Specific government agencies are charged with the management of specific parks and protected areas for the broad purposes of conservation and recreation. An agency's decision to outsource services does not relinquish the responsibility of

management (Domberger & Jensen, 1997). The agency must remain in a regulatory role; supervising and monitoring the services and the private company. Monitoring is of utmost importance in all outsourcing models in order to ensure the contractors follow the contract stipulations and the prescribed duties. A lack of monitoring would lead to the inability to evaluate many governance principles due to lack of information. Thus, government employees can directly comment on the effects of outsourcing visitor services to private contractors.

Rather than the government directly arranging and producing all services in parks, specific responsibilities can be outsourced through a commercial contract. Parks continue to be held as a merit good owned by the government, with the private contractors providing particular services. The contractors can offer their opinions regarding the bidding process, the role of monitoring, interactions with visitors and their overall perception of the outsourcing model.

Members of conservation and recreation-based NGOs hold various and vested interests in the management of parks and protected areas. NGOs are comprised of private citizens assembled together to assert a collective voice to government and the public regarding their points of view and concerns regarding park management. NGOs serve as advocates, watchdogs, and commentators on the management of parks. The members of NGOs are often vocal with their perspectives regarding the perceived effects of outsourcing visitor services to commercial contractors.

The research is a response to the need to understand the implications of the outsourcing management model on governance from different stakeholders' points of view. More specifically, the research investigated the perceptions of the

implications on governance when visitor services are outsourced to the commercial sector, in the context of British Columbia Provincial Parks.

### 1.3 Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the case study research was to explore the perceived implications of an outsourcing model on governance by members of three groups: government employees of BC Parks, private contractors, and members of conservation and recreation non-governmental organizations. More specifically, the following research questions were investigated:

1. How do government employees of BC Parks, the private contractors, and members of non-governmental organizations perceive the implications of BC Parks' outsourcing model of service delivery on the principles of governance:
  - a. Legitimacy and Voice?
  - b. Direction?
  - c. Performance?
  - d. Accountability?
  - e. Fairness?
2. How do the perspectives of the government employees of BC Parks, private contractors, and members of NGOs compare and contrast?
3. How do government employees of BC Parks perceive:
  - a. the performance of the private contractors?
  - b. the role of non-governmental organizations in BC Parks?
4. How do BC private contractors perceive:
  - a. the BC Parks agency?
  - b. the role of non-governmental organizations in BC Parks?
5. How do members of non-governmental organizations perceive:
  - a. the BC Parks agency?
  - b. the performance of the private contractors?
  - c. their role in BC Parks?
  - d. other NGOs?
6. How does monitoring fit within the outsourcing model and the concept of governance?

An outsourcing model for parks and protected areas yields implications for both conservation and recreation management. Thus investigating the implications of an outsourcing model is important to all citizens, whether or not they are recreation users in parks. Since the residents of British Columbia are the owners of BC Parks, this research served as an assessment of the governance of BC Parks.

Furthermore, examining the various perceptions regarding the outsourcing arrangements for providing visitor services in provincial parks in British Columbia has added to the general body of literature surrounding governance of parks and protected areas. Moreover, from a park planning perspective, BC Parks benefitted from the research by expanding all stakeholders' understanding of the perceived implications of commercial contractors providing visitor services.

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I review relevant literature pertaining to the implications of privatization on governance. This review includes a brief overview of the evolving role of government in the provision of public goods and services, followed by an introduction of the concept of privatization (its ideological foundation and its emergence in parks) and an overview of the various models of management of parks and protected areas. These topics are followed by an exploration of the notion of governance, the principles of sound governance, and their relevance to parks management. Finally, the potential implications of a parks agency adopting an outsourcing model on governance are investigated.

### 2.1 Delivery of Public Goods and Services

The role of the government in the provision of public goods and services is a subject of passionate debate and discussion among scholars, policymakers, and practitioners. Historically, the production of goods and services by government was believed necessary to counteract the flaws inherent in a market economy (Walsh, 1995). In particular, the market was believed to fail in certain instances, such as the equitable distribution of resources. Certain services, such as health care and education, carry such moral significance in society that government intervention was deemed necessary to ensure equitable, fair and just access for all citizens (Walsh, 1995).

Proponents of privatization, in response, identified several deficiencies with the traditional model of direct provision and argued for the “reinvention” of government (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) through the adoption of market mechanisms in the public sector. Government’s monopolistic system of planned production, they argued, is implicitly inefficient. With no competitors, and thus no incentive to keep costs down, operations are presumably ineffective and wasteful (Walsh, 1995). Government’s traditional arrangement of direct delivery can be ameliorated, proponents of privatization suggested, through market mechanisms, such as outsourcing the production of certain public services to the commercial sector (Walsh, 1995).

All told, this debate reflects the politics of public service provision and the contested role of the public sector in service delivery. Whenever one discusses the role of government, one must naturally consider the role of the private sector, too. As Moore (1995, p. 29) wrote,

It is not enough to say that public managers create results that are valued; they must be able to show that the results obtained are worth the cost of private consumption and unrestrained liberty forgone in producing the desirable results.

When is it appropriate for government to provide service directly? When is it appropriate for the commercial sector to do so? These questions have encouraged scholars and practitioners for years.

During the golden age of the welfare state (1945-1975), government more often than not served as the direct provider of public goods and services (Glover, 1999a). Consumption of services, such as recreation and parks, was considered

beneficial to individuals and society (based on moral and social reasoning). As a result, government was expected to address broader social conditions to ensure equal access for the general public; the free market, by contrast, presumably disregarded the needs of disadvantaged members of society, unless addressing them was a profitable venture (Self, 1993).

After World War II, North America experienced a post-war prosperity the blooming of the middle class and a superior standard of living (Shultis, 2003). With an increase in disposable income and leisure time, combined with the transportation advances of the car, the North Americans masses increasingly visited the parks and national historic sites. Furthermore, the people who worked at parks were respected and considered dedicated civil servants (More, 2005).

However, economic stagnation in the mid-1970s resulted in increased inflation, interest rates, unemployment, and declining incomes (Lindberg & Maier, 1986). Free market economists attributed the declines to factors such as globalization, a waning labour influence, technological advances, and immigration (Teeple, 1995). As a result, a conservative backlash against government gained ground. Conservative politicians such as Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and Brian Mulroney, condemned the "nanny state" for its large deficits and overall inefficiency, while advocating for smaller government (Shultis, 2005). Driven by their rhetoric, conservative groups, espousing neo-conservative doctrine, began to demand decreased taxes, smaller government, increased fiscal responsibility and accountability, increased public-private partnerships, and limited intervention in the

economic and social lives of citizens. In short, critics of the welfare state argued the structure of the government removed the motivation for politicians and bureaucrats to be fiscally responsible and efficient. The validity of public services was not being challenged, but rather the methods of delivery were questioned. As a result, alternatives to the traditional model were sought (Burton & Glover, 1999).

In response, governments began to embrace the enabling authority of the state (Burton & Glover, 1999). This "authority" distinguished between arranging services and producing them, thereby allowing government to make the argument that it needed to arrange services, but not necessarily produce them. Barnett and Carmichael (1997), proponents of privatization, remarked the two key roles of the government employing the enabling authority were to: (1) facilitate the production of services for the public; and (2) provide opportunities for competition for service producers. For Barnett & Carmichael, the primary objective of the enabling authority of the state is economic, making cost efficiency the principal consideration. Irrespective of the preferred producer of the service, the enabling authority of the state is evidenced by the variety of forms of public leisure service delivery currently in use by governments that span the ideological spectrum (see Burton & Glover, 1999; Walsh, 1995).

## 2.2 The Faces of Privatization

Not surprisingly, the adoption of business principles by the public sector has been a source of contention among practitioners and academics. Many academics assert such principles are incongruent with the aims of government because they

threaten traditional notions of equity, citizenship, and democracy (More, 2002; Hemingway, 1999; Saul, 1994; Murdock, 1994; Smale & Reid, 2002). Proponents of privatization, by contrast, contend the adoption of business principles improves service quality, responsiveness, and overall efficiency (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Crompton, 1999; Savas, 1987). These positions represent different lenses through which to understand the consequences of privatization.

Samson (1994) identified three such “faces” or lenses. First, privatization can be viewed solely through an economic lens. Conservative politicians and free market economists adopt the perspective that privatization is a technique to solve economic problems. The scope is intentionally limited to disregard the ripple effects of privatization and the underlying ideology. Privatization is solely regarded from an economic standpoint and evaluated by the paramount criteria of cost-effectiveness.

The second face of privatization is understood as a relational process because it focuses on the broader range of social impacts and effects of privatization (Samson, 1994). The sociological face is often adopted by progressive policy makers who are aware of the creation of disenfranchised classes through cuts to social services thus decreasing social justice. Nevertheless, the negative social consequences of privatization are often downplayed, given that such cuts do not enhance politicians’ popularity.

The third and final face of privatization is a combination of the first two faces and also regarded as a hegemonic project. It is regarded as a process of using the dogma of privatization to change the values, perceptions, and ideology of the public

and private sectors (Samson, 1994). The public perception of the government shifted over the past 30 years from that of a provider of social services as a means of correcting the flaws of the market economy to an inefficient and wasteful bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the perception of the commercial sector shifted from distrust due to its emphasis on profit, to being praised for efficiency, innovation, and responsiveness.

Samson's three faces offer different lenses through which we can understand privatization. They also reflect different perspectives politicians, managers, scholars and citizens can hold. The embrace of privatization in North America reflects the significance of Samson's first face of privatization, which praised privatization as an economic solution to an economic problem.

### 2.3 Privatization in Parks and Recreation

A public good is one that benefits an entire populace, rather than simply those individuals who partake of the service (Crompton & Lamb, 1986; Walsh, 1995). Public goods are distinguished by joint and non-exclusive consumption (Peston, 1972), whereas private goods, are characterized by individual and exclusive consumption (Savas, 2000). Parks, recreation and tourism services are generally considered merit goods, which fall along the middle of the public-private spectrum (Burton & Glover, 1999) since conservation serves the public good and recreation serves the individual users.

Parks have a dual mandate of conservation and recreation. Conservation primarily serves the public good by protecting the functioning of essential

ecosystems required for survival of humanity (i.e. cycles and systems of water, air, nutrient as well as the native components). And recreation, primarily benefits the user, thus the introduction and societal acceptance of user fees in parks.

In 1998, John Crompton, identified four forces that he believed led to the emergence of privatization in parks and recreation in North America: (i) a shortage of tax funds; (ii) convergence of political thinking; (iii) recognition of the traditional model as a monopoly and its associated inefficiencies; and, (iv) the awareness of the distinction between arranging for a service and producing a service.

Crompton (1998) argued the initial force behind the privatization of parks and recreation services stemmed from frustration with the traditional model of direct service delivery and the shortage of tax funds. He argued the economic recession and the tax revolt of the late 1970s and early 1980s in the USA led concerned taxpayers to scrutinize the inefficiencies of the traditional model of service delivery. For this reason, Crompton believed government appropriations to parks and recreation agencies steadily decreased. Meanwhile, the responsibilities of managers dramatically increased, including more land to manage and demand for high quality services through the use of commercial sector skills (such as target marketing) resulting in the expectation of public administrators to more with less. Thus, new alternatives to service delivery were sought. In Crompton's words,

The emergence of privatization was a natural response to these perceived limitations of direct provision. At the same time, it embraced two pervasive tenets of American lore – that government is inherently wasteful because it lacks the incentive of the profit motive, and that private enterprise is inherently efficient because inefficiency is not tolerated in the market-place (p.92).

This observation is consistent with Samson's (1994) third face of privatization regarding the shift in perceptions of the characteristics and capabilities of the public and commercial sectors. Once more, privatization is justified as the solution to economic problems, while not revealing the potential negative implications (these are explored below).

Crompton (1998) identified the convergence of political agendas as the second force behind the privatization of parks and recreation in the USA. As he saw it, support for the privatization of public services grew across the political spectrum in the 1980s. Privatization was perceived by politicians as the solution to a cost-effective delivery of public services, increased choice for participants, opportunities for private sector involvement and reducing the size of the government.

The third force that fuelled the advancement of privatization was the recognition of the inefficiencies associated with monopolistic direct delivery (Crompton, 1998). Monopolies are believed to lack the incentive to be cost-efficient and responsive to the needs of clients. Competition, by contrast, represents the stimulus for improved efficiency, responsiveness, innovation, and service quality. Accordingly, the public began to question why these principles were not applied to the public sector. Opponents to privatization called for a renewed commitment to the re-distribution of wealth and continued equal access to services (Ravenscroft, 1993). However, their voices were drowned out by calls to privatize services. Privatization was heralded as an economic strategy; it would inject competition into the public sector to forward cost-efficiency in the delivery of public services.

The fourth and final force of the emergence of privatization, according to Crompton, was the awareness of the distinction between arranging the provision of a service and its production. Government agencies, it was argued, should be responsible for recognizing the need for a service, while producing the service should be the responsibility of another (commercial) provider (Drucker, 1969).

Crompton articulated the justification for this distinction:

The provision decisions deals with social goods, contending values, who should benefit and who should pay, equity, income redistribution, and other issues that are inherently political. In contrast, the production decision is mainly an economic issue, concerned with how the political service objective can be most effectively and efficiently delivered (p.99).

Savas (1987), one of the most ardent advocates of privatization, vindicated that privatization helped restore government to its foundational purpose: "to steer, not to man the oars" (p.290).


Decisions in government reflect the current hegemonic socio-political ideology. Neo-conservative proponents have stimulated a decreased budget and fewer government employees for parks management. Furthermore, parks are experiencing increased visitation levels, large park lands to manage, ennobled goals expressed in mandates and Parks Acts (i.e.: restoration or maintenance of ecological integrity) and a demand for high quality visitor services (Eagles, 2008a; More, 2005). In order to cope, parks agencies are encouraged to act as a business through user fees, partnerships (with not-for-profit and private sectors) marketing strategies, business plans, and customer-oriented philosophies.

Crompton (1998) discussed his perception regarding the evolution of the role of the government in the delivery of public services. The economic and social paradigm supported a decrease in societal taxes, political support for privatization, increased dissatisfaction regarding inefficiencies of the public sector, and the recognition of the enabling authority of the state. Therefore, the growing perception that the traditional role of direct provision was unsustainable resulted in the adoption of various alternative arrangements for the delivery of public services (along the public-private spectrum).

#### 2.4 Models of Service Delivery in Parks

More (2005) identified five common management models for the provision of parks and protected areas, ranging along the public – private continuum: (i) Fully Public, (ii) Public Utilities, (iii) Outsourcing, (iv) Private Ownership, and (v) Fully Private (see Figure 1). A description of each model will follow.

Figure 1: Management models for parks and protected areas



The Fully Public model recognizes park management as a “legitimate government function to be fully financed through taxes” (More, 2005, p.15). The state owns the land while a government agency manages the resources. Supporters of the Fully Public model articulate how every citizen is an equal and an owner of parks. Critics

of the Fully Public model attest that non-users are burdened with the cost of paying for park management while not directly benefitting. Furthermore, the parks agency is a monopoly and thus lacks the incentive to be efficient and to be responsiveness to the public needs (More, 2005).

The Public Utilities model regards park management as comparable to government-run public services such as water, electricity and gas financed (partially or fully) through user fees. In this model, a primary objective of park management is to become financially self-sufficient, so as not to burden non-users through taxes. With the traditional public utilities approach, fees help reduce use and aid in conservation of the finite resource. However, with parks and protected areas, a dual goal of conservation and recreation is often mandated. Thus, participation and use of parks and outdoor recreation is encouraged. Even so, some research has demonstrated that user fees discourage park visitation and outdoor recreation participation among low-income users (More & Stevens, 2000). However, other academics challenge More's (2005) claims, arguing for example that research was based on hypothetical situations, rather than real experiences. Other academics have disregarded More's claims since previous research indicated that the transportation and equipment costs served more as deterrents than do user fees (Greswell, 2004).

Outsourcing is the third management model, based on the principle of the enabling authority of the state. The government recognizes the need for a service and arranges the private sector produce it. Companies compete for the right to

produce the service. Outsourcing can decrease costs and allow for flexibility and responsiveness to clients. It is now common for park agencies to outsource services to private, for-profit companies, such as: food stores, restaurants, equipment rentals, trip guiding, specialized recreation services, transport, infrastructure construction, and maintenance (Eagles, 2009). However, Conlin and Berstein (2004) remarked on the potential long-term social costs of outsourcing given that commercial companies tend to pay lower wages and offer fewer benefits than government which can result in reduced local economic impact and a deterioration of service quality over time.

Private Ownership of parks and protected areas by not-for-profit organizations is the fourth management model. The organizations must be financially self-sustaining, relying on membership fees, donations and volunteers. Thus the organizations are constantly focused on raising money and consequently can develop close ties with industry (potentially succumbing to commercialization) or become a corporate industry itself.

The fifth and final management model is Fully Private ownership of parks and protected areas, operated and managed (More, 2005). The extent of land that can be conserved under the Fully Private management model is questionable considering only areas that are profitable will receive attention. The Fully Private model raises concerns regarding equity and access. The private sector operates on the principle of profit, and thus people who are unable (or not willing) to pay are excluded, thus potentially disadvantaging people of low income from visiting parks.

For this research project, I am particularly interested in More's (2005) Outsourcing model because it represents the current management arrangement for BC provincial parks system. Outsourcing presumably has its own unique implications, implications that have not been explored in any great depth within the context of parks and protected areas. Furthermore, very few studies have focused on how different stakeholders perceive such implications. In particular, I am interested in examining the various participants' perceptions regarding an outsourcing model's implications for governance. How should parks be provided, financed, and managed? How should power be exercised? Which stakeholders should be part of the decision making and in what capacity? These are questions of governance that, in my view, warrant attention.

Parks represent a plethora of meanings to citizens, including wilderness, community social function, hunting preserve, business and profit, physical and emotional health, ecological preservation, recreation, meaning of life, protecting native people and their lands, historical and cultural preservation (Eagles & McCool, 2002). Since parks represent an array of meanings to many people, which values prevail and why? Who are the decision-makers regarding the management of BC Parks? Who is invited to the table and in what capacity? How are decision-makers held accountable? The utilization of the concept of governance in the proposed research will aid in answering such questions.

## 2.5 Governance

In ancient Athens, government was the process for discussing and resolving issues of public concern. In the modern era however, government has developed into a distinct entity, requiring representation of citizens (rather than direct involvement). The Institute on Governance articulates the important distinction between government and governance; the former as an institution and the latter a process. The terms are not synonymous. Graham et al. (2003) defined governance as:

The interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine how power and responsibility are exercised, how decisions are taken, and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say. It is about power, relationships and accountability: who has influence, who decides, and how decision-makers are held accountable (Graham, et al., 2003, p.2-3).

It is a process of making decisions about the future, determining who should be involved in the process and how decision-makers are held responsible (Graham, et al.).

The United Nations Development Programme (1997) developed a list of 10 characteristics of good governance, which Graham, et al. (2003) collapsed into five principles of sound governance for parks and protected areas (see Table 1).

Table 1: The five principles of sound governance

Principles of Sound Governance	Criteria
Legitimacy and Voice	- Public participation - Consensus orientation
Direction	- Strategic vision
Performance	- Responsiveness - Effectiveness - Efficiency
Accountability	- Accountability - Transparency
Fairness	- Equity - Rule of Law

(Graham, et al., 2003, p.8)

The principle of Legitimacy and Voice is characterized by the approaches used for public participation and the degree of consensus-oriented decision-making. Public participation means all people should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests (UNDP, 1997). Consensus-oriented decision-making is the ability to mediate differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the group (UNDP, 1997).

The principle of Direction involves an overall strategic vision towards decision making; looking constructively towards the future, with consideration of the historical, cultural and social complexities of each situation (UNDP, 1997).

Performance involves three very important governance criteria: responsiveness to stakeholders, effectiveness and efficiency of operations (Graham, et al., 2003). Responsiveness occurs when institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders using a proactive manner regarding complaints and public criticisms (UNDP, 1997). Effectiveness involves the capacity to realize organizational objectives (UNDP, 1997). Efficiency refers to making the best use of resources or the capability of acting or producing effectively with a minimum amount or quantity of waste, expense or unnecessary effort (UNDP, 1997).

Accountability involves accountability and transparency to stakeholders (Graham, et al., 2003). Accountability is the requirement that officials answer to stakeholders on the disposal of their powers and duties, act on criticisms or requirements made of them and accept responsibility for failure, incompetence or deceit (UNDP, 1997). Transparency is the sharing of information and acting in an open manner (UNDP, 1997).

Fairness deals with equity amongst stakeholders and the overall application of the rule of law (Graham, et al., 2003). Equity is just treatment, requiring that similar cases are treated in similar ways (UNDP, 1997). Application of the rule of law refers to legal frameworks being fair and enforced impartially (UNDP, 1997).

The principles are intended to be internationally relevant and applicable in parks and protected areas. Graham, et al. (2003) recognized the inherent difficulties and controversies in obtaining their goal of world-wide principles. First, some principles overlap and possibly counteract each other. For example, a mass

undertaking and emphasis on public participation would decrease the level of efficiency. Therefore, balance and judgment must be used in the application of the principles. Furthermore, societies place various levels of importance on different principles depending upon what is culturally valued. Thus, the concept of internationally-accepted principles of sound governance brings about a discussion of values, cultural perspectives and desired socio-economic outcomes.


Graham, et al. (2003) concluded that there is no “one size fits all” approach to governance. The principles are only guidelines and are intended to be applied with cultural, societal, and developmental considerations in mind. Furthermore, the “devil is in the detail” given that the application of the principles is quite complex. Graham, et al. also argued that governance is the means to desired outcomes and an end in itself. Through sound governance, parks and protected areas can be successfully managed. Success is evaluated based on the level of achievement of the objectives of protected areas and the level of adherence to the principles of sound governance. Unfortunately, the specific criteria to evaluate the level of adherence to the principles and thus the level of good governance has yet to be firmly established (Hannah, 2006), thereby further adding to the divergence regarding stakeholders’ perception of governance.

## 2.6 Stakeholders in Governance

Before I explore the potential implications of models of service delivery on the governance of parks and protected areas, it is necessary to examine the people and agencies that have a stake in the governance process (see Figure 2).

Governance occurs within the four sectors of society represented by citizens and agencies: government, business, civil society (including the voluntary or not-for-profit sector) and the media. These sectors are embedded in traditions, past historical events, culture, and technological advancements (Graham, et al., 2003).

Figure 2: Agents involved in Governance



(Graham, et al., 2003, p.3)

The borders separating the different sectors are permeable, as power and responsibilities can shift among stakeholders. The depiction of the actors involved in governance has been drawn to denote their relative power in Canadian society. The agents traditionally involved in the governance process of parks and protected areas include a government agency, private contractors, conservation and recreation non-governmental organizations, and local communities.

The private sector's increased involvement in the provision of public goods (i.e. education, health, parks) represents a "classic example of a governance question" and has resulted in an increasing role for non-governmental organizations

(NGOs) in protected area governance (Graham, 2002, pg.5; Alcorn, Luque, & Weisman, 2003). NGOs are a part of civil society. They articulate concerns regarding the consequences of private sector principles and values in the delivery of public services and question whether or not such partnerships are appropriate (Alcorn, et al.).

The United Nations has recognized the important role NGOs play in environmental protection, management and stewardship (Deacon, 2004; WCED, 1987). NGOs involved in the environmental movement are highly diverse, occurring at various levels (local, national, regional, and international groups) and charged with various missions (i.e., environmental protection, species-at-risk) (Jasanoff, 1997). Alcorn, et al. (2003) noted the two main types of NGOs that participate in protected area management:

(a) nongovernmental organizations, associations and/or federations that represent the collective interests of certain groups affected by or interested in protected areas, including community-based organizations; and

(b) nongovernmental organizations led by a private board of directors, with missions to perform services in and around protected areas (p.3).

NGOs are involved with protected area governance in three principal manners: (1) affecting policy making, (2) designing and implementing projects, and (3) influencing the actions of private companies, political parties and government agencies (Alcorn, et al., 2003).

NGOs have influenced governance through the use of four tactics: (i) setting agendas and communicating them to citizens, governments and private companies through lobbying, press declarations, petitions, blockades and litigation; (ii)

negotiating outcomes with government and in some cases also private sector actors; (iii) conferring legitimacy on negotiated outcomes, which helps build public trust in the agency; and (iv) implementing solutions that governments will not or cannot do themselves, including land acquisition, stewardship, education, research and monitoring (Simmons, 1998; Whitelaw, Vaughan, Craig, & Atkinson, 2003; Alcorn, et al., 2003).

Graham et al. (2003) argued that the concept of governance opens the door for the “discuss[ion] of the role of government in coping with public issues and the contribution that other players may make” (p.29). The five principles of sound governance are internationally relevant and applicable in a wide range of parks and protected area circumstances. To recapitulate, governance in the context of parks and protected areas refers to decisions about direction (i.e., how to deliver, finance and manage visitor services in parks), how power is exercised (i.e., the level of authority held by the various agents), and who is involved in the process (i.e. which stakeholders are invited to the table and in what capacity).

## 2.7 Governance Models in Parks and Protected Areas

An investigation of Glover and Burton’s (1998)<sup>1</sup> alternatives for delivery of public services, Graham et al.’s (2003) principles of sound governance, and More’s (2005) management models led Eagles (2008a) to new areas of governance research. Eagles investigated governance of parks and protected areas with a focus on: 1) the identity and role of the owner of the land and resources; 2) the source of

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<sup>1</sup> A typology of alternative forms of public leisure services delivery, distinguished by the level of competition, the nature of the good, and the level of government control.

the income for management; and 3) the type of management body. Eagles proposed eight models of management exist widely in parks and protected areas including: Golden Era of National Parks, Parastatal, Non-Profit Organizations, Ec lodge, Public and For-Profit, Private Combination, Public and Non-Profit Private Combination, and Aboriginal and Government. The Public and For-Profit Private Combination model is the most relevant to the proposed research and will now be investigated further.

The Public and For-Profit, Private Combination Model has government ownership of the resources, funding through societal taxes and user fees, and management by both a government agency and a private, for-profit corporation (Eagles, 2008a). This model is the most common approach used today in North America and is similar to More's (2005) outsourcing model. Taxes are primarily intended for managing the natural and cultural resources while user fees are principally aimed for tourism and visitor services. In actuality, the sources of income have funded both resource and tourism management (Eagles, 2008a). Canadian examples of the Public and For-Profit, Private Combination Model are the Ontario and British Columbia provincial parks systems. Government agencies own and manage the resources; however, significant differences exist in these two provinces approaches to the management of finances and tourism.

To illustrate, in the mid-1990s, the Ontario Parks Director and the Harris government adopted an entrepreneurial approach to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of Ontario Parks. The management structure of the parks agency was

changed so that parks could retain all of the earned income and place it into a special purpose account which would carry over, year to year. For the most part, Ontario Parks operates under the traditional model of direct provision, (arranging and producing visitor services themselves) with minimal partnerships with private contractors (Eagles, 2008a).

Whereas in the early-1980s, the BC government made a policy change and began to transfer front country visitor services in provincial parks to for-profit companies. By 1989, all front country visitor services were managed by private contractors known as Park Facility Operators (PFOs) (FORUM Consulting Ltd., 2008). BC Parks oversaw the private companies and focuses its efforts on ecological and resource management of the parks and monitoring the private contractors. This management model falls under More's (2005) Outsourcing model and Eagles' (2008a) Public and For-Profit, Private Combination Model.

These provincial examples bring about questions regarding the role of the parks government agency and awareness of the different approaches to management (Eagles, 2008a). Other concerns include the acceptability and appropriateness of an Outsourcing model and a government agency's adoption of commercial-sector principles.

## 2.8 Implications of Models of Service Delivery on Governance

Presumably, the models of service delivery for parks and protected areas presented by More (2005) and Eagles (2008a) have various implications for the five principles of governance: Legitimacy and Voice, Direction, Performance,

Accountability and Fairness. What follows is a review of literature associated with the implications of an outsourcing model on the principles of governance.

The implications of outsourcing park services on the principle of Fairness has stirred considerable debate, since parks are generally considered a merit good, some fear outsourcing services may threaten equitable access to parks and their services. Outsourcing services is customarily perceived as a means of improving efficiency, thus positively impacting upon the principle of Performance. However, with an increased understanding and recognition of the government's responsibility and cost of monitoring contractors, the relative success of outsourcing services has begun to be questioned. Within the outsourcing model, the principle of Legitimacy and Voice is negatively impacted due to the different values between the commercial and public sectors. A nominal amount of research has been conducted to determine the ramifications of outsourcing on governance on the principle of Direction, thus yielding a lack of consensus in the literature. And of all the principles, outsourcing services most negatively impacts upon the principle of Accountability.

Eagles (2009a) evaluated the eight widely used management models' (in parks and protected areas) level of adherence to the criteria of sound governance. Eagles' concluded efficiency ranked the highest importance of all governance principles and transparency ranked the lowest.

### 2.8.1 Legitimacy and Voice

The category of Legitimacy and Voice is characterized by the approaches used for public participation and the degree of consensus in decision-making (Graham, et al., 2003; UNDP, 1997). Public participation means all citizens should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests (UNDP, 1997). Consensus-oriented decision-making is the ability to mediate differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures (UNDP, 1997).

Participatory democracy is inherently inefficient (Albert & Hahnel, 1991). It involves a myriad of citizens working towards consensus-based decisions, which require time, effort, skill in its facilitation and dedication to the process. Government agencies include public participation in decision-making and are open to public scrutiny regarding finances (More, 2005). Most parks and recreation agencies are mandated to solicit public participation (i.e. during the creation of a park management plan) whereas private contractors have no such requirements. Since commercial organizations are driven by profit, efficiency is highly valued. Informed speculation reveals public participation and consensus in decision-making do not coincide well with the values of commercial organizations. They prefer the vote with your wallet type of public input.

While the government is expected to solicit public input, the form of participation can vary, as articulated by Arnstein's ladder (1969), from

nonparticipation (manipulation and therapy), to degrees of tokenism (informing, consultation, and placation) and finally degrees of citizen power (partnership, delegated power and citizen control). Outsourcing services has the potential to lower the degree of public participation, if it allows for participation at all (Hodge & Greve, 2007). It is unlikely for private contractors to solicit broad public participation, aside from satisfaction surveys.

The principle of Legitimacy and Voice is especially relevant and applicable to the role of civil society in the governance process. If the government is charged with the responsibility of protecting and presenting areas of natural and cultural significance, agents such as non-governmental organizations serve as commentators and watchdogs of government agency's actions and policies. Yet outsourcing services can weaken the authority of such stakeholders (i.e. NGOs and politicians) who can influence public sector activities but have more difficulty influencing commercial companies (Harland, et al., 2005).

### 2.8.2 Direction

The governance principle of Direction encompasses the criterion of strategic vision (Graham, et al., 2003; UNDP, 1997). Good strategic vision involves leaders and citizens having a broad and long-term perspective on good governance, along with a sense of what are needed for such development. There is also an understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in which that perspective is grounded (UNDP, 1997). Ultimately, strategic vision is about outcomes. Parks and protected areas are guided by the dual goals of conserving

areas of natural and cultural significance for future generations as well as providing recreation opportunities for all citizens.

There has been limited research conducted to determine the implications of outsourcing services on strategic vision. Harland, et al., (2005) asserts that if basic services are outsourced, government employees can redirect their focus on core competencies and the long-term improvement of services. Yet, if numerous public services are outsourced, it reduces overall government control, known as “privatisation by stealth” (pg.839). If commercial companies have leverage over the parks agency, it may negatively impact the agency’s long-term vision for park (Harland, et al.).

The strategic vision of a parks agency may be reflected in its strategic planning. If an outsourcing model involves renewing contracts after relatively short periods (e.g., 3-5 years), a contractor will only plan for the short term with the intent to renew its contract. The government agency that arranges the service is unlikely to consider long-term planning because it will defer to the contractor to manage the resource (Glover, 2008).

More (2005) advocates the public model approach, where parks are funded through taxes, enables the “undertak[ing] of non-economic (unprofitable) goals, such as the preservation of biodiversity or ecosystem integrity” (p.15). The privatization of parks and recreation services has the possibility of threatening the conservation mandate of parks and protected areas. Privatization increases the probability of commercialization due to the focus on profit, and thus increasing the

need for amenities (roads, shops, restaurants, parking lots, etc.) which has detrimental effects on the mandate of conservation and the ecological integrity of the ecosystem (More, 2005).

### 2.8.3 Performance

The governance principle of Performance encompasses three criteria: efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness (Graham, et al., 2003). In the context of parks and protected areas, the indicators refer to the efficiency and effectiveness of operations, and responsiveness to stakeholders. Privatization of public services ostensibly increases financial efficiency due to the driving force of competition (which increases choice, responsiveness and innovation) and thus presumably improved effective delivery of services (Glover, 1999a).

#### 2.8.3.1 Efficiency

Efficiency refers to “the relationship between inputs and outputs and the amount of effort, expense, or waste involved in delivering a service” (Crompton & Lamb, 1986, p.80). In other words, it involves making the best use of resources. Eagles (2009) asserted financial efficiency is the pivotal governance criterion as it is the highest-valued in society. Furthermore, he affirmed that outsourcing services is designed to increase efficiency.

The neo-conservatism ideology asserts that privatization increases efficiency; namely it improves cost savings (Glover, 1999a). Recognizing the distinction between arranging for a service and providing the service permits the government

to decide what services to offer, while allowing private and not-for-profit companies to provide the services more efficiently than could the government. Commercial organizations typically have a lower cost of delivery than government in part due to specialization and taking advantage of economies of scale (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002).

Since the government lacks the profit incentive, it is inherently wasteful (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). On the other hand, the private sector thrives on the principles of efficiency, competition and consumer choice (Glover, 1999a). "The purpose of the market is, precisely, that the inefficient shall fail, and the efficient expand" (Walsh, 1997, p.34). Outsourcing services decreases the traditional bureaucratic structure of the government and allows for the displacement of inefficient employees. Furthermore, improved efficiency is often correlated to a similar amelioration in effectiveness and responsiveness (Glover, 1999a).

The potential increase in efficiency under the outsourcing model is not due to the shift in sectors (public to private) but rather can be attributed to the introduction of competition over monopoly (Greene, 2002). And for privatization to fulfill the promise of improved efficiency, the conditions of competition and government capacity must be present (Van Slyke, 2003; Kettl, 1993). Yet competition is not always present in outsourcing scenarios and there often exists a lack of managerial knowledge regarding contract management (Van Slyke, 2003).

Privatization was initially heralded as the panacea to inefficient government agencies. Numerous scholars cited success stories of accrued cost-savings due to

privatization (Savas, 2000; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Dilger, et al., 1997; Lampone, 1995). Yet, there exists a lack of consensus in the academic literature on the magnitude of expected cost savings to the government and moreover, increasing evidence that cost savings have been overestimated (Jensen & Stonecash, 2005; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Kremic, Tukul, & Rom, 2006). Furthermore, recent research suggests the cost of monitoring negates the supposed dramatic improvement in efficiency (Marvel & Marvel, 2007). Sclar (2000, ¶15) postulates

Why did things not turn out as well as the privatization advocates predicted? For one thing, tasks that make up the bulk of public services are often more complex than privatization advocates maintain, and the complexity translates into extra costs to administer the contracting process, monitor work and evaluate performance. These can outweigh savings from lower production costs.

Monitoring private contractors accrues additional public management costs (Van Slyke, 2003). Furthermore, if the cost of monitoring contractors is not adequately factored into the parks agency's budget, the contractors operate independently of the agency (Eagles, 2009). The limited empirical research demonstrating the magnitude of cost-savings in park agencies due to outsourcing furthers the assertion that the privatization movement is inherently ideological, rather than solely based in economic rationalizations (Samson, 1994; Van Slyke, 2003).

#### 2.8.3.2 Effectiveness

Effectiveness refers to "end results and the impact of a service on a clientele" (Crompton & Lamb, 1986, p.80). Effectiveness involves producing desired results

that meet needs. Outsourcing services has the potential to positively impact upon the effectiveness of operations of services at a park agency (Eagles, 2009).

Outsourcing basic services in park agencies (i.e. custodial services) to commercial companies allows government staff to concentrate on specialized positions (i.e. scientists and rangers), thus enabling the agency to more effectively achieve their mandated goals (Cavers, 2004; Harland, Knight, Lamming, & Walker, 2005).

In the evaluation of effectiveness, the agency must investigate the outcomes – individuals' experiences – and the achievement of a broader impact regarding the societal objectives of parks (Glynn & Murphy, 1996). However, a lack of monitoring of the contractors raises the question regarding the relative effectiveness of outsourced services (Marvel & Marvel, 2007; Van Slyke, 2003). To ensure effective service delivery, "the monitoring of privatized services must begin with the tendering/bidding process and must continue indefinitely as services are delivered by private producers" (Glover, 1999a, p.16). Thus proper monitoring of contractors is needed to ensure quality of services.

#### 2.8.3.3 Responsiveness

Responsiveness occurs when institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders using a proactive manner regarding complaints and public criticisms (UNDP, 1997). Responsiveness refers to how willing an organization and its employees are willing to help customers and provide prompt service (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985).

Many contend that outsourcing services to private contractors improves responsiveness and service quality due to the focus on client satisfaction (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Crompton, 1999; Savas, 1987). Because private companies are driven by profit, organizations thus value the importance of being responsive to clients' demands and criticisms to ensure repeat business, positive word of mouth, and ultimately the renewal of its contract. Therefore, the combined government-private management arrangement results in a strong level of responsiveness (Eagles, 2009).

#### 2.8.4 Accountability

The governance principle of Accountability includes the criteria of being accountable and transparent to all stakeholders (Graham et al., 2003; UNDP, 1997). Eagles (2009) concluded that of all the governance criteria, accountability and transparency ranked the weakest, for all eight management models (for parks and protected areas). The low score may be indicative of its relative importance in society.

##### 2.8.4.1 Accountability

Accountability is the requirement that officials answer to stakeholders on the disposal of their powers and duties, act on criticisms or requirements made of them and accept responsibility for failure, incompetence or deceit (UNDP, 1997).

Accountability refers to the obligation to answer for one's decisions and actions to stakeholders (Barton, 2006).

Outsourcing services has the potential to lower accountability, if government relinquishes their responsibilities. Domberger and Jensen (1997) attest the public sector may outsource the responsibility of providing the service, but the responsibility of accountability still remains with the government. Therefore, the regulatory role of monitoring the private contractor must remain since it is pivotal to fulfilling the obligation of accountability

Outsourcing services, in fact, has the potential to enhance public-sector accountability through the review of standards, performance monitoring, and the establishment of policies and mechanisms for redress (Domberger & Jensen, 1997). Yet governments often underestimate the cost of monitoring into the budget. In the case of insufficient funds to monitor, private contractors operate autonomously of the parks agency, resulting in lowered accountability (Eagles, 2009).

#### 2.8.4.2 Transparency

Transparency refers to the sharing of information and acting in an open manner (UNDP, 1997). Private companies have no mandated responsibilities to be transparent to the public. Contractors are only obligated to report to their shareholders and the parks agency. Thus outsourcing services has the potential to lower the level of transparency (Eagles, 2009; Hodge & Greve, 2007).

#### 2.8.5 Fairness

The principle of Fairness refers to the criteria of equity and rule of law (Graham, et al., 2003). The principle of equity is one of the most contentious issues

regarding the implications of a government agency contracting out services to a private, for-profit company. As for rule of law in provincial parks, provincial and federal laws, as well as the regulations in the Parks Act must be abided by and enforced impartially.

Crompton and Lamb (1986) asserted that “primary concern should be given to equity, then to effectiveness, and finally to efficiency” when prioritizing indicators of a government agency’s performance (p.168). Equity is based on the principles of fairness and justice in the distribution and allocation of public services (Crompton & Lamb).

Privatization is considered equitable if the fairness of allocation is defined by market equity (Glover, 1999a). The market equity model refers to the distribution of services “to groups or neighbourhoods in proportion to the tax or fee revenues that they produce” (Crompton & Lamb, 1986, p.158). Therefore, people pay only for the services they want and are not burdened with funding services they do not consume. Proponents of privatization believe that targeted programs (vouchers, free or discount days) would be effective in reaching low income users (LeRoy, 2005; Glover, 1999a). Yet More (2002) noted that targeted programs lack empirical evidence to demonstrate that the initiatives indeed help increase participation among low-income users.

Privatization is considered inequitable if the fairness of allocation is defined by equal opportunity or compensatory equity (Glover, 1999a). The equal opportunity model refers to “allocating equal amounts of services to all citizens

regardless of need or amount of taxes paid" (Crompton & Lamb, 1986, p.156). This approach is not reflective of the unequal socio-economic status of citizens and thus further increases the gap (Glover, 1999a).

The adoption of commercial sector principles in the public sector impacts upon the foundational notion of equity in government services. Privatization has the potential to affect disadvantaged people who cannot afford to pay for services, thereby resulting in a world of leisure gainers (wide variety of opportunities and choices) and leisure losers (minimum amount of services available) (Glover, 1999b; Ravenscroft, 1993). This approach to service delivery reflects the concept of creaming, whereby contractors provide services that appeal to the users most likely and able to pay and "tend to ignore services that are most difficult to deliver or customers who are difficult to serve" (Crompton, 1999, p.240). Furthermore, outsourcing visitor services to a private company can reduce equity due to the need of full cost recovery (including paying the contract fee to the park agency) plus a profit (Eagles, 2009). Thus, people who are unable to pay or programs with lower attendance are likely to be ignored with the public sector's adoption of commercial sector principles (Glover, 1999b).

#### 2.8.6 Overall

In this chapter, the management model of outsourcing has been evaluated using the principles of sound governance. The principle of Fairness has the potential to reduce equity if the fairness of allocation is defined by market equity, and through the presence of creaming. Within the outsourcing model, the implications

on the principle of Performance ranged depending upon the criteria. Outsourcing yields a small improvement in efficiency, the potential to improve effectiveness (but requires monitoring) and a positive impact on responsiveness. The implications of outsourcing services results in a lowered level of adherence to the principle of Legitimacy and Voice, since the commercial sector values efficiency over public participation and consensus-orientation in decision-making. It appears the principle of Direction is negatively impacted, due to short-term contracts and potential loss of government control to the commercial sector. Accountability is indubitably negatively impacted by the outsourcing management model.

The government agency's monitoring of private contractors and their services appears to be of paramount importance for the outsourcing model to be successful. Monitoring allows managers to determine the degree of efficiency gains or losses, the effectiveness of outsourced services, and retains their ability to be accountable to stakeholders. As for BC Parks, Cavers (2004) concluded the monitoring of contractors was insufficient. Years of downsizing park staff and budget, left BC Parks unable to monitor contractors and enforce regulations.

Historically, the focus of research has been on equity, efficiency, effectiveness in relation to parks and protected areas (Glover, 1999a; Crompton & Lamb, 1986). However, the governance principles indicate there is more to take into consideration. The debate continues regarding the appropriateness and implications of the various governance models for parks and protected areas. Therefore, the development of a better understanding of the implications of British

Columbia's provincial parks' outsourcing model on governance from the perceptions of the different park stakeholders drove this project.

## CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

### 3.1 Introduction

The research investigated the perceived implications of an outsourcing model of parks and recreation services on governance. British Columbia Provincial Parks was chosen as the case study for this research since front country visitor services have been outsourced to the commercial sector for over twenty years.

This chapter introduces the philosophical framework of social constructionism, case study methodology, the methods of interviews, and document analysis. The history of the BC Parks agency is then presented with a focus on the shift towards to the adoption of privatization. The procedures used for recruiting and interviewing are presented. A description is offered regarding the strategies and procedures for establishing trustworthiness. Finally, the limitations of the study are discussed.

### 3.2 Philosophical Framework

The philosophical framework adopted for this study was social constructionism. Social constructionism asserts that individuals co-create subjective meanings of experiences in their attempts to understand and make sense of the world in which they live (Patton, 2002). It assumes everyone is born into a social and culturally-constructed set of norms. These norms serve as a starting point from which social actors recognize, produce and reproduce social actions. Because an individual's social reality is believed to be socially determined, social constructivists

aim to problematize the idea that material objects have an essence. Thus, researchers who adopt this anti-essentialist philosophical framework seek to explain how their research participants interpret or construct their inter-subjective realities in specific linguistic, social, and historical contexts (Schwandt, 2001). The assumptions associated with a social constructionist framework are reflected in my choice of methodology and methods.

### 3.3 Case Study Methodology

A case is a single, specific, unique phenomenon, bounded by time, place, event or activity (Creswell, 2003; Stake, 1995). Case study research is an intensive, holistic, and in-depth investigation of a single unit – the case (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg, 1991; Stake, 1995). Case study research is a "systematic inquiry into an event or a set of related events which aims to describe and explain the phenomenon of interest" (Bromley, 1990, p.302). A fundamental goal of case study research is to "generate knowledge of the particular" (Stake, 1995, pg.20). The case study of BC Parks was an example of More's (2005) outsourcing model. The phenomenon studied were the perceived implications of an outsourcing model on the principles of governance.

The research can be classified as an instrumental case study (Stake, 1995), whereby the purpose was to examine the implications of an outsourcing model via the case study BC Parks. Instrumental case study refers to an interest in a particular case (BC Parks) with an examination of an issue for insights (implications of an outsourcing model on governance). The purpose of the instrumental case

study was to explore BC Parks in-depth to provide insight into and understanding of the perceived implications of an outsourcing model on governance.

The BC Parks case study was a multi-perspective analysis of the voice and perspective of government employees, private contractors, and members of NGOs, and the interactions between them (Feagin, et al., 1991). Guided by the tenets of social constructivism, the participants' perceptions of the phenomenon were sought.

### 3.4 Data Sources

Data for this project were gathered from three sources. First, I conducted semi-structured interviews with public administrators working for BC Parks, private contractors, and members of non-governmental organizations. Yin (2003, p. 89) described an interview as "one of the most important sources of case study information" because it focuses directly on the case study participants who can provide first-hand insights. The study aimed to uncover the participants' perceptions of the implications of an outsourcing model on governance. The participants' perception of equity or performance of BC Parks represents their social reality and personal truth. There is no one truth regarding the implications of outsourcing on governance, but rather multiple truths. Interviews allowed participants to openly express themselves their perceptions of the implications of outsourcing on governance.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted to allow respondents to share their personal experiences, while keeping the interview focused on the topic of BC Parks' outsourcing visitor services' implications on the principles of governance.

With participants' permission, all interviews were recorded and later transcribed for a detailed analysis.

Second, I collected documents to develop a chronology of events and to add depth to the identified themes from the interviews. In particular, I collected administrative reports from BC Parks, and newsletters and publications from private contractors, and NGOs. The document review helped provide the context surrounding the information gathered during the interviews (Marshall & Rossman, 1999).

Third, I kept a journal to record my observations and interpretations of my interactions with research participants. Reflexivity is deemed essential for critical self-reflection, because the researcher is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis (Stake, 1995; Schwandt, 2001). Commencing with my travels in British Columbia and until my thesis was completed; I kept a journal to record my ideas, thoughts and reflections about the interviews, data analysis, and the research process as a whole. After an interview was complete, I wrote out my reflections of the interview, such as my overall impressions and participant's main messages and the body language conveyed. Reviewing my journal entries was useful as an outlet to work through emerging themes and later used for reflexivity regarding the evolution of my thoughts and themes. Reflexivity is a "very important procedure for establishing the validity of accounts of social phenomena" (Schwandt, 2001, p.224). The trustworthiness of results will be further explored in this chapter.

### 3.5 Description of the Case Site

While BC Parks remains under public ownership, the visitor services (i.e. camping and day visits) have been operated and maintained by private sector businesses, known as Park Facility Operators (PFOs) since the early 1980s. BC Parks was chosen because of its unique arrangement of outsourcing front country visitor services and serves as an example of privatized parks and recreation services in Canada.

In 1983, under the Social Credit Government, BC Parks began to contract out visitor services. Privatization of park services was the solution to decreased government appropriations and the pressure to improve efficiency. An internal discussion paper entitled *The Role of the Private Sector in Providing Park Visitor Services* circulated through the Parks and Outdoor Recreation Division of the Ministry of Lands, Parks, and Housing in 1983. The paper declared the many advantages and capabilities of the commercial sector in providing certain park services over the BC Parks agency itself. Recommendations included contracting out basic services (facilities maintenance, garbage collection, fee collection, security, safety, and public relations) and potentially enhanced services (firewood provision, visitor programs, transportation and guiding, and food and accommodation) because user fees could easily be charged (Parks and Outdoor Recreation Division, 1983). The paper clearly articulated that BC Parks would remain in full management control and to “prevent private investment in capital on

BC Parks property" (Cavers, 2004, p.18). There was no mention of contracting out resource management responsibilities.

After the implementation of the outsourcing model, various commentators in the 1980s indicated a decrease in quality in BC Parks and noted difficulties with contractors. "Park not maintained to traditional standard" represented the overarching complaint of BC Parks managers in 1984 (Western Management Consultants, 1984)<sup>2</sup>. In 1986, an internal study conducted by two BC Parks staff members noted moderate cost savings had been achieved; however there had been a decrease in quality of service (Block and Davies, 1986). Another internal document from 1988 explored various possibilities to increase involvement of the private sector in campsites cautioned BC Parks to more carefully state their mission to potential contractors, in order to make sure that private sector service providers are aware of their responsibilities to the park system as a whole (Parks and Outdoor Recreation Division, 1988).

By 1989, all front country visitor services (such as campground management) had been outsourced to private contractors, known as park facility operators (PFOs) (FORUM, 2008). Consequently, BC Parks' staff levels were drastically cut; in 1980, there were close to 400 full time park employees and in 1990, there were 200 full-time park employees (BC Ministry of Environment, 1990). An entrepreneurial approach towards park management had been fully adopted by

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<sup>2</sup> An interview with Public Administrator #5 suggested camper dissatisfaction was rooted in the type of facilities (i.e. flush toilets rather than pit toilets) rather than the private contractor's maintenance.

BC Parks. Marketing strategies such as visitor satisfaction surveys, and referring to outdoor recreationists as clients (Ministry of Lands, Parks, and Housing, 1986) exemplified BC Parks' new customer orientation.

BC Parks evolved from the traditional direct delivery approach to a privatized model of park management. Carvers (2004) wrote, "the shift in orientation reflects a desire within BC Parks to separate which services were of public benefit and which were for private gain" (p. 22). Conservation efforts, such as research activity, ranger patrols, and other non-visitor services have always been managed and funded by BC Parks.

Under the NDP Government (1991-2001), the total protected area system rose from 350 protected areas covering 4.85 million hectares, representing 5.04% of BC, to 807 protected areas covering 11.35 million hectares, representing 11.87% of the province (BC Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection, 2001). However, while the total number and area of parks and protected areas increased over the years, the number of BC Parks staff members and the budget steadily decreased (Cavers, 2004).

In 2002, under the new Liberal government, rather than having one year contracts for each park, the 245 operational parks were bundled together into 27 areas with 10 year contracts (FORUM, 2008). Every year, the PFO is required to submit an annual business plan. Every three years, the PFO and the BC Parks' area supervisor renegotiate the financial and business plan. Since the shift from the

park-by-park model, to the bundle model, PFOs are now typically bigger companies running many parks, rather than numerous contractors, each running one park.

On July 27, 2006, Minister of Environment Barry Penner announced the new Park Lodge Strategy involving tourism development, ranging from tent-like yurts up to 100-room luxury hotels to be built in 12 provincial parks (ENS, 2006). Penner explained that the Fixed Roof Accommodation Policy is part of the plan “to capitalize on an expected tourism boom leading up to the 2010 Olympic Games” (CBC, 2006).

Opposition to the Park Lodge Strategy from NGOs and citizens rose quickly. The Campaign for BC Parks, (2007) a citizen-led group, outlined their concerns regarding a lack of public participation in the Park Lodge Strategy and the damaging effects to the environment (construction of buildings, roads and marinas, helicopter and float plane traffic, garbage and sewage disposal, and potential water supply issues) and to local park municipalities.

BC Parks has a long history of outsourcing services to commercial sectors. Privatization is not simply an economic strategy, but a political one as well. The professed superiority of the commercial sector in providing services was evident in the review of BC Parks history. Cavers (2004) research concluded BC Parks’ services were of high quality, yet monitoring had become insufficient. Samson’s (1994) third face of privatization is illustrated through

the economic justification of cuts to BC Parks budgets, of the termination of interpretation funding, and the further shift away from government control over contracted services (Cavers, 2004, p.53).

Many academics worry that without monitoring, therein lays a threat to the conservation of parks and the ecological integrity of the ecosystems (More, 2005; Cavers, 2004).

As for 2007, British Columbia had 893 provincial parks and protected areas, which encompass 13.8% of BC's land base, totalling 13.09 million hectares (BC Parks, 2007a; BC Parks, 2007b). BC provincial parks are managed by BC Parks and Protected Areas, a branch of the Environmental Stewardship division under the Ministry of Environment (BC Parks, 2007c). BC Parks and Protected Areas operate with the authority of three pieces of legislation including, the Park Act, the Ecological Reserve Act and the Environment and Land Use Act (BC Parks, 2007d).

### 3.6 Study Participants

In an effort to achieve an understanding of the implications of an outsourcing model on governance of BC Parks, government employees of BC Parks, private contractors (known as park facility operators), and members of various non-governmental organizations were interviewed. There exists minimal research which has investigated park stakeholders' perceptions of the repercussions of a parks agency outsourcing services.

All participants were introduced to the study and given a letter of information and a consent form (Appendix C).

### 3.6.1 Government Employees of BC Parks

The provincial government has remained in a regulatory role of supervising and monitoring the private contractors. Government employees have an in-depth understanding and varied perspectives regarding the benefits and consequences of outsourcing visitor services to private contractors. I met with six civil servants working for BC Parks' head office in Victoria, BC, with varying levels of years of experience with the organization. Each participant signed the consent form and declined to be identified in any publications and to the use of attributable quotations. The participants did agree to the use of anonymous quotations. It was very important to the participant that their identities remain anonymous, which suggests to me that they feared being reprimanded for providing negative feedback. I concluded that bureaucrats must adopt the standpoint of the government in power and repercussions existed for those that did not follow suit. To protect their anonymity, I referred to the civil servants as GOV Participant #1 through 6. Unfortunately, one of the interviews did not record properly. Thus I used my extensive notes in my journal post-interview to paraphrase the participant's perceptions.

### 3.6.2 BC Parks Contractors

When BC Parks began to outsource visitor services, it resulted in displaced government employees, who were encouraged to bid for the contracts themselves. In the year 2007-2008, BC Parks had 220 contracts with 37 private contractors, known as Park Facility Operators (PFOs) (BC Parks, 2008a). PFOs manage park

facilities and services at one park, or a group of parks in a specific area (known as a bundle). PFOs typically manage BC Parks campgrounds, including selling permits, collecting user fees, maintaining the safety and cleanliness of the grounds and infrastructure, equipment rental, and other visitor services. There are a few non-traditional roles in which PFOs manage ski hills, previously owned and managed by BC Parks. Out of the twenty-seven bundle areas, twenty-two of the PFOs were registered as members of the Park Facility Operators' Society of B.C. Three PFOs from the Society were interviewed. Two of the PFOs have been working as a contractor for BC Parks since the beginning of the outsourcing model. The other PFO had been working for BC Parks for approximately five years. Two of the PFOs worked at parks in the Vancouver-Victoria region, whereas the other PFO worked at a park much further north. Even though the PFOs all initially agreed to be identified in publications and to the use of attributable quotes, during the interviews, the participants began to request certain stories and perspectives be kept off the record. Therefore I decided to protect the anonymity of the contractors, and I referred to them as PFO Participant #1 through 3.

### 3.6.3 Members of Non-Governmental Organizations

Non-governmental organizations are founded on a wide array of interests. In the realm of parks and recreation, NGOs tend to vary along a continuum of interests ranging from wilderness preservation to consumptive and/or motorized recreation (see Figure 3) (Eagles, 2007). The continuum served as guide in helping select an array of organizations to recruit for my study.





category (Appendix A). The BC Wildlife Federation is an organization of hunters and anglers. BC Nature and BC Wildlife Federation are both members of the Outdoor Recreation Council of British Columbia.

I also met with one conservationist who was not associated with an NGO but was incredibly active and well-respected within BC's environmental community. I would classify the conservationist in the environmental conservation category.

Since the identity of the government employees and PFOs were protected, I decided to also protect the anonymity of the members of the NGOs. I referred to the NGO participants as NGO Participant #1 through 5. Once again, one of the interviews with one of the NGO representatives did not record properly. Thus I used my notes in my journal to paraphrase the participant's perceptions.

### 3.7 Procedures

My research was part of a larger research project, aimed at better understanding how parks, recreation and tourism services are delivered in Canada, and its implications on governance. Research was conducted through interviews and online surveys of the various park stakeholders (staff, contractors, and members of non-profit organizations) of Ontario's and British Columbia's provincial parks.

My research solely focused on interviews with government employees, private contractors, and members of NGOs associated with BC Parks. I will now

explain my procedures used for recruiting, interviewing and following-up with participants.

### 3.7.1 Recruiting Participants

I primarily used the snowball sampling technique (Babbie, 1995), asking participants to recommend other BC Parks employees, PFOs, and members of NGOs to interview. Due to the political nature of the study, I first interviewed government employees of BC Parks, then the PFOs, and finally members of the NGOs.

Dr. Bob Pfister, a Professor at Malaspina University-College in Nanaimo, BC, (now known as Vancouver Island University) was friends with one of my advisors and agreed to meet with me upon my arrival. Dr. Pfister had previously worked for BC Parks in the early 1980s and maintained some contacts within BC Parks. The majority of Dr. Pfister's contacts were retired and had already been interviewed by Cavers in 2004. Dr. Pfister also recommended various NGOs and members within the organizations whom I could phone.

Through the help of Dr. Paul Eagles, contact had been established with BC Parks before I left for British Columbia. Upon my arrival, I met with a BC Parks employee who served as my main contact. From there, the snowball quickly began to roll as I was introduced to many government employees. BC Parks employees also suggested PFOs to contact as well as which NGOs to speak with, and which NGOs not to bother making contact. These suggestions sparked my interest, and I contacted all PFO and NGOs mentioned.

The PFO first recommended to me agreed to meet and also suggested three other PFOs whom I contacted and interviewed. PFO information was readily available from BC Parks web page.

Through recommendations from BC Parks employees and PFOs, and a comprehensive internet review of the array of NGOs in BC, certain organizations were contacted to have NGOs represented along the spectrum of interests. The aim was for equal representation across the spectrum in terms of depth of interviews not in terms of the number of interviews.

All participants were contacted (via letter or e-mail or phone or in-person) to introduce the study, its purposes and significance, and requested their participation.

### 3.7.2 Interviews

I conducted semi-structured interviews with government employees, private contractors and members of NGOs. The stakeholder interviews addressed questions related to: (1) goals or expectations of each party; (2) what outsourcing looks like and/or how it is viewed by the different parties involved; (3) stakeholders' perceptions and/or experiences with respect to its operation, processes and outcomes; (4) changes that participants perceive or anticipate as a result of their involvement in the contracting; and, (5) any options or improvements that should be made with regard to contractor selection, terms and conditions, and implementation and monitoring.

The interview guide was developed to cover the UNDP principles of governance (Appendix B). Hannah's (2006) interview guide for her research of the governance of private protected areas in Canada was used as a basis and structure for creating questions. The questions were only used as guides and were not followed precisely. The questions were intended to keep the conversation focused on the implications of an outsourcing model on governance while allowing the participant to express themselves and share stories to illustrate their points of view. Interviews were conducted in participants' office (with the door closed) or a nearby coffee shop.

Data obtained through these questions provided insights for planning and management of contractors in parks and protected areas. Moreover, the research findings added to the body of knowledge surrounding outsourcing public services and its implications of governance.

### 3.7.3 Follow-up

A letter of appreciation was provided to all participants (Appendix C). The letter included details about the purpose and benefits of the study. The outcomes of the study will be communicated to participants through the parks governance web site: <http://parksgovernance.uwaterloo.ca/>. I will also mail a report detailing the findings, as well as a bound copy of my thesis to the BC Parks' Head Office, the PFO Society, and to each NGO.

### 3.7.4 Data Analysis

Qualitative research is an ongoing process requiring reflection and critical analysis (Creswell, 2003). The case study research involved interviewing participants (government employees, contractors, and members of NGOs), and an exploration of the setting of BC Parks through document analysis. While the purpose of my research was to investigate the perception of the implications of BC Parks' outsourcing model on governance, it was important to first analyze the transcripts for the participants' over-arching themes and then deductively analyze the transcripts into the governance principles. I used thematic organization (Labov, 1982) to investigate the meaning behind participants' stories.

To analyze the interviews, I began using Stake's (1995) strategies of direct interpretation and categorical aggregation. Direct interpretation involved asking myself 'What did that mean?' while reading the transcripts. Categorical aggregation involved the search for patterns. Following Tesch's (1990) system of coding, I reviewed each transcript thoroughly, while questioning the underlying meaning of participants' words.

I read through all the transcripts twice, in chronological order to get an overall impression of the data while jotting down notes in the columns and highlighting phrases that caught my attention. I then focused on one stakeholder group at a time, since I reasoned members of the group would share similar experiences with BC Parks, and thus similar themes would arise. After reviewing each transcript from a group, similar topics began to emerge which I clustered

together – first for each individual participant of the group, and then collapsed similar categories together from the group. Once I felt I had an impression of each of the stakeholders' themes, I delved deeper into each group by re-reading the transcripts and further refining the topics, using participants' words. As I identified topics from the data, I wrote memos and had many insightful discussions with my advisors and peers. The stakeholder groups shared common experiences with BC Parks, which led me to organize the data thematically.

Thematic organization is the audience's evaluation of the participant's attempt to convey the meaning of the events in her stories (Labov, 1982). Since stories are told with the audience in mind, the participant acts as a performer – drawing from one of her many personas to best convince the audience (in this case, me) the meaning of her story. Qualitative research involves the recognition of the active role of the researcher in attaching meaning to the story. The researcher is the audience, the interpreter and the narrator. Larson (1997) thus argued that “researchers may impose meanings on the lives they study and end up saying more about themselves and the things they value than they do about those they study” (p.469). My role active role as the researcher is later explored.

Journal entries and memos were kept for the purpose of reflexivity since I was an active participant of the research process (Richardson, 1994). Journal entries helped capture my flow of ideas regarding the meaning of the participants' words while reading the transcripts.

The document review aided in gaining a deeper understanding of BC Parks, the PFOs and the NGOs, as well as establishing a coherent timeline of events. I reviewed the BC Parks Legacy Project Final Report (1999), The Recreation Stewardship Panel (2002), The Evaluation of the BC Parks Service Delivery Model by FORUM Consultants (2008), two of the Western Wilderness Committee Educational Reports written by Barlee: "BC Parks -A World Famous Legacy" (2006) and "Provincial Parks - How does BC measure up?" (2007), as well as the web sites of each organization to review their mission statement and objectives.

Garrison and Massam's (2001) conducted discourse analysis research on environmental policy document produced by the NDP and PC Ontario Provincial Governments of the 1990s. They questioned what changes in language use indicate an ideological shift with respect to the management of environmental issues. They concluded that changes in language use are indicative of an ideological shift with respect to the management of environmental issues. Following their lead, I conducted a small-scale discourse analysis on the residents of British Columbia's vision of BC Parks (as articulated by the Legacy Project under the NDP Government) as well as the Liberal Government's vision of fish, wildlife and parks.

Discourse analysis research involving written texts assumes intentionality of language (Garrison & Massam, 2001; van Dijk, 1983). The choice of words and structure of the text (i.e. word ordering and collocation of words) can be interpreted to understand/reveal meaning. Since policy documents are subject to much peer review, it can be assumed the document as representative of the voice of the group

who produced it (at a specific point in time and within a particular situational context). Furthermore, the frequency of word use is related to the centrality or importance of an issue.

### 3.8 Trustworthiness

The trustworthiness of the findings is a polemic issue in qualitative research. Traditionally, the validity and reliability of qualitative research was challenged by quantitative researchers. However, through the acknowledgment that qualitative research requires different language and different tools, the concept of trustworthiness emerged. Trustworthiness refers to achieving an authentic representation of participant perspectives in the findings (Barbour, 1998). There were numerous strategies I used in order to address trustworthiness: peer review, reflexivity and crystallization (Richardson, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Curtin & Fossey, 2007).

Peer review (or debriefings) was used to increase credibility. I consulted with my advisors and peers to discuss preliminary and concluded concepts, and received helpful feedback regarding the meanings and basis for interpretation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). I also consulted with a PhD graduate working as a researcher at the University of British Columbia who believed my findings “accurately painted the picture of BC Parks”.

The process of reflexivity was fulfilled through writing in a journal throughout my research. I documented and reflected on my thoughts, beliefs, and emotions throughout the research process.

Richardson (1994) asserted that data can be considered from many different perspectives. Crystallization is a representation of how people, individual selves, and their understandings are multifaceted and complex. Richardson then suggested we ask if our research has contributed to the understanding of social life and if our text revealed the participants sense of lived experience? Furthermore, since stories are told with the audience in mind, participants act as a performer – drawing from one of her many personas to best convince the audience (in this case, me) the meaning of her story (Labov, 1982). Therefore my presence as the audience and the manner in which I investigated participants' perceptions of the governance of BC Parks influenced what they had to say.

Another interesting source for evidence of trustworthiness arose from an Evaluation of BC Parks' (updated) Service Delivery Model (implemented 2003), which was commissioned by BC Parks in 2007 and conducted by FORUM Consulting Group, Ltd. Once I had finished analyzing the data and elicited my themes, I read the report and found invaluable information regarding contract management, as well some similar findings to my own research. The Evaluation of the BC Parks Service Delivery Model (2008) added to my insights regarding the inner workings of the BC Parks – PFO relationship, the outsourcing model, and the implications on governance.

### 3.9 Limitations

A limitation of the research was the extent to which the views expressed by the participants I interviewed were representative of the groups they represent.

Furthermore, a selection bias was present since I primarily used the snowball effect.

The way my study unfolded, I only interviewed civil servants at the BC Parks' head office in Victoria, BC. With much insistence, the public administrators suggested I speak with more and more employees. After six interviews, I respectfully explained I had to switch my focus to recruiting and interviewing PFOs and members of NGOs. However, that also resulted in a lack of interviews with any BC Parks field staff (i.e. area supervisors or park rangers). This limitation suggests that the findings are reflective of BC Parks' public administrators, rather than the BC Parks Agency as a whole.

## CHAPTER 4: THE BC PARKS CONTEXT

The document review aided in establishing the context of BC Parks and the outsourcing model. This chapter provides an overview and an evaluation of how contracting bidding, management, and monitoring functions in BC Parks. The finances of BC Parks' revenue and expenditures are then reviewed.

### 4.1 The BC Parks Service Delivery Model

In 2002, under the newly elected Liberal government, BC Parks made significant changes to the service delivery model to increase efficiency and effectiveness for both the Ministry and the PFOs (FORUM, 2008). BC Parks articulated their objectives in making the shift from the park-by-park model to the bundle model:

The overall intent of the new delivery model was to enable the PFOs greater freedom to operate their own businesses while still maintaining BC Parks' standards and enhancing the visitors' experience. At the same time it was expected that BC Parks would experience financial savings resulting from economies of scale in the PFOs' operations (FORUM, 2008, p.10).

Rather than having one year contracts per park, 245 operational parks were bundled together into 27 areas with ten-year contracts (BP Society of Park Facility Operators, 2008). Since the shift from the park-by-park model, to the bundle model, PFOs became bigger companies running many park services (i.e. five to 25 campgrounds), rather than the previous small, individual park contractors.

As of May 2008, BC Parks had about 30 contracts with about 20 PFOs (FORUM, 2008, pg.6) There are 27 bundle areas, plus individual contracts at

specific parks, since not all park services were able to be bundled together. Furthermore, several PFOs operate more than one bundle. However, the BC Parks website provided a list of PFOs and contact information for the 2008/2009 season, which detailed 27 bundle areas managed by 23 PFOs, as well as 11 PFOs managing 17 non-bundled areas (BC Parks, 2009a) (Appendix D). There is variance between the numbers of PFOs reported by the different documents.

Two other changes were enacted in 2002, regarding monitoring and revenue opportunities for PFOs. The style of monitoring shifted from a 'rules based approach' to a 'performance based approach'. Before 2002, park area supervisors would monitor PFOs using a specific checklist (i.e. are the washrooms clean? y/n). Since 2002, the park area supervisors are meant to monitor PFOs using Key Performance Indicators to get an overview of the services provided, which will be further discussed elsewhere. BC Parks increased investment and revenue opportunities for the PFOs by bundling together numerous campgrounds (thus increasing their economies of scale) and by increasing the contract length from one year to ten years (thus allowing a greater time period to make a return on investments in park services). The PFOs were encouraged to propose to BC Parks the addition of other recreation and park services in their bundle (i.e. visitor centres and rental equipment).

An evaluation of this new delivery model was commissioned by BC Parks in 2007 to FORUM Consulting Group Ltd., and was managed through a joint BC Parks – PFO steering committee. The evaluation assessed whether BC Parks'

aforementioned objectives for the bundle model were being achieved. Four broad evaluation questions, which were the terms of reference, provided by BC Parks, guided FORUM's evaluation:

- a) Is the current BC Parks service delivery model operating as intended?
- b) Is the service delivery model an effective and efficient means of implementing MOE and government policy?
- c) Is the service delivery model being managed effectively? Are the right tools in place to support it?
- d) Are there adjustments which could be made in the delivery model to increase effectiveness and/or efficiency?

FORUM (2008) conducted a review of BC Parks, which enabled me to access information regarding contract procurement process, contract management, contract monitoring, and other vital information regarding BC Parks. The FORUM (2008) document represents a comprehensive overview and evaluation of the BC Parks outsourcing model, without which I would have been left with many unanswered questions. I will now present an abbreviated version of their findings.

#### 4.1.2 Contract Procurement Process

Since 2002-2003, the contract procurement process has been undertaken in three phases. First, BC Park issues "A Request for Expression of Interest (RFEI)" to stimulate interest in potential private proponents and identify the pool of candidates. BC Parks advertised the RFEI in local and provincial newspapers, and directly contacted people they believed would be interested in applying. Second, BC Parks used "A Request for Qualifications (RFQ)" to evaluate the suitability of the candidates. Finally, BC Parks issued "A Request for Proposal (RFP)" which requires proponents to submit an operating plan including a financial proposal. BC Parks

then choose the winning bid from the pool of qualified candidates who submitted a RFP.

In the Final Draft of the “Evaluation of the BC Parks Service Delivery Model” (2008) conducted by FORUM Consulting Group Ltd., they found no legal challenges to the RFEI/RFQ/RFP methodology used for procurement. FORUM also noted that “while both BC Parks and the PFOs found the three-part process quite complex and time consuming, it met government requirements and it achieved the objectives of putting the contracts in place as and when required” (p.19). FORUM also concluded that there were sufficient numbers of interested and qualified contractors at all stages of the procurement process (RFEI - 60 responses; RFQ - 135 responses; and RFP – 70 responses). The aforementioned conclusion was significant since operating and maintaining many provincial park campgrounds is a specialized skill which could have resulted in only a few candidates.

#### 4.1.3 Contract Management

Contract management consists of a written agreement which clarifies each party’s roles and responsibilities. The explicit and implicit obligations of the PFOs and BC Parks under their contracts are included in the thesis (See Appendix E). Contracts are 10 years in length, however, BC Parks has the right to cancel the contract, and the PFOs have the right to walk away.

PFOs are charged with the responsibilities of operating and maintaining park services and campgrounds, collecting camping and other fees, and accounting for their operating performance to government (FORUM, 2008). PFOs provide the

visitor experience through a “clean, functional, and safe environment” (BC Parks, 2008b, pg.6). Their responsibilities include: fee collection, garbage and recycling, security, facility maintenance, conducting satisfaction surveys, and ensuring cleanliness of facilities and park grounds. The PFO staff members are the first responders to complaints, ensure security and safety through soft compliance (noise, liquor, violence, vandalism). The PFOs have the power to evict visitors, but have no powers to enforce the Parks Act.

The PFOs are required to submit an annual operating plan to BC Parks by October 1 each year (including services offered and fees collected) and submit a three-year business plan detailing predicted operating costs. The PFOs are estimated to employ some 700 employees in their parks operations (FORUM, 2008).

BC Parks are charged with the responsibilities of conducting performance measurement activities and sharing the results with the PFOs so improvements can be made, reviewing annual business plans within 30 days and providing feedback, maintaining good business relationships with the PFOs, and providing support to the PFOs in respect of their obligations when called upon to do so (FORUM, 2008).

While roles and responsibilities are outlined in contractual agreements, a strong business relationship, based on trust and understanding is of utmost importance. FORUM (2008) noted some tension between PFOs and the BC Parks’ staff.

The PFOs [felt] that BC Parks lacked an appreciation of how the parks should be managed on a day-to-day basis and the specific challenges that PFOs face as private sector businesses (pg.25).

Some PFOs' indicated they would not be bidding again on a contract bundle due to their negative experiences. FORUM (2008) recommended using the Joint Executive Committee, which meets twice a year on which BC Parks and the PFOs are represented, to address the concerns to ameliorate the business relationship, to thus continue offering high quality experiences to visitors. The PFOs expressed frustration surrounding the ambiguity of preventive maintenance, the inability to set camping prices, and the constraints surrounding potential investments in capital expenditures.

BC Parks' facilities are estimated to have a replacement value of some \$500 million (FORUM, 2008, pg.34). Capital expenditures on new facilities and existing ones are controlled by BC Parks. Routine operating maintenance of the campgrounds is undertaken by the PFOs (such as cleaning, lawn mowing, staining of tables, replacement of rotten sign/ water posts and sign painting). PFOs are also required to do preventive maintenance, however, there was much disagreement amongst BC Parks area staff and PFOs regarding what does and what does not constitute preventive maintenance. The preventive maintenance issue represented the single biggest irritant in the PFOs' relationship with BC Parks. FORUM recommended updating the Facilities Management System to reduce reoccurring on-the-ground inspections of preventive maintenance by parks staff. The Facilities Management System is not a published document available to the public.

PFOs' second biggest irritant was the inability to set overnight camping prices according to market demand. BC Parks explained that part of their mandate was to provide high quality recreation experiences at an economically accessible price for the residents of British Columbia. BC Parks partially addressed these concerns through the Statute 2 legislation that changes to how prices are set; rather than prices being set by Cabinet, they will now be set by the Minister of Environment (MoE, 2008). For the 2009 camping season, discounted rates will be introduced for longer-stays to encourage camping in the shoulder season and in underutilized parks. In the 2010 camping season, rates will be raised or lowered depending upon campground amenities and services, local market conditions, and season variations (MoE, 2008). Furthermore, a Park Enhancement Fund was established as a special account to keep revenue generated from the sale of BC Parks merchandise to fund activities such as interpretative programs, and new or improved park facilities, as well as research and restoration activities within protected areas (MoE, 2008).

Since the shift to the Bundle Model in 2003, PFOs have been encouraged to financially invest in park services and facilities, to increase their revenue (and thus decrease their deficiency payments). The PFOs explained to FORUM their frustrations surrounding this new push from BC Parks (see Table 2).

Table 2: Circumstances & Consequences for capital investments by PFOs

CIRCUMSTANCE	CONSEQUENCE
The PFOs are unable to use the lands on which the campgrounds are situated as security for bank financing for additional investments, since they still belong to the Crown.	It is difficult for the PFOs to raise risk capital secured by their businesses because they have limited collateral.
While a ten-year period is reasonable to earn a return on a private investment, every passing year reduces the potential return period and therefore increases the PFOs' required annual rate of return.	PFOs are more interested in investment in the early years of the contract but their interests tend to decline over time as the payback period grows shorter.
At the end of the contract period, the PFOs might have no opportunity to operate the new facility since there is no guarantee that the PFO will still have the contract in place after ten years.	If significant investments are made by the PFO, the residual value at the end of the contract might be small or even zero.
Several PFOs noted that approval from BC Parks is slow and cumbersome.	Every month that slips by in the approval process reduces the time available for the PFO to make a return on the capital employed in the new attraction.

(FORUM, 2008, pg. 36)

Despite the bundle shift and the hope for PFOs to invest in parks services and facilities, there was little enthusiasm or commitment from PFOs to further invest in capital park services or facilities.

#### 4.1.4 Contract Monitoring

BC Parks' land and facilities continue to be under public ownership. PFOs are contracted to maintain park facilities to BC Parks' standards (which are inaccessible to the public). BC Parks conducted regular monitoring and reporting activities to

ensure the PFOs are meeting BC Parks' standards (FORUM, 2008, pg. 20). BC Parks monitored the PFOs using the following tools:

- a) Inspections and Key Performance Indicator (KPI) reports conducted by BC Parks independently or with PFOs conducted periodically, several times a year;
- b) Monthly financial and annual financial statements (includes revenue collected);
- c) Attendance statistics submitted monthly;
- d) Satisfaction surveys conducted every third year for most parks;
- e) Comment cards (includes comments cards developed by BC Parks and PFOs); and
- f) Informal interaction with PFOs and campers.

The first four monitoring and reporting activities will now be reviewed.

#### 4.1.4.1 Key Performance Indicators

The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) evaluate eight areas: visitor satisfaction, state of the facilities, financial performance, PFO staff presence and appearance, community involvement, legal obligations, provision of additional services and the protection of natural and cultural values (Appendix F).

BC Parks and PFOs were more satisfied with the KPI reports rather than the former system of check-list monitoring. However, both parties agreed improvements to the system were needed. The PFOs raised concerns regarding inconsistent implementation of KPI measurements among the different regions in BC Parks. FORUM (2008) documented that both BC Parks and the PFOs were interested in moving towards a self-auditing system by PFOs supplemented by rigorous third party audits (paid for by PFOs).

FORUM (2008) noted that the PFOs felt that different parks offer visitors different experiences and thus should be evaluated accordingly. FORUM noted there to be four types of parks in BC: (1) long-stay destination, (2) adventure/wilderness, (3) overnight short-stay bedroom, and (4) day-use only. Since visitor expectations vary for each category of park experience, FORUM (2008) suggested that BC Parks and the PFOs should develop goals and objectives for each category to further clarify the PFO's responsibilities and how best to facilitate such experiences for visitors.

FORUM (2008) recommended that the Joint-Executive Committee should continue to perfect the KPI methodology to reflect practical and realistic measurement. Furthermore, the KPI results should enable BC Parks to compare results amongst PFOs (which at present does not exist). FORUM (2008) suggested using a 'Principle Based Evaluation' to standardize monitoring and allow the information to be relayed back to the public. The four possible outcomes of the evaluations could be:

- A - This PFO (or park) exceeds BC Parks' expectations.
- B - This PFO meets all BC Parks' expectations.
- C - This PFO meets some of BC Parks' expectations, but not all.
- D - This PFO does not meet BC Parks' expectations.

The assessment would be based on (1) explicit campground management objectives; (2) explicit performance evaluation criteria linked to the campground management objectives; and (3) explicit measurement processes linked to the evaluation criteria (FORUM, 2008, pg.31). BC Parks and the PFOs need to establish an agreed upon list of criteria regarding performance objectives and evaluation

criteria which would be applicable throughout the province. Top performing PFOs would need less monitoring than poor performing PFOs. Once an improved and transparent system of monitoring and evaluation is developed, BC Parks could introduce performance based bonuses and penalties for PFOs. As of 2008, no bonuses existed for high performing PFOs, and if poor performing PFOs were found, BC Parks was limited to sending a "Section 9 letter" which contains a threat of cancelling the contract.

#### 4.1.4.2 Financial statements

PFOs are required to submit monthly and annual financial statements to BC Parks. However, FORUM (2008) strongly urged BC Parks to develop and implement a financial statement template for PFOs and to have the statements audited. FORUM (2008) also noted the lack of BC Parks' capability to analyze and use the important information. The PFOs' annual operating plans were useful documents, however, they lacked park-specific detail that BC Parks staff felt was needed. Furthermore, in lieu of an explicit guideline regarding a "reasonable level of profit" for a PFO to earn, many "acrimonious negotiations" resulted between BC Parks and the PFOs (FORUM, pg.26). FORUM recommended developing guidelines to help reduce tensions and provide direction for parks staff.

BC Parks sets all park fees, which the PFOs collect. As the PFOs have negotiated individual contracts with BC Parks, if the fee revenues are less than the agreed-upon operating costs, then BC Parks makes up the deficit, known as "deficiency payments" (FORUM, 2008). While most parks run at a deficit, if the fee

revenue exceeds the negotiated contract price at a park, the PFO would then return a portion of the surplus profit to BC Parks (FORUM). Deficiency payments enables PFOs to operate a financially viable business and BC Parks to offer visitor services at a relatively low cost to citizens.

The FORUM Report (2008) included the total deficiency payments made to PFOs from 2002-2007 which are outlined in Table 3.

Table 3: Deficiency Payments 2002-2007 (all figures in millions)

Year	Budget	Payment Total	Variance	Variance %
2002-2003	1.4	1.6	0.2	17
2003-2004	2.3	3.3	1.0	43
2004-2005	2.4	2.4	0	0
2005-2006	2.5	3.1	0.6	24
2006-2007	3.0	4.4	1.4	47
Five year Total	11.60	14.80	3.20	28

(FORUM, 2008, pg.38)

The first column in Table 3 (budget) indicates the amount allocated for PFO deficiency payments, while the second column (payment total) indicates the amount actually paid to PFOs.

BC Parks also sent me an internal document of detailed financial information regarding deficiency payments made to PFOs which are outlined in Table 4.

Table 4: Deficiency Payments 2003-2009 (all figures in millions)

Year	RFP Contract Price	Negotiated Contract Price
2003-2004	1,370,683	
2004-2005	2,313,627	
2005-2006	2,322,752	
2006-2007		3,826,735
2007-2008		4,455,353
2008-2009		4,549,980

(BC Parks, 2008e)

The first column in Table 4 (RFP Contract Price) indicates the amount actually paid to PFOs and the second column (Negotiated Contract Price) indicates the amount allocated for PFO deficiency payments. A comparison of Table 3 and Table 4 revealed variations in the reported amounts of deficiency payments.

FORUM (2008) found many inconsistencies in financial reporting of deficiency payments – some years were entered per bundle, other years were done by region. The inconsistencies were not “conducive to effective financial analysis for performance assessment purposes” (pg.38). FORUM urged BC Parks to collect financial information using a standardized template to enable accurate information and to allow for comparisons between bundles and years. The new system should be automated and web-based. Financial reporting is a key element of BC Parks’ accountability to the Ministry of Environment, and ultimately to the taxpayers. FORUM’s recommendation is well reflected in the variance between the two tables presented above. As a researcher, I found BC Parks’ financial information difficult to

obtain, understand, and often conflicted with other government documents, which validates FORUM's findings regarding the lack of consistency in tracking financial information.

BC Parks' revenue and expenses from 2006/07 and 2007/08 were available online on the BC Parks web page (BC Parks, 2008f). Detailed financial statements are presented in Appendix G, exactly as they appear in the BC Parks Report. The ability to review BC Parks' finances demonstrates a significant level of transparency and accountability to citizens. Nevertheless, much more effort is needed in explaining the complex financial information to be truly accessible to the citizens of British Columbia.

The financial information allows for further comparison with other provincial park agencies operating under different management models (which are beyond the scope of the current thesis). BC Parks' revenues, recoveries, capital expenditures and operating costs, and number of government employees are now presented and discussed.

BC Parks' revenue and recoveries are summarized in Table 5. The original document listed each specific source of revenue.

Table 5: Revenue and Recoveries

	2006/07	2007/08
Total Recreation User Fee & Permit Revenues	14,005,875	14,363,845
Recoveries	3,639,696	2,884,726
Total Revenue & Recoveries	17,645,571	17,248,571

(BC Parks, 2008f)

Overall, BC Parks' collected \$14,005,875 in 2006/07 and \$14,363,845 in 2007/08 in revenue from user fees and permit sales (see Table 5). Camping fees ranged from \$10.00 to \$24.00 per party, per vehicle, per night (up to a maximum of eight persons including children) (BC Parks, 2009b). Persons with disabilities are charged no fee. Senior citizens over the age of 65 are charged half-price (BC Parks, 2009b). As for recoveries, BC Parks was allocated \$3,639,696 in 2006/07 and \$2,884,726 in 2007/08 from other government agencies for specific projects, such as the management of the mountain pine beetle (see Table 5).

PFOs collected and retained \$11,937,648 in 2006/07 and \$12,283,665 in 2007/08 in user fees (see Table 6). BC Parks paid deficiency payments to the PFOs; \$3,782,000 in 2006/07 and \$4,541,528 in 2007/08.

Table 6: Operating Contracts & Commission Costs

	2006/07	2007/08
Contract services		
– retained fees	11,937,648	12,283,665
– net deficiency payments	3,782,000	4,541,528
– non-bundled parks	797,723	892,613
Parking fee commission	387,128	338,863
Annual pass commission	11,440	17,203
Sub-total Operating Contracts & Commission Costs	16,915,939	18,073,871
BC Parks Operating Expenditures <sup>1</sup>	27,001,415	27,100,748
Total operating costs	43,917,354	45,174,619

<sup>1</sup> Operating expenditures: salary, benefits, travel, good & services as well as projects financed through recoveries (i.e. mountain pine beetle)

(BC Parks, 2008f)

The Year End Report did not specify what specific sources of revenue the PFOs retained. After reviewing the information numerous times, I believe the PFOs kept the camping, boating, and day-use group reservation fees, since those three sources of revenue totalled the “retained fees for contract services” presented in Table 6. However an internal document stated that PFOs retained 100% of the camping fees, 100% of the septic fees, and 50% of the parking fees) (BC Parks, 2008b). Once again, there was much inconsistency regarding BC Parks’ financial information.

The cost of operating visitor services in BC Parks, was \$16,915,939 in 2006/07 and \$18,073,871 in 2007/08 (generated revenue plus deficiency payments). BC Parks’ operating expenditures totalled \$27,001,415 in 2006/07 and 2007/08 in \$27,100,748 (see Table 6).

BC Parks spent \$31,020,000 in 2006/07 and \$26,616,223 in 2007/08 on capital and compensation expenditures, such as land acquisition, upgrading water and sewer systems, road and trail maintenance and campground and day use reconstruction (see Table 7).

Table 7: Capital & Compensation Expenditures

	2006/07	2007/08
Capital & Compensation Expenditures	31,020,000	26,616,223

(BC Parks, 2008f)

BC Parks' expenditures totalled \$76,267,354 in 2006/07 and \$76,348,842 in 2007/08 (Table 8).

Table 8: Total Expenditures on BC Parks

	2006/07	2007/08
Total BC Parks Budget Expenditures	62,601,138	59,151,111
Total Expenditures on Parks (incl. Retained fees & Partner contributions)	76,267,354	76,348,842

(BC Parks, 2008f)

Table 9 followed the exact formatting and presentation used in the BC Parks Year End Report (BC Parks, 2008f). FTE is an acronym for "full-time equivalent"; for example, two employees working half time equal one FTE. The rangers comprise about 35% of the FTE budget for personnel in BC Parks. From what I understand, this information indicates there were 188 FTEs in 2006/07 (including 134 rangers working the equivalent of 64 FTE) and 193 FTEs in 2007/08 (including 145 rangers working the equivalent of 69 FTE). The data shows most park rangers do not work

full-time year round, and it is reasonable to assume that the staffing levels are increased during the peak season (May to September).

Table 9: Government Employees

	2006/07	2007/08
# BC Parks' Govt FTEs	188	193
Ranger FTEs	64	69
# Rangers	134	145

(BC Parks, 2008f)

In sum, BC Parks' Year End Report (2008e) represented a marked level of transparency and accountability to citizens regarding the use of tax dollars. However, before the operating year 2006/07, I was unable to find a comprehensive document regarding BC Parks' finances. Furthermore, the Year End Report was confusing and left me with many unanswered questions.

The financial figures presented allow for further comparison with other provincial park agencies operating under different management models (which are beyond the scope of the current thesis).

#### 4.1.4.3 Attendance statistics and Satisfaction surveys

Despite visitor statistics and financial information being 'collected rigorously' and sent to Victoria, the FORUM Report did not describe the methods used by PFOs for counting visitors (FORUM, 2008, pg.21). A senior administrator in Ontario Parks mentioned that BC Parks uses axle count measurement on the Sea to Sky highway,

which captures both visitors<sup>3</sup> and entrants<sup>4</sup>, thus inflating the visitor use data (Eagles, in press; Hornback and Eagles, 1999). Axle count measurements consist of pressure sensors on or under the road with a counter attached to capture the number of vehicles passing through (Eagles, in press). In the 2007/08 BC Parks Year End Report, the attendance statistics were presented (see Table 10). Nevertheless, no details were provided regarding the method of recording visitor use.

Table 10: BC Parks Attendance

	2006/07	2007/08
Visits (in person days)		
Day Use Visits	16,942,850	17,081,091
Camping Visits	2,323,110	2,381,099
Marine Visits	205,798	180,663
Total Park Attendance	19,471,759	19,642,854

(BC Parks, 2008f)

The PFO staff conduct satisfaction surveys of campers every year, designed by BC Parks (BC Parks, 2008b) (see Table 11).

<sup>3</sup> a person who visits the lands and waters of a park or protected area for purposes mandated for the area

<sup>4</sup> a person going onto lands and waters of a park or protected area for any purpose

Table 11: Campground Satisfaction Ratings (2003-2007)  
Percent ranked 'excellent' and 'above average'

Services	Standard	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Mean
Cleanliness of grounds	93	93	91	93	93	94	92.8
Maintain natural surroundings	88	88	88	88	89	91	88.8
Condition of facilities	85	81	81	81	81	83	81.4
Sense of security	84	84	84	82	85	85	84.0
Cleanliness of restrooms	78	73	71	75	76	77	74.2
Control of noise	79	77	75	73	78	80	76.6
Value for fee	72	60	59	65	67	73	64.8
Availability of recreation opportunities	59	n/a	n/a	60	61	61	60.7
Overall Visitor Index <sup>5</sup>	80	82	80	81	83	84	82.0
Number of respondents		4,622	4,829	4,395	4,967	4,253	

(FORUM, 2008, pg. 33)

Campground satisfaction rates between 2003 and 2007 vary depending upon the service. The numbers represent the percentage of visitors who ranked the criteria as excellent or above average. No information was provided regarding how the satisfaction of services was measured. I took the mean of each criterion to get an overall sense of the satisfaction of services. The criteria were ranked in the

<sup>5</sup> Overall Visitor Index is calculated based on five services: cleanliness of restrooms, cleanliness of grounds, condition of facilities, sense of security, control of noise

following order of satisfaction: cleanliness of grounds (m=92.3%), maintain natural surroundings (m=88.8), sense of security (m=84), condition of facilities (m=81.4), control of noise (m=76.6), cleanliness of restrooms (m=74.2), value for fee (m=64.8), and availability of recreation opportunities (m=60.7). Clearly, there are many happy campers visiting BC Parks. There appears to be a direct correlation between BC Parks standard measure and visitor satisfaction (see Table 12).

Table 12: BC Parks standard measure compared with visitor satisfaction mean

Services	BC Parks Standard	Visitor Satisfaction Mean
Cleanliness of grounds	93	92.8
Maintain natural surroundings	88	88.8
Condition of facilities	85	81.4
Sense of security	84	84.0
Control of noise	79	76.6
Cleanliness of restrooms	78	74.2
Value for fee	72	64.8
Availability of recreation opportunities	59	60.7

The satisfaction levels come quite close to BC Parks' required standards and follow the same rank order (except the condition of facilities and sense of security are reversed). Comparing these numbers raised a few questions. Most importantly, how and why did BC Parks choose to rank the importance of each of these services? Why does BC Parks rank the availability of recreation opportunities as the least importance criteria in relation to the other eight? Why is value for fee the second

lowest ranked in visitor satisfaction, as well as having the largest deviation between BC Parks' standard and the satisfaction level? These are questions that warrant further investigation.

#### 4.1.7 Evaluation of the Model

FORUM (2008) concluded that considerable strides in efficiency and effectiveness were experienced under the new Bundle Model compared to the old park-by-park model. In the period from 2003 to 2007, the PFOs' incurred increased operating costs due to the increased cost of labour, fuel and supplies. The new Bundle Model proved to be much more resilient to these increases than the park-by-park model would have been. FORUM also noted the heavy workload spread amongst the remaining BC Parks' staff members who have had "difficulty coping" (2008, pg.41).

The themes identified through the interviews will now be explored. It is interesting to note that there were similar themes between the FORUM Report (2008) and those from the interviews.

## CHAPTER FIVE: PASSIONATE YET POWERLESS

### 5.1 Outline

The overarching theme I identified from the analysis of the transcripts was Passionate yet Powerless, which characterized stakeholder comments on the governance of parks in BC. The Park Facility Operators, the public administrators working for BC Parks, and non-governmental organization representatives were all passionate about parks, yet felt powerless to influence the direction and management of BC Parks. The stakeholders were all dedicated to their vision of the conservation of and recreation opportunities in BC Parks. However, each stakeholder group described the significant challenges it faced in executing its ideas for BC Parks.

The Park Facility Operators undertook a great risk as businesses working for BC Parks and their relationship with BC Parks staff was marked by mistrust. The public administrators experienced growing pains in terms of reorganization of BC Parks with newly elected officials thus creating a sense of powerlessness. The non-governmental organization representatives strongly disagreed with the direction the Liberal Provincial Government set for BC Parks. These senses of being passionate yet powerless shaped the participants' perceptions of governance.

The theme of passionate yet powerless will now be reported for each stakeholder group: the Park Facility Operators (PFO) theme of "Risky Business"; the public administrators theme of "Beholden to the Elected Officials"; and the

members of the non-governmental organizations (NGO) theme of “Protecting BC Parks from the Liberals”.

## 5.2 Risky Business: The PFOs’ Perspective on Park Governance

When the privatization model was introduced to BC Parks in the 1980s, many displaced parks staff bid on and were awarded park service contracts. PFO Participant #1, for example, was a displaced park employee who became a Park Facility Operator in order to work in parks and follow his passion. He commented:

I’ve been on all sides of this. I was a ranger and then dismissed and let go. I wasn’t allowed to fulfill my passion. To starting my own business and moving forward and making a difference in our parks, and I can go into any park in this area and point to all the things that I did in these Parks, which I don’t think would’ve gotten done if a Ministry was running it or if another company was running it. (PFO Participant #1)

PFO Participant #1 appeared to be proud of his role in shaping parks in BC, a role and level of influence he perhaps would not have had if BC had not adopted the privatization model. All of the PFO representatives openly discussed the benefits of the privatization model; namely the flexibility and efficiency of private companies compared to government.

Interestingly, the three PFOs interviewed noted they were driven to become contractors because of their passion for parks and protected areas, not because they were seeking to make money. In PFO Participant #1’s words, he wanted “to make a difference by running free interpretation programs with BC Nature (an NGO), removing invasive species, and other conservation efforts”. Given his passion for conservation, PFO Participant #3 insisted that PFO businesses did not conflict with the environmental goals of conservation. He explained that PFOs openly

embraced the conservation mandate of BC Parks, which set them apart from other campgrounds in BC. Like the other participants, PFO Participant #2 enjoyed working outdoors and the positive customer service interactions with visitors. These descriptions put a human face on the contractors and reveal motives other than profit. Even so, the PFOs lamented their sense of low job security and the difficulties they faced interacting with the public administrators. These interactions shaped their perspectives on the governance of parks in BC.

### 5.2.1 Financial Challenges

The PFOs underscored the risk they assumed as contractors working for BC Parks. The short operating season of most parks yielded a small time frame to make the business financially viable. Furthermore, to the PFOs' dismay, all prices (i.e. camping rates) are set by Cabinet, which compounded the difficulties of running the business independently, thereby creating a sense of lack of control. Because the service contracts were ten years in length (with financial renegotiations every 3 years) and included a cancellation clause, PFOs experienced a low level of job security. As a result, the PFOs felt unable to financially invest in parks due to the short length of the contract and limited amount of time to make a return on their investment. As PFO Participant #3 pointed out:

I'm coming to the half way point with our contract. I have four years after this year. So I've told you that the info centre was a \$15,000 investment. Well, all those opportunities now will become dormant. I won't be looking at those kinds of opportunities anymore because it's going to be four year, three years and so on. So what kind of assurances have I got? So that, I don't think that's really where we want to be. I think we're just kind of getting going here. So really there should be, whether it's a longer term or whether we redo every five years and we're always looking at a ten year

period. I would like to see that change, because I think that would put more effort to operators to continue investing.

Interestingly, NGO participant #4 recognized the challenge of operating as a contractor:

And again, the PFOs, it's not to say that they don't have a desire or interest but they are running a business and ultimately it's their bottom line that they are responsible for and when those contracts are such that, they may or may not be there in 5 years their interest in investing resources and tying into the business is much more limited, then a government that's going to be there for the long haul. (NGO Participant #4)

These comments suggest the PFO's hands were tied insofar as each PFO's need for its business to be financially viable within the contract length overrode its desire to invest more in parks, especially near the end of the contract term.

Deficiency payments further added to the risk of undertaking a contract with BC Parks. Any increase in a PFO's park revenue resulted in financial savings to the government by lowering the PFO's deficiency payment, rather than retaining the additional revenue. GOV participant #4, one of the public administrators I interviewed, recognized PFO concerns about this policy:

That's one other aspect we're looking at is we don't...we've got a penalty phase built into the agreement. We don't have a reward phase, you know? So every three years, when we renegotiate, they [PFOs] might have increased their revenue, right? So they brought in more campers or whatever. So we go back to the table and say "oh, your revenues increased by twenty percent, so we want to reduce your deficiency by twenty percent". And they'll say "yeah, but my costs have gone up here, and I've worked really hard to get that revenue up higher and, you're not letting me keep any of it. You're taking it all away by reducing my deficiency that you're going to pay, right?" So, that's our goal, right? We want to try to get rid of the deficiencies for the taxpayers, but at the same time, they've [PFOs] worked really hard to put more money in their pocket over the last three years. And now, at the end of that cycle, we're coming to take it away from them, right? Through negotiations. So what we want to try to work on it, again...

Given the flaws with the deficiency payments, a few of the public administrators I interviewed expressed their desire to improve the situation for contractors. They indicated the Government's plan to eventually eliminate deficiency payments to make parks fully cost recovery, avoid burdening tax payers, and reward PFOs. Various civil servants discussed ways to rectify the situation, largely based on financial incentives (PFOs to keep a certain percentage of the extra revenue) or a reward system of a longer contract, yet the issues remained unaddressed.

All told, the present policy made it challenging for the PFOs to operate in a business manner. As PFO participant #2 commented:

If anybody in the system has sort of struggled or faltered is because of that risk or a bad deal to begin with the government. It generally isn't because their business practices have been poor or what they propose in the first place as far a business case wasn't sound. It's a matter of them having been impacted by an environment event or the government didn't disclose something in the initial process and it cost the operator a lot of money.

PFO Participant #2 underscored how the high risk and unfair financial deal PFOs experience led to a challenging business environment. PFOs were not compensated for loss of revenue due to an environmental event, such as a forest fire. So if a forest fire occurred and deterred campers, the PFO experienced the associated loss of revenue. Conversely, if a PFO attracted more campers and increased revenue, the government simply lowered its deficiency payment. Under such a circumstance, the deficiency payment remained constant.

Two of the PFOs interviewed articulated their belief that deficiency payments would be unnecessary if BC Parks would raise the cost of camping, which they

lamented was far below what the market would bear. PFO Participant #2 shared his opinion:

My personal opinion is I don't believe they [BC Parks] shouldn't have to run under deficiency payments and I really believe that what we're charging is far below market value. And it's difficult for BC Parks because it's a political position they hold obviously, it's one that is very close to residents of BC and they're always, they're out there concerned or negative press that comes from the rates. My colleagues that have been in the industry longer have mentioned that as soon as rates do increase there's a down turn in business, which I can totally understand because what happens is that there's a five or six year period where rates won't change at all and then they will change fairly significantly. So obviously, that has to change, it has to be very gradual and assured that quality increases with the mark up in rate. But I think there's opportunities there to raise that and really to burden the province less. And they're [BC Parks staff] beginning to understand that.

The comments revealed the flaws associated with BC Parks' stagnant prices and then dramatic increases which resulted in a decrease in visitation. PFO Participant #2 believed BC Parks employees were beginning to agree with the PFOs' point of view regarding low pricing. Nevertheless, all three interviews revealed power imbalances between PFOs and BC Parks employees.

#### 5.2.2 Power Imbalances with BC Parks Employees

PFO participants were self conscious that the public and government employees possibly viewed them as "just maintenance workers". Consequently, they felt undervalued and disrespected by park staff. PFO Participant #1 summed up this concern in the following quote:

And I think that's where it's very frustrating, where that trust thing goes, because we've talked about how passionate we are and then somebody comes in and says, "Well, the toilets are dirty right now, so why aren't you cleaning it?" That's not the only reason that I'm here.

In short, the PFOs felt “below” the park staff who oversaw their contracts.

Evidently, the public administrators were aware of the contractors’ concerns. In a PowerPoint training session for BC park rangers, the power imbalance between PFOs and parks staff was addressed (PFO Service Delivery Model, 2008). One slide read:

- PFOs are BC Parks’ PARTNERS
- PFO staff are not “below us” – hierarchy attitude is not acceptable

The slide information conceded a history of hierarchical attitude between parks staff and the PFOs, but also offered evidence of the public administrators’ attempt to address and potentially improve the relationship.

Nevertheless, the PFOs’ comments in the interviews did not reflect any change in the relationship. The PFO participants commented on the power of area supervisors to “make or break you” depending upon the supervisors’ style of management, acceptance of the outsourcing model, and written performance reviews of PFOs. Furthermore, the contractors discussed their frustration surrounding the political nature of financial negotiations with park staff:

My costs are based on real numbers that I come up with, like estimates on labour costs, etc. Their ability to pay me is completely based on political numbers that are set in advance usually before we go into negotiations. Then I, as a business person, have to decide whether or not I can risk losing this job because it’s still essentially buying a job, or do I walk away and find something else to do for a living and let them suffer with the consequences. (PFO Participant #3)

The aforementioned suggests that PFOs are expected to operate front country visitors services at the minimum cost possible and unforeseen increases in expenses can’t always be compensated by the government. The cancellation clause

in the contract allows either the PFO to walk away or the government to rescind the contract. I asked GOV Participant#2 if the cancellation clause had ever been used, to which he explained it had only been used once to do a mass cancellation of all contracts when switching from the park-to-park model to the bundle model.

However an internet search revealed a Vancouver-based newspaper ran an article regarding the revoking of Gibson Pass Resort's contract in January 2008 (Fournier, 2008). Kate Thompson, Ministry of Environment spokesperson, was quoted in the article, saying that "Gibson Pass Resort Inc. has had its park-use permits revoked... it had about \$80,000 owing to two suppliers. A temporary operator is in place". However, Gibson Pass Resort's lawyer Carey Veinotte said in a January 11 letter to the Ministry of Environment "bureaucrats were motivated by malice or other improper purpose and must pay \$140,000 in deficiency payments damages for unilateral reduction of parking fees and the wrongful appropriation of Gibson Pass equipment". The article also noted that Gibson Pass Resort also owned a logging company which was in financial crisis. Furthermore, an NDP critic Shane Simpson criticized the Liberal Government for not ensuring the financial stability of PFOs through oversight and regular audits (Fournier).

The Province's article raises further curiosity regarding PFO Participant #2's comments on pg.92 regarding PFOs who have lost their contract due to an environment impact or "the government didn't disclose something in the initial process and it cost the operator a lot of money". So the government can cancel a contract if the PFO is not performing up to BC Parks' standards, as monitored by

area supervisors, yet, the PFOs all noted a significant lack in consistency with contract monitoring. PFO Participant #1 noted:

They are "BC Parks" but there's 9 regions and they are all different. There is no consistency. I think that's what they're struggling with the most right now, is that they don't have consistency. So it's mixed messaging to the PFOs. That's why we also formed a Society so that we can chat, if there's problems.

The PFO Society was initially formed for bulk purchasing (e.g. uniforms, equipment), but evolved to serve as a united voice to lobby the BC Parks Agency and a forum to discuss issues encountered by PFOs (PFO Background Information, 2008). The PFOs attributed the lack of consistency in contract monitoring to personality differences and the power of area supervisors, all of which directly impacted upon the PFOs' business. The PFOs and public administrators articulated the transition in approach to monitoring:

There's been a shift with respect to the model of operation. Where BC Parks have come from the point where they have monitored very, very specifically and on a, sort of on a day-to-day basis if you will of the condition of facilities and the operation. And with this new model, they wanted a step back from that. They wanted the operator to do that. They wanted to monitor the trends from the higher level. Which is really good. I can't say that that's been successful because the area supervisors from BC Parks are very comfortable and very knowledgeable of monitoring on a day to day basis and being that this is new I'm not sure whether it was training and direction or what it was or the personal preference, a lot of the various supervisors really didn't make that transition and they still gravitate into that. They're very focused on facilities. Are they clean, are they not? Are they neat and tidy or are they not? They'll also need to be looking at and need to be looking at and they need to be monitoring in a higher level. It's not even if he's [PFO staff] collecting the right amount of change, but what's his approach like? Is he providing good quality provision? Can he answer questions when they're [visitors] asking? (PFO Participant #2)

While the PFOs welcomed the idea of a micro to macro shift in monitoring, it appeared many area supervisors continued to focus on facilities and day-to-day

operations. PFO Participant #2 articulated his desire for PFOs to manage and monitor the daily operations, with parks staff monitoring higher level trends, such as service quality.

All the PFOs expressed the variance in negotiation styles of area supervisors and overall lack of consistency. PFO Participant #2 expressed his gratitude for having a progressive area supervisor with whom he renegotiated his contract in “non-competitive fashion”. He felt all his business information was shared in a very transparent manner. However, other participants thought their area supervisors continued to gravitate to the old style of micro-monitoring on the status of the facilities. PFO Participant #2 mentioned years ago having “screaming matches” over the financial aspects of contract negotiations with parks staff. Under the new approach to monitoring, PFOs were expected to monitor the day-to-day operations of their business and report back to the BC Parks staff. The public administrators described how top performing PFOs need less monitoring and vice versa. GOV Participants #1 spoke to the challenging evolution of the relationship between contractors and public administrators:

Right at the beginning, I must admit the relationship was about butting heads with the PFOs. There were some growing pains to get through under this new model. But for the most part, the philosophy of the PFOs and the philosophy of BC Parks has really started to gel well in terms of their interest and our interest are very much aligned. We work together to make sure the outcomes are achieved on that particular model so it seems to be working.

GOV Participant #4 offered a similar perspective:

Now we’re trying to build what I would call stronger working relationships with our contractors.

Despite efforts by public administrators to improve the relationship, PFOs felt frustrated with the lack of consistency with monitoring. The PFOs disputed the effectiveness and capacity of public administrators to make such changes, which further underscored the PFOs sense of powerlessness. The PFOs also articulated the public administrators' lack of business sense, which contributed the sense of mistrust.

The Liberal government's "BC is open for business" mantra resulted in many changes to BC Parks. The Government articulated their goal to increase BC Parks visitation by 20% by 2010 (as discussed by GOV Participant #4 and #5). The Government increased BC Parks' focus on revenue with Statue 2 – differential pricing of campsites based on the quality of the campsite and time of year (peak versus non-peak season). Moreover, contractors were strongly encouraged and almost expected to invest financially in additional services (i.e. canoe and bike rentals). However, the contractors commented on the limited time frame to earn a profit on such an expensive investment due to (1) the short operating season, (2) the short contract length, and (3) the needed liability insurance policies for recreation activities. Furthermore, it deeply frustrated the PFOs that the public administrators made these suggestions without exploring the cost-benefit analysis of such investments. As previously discussed, the motivation to increase revenue was minimized due to lowered deficiency payments:

Like I said, they expected all that to come forward without ever looking at those things as a business model and deciding whether or not you could make money in any of those businesses within a provincial park. Most of us have looked into these [additional park services] and most of us have tried

one or two of them and as a group have decided that that investment is a big risk to put out there to make additional money and reduce their costs because they're not money makers. (PFO Participant #3)

They're built on sort of a military structure you know it's very authoritarian and it comes down the change of command where as we are – we can't take orders like that. We have to make money at this you know what I mean. This is our business you know. If it doesn't make financial sense then we just can't stay yes to you we'll have to question you on a lot of things or we are going to lose our shirts, we're going to lose our houses. Right now every bit of credit I have is tied up in this system. I can't sell my house, you know, I can't finance anything else. I can't – I just basically operate this business for the government and with a very limited potential profit margin right now. I have financed or mortgaged my life to buy this job. The government employees don't want to make it a nice job for me, so that's sort of the down side... it's still better than working in an office. (PFO Participant #3)

Building trust is really important. Really, really important and it's, that's where there needs to an understanding from BC Parks of the business aspect of this. So that they're not put into a position where they're prescribing that we do something a certain way because that's where the conflicts come in. (PFO Participant #2)

These quotes illustrate the PFOs' frustration with public administrators whose lack of business sense, in their view, led to poor policymaking which negatively impacted the government-contractor relationship. Despite the Liberal government's mantra that "BC is open for business", the conditions for PFO businesses to operate effectively were not, according to PFO participants, in place. Interestingly, PFO Participant #1 discussed the potential drawback of the government's plan for PFOs to be more business-focused:

Our members are unique. It's a unique business. It's a lot of Ma and Pa type because if you go past the lower mainland you start heading there are lots of beautiful Parks but it's a very short season and very, very busy in this little chunk of the year. And that's it. It's hard to run a business in that way. You have to be passionate about it. I think Parks is going to see this next - sort of go around after the 6 years of this new bundle. Some of our members have already told us that they are taking the option to walk away. That's because, BC Parks wants us to run it as a business and we are forward thinking. Trying to be progressive. We're trying to do things for conservation. But somebody

who wants to go and park their RV and run a couple of campsites and rake and clean and meet the people and happy to talk to the people. They don't want all this paper. They don't want all this work. That's not what they're about. They just don't want the company part of it. (PFO Participant #1)

These comments revisit the PFOs' passion for parks and the difficulty of operating such a business due to the short operating season. PFO Participant #1 disclosed that certain PFOs will not renew their contracts, those who had previously enjoyed the lifestyle of operating a campground and were not interested in becoming a business-focused company with all the associated paperwork. Furthermore, he explained that "not a lot of people are in this business anymore", suggesting a lack of operators in BC. He questioned what would happen to the quality of BC provincial parks if they're not managed by people filled with passion for parks, which may happen more and more under the bundle. PFO Participants noted they came into business to pursue their passion for parks, but were ultimately faced with a high risk, low security job and many difficulties dealing with BC Parks staff.

All three PFO research participants discussed the lack of enforcement of the Parks Act regarding parking, vandalism, alcohol and security issues. The PFOs can request people to comply with the Parks Act, but have no authority to enforce the rules. Furthermore, all three PFOs noted how the majority of park visitors knew PFOs didn't have that authority. The PFOs explained how few park rangers work for the BC Parks Agency, and spent the majority of their time in the office or monitoring the backcountry, and are rarely to be found in front country parks. PFO Participant #3 commented:

If I'm there 100 days of the year, you know on the ground in the parks – if I run into even one of the Rangers it's pretty rare. The PFOs are pretty much

the presence. You know, the Park Rangers, most people don't know what one is in my parks now.

PFO Participant #3 continue on to describe his staff's search and rescue efforts at his parks:

The average year we save two lives. Last year, these two guys had gone in and swam and their friends had reported them missing, and we found them huddled underneath a tree. That was definitely what you'd consider a Park Rangers role, but the Park Rangers aren't there anymore.

PFO Participant #2 believed the enforcement issue got pushed to the side since currently, there appears to be no solution – the government will not hire more park rangers, yet refuses to outsource the responsibility. In a PowerPoint presentation for training new parks rangers, the PFO staff's responsibilities regarding enforcement were outlined (PFO Service Delivery Model, 2008):

- Security
  - Soft compliance (noise, liquor, violence, vandalism)
  - Power to evict
  - First Responders (wildlife encounters, accidents)

This internal document reveals that PFOs have security responsibilities within parks, yet the interviews demonstrated the PFOs' perceived lack of authority to carry out such responsibilities.

In conclusion, the public administrators were cognisant of the flaws in the outsourcing model, but not fully aware of how mistreated the PFOs felt. The PFOs were discouraged by a sense of powerlessness and mistrust. For a strong, working relationship built on trust, the PFOs need the public administrators to increase their understanding of business principles, to amend the punitive deficiency payments model, for area supervisors to stop micro-managing and monitor for higher-level

trends, to increase consistency with monitoring and negotiations, to address the lack of Parks Act enforcement and overall increase the respect towards PFOs.

### 5.3 Beholden to the Elected Officials: The Public Administrators' Perspective on Park Governance

Changes in government officials affect the provision and management of public sector resources. The transition of elected officials has profound implications for the way in which BC Parks are managed, such as the roles and responsibilities of civil servants, the level of funding, and the focus and balance between conservation and recreation. The public administrators I interviewed from BC Parks shared a sense of constant transition and powerlessness due to changes in elected officials, directives and initiatives. Nevertheless, the public administrators felt very passionate about and dedicated to their job and BC Parks:

I think normally one of the things that occur historically in Parks, there was not a lot of turnover. People who got jobs in Parks loved it. A lot of people would sacrifice, I think, moving to other kinds of positions that probably paid more, because I think people were committed to what they believe like I think it's not just enjoyment of the work, but I think its people really feel that what they are doing is making a contribution to society. (GOV Participant #5)

The public administrators expressed their enjoyment of their work and their commitment to the mandate of BC Parks. GOV Participant #5 explained that parks employees were serving a higher purpose by 'making a contribution to society'. However, the public administrators experienced much change and angst regarding staff, budget, and responsibilities depending upon the elected officials in power.

GOV Participant #5 noted that in the early 1980s, there were close to 400 full time park employees. However with the full move towards complete outsourcing

of all front country visitor services in 1989 led to job cuts and role changes whereby they began to manage contracts, rather than provide services directly.

Throughout the 1990s, the NDP doubled the size of BC Parks to achieve the goal of 12% of the provincial land base under protected areas. The public administrator commented that priority was placed on land acquisition.

Under the new Liberal Government, between 2001 and 2005, the Environmental Stewardship division's (under which BC Parks operates) budget fell 40% (\$83.5 million to \$50.8 million dollars) and government employees were cut by 31% (1298 to 897) (Recreation Stewardship Panel, 2002). Then in 2002/2003, one year contracts were eliminated and 245 parks were bundled together into 27 areas with 10 year contracts (PFO Background Information, 2008). The public administrators were then required to work with bigger companies rather than smaller Mom & Pop type contractors. This state of constant transition and cutbacks led to feelings of powerlessness, which typified the public administrators' perceptions of governance. GOV Participant #4 described his experience:

So land base goes up but your resources go down for staffing and then your money, your budget that government's giving you is going down. So there's no parallel in terms of what governments doing with this system. And then you've got the facilities that need to be replaced.

While the size of the protected areas in BC Parks more than doubled since 1990, the participants noted their staff and budget steadily decreased and facilities which needed replacement. He and other public administrators were irritated by the Government's message of "do more with less". The public administrators cited significant cost savings due to the outsourcing model:

I think in terms of revenue it's working okay. You know we've seen increases in revenue. It just involves a lot of work and discussion. A lot of sort of connecting with the PFOs. I'd be interested in hearing how Ontario Parks is doing. I think in terms of – there have been a number of studies that have been done that have demonstrated cost savings – definitely cost savings. Whether the staff moral or that kind of thing is working well, you know, you'd have to talk to other people. (GOV Participant #5)

The public administrators were convinced of the increased efficiency of the outsourcing model due to their low operating costs of staff and budget.

Interestingly, after referencing studies which demonstrated cost savings, GOV Participant #5 then mentioned "it just involves a lot of work and discussion" referring to the effort involved in contract monitoring and management. He then questioned if the cost savings came at the cost of lowered park staff morale. It seemed that the public administrators believed the outsourcing model resulted in an increase in efficiency, but then qualified their statement with a negative consequence or perception of the outsourcing model on park staff.

The public administrators expressed their frustration regarding decisions made by elected officials. They repeatedly noted their roles and responsibilities changed depending upon the political direction. In GOV Participant's #1 words:

So what it's meant for our staff is a shift from "We're in control, we do it", to one of "We monitor, we report out, we work with the contractor to bring the standards to a level that's needed around here". It took us a little bit of time to get use to the new models, to move from the late 80's and into the early 90's. Then everything worked fairly nicely through the 90's. Then as we moved into the bundle model, we have yet another hurdle to get over again as we were changing mindsets. When you move to a new government, you have people that are more than willing to jump into that and try it out. You have other people that are really hesitant and automatically jump to conclusions that it's not going to work because it's a change. So those things take time so if I was to provide anybody some advice over doing a different, another government models in terms of our country's provisions of services,

you need to create a buffer time in there and recognize that you will go through growing pains and go through headaches.

In short, the public administrators explained they were forced to make many adjustments over the years, which led to a seemingly constant state of flux. GOV Participant #1 noted the power of elected officials to set direction and the public administrators' growing pains associated with such changes, the varying level of acceptance and trepidation to change, and the extra time needed to adjust to change. The contractors did recognize the public administrators' struggle over the change in responsibilities:

Keeping in mind, I mean some area supervisors do very well at this, but there are also area supervisors that are put into this position and it's not really what they signed up for 15 years or 20 years ago. And I give them credit. They're hanging in there. They're trying to change with the time but they really want to be in the field. They want to be a part of the park operations, via backcountry or front country. I don't know if they're really turned on by contract management. (PFO Participant #2)

The PFO participants acknowledged the difficult transition the public administrators made, shifting from direct provider to contract monitor. The PFOs questioned whether some of the public administrators actually enjoyed monitoring contracts or if they would rather be on the ground, directly providing services. The PFO participants' comments reflected the public administrators' lack of power in determining their own role and responsibilities.

Most of the NGO representatives expressed their respect for civil servants dedicated to BC Parks. NGO Participant #3 recognized the "tough changes" public administrators experienced over time, including staff and budget cuts, which impacted upon their visibility in parks and decreased their morale overall. The

members of the NGOs also noted the power of elected officials to set the direction of and new initiative for BC Parks (such as lodges in parks). NGO Participant #2 explained:

But you have to remember, you have politicians and you have bureaucrats. And they are subject to direction from above. I know so many of these people and I know that they're squirming, I believe, under what's going on in parks today.

NGO Participant #2's comments revealed how most public administrators disagreed with the direction of BC Parks as set by the Liberal government and reflected the limited power of BC Parks' civil servants as compared to elected politicians. The relationship between public administrators and elected officials was strained. GOV Participant #4 commented:

We're basically a good news story for government, for the most part. But it's...the last five years has been really hard to sort of work with the Liberals, and get them to see the advantages of B.C. Parks, right? It's hard when you're competing against logging, and mining interests and other things, so...

The public administrator participants argued that elected officials were pre-occupied by other competing interests (i.e. resource extraction). The public administrators struggled to convince the politicians of the benefits and mandate of BC Parks, to which politicians seemed indifferent. The public administrators described the power of the elected officials to set the direction and priorities for BC Parks. First and foremost, they claimed, elected officials allocated funding to each Ministry:

I think it depends on politically who's in power, how Parks is perceived in terms of a priority. In government, there is always competition for money. The Ministry of Health and Education are the two big ones and the population is aging so their whole budget has grown astronomically, it's huge. So if you cap the tax rate and you've only got so much revenue, where's it going to come from? It's going to come from the other sectors. (GOV Participant #5)

Of course, budget allocations are inherently political. Public goods and services are all in competition for the finite amount of tax dollars to be distributed amongst the Ministries (i.e. Health, Education, and Environment). If Parks are not perceived as a priority by the elected officials, then participants argued funding will remain stagnant or decrease. While GOV Participant #5 noted the limited potential for funding from taxes, another source of revenue was user fees or cost reductions, which the Liberal government actively pursued.

Participants suggested the emphasis and priority of the goals of conservation and recreation changed depending upon the direction of the elected officials in power. In the 1990s, they argued, the NDP government more than doubled the size of the park system and an emphasis and funds were directed on land acquisition, while recreation took the back seat. Since the 2001 election of the Liberal party, the focus, they suggested, has shifted:

There have been concerns that the notion of providing quality business services had sort of been pushed to the side in the 1990s while building the Parks system from 6% up to almost 14% today in terms of park size. So the government now wants to see more around the people side of things, more around the business side of things, more around the economic contribution of Parks and that. (GOV Participant #1)

The Liberal Party's focus for BC Parks was visitor management, using a business approach and enhancing the economic contribution of parks. Furthermore, many public administrators explained that they were under fiscal pressure from the elected officials to cut deficiency payments in half and to eventually eliminate deficiency payments all together so as not to burden the tax payers.

The participants voiced their concern about the Liberal government's aim to generate revenue through BC Parks. GOV Participant #4 divulged that the Premier's Office phoned and announced that the decision had been made that parking meters would be installed in certain provincial parks and "to make it happen", which allowed no time for public consultation. GOV Participant #5 expressed his concerns with this policy:

A lot of the changes that have come in Parks since about 2001 come directly from sort of the Premier's Office. It's been a big push, so the Fixed Roof policy is a big initiative. The new challenge is to increase attendance by 20% by 2010.

The plan to eliminate deficiency payments, the installation of the parking meters and the proposed Fixed Roof policy reflects the gross power imbalance between elected officials and public administrators. GOV Participant #1, however, felt these sorts of policies made no difference to his job:

It's interesting that, it doesn't matter which, it doesn't matter what governments is in charge. The business of managing Parks is protecting remains relatively constant through that process. Your business of twenty, thirty, ten years ago, is very similar to that of business of today. We might do things in a little bit of a different, but the outcome of what we're trying to manage to remains sort of constant through that.

It should be noted this perception was distinctly different from his colleagues who I interviewed for this study.

All told, the public administrators' experience with BC Parks was characterized by being passionate about parks yet powerlessness to elected officials. The constant reorganization of BC Parks' staff, budget, and associated roles and responsibilities caused the public administrators a great deal of growing pains. Furthermore, the majority of the public administrators interviewed disagreed

with the direction of BC Parks as set by the Liberal Provincial Government.

Nevertheless, the public administrators of BC Parks were beholden to the elected officials' policies.

#### 5.4 Protecting BC Parks from the Liberals: The NGOs' Perspective on Park Governance

The NGO representatives' passion for BC Parks was palpable. While each research participant had specific interests in the management and use of BC Parks, it was their deep passion and dedication for BC Parks that held them together as a group. NGOs represent a variety of citizen interests in parks.

In 1991, the NDP Provincial Government announced its plan to double the size of BC Parks to reach the UN goal of preserving 12% of one's land base in protected areas (Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks, 2000). In 1997, due to the vast expansion of the size of the BC Parks system, the Minister of the Environment of the NDP government appointed a panel of nine experts (including NGO Participants #2 and #3) to meet with citizens around the province to offer the Government recommendations regarding the long-term vision of the planning and management of BC Parks. The NGO representatives I interviewed highlighted the BC Parks Legacy Project as the pinnacle of good governance in the recent history of BC Parks. As NGO Participant #3 described:

People had strong feelings and to me as I said earlier, it became really clear that people in British Columbia have a passion about the parks. They care deeply about them. They want to see them properly cared for. They want to see them properly managed. They want to ensure they remain public assets, a public good.

The BC Parks Legacy Project represented the will of the citizens to keep parks publicly owned without any commercialization. NGO Participant #2 considered the Parks Legacy to be “the most open and comprehensive public participation process regarding BC Parks”. The Legacy Project (1999) articulated the residents of British Columbia’s vision statement for BC Parks:

British Columbia is distinguished by its globally significant natural diversity and magnificent natural landscapes. Publicly owned protected areas are the nucleus of this legacy. These lands and waters preserve, in perpetuity, representative examples of the province’s natural diversity in naturally evolving ecosystems. These special places also protect associated recreational and cultural heritage values that embody the close relationship that we, as British Columbians, have with our environment. Our identity as a people and our sense of place are inherently linked to the long-term sustainability of the values that our protected areas system represents (pg. iv).

The importance of environmental protection is present throughout the entire vision statement. The priority is placed upon “publicly owned protected areas” and followed by “recreational and cultural heritage values”. Furthermore the vision statement articulated how the identity of BC residents is clearly linked to the environment and its long-term protection.

The NGO representatives were in favour of the NDP’s green policies and consultation with the public. Thus, despite some minor cutbacks to budget and staff to BC Parks, the NGO representatives were largely pleased with the policies and actions of the NDP government throughout the 1990s, the predecessors to the current Liberal Government.

#### 5.4.1 “BC is Open for Business”

Accordingly, the interviewed NGO participants felt the governance of BC Parks worsened with the election of the Liberal Party in 2001. They rejected the Liberal Party's decision to “open BC up for business”. Since 2001, the members of the NGOs observed, in their view, the erosion of environmental standards, the protection of sensitive landscapes, and their democratic voice and subsequent influence in park governance. To the NGO members' dismay, the “neo-conservative” Liberals failed to implement the recommendations of the BC Parks Legacy Project, choosing instead to forward significant business-oriented projects for BC Parks without public consultation. The NGO members admonished the Liberal government for adopting the attitude that “Parks should pay for themselves” and generate revenue (i.e. “Parks for Profit”). The policy direction of the Liberal government, in their view, changed the face of BC Parks. The sub-themes of the NGOs are placed in quotations, since the NGOs were primarily reactive against the Liberal Government's policies.

Because the findings of the BC Parks Legacy Project coincided with a change in government, the newly elected Liberal government did not implement the majority of the recommendations; it was not their initiative. The fiscally conservative Liberal government formed The Recreation Stewardship Panel, which investigated potential revenue generation venues in BC Parks (i.e. feasibility and potential rates for wood and parking) through consultation with certain NGOs. The Recreation Stewardship Panel was instructed to conduct their investigation using

the Liberal's vision for the future of British Columbia's fish, wildlife and park recreation:

Fish, wildlife and park resources continue to be deeply treasured by British Columbians and are a cornerstone of the provincial tourism economy. The province is renowned for its expanding world class outdoor recreation opportunities. Services that support outdoor recreation are supported by the users and are delivered through a variety of public, private, not-for-profit sector and first nation partners and have direct links to local communities. Conservation and protection of British Columbia's fish, wildlife and parks are not diminished by recreational users and are a showcase to the world of British Columbia's commitment to sustainable resource management (Recreation Stewardship Panel, 2002, p.11).

Despite the well-documented citizen held vision of BC Parks, the Liberal government set its own vision for BC Parks, which included reductions in budget and staff and a move toward a greater privatization of BC Parks. The rhetoric used by the Liberal government illustrates the political dogma of neo-conservatism (Shultis, 2003). The importance of the economy and fiscal conservatism is present throughout the entire vision statement. Moreover, there exists a motif of growth regarding the economy (increasing tourism) and outdoor recreation opportunities.

The first sentence of the vision statement has two distinct recognitions: (1) BC residents "deeply treasure' the environment" (fish, wildlife and park resources) and (2) the environment's contribution to the economy. Furthering the neo-conservatism ideals of reduced budgets and fewer government expenditures and staff, the vision statement suggests increased user fees to fund management ("services that support outdoor recreation are supported by the users") and partnerships with private and not-for-profit agencies (Shultis, 2003). The odd sentence structure of the last statement suggested to me the Liberal Government's

primary interest is in the use function of protected areas over sustainable resource management. Thus in spite of internal and external research demonstrating that BC residents value preservation over the use function of parks (BC Parks Legacy Project, 1999; BC Parks, 1995), the Liberal Government's vision statement reversed the order of priority as expressed by residents.

NGO Participants #2 and #3 perceived The Recreation Stewardship Panel's report as relatively worthwhile, but lacked the broad scope and public participation of the Legacy Project. Members of the NGO community expressed how privatization was ideologically driven by elected officials. NGO Participant #3 questioned the longer term ramifications of the privatization model for BC Parks:

I think this whole move about contracting out was part of it initially, but might have been driven by a budgeting perspective. But I think some of it was driven from a philosophical perspective. I think that the government of the day was committed to the idea of contracting out, but you know, some governments tend to be more in favour of the government taking the lead, government doing the bulk and providing the bulk services when it comes to things like public assets like BC Parks. But others philosophically tend to be more committed to contracting out, believing that's a more efficient and cheaper way to go. There may be efficiencies, but the debate is still open as to whether it's the right way or not in terms of the long-term health, and the long term good of the parks system. (NGO Participant #3)

NGO Participant #3 noted how outsourcing services to private companies was traditionally valued as a means of increasing efficiency, yet privatization was ultimately an ideological push to further shift responsibilities from the government to the private sector. His comments suggested he was not convinced contracting out was the "right way" of managing the long-term health and good of BC Parks. Furthermore, the NGO representatives interviewed stated loud and clear that BC Parks have always been understaffed and underfunded:

British Columbia has almost 14 million hectares of protected area, yet where we are in terms of Rangers where we are in terms of funding, where we are in terms of staff, is amongst the lowest of all protected area systems, not only in Canada, but in North America. (NGO Participant #4)

The NGO participants expressed their belief that BC Parks had always been “hurting” for resources. NGO Participant #3 explained how doubling the size of the protected area system in BC Parks was a monumental achievement, yet the NDP offered no corresponding increase in budget or staff for park management. The situation was further intensified by the election of the 2001 Liberal government and its 30% cuts to BC Parks’ staff and budget. NGO Participants #1 asserted that a minimal level of staff and funding negatively affected the government’s capacity to “properly steward the resources in British Columbia”. The NGO representatives’ conviction that BC Parks was chronically underfunded and understaffed reflected their passion yet sense of powerlessness to affect the governance of BC Parks.

A repercussion of the Liberal government’s staff and budgetary reduction to BC Parks was the elimination of all interpretation programs in the parks. NGO Participant #1 pointed out that British Columbia and Mississippi were the only jurisdictions in North America without any park interpretation programs. One NGO, BC Nature, took the initiative to apply for a grant from Service Canada to hire staff and run interpretation programs in a number of BC Parks in cooperation with the PFOs. Unfortunately, since interpretation is no longer considered a career job, and due to the uncertainty of funding, members of the NGO community noted that the quality of the interpretation programs had decreased. NGO Participant #5 believed that “interpretation is the heart of the park system”. NGO Participants #1 and #5

articulated their position that park interpretation helps foster environmental stewardship in visitors, which is a core function of parks, and thus needs financial stability from government. All of the NGO representatives commented on how interpretation programs helped create memorable experiences for park visitors and their hope that government funded interpretation programs would one day return. Despite the NGOs passion for interpretation in parks, they were unable to convince elected officials of the value and necessity of government-funded programs, furthering their sense of powerlessness.

#### 5.4.2 "Parks Should Pay for Themselves"

The further reduction of BC Parks' funding and number of employees mystified many of the members of NGOs interviewed since they believe that parks do pay for themselves. NGO Participants #1, #2, and #3 had reached this conclusion from a government funded study regarding the Economic Benefits of Parks:

There's a 2001 report that's called the "The Economic Value of British Columbia's Provincial Parks" and it looks at for every dollar invested by the provincial government is nearly \$10 that are producing visitor expenditures, largely going into outlining communities that are surrounding parks. So far from being an economic drag on the economy, parks, aside from creating valuable eco-system services that are really immeasurable in some ways through the economic ends, they actually create a lot of money that's going into nourishing local communities. (NGO Participant #1)

The findings of the government funded study indicated parks do pay for themselves by stimulating the local economies surrounding parks. Moreover, parks add 'immeasurable ecosystem services,' which relate to functions in the environment that are important to all members of society, such as clean water and air. NGO

Participant #3 was confounded by the Liberal's staff and budget cuts to BC Parks since he perceived the economic contribution of parks are in line with the Liberal's political direction to stimulate the economy, and thus investing in parks is investing in the economy. Nevertheless, under the political direction of "opening BC up for business", the NGO representatives perceived the Provincial Government not only requiring parks to be self-sufficient, but also to be sources of profit. However, my analysis earlier in the thesis shows that the parks are not financially self-sufficient and do not create much profit for the operators.

#### 5.4.3 "Parks for Profit"

With a focus on efficiency, cost savings and private sector involvement, the NGO participant feel the Liberals were pushing the vision that parks should not only pay for themselves but are also great sources of potential profit. According to NGO Participant #1, such an approach has detrimental effects to the ecological integrity of the park. She believed parks were a public good – thus valuable to all members of society – and needed to be under the protection and management of the government, not private companies. NGO Participant #1 discussed Pinecone Provincial Park, which was a proposed area for hydro-electrical independent power projects, run by private companies, as examples of the difference between public goods and private profit. The proposed hydro-electrical power plant in Pinecone Provincial Park would have resulted in splitting a 'Class A' wilderness park in half, to accommodate the hydro-electrical power house and transmission lines. She explained:

I think what almost happened in the Pinecone Park, is a real reflection on the difference between public and private, that for a private company which stood to make a billion dollars from the energy purchase agreement which is extremely lucrative, it made perfect financial sense when you're only looking at it through that narrow lens to put a power line through the park and put power houses in important wild salmon habitat. But if you look at that through a public policy lens and a public good, then you'd weigh the economics in one hand and the public good on the other hand, and when you weigh them you'd realize that the public good was more important. I'm a firm believer that there are some things that are too important to give away to corporations, that are too important to give away to private stock promoters and that's what a lot of these guys are and I would argue very strongly that our rivers and parks are something that are too important to give away.

One's ideology helps to define perceptions of public goods and service, and the roles of the government and the private sector. Ideology can thus be conceptualized as the lens in which you see parks and their many values and uses. According to the NGO representatives in this study, the Liberals view BC Parks through an economics lens while they themselves use an environmental lens. Therefore, the Liberal Government's focus became private profit rather than the NGOs' focus on the health of the public good of parks. NGO Participant #1 viewed parks as a public good that ought to be protected ecosystems in which citizens can recreate responsibly. Opening up parks for private exploitation of resources, in the view of the NGO participants, was not in line with the mandate of conservation and recreation. NGO Participants #1 and #2 believed the Liberal government's focus on profit trumped the ecological integrity of parks. Their concerns were validated by my discussion with a public administrator working for BC Parks in which GOV Participant #1 offered the following observation:

I should mention that industry and others are ones that I think we need to do a much better job of forming relationships with, and in exchange, we need industry, such as forestry and mining, to recognize the importance of the protected system so that they can continue to undertake their business.

GOV Participant #1 was a “negative case”, in this sense, whose opinions differed from the majority of the other public administrators interviewed. His comments reflected the will of the Liberal Government, and the fears of the members of the NGOs and many BC Parks civil servants.

All of the NGO participants commented on the Liberal government’s “parks for profit” vision, which involved installing parking meters in provincial parks, and accepting proposals for the construction of resorts inside provincial parks, both without consulting the residents of British Columbia. NGO Participant #1 was outraged at the Liberal Government’s initiatives for BC Parks, the lack funding and staff, and lack of public participation:

The government has turned its back on parks, cut Park Rangers, cut park staff, reduced the park budget, and then of course, in 2003 and 2004, introduced parking meters into 41 of the most popular Provincial parks with no consultation with the public. And about two years ago the BC government was contemplating putting in resorts and lodges. Parks for profit. And again they did this with no public consultation.

The elected officials’ decisions regarding resorts in BC Parks infuriated the public and NGOs as described by NGO Participants #1-4 in the interviews. NGO Participants #2 explained how the potential for the commercialization of BC Parks was dramatically increased when the Liberal government passed new legislation to allow park boundary adjustments to be made by the Minister of the Environment, rather than being passed by Cabinet (West Coast Environmental Law, 2003). He articulated how the legislation change increased industry’s access to extract or use

the parks' resources (i.e. forestry, mining, tourism) and thus undermined the long-term protection of parks.

The privatization of parks further concerned NGO Participants #1 because, in her view, it resulted in a decrease in access to information. More and more a private company's information was considered propriety information, she argued, which was not publicly available and which lowered the government's accountability to citizens. NGO Participant #1 explained how the Commissioner's Office certified eight environmental organizations' complaint of systematic discrimination with regards to accessing information about BC Parks through Freedom of Information requests. The Ministry of Environment was instructed to write a yearly report demonstrating timely interactions with environmental groups. But NGO Participant #1 noted no improvements.

#### 5.4.4 Diminished Democracy

The NGO representatives in this research project noted a loss of power, control and voice in the management of BC Parks due to increasing private sector involvement, which, in their estimation, negatively affected the environment and reduced public participation and government accountability and transparency. For example, NGO Participants #1, #2, and #4 discussed how there were over five hundred rivers staked by private companies to develop hydro-electrical independent power projects. The NGO representatives referenced a section of Bill 30 introduced by Government which took away local municipalities' zoning authority (BC NDP, 2006). Furthermore, it affected the public participation process, required by law, by

allowing such processes to be conducted by the private companies proposing the project:

We can't, as an environmental community and even as a public, see each one of these projects as a one off. We just don't have the resources, we don't have the time. It's something very, very wrong with the process. (NGO Participant #1)

NGO Participant #1 expressed her dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of the process for public input regarding private companies developing hydro-electrical projects, given that the rivers are publicly owned as a public good. The privatization model of BC Parks negatively affected the process, she argued. My interview with GOV Participant # 3, a public administrator responsible for the public participation process of Pinecone Burke, was surprised by this opinion:

I was really taken by surprise because I saw my role as being sort of an objective facilitator of a process, right. I'm there to make sure the process happens, to observe what people have got to say to take that information back to the decision-makers and that's that way a public open house of this kind is supposed to run. I give them a chance to say what they want to say and I take that information into consideration. What surprised me was that people expected the Parks Agency to be acting at the open house as advocates for the park. Like they wanted us to be standing up in opposition to the proponent's proposal. To me as a public servant, that seems like a completely inappropriate role, but that was a very, very strong public expectation at these meetings and as a result park staff came in for quite a lot of well, abuse I guess it would fair to say. And then there was a lot of criticism about how the process was designed and this is one of things that may be relevant to the whole outsourcing discussion possibly, is that we, the way our policy is structured at this time, the onus for developing and carrying out the public consultation process is on the private proponent. So BC Parks doesn't really have a role in saying, thou shall talk to these people in this fashion and report in this manner. It's go do whatever you feel is appropriate and we'll assess whether or not it's in fact inadequate. So we have an accountability at the end of the day to assess whether or not something has been adequate, but we don't have a role at that front end for saying what we think that adequate thing would be, right. So there was a bit of a disconnect there and again, the public were very dismayed by that structure and they thought that as the responsible government agency,

BC Parks, should have a very hard and firm role in dictating what the consultation process would be. And I guess what I found is that at the end of the day, we were in fact, expected to be accountable to the public for how the public consultation process was designed, but we didn't have a role in the front end in designing the public consultation process.

NGO participants argued the public participation process depended upon the will of the Provincial Government. The Liberal Government's policy required the private proponent to administer the public participation process, with the BC Parks' public administrators charged with assessing the adequacy of the proponent's efforts and relaying information back to the 'decision-makers'. However, the NGO participants expected the public administrators to be 'advocates' for the park, standing in 'opposition' to the private proponent's suggestion to build transmission lines through the park. The civil servants had no role in designing the public consultation process, yet the public held the administrators accountable for the process. GOV Participant #3 noted the massive disconnect between the public's expectations of the process of public participation and how the Liberal Government had it structured. Thus, the NGOs are subject to the authority and will of the elected officials. GOV Participant #4 further elaborated on the power of the elected officials to dictate public participation processes:

With the NGOs it's an interesting relationship, because the first level that I see is the relationship they have with the government overall. So even before you get into the parks business, it's how do they precede the government of the day? So, when we had the NDP in power, it would be a different relationship than when you had the Liberals now in power. So, that's the first level is how did the NGOs relate to the government of the day? The second level is how do they relate to us in terms of being part of the Ministry? I think there's a number of different ways they approach it. (GOV Participant #4)

The degree of public participation, argued the NGO participants, depended upon the elected officials' policies. The NGOs' relationships with the elected officials and public administrators were subject to the government of the day. Both the members of the NGOs and the public administrators believed their relationship ranged from collaborative to adversarial, depending upon the specific organization. Certain NGOs focused their efforts on collaboration and dialoguing with BC Parks' civil servants and the Minister of Environment. Other NGOs were activist-oriented organizations that, through the media, were openly critical of government policies negatively affecting the environment. As a result, the latter NGO participants found civil servants and elected officials were reluctant to meet with them. Many NGO participants believed the wide spectrum of NGOs in BC served a variety of purposes and interests and overall positively impacted government policy and practice. Yet the NGO representatives enunciated their perceptions regarding an overall lack of public participation and their concerns regarding increased private sector involvement in the environment under the Liberal Government:

I think the public's being removed from the picture nearly completely. Yes, democracy's messy, it's slow sometimes. It's arduous, and you don't always get the results that you want and sometimes it's not efficient for business. But it's the best system we have for accountability and transparency and for protecting civil rights, and for protecting the public good and you just see the, for instance, the environmental assessment process, it was weakened in 2002, the budget was cut, you had fewer staff that was able to enforce the Act, and you also had public participation almost removed - meaningful public participation, removed and I think you can see that nearly across British Columbia and across, you can see that right across British Columbia that the government said that you're okay for business and that meant reducing environment red tape in many places and also getting the public out of the way. If the BC government thought it was right for the province, then it didn't matter a good god damn, what people said, it's happening, and

that's often cloaked in greater efficiency, but it also, usually works against democracy. (NGO Participant #1)

NGO Participant #1 believed the Liberal government's focus on efficiency and private sector involvement lowered the tenets of democracy, namely public participation, accountability and transparency. Members of the NGOs asserted that BC Parks are owned by the citizens of the province and intended for environmental protection and appropriate recreational uses, irrespective of the fiscal bottom. Thus, under the direction of the NGO described "neo-conservative" Liberal government, efficiency trumped democratic processes. Nevertheless, the NGOs' passion for BC Parks brought them together to protest the proposed lodges in parks:

The environmental groups all came together as a sort of parks council. We fought that thing and that, I think it was a marketplace that decided that it wasn't a good idea. Because out of the 12 that they took forward, they only had four proposals and they're the ones that we actually fought. So really, when you look at the park lodges then, it failed and I have been told by government that they won't carry on with it. So that was, to us, a pretty major win. (NGO Participant #2)

A window of opportunity was when the government introduced parking meters. It pissed people off, got them enraged – it just bugged the hell out of people. And then another window of opportunity was when they wanted to put lodges and resorts again with no public consultation in parks and again that pissed people off that they weren't consulted in. People wrote letters to their papers, they talked to their friends, they talked to their neighbours, they talked to their mayors. The week when the government made the announcement to come out to put lodges and resorts in parks and it caused absolutely a media storm in the province, then they cooled their heels on that fairly quickly. (NGO Participant #1)

And so, despite conflicts between different organizations (i.e. acceptability of hunting or motorized recreation in parks) and a powerful Liberal Government with a vision to further privatize BC Parks and minimize public participation, the NGOs

were successfully able to inform and mobilize citizens to end the Fixed Roof Accommodation Policy.

The members of the NGOs' shared a sense of passion for parks yet felt powerlessness and mistrust towards the Liberal Provincial Government. While under the NDP Provincial Government, the NGOs agreed with their policies and actions and were often consulted regarding park management. However under the Liberal Provincial Government, a new vision for BC Parks evolved: parks went to be self-sufficient through budget and staff cuts, and parking meters, and furthermore, requiring parks to generate profit through private resource extraction (enabled due to a change in BC Parks Act). The obliteration of the Fixed Roof Accommodations policy represented the NGOs' only example of empowerment under the rule of the Liberal Government.

## 5.5 Conclusion

The PFOs chose to follow their passion for parks by running the front country services for BC Parks. However, they felt underappreciated and undervalued by BC Parks' staff; they felt undertaking such a service contract had many risks which gave way to a sense of low job security. Furthermore, the contract stipulations meant limited potential for PFOs to increase their income. Despite BC Parks' urges for PFO investment in capital expenditures, the PFOs strongly believed the cost-benefit analysis did not allow this to occur. The PFOs noted the vast power imbalance between them and the BC Parks' staff. Their relationship was characterized by a deep sense of mistrust.

The BC Parks' public administrators described their passion for parks and they believed their efforts were positively contributing to society. However, they were subject to ongoing growing pains due to changes in elected officials causing fluctuations in budget and staff levels. The public administrators had begun as the direct service providers themselves and evolved into the role of contract management of bigger companies, requiring more knowledge of business management. The power of the Provincial Government reduced the public administrators' ability to influence the direction and management of BC Parks.

The members of the NGOs had experienced a decade of an NDP Provincial Government who doubled the size of the protected areas of BC Parks and welcomed public participation and documented the citizens' vision for BC Parks' management. However, in 2001, a new Liberal Provincial Government was elected who drastically cut the budget and staff numbers of BC Parks including funding for interpretation programs. Furthermore, the new Government introduced Bill 84 (thus potentially increasing private sector's access to resource extraction), parking meters in popular provincial parks, and the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal, all of which without any public consultation. The actions of the Provincial Government regarding BC Parks greatly differed from that of the documented citizens' vision for BC Parks. The NGO representatives' moment of hope arose when the Provincial Government quietly decided against the implementation of the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal. The members of the NGOs believed it was their efforts of informing and mobilizing citizens against the proposal, which the Provincial Government listened.

The interviews revealed the park stakeholders' sense of passion and powerlessness and mistrust, which not surprisingly had implications on how they viewed governance. The sense of powerlessness indicates they are not full participants in the governance process. Using the findings from the document analysis and the themes which emerged from the interviews, I will now analyze the implications of BC Parks' outsourcing model on governance.

## CHAPTER SIX: PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNANCE IN BC PARKS

### 6.1 Outline

The purpose of the case study research was to explore the perceived implications of an outsourcing model on governance by members of three groups: government employees of BC Parks, private contractors, and members of conservation and recreation non-governmental organizations. This next chapter of the results will present and briefly describe the results of the core research questions: (1) What are the stakeholders' perceptions of the implications of BC Parks' outsourcing model on governance? (2) How do the stakeholder groups perceive themselves and each other? and (3) How does the role of monitoring within the outsourcing model and the concept of governance?

### 6.2 Perceived Implications of BC Parks' Outsourcing Model

First and foremost, I was investigating how the government employees of BC Parks, the PFOs, and members of non-governmental organizations perceived the implications of BC Parks' outsourcing model of service delivery on the five principles of governance: legitimacy and voice, direction, performance, accountability and fairness.

#### 6.2.1 Legitimacy & Voice: Public Participation & Consensus-Orientated Decision Making

The principle of legitimacy and voice is characterized by the approaches used for public participation and the degree of consensus-oriented decision-making.

Public participation means all people should have a voice in decision-making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their interests (UNDP, 1997). Consensus-oriented decision-making is the ability to mediate differing interests to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the group (UNDP, 1997).

When asked about public participation, two of the public administrators explained the importance and power of the elected officials in determining the importance and processes for public participation and consensus-orientation in decision making (as discussed by GOV Participant #4, on pg.121). The processes used for public participation under the NDP Government greatly differed from those of the Liberal Government.

The Liberal Government set a policy that private proponents interested in developing hydro-electrical projects in parks were to administer the public participation process themselves, and public administrators were to assess the level of adequacy of the process (as discussed by GOV Participant #3 on page 120). The citizens of British Columbia strongly disagreed with this policy for public participation and felt the public administrators should be driving the process as opposed to the private proponents. NGO Participant #1 was at the public participation meetings regarding a proposed hydro-electrical project in a provincial park, and asked a BC Parks staff member "Who's in charge of this process? This process about public lands, about public parks and about wild salmon and they [BC

Parks staff] said the [private] proponent is.” The quote reflects the disapproval of the private company driving the public participation process regarding public goods.

The NGO representatives lamented there were no public participation opportunities regarding the introduction of parking meters in parks and the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal announcement (as discussed by NGO Participant #1 on pg.118). The NGO members articulated a markedly low level of public participation and consensus-orientation decision-making in BC Parks. Conversely, under the NDP Government of the 1990s, the NGO members described a higher level of public participation as demonstrated by the BC Parks’ Legacy Project (as discussed by NGO Participant #3 and 4).

My interviews with members of NGOs and the public administrators revealed the level of public participation, degree of influence, and access to information greatly depended upon the NGO. The continuum of NGOs varied from collaborative and dialogue-focused (i.e. BC Nature) to NGOs who are sharply critical of government policy, activist-based and organize protests (i.e. Wilderness Committee). Through my interviews, I concluded that the collaborative-focused NGOs had higher levels of interaction with elected officials and public administrators (as compared with activist NGOs). NGO Participant #2 belonged to a collaborative NGO, and commented:

I’m an activist, but I prefer to do it with dialogue, letters and common sense rather than, I’ve never stood in one of these protests. I meet with the minister of environment and other ministers, depending on the issue.

Whereas NGO Participant #1 was a member of an activist based NGO, and commented:

We're an activist organization and we don't hold our punches when it comes to criticism on the government. We value strong environmental standards over cozy a relationship with government. We'll be critical where warranted and we'll do it through media, because that's one of the more effective means of communication and educating our members... which can create hostile relationships with governments and that makes them much less likely to meet with you and share information.

The PFOs' role in public participation was limited. Their experiences were focused on customer service with visitors and working with volunteer groups at the park level, within the rules and regulations of BC Parks. PFO Participant #1 shared his perspective:

I would say our main focus is just dealing with parks and their partners – lots of volunteer groups that want to come out and feel it's their park. So it's - we're there sitting at the table with them in lots of different meetings. But we're actually not dealing directly, besides BC Nature. That's probably our biggest group that we deal with because they're very interested in ensuring that interpretive programs continue to run.

The PFOs explained that administering public participation was not their role, but rather the role of BC Parks.

#### 6.2.2 Direction: Strategic Vision

The principle of direction is based on the criteria of strategic vision. Good strategic vision involves leaders and citizens having a broad and long-term perspective on good governance, along with a sense of what is need for such development, as well as an understanding of the historical, cultural and social complexities in which that perspective is grounded (UNDP, 1997).

The Liberal Government introduced their vision for the future of British Columbia's fish, wildlife and park recreation which illustrated their focus on the economic benefits of parks and fiscal conservatism (as discussed on pg. 112). Furthermore, the Liberal Government proposed and passed the BC legislature Statute 84 in 2003, which granted power to the Minister of Environment to adjust park boundaries, rather than having such changes done by Cabinet (West Coast Environmental Law, 2003). All of the NGO representatives and a few of the public administrators expressed concern that Statute 84 would increase the potential for private industry to extract park resources (i.e. forestry, mining, and hydro-electrical projects) and weakened the protection of parks. Two members of the NGOs in particular worried about the "long-term health of BC Parks" under the outsourcing model and under the Liberal Government (as discussed on pg. 113).

Public Administrator #1 left me with the impression he did not feel powerless or a sense of mistrust towards the Liberal Government since his vision of BC Parks was in line with the Liberal mandate (pg. 118). All interviewed public administrators (except one) expressed their apprehension regarding the Liberal Government's changes regarding BC Parks, such as the introduction of parking metres, the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal without prior public consultation and the amendments to park legislation.

The PFOs and public administrators perceived the shift to the bundle model in 2003 resulted in BC Parks wanting more business-focused, with more sophisticated, larger companies running the bundles.

Now we sort of come into this new model 5 years ago where we asked for a more sophisticated, business-like operator. So they have bigger bundles of parks, they have more revenue that they're capturing within their contracts. They have to hire more staff, have more infrastructure and resources, so you truly need to be a good business person to be able to run that type of operation. (GOV Participant #4)

However, PFO Participant #1 feared it could potentially result in PFOs without the deep passion for parks (as discussed on pg. 99). Despite the Liberal's "open for business" mantra, the PFOs felt there existed many constraints to successfully operating their businesses and the limited potential for increased personal revenue which was compounded by the BC Parks' staff lack of business sense (discussed on pages 98-99 by PFO Participants #1 and #2).

This research revealed that the strategic vision for BC Parks is under debate by the stakeholder groups. The park staff appeared to be willing to accept the current model, but were concerned for the future of BC Parks under the direction of the Liberal Government. The PFOs wanted the current outsourcing model to continue with refinements that would enable them more flexibility and autonomy to run their business successfully. The NGO representatives wanted (1) increases to the BC Parks' budget, (2) more government employees, (3) an increased park staff presence in parks, (4) strengthened legislation for the protection of parks, (5) no commercialization in parks; and (6) limit or remove extraction of park resources by private industry.

### 6.2.3 Performance: Responsiveness, Effectiveness, Efficiency

The UNDP (1997) judges performance according to three governance criteria: responsiveness to stakeholders, effectiveness and efficiency of operations.

Responsiveness occurs when institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders using a proactive manner regarding complaints and public criticisms. Effectiveness involves the capacity to realize organizational objectives. Efficiency refers to making the best use of resources or the capability of acting or producing effectively with a minimum amount or quantity of waste, expense or unnecessary effort (UNDP, 1997).

#### 6.2.3.1 Responsiveness

The public administrators and the PFOs expressed their belief regarding a high level of responsiveness, which was attributed to the PFOs' focus on customer service:

If it is a complaint about a day-use site, or it's a complaint about a campground, we ask that the PFOs respond. The PFOs need to manage that as part of the models, part of the business delivery model. We'll hear about it if it's not done to customer satisfaction. And again, it goes back to my comments that PFOs want to keep their customers, because the more customers they have, the better the business. The more money they make. So I think there's a combined interest to ensure that customer satisfaction is acknowledged and dealt with. (GOV Participant #1)

It has to be timely. We represent our company. We represent the province. So we'd want to handle this in the most professional way possible (PFO Participant #2)

GOV Participant #1's comments revealed the perception that the PFOs' focus on customer service resulted in increased profit – however the PFOs debunked those statements as myths in their interviews and this was confirmed by the FORUM Report (2008). The PFO's comments revealed the pride in his job and to be representing the province, and the importance of timely responses to visitors.

Conversely, some of the NGOs and two of the PFOs' discussed the inaccessibility of the BC Parks' Agency staff. The PFOs commented:

Yeah, I'd say that we handle over 99% of the interactions with the public. BC Parks does not have a person to get in touch in my town and people, unless they already know the person, they can't get in touch with them. I'm the contact. Even if it's an issue with BC Parks that they have to deal with, basically they come to me and I pass it on for these groups (PFO Participant #3).

We're the ones that are dealing face to face, on the phones talking to people (PFO Participant #1).

It appeared the BC Parks staff were much less accessible to the visitors and the public in comparison to the PFOs.

#### 6.2.3.2 Effectiveness

BC Parks employees conduct Key Performance Indicators assessments and satisfaction surveys, as well as collect monthly and annual financial statements, attendance statistics, and comment cards. The public administrators, the PFOs and the FORUM Report (2008) referenced the high level of visitor satisfaction and low operating cost as evidence of effectiveness. GOV Participant #1 said;

The public, through the satisfaction surveys that we do, are still very satisfied. The ratings are as high, if not higher, than when we were doing it.

The majority of the NGO members interviewed commented on the high quality of visitor services provided by PFOs. NGO Participant #3 described how "there are some great PFOs who put a lot of heart and soul into their work and [that] the public sees that". Nevertheless, the members of the NGOs did not believe BC Parks had a high level of effectiveness. Every NGO representative noted the limited amount of government staff and budget allocations for BC Parks. NGO Participant

#1 (as discussed on pg. 115) posited there were too few staff members and too little budget to effectively steward the resources of BC Parks (which may suggest the resource protection goal may remain unfulfilled).

Furthermore, NGO Participants #1, 2, 3 were upset when the Liberal Government cut BC Parks' budget, which resulted in parks with low levels of visitation being shut down. NGO Participant #1 lamented:

you saw in the [Liberal Government's] first term that some parks that weren't Front Country, that didn't have PFOs were just closed down, that the water taps were turned off, the garbage cans were taken away and the park was shut because they weren't seen – if they couldn't squeeze a buck out of that particular park, they didn't see it as having a value. There was quite a bit of outrage about that and government backed off that a little bit because I think they underestimated how strongly British Columbians feel about the importance of our park system.

Many NGO Participants also commented on the lack of government funded interpretation programs and considered this an indication of a lack of effectiveness.

NGO Participant #5 said:

Interpretation programs create stewardship of parks' inherent ecological value and helps to make sure we have something to pass on to our children that's intact, an environmental legacy for future generations.

The lack of interpretation programs in BC Parks will be further explored in the next chapter.

#### 6.2.3.3 Efficiency

The public administrators and the PFOs interviewed adamantly expressed how BC Parks' outsourcing model has resulted in significant cost savings compared to the traditional direct delivery model by government employees:

Financially, we're probably better off. We probably saved the taxpayers a lot of money in terms of using the private sector to deliver. Now, there was a lot of work put into. (GOV Participant #1)

The public administrators and the PFOs reported the outsourcing model to be efficient and effective due to low levels of government staff and budget, and the flexibility of the private sector (compared with government's regulations).

Furthermore, since the switch from the park-by-park model to the bundle model in 2002, the PFOs have increased their economies of scale which has been conducive to increased efficiency, as noted in the FORUM Report (2008).

Despite the initial claims of increased efficiency; the public administrators also explained the drawbacks of the outsourcing model in regards to efficiency. Many public administrators indicated that there was an immense amount of time and effort spent by government staff in monitoring the PFOs, which negated cost savings:

A challenge that came out of that [switching to the bundle model], was more time required because now PFOs had to be bigger, more financially more mature business people because there were more operating now on very much a bigger area and all complexities that go with that. So just managing your personality HR issues was a big, you know, a big time commitment. So that drove costs up.

As for the NGO representatives, most of them hesitantly agreed that the outsourcing model had resulted in increased efficiency. Yet explained how efficiency came at the cost of decreased accountability, limited staff and budget, and potentially the long-term health of the parks system (as discussed by NGO Participants #1 on pages 122-123 and NGO Participants #3 on pg.117).

#### 6.2.4 Accountability: Accountability & Transparency

The governance principle of accountability is based on accountability and transparency to stakeholders. Accountability is the requirement that officials answer to stakeholders on the disposal of their powers and duties, act on criticisms or requirements made of them and accept responsibility for failure, incompetence or deceit (UNDP, 1997). Transparency is the sharing of information and acting in an open manner (UNDP, 1997).

The NGOs asserted that the elected officials had demonstrated a very low level of transparency by announcing the installation of parking meters in BC Parks and the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal with no warning or any prior public participation (pg.123).

The PFOs reported high levels of accountability and transparency with the government, since their financial information was shared with the public administrators. PFO Participant #2 discussed his financial information was shared with his area supervisor in a:

very transparent fashion in the sense that BC Parks are very interested in as much detail as possible. And again, I'm lucky that nobody's playing games with me because you feel a bit vulnerable.

The PFO's comments demonstrate that all financial information regarding his company is given to BC Parks.

However, a few NGO representatives and the PFOs and many public administrators explained that such financial information is considered proprietary information and is not openly shared with the other stakeholders. PFO Participant

#1 explained that “BC Parks shares the [visitor] statistical information but they’re not supposed to release any financial information of a company”. This regulation upset NGO Participant #1, she expressed that:

If you have a private company that is managing a public good but you don’t have access to the records, then how do you hold a decision-making body accountable if you can’t see the records and to be able to reflect and on whether they’re making wise choices that are in the public good for public parks or for our wild rivers?

The NGO representatives also commented on an overall lack of transparency. NGO Participant #4 discussed the lack of transparency regarding proponents’ request for access to crown lands for larger developments:

So we’re trying to be a little bit of a watchdog in that regard because so many of these things are coming forward and there really isn’t a clear public process for people to input into them. A lot of times, unless you were right there in the local community you didn’t even know that they were happening. Our members would like to have knowledge and awareness that things are being proposed in various areas of the province so that they could have input. Sometimes with the postings online, there’s incomplete information for the link to the components, or information it’s not active or not working properly or there will be amendments made and the amendments aren’t posted, so missing information.

These comments reflect a very low level of transparency, and the watchdog role of NGOs (however, the role is inhibited due to a lack of transparency).

FORUM’s (2008) final report included strong recommendations to improve, standardize and implement online financial tracking information of the PFOs, to enable comparisons, and further enhance accountability to the Ministry of Environment and the taxpayers.

### 6.2.5 Fairness: Equity & Rule of Law

Fairness deals with equity amongst stakeholders and the overall application of the rule of law. Equity is just treatment, requiring that similar cases are treated in similar ways. Application of the rule of law refers to legal frameworks being fair and enforced impartially.

The PFOs and the public administrators agreed that BC Parks represented an equitable situation for the residents of BC. GOV Participant #2 said:

We recognize that camping has got a social element to it. It is subsidized by government. It is still extremely good value for money. Our top rate right now I think is \$24 or \$25 per night. When you compare that to any other form of overnight accommodation it is still significantly cheaper than just about any other form of holiday.

Furthermore, the low cost of camping and low or no cost of entry to parks meant BC Parks were financially accessible to BC residents. Senior citizens were charged half price and people with disabilities' fees were waved.

There was a lack of consensus amongst NGO representatives regarding the perception of equity in BC Parks. The participants expressed: (1) the desire to abolish user fees in BC Parks; (2) negative experiences with senior citizens taking advantage of the discounts; and (3) equity was not discussed.

All of the PFOs and many the members of the NGOs asserted a low level of rule of law in BC Parks since the PFOs are not given the legal authority that gives them full enforcement capability and there is an insufficient number of park rangers to enforce the Parks Act (as noted by PFO Participant #3 on pages 100-101). The

public administrators did not address rule of law or the enforcement of the Parks Act in the interviews.

### 6.2.6 Overall Perceptions of Governance

The stakeholders' perceptions of governance were rooted in a sense of powerlessness and mistrust. The research demonstrated that perceptions of governance differed with each stakeholder group. To portray an overall sense of each stakeholder group's current perception of governance, I assigned one of three levels of satisfaction with BC Parks' adherence to the governance principle (low, medium, or high) presented in Table 13. The levels of satisfaction were drawn from the interview data. Certain principles of governance were not discussed explicitly with a stakeholder group, thus no level of corresponding satisfaction was assigned.

Table 13: Stakeholders' perceptions of governance in BC Parks

Principles of Governance	PFOs	Public Administrators	NGOs
Strategic Vision	Medium	Medium	Low
Efficiency	High	High	Medium
Effectiveness	High	High	Low
Responsiveness	High	High	Low
Public Participation	-	Medium	Low
Consensus-Orientation	-	Medium	Low
Accountability	High	Low	Low
Transparency	High	Low	Low
Equity	High	High	Medium
Rule of Law	Medium	-	Low

The stakeholder groups varied in their perceptions of the governance principles which demonstrates the value and importance of the principles of social constructionism; there is no one, objective and ultimate truth for all participants, but rather participants constructed their perceptions of the governance of BC Parks based on the co-created subjective meanings of their experiences. Interviewing three park stakeholder groups (as opposed to one group) yielded much richer data to better explain and understand the governance of BC Parks.

### 6.3 Stakeholder Relations

The second focus of my research was to determine how the stakeholder groups perceived their role in BC Parks and how they perceived each other.

#### 6.3.1 Government employees

The government employees of BC Parks perceived their role as monitoring the PFOs to ensure they were providing a high standard for visitor services and recreation opportunities in BC Parks. The public administrators described their satisfaction with the performance of the PFOs based on high levels of visitor satisfaction as evidenced by the annual survey. The NGOs were perceived as commentators and watchdogs to government's policies and actions.

#### 6.3.2 PFOs

The PFOs described themselves as the "face of BC Parks". Since park employees were rarely found in front country parks, the PFOs described the importance of their role in providing visitor services. The private contractors in BC

felt undervalued by the BC Parks employees and were frustrated regarding the lack of business sense in park employees. The PFOs work in collaboration with many NGO wanting to volunteer or recreate in the parks they managed. BC Nature and the PFOs hired and paid park interpreters to offer free environmental education programs to the public.

#### 6.3.5 Members of NGOs

The members of the NGOs positively regarded BC Parks employees. NGO Participant #2 described BC Parks employees as “the finest in North America”. Many of the NGOs sympathized with the difficult changes the park employees’ had experienced over the years (budget and staff cuts and reorganizations). While most of the NGO members also admired the good work of the PFOs, they also described the inherent flaws of business within a public model. The NGOs articulated how a business cannot remain stagnant and the PFOs can only see until the end of their contract.

The members of the NGOs compared and contrasted in their specific agendas for BC Parks and their approach to interacting and influencing government. The collaborative-focused NGOs can at times sit down with government and work out agreements. However, the activist-based NGOs often expressed their criticisms of government policies through the media to inform citizens, without the worry of ruining their relationship with government. The NGO representatives believed each organization had its role to play in BC Parks. And when they joined together (such as ending the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal) they were a force to be

reckoned with. The NGO representatives perceived their role as holding the government accountable for their actions, and to influence the direction of BC Parks to ensure environmental protection, equitable recreation opportunities and interpretation programs in parks.

#### 6.4 The Role of Monitoring

The final focus of my research was to investigate how the role of monitoring fits within the BC Parks' outsourcing model as well as the concept of governance. As discussed in Chapter 1, an agency's decision to outsource services does not relinquish the responsibility of management (Domberger & Jensen, 1997). BC Parks retains ownership of the lands as well as overseeing the management and delivery of visitor services in parks. The governance of BC Parks remains the responsibility of the BC Parks Agency, thus monitoring contractors is of pivotal importance.

BC Parks uses Key Performance Indicators to monitor the performance of PFOs. The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) evaluate eight areas: (1) visitor satisfaction, (2) state of the facilities, (3) financial performance, (4) PFO staff presence and appearance, (5) community involvement, (6) legal obligations, and (7) provision of additional services and the protection of natural and cultural values (Appendix E).

The FORUM (2008) Report concluded that both government employees and the PFOs perceived the KPI system of monitoring to be superior to the previous check-list type of monitoring. The FORUM Report suggested the Joint-Steering Committee continue to improve the system of monitoring by: (1) outlining the

expectations for each type of park experience<sup>6</sup>; (2) develop a report card style of evaluation using agreed-upon and explicit objectives; (3) moving towards PFO self-audit with third party audit too; and (4) standardizing financial templates for PFOs to submit required information which would enable comparisons.

The FORUM Report (2008) indicated the PFOs and the public administrators' intent to move towards a self-auditing form of monitoring daily operations (as well as scheduled third party audits). On one hand, I believe PFOs' self monitoring their daily operations in conjunction with the report card style monitoring has much potential to build trust and ameliorate the PFO-Government relationship. On the other hand, it further removes the BC Parks' staff from parks and decreases their connection to the visitors. BC Parks' staff must ensure sufficient level of monitoring in order to be accountable to the citizens of British Columbia regarding the state of provincial parks and the provided visitor services.

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<sup>6</sup> (1) long-stay destination, (2) adventure/wilderness, (3) overnight short-stay bedroom, and (4) day-use only.

## CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION

### 7.1 Introduction

The research findings are compared to the literature addressing privatization as well as the governance of parks and protected areas. The research findings revealed the importance of and the need to investigate the policy-administration literature to understand the governance of parks and protected areas. Furthermore, the idea of public-service motivation in contractors as a mitigating factor is explored. In conclusion, the role of political ideology and civic engagement are explored, as well as a reconceptualization of efficiency in BC Parks.


### 7.2 The Politics of the Governance of BC Parks

Governance is about power (who has influence?), relationships (who decides?), and accountability (how are decision-makers held accountable?) (IOG, 2007). According to participants, elected officials of the BC Provincial Government had considerable leverage over the management of BC Parks and its public administrators. The biggest imbalances appeared to involve contractors, public administrators, and elected officials. NGO members were able to inform and mobilize citizens to act against government policies and actions, to which elected officials in the Liberal Government responded (i.e. dropping the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal). Given that elected officials are supposed to reflect the will of the people, sensitivity toward civic engagement ought to be particularly important in managing public goods and services. These imbalances and instances

of mistrust speak to governance as a whole insofar as they influenced perceptions of and satisfaction with the current operating model. It suggests that in BC Parks, the elected officials hold the power while the public administrators, the PFOs and the members of the NGOs are not full members in the governance process.

Based on my findings, I propose the five principles of sound governance (Graham, et al., 2003) be re-arranged to demonstrate the influence of the elected political party to set the direction and management of parks and protected areas. From what I gathered from the interviews I conducted, the ideology of elected officials sets the direction for parks, which then guides and prioritizes the other governance principles. The current Liberal Government's strategic vision that "BC is open for business" resulted in a focus on efficiency, which lowered public participation and transparency (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: The Governance of BC Parks



While Graham et al.'s (2003) principles intuitively fit together, it is important to note that my research findings clearly demonstrated each UNDP (1997) principle as a distinct concept which needs investigation.

### 7.3 Implications of Outsourcing Model

The implications of an outsourcing model on parks and protected areas are now examined.

#### 7.3.1 Direction

Harland et al. (2005) asserted that if basic services are outsourced, government staff can focus their efforts on the core competencies of the strategic vision of the agency. While BC Parks has a dual mandate of conservation and recreation, I focused my research on visitor services. Government staff spent most of their time in contract monitoring and management. To assess Harland et al.'s

findings for the case study of BC Parks, I believe both the responsibilities of recreation and conservation need to be taken into account.

If many public services are outsourced, it can reduce government control, known as “privatization by stealth” (Harland, et al., 2005, pg. 839). Despite all front country services being outsourced in BC Parks, government control was not reduced as indicated by the sense of inferiority of PFOs to government employees. However in BC Parks, government control was reduced due to constant re-organization, staff and budget cuts and shifts in roles and responsibilities which resulted in decreased staff morale.

There exists minimal research regarding the implications of outsourcing government services on a public agency’s direction. I believe more research is needed regarding the impact of elected officials on the direction of public agencies and the relationship between politicians and administrators.

### 7.3.2 Performance: Responsiveness, Effectiveness, Efficiency

#### 7.3.2.1 Responsiveness

Customer service responsiveness was ameliorated under the outsourcing model (by the PFOs and public administrators). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) attribute the private sector’s superiority in responsiveness due to their focus on client satisfaction which was driven by their motivations for profit and contract renewal. In BC Parks, Osborne and Gaebler’s argument is incongruent. There is minimal potential for an increase in contractors’ profit. And the contractors

interviewed demonstrated their motivation for contract renewal to continue their passion for and careers in parks.

The findings suggested a decrease in government-related responsiveness issues due to the inaccessibility of BC Parks staff. This came as no surprise given that the use of the current management model resulted in the replacement of park staff employed by the government with park staff employed by the PFOs. So park visitors only see PFO staff during their visit.

This research shows a general lack of responsiveness by the current Liberal government in regard to provincial parks. The government has no procedure to enable the continuous monitoring of the success of the current park management model, other than by complaints, overall visitor use data, and the demands for deficiency payments. Evidently, the park profile in the current government is low, thereby giving the parks little attention at the cabinet table. One wonders if the current management model is inherently designed to give an overall low level of responsiveness.

#### 7.3.2.2 Effectiveness

Monitoring privatized services is essential in ensuring effective service delivery (Marvel & Marvel, 2007; Van Slyke, 2003; Glover 1999a). Conversely, the PFOs described their irritation regarding BC Parks' micro-management style of monitoring. The FORUM (2008) report indicated that the PFOs and the public administrators were moving towards BC Parks staff monitoring higher level trends, (such as visitor use trends) and a PFO-self-auditing system. This move may help

strengthen the trust between PFO and BC Parks staff but potentially create a further disconnect between BC Parks staff with the parks and the visitors.

Glynn and Murphy (1996) asserted that effectiveness includes not only the individual experience, but also the achievement of broader impact regarding the societal objectives of parks. The public administrators, the PFOs and the FORUM Report (2008) referenced the high level of visitor satisfaction as evidence of effectiveness. The NGO members (except one) also commented on the high quality of visitor services provided by PFOs. The NGO representatives however, were unconvinced of the effectiveness of BC Parks in achieving broader social impacts. The NGOs noted the lack of government-funded interpretation programs represented a core function of BC Parks as a means of fostering environmental stewardship in citizens.

Furthermore, the public administrators alluded to the negative impact on staff morale and effectiveness regarding the difficulties of constant agency re-organization, low levels of staff and budget, large area of lands to manage, and the labour intense responsibilities of contract management (which was also noted by two members of the NGOs, and in the FORUM Report, 2008).

Through my interviews and document analysis of budget allocations, it appeared to me that government is focused on running BC Parks with the absolute minimum level of cost to the consumer and the government. The outsourcing model appears to be effective in fulfilling this goal. However, the PFOs only operate in some of the BC parks, those that have sufficient tourism volume to justify the cost.

The vast majority of the parks have no PFOs and no on-the-ground government staff, so in these cases, it is questionable whether or not the model is effective.

#### 7.3.2.3 Efficiency

For the outsourcing model's promise of improved efficiency to be fulfilled, the conditions of competition, the incentive for profit, and government capacity to manage contracts must all be present (Van Slyke, 2003; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Kettl, 1993).

The element of competition is present during the initial bidding of service contracts for BC Parks. However, once the contract is in place, the PFOs maintain a monopoly over the bundle of parks for 10 years, with prices set by BC Parks. It appears the element of competition is markedly different in a government service contract compared with the private sector. Contract bidding represents the only time for competition amongst PFOs.

The PFOs must meet the BC Parks' standards as well as document and account for all of their expenditures. Every three years, the PFOs and government employees meet to assess how closely the PFO has stuck to their financial management plan and negotiate the proposed financial plans for the next three years. Thus, aside from the contract bidding, the element of competition metamorphosizes into a struggle to keep costs low in order to keep the contract.

My research findings revealed that the current contract model is designed to lower the desire of the contractors to attain higher levels of financial return. Since

an increase in revenue (i.e. more campers) results in a decrease in deficiency payments, it effectively eliminates the PFOs ability and desire to earn a profit above the agreed upon contract with BC Parks. The FORUM Report (2008) addressed this concern as well, citing the need for penalties and bonuses in the PFOs' contracts. Thus, theoretically, it can be argued that the PFOs' lack of incentive for profit is a flaw of the BC Parks' outsourcing model. However, the interviews uncovered motivations other than profit, such as a passion for parks and serving the public good. This finding can be classified as public service motivation, which mitigated the lack of profit incentive and will be further explored elsewhere.

Statute 2, which granted the Minister of Environment (rather than Cabinet) the authority to set prices in BC Parks, increased the potential for efficiency. Prices in BC Parks now vary depending upon the season (i.e. charge less during shoulder season) and the quality of the campsite (i.e. charge more for prime campsites and vice versa). McCarville (1990, 1992) noted that perception of high quality increases participants' willingness to pay for increased cost.

The FORUM Report (2008) reported varying levels of success with regard to BC Parks' managerial capacity for contract management. The contract procurement was affirmed as successful. Despite the outlined contract responsibilities, the monitoring, and the business relationship between government and improvements over the years, there were still many areas for growth to ensure the smooth operation of the outsourcing model. The areas of improvement included: standardized tracking of the PFOs' financial information, addressing BC Parks' lack

of capability to conduct financial analysis, re-defining the Preventive Maintenance, updating the Facilities Management System, incorporating bonuses and penalties in the PFOs' contract, and most importantly, ameliorating the government-PFO business relationship.

FORUM Consultants Ltd. (2008) concluded that the new bundle model for service delivery was far more efficient and effective than the previous park-by-park model due to specialization and increased economies of scale (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002). The terms of reference provided to FORUM by BC Parks (presented on pg. 65) clearly demonstrated the high level of priority placed on efficiency and effectiveness. The four questions that guided the FORUM research focused entirely on the level of efficiency and effectiveness of BC Parks. The evaluation did not take into consideration the other principles of governance. Eagles (2009) asserted that the principle of efficiency is the highest-valued in parks governance, which supported my findings.

Many public administrators indicated that there is an immense amount of time and effort spent by government staff monitoring the PFOs, which lowers the perceived attained levels of efficiency as indicated by Marvel and Marvel (2007) and Sclar (2000). Nevertheless, the high cost of contract management by government staff members does not appear in most discussions of private sector operations of government services. For a full understanding of the financial efficiency of this model, all costs should be included, which is not done well in BC Parks. The limited empirical research demonstrating the magnitude of cost-savings in park agencies

due to outsourcing furthers the assertion that the privatization movement is inherently ideological, rather than solely based in economic rationalizations (Van Slyke, 2003; Samson, 1994).

### 7.3.3 Fairness: Equity & Rule of Law

#### 7.3.3.1 Equity

In theory, a focus on efficiency should be problematic for equity (Crompton & Lamb, 1986). While the main rationalization for using an outsourcing model is to increase efficiency, surprisingly participants reported that BC Parks had maintained an appropriate level of equity; likely due to the low cost of camping. These research findings suggest that an outsourcing model does not result in an increase in cost to users. Perhaps BC Parks is a more efficient model, meaning BC Parks can afford to keep prices low to ensure cost equity.

My visceral reaction regarding equity and users fees aligns with Greswell's (2004) assertion that transportation and equipment costs represent the significant barriers to people with low-income recreating in parks (as opposed to the cost of user fees); thus trumping More and Stevens (2002) contention that user fees discriminate against people with low income from accessing parks. Furthermore, with the steady trend of decreased government appropriations to parks and protected areas and world-wide adoption of user fees (Sickle & Eagles, 1998), I urge academics and practitioners to acknowledge that user fees are here to stay, and to shift the debate and research towards effective differential pricing.

Park, et al. (in press) conducted 228 highly-structured interviews in a U.S. National Forest campground to investigate perceptions of equity and user fees. The questions centered on the relative importance of six criteria in determining perceptions of social equity and price acceptability judgments: public input, frequent users favouritism in decision process, price subsidy, fee level, frequent user benefits, revenue distribution. The most significant predictor of social equity judgment and price acceptability of user fees was "the extent of public input" regarding the establishment of user fees. Park et al. believed that:

this result implies that public input may contribute to efficiency, transparency, accountability and responsiveness of decision related to user fees. Public input is thought to build an understanding of the decision making process of the authorities (Eisenberger, Fasolo, & Davis- DaMastro, 1990; VanYperen, Van den Berg, & Willering, 1999). This result is consistent with Lauber and Knuth's (1999) statement that public input may be used to hold the government accountable, facilitate good decisions, promote fairness, and promote acceptance of government decisions (pg.8)

The vast importance of public input is clearly articulated by this study. Furthermore, Park et al. contend public participation can positively affect other areas of governance, such as efficiency, transparency, accountability and responsiveness.

Interestingly, the "price subsidy" variable was not a significant predictor of social equity or price acceptability of user fees. Participants "did not support free use by low income users nor do they believe that fee waivers should be provided to allow access for those who are unable to pay" (Park, et. al., pg.9). The findings differ from previous research regarding price subsidies for economically underprivileged people (Christensen & Dustin, 1989).

### 7.3.3.2 Rule of Law

To my knowledge, there is no literature regarding rule of law in an outsourcing model in parks and protected areas. This research concluded there is a significant problem with the rule of law in BC provincial parks.

The public administrators were interviewed first, and the issue of enforcement did not come up. I was also surprised that the issue did not arise in the FORUM Report (2008) given that it came up in every PFO interview. I can only speculate as to why the enforcement issue was not brought up by the public administrators or the FORUM Report. In my opinion, the enforcement issue also represents a lack of effectiveness, since BC Parks has outsourced to PFOs to provide safe recreation opportunities, but have not transferred over all of the authority to do so.

The safety of individuals in provincial parks is the responsibility of the government, unless clearly transferred to the private sector and they willingly accept it. My review of the service contract between a PFO and BC Parks revealed no PFO acceptance of liability (Appendix C). Yet, a BC Parks internal document (2008b) and my interviews concluded PFOs are indeed charged with the safety of park visitors in front country visitor services. Interestingly enough, the campground satisfaction surveys from 2003-2007 reported 84% of visitors ranked "security" as excellent or above average. Nevertheless, the PFOs are setting a dangerous precedent by conducting the role of park rangers, without the needed level of authority.

The issues of outsourcing, underfunding, enforcement, safety and ageing infrastructure in BC Parks, brings to mind the Cave Creek Disaster of 1995, where fourteen people died when a viewing platform collapsed Paparoa National Park, New Zealand. While The Royal Commission of Inquiry concluded multiple flaws with the actual platform, the "root causes" of the collapse were determined to be a systematically and seriously underfunded and under-resourced Department of Conservation. The report of the Commission concluded that given the Department's state, "a tragedy such as Cave Creek was almost bound to happen" (Commission of Inquiry, 1995, pg.113).

I am stating loud and clear that the enforcement issue in BC Parks needs to be addressed. BC Parks must examine the PFOs' lack of authority and the lack of clearly stated responsibilities surrounding visitor safety, and the lack of funding needed to assign park rangers to the field to serve as enforcement officers of safety. I hope that BC Parks can learn from the tragedy of Cave Creek and address the issue before a serious incident involving death and a lawsuit emerges.

#### 7.3.4 Legitimacy & Voice: Public participation & consensus-orientated decision-making

Hodge and Greve (2007) noted that outsourcing has the potential to lower public participation. However, I would argue that the ideology of the elected officials has more impact on public participation (and all the governance principles) than does outsourcing services. My findings confirmed the Liberal Government's focus on the economic benefits of parks and fiscal conservatism resulted in a

reduction in the level of public participation and consensus-orientation in decision making. In BC Parks, public participation is either non-existent (manipulation and therapy) or tokenism (informing and consulting) (Arnstein, 1969).

This research did not attempt to directly deal with park visitors as a stakeholder group. However, the research appears to show that in this management model, besides satisfaction surveys, the park visitor is simply a consumer of a service, rather than an active participant in management. This suggests that under this current model and Government, the park visitor, who is a citizen of BC, is not involved in the development or implementation of BC park policy unless a member of an influential NGO.

#### 7.3.5 Accountability: Accountability & Transparency

How can the public hold BC Parks accountable if they are not first transparent? Low levels of transparency were evident in the decisions to introduce the parking meters, the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal, the NGOs' complaints regarding poorly administered requests for Freedom of Information, and the available financial and administrative information.

Furthermore, as a researcher, I had great difficulty in accessing basic information about the agency regarding budget and staff information (before 2006) and at times, the information sources would conflict with each other. This suggested BC Parks has a low level of capability (likely due to a shortage of staff) to collect, collate and provide information, resulting in a low level of transparency. This research contradicts More's (2002) assertion that government agencies are


open to public scrutiny about finances. In addition, the private sector contracts reduced an already low level of transparency, since PFOs' finances are classified as proprietary information.

I argue that the elected officials' decision to not follow through with the Fixed Roof Proposal reflected a nominal level of accountability since they acted upon citizen criticism that such accommodations did not belong inside parks.

Domberger and Jensen (1997) believed accountability was enhanced in a privatized model due to the review of standards, performance monitoring, and the establishment of policies and mechanisms for redress. In BC Parks, the aforementioned procedures were established and re-evaluated, however little was shared with the public.

Australian professors Hodge and Coghill (2007) evaluated accountability in three privatization case studies: electricity provision, urban passenger rail transport and urban road infrastructure. They asserted that accountability is a complex concept with multiple dimensions. They concluded four types of accountability were present in a privatized state, (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Accountability Pyramid in a Privatized State




(Hodge & Coghill, 2007)

At the top of the pyramid rests the legal means to enforce accountability when the other mechanisms fail (Hodge & Coghill, 2007). In the middle of the pyramid are the "hard" and "soft" mechanisms which ensure public accountability in a privatized state. The bottom of the pyramid represents the behaviours and ethics of the individual people working as service providers, which can be influenced by the organizational culture of the work environment. Nevertheless, this diagram does not include the complexity of accountability such as the relationships between the stakeholders, and the political processes of operating these mechanisms. Hodge & Coghill concluded great accountability to the public is needed in a privatized state.

7.4 Stakeholders involvement in the governance of BC Parks

Using Graham et al.'s (2003, pg.3) diagram of the agents involved in the governance process, I have redrawn the diagram to depict the stakeholders' involved in the governance of BC Parks (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Stakeholders involvement in the governance of BC Parks



The depiction of the stakeholders involved in governance has been drawn to denote their relative influence in BC Parks. Elected officials hold the most influence by setting the direction for the management of BC Parks. Public administrators carry out the will of the Government and monitor contractors. The PFOs have the least amount of influence and act as the direct service providers to visitors. If the NGOs

can inform and mobilize enough citizens to lobby elected officials for change, the elected officials have proven they will listen to the citizens. The media plays an important role in the governance process: sharing information between the different sectors.

The majority of the PFO-NGO interactions are on the park level (i.e. volunteer groups and coordination of interpretation programs). The relationship between the Government (public administrators and elected officials) and the NGOs vary depending upon the NGOs' approach (i.e. activist versus collaborative).

## 7.5 Practical Recommendations

There exist innumerable reports filled with recommendations on how to improve BC Parks<sup>7</sup>. With a plethora of ideas already present, it suggests to me the problem lies in the implementation stage. Furthermore, projects can become derailed with the change of government, as evidenced by the Legacy Project. Therefore, I only offer a few concrete recommendations to the agents involved with BC Parks, in regards to visitor monitoring, relations between stakeholders and a caution regarding the increase in the Minister of Environment's power.

### 7.5.1 Visitor Monitoring

A senior administrator in Ontario Parks suggested BC Parks uses vehicle counters on the Sea to Sky highway, which offers no distinction between entrants and visitors, thus creating inflated park visitation figures. I strongly recommend the

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<sup>7</sup> B.C. Parks' Legacy Report (1999), The Recreation Stewardship Panel (2002), FORUM Report (2008)

methods of counting visitors in BC Parks be improved. Hornback and Eagles (1999) recommend park managers count both entrants<sup>8</sup> and visitors<sup>9</sup>, but clearly report the data as separate types of use.

Collecting data regarding entrants through axle count measurement increases park managers' awareness of and responsiveness to issues such as traffic control, enforcement, transportation and infrastructure (Hornback & Eagles, 1999). However, visitor impact is best captured by measuring the length of stay (the total number of days that visitors stay in the park) known as visitor days (Hornback & Eagles, 1999). Thus if a camper stays at a park for five nights, the recorded use would be five visitor days. And if a family of three stays at a park for five nights, it would yield fifteen visitor days (Hornback and Eagles, 1999). Permit sale data (i.e. camping and rental equipment) is much more accurate than vehicle counters at capturing visitor days, which further enables a rich set of data analysis for trends and visitor capacity issues (Eagles, in press).

I wonder if the methods of counting visitors and entrants will be improved. I worry that it is in the politicians', public administrators', the PFOs' and even the NGOs' best interest to continue reporting inflated figures of visitor use which suggest higher levels of efficiency and justification for increased resources for management. My hope is that the public administrators and the NGOs will pursue the true impact of visitors and entrants. BC Parks requires proper methods of

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<sup>8</sup> a person who visits the lands and waters of a park or protected area for purposes mandated for the area

<sup>9</sup> a person who visits the lands and waters of a park or protected area for purposes mandated for the area

counting visitors and entrants to conduct visitor trend information, assess impact of use, and allow for comparisons with other park systems.

### 7.5.2 Stakeholder Relations

The PFO-Public Administrator relationship was marked by mistrust. Despite the outsourcing model being in place for 20 years, the PFOs continue to feel undervalued by BC Parks. Thankfully, my research found evidence of BC Parks working towards ameliorating the relationship. As indicated in the FORUM Report (2008), I believe the joint BC Parks - PFO steering committee will be integral in improving the relationship.

The members of the NGOs specified how they were reactive to government initiatives. However in the book *Protected places: A history of Ontario's provincial parks system* (Killan, 1993) there are many examples where the Ontario NGOs were proactive in improving park policy and management. I encourage the members of the NGOs to envision how they want BC Parks to be managed, and to lobby the public administrators and the elected officials for their desired changes. The NGOs should remember the power of working together, as demonstrated by the successful lobby against the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal.

Interestingly, throughout all the interviews (except with two NGO members) there existed a complete acceptance of the privatization model. It appeared the public administrators, the PFOs and most members of the NGOs have put themselves into a conceptual box with a lack of recognition of other management models.

### 7.5.3 Minister of Environment

Since the election of the Liberal Government in 2001, the power of the Minister of Environment has dramatically increased. The Minister can now remove areas from parks (Statute 84, 2003) as well as set the prices for BC Parks (Statute 2, 2008) whereas previously these decisions were made by Cabinet. The NGOs representatives expressed their reservations regarding the Minister of Environment having the ability to change park boundaries in order to allow resource extraction. Some of the public administrators expressed the increase in flexibility regarding prices allows for increased flexibility to offer discounts for underutilized or off-season parks, and to charge more for prime campsites and popular parks. With the Minister of Environment's significant level of influence over BC Parks, the role of transparency and the NGOs' watchdog role are now more important than ever.

## 7.6 Research Recommendations

The governance literature noted the role of government; however, I found no discussion regarding the respective roles of public administrators and elected officials, which was a major finding in my research. The role of and potential for public service motivation is also explored.

### 7.6.1 The Policy-Administration Dichotomy

My review of the governance of parks and protected area literature yielded no discussion regarding the different roles and interactions between the two major players within government: the public administrators and the elected officials. To

understand the governance of parks and protected areas, irrespective of the management model, the politics of administration must be explored.

Pervasive in the 1920s and 1930s, the academic literature advocated mutually exclusive roles for politicians and public administrators: the separation of public administrators from political activities and politicians from the implementation of public policy (Svara, 2001). Today, the public administration literature has discounted the aforementioned ideas and coined it “the myth of the dichotomy”.

While the myth of the policy-administration dichotomy has largely been debunked, Kettl (2000) noted that privatization efforts to increase efficiency approximates the terms of the dichotomy, due to a break in dialogue. However, in BC Parks, under the outsourcing model, visitor services are administered by the contractors, monitoring is conducted by the civil servants, and policy is set by the governing body. However, not everything can be written in policy or a contract. Thus the public administrators are left to interpret policy and the contractors are left to deliver visitor services on the ground. Feedback loops are present through the contractors to the public administrators, and then to elected officials. Thus, I argue that dialogue isn't necessarily broken due to contract monitoring. Svara (2001) questioned the appropriateness of certain services being outsourced:


unless it is reserved for services that can be appropriately defined without ongoing broad based administrative input and appropriately delivered without continuous political oversight, the strict separation of policy makers and service deliverers can lower the quality of governance and service (p.180).

As it stands, I believe BC Parks does require what Svava (2001) described as broad based administrative input and continuous political oversight – which raises concerns regarding the appropriateness of outsourcing visitor services.

Furthermore, a major flaw of the privatization of BC Parks was the decrease in the public administrators' level of independence and influence in the operations of the parks. The political power of park administrators comes from the visitor whom they serve. In BC, the park agency is no longer directly connected to the park visitors and thus to the citizens of BC and therefore, the agency has low levels of political power.

Svava (2001) proposed a complementarity model of politics and administration, which features interdependent relationships among elected officials and government administrators, each having distinctive roles but also needing to come together to effect sound governance and to promote the public interest. Elected officials maintain political control by setting direction and continuous oversight. Public administrators maintain professional independence by asserting their perspectives in the formation of policy and adhering to professional standards in implementation. Svava put forth a model of potential policy-administration situations (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Understanding the Interaction between Politicians and Administrators



\*Reciprocating values that reinforce the position of other set of officials:  
 (1) Politicians respect administrative competence & commitment  
 (2) Administrators are committed to accountability & responsiveness

(Svara, 2001, pg.179)

I believe BC Parks currently fits into Svara's (2001) typology of Political Dominance, characterized by high degree of political control and low level of public administrators' independence. The Political Dominance in BC Parks was epitomized by the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal. The politicians' mantra set the direction for BC Parks which opened them up for business and profit. Meanwhile, the public administrators were "squirming" under the politician's direction and decisions. I suspect that if the politicians had sought the public administrators' professional perspective, it would have been suggested that lodges do not belong inside of parks and would have predicted the negative feedback from citizens.

Furthermore, the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal and the installation of parking meters were announced without any public consultation or any forewarning

of such a possibility for BC Parks (pg.96), which conflicted with public administrator's professional standards in implementation.

The high degree of political control and low level of administrators' independence negatively impacted transparency and public participation. It was public outrage, a media storm, and a lack of companies submitting proposals (as mentioned by NGO Participant #2 on pg.115) which resulted in the end of the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal.

Further research regarding the governance of parks and protected areas must take into account the political culture of the area. I propose conducting collaborative research with political scientists to better understand the politics of administration, and to interview politicians since they are powerful stakeholders in the governance process. I recommend using Svava's (2001) model of policy-administration to increase understanding of the potential power imbalances in place, in order to properly conceptualize the governance of parks and protected areas.

#### 7.6.2 Public Service Motivation

Jolley (2008) wrote a think piece regarding the lack of literature of public service motivation (PSM) in private contractors performing public sector tasks. Public service motivation encompasses a dedication and commitment to public institutions and organizations (Perry & Wise, 1990). The public administrator literature supports that a strong PSM serves as a "mitigating factor to protect[ing] and promot[ing] the public interest" (Jolley, 2008, pg. 5). Thus Jolley pondered the



Parks due to increased contract length, the interdependence between government and contractors and the push for a good business relationship based on trust. Thus, in my opinion, the importance of PSM in private contractors is of medium to high importance in BC Parks. I do believe the PFOs I interviewed all had high level of PSM, which BC Parks needs to further recognize by instituting rewards for good work into the contracts.

## 7.7 Concluding Thoughts

I questioned whether privatization's focus on efficiency lowered public participation and transparency. BC Parks has operated under the outsourcing model since created under the Social Credit Government in the 1980s, the NDP Government in the 1990s and the Liberal Government in the 2000s. Under the direction of the NDP Government, the members of the NGOs reported high levels of satisfaction with the principles of public participation and transparency whereas low levels satisfaction under the Liberal Government. Thus it is the ideology of the elected officials which has the greatest impact on the governance principles. The ideology of the Government sets the strategic vision for the management of BC Parks and the focus and importance of the remaining governance principles. Strategic vision in BC Parks, under the high degree of political dominance, was set by the neo-conservative Liberal Government, which valued efficiency and effectiveness, and thus lowered public participation, accountability and transparency.

I wondered whether overall good governance is even possible, since often an emphasis on one principle then lowers another. Furthermore, satisfaction with the principles of governance greatly depends upon one's prioritization of the principles. Various cultures and societies value different principles of governance and it changes over times. And elected officials are supposed to represent the masses of people. Thus for governance to be truly representative, there needs to be civic engagement in the management of public services.

Since 1989, BC Parks has outsourced all front country visitor services to private contractors in the name of increased efficiency. Yet BC Parks has conceptualized efficiency as operating at the lowest cost possible which has resulted in strained relationships with contractors, loss of government funded interpretation programs, heavy workloads for public administrators, and a disconnect between the agency and its constituents. Efficiency refers to making the best use of resources; it is "the relationship between inputs and outputs and the amount of effort, expense, or waste involved in delivering a service" (Crompton & Lamb, 1986, p.80). In BC Parks, high efficiency has come at the cost of lowered transparency, public participation and rule of law. I urge all stakeholders involved with BC Parks to expand their focus beyond efficiency and to take all of the principles of governance into consideration.

I speculate that the BC Parks' outsourcing model creates a disconnect between the park visitors and the BC Parks agency. What happens when visitors share their concerns and ideas with PFO staff? PFOs appear to have little power in

making any changes. Do the PFOs inform BC Parks? And if so, does BC Parks take that information into consideration? I wonder if the visitors feel disconnected to the agency or if they are indeed satisfied with interacting with the PFO staff? Without a doubt, for parks to survive and thrive, there needs to be a strong constituency of supporters. Bushell et al. (2007) explained that “political support for parks only exists if sufficient numbers of satisfied park visitors are influential enough to affect societal decision-making” (pg.9). Based on my research, I conclude that a major flaw of the outsourcing model is the disconnect between the BC Parks agency and the park visitors.

## 7.8 Reflections

As a qualitative researcher, it is impossible to let go of the lens through which I see the world. Journaling, however, did aid in my reflexivity and mindfulness of my own ideologies. Even as I defend my thesis I question the validity of my themes. It was my own passion for parks (and my vision for their management) and my own disbelief at the Fixed Roof Accommodations Proposal which drove me to investigate the governance of BC Parks. I ask myself what the theme “passionate yet powerless” truly captures since Larson (1997) asserted that “researchers may impose meanings on the lives they study and end up saying more about themselves and the things they value than they do about those they study” (p.469). I take solace in Laurel Richardson’s (1994) concept of crystallization and that my research findings contributed to the understanding of social life and represented the participants’ sense of lived experience. In keeping with the tenets

of crystallization, I acknowledge that only a partial understanding of the governance of BC Parks was obtained from this research and this understanding was reflected from many different perspectives.

The nature of my investigation and approach to analysis unveiled rather interesting findings, such as humanizing the face of private contractors in BC Parks, the power dynamics between PFOs and BC Parks staff, the low level of rule of law, and the reconceptualization of efficiency as operating at the lowest possible cost.

Overall, I'm grateful for the opportunity to have expressed my perception, of the government employees, the PFOs and the members of the NGOs' perceptions of the governance of BC Parks.

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# Appendix A

## Outdoor Recreation Council of British Columbia



Low-impact recreation	Motorized/Consumptive Recreation
BC Camping Association BC Nature Canadian Parks and Wilderness BC Spaces For Nature Friends of the Stikine Society Recreational Canoeing Association of BC Trails Society of BC Hike BC Federation of Mountain Clubs of BC International Mountain Bicycling Association Guide Outfitters Association of BC Pacific International Kayak Association Okanagan – Similkameen Parks Society Sea Kayak Association of BC Backcountry Horsemen of BC Horse Council of BC Underwater Council of BC	BC Federation of Drift Fishers BC Federation of Fly Fishers BC Off-Road Motorcycle Association BC Snowmobile Federation Four wheel Drive Association of BC Council of BC Yacht Clubs BC Fishing Resorts & Outfitters Assn.

# Appendix B

## Interview Guide

### BACKGROUND CONTEXT:

#### Questions for Government employees of BC Parks

1. It is my understanding is that your job title is ' \_\_\_\_\_ '?
  - a. Can you walk me through a typical day at work?
2. How does BC Parks monitor private contractors?
  - a. Do you keep annual reports?
  - b. Can I see a copy of a contract?
  - c. How many people in the agency are dedicated to monitoring private contractors?
3. How much interaction do you have with NGOs?
  - a. How influential are NGOs on your decision-making?
  - b. Can you think of a story to illustrate what we're talking about?

#### Questions for Park Facility Operators

1. It is my understanding is that your job title is ' \_\_\_\_\_ '?
  - a. Can you walk me through a typical day at work?
2. Could you describe your interactions with BC Parks?
  - a. How often do you meet with BC Parks employees?
  - b. What kind of information do you have to relay to BC Parks about your organization? (i.e. Finances? Visitor statistics?)
3. How much interaction do you have with NGOs?
  - a. How influential are NGOs on your decision-making?
  - b. Can you think of a story to illustrate what we're talking about?

### Questions for Non-Governmental Organizations

1. It is my understanding is that your job title is '\_\_\_\_\_'?
  - a. Can you walk me through a typical day at work?
2. How much interaction do you have with BC Parks? And how much interaction do you have with park facility operators?
  - a. How much influence do you think your organization has had on BC Parks policies in the past ten years?
  - b. Can you think of a story to illustrate what we're talking about?

### Questions for all participants

1. How do you feel about the current privatized arrangements for visitor services?
  - a. Do you feel your opinion is widely held in your organization?
2. What are the advantages to the current arrangements?
  - a. During your time affiliated with this organization, what's been the best thing?
3. What are the disadvantages to the current arrangements?
  - a. During your time affiliated with this organization, what's been the worst thing?

## GOVERNANCE

For the second half of the interview, I'd like to discuss you with you five main concepts, broadly referred to as governance... so things like public participation, equity, efficiency, accountability, and so on.

### LEGITIMACY

1. I'm curious, as a citizen, what does public participation mean to you?
2. Can you comment on the public participation process for BC Parks?
  - a. Who attends the meetings?
  - b. If you could name the best (or worst) example of public participation regarding BC Parks, what would it be?
3. How are decisions made?
  - a. Who gets to input their ideas?

### FAIRNESS

1. It is my understanding that BC Parks has outsourced all visitor services to private contractors.
  - a. Based on this reality as you perceive it, does it represent an equitable situation for citizens?
2. Are all visitors treated in the same manner?
  - a. Is that a good thing? (i.e. People with disabilities? Low-income families?) Should everyone pay the same amount for services?
3. Does BC Parks stick to its announced major policies?
  - a. Can you think of an example?

## PERFORMANCE

1. The academic literature on contracting suggests the main reason for outsourcing services is to increase efficiency and cost-savings.
  - a. In your opinion, has this happened with BC Parks?
  - b. Are people getting more bang for their buck?
2. Do the private contractors follow the guidelines provided by BC Parks?
3. How does BC Parks respond to complaints and public criticism?
  - a. Does BC Parks acts on participants' suggestions?
  - b. What's the most positive (or negative) story to illustrate your ideas?

## ACCOUNTABILITY

1. How are the policies of BC Parks communicated with the public?
2. How can information regarding decisions (and the reasoning behind them) be accessed?
3. How is the public kept informed about major expenditures?

## DIRECTION

1. Do the provincial parks in BC have management plans?
  - a. Are they accessible? How? To whom?
  - b. Are they implemented?
2. How do you feel about the direction BC Parks is taking?
3. What do you want to see happen in the future of BC Parks?
4. What do you believe is likely to happen in the future of BC Parks?

### PRIVATE/PUBLIC ISSUES

1. Are there any conflicts between environmental goals of protection and economic goals of revenue-generation?
  - a. Can you think of an example?
2. Is there tension between public and private interests?

### CONCLUSION

1. What does the privatized model mean to you?
2. Who else would you recommend I interview?

## Appendix C

### Letter of Information

April, 2008

Dear \_\_\_\_\_,

I am a graduate student in the Recreation and Leisure Department at the University of Waterloo. I along with three faculty members are currently conducting research regarding people's perceptions of the characteristics and performance of visitor services in provincial parks in British Columbia. As part of this research study, we are conducting interviews with government staff of BC Parks, park facility operators, and members of non-governmental organizations.

Participation in this study is voluntary. If you choose to participate, it will involve an interview of approximately one to two hours in length to take place in a mutually agreed upon location. You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you so wish. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time without any negative consequences by advising the researcher. With your permission, the interview will be audio recorded to facilitate collection of information, and later transcribed for analysis.

All information you provide is considered completely confidential. Your name will not appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study, unless you have given your permission to be identified in any publications and quotations attributed to you. Data collected during this study will be retained for two years in Dr. Paul Eagles' locked office. Only researchers associated with this project will have access. The electronic data will be saved for five years on a secure server at the University of Waterloo. Afterwards all the data will be destroyed. There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant in this study.

If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please contact me on my cell phone at 519-568-9774 or via email at [blmccutc@uwaterloo.ca](mailto:blmccutc@uwaterloo.ca), or my supervisor, Dr. Paul Eagles at [eagles@uwaterloo.ca](mailto:eagles@uwaterloo.ca), 519-888-4567 Ext. 32716.

I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. However, the final decision about participation is yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation in this study, please contact Dr. Susan Sykes of this office at 519-888-4567 Ext. 36005.

Yours sincerely,

Bonnie McCutcheon  
Graduate Student  
Department of Recreation and Leisure Studies  
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON

## CONSENT FORM

I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted by Professors Paul Eagles, Mark Havitz, Troy Glover and graduate students Bonnie McCutcheon and Windekind Bueau-Duitschaever of the Department of Recreation and Leisure Studies at the University of Waterloo. I have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory answers to my questions, and any additional details I wanted.

I am aware that I have the option of allowing my interview to be audio recorded to ensure an accurate recording of my responses. I am also aware that excerpts from the interview may be included in the thesis and/or publications to come from this research, with the understanding that I may choose whether quotations are anonymous or attributed. I was informed that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty by advising the researcher.

This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. I was informed that if I have any comments or concerns resulting from my participation in this study, I may contact the Director, Office of Research Ethics at 519-888-4567 ext. 36005.

With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this study.

YES    NO

I agree to have my interview audio recorded.

YES    NO

I agree to be identified in any publications resulting from this study.

YES    NO

I agree to the use of attributed quotations.

YES    NO

I agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes of this research.

YES    NO

Participant Name: \_\_\_\_\_ (Please print)

Participant Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Witness Name: \_\_\_\_\_ (Please print)

Witness Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

## Appendix D

PFOs operating in BC Parks

(BC Parks, 2008a)

<u>Bundle Area</u>	<u>PFO</u>	<u>#PFOs</u>
Cariboo - Bowron Lake	BC Parks Cariboo Region	1
Cariboo -Cariboo	G & P Kleenery Ltd.	2
Kootenay - East	Kootenay Park Services Ltd.	3
Kootenay - West & North West	West Kootenay Park Management Inc.	4
Lower Mainland - Fraser Valley	Sea to Sky Park Services Ltd. <sup>1</sup>	5
Lower Mainland - Lower Mainland	Peace Park Management Ltd. & SSG Holdings Ltd.	6
Lower Mainland - Sea-to-Sky	Sea to Sky Park Services Ltd. <sup>1</sup>	-
Lower Mainland - Sunshine Coast	Swens Contracting	7
Okanagan - Boundary	Kaloya Contracting Ltd. <sup>2</sup>	8
Okanagan - Manning/ Similkameen	Gibson Pass Resort Inc.	9
Okanagan - North Okanagan	Quality Recreation Ltd.	10
Okanagan - South Okanagan	Kaloya Contracting Ltd. <sup>2</sup>	-
Omineca – Hwy 16, 27 & 97	Quartz Contracting	11
Omineca - Mt Robson	Design By Nature Park Services <sup>3</sup>	12
Peace - Liard	Kootenay Forest Resources	13
Peace - North & South Peace	Mariah Recreation Management Services	14
Skeena – QCI	Old Massett Village Council	15
Skeena - Smithers/ Hwy 37	Northwest Escapes Ltd. <sup>4</sup>	16
Skeena - Terrace/ Rupert	Northwest Escapes Ltd. <sup>4</sup>	-
Thompson - Kamloops	Brandywine Environmental Management Ltd.	17
Thompson - Merritt	L. Lemkay and D. Baker	18
Thompson - Shuswap	no pfo	18
Thompson - Wells Gray	Blackwell Park Operations Ltd.	19
Vancouver Island - Mid Island	R.L.C. Enterprize Ltd. <sup>5</sup>	20
Vancouver Island - North Island	R.L.C. Enterprize Ltd. <sup>5</sup>	-
Vancouver Island - North Island	R.L.C. Enterprize Ltd. <sup>5</sup>	-
Vancouver Island - South Island Gulf Islands	K2 Park Services Ltd.	21

<u>Non-bundled Parks</u>		
<u>Park Name</u>	<u>PFO</u>	<u>#PFOs</u>
Barkerville	Caleb and Rose Higgins	22
Newcastle Island	Snuneymuxw First Nation	23
Cypress	Cypress Mountain	24
Mount Seymour	Mount Seymour Resorts	25
Alexandra Bridge	Yale First Nation <sup>6</sup>	26
Emory Creek	Yale First Nation <sup>6</sup>	-
Kilby	Kilby General Store & Farm	27
Prophet River Wayside	?	-
Andy Bailey	The Northern Rockies Regional District	29
Kiskatinaw	Alex Crabbe	30
Buckinghorse River Wayside	Buckinghorse Lodge	31
Nisga'a Memorial Lava Bed Park	?	-
Babine Lake – Pendelton Bay	Burns Lake Community Forest Ltd. <sup>7</sup>	34
Jackman Flats	Design By Nature Park Services <sup>3</sup>	-
Omineca	?	-
Rearguard Falls	Design By Nature Park Services <sup>3</sup>	-
Ethal F. Wilson Memorial	Burns Lake Community Forest Ltd. <sup>7</sup>	-

\* The seven subscripts indicate a PFO managing more than one area.

## Appendix E

### Components of the Contract

(FORUM, 2008, p.22-24)

The contracts between BC Parks and the PFO essentially describe:

- The obligations of the PFOs and of BC Parks; and
- How the PFOs get paid for meeting their obligations.

The main expectations of the contract methodology are that it should:

- Reflect the main components of the parties' activities and obligations;
- Compensate the PFOs fairly for their efforts and contributions;
- Provide incentives for good PFO performance;
- Compensate BC Parks fairly for the concessions granted to the PFOs;
- Remain fair and transparent to both parties;
- Be accountable and explainable to the public;
- Reflect the PFOs performance in meeting BC Parks' expectations; and
- Be predictable for BC Parks and the PFOs' for budgeting and planning purposes.

### PFOs' Obligations

The explicit operational obligations of the PFOs under their contracts are as follows:

- Operate and maintain the facilities described and defined;
- Offer the facilities to users (day and overnight visitors);
- Collect and retain additional fees - revenues arising from the additional facilities;
- Collect and remit to government Park Act and Pass fees in accordance with Schedule "D" of the contract;
- Offer pay parking passes to visitors;
- Permit exempt visitors to use the parks free of charge;
- Control operating areas (as defined) to ensure safety and orderly use, including
  - Regulation of entry, movement and activities;
  - Eviction where necessary; and
  - Arrangements with police to regulate public safety and conduct.
- Keep books and records;
- Allow an audit if requested by BC Parks;
- Pay moneys to BC Parks when due;
- Pay all taxes, costs and charges for operating the operating areas;
- Deliver receipts and other evidence for payment on demand by BC Parks;
- Observe, abide by and comply with all laws, the agreement and Parks design and facility standards;

- Keep the operating areas in a safe, clean and sanitary manner;
- Not permit hazard or nuisance;
- Not remove or destroy any natural resource without BC Parks written consent;
- Not construct, install or repair facilities except for the purposes set out in the Annual Operating Plan (as approved by BC Parks);
- Pay all accounts and expenses as they become due;
- Ensure users do not perform unsafe or hazardous activities; and
- Take reasonable precautions to suppress fires.

The contracts contain explicit administrative clauses related to performance and maintenance covering the following:

- Deliver an Annual Operating Plan to BC Parks by October 1 each year, including services offered and fees collected;
- Deliver a (“rolling”) three-year Business Plan each year including services, planned repairs and replacements, additional facilities, advertising, reports to be completed, organizational structure, staffing and financial projections;
- Complete all inspections, diagnostic procedures, maintenance items (OM) and condition assessments proposed in the business plan;
- Report PM items (as proposed in the Plan) within 30 days of completion. (There are also rules related to PM under-spending);
- Convince BC Parks as to capacity, quality, revenues and cost controls;
- Provide a security deposit, in an amount agreed in the contract, as a guarantee of the PFOs obligations under the contract; and
- Maintain Commercial and CGL insurance as specified.

Under Section 9 of the agreements, BC Parks may suspend all or part of the agreement or terminate it under certain conditions. The PFOs are therefore obliged not to allow any of the following circumstances to occur, which may give rise for termination “for cause”:

- Non-payment of moneys due to BC Parks;
- Failure to comply with the terms of the agreement;
- Insolvency or assignment of creditors;
- An act under the Bankruptcy Act;
- Appointment of a receiver-manager; or
- A winding-up order.

## BC Parks' Obligations

The explicit obligations of BC Parks under the contracts are to:

- Grant a Park Use Permit to occupy the Operating Areas (as defined) for specific purposes for a period of ten years;
- Offer the PFO first right of refusal to operate additional services;
- Review the Annual Business Plans within 30 days of receipt and ensure compliance with the contract; and
- Accept or reject any proposed PM item.

Among BC Parks implicit obligations, derived partially from the obligations of the PFOs, are the following:

- To maintain good business relationships with the PFOs;
- To perform performance measurement activities so that both BC Parks and the PFOs will know exactly where they stand with regard to BC Parks' standards and expectations and where improvements should be made;
- To allow the PFOs to establish agreed-upon levels of performance whereby their compliance with BC Parks' expectations is transparent and explicit; and
- To provide support to the PFOs in respect of their obligations when called upon to do so.

## Appendix F

### Key Performance Indicators

(BC Parks, 2008d)

#### Objective #1

Park Visitor Satisfaction

Performance Indicator	Key Measurables	Excellent? Satisfactory? Unsatisfactory?	Comments
Letters of complement or complaint received by BC Parks staff	No. of letters received. Nature of complement or complaint. Timeliness of any required actions by Operator.		
Satisfaction surveys	Performance levels at, or above, provincial standards. Overall satisfaction results for the (campground/day use site).		
Staff on-site contact with park visitors	Personal interviews with park visitors. Appropriateness of Operator's handling of complaints/issues.		
Minister Letters received by BC Parks	Number of letters received. Nature of complement or complaint. Timeliness of any required actions by Operator		
Phone Calls received by BC Parks staff	Number of phone calls received by BC Parks staff. Nature of complement or complaint. Were follow up actions completed by Operator in timely fashion?		
Notes			

Objective #2  
State of Facilities

Performance Indicator	Key Measurables	Excellent? Satisfactory? Unsatisfactory?	Comments
Roads	Surface condition of road. Drainage structures free and clear of debris. Vegetation controlled appropriately on road edges and ditch lines. Shoulders maintained to road standards.		
Grounds	Lawns cut and trimmed. No garbage laying around. Campsites cleaned and maintained. Beach areas free of litter. Danger trees assessed, modified and/or removed.		
Buildings	Condition of interior for paint and cleanliness/odour. Condition of components (plumbing, electrical, toilets, partitions). Exterior of building for paint and condition of siding, trim, doors and windows. Roof condition (shakes, roof cap and vents in place). Building environment (danger trees).		
Trails	Trails brushed back to standards. Drainage structures in place and being maintained. Condition of tread surface. Condition of bridges or boardwalks.		
Water	Water posts secure. Water taps not leaking. Drains in place and functioning. Water testing being done. Valves boxes covered.		
Signs	Conditions of signs: do they meet standards?		
Notes			

Objective #3  
Financial Performance

Performance Indicator	Key Measurables	Excellent? Satisfactory? Unsatisfactory?	Comments
Camping targets	Number of camping parties compared to 3-year average. Number of camping parties compared to projections in the Annual Operating Plan		
Partnerships	Has the Operator followed the Business Plan/Annual Operating Plan? Has the Operator accessed or examined other possible sources of funding e.g. employment grants?		
Day-use targets	Number of day-use parties compared to 3-year average. Day-use parties compared to projections in the Annual Operating Plan.		
Marketing/ Advertising	Is there a marketing/advertising plan in place as outlined in the Annual Operating Plan? Does the advertising promote any additional services offered?		
Park User Fees	Are park user fees correct? Is the Operator following fee policies and regulations correctly? Is the necessary information being recorded and provided to BC Parks?		
Notes			

Objective #4

Staff Presence & Appearance

Performance Indicator	Key Measurables	Excellent? Satisfactory? Unsatisfactory?	Comments
Staff Appearance	Does overall staff appearance meet BC Parks' and park visitors' expectations? Is there a company policy in place for staff dress code? Do staff uniforms meet BC Parks' uniform standards and the terms of the Agreement?		
Availability of Staff	Appropriate level of staff on shift for size of operation and as outlined in Annual Operating Plan. Signs displayed in appropriate locations directing public on how to contact staff. Appropriate supervision for size of operation and as outlined in Annual Operating Plan.		
Training	Training plan in place. Does the training plan cover all aspects (e.g. emergencies, public relations, maintenance, security, ecological integrity, environmental stewards, etc.) of the operation? Is there a set out schedule for training new staff?		
Notes			

Objective #5  
Community Involvement

Performance Indicator	Key Measurables	Excellent? Satisfactory? Unsatisfactory?	Comments
First Nations	Has the operator delivered what is detailed in the Annual Operating Plan regarding First Nations? Has the effort to involve First Nations as employees or otherwise been successful?		
Community Events	Has the operator delivered what is stated in the Annual Operating Plan regarding community events? What steps have been taken to encourage community events? What, if any, feedback did you receive from the local community?		
Volunteers	Is the operator supporting the use of volunteers in its operation? Has the operator made steps to talk with volunteer groups? Have any comments or concerns been received from volunteer groups?		
Clubs/ Organizations	Has the operator delivered what was detailed in the Annual Operating Plan? Have you received any feedback from clubs or organizations conducting appropriate activities in the park operating area? Are their efforts being assisted?		
Publications	Do brochures and park information publications meet our Park Information Standards?		
Notes			

Objective #6

Legal Obligations of Agreement

Performance Indicator	Key Measurables	Excellent? Satisfactory? Unsatisfactory?	Comments
Insurance/ WCB/ Performance Guarantee	Are the insurance/WCB and performance guarantee requirements being met? Have there been any WCB infractions and have you been notified? Is the performance guarantee adequate for the risk?		
Statistics	Are you receiving monthly records of all visits five (5) days following the end of the month? Are PSPS reports and statistics being submitted on time? Are financial records being submitted on time? Are you receiving Complaint/Occurrence Reports immediately after a serious personal injury/death or major property damage? Are revenue returns on time?		
Evacuation/ emergency/ plans	Is there Evacuation Plans in place for all Operating Areas? Are written plans in place for all emergency situations? Do these plans provide direction for staff? Is there a phone list for contacts?		
Danger/ Wildlife/ Tree Assessment	Number of evaluations completed. Reports delivered. Necessary action (modification/removal) taken.		
Notes			

Objective #7  
Additional Services

Performance Indicator	Key Measurables	Excellent? Satisfactory? Unsatisfactory?	Comments
New Additional Services	Has the operator delivered what was stated in the Annual Operating Plan/Business Plan? Have there been adverse impacts to the park environment? Has the public provided any feedback?		
Standards	Does the service meet industry standards? If facilities were constructed do they meet Parks standards or guidelines?		
Revenue Generation	Is the service being offered extending the length of stay within the campground? Is the service attracting more visitors to the park? Is the service self supporting financially?		
Notes			

Objective #8

Protection of Natural and Cultural Values

Performance Indicator	Key Measurables	Excellent? Satisfactory? Unsatisfactory?	Comments
Special Provisos	Has the Operator developed special procedures and standards to address Special Provisos as outlined in the Agreement? Is the Operator adhering to the Annual Operating Plan where it refers to Special Provisos?		
Control of Park Visitors to Lessen Impacts on Key Identified Natural and Cultural Values	Are there safeguards in place to stop public from entering sensitive areas? Has the Operator developed a public education program around the protection/stewardship of the natural and cultural values? Have special monitoring plots been set up where required?		
Protection of Natural and Cultural Values	Has the Operator developed special procedures and standards to address natural and cultural value concerns expressed in the Agreement or in the Annual Operating Plan? Are the special procedures and standards being followed? Are any operator activities adversely affecting natural and cultural values?		
Park Act and Policy	Is the operator enforcing the Park Act as it pertains to general protection of natural and cultural values? How many warnings have been issued?		
Staff	Is the Operator 's staff aware of natural and cultural values in the particular Operating Areas? Has any specific training been given? Has the Operator developed special work procedures to protect sensitive natural and cultural values?		
Notes			

## Appendix G

2007/08 BC Parks Year End Report. (BC Parks, 2008f).

### Revenue

	2006/2007	2007/2008
Camping fees	11,628,362	11,988,378
Boating fees	304,804	275,988
Day use parking fees	902,727	695,986
Annual parking pass	74,195	69,253
Day use group revenues	4,482	19,299
Maquinna hot springs	15,918	15,540
Film revenue	6,180	9,186
Backcountry permits	4,995	4,536
Misc. Fees and licences	2,516	7,713
Sub-total Rec. User Fees	\$12,944,180	\$13,085,880
Non-ski Park Use Permit Fees	484,969	831,452
Ski hill revenue	576,725	446,513
Sub-total Park Use Permit Fees	\$1,061,695	\$1,277,965
Total Recreation User Fee & Permit Revenues	\$14,005,875	\$14,363,845

### Recoveries

	2006/2007	2007/2008
Mountain Pine Beetle	1,940,146	1,585,595
Fuel Management	423,290	239,739
Act Now Wild at Heart	n/a	91,037
Other	844,052	135,315
Sub-total Recoveries Within Govt	\$3,207,488	\$2,051,686
Tree Removal (stumpage)	98,305	355,319
Tatshenshini River Rafting	58,279	50,682
Liard Hot springs	61,883	54,505
Empire Valley Ranch	18,000	18,000
National Park Establishment	71,241	177,219
Skagit Valley Interp	23,689	32,205
Other	100,811	145,110
Sub-total Recoveries External to Govt	432,209	833,040
Total Recoveries	\$3,639,696	\$2,884,726

Total Revenue & Recoveries	\$17,645,571	\$17,248,571
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Expenses

	2006/2007	2007/2008
Operating expenditures		
Salary, benefits, travel	13,167,629	13,579,976
Goods & services	5,647,756	5,515,671
Tree removal expenditures	98,636	212,830
Fuel management	1,967,071	1,741,342
Amortization	5,623,244	5,827,736
Sub-total	\$27,001,415	\$27,100,748
Contract services		
– retained fees	11,937,648	12,283,665
– net deficiency payments	3,782,000	4,541,528
– non-bundled parks	797,723	892,613
Parking fee commission	387,128	338,863
Annual pass commission	11,440	17,203
Sub-total	\$16,915,939	\$18,073,871
Total operating budget	\$31,581,138	\$32,534,888
Total operating costs	\$43,917,354	\$45,174,619

## Capital & Compensation Expenditures

	2006/07	2007/08
Land Acquisition	3,900,000	5,220,178
Compensation Funds Received		327,653
Compensation Paid	10,300,000	8,000,000
Sub-total Acquisitions & Compensation	\$14,200,000	\$12,892,525
Myra Trestles		3,776,455
Campground & day use area		
Reconstruction		4,939,431
Water & Sewer Systems		2,253,452
Road & Trails		2,020,179
Other (includes above 3 categories for 06/07)	9,920,000	734,181
Sub-total Facilities	\$16,820,000	\$13,723,698
Total Capital & Compensation Expenditures	\$31,020,000	\$26,616,223

## Total

	2006/07	2007/08
Total BC Parks Budget Expenditures	\$62,601,138	\$59,151,111
Total Expenditures on Parks (incl. Retained fees & Partner contributions)	\$76,267,354	\$76,348,842

## Other Information

	2006/07	2007/08
Partner contributions/ Donations to land acquisitions	\$1,330,000	\$4,558,000
Total value of land acquired	\$7,630,128	\$9,832,800
Number of Park Use Permits issued	1,146	1,069
# BC Parks' Govt FTEs	188	193
Ranger FTEs	64	69
# Rangers	134	145
Ha protected <sup>1</sup>	11,874,463	12,044,112
# BC Parks with interpretation programs	16	23
Attendance at interpretation programs <sup>2</sup>	56,243	108,842

<sup>1</sup> Hectares protected captures all formally established Class A, B and C parks, recreation areas, conservancies, ecological reserves and protected area designations under the Environment and Land Use Act at the end of each fiscal year. These numbers do not include wildlife management areas or other conservation lands managed by the Ministry of Environment for the benefit of fish and wildlife, nor do they include Government-approved areas that have not yet been formally designated.

<sup>2</sup> 06/07 Interpretation numbers only included July & August interpretation attendance, did not include May and June interpretation programs for school children. 07/08 numbers are also higher because they include roving interpreters in campgrounds (not tracked in 2006).