
by

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Author’s Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Abstract

HIV/AIDS is an urgent health issue in many areas of the world, particularly in Africa. In addition to reaching pandemic status, HIV/AIDS is also being elevated to the level of a security threat. While this is occurring both nationally and internationally, the United Nations is leading this securitization attempt. The UN has been able to engage in this attempt as it is the most influential international organization and the leading norm promoting organization. Securitization is an analytic process that traces how issues become identified and understood as security threats. This concept originated within the Copenhagen school of security studies, and this is the framework that this paper relies on to analyze the connection between HIV/AIDS and security.

The connection between HIV/AIDS and security is now widely internalized, accepted and even promoted by national governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. However, the successful securitization of HIV/AIDS has yet to be fully explored, understood, or tested. This paper undertakes this task, and relies on the Copenhagen process of securitization to trace the security discourse initiated from the UN, down through four selected case studies. It identifies which of the key Copenhagen requirements for securitization have been met, and which have not been met, ultimately leading to the conclusion that the United Nations prompted a successful internal securitization and an unsuccessful external securitization.

This paper concludes that the current Copenhagen school process of securitization is flawed and is inadequate for studying today’s emerging non-traditional threats. In particular, it is unable to trace the securitization of HIV/AIDS as a result of stringent and unrepresentative criterions. It attempts to move forward by offering a rationale and direction to begin updating the Copenhagen process of securitization.
Acknowledgements

This project came together with the help and dedication of several key individuals.

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I would like to thank my colleagues, several of whom engaged in numerous debates regarding the theoretical aspects of this paper. Their debates helped to address areas of weakness and brought to my attention alternative theoretical debates.

I finally need to thank my family for their constant support, suggestions and feedback, despite their lack of experience in this area. I particularly need to thank my partner who had to deal with late nights and early mornings, and without whom I could not have completed this thesis.
Dedication

This paper is dedicated to my late aunt, Dr. Beverley Antle, who always encouraged and supported me. She made me believe in myself and encouraged my drive and determination when I could not. She pushed me to apply for my masters, to pursue what I wanted, and to study an issue that we were both passionate about. In part, it was from her encouragement and passion that I found the strength to complete my thesis, and it saddens me deeply that she will never see it completed.

This paper is also dedicated to all those who she worked hard to support, and to those who benefited from her dedication and commitment. I can only hope to have some of the strength that she possessed, and to help half as many as she did.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

HIV/AIDS is one of the most urgent and pressing health issues of the past several decades; it has widespread and complex economic, social, political and international implications. The consequences and impacts of the spread of HIV/AIDS manifest differently within developed and developing countries, as well as between those who have access to medical care and those who do not. For many within developed regions such as North America, HIV/AIDS is a generally foreign virus; a health issue that while it has no cure, is now manageable with access to the right medication. For other regions, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, it represents a devastating and terrifying reality, and a daily grim fate that is almost as destructive for those who are not infected as it is for those who are. As different as the experiences are for individuals, the reality for states and the international system as a whole is equally complex. The potential security implications of the spread of HIV/AIDS for states in the global system are multifaceted and require urgent attention and further study. Ultimately, regardless of the observable impacts, how HIV/AIDS is framed has a direct impact on how it is recognized and addressed.

This paper attempts to delve into the problem of how to study the dynamics of HIV/AIDS from a security perspective. In order to adequately examine this issue, first and foremost this paper traces the framing of HIV/AIDS as security issue by applying the process of securitization as developed by the Copenhagen School.¹ From initial reviews of the existing literature and the ongoing debate surrounding HIV/AIDS and security, it has become clear that there are various

¹ Securitization is a concept, developed within the Copenhagen school of security studies. It describes the discursive recognition and elevation of an existential threat to the level of a recognized security issue. This process is described in detail in Chapter 3. HIV/AIDS refers to Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), hereby referred to collectively as HIV/AIDS.
divides on this topic. This study reviews the process, the actors involved and the mechanisms that have initiated the attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS, whether fully realized or not. In other words, it traces how HIV/AIDS has been elevated to the level of a security issue within the international system, by identifying the extent of the internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue within both the national and international systems. It begins by arguing that the United Nations initiated the attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS and in turn prompted and influenced states to begin approaching the issue in the same manner. The following chapters review several key areas of security studies, the context of HIV/AIDS as a pandemic, previous connections between HIV/AIDS and security, and the process of securitization itself. It then studies in more depth, how successful HIV/AIDS securitization attempts have been within the United Nations itself, and within four selected governments.

In order to ensure clarity in the following chapters, two key questions need to be answered: what is a threat? And moreover, what is security? These concepts are elusively subjective and yet willingly invoked all too often. In the non-academic and non-theoretical sense, security and threat are used so often that there is no pause taken to reflect on their meanings, or the qualifications that should be applied to differentiate them from everyday dangers and risks. In an academic and theoretical sense, these two words have very specific but strongly contested meanings. Security and threat have always been invoked to justify inter and intra state wars, espionage, terrorism, arrests, killings, mass murders, genocide, and conversely, peace, diplomacy, international laws, the United Nations, and the list goes on. Can there be one all encompassing definition of threat or should the definition be flexible enough to identify what cannot yet be anticipated? It is not possible to be certain as to what does and does not constitute a threat in a general sense. In turn, what constitutes security and insecurity needs to be both critically
analyzed and developed based on situational and regional considerations. It is in part for this reason that this paper selected the Copenhagen school, found within the critical security studies (CSS) framework, as the framework from which to study HIV/AIDS and security. This framework explains that security is discursively built, and not in fact singularly defined. In comparison with the other relevant frameworks, this paper finds that the Copenhagen school is at the same time both more focused, and less restrictive, because it does not confine the analyst to interpret through one predefined lens. The framework provides the analyst with the ability to focus more on the real and practical understandings of security, on a case-by-case basis. It allows for the study of how actors understand, present, and in turn address security issues, and it therefore offers the most suitable security school under which today’s issues can begin to be studied. While many schools are either too narrow or too broad in their focus on the actors and the systems, the Copenhagen school avoids such problems by remaining open to the possibility of studying security from a variety of levels, and does not focus on one specific actor. It allows for a state-centric analysis, but it does not recognize the state as the only relevant actor or referent. They explain that, “we have constructed a wider conceptual net within which the state-centric position is possible but not a predetermined outcome.” While some would see this as unfocused or too broad, in practice it allows for a more realistic study of what is actually occurring without imposing the theory’s own restraints on the outcomes of the study. The Copenhagen school maintains conceptual focus and clarity by requiring very specific actions to occur before accepting successful securitization. Finally, the framework’s understanding and treatment of security, allows it to step back from the debates regarding widening or maintaining narrower security definitions.

3 Ibid., 37.
Using the Copenhagen school as the framework, this paper argues that the United Nations (UN) has played a key role in how HIV/AIDS is now understood internationally. It was the securitizing actor, in both an internal (within the organization), and an external (global) attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS. This paper argues that the UN prompted a successful internal securitization of HIV/AIDS, which when accepted, initiated an external global call for the securitization of HIV/AIDS. As a result, four government studies (Canada, the United States, Botswana, and Zimbabwe) are relied on to trace how successful the call for a global securitization of HIV/AIDS was. This paper ultimately finds that according to the Copenhagen process of securitization, the attempt was unsuccessful. However, it also finds that the audiences (four governments) accepted the framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, and they frequently address the issue as such within their own policies and approaches. As a result, it is concluded that there is at least an internalization of the issue as a security threat. The study highlighted flaws within the Copenhagen framework, and in turn, this paper concludes that while the framework is still quite important and capable of studying most of today’s security issues, it needs to be updated to account for how states currently interact within the international system and how they react to global security threats. To prompt future development within the Copenhagen framework, this paper concludes by proposing several key areas that should be reevaluated, including: the requirement of the threat to be presented as existential, the requirement for action beyond the normal political procedure, the requirement for emergency measures, and finally the designation of referents as objects and not actors. The conclusions are intended as the starting point for future research into this issue and framework.

The ensuing chapters begin by clarifying the overall critical framework, the theoretical background, and in particular, the key concepts and processes of securitization. The second
chapter provides a thorough review of the theoretical background, including current and relevant 
literature on traditional security studies, human security, critical security studies, and particularly 
focusing on the Copenhagen school. It also reviews HIV/AIDS, HIV/AIDS as a security issue or 
threat, the United Nations as a norm promoting organization, and the involvement of the UN in 
the endorsement of HIV/AIDS as a threat and or security issue. The third chapter focuses on the 
theoretical framework, detailing the process of securitization by clarifying each step of the 
process. The chapter concludes by outlining the purpose and methodology of the research. The 
fourth chapter provides analysis of the role that the United Nations played in the attempt to 
internationally securitize HIV/AIDS as well as the influence of the UN in the institutionalization 
of HIV/AIDS in national government policy. The fifth chapter traces the process of securitization 
of HIV/AIDS within the four chosen governments (Canada, the United States, Botswana and 
Zimbabwe) and traces the degree to which HIV/AIDS is framed as a security issue. Finally, the 
sixth chapter discusses the results, conclusions of the research, and finally proposes areas of the 
Copenhagen framework that should be updated, through a proposed expansion of the framework.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Review of Relevant Theoretical Frameworks

The following sections review the various relevant security frameworks, in order to justify why the Copenhagen framework was ultimately selected as the most appropriate for this study. As well, through reviews of the current more non-traditional frameworks, the groundwork is established for some of the conclusions that the study later comes to.

Traditional Security

Traditional security issues, such as a nuclear threat or a military attack, are readily identifiable as security issues and thus in both policy decisions and academic research, such threats can be clearly identified, analyzed, or promptly addressed. Security from this perspective is defined very narrowly, with a singular focus: protection and preservation of the state. The traditional referent of security is the state, and traditional threats are widely accepted to be military or political threats. States are recognized as the only actors and security is gained through military power.\textsuperscript{4} Traditional security studies focus on war and have been defined as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force.”\textsuperscript{5} Furthermore, this realm of “security studies assumes that conflict between states is always a possibility and that the use of military force has far-reaching effects on states and societies.”\textsuperscript{6}

The focus of this section is Realist theory. Realism itself is not a single unified theory; it contains different variations and has continued to evolve since its inception.\textsuperscript{7} The clearest

\textsuperscript{4} Ken Booth, \textit{Critical Security Studies and World Politics} (Boulder Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 32.
\textsuperscript{7} Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” 212.
distinctions within, are made between classical realist theory and neorealist/structural realist theory. Classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, focus on individuals and how they are naturally inclined to pursue power and are driven to dominate, which inevitably leads to fighting and war. Such views of security only recognize military and/or political threats to the security of the state. They hold the belief that states only act in their own national interest in order to gain or maintain power. This is done first and foremost through the use of force.\(^8\)

Neorealists, or structural realists, particularly Kenneth Waltz, have focused beyond the role of human nature and acknowledge the role of the international system. They argue that the anarchic international system, lacking an authority that states can rely on for protection, forces states to ensure their own survival. In other words, it is state against state, each constantly trying to preserve power and their own national interests.\(^9\) The anarchic nature of the system therefore makes security the ultimate focus of states. This can lead to the fundamental security dilemma, as each state strives to maintain security through gaining power, “what one does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure.”\(^10\)

There is a divide within structural realism itself, between those who are classified as defensive realists and those who are classified as offensive realists. Defensive realists, such as Waltz, argue against pursuing power and hegemony to the maximum, because it would be counterproductive as demonstrated above with the security dilemma. Offensive realists, such as John Mearsheimer, follow the opposite logic. They argue that it is necessary within the anarchic system, to ensure that the state continues to gain and maintain the most power possible. Power is

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the ultimate goal, because it ensures security; as a result, offensive realists argue for the pursuit of hegemony.11

Security is synonymous with power, and therefore states exist in a constant struggle and competition for power. Structural realist explanations for this competition are based on five basic assumptions about the international system. 1) “Great powers are the main actors in world politics, operating in an anarchic system.” 2) “All states possess offensive military capacity.” 3) “States can never be certain about the intentions of other states.” 4) “The main goal of states is survival.” And 5) “States are rational actors… capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival.”12 Through the assumptions outlined above, incentives for state aggression can be understood. John Mearsheimer explains that three patterns emerge: “first, states in the international system fear each other… fear is a potent force in world politics;” “second, each state in the international system aims to guarantee its own survival;” and “third, states in the international system aim to maximize their relative power position over other states.”13

Although states struggle for power, realists in general agree that states do in fact cooperate within this system, albeit, cooperation has its limits. As a result, for realists, real peace is unlikely.14 Mearsheimer underscores why cooperation, if it occurs, is difficult to maintain: because states are faced with “relative-gains considerations and concern about cheating.”15 When states do cooperate, it is the balance-of-power logic that motivates them to cooperate by forming

12 Dunne and Schmidt, “Realism’, 73-74. This chapter is quoted because the excerpts are succinct and clearly articulate these five basic assumptions. However, they are explored and explained in greater depth in both John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, V. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995), 10; and Waltz, “Realist Thought.”
14 Ibid., 9.
15 Ibid., 12.
alliances against common enemies. Ultimately, realism is pessimistic about states and their selfish pursuit of power. It is assumed that since all states are driven by the same goal, for more power, war is inevitable. In turn, realist understandings of security are rigid and strictly regimented by rules governing how states act and how they interact within the international system.

In such a framework, there is no room to recognize the current developments of the international system. Methodologically, traditional security studies are unable to account for alternative conceptions of security. Security, threats and referent objects are understood objectively as established concepts that are not socially constructed. Traditional frameworks for studying security are neither applicable nor analytically useful for studying HIV/AIDS as a security threat. The fundamental problem with such conservative definitions of security is that global insecurity has become much more complex. The military can no longer be considered the sole locus for security and states are no longer the sole international actors. There are many more actors involved in current security deliberations. The international system can no longer be understood through a realist lens alone. In addition, the changing roles of international organizations, particularly the United Nations, are not reconcilable with traditional security studies; the presence and action of the UN challenges the traditionalist assumptions of actors and actions within the international system. States, societies, and the international community as a whole have evolved and developed in ways that now foster the development of previously unrecognizable security issues. These issues threaten various groups at every level, from the

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16 Ibid., 48.
individual to the global population. Many of the threats that arise today, including environmental and health related threats, are unable to be identified or analyzed as security issues within traditional security studies.

The following further highlights some the most frequently invoked critiques of the traditional state-centric approach to security. Ken Booth presents an extensive review of the most vehemently argued critiques of realism. He summarizes that realism: 1) is not realistic because it offers an incomplete representation of world relationships; 2) is a misnomer, because it presents a perception of the world, not a representation of the world; 3) is a static theory, because it cannot account for the future and instead envisages a constant present; 4) its methodology is unsophisticated, because it is based on a common sense understanding of how the system operates; 5) it fails the test of practice, and instead it actually contributes to the suffering of victims by constructing and perpetuating a world politics that ignores the security of the majority of the world’s population; 6) its assumptions are in fact regressive, by ignoring how the world works and what is held as important, it disregards the realities we face today; 7) its agenda is too narrow, that is based on the perceived strategic interests of states; 8) its ethics are actually hostile to the human interest, by remaining narrow and selfish with the state as the highest decision making body; and finally 9) is intellectually rigid.¹⁹

In a continuation of Booth’s fifth flaw of realism, Pauline Kerr focuses on critiques of the state-centric approach from normative, utilitarian and consequential viewpoints. She argues that the most recognized critique of the traditional approach is that it is unable and unwilling to recognize the “normative human-centric dimensions of security.”²⁰ This argument moves beyond

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¹⁹ Booth, Critical Security Studies, 5.
identifying theoretical gaps, and actually argues that there are direct policy consequences resulting from ignoring the human security aspect; there is a quality of life aspect missed by focusing solely on the state as the locus for security. The traditional approach ultimately dismisses the security of individuals, and is unable to connect with many key principles of international law, particularly humanitarian law.

Security is now a highly contested concept. Critical security studies itself grew from an environment of discontent with the manner in which traditional studies was unable to explain current events. It culminated from the rejection of the “statist and military-oriented assumptions of traditional security studies as a means of opening the field to greater theoretical scrutiny and debate.” The umbrella term CSS provides the impression of a unified framework, however, many of the scholars who began working in this area had little else in common except dissatisfaction with traditional security studies. In addition to Ken Booth, Keith Krause, Michael Williams, Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Richard Wyn Jones, Lene Hansen and Jef Huysmans are just some of the scholars who have been contributing to the growing body of knowledge that is attempting to clarify current security needs and who all explicitly reject the narrow confines of traditional security studies. CSS, and specifically the Copenhagen school, is discussed in more depth in the upcoming section.

The following section reviews two of the more well-known frameworks within non-traditional security studies; specifically, human security and the Copenhagen school. By

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21 Kerr, 8-9.
22 Ibid., 11-14.
24 CSS continues to evolve and develop, but it is still not capable of being identified as a unified and singular framework. Instead, there are many differing frameworks that are each developing within what can be understood as a critical security framework.
reviewing human security first, it also helps to further develop this paper’s understanding of threats and threat recognition.

**Human Security**

Human security is a starkly different framework than traditional security studies and it can be classified as occurring on the entirely opposite end of the security spectrum. As a security framework, human security is loosely defined as both *freedom from want* and *freedom from fear*. Contrary to traditional security studies, the referents for human security are human beings. Threats are often recognized as non-military, and rather than coming from external sources, many times the threats arise internally. In this framework, the state itself is often found to be the source of the threat.

The concept of human security is widely used within the non-academic world, and is used to justify the focus on non-traditional security threats within both the UN and developed countries’ foreign policies. A strong and clear understanding of human security is vital before exploring the deeper and more complex theoretical concepts. Human security continues to be an ambiguous concept, and despite its increasing usage and international political acceptance, it has not been clearly defined for the lay reader and even for those experienced in the concept, it holds a range of alternative definitions.\(^2^6\) Human security has two overarching connotations: human security as a *concept* and human security as an *analytic paradigm*. First is human security as a *concept* to strive for and a concept that influences and shapes both national and international policies. Human security as a *paradigm*, allows for an in-depth and holistic analysis of past and

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present security issues and it provides an analysis that could not have been attained using traditional security frameworks. This distinction is further explored in the paragraphs below.

Freedom from fear encompasses protection from physical violence and protection of basic human rights, and above all, the protection of the right to life. This is considered the narrow end of the human security spectrum. Freedom from want is considered the broader understanding of human security. It argues that economic development, peace, and overall order cannot be achieved within developing countries and failed states without stability, or security. As such, political order or restoration is essential and necessary for development.27

Human security’s background can be traced back to early liberal philosophies, but current understandings of human security arose from growing discontent with the traditional security paradigm following the end of the Cold War. Taylor Owen identifies that with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and despite the so-called balance established by the Cold War, individuals were not as safe as they were perceived to be. People were dying from poverty, disease, hunger, violence and various human rights violations, and the traditional security worldview was in fact camouflaging these threats to individuals.28 Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong have further summarized the rise of human security by arguing that there were six motivating factors that prompted the rise of human security during the twentieth century: 1) the populations that were drafted into armed conflicts changed from smaller numbers of elites to the larger masses; 2) the industrial revolution in conjunction with the scientific revolution led to larger numbers of citizens being killed in the process of protecting the state (due to various advancements in weapons technology); 3) certain states engaged in mass murders of their own populations; 4)

following decolonization, some states did not possess the capacity to provide security for their own populations; 5) the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War prompted an international reevaluation of understandings of order and security; and 6) globalization led to reduced state prominence and a reevaluation of the focus on military threats and defense.\(^{29}\) It could be concluded that human security rose out of the lack of focus on the human impact of conflict and instability. To date, there have been many efforts to establish a clear definition of human security, but it remains ambiguous due to the fact that there are differing schools of thought, as explained below.

Human security as a concept became more widely recognized following the publication of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 1994 *Human Development Report*. The UNDP report established four defining aspects of human security: first, human security is a universal concern; second, its components are interdependent because threats are not confined by borders; third, it is more manageable when intervention is early rather than late; and finally its focus is on individuals and their interactions within society.\(^{30}\) The United Nations has been deeply involved in helping to entrench the conception of human security both nationally and internationally. The UN has advanced three broad understandings of human security: human rights; freedom from fear; and freedom from want. The UNDP report also offered seven broad conceptual guidelines, which it argued, fell under the guidelines of human security. They are: *economic security threatened by poverty; food security threatened by hunger and famine; health security threatened by injury and disease; environmental security threatened by pollution, environmental degradation and resource depletion; personal security threatened by various*


\(^{30}\) Booth, *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, 51-52
forms of violence; political security threatened by political repression and community security threatened by social unrest and instability.  

Human security as a *paradigm* challenges traditional views of the referent of security. As opposed to protection of the state against external threats, the focus of human security is the protection of individuals from both external and internal threats. New approaches for studying security are now more necessary than ever because the traditional frameworks for analysis can no longer explain many of the threats and events that are occurring. Wars between states are one example of this; the policies that were advised to prevent them were understood and created within a traditional framework. However, traditional frameworks cannot explain violent conflicts within states and presently these now make up over 95% of current armed conflicts.

Similarly to the disagreements found in the larger framework of security studies, within the human security paradigm there remains a lack of consensus on many issues, in particular and most problematically there is disagreement over the threats that individuals need protection from. The disagreements have been generally divided between those who believe there should be a widening of the human security paradigm, and those who wish that the paradigm remained more narrowly constrained. Taylor Owen provides an alternative for those who find the narrow versus broad debate futile. He suggests a hybrid definition, one that does not see a difference between death from a weapon and death from a natural disaster. Owen created a two-part definition of human security, one that offers a more concise understanding of human security. First human security is “the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive

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33 Ibid., VIII.
34 Ibid., VIII.
threats.” Secondly, he refines the threats that fall under the auspices of human security by clarifying that “individuals require protection from environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats.”

To justify his assertions, Owen explains that different harms require vastly different policy responses and as a result, all threats should be evaluated based on their level of severity. Owen argues that only those threats that surpass a defined severity threshold should be included under the umbrella of human security. He goes on to clarify what the severity threshold entails and how it is defined. The following qualifiers set his so-called threshold: the minimum level of survival necessary (vital core) and the severity and immediacy of the threat (critical and pervasive threats). By adhering to Owen’s threshold definition only the most severe threats, those that take or seriously threaten lives, would be identified as human security threats. Owen’s conceptual model is promising because, unlike other models, it takes the focus off of the threat and places it on the individual and the impact on the individual, and he also bases it on regional considerations. Rather than remain confined by a set number of predefined threats that are assessed regardless of other regional, political, social and economic considerations, Owen’s threshold definition is flexible enough to be used on a case-by-case basis.

Human security continues to remain contested and widely critiqued, both on conceptual and methodological grounds. Many scholars have argued and continue to argue that the expansion of security to include a wider variety of issues will run the risk of diluting the concept, making it useless as an analytic tool. There are also questions regarding its applicability as a

36 Ibid., 20. Note that Owen has narrowed the threat categories from the UNDP report to only six threats.
37 Ibid., 20.
38 Ibid., 20.
practical guide for both academic research and governmental policy application. These questions relate back to the murky definition of human security. Roland Paris points out two underlying and interconnected issues which may be undermining the applicability of human security for students and practitioners alike: first is the lack of a clear and precise definition. Second, is the worry that those most committed to human security have a vested interest in maintaining the vague and expansive nature of the term. The problems that Paris points to can be demonstrated through the differences between the Canadian and Japanese governments understandings of human security. Canada adheres more to the narrow freedom from fear understanding, which identifies threats to people’s rights, safety and lives. By contrast, Japan follows a broader conceptualization of human security, freedom from want. This includes all threats that affect the survival, daily life, and dignity of individuals. These differences can affect much more than the national foreign policies of both Canada and Japan, they can infiltrate and confuse the international understanding of human security. As well, the differences can prevent coherence within international efforts to unite in global policies and approaches to threats. For these reasons, in order to narrow the analytic focus and to also find more conceptual clarity, the Copenhagen school is the framework selected. The following briefly reviews critical security studies and then engages in a more in depth review the Copenhagen school framework.

**Critical Security Studies and the Copenhagen School**

Critical security studies is defined by Steve Smith as a framework that consists of “alternatives for security studies to that offered by the mainstream [and] it is explicit in its
rejection of realism, [but] it does not add up to an alternative theory.”\textsuperscript{43} The so-called alternatives that Smith refers to above are established within various schools of thought, but for this discussion the most relevant alternatives are found within the Copenhagen, and Aberystwyth schools.\textsuperscript{44} CSS became more prevalent in international relations following the middle of the 1990s.\textsuperscript{45} Originally, the most that the various CSS approaches had in common with each other was a mutual dissatisfaction with traditional security studies.\textsuperscript{46} However, there have been many strides forward in the advancement and clarification of the concepts within this area, and this is mainly due to an ongoing dialogue and continuum of critiques reverberating between various CSS scholars. It is important to reiterate that CSS is not a theory, but what Booth calls “a body of knowledge.”\textsuperscript{47}

As a result of the ongoing variations within each of the above-mentioned schools, there are conflicting understandings within critical security studies of what constitutes a security threat. For this paper the focus is on the Copenhagen understandings of security, threats, and relevant actors, which are discussed in more depth in the ensuing subsection. The variations between the different schools’ understandings of security and threat are area of both weakness and strength for them, and problems that garner much criticism from other scholars. In part, these differences can be beneficial by allowing flexibility in threat identification, but they can also be detrimental for the same reasons that are identified within the previous section on human security. Regardless, the schools within CSS have made great strides forward and they continue to push for clearer methods of threat identification and threat analysis.

\textsuperscript{43} Smith, “The Contested Concept of Security,” 45.
\textsuperscript{47} Booth, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, 260.
The Aberystwyth school focuses mostly on the individual as the referent and it maintains a narrower focus than CSS in general. The Copenhagen school does not restrict itself to one level of referent, and it focuses on the political construction of insecurity and danger. The Copenhagen school offers one of the most important developments within CSS, with their process of securitization. This process is the central framework for this research and it is discussed in depth in the following chapter. Unlike the Aberystwyth school, the Copenhagen school does not restrict its potential analysis to one level of referent, and this is one of the reasons it was selected as the framework for this study. This paper needed a framework that was capable of analyzing the complexities of what was practically occurring, without initially restricting the area of study.

Before continuing, it is necessary to address one of the most common critiques of widening the security agenda, the ‘security trap.’ The concept of the ‘security trap’ refers to the potentially problematic outcomes of widening the security agenda to include virtually everything, which in turn may counteract the original purpose of widening the agenda in the first place. By attempting to include more issues under the security umbrella, it is argued that the concept of security becomes diluted and that we may actually become more insecure. It is also argued that a second problem may also occur in tandem with the first trap. That is, as we attempt to create more security, there is the potential to actually create more anxiety. These are the risks associated with delving into these sorts of issues. The c.a.s.e Collective further summarizes the potential problem for scholars exploring security by explaining, “the irony is that even the most careful and critical scholar aiming at avoiding the first and second traps might unwillingly

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51 Ibid., 460.
participate in the securitization of new issues when analyzing how these issues are de facto framed in terms of security.”\textsuperscript{52} In moving forward, this problem is recognized and understood to be an underlying risk for all who study security in general. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde also point out that, “there are intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word security onto an ever wider range of issues.”\textsuperscript{53} In studying and theorizing about security issues, they warn that intellectual coherence needs to be upheld. However, maintaining intellectual coherence is not the only reason they warn against overly relying on security, they have ethical reasons for restraining as well. In certain instances, it may be more dangerous to avoid 'tacking’ the word security on certain issues. The point is, we need to be able to recognize when to connect it or not. The following section begins to outline the foundational concepts of the Copenhagen school, particularly the concepts of security, referent objects, and threats.

\textbf{Security, threats, and referent objects.}

Security continues to be a disputed concept, and will likely remain one as long as there are divides within security studies more generally.\textsuperscript{54} For this paper a clearer understanding of what constitutes security is necessary, and of what Copenhagen school understands security to mean. The following questions provide guidelines for better understanding security: security for whom, from whom, in what way and for how long? While exploring these questions, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde explain that we need to remember that there is a difference between an international relations invocation of security and the references to security

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 461.
\textsuperscript{53} Barry Buzan, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1.
in everyday language. Security at its most basic level is about survival and, as a result, the particular nature of security threats can be used to justify exceptional measures enacted to address the threats. There can never be a universal standard of security based on what threatens human life because threats are relative to the referent objects. Security is dependent on the actor’s understanding of insecurity, and insecurity is dependent on the actor’s ability to manage the threats that occur daily.

There is an ongoing debate within CSS, and security studies more generally, between those who wish to maintain a narrow definition of security threats and those who wish to widen the field by accepting the recognition of more non-traditional threats. Taylor Owen discussed threats in the context of human security, and he provided critiques that apply more generally to security studies. This is reviewed again in chapter six. One of the differences between the understandings of Owen and that of Buzan and Waever is that Owen has a more material definition of security, while Buzan and Waever have a discursive definition of security. The Copenhagen school provides the clarity and focus that is necessary in order to study the issue at hand. Their discursive definition is more reflective of how actors engage in security discussions, and how they construct threats. As is discussed in more detail below, the Copenhagen school does not predefine threats, but does categorize where threats can be identified, according to predefined sectors: military, political, societal, economic, and environment.

What sets the Copenhagen school framework apart from most security studies, is that they argue it is “neither politically nor analytically helpful to try to define ‘real security’ outside of the world of politics and to teach the actors to understand the term correctly…It is more relevant to

56 Ibid., 21.
57 Threat identification is explored in a later chapter, for now it is important to review the CSS concept of *security, threats* and *securitization*. 
grasp the processes and dynamics of securitization.”

Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde do provide a general definition of security, as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.” Furthermore, contrary to the belief of many, the Copenhagen school is not a state-centric framework. It recognizes that the state can be and many times is the referent of security, but they clarify that it is not the only possible referent. Rather than imposing their own restrictions on the referent of security, they allow for the case specific recognition of the referent in practice. The Copenhagen school clarifies that security issues should be studied within one of the following predefined sectors: economic, military, political, social, or environmental. In each of the sectors they outline specific areas of potential security relevance. They further clarify who the potential referent may be within each of these sectors, but again, they do not limit the framework by defining and restricting the analyst to specific referents (as is the case with both realism and human security). With regards to threats, the Copenhagen school argues that they can be external or internal; the threat is dependent on the sector under investigation. The threat does not need to be a real objective threat, it only needs to be presented as a threat.

Buzan, Waever and de Wilde analyze security issues across different sectors and levels of analysis. This allows them more clarity, while expanding and broadening far beyond traditional security studies; however, it also narrows and refines the understanding of security in a way that human security cannot. In this way, the framework is unique. They explain and identify referent objects and threats in the following manner: within the military sector, the referent is usually the state, but other political entities can be recognized. They recognize that military affairs are no

59 Ibid., 23.
60 Ibid., 37-39.
61 This is discussed further in the chapter on theoretical development. Ibid., 7-8.
62 Ibid., 23-33.
longer always synonymous with security. “Defense of the state is becoming only one, and perhaps not even the main de facto, function of the armed forces.” Within the political sector, they still recognize the importance of the sovereignty and ideology of the state as the referent. However, they clarify that “among the ever more interdependent and institutionalized relations characteristic of the West (and increasingly the international system as a whole), a variety of supranational referent objects are also becoming important.” Within the economic sector, they admit that both the referent object and existential threats are difficult to predetermine. To provide insight, they explain that “as in the political sector, supranational referent objects from specific regimes to the global market itself can be existentially threatened by factors that might undermine the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute them.” Within the societal sector, they conclude that the referent object should be understood as “large-scale collective identities that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions.” They elaborate that within this sector it is difficult to differentiate between existential and lesser threats, and so whether identities are securitized will depend on the understandings of identity that the holders of collective identities maintain.

Finally, within the environmental sector, they explain that the variety of potential referents is quite vast, ranging from concrete things to less clear and more large-scale issues. They explain that, “at either the macro or micro extreme are some clear cases of existential threat (the survival of species, the survival of human civilization) that can be securitized.”

Buzan et al. define security issues as being “staged as existential threats to referent objects by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules

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63 Buzan et. al., 22.
64 Ibid., 22.
65 Ibid., 22.
66 Ibid., 22-23.
67 Ibid., 23.
68 Ibid., 23.
that would otherwise bind.” They argue that in order to recognize a potential security issue as a real and viable threat, it needs to meet the above three “strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political.” To clarify, the three criteria for successful securitization are: existential threats, and emergency measures, that go beyond normal political rules. This adherence to specific criteria is one of the main critiques of the Copenhagen process of securitization. By following strictly defined and narrow criteria for recognizing threats, new and emergent critical issues are unable to be studied as threats, because there are predefined sectors under which threats can be identified and guidelines for how actors have to react to the potential threat.

According to the Copenhagen school, for issues to become questions of security they need to be constructed in such a manner; scholars argue that this is done particularly through political discourse. By engaging in security discourses, actors imbue a heightened priority on particular issues. Security is understood as a political discourse that instills responsibility and legitimates the use of power. Furthermore, the securitizing actors are bestowed with the legitimate power necessary to engage in the “decisive and otherwise exceptional actions” and the discourses simultaneously bestow a responsibility to engage in the abovementioned actions on those actors involved. When an issue is understood as a security issue, or as a threat, it takes on political saliency and in turn “not only will [the referent] be subject of intense policy activity, but [the referent] will also be favorably treated when resources are allocated.” In summary, security

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69 Buzan et. al., 5.
70 Ibid., 5.
71 This is discussed further in the chapter on theoretical development. Ibid., 7-8.
73 Ibid., 35.
74 Ibid., 25.
should be understood as a political discourse that enacts responsibility and legitimizes the exercise of power, in order to protect against a threat(s).\footnote{Buzan et. al., 35.}

This Copenhagen school framework is discussed in depth in the ensuing chapter on the securitization framework. Before that discussion, the following section demonstrates the importance of studying HIV/AIDS, by clarifying how far reaching the virus is and the social, political and economic impacts it can have on states and the global system.

**HIV/AIDS as a Global Security Issue**

The HIV epidemic has a great capacity to magnify all the social problems of the environment in which it occurs.\footnote{Ulf Kristoffersson, “HIV/AIDS as a Human Security Issue: A Gender Perspective,” in *The HIV/AIDS Pandemic and Its Gender Implications*, (Windhoek, Namibia: 2000), 3.} (In actual fact it) has adverse effects on all structures of society. It is, in fact, the breadth and scope of these effects that make AIDS a threat to human security and a potentially destabilizing force worldwide.\footnote{Security Council, Executive Director UNAIDS, Statement to the Security Council, 2003, 3.}

As of 2007, there were approximately 40 million people living with HIV, and to date approximately 25 million people have died from AIDS related illnesses.\footnote{Paul G. and Patricia D. Siplon Harris, ed., *The Global Politics of AIDS* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 1. UNAIDS estimates the global HIV rates to be between 30 million and 36 million. UNAIDS, "2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic," (Switzerland: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2008), 214. Also, see Figure 1, page 26, for global AIDS distribution percentages.} It is not just a problem of the so-called developing world but the devastating impact is most visible in the poorest and least developed regions. What poses to be the most serious issue for the coming decades is that regions that previously experienced low prevalence levels are now experiencing noticeable increases in HIV prevalence rates (specifically the former Soviet states, and south, southeast, and...
east Asian countries). For this reason in particular, security scholars need to be capable of recognizing and understanding HIV/AIDS as a potential security threat either nationally, regionally and even globally. In the last decade, national and international responsibility regarding HIV/AIDS has become widely debated within both developed and developing nations. The complex relations that result from the spread of the pandemic have an impact on

Figure 1: Estimated Global Distribution of HIV/AIDS for 2007

![Estimated Global Distribution of HIV/AIDS for 2007](image)

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79 Harris, ed., *The Global Politics of AIDS*, 1-2. The term *prevalence rate* is used to describe the total number of cases of a disease in a population at a given time.
more than just the individuals who are infected. In regions such as Africa, where the virus has reached epidemic status, all levels of society are negatively affected. The social, political and economic spheres are currently being destabilized by death rates alone. Internationally, the virus is garnering unprecedented attention and debate.

The connection between HIV/AIDS and security has been argued for many years.80 Dennis Altman offers insight into the early efforts that were made to understand HIV/AIDS as a global security issue. He claims that there is evidence that as early as the 1990s, individuals within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were arguing for the need to understand the impact of HIV/AIDS on national and international stability.81 Altman also refers to the Ottawa Charter as one of the first examples of an official attempt to establish an international framework to control HIV/AIDS.82 Jonathan Mann further influenced the evolution to our current understanding of HIV/AIDS. Mann was the first director of the Global Program on AIDS. He made a connection between human rights and HIV/AIDS, and from there grew the eventual connection between AIDS and development. This latter connection was one of the key motivators behind the decision of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) to establish UNAIDS.83

While the practical connection between HIV/AIDS and security was made early on by those working directly in the field and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is beyond the scope and framework of this study.84 The pinnacle of this attention and debate came when HIV/AIDS

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80 Although there are scholars studying these issues, very few are from security studies more generally and even fewer adhere to a css framework of analysis. Some of the most notable scholars studying HIV/AIDS and securitization are reviewed in the following chapter.
82 The Ottawa Charter was presented by the World Health Organization at the first international conference on health promotion, in 1986. The Charter explains that for gains in health, the following eight key areas need to achieve security: peace, shelter, education, food, income, eco-system stability, resource stability, and finally social justice and equality. The Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion, (21 November).
83 Altman, "HIV and Security," 3.
84 The Copenhagen framework of securitization only recognizes the moment of securitization and onward, ignoring the importance of context and of the long-term contributions that lead to successful securitization. This is an aspect
was officially recognized and elevated to the level of an international security issue by the United Nations. On the 10 January 2000, HIV/AIDS was designated a threat to international peace and security in Africa by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The Security Council held a daylong meeting discussing the security implications of HIV/AIDS, with a particular but not singular focus on Africa. The discussions that took place explicitly discussed the security impacts of the virus and the threat beyond Africa if it was left unaddressed. This action was not without reason. The argument was that conflict, food insecurity, political instability, economic instability and the changing of social norms are some of the most complicated and visible outcomes of the spread of HIV/AIDS. After this point in time, the contentious connection became much more widely debated within the practitioner and academic realms. Scholars have discussed, encouraged, and discouraged the designation of HIV/AIDS as a security threat and the debate continues to this day. The following paragraphs review some of the most visible effects of the interaction between HIV/AIDS and the local political and social environment, starting with the relationship between conflict and HIV/AIDS.

Although the full connections between HIV/AIDS, security and the global situation have yet to be fully explored, the impact of HIV/AIDS on security has been explicitly made in Africa.

86 The meeting and the actions that followed are discussed in more depth in the section on the United Nations.
87 These are particular situations occurring within Africa: however, it is not difficult to foresee future related occurrences in unaddressed areas; China, and Russia have the potential to experience epidemic level outbreaks in the near future. As well, it is necessary to understand the global impact of these events within Africa: globalization has ensured that we have become a true global community, with economic and social ties to what were traditionally regarded as isolated areas.
The reason for this more intensified focus is that HIV/AIDS has primarily affected Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In SSA, the primary cause of death is AIDS and, in some countries, the adult prevalence rates are as high as 20-30 percent of the population. The high prevalence rates, in combination with other long term problems that continue to plague SSA and Africa more than any other region, are leading to a complex variety of social, political and economic problems.

Figure 2: The Ten Sub-Saharan Countries with Highest Adult HIV Prevalence Percentages

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88 See Figure 1 and 2 for details.
90 This chart is also important because the two African cases were chosen (in part) based on the two countries with the highest HIV/AIDS rates in 2001, and then the two highest drops in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in 2007. Swaziland and Lesotho both had high prevalence rates in 2001, but did not experience any significant reductions in rates.
Previous attempts to understand the connection between HIV/AIDS and security have been problematic because many of those who become infected can live up to ten years or more before AIDS actually develops. AIDS impacts their own ability to function in society, and within their own lives. Due to these temporal considerations, there are long term and short term security implications that each have complex dynamics whether individually, nationally, or globally.

The disastrous long-term effects have become much clearer now, as the virus has had time to infect almost three generations of people. It has cycled through and killed at least one full generation of people. The short-term versus long-term effects for Africa are each quite different. Robert Ostergard has identified the short-term effects as posing the most serious security problems for Africa. This temporal dimension is what Ostergard has argued requires the most attention. He argues that the threat posed by HIV/AIDS in the short-term is indirect, however this is also what makes it a security threat. The impacts are less discernible and can therefore go unnoticed until it is too late. For Ostergard it is predominantly the military and political security of the African countries that are threatened by the “invisible enemy.” Ostergard is referring to the dramatic loss of sheer manpower, meaning that the loss of human life will have an immediate impact on the ability of states to defend themselves and to effectively run themselves.

The relationship between conflict and HIV/AIDS requires further attention because of the detrimental outcomes that can result from the interaction between HIV/AIDS and conflict situations. P.W. Singer stresses that the main connection between the two is most visible within the military sector. According to Singer, the global infection rates for soldiers are on average much higher than the rates of civilians. Within Africa, the rates of infection for the military are as much as four times the civilian rates and, during conflict, the rates are estimated to increase up to

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fifty percent higher than that of the civilian population. In African militaries, the reported rates of infection remain quite high and for that reason some governments have chosen not to divulge their rates of HIV/AIDS infection. The following are estimated HIV/AIDS prevalence rates within militaries from 2000: Angola (40-60%), Eritrea (10%), DRC (40-60%), Nigeria (10-20%), Tanzania (15-30%), Ivory Coast (10-20%), Lesotho (40%), Malawi (50%), Zimbabwe (55%), Botswana (40%), Namibia (33%), Zambia (35%), and South Africa (21%). With such high rates of infection, maintaining the adequate skilled militaries necessary for ensuring national security especially poses a major challenge.

The prevalence of HIV/AIDS has much wider implications for the affected countries beyond the loss of able soldiers. Alex de Waal explains that, “modern institutions are framed around decades-long working lives. The running of a bureaucracy such as a government ministry, a large firm or an army, depends on staff who have not only professional skills but also many years of experience and extensive networks of personal contacts.” With such high rates of infection, it is inevitable that the core infrastructure of a state will be affected if the infection rates become too high. One example of the impact is witnessed in Mozambique. The country is having a great deal of difficulty recruiting and training the necessary number of new officers in order to fill the positions of those dying of AIDS-related illnesses. Experiences like that of Mozambique may become more widespread and more visible within the next decade.

The risks of increasing prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS during periods of conflict are

94 The Zambian authorities have not disclosed the actual prevalence rates; Elbe suggests that this is because the rates are so high. Elbe, "HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa," 164.
especially pertinent for security discussions, principally because within the global system there are many conflicts occurring. In 2007, there were 328 recognized conflicts occurring internationally, which is up from 278 in 2006. It is important to note that 198 of the conflicts in 2007 were identified as non-violent. Non-violent conflict includes strategies to reduce or wage political and social turmoil, during which time there can be widespread chaos and instability. During non-violent conflict, the reconstruction efforts are not always as prevalent and so the resources to test for HIV/AIDS are much less accessible. Armed conflicts greatly increase the spread of HIV/AIDS, but for regions where the prevalence rates are already high, the virus has a particular impact and affect on the nature and the conduct of the war. Conflict and HIV/AIDS interact negatively in several specific ways. These ways include: first and foremost the systematic rape of civilians by the soldiers involved in the conflict on both sides; widespread and uncontrollable population movements; the establishment of large refugee camps and the conditions created within that foster more widespread rape and unprotected consensual sex; poverty, which leads to increased reliance on commercial sex for economic stability; reduction in access to information and a decline in literacy; and finally, the devastation of basic but vital infrastructure, particularly health care systems. Altman points out that the above factors can all be clearly identified in various conflicts within the Congo, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and East Timor, to name a few.

Peter Piot, the Executive Director of UNAIDS, makes a specific aspect of the relationship

99 Research, "Conflict Barometer 2007." It is necessary to add that violent conflict receives more attention than non-violent conflict. As a result, sexual violence that occurs during non-violent conflict can be overlooked in the aftermath. In turn, the spread of HIV/AIDS may occur more silently than usual.
100 Elbe, "HIV/AIDS and the Changing Landscape of War in Africa," 160.
101 Altman, "HIV and Security," 5; Ruku Oyaku, "Wars and HIV/AIDS Spread in Sub-Saharan Africa," posting to break-the-silence@hdnet.org.
102 Altman, "HIV and Security," 5.
quite clear by claiming that, “war is the instrument of AIDS and rape is an instrument of war.”

Elbe also explains that the impact of HIV/AIDS is most visible in the manner in which the conflicts are waged, especially the use of sexual violence as a so-called weapon of war. Rape has been systematically employed during African conflicts in Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. During the Rwandan genocide in particular, it has been estimated that upwards of 500,000 women were raped. (The extent of the spread of HIV/AIDS from the Rwandan genocidal rapes has yet to be fully determined).

The experience of peacekeepers and peacekeeping operations demonstrates the potentially devastating interaction between HIV/AIDS and conflict. The United Nations adoption of Resolution 1308 in 2000 culminated in international recognition of the implications of HIV/AIDS for peacekeeping personnel. The United Nations “expresses concern at the potential damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of international peacekeeping personnel, including support personnel.”

The approach that is being taken by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is not reflective of the security discourses being repeated and invoked within the UN. The DPKO has stated that reducing the spread and prevalence of HIV/AIDS within peacekeeping operations is a priority for the department. However, the approach that the DPKO is using involves:

1. The creation of specific capacity within missions for AIDS programmes;
2. Ensuring the availability of condoms for personnel and observing universal medical precautions, including the provision of screened blood supplies and post-exposure prophylaxis kits;
3. The development of voluntary counselling and testing capacities in missions;
4. Establishing monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, like the 2005 HIV/AIDS knowledge, attitude and practice survey among peacekeepers in Liberia;

and (5) developing outreach projects specifically targeting local communities and integrating HIV/AIDS concerns into broader mandated activities, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the training of national police forces.\textsuperscript{107}

John Kemoli Sagala further underlines the importance of establishing adequate approaches to health and security by highlighting the fact that the military, including peacekeepers, has a longstanding relationship with health issues that supports the connection between HIV/AIDS and conflict. In particular, Kemoli Sagala argues that the relevance of understanding the relationship between the military and its susceptibility to health issues lies in the fact that military populations are highly vulnerable to infections, particularly African militaries,\textsuperscript{108} because of:

existing socioeconomic and political conditions, the macho nature of their job, the mobile tendency of military service, civil wars and other armed conflicts, sexual assault of vulnerable populations and refugees, cultural practices and unsterile traditional rituals, unsterile health care, tainted blood transfusion, multiple concurrent sexual partners, CSWs [commercial sex workers], low condom use, and the presence of other STDs such as syphilis and gonorrhea.\textsuperscript{109}

What the DPKO does not take into account, is that conflict enables and hastens the spread of HIV/AIDS through many avenues during conflict, including through rape and other forms of sexual violence; through soldiers engaging in high risk sexual activity; through peacekeepers engaging in high risk activity and spreading it as they are more mobile than the general population; through insufficient reconstruction efforts following the conflict; and finally, through lack of services and access to HIV/AIDS testing. The above paragraphs have highlighted the intrusive and dynamic relationship that can occur between HIV/AIDS and conflict; in particular,


\textsuperscript{109} Kemoli Sagala, 295.
they demonstrate the potential security implications that can result from their interactions together.

The invasive nature of the virus means that areas with epidemic prevalence levels experience devastating consequences across all levels of society and the potential security implications for HIV/AIDS as a pandemic are even greater. Beyond conflict situations, the social, political and economic structures are also inevitably altered and within each of these sectors there are more widespread and long-term effects than those witnessed during the times of conflict. In all actuality, we have yet to see the full impact of the spread of HIV/AIDS on an affected society. A 2006 UNAIDS report identifies that the highly affected countries have yet to experience the full extent of the ‘final waves’ of the global pandemic.\textsuperscript{110}

Another major aspect of security that is impacted by the spread of HIV/AIDS is food security, which is especially crucial for any country experiencing instability, and also for those that are in the fragile process of development. The food security of countries, especially within SSA, is being fundamentally affected by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations,

The impacts of HIV/AIDS on poor rural populations are many and intertwined. The impacts can be felt most dramatically in entrenched poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, in the reduction of the labour force, and in the loss of essential knowledge that is transmitted from generation to generation... What's more, these same consequences of HIV/AIDS - poverty, food insecurity, malnutrition, reduced labour force and loss of knowledge - contribute to making the rural poor more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection.\textsuperscript{111}

The interactions of the Jaboya system in Lake Victoria further exemplify the above-mentioned interactions. The Jaboya system refers to the relationship between the fishermen and the women


\textsuperscript{111} FAO, "Impacts of HIV/AIDS," (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations).
who purchase the fish from them and it is usually a sexual relationship. A woman who participates in this system explained that, “when fishermen come from the lake, I buy their fish, but in order to guarantee that you get fish you must also develop a sexual relationship. Without sex there is no guarantee that you will get any fish.” These relationships continue as the women procure transport to the market, and secure the sale with the market vendors. The Jaboya system, is intricately part of the industry and secures access to food for many women; it is viewed as the only option for women without any other support. To complete the cycle of the spread of HIV/AIDS, the fishermen migrate along the coast with the fish and thus increase the risk of further spreading the infection. The Jaboya system demonstrates the severe and vicious circle that is created by the relationship between HIV/AIDS and food insecurity.\(^\text{112}\)

It has been argued that all levels of security are threatened by the spread of HIV/AIDS, including the security of those at the individual, national, and international levels. However, each level experiences different outcomes as various aspects of their social, economic, and political stability are affected by the spread of HIV/AIDS.\(^\text{113}\) The complex relationship between HIV/AIDS and security continues to be examined by scholars and practitioners alike, but to date they have yet to fully address the potential for widespread devastation and the extent of the challenge that is faced by the global community. Alex de Waal clarifies what the international community is truly facing, as he explains that, “HIV/AIDS is destined to be an ineradicable part of the human condition for the next hundred years. Unlike recent historic epidemics and wars, which resulted in death for a contained period of time, HIV/AIDS will be


akin to the devastation of a war in each and every generation.”\textsuperscript{114}

The United Nations

A review of the role that the United Nations has played in the development of international norms is necessary for this study because in general the UN has initiated and influenced state acceptance of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. The process of securitization is comparable to the normalization of international issues, and thus the influence of the UN as a norm advanceer is quite relevant to these discussions.

Since its establishment in 1945, the UN has been pivotal in contributing to the development and progression of international relations, particularly by establishing international norms and supporting the international acceptance of conventions. The UN is one of the only international organizations that has the ability to influence and change the accepted norms of states and national actors, at both the national and international levels.\textsuperscript{115} Its capacity to do so is directly related to its international legitimacy and authority as an organization, two qualities that very few other international organizations possess together. Its influence is not always openly accepted nor is it always recognized, and its abilities are constantly in check with the fact that “decision-making in world politics and international organizations remains dominated by states.”\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{114} Alex de Waal, "Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About AIDS Today and Tomorrow," \textit{Index on Censorship} 33, no. 210 (2004), 27.


\textsuperscript{116} Daws, "World Politics: Continuity and Change since 1945," 3.
As the international organization, the United Nations is the leader in normative advancement. The UN is taking on the foremost role in establishing global governance norms. It has been bestowed with the role of guardian of “collective legitimacy,” which in turn allows the UN to affect the international standards of state behaviour.\textsuperscript{117} Actions and reactions from the UN have an impact on international cohesion, but more importantly it legitimizes policies and stabilizes world order. In doing so, it also establishes and disseminates international norms and policies. This legitimation of decisions, values and principles governing international order is one of the main functions of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{118} These connections between authority, power, and legitimacy are critical for discussions regarding the ability of the UN to influence norm advancement and norm change. As Ramesh Thakur explains, “ideas matter and institutions matter as conduits for ideas.”\textsuperscript{119} Thakur further highlights the potential influence of the UN in these matters as he explains that international commissions provide a means of leveraging new and contested ideas into “generally accepted global norms.” In other words, “commissions can be a catalyst to register norm shifts and convert them into international public policy.”\textsuperscript{120}

The United Nations is the only international organizations of its kind that has widespread international acceptance. The inclusion of most of the international community within the organization is one of the most important aspects of the dynamic. From the power, legitimacy and authority derived from international acceptance, the UN is imbued with the potential to securitize an issue across the international system in the same manner that it is able to diffuse and promote various norms internationally. There is no other organization that has the capacity to influence across various levels; actors can securitize an issue if they are powerful enough, but

\textsuperscript{119} Thakur, \textit{The United Nations, Peace, and Security.}, 10.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 11.
only within their own system (a state can securitize a threat to itself, but its attempts to securitize a threat within another country, will generally go unrecognized). The UN is an internationally recognized organization that is involved in many different systems and to this day, it is relied on to provide and advise on matters of national and global importance.

Thakur acknowledges that norms influence the goals of states and the manner in which states pursue their goals, but he also points out that currently there are no \textit{sufficient} methods for conceptualizing a theory of international norms or even for conducting empirical research into this area. He offers that the critical question we should focus on is how contested norms become institutionalized, both nationally and internationally. As well, we should be studying the \textit{interactive dynamics} of the process of institutionalization.\footnote{Thakur, \textit{The United Nations, Peace, and Security}, 12.} Thakur’s work on norms offers an additional view for theorizing about securitization in general, and it may offer an additional understanding of the process of securitization of HIV/AIDS. If international norms, those brought to life within commissions and various organs of the UN, can be transmitted from the international level to the national level,\footnote{Ibid., 12-13.} then it can be supposed that the securitization of HIV/AIDS would also occur similarly if initiated by the United Nations.\footnote{For the intents and purposes of this paper, a full review of the vast literature on international norms and norm diffusion was deemed unnecessary. This section was meant to establish the connection between the legitimacy and authority of the UN that allows it to be actively involved in the international influence of norms, and the potential for the UN to become involved in the securitization of HIV/AIDS. It is also a justification for identifying the UN as the starting point for the so-called international securitization of HIV/AIDS. The UN is one of the only IOs that has the power, authority and legitimacy to actively initiate an international level securitization.} Since norms are transmitted from the UN down to nations, tracing the same path of institutionalization can test the argument that HIV/AIDS is a security issue.
The United Nations, Security, and HIV/AIDS

While there have been other influential organizations, particularly local NGOs, who have been actively involved in identifying a connection between HIV/AIDS and security, the focus for this paper is the UN and its role in elevating the discussions to the international stage. The UN has taken several strides forward in reconceptualizing security discussions. The organization has helped to shift current security discussions in three identifiable ways: firstly, it has been an “incubator and a generator of new ideas.” Secondly, it has been a site for debates on security and for the formation of new coalitions. Finally, it has been a legitimizing tool, giving weight to the human security paradigm in practice. The connection within the UN between HIV/AIDS and security has its roots in the general evolution of security discussions within the UN. The Human Development Report (HDR) is the identifiable moment after which the global language and conception of human security was pushed forward, as demonstrated by the following: “the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives.” The HDR was only the beginning; there have been other commissions and reports that have further influenced the broadening global understanding of security. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Human Security Commission’s 2003 report entitled Human Security Now are two of the most visible human security endeavors. Two other commissions that have focused specifically on HIV/AIDS are: the 2001 General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, and the Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (which calls for another Security

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124 This paper recognizes the importance and role other actors beyond the United Nations in elevating HIV/AIDS to the level of a security issue. It was beyond the scope of this paper to engage in a review of all actors involved in getting HIV/AIDS to the agenda of the United Nations. It was also beyond the scope of the framework, as it focuses primarily on the securitizing move and beyond.
126 Ibid., 91.
128 Ibid., 553.
Council session on HIV/AIDS and recommends Security Council cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO)).

The United Nations has been closely involved in the development and diffusion of norms relating to all three broad understandings of human security (human rights, freedom from fear and freedom from want) and it has helped to facilitate state acceptance of these norms. The UN has historically been involved in the identification of the connection between health and security.

Starting in 1945, the UN established within Article 55 of the Charter, that:

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;

b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and

c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

In this article of the Charter, the UN opens the door for more explicit discussions of health and security. The UN clearly acknowledges its right to promote solutions for international health problems. In admitting this, it must also be capable of identifying what those international health problems are. This is an important clarification of the role that the UN sees itself playing in the diffusion of norms. The World Health Organization, as a branch of the United Nations, openly recognized the link between health and security as early as 1946. In the preamble to WHO’s constitution, this link

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130 Penny, "Human Security,” 554.
was made explicitly clear: “the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security.”

The 2000 argument by the UN, that the AIDS pandemic posed a security threat and one of severe extent for Africa, laid the groundwork for the argument of broader security issues. It was agreed that a broader security agenda had to encompass pandemics from new diseases, as well as the reemergence of resistant strains of old diseases. The following statement highlights the extent of the internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue within the UN: “a world in which every year 11 million children die before their 5th birthday and 3 million people die of AIDS is not a secure world.” This quote is important for two key reasons. First, the message is clear, succinct and thought provoking and it openly connects HIV/AIDS and global security. However, the second reason it is powerful is the underlying relevance; Kofi Annan was the face of the United Nations, he connected AIDS and security in a simple sentence. This statement has likely been quoted and repeated countless times. Norm internalization is not only successful through the influence and official acceptance by official organizations; individuals with high levels of authority have a great deal of influence on the path of acceptance, whether intentional or not. It is argued by the UN that HIV/AIDS can be understood as a human security issue and thus identifiable by the UN because of the path that the infection takes: from infection to communal devastation and finally to social and national disintegration. To break it down further, Thakur clarifies that AIDS can be a personal security issue, an economic security issue, a communal security issue, a national security issue, and finally an international security issue. Ultimately, it is clear that there is a gap between current security capabilities and real security needs. In order to

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132 Burci, "Health and Infectious Diseases," 587.
133 Ibid., 588.
134 Kofi Annan, Ibid., 85.
136 Ibid., 85-86.
begin to redress this gap, the concept of security needs to be more clearly agreed upon and security frameworks need to be capable of recognizing instances of security based on the real world impacts and recognition of the impacts.

In moving forward, this paper accepts the role of the United Nations, and the influence that the organization itself continues to maintain, as well as the influence of high-level actors within the UN. While it is clear that HIV/AIDS as a security issue has become regularly invoked, and has historic significance within the United Nations, it is necessary to test whether the Copenhagen process of securitization has been successful within the United Nations. This is the focus of chapter four. Furthermore, the impact of the UN influence on other states is quite relevant to this process, and is therefore connected to its capacity to globally securitize HIV/AIDS. For this reason, it is important to briefly review the argument for a connection between norms and securitization. The following underscores the connection between norms and securitization, in order to further demonstrate how the UN is capable of globally securitizing an issue like HIV/AIDS. This also helps to explain why chapter five traces the global process of securitization as initiated by the United Nations, within the four governments studies.

Theoretically, Marco Antonio Vieira makes an important connection between Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde’s process of securitization, and international norms. Vieira finds that the securitization framework provides an important contribution to the literature on international norms. He focuses on how the securitization framework can help to clarify the “constitutive dynamics of international security norms;” meaning, how norms are formed and become accepted and established. Most importantly, Vieira argues that in the final stage of securitization, the threat becomes accepted, internalized, and institutionalized as an international norm.  

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137 Vieira, ”The Securitization of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic as a Norm,” 139.
138 Ibid., 139.
Vieira’s argument provides clarity and further understanding of how successful securitization occurs, and it particularly helps to emphasize the role that the United Nations plays in the current process under investigation.

Vieira’s connection between international norms and securitization is not alone. As discussed in the following chapter, Sjöstedt makes such a connection, and integrates it into her own version of securitization. The most relevant aspect of both of these studies is the explanations of how norms become internalized; threats are eventually widely accepted and institutionalized, and no longer require arguments regarding their security nature. The connection between securitization and norms is revisited in the final chapter.

Before beginning the analysis of the extent to which the UN has involved itself in the framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, the ensuing chapter reviews the theoretical framework in greater detail and outlines how this paper studied the securitization of HIV/AIDS and the importance of this type of research.

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139 Ibid., 139-140; Sjöstedt, "Exploring the Construction of Threats: The Securitization of HIV/AIDS in Russia."
CHAPTER THREE:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

Copenhagen School Process of Securitization

Securitization

In its most basic form, securitization is the process of framing an issue as a security threat. Securitization is defined by the Copenhagen school as the “process in which the socially and politically successful ‘speech act’ of labeling an issue a ‘security threat’ removes it from the realm of normal day-to-day politics.”\(^{140}\) The above understanding of securitization that Buzan et al. first employed was a step-by-step process. An issue is first presented as an existential threat through a securitizing move (a key speech act), made by a securitizing actor (see below), thus justifying emergency measures to address it, which in turn calls for actions outside the realm of regular political procedure, and ultimately requires an audience acceptance of the issue as a security threat.\(^{141}\) Buzan et al. clarify the essential questions for understanding the process of securitization, by asking “who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e. what explains when securitization is successful).”\(^{142}\)

By securitizing an object, it imbues a sense of urgency that only security issues receive and in turn demands immediate attention. There are both benefits and pitfalls to securitizing a referent object, each are specific to the referent object and the facilitating conditions associated with it.

Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde further explain that securitization should be understood as an

\(^{142}\) Ibid., 32.
intersubjective process, and not simply as an objective or subjective process. One person alone does not decide on the meaning of security, it is understood and agreed upon with the consent and acceptance of others. Security is therefore developed through the speech acts, and by building on understandings of security agreed upon by many. The process does not always have to be a one-time event; according to Buzan et al. “securitization can either be ad hoc or institutionalized.”

Securitization is considered a step beyond politicization and one that places urgency on the recognition and immediate address of the critical issue. Securitization is not only an analytic tool, but also a practical tool. This idea is highlighted within the case studies, by tracing the processes of securitization. Since Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde agree that “securitization can be studied directly; it does not need indicators,” this study traces securitization by: identifying the referent objects, the securitizing actors, their securitizing moves, the various speech acts, and the success of the attempts at securitization. The extent of the securitization is first and foremost demonstrated though an exploration of the role that the United Nations had in the securitization of HIV/AIDS.

**Existential threat**

The process of securitization requires the identification and articulation of an existential threat. The existential threat is an essential component of the Copenhagen process of securitization. Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde explain that it essentially refers to the framing of an issue as an urgent and direct threat to the existence or the ability of the referent object (see below) to continue to function. However, an existential threat can only be understood in context with the

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143 Buzan et. al., 30.
144 Ibid., 27.
145 Ibid., 25.
referent object as there is no universal standard for what constitutes an existential threat. Buzan et al. explain that the “essential quality of existence will vary greatly across different sectors and levels of analysis; therefore, so will the nature of existential threats.”\textsuperscript{146} They clarify some of the restrictions to what constitutes an existential threat by elaborating what is likely to constitute an existential threat within each of the sectors.

In the \textit{military sector}, they explain that an existential threat is normally understood as a threat to the state or its armed forces and the ability of the state to function in its normal capacity.\textsuperscript{147} In the \textit{political sector}, the existential threat is understood in relation to the sovereignty of the state. Sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything affecting its legitimacy and/or authority. In the international arena, anything that undermines the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute the regimes within, can be recognized as existentially threatening.\textsuperscript{148} In the \textit{economic sector}, Buzan et al., explain that existential threats are harder to identify. For firms, bankruptcy is most commonly argued as existentially threatening. However, for market economies, firms are only expected to last for certain periods of time. Unless the survival of the population is threatened, the national economy cannot be identified as existentially threatened within. Buzan et al. explain that like the political sector, supranational referent objects can in fact be existentially threatened by something that directly affects their rules, norms, or institutions.\textsuperscript{149} In the \textit{societal sector}, existential threats are even harder to predefine, let alone distinguish from lesser threats. In general, the identification of existential threats is dependent upon what Buzan et al. call the holder of collective identities and how their identity is maintained. Identity and language are generally the only two areas where threats can be

\textsuperscript{146} Buzan et. al., 21-22.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 22.
recognized as existential in this sector. Finally, in the *environmental sector*, there are some clearly identifiable instances of existentially threatened referents, including the survival of species, and human civilization; however, as in the economic sector, there are inherent difficulties in constructing problems as existentially threatening.

**Securitizing actors**

A *securitizing actor* is an actor who has the authority and legitimacy to speak security and who, therefore, has the ability to present the speech acts to an audience. According to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, securitizing actors are generally high-level political leaders such as presidents and prime ministers, but they can also be governments, bureaucracies, lobbyists, pressure groups and arguably widely accepted and respected international organizations. Buzan et al. further explain that some problems can occur when trying to identify the securitizing actor. In particular, speech acts do not always openly identify who or what is attempting to securitize the threat against the referent object (see below). As a result, they suggest focusing less on *who* attempts to securitize and more on the *logic* behind the securitization. This is taken to mean that as an analyst, the actor is important, but studying securitization should not be hindered by apprehension regarding who is and who is not an appropriate securitizing actor. The intent behind the securitization is just as important.

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150 Buzan et al., 23.
151 Ibid., 23.
152 Ibid., 40.
153 Ibid., 41.
Referent objects

The referent object of a securitization attempt is easier to discern than the securitizing actor. As discussed earlier, traditionally the referent object for security was the state. According to the Copenhagen school, in theory, securitizing actors can attempt to establish anything as a referent object. They qualify that statement with the fact that in practice, the securitizing actors’ attempts are variably influenced by the facilitating conditions (see below), and as a result certain attempts to securitize will be more successful than others, depending on the referent object in question. Most simply, a referent object is something that can be identified as an object that needs to survive. The speech-act identifies the referent object as being existentially threatened by a specific threat, and thus in need of protection. The general definition of an existential threat is self-explanatory, but the exact meaning is only fully understood in the context of the referent object. As discussed earlier, there is no universal understanding of security and there can be no universal understanding of an existential threat. Buzan et al. further explain that qualities of existence differ depending on the referent objects in question, and the sectors under examination. Buzan et al. explain that analysts should carefully review the discourses to establish what the referent objects are. Finally, they note that there are in fact some limits to what can and cannot be securitized; security is not entirely subjective. In all actuality, Buzan et al. explain that there are “socially defined limits to what can and cannot be securitized.” Meaning that there are certain issues that will not be accepted by the audience, or that securitizing actors will not attempt to securitize because it is socially understood.

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154 Buzan et al., 37.
155 Ibid., 21.
156 Ibid., 39.
**Functional actors**

Functional actors are not always consistently recognized in the process of securitization, but they play an important part in the success or failure of the process. Functional actors, as Buzan et al. identify them, are actors who “affect the dynamic of a sector.” They are neither the referent object nor the securitizing actor, but they have an influence on the outcome of the process due to their ability to affect the understanding of security within the sector in question. Actors who may fall under this category include those within international organizations and especially civil society: interest groups, lobbyists, NGOs, and any other group who would have a vested interest in the success or failure of securitization. These are recognizable as actors who do not have the authority to securitize but they are actively involved in supporting or preventing the securitization attempt. They will be identifiable through their discourses and/or actions.

**Securitizing moves**

A securitizing move occurs when something is presented, through discourse (speech act), as an existential threat to a referent object. Within the Copenhagen school framework, the speech act is extremely important for successful securitization. Language and rhetoric frame an issue as a security threat; however securitization is not only achieved through directly talking security. “[A] successful speech act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes the speech.” This can occur through the framing language of security used in policies, reports, papers, recommendations and speeches. The speech acts are the focus of the research for the analysis portion of this paper; the

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157 Buzan et al., 36.
158 Ibid., 36.
159 Ibid., 25.
160 Ibid., 32.
attention is particularly centered on the resolutions and reports from the United Nations, as well as the foreign and national policies of the four chosen governments and speeches by those governments.\textsuperscript{161} Buzan et al. argue that most securitizing moves are attempted at the global level; however, most successful instances of securitization occur at the local level.\textsuperscript{162} This will be explored within the case studies, starting at the global level, and reviewing the local state level instances of securitization.

\textit{Facilitating conditions}

Buzan et al. explain the importance of facilitation conditions, although they only briefly outline the conditions and their role in studying the process of securitization. Identifying facilitating conditions can help to provide context and explanation for successful instances of securitization. Buzan et al. differentiate the facilitating conditions in direct association with the speech-acts. Furthermore, they divide the conditions into two categories: internal conditions to the speech-act and external conditions to the speech-act. Internal conditions are related to how the speech itself is constructed, the language used and its ability to relate it to security form. External conditions are affected by the securitizing actor and the apparent threat. They summarize the internal (1) and external conditions (2 and 3) that exist for successful speech-acts as follows:

1) The \textit{demand internal} to the speech act of following the grammar of security
2) The \textit{social conditions} regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor/the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt
3) \textit{Features} of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization \textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{161} This research reviews and analyzes the extent to which the UN has influenced the internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue within Canada, the United States, Botswana and Zimbabwe.
\textsuperscript{163} Italics have been added for emphasis. Buzan et. al., 33.
The first condition refers to the construction of the security discourse and the need for a clear expression of existential threat, a point of no return, and an option for how to deal with it. As well, there will be grammar particular to the sector within which it falls. The second condition reiterates the importance of authority, although not necessarily official authority; it refers more so to whether they hold enough standing in society to be accepted. Finally, the third condition highlights the fact that visible and tangible threats are easier to be securitized if they are clearly threatening. If an army tank is visible, it makes a securitizing move easier, in comparison with an invisible virus.\footnote{Buzan et al., 33.}

Current Critiques of Securitization and Concerns with Securitizing HIV/AIDS

There are several key scholars contributing to the growing body of literature critiquing the Copenhagen securitization framework.\footnote{Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” European Journal of International Relations, no.14 (2008), 583. Matt McDonald notes scholars who have previously critiqued the Copenhagen process of securitization, include: Bill McSweeney, Olav F. Knudsen, Lene Hansen, Thierry Balzaq, Claudia Aradau, Michael Williams, Lynne Doty, and Ken Booth. Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” European Journal of International Relations, no.14 (2008), 583.} Matt McDonald provides a particularly pertinent review and he identifies some of the problems that other scholars have with the framework. In particular, McDonald identifies and explores three specific aspects of the process of securitization that he finds problematic. First, he explains that the \textit{form} of act is defined narrowly; specifically he finds that the Copenhagen school does not adequately explore other methods of representation beyond the discursive speech acts. Second, the \textit{context} of securitization is too narrow, because it highlights the securitizing move as the single most important moment in the process. McDonald argues that this misses the construction of security over a period of time and also misses why certain issues are securitized and others ignored. Finally, and most problematic for McDonald,
the nature of securitization is only understood in its recognition of threats to security, meaning that security is only understood through dangers and threats. McDonald explains that this only perpetuates the negative and reactive connotations associated with security. Some of the most relevant issues that McDonald raises are in relation to areas that have been identified as under-theorized, including: the speech acts themselves, the lack of attention to context of securitization and finally threat recognition. Furthermore, he highlights a problem with securitization that is discussed in the concluding chapter of this paper, “the securitization framework…is narrow in ways that are both analytically and normatively problematic, providing a partial account of the construction of security and potentially reifying traditional security discourses and practices in the process.”

McDonald reiterates earlier critiques made by both Ken Booth and Michael Williams, arguing that the Copenhagen process of securitization is problematically linked to traditional realist understandings of security. Specifically, that the framework maintains too much of an unchanging identification of security, bound by specific and strict rules that resonate with militaristic action.

Another relevant critique comes from Roxanna Sjöstedt, who adds to the ongoing securitization discussions by critiquing one of the proclaimed requirements for successful securitization: the necessity for a securitizing actor to call for extraordinary measures to be taken in order to achieve successful securitization. She finds the above requirement limits the analytic and empirical potential for securitization because a decision-maker would only resort to bypassing normal political procedures in the most extreme of circumstances. As an alternative, Sjöstedt offers the following conceptualization, “here [the securitizing move is] operationalized

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166 McDonald, 564.
167 Italics added for emphasis. McDonald, 568.
168 Ibid., 579.
as the public framing of an issue as a national threat, accompanied by a strategy to act.”

Sjöstedt also focuses on the interactions between norms, identities, and securitization. She clarifies that an important aspect that underlines the primary research for this project is that an observable or traceable “discursive change is sufficient to conclude that some form of norm internalization has taken place.”

She argues that a noticeable difference in how the issue is discussed, framed, and worded, can demonstrate norm acceptance. In this case, that would mean that HIV/AIDS is regularly framed as a security issue or threat and that words such as threat, fight, and combat are used to describe the approach for addressing it. This requirement is important for tracing the influence of the United Nations and for recognition of the extent to which states have followed suit.

Colleen O’Manique takes a very critical stance towards securitization and HIV/AIDS, by approaching the link between security and HIV/AIDS from a feminist perspective. Her work is mostly a theoretical critique and an attempt at theoretical development. She concludes with a consideration that highlights an important direction of study. “Critical to any understanding of the securitization of HIV/AIDS must be a consideration of how the national and global security interests of the dominant powers contribute to the current global “security crisis” of HIV/AIDS.” This suggestion underlines the importance of discussing these issues and it sets the stage for future research directions.

Marco Antonio Vieira, Stefan Elbe, Colleen O’Manique, Simon Rushton, and Roxanna Sjostedt have all recently written on various aspects of securitization and HIV/AIDS. They all explicitly work under the assumptions that securitization of HIV/AIDS is in fact possible, and

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170 Ibid., 12.
171 Ibid., 24.
that it has already occurred in particular circumstances. Rushton, Vieira, and Elbe\textsuperscript{173} all focus on the larger phenomenon of HIV/AIDS securitization, specifically the international construction and identification of HIV/AIDS as a threat. Alternately, Sjöstedt and O’Manique focus on more specific and narrow occurrences of HIV/AIDS securitization. Sjöstedt explores securitization through a case study of HIV/AIDS securitization in Russia,\textsuperscript{174} and O’Manique offers a feminist understanding of the securitization of HIV/AIDS through a case study of Sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{175}

Rushton, Elbe and Vieira particularly contribute to the ongoing discussion, as they further underscore the development and recognition of the international securitization of HIV/AIDS. Rushton traces the actual securitization of HIV/AIDS, by focusing on the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1308 (SC resolution 1308). Rushton explores the validity of SC resolution 1308 as evidence of securitization of HIV/AIDS. In particular, he questions the content of the resolution, by arguing that the significance of the securitizing actions within the resolution may have been overstated.\textsuperscript{176}

Through discussions around the ethical dilemma of securitizing HIV/AIDS, Elbe brings an important aspect into the debate. He warns of the normative dangers, particularly the diversion of national and international responses away from general society and more towards state institutions, including the military. The second danger he identifies is the potential of the threat-defense logic, meaning that states will narrow their responses to that of their own national self-interest and in turn they will take away from the grassroots organizations that have made crucial


forward movement with regards to the social perceptions of the disease.\textsuperscript{177} Elbe further argues that national and international action, towards HIV/AIDS, are likely to be confined to those cases where it is only within the actor’s own security interests. To clarify, “States may take action to defend their core security interests, but they are unlikely to undertake measures extending much beyond these narrow concerns.”\textsuperscript{178} Numerous international organizations, specifically the United Nations, have been making strides forward in uniting states in a global effort to address the perceived security threat, while avoiding the potential disregard for the efforts of local grassroots movements. In his more recent work, Elbe has also questioned the benefits of framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue and instead he argues for a reframing of HIV/AIDS as a global risk.\textsuperscript{179}

Finally, like Sjöstedt, Vieira adds to the literature by discussing the securitization of HIV/AIDS as a norm. He presents another updated framework for understanding securitization as an international norm. Viera’s work further highlights the influence of the UN and the relevance of the interaction between the UN and international states. He emphasizes the idea that the international understanding of HIV/AIDS has transitioned from that of politicized issue to that of securitized issue.\textsuperscript{180}

As demonstrated above, whether HIV/AIDS poses a security threat to various levels of society is increasingly being debated within international system, specifically within international organizations and states. Previous strategic studies have identified security either objectively or subjectively and in doing so the threat is understood as either real or perceived. Although there is no cure for HIV/AIDS, it can be managed, but for many the medicines that are available are too

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\textsuperscript{177} Elbe, “Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking HIV/AIDS and Security,” 120.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 129.
\textsuperscript{180} Vieira, "The Securitization of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic as a Norm," 137-140.
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expensive or are not accessible for a variety of other reasons. It could be argued that within Canada and many so-called developed and first world countries it is no longer fatal for those with access to medical care, meaning that the virus alone can no longer be considered a threat on its own. The potential exists to manage the virus effectively and live a life with what could now be considered a chronic disease. As a result, within Canada, the overall threat posed has been identified as low. However, within developing and third world countries such as Zimbabwe, the fatal nature of the virus poses an identifiable individual and national threat, except for the few who have the money and access to medicine. Lack of access to medicine, and its fatal nature, in interaction with other conditions arguably makes the virus an individual threat but due to the increasing pandemic status of the virus, the state itself is increasingly identified as the focus of the threat.

This study situates itself with this group of scholars who are questioning the Copenhagen School securitization framework, particularly the stringent requirements for confirming successful securitization. This research finds that the strict requirements with regards to the articulation of an existential threat, the call for emergency measures, and the requirement for action taken outside of the normal political channels prevents the recognition of potential instances of securitization.

These three criteria are revisited in the conclusion, and are the focus of a critique of the Copenhagen school process of securitization. This paper incorporates an updated version of the criteria into a proposed revised process of securitization, and it concludes that the current process of securitization prevents non-traditional security issues from being properly analyzed. To summarize, this study aligns itself with scholars such as Roxanna Sjöstedt, who argue that the
process is not reflective of how actors engage in the recognition of today's security issues and the action they take to address potential threats.

This research traces the dialogue of the securitizing actors towards specific referent objects. The securitizing actor is identified as the United Nations. The referent object in this study is Africa, and finally the audience is considered the member states within the United Nations. This study will focus on four particular governments, due to the time constraints of this study. The research attempts to demonstrate the influence that the securitizing actor, the United Nations, has had on the acceptance of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. Although securitization of HIV/AIDS remains controversial, and many scholars in the security field argue that it is not possible or it has not yet occurred, as demonstrated above there are several scholars who are exploring the concept and are contributing to the growing body of securitization literature. The above paragraphs reviewed some of their work in an attempt to demonstrate that a foundation has already been established for analyzing HIV/AIDS as a security issue.

**Purpose and Methodology**

**Methodology**

HIV/AIDS is not only framed from a national security perspective, but also a global security perspective. This paper traces the securitizing moves and discourse that are occurring and being transmitted from the international level to the national level. Regardless of whether the securitizing move itself is weak, the aftereffects can be powerful, can build support, transform norms and ultimately change the understanding from that of potential security issue to that of a recognized security threat. The UN has been framing HIV/AIDS as a security threat from the perspective of human security and framing it as a global threat, with the referent objects being
specifically Africa but potentially all national states. The Canadian and American governments address HIV/AIDS within their foreign policies, from a global and human security perspective. The fact that these governments address the epidemic within their foreign policies reflects their potential understanding of the virus as a global threat and not as a national security threat. However, within the governments of Botswana and Zimbabwe, HIV/AIDS is regularly framed from a national security perspective, in national coordination plans and national strategic plans.

First and foremost, this paper attempted to test the process of securitization, through studying how HIV/AIDS is increasingly being argued as security issue. As Barry Buzan et al. explained, the best way to study securitization, it to study “discourse and political constellations,”\(^\text{181}\) meaning, to study the language of political organizations or groupings. This paper followed their suggestion and focused on the framing language of UN and government documents, speeches and policies. This paper applied the Copenhagen process of securitization to the United Nations and the four selected governments. In order for successful Copenhagen securitization to be confirmed, the following three criterions needed to be present in each case: issue presented as an existential threat, a call for emergency action and actual action that is beyond normal political measures. If these were not all present then securitization did not successfully occur. There also needed to be a clear demonstration of audience acceptance of the argued security issue and this is confirmed through the four government cases, which are in fact the audience to the UN global securitization attempt. If they accept the argument, it will be visible through internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue and action towards addressing it.

This research relied on content analysis to help review securitizing discourses within the United Nations and the four chosen governments. This paper systematically identified when the UN and each of the governments implicated HIV/AIDS as a security threat, by analyzing

\(^{181}\) Buzan et al., 25.
documents for specific security language. The documents did not necessarily need to directly use the word *security*; they also used other words that directly implicate it as a security issue.\(^{182}\) This paper selected the following words, after initial reviews of UN documents, in order to trace and identify the extent to which HIV/AIDS has been securitized: *threat*, *fight*, and *combat*. These words, identified by this paper as *security language*, on their own do not confirm successful securitization but they indicate participation in this process because of their extensive use within UN documents and also because of their strong security implications. Since successful securitization needs to be confirmed through the call for *emergency actions* to reduce an *existential threat* that is *beyond normal reactive measures*, the discourse was essential to review. As well, there needed to be an audience acceptance of the framing of HIV/AIDS as a threat. In each case, the framing language was reviewed and traced and it was determined through the language whether the three key requirements outlined above were present. Finally, it was determined whether the countries as the audience, accepted the call for securitization by the UN, through the internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue.

The other concurrent method of analysis involved tracing the processes of securitization (process tracing). Lene Hansen also describes this type of discourse analysis, as tracing the intertextuality. Intertextuality refers to the fact that texts are written with traces of previous texts, by referencing past texts. Hansen explains that “a text is simultaneously drawing upon a textual past and constructing this past into a unique new text.”\(^{183}\) The paper acknowledges the presence of intertextuality: similar language and references to security and HIV/AIDS in the context of a security threat.\(^{184}\) This meant tracing the United Nations identification of HIV/AIDS as a security issue.

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182 Buzan et al., 26-27.
issue and the ensuing policy discourses of the four governments, as reflected within their national and foreign policies. To complete the process, and to demonstrate successful securitization, an understanding of current action towards reduction of the threat was essential. This process was replicated for each government. By specifically focusing on the dialogue and the similar discourses between the United Nations and the national governments, the influence of the UN in this process was demonstrated. The government references to UN reports and recommendations are especially important in demonstrating the influence of these organizations. This internalization was determined to be evident if the UN influenced and affected how the government policies were developed. To further add to this evidence, anecdotal reviews of newspapers from each country case study were done in order to demonstrate a more widespread and deeper acceptance of the claim. This review also highlighted the roles of facilitating actors in the audience acceptance of the security claim.

As mentioned above, the documents that were analyzed were all coded for what has been called security language (threat, fight, combat) and the results are collected in tables, with word frequencies noted. (The security language is not synonymous with securitization). These are found in the appendices section at the end of the paper. All of the frequencies and coded documents for the United Nations are collected in Appendix 2, Appendix 3 contains those for Canada, Appendix 4 contains those for the United States, Appendix 5 contains those for Botswana, and finally Appendix 6 contains those for Zimbabwe. For the majority of the cases, only security language that was in direct reference to HIV/AIDS, identified through concordances, was tabulated. In the rare cases that security language not referring to HIV/AIDS

185 Concordances are excerpts from the document, which include a certain number of words before and after the coded security language. For example, when coding for fight, the concordance pulled the four words that were before and after fight in order to ensure that it was used in reference to HIV/AIDS. This was done for each security word in each document.
was included within the tables, it is noted in text. The coding software used for the study was the *YoshiKoder*, a downloadable content analysis software program, developed by Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.\(^{186}\) It was used in order to determine the frequency of the selected security language and it also collected the concordances, which showed the context in which the security language was being used.

**Justification of Case Selection**

The following paragraphs review the country selections, why they were chosen and how they attempt to clarify whether the securitization of HIV/AIDS is possible and/or occurring. The UN has almost single handedly promoted the acceptance of human security within the practical world of states and other IOs. The 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report first brought widespread recognition of this concept\(^{187}\) and within this framework the UN has been able to raise concern and awareness of the global security threat that HIV/AIDS poses. For these reasons, as well as other factors that are discussed in depth within the paper, the UN was identified as the initial starting point for a Copenhagen securitization of HIV/AIDS.\(^{188}\)

The two sets of comparisons are different in that Canada and the United States only discuss HIV/AIDS as a security issue within their foreign policies. Within government policies and departments, HIV/AIDS is framed as a security issue from an international perspective. Yet within Botswana and Zimbabwe, HIV/AIDS is understood as a national health concern and a health priority. Accessing Canadian and American policy documents was not an issue. They are

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\(^{186}\) Available online, at: http://www.yoshikoder.org/.


\(^{188}\) Again, it is recognized that there was a great deal of background work that lead to the eventual UNSC meeting on HIV/AIDS and African security. However, a review of the historical context and influence of other organizations is beyond the scope of this paper.
all available on both government websites and they are chronologically maintained. The problem that occurred when trying to review the government documents that addressed HIV/AIDS within both Botswana and Zimbabwe was access. It was quite difficult to gain access to primary documents that addressed any official HIV/AIDS policies. Due to the ongoing work with the UN, these governments are required to submit annual AIDS reports through their national AIDS programs. Through these programs, presidential speeches and other reports, it was possible to gain insight into both government perspectives. Speeches provide first hand access to how these governments understand HIV/AIDS, just as well, if not better than the official documents.

The first two governments, Canada and the US, were selected due to the fact that they are western countries not currently experiencing an epidemic. Within Canada there is open access to information, especially with regards to the necessary foreign policy documents. Most importantly, Canada has a close link to the human security framework. The Canadian Government website has a section devoted entirely to human security, so their positions and efforts are clearly identifiable.\(^\text{189}\) With regards to the United States, as a major world power and an influential government, the extent to which they have securitized HIV/AIDS is very relevant. As well, the US approach to HIV/AIDS as a security issue is particularly pertinent in their foreign policy because of their foreign involvement in conflict situations. They were also selected because of their relationship with the United Nations and thus it was assumed that they would likely share more similar viewpoints concerning issues of security.

The two African countries were selected not to compare with the Canadian and American perspectives, but to compare and contrast with each other. Botswana proves to be an interesting case because in 2001 it had the highest prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS at 38\%, while in 2005 it

dropped to 24%, and currently it is sitting at around 23.9%.

The Botswana government presents itself as being actively involved in tackling the high rates of HIV/AIDS, and with the stability of the political system, it was assumed that the drop in rates could be attributed to government attention. As a result, how the government approaches and frames HIV/AIDS is extremely pertinent.

Zimbabwe also proved to have high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. In 2001, the prevalence rates were approximately 33.7%, whereas in 2005 the rates had dropped to 20.1%, and the current estimates have dropped dramatically to 15.3%. The same reasons that Botswana was selected apply to the reasoning for Zimbabwe’s inclusion. Decreases of these proportions may demonstrate a change in governmental approach or policy towards HIV/AIDS. For Zimbabwe, other influences may be responsible for the dramatic reduction in prevalence rates. Zimbabwe is different from Botswana in that it has not had a stable political or social system for quite some time. For this reason, it was decided that these two countries would provide an important glimpse into how African governments are framing and then addressing HIV/AIDS.

These case studies are not meant to be representative and they are not meant to provide generalizations. They are intended to demonstrate whether the process of securitization has trickled down from the UN, to various governments, and thus influencing national and foreign policy decisions. By following the process of securitization, it should confirm the influence of the United Nations and support the occurrence of a global securitization of HIV/AIDS.

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191 There are other potential reasons for the drop in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates, however, for case selection purposes, this understanding should be adequate.

Areas of Uncertainty

The coding program, the Yoshikoder, cannot automatically code for the selected security words while at the same time filtering to ensure that the frequencies include only security language associated with HIV/AIDS. This is a problem with the coding program, and it requires manual checks done using separately identified concurrences to identify the proximity of the security language with HIV/AIDS. As a result, there may be a few frequencies in which the numbers do not reflect direct correlations between HIV/AIDS and security language. This is attributable to human error, but for this study, it should not change the results. There were enough documents reviewed in order to demonstrate regular and widespread references to HIV/AIDS as a security issue.

Another area of uncertainty exists with regards to the intentions of the UN and the four governments. It could be argued that the United Nations and the governments were not intentionally securitizing HIV/AIDS or furthermore that they did not want to do so. This paper finds that whether this is true or not does not change how they have framed HIV/AIDS within the national and international discourses. If anything, it is important to review these issues to show the importance and implications of securitization and that it can occur whether intentionally or not. Language should be carefully chosen because it can have unintended meanings and affect how things are understood and therefore addressed.

It is important to review some of the limitations of this paper that result from the research methods. First and foremost, the research is essentially based on secondary and publicly available government documents. Primary research was not conducted; this was particularly due to the limitations with regards to traveling to Africa. As a result, the author's understanding of the two African case studies is particularly limited in this way.
It is also necessary to recognize the limitations of this study as a result of partial information. While this study draws on the tradition of discourse analysis, it limits itself to the study of a set of written documents and essentially conducts an in depth content analysis of these documents. This choice of analysis is what the Copenhagen school does in their initial work; they focus on the speech acts themselves, analyzing for direct articulations of security threats. It is recognized that the reliance on direct speech acts has garnered many criticisms and arguments for moving beyond strict reliance on direct speeches. These critiques are particularly argued by McSweeney and Williams, and are discussed in detail in the previous section on critiques of the Copenhagen school.

Furthermore, the study is restricted by the statist ontology, as it relies on our acceptance of the key actors in global security to be states: as individual national states, and collectively as the United Nations. This study follows the inclinations of the Copenhagen School, and even though their framework does allow for a broader investigation, the focus remains ultimately on states and has not addressed other actors involved in the process.

Finally, this study is further limited in its comparisons and its strict reliance on official documentation. First, the author relies on the reader's acceptance of the validity of her comparisons and second, the author has not included extensive research on HIV/AIDS in general or background historical research on the audience and referent countries.
CHAPTER FOUR:
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HIV/AIDS AS A SECURITY ISSUE

Background Information

The United Nations has played the most significant role in the international promotion of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, as a result, the UN is identified here as the *securitizing actor*. This paper argues that there are two separate securitizing moves and therefore two attempts at securitization that the UN has initiated. The move that is internationally understood to be the *securitizing move* is the passing by the Security Council of Resolution 1308. However, it is argued here that the meeting on January 10th, “The situation in Africa: the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa,” should be understood as the *internal* securitizing move, and the passing of Resolution 1308 as the moment when HIV/AIDS was accepted by the internal audience (members of the UNSC) and thus securitized.

In the build up to Resolution 1308, this paper argues that the meeting held on January 10th, 2000 has now proved to be a more influential moment than the day the resolution itself was passed. The United Nations Security Council held daylong sessions, on the 10th of January 2000, for the discussion of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. The agenda was entitled “The situation in Africa: The impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa.” The discussions that took place were unlike any other top level HIV/AIDS debates that had taken place in the past; the participants were high-level representatives of various countries and organizations. In addition to the fourteen member states that were present, the following countries requested and were granted access to participate in the discussions: Algeria, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Croatia,

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Cuba, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mongolia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Senegal, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Also granted access to the days proceedings were Mr. James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank; Mr. Mark Malloch Brown, Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme; and Dr. Peter Piot, Executive Director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS.\(^{194}\) The president of the Security Council at the time, and United States representative, Mr. Al Gore, opened the meeting.\(^{195}\)

It was at this meeting that the precedent was set, and this meeting should be considered the internal securitizing move for a United Nations securitization of HIV/AIDS. It was the first time in the history of the Security Council that a health issue was discussed in the context of a security threat. The following statements made by Vice-President Al Gore illuminate the general discourse and sentiment of the arguments that were made. Mr. Gore openly admitted that they were meeting on that day to discuss “a brand-new definition of world security,”\(^{196}\) and that “there are new forces that now or soon will challenge the international order, raising issues of peace and war. It (is) time to change the nature of the ‘way we live together on this planet.’ From this vantage point ‘we must forge and follow a new agenda for world security.’”\(^{197}\) Mr. Kofi Annan picked up where Mr. Gore left off and attempted to narrow the debate by declaring that “nowhere else has AIDS yet become a threat to economic, social and political stability on the scale that it now is in Southern and Eastern Africa. The impact of AIDS in that region is no less destructive

\(^{194}\) The role that these men played during the meeting, and the role in particular that Dr. Peter Piot played in the larger scheme of the securitization of HIV/AIDS, leaves them to be identified as facilitating actors.

\(^{195}\) Ibid., 2.

\(^{196}\) Ibid., 2.

than that of warfare itself.” These were powerful statements, made by powerful men, within what many recognize as one of the most powerful international organizations. The impact and symbolic support that reverberated from this meeting have invariably influenced how governments are now approaching and recognizing HIV/AIDS within Africa, and globally.

Over the course of the meeting itself, HIV/AIDS was frequently discussed and argued to be an urgent and immediate threat to the stability and security of Africa, and there were calls for immediate attention. The meeting heard over forty high level speakers present, and it lasted for a total of seven hours. The official recognition of HIV/AIDS as a threat to the peace and security of Africa was undeniable. Many took these discussions home to begin framing their own state level approaches; this is identifiable through the increase in frequency of security language within the four reviewed governments.

During the months prior to the passing of Resolution 1308, there were several other meetings within the Security Council which further internalized the consensus of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. Following a meeting on the 13th of January 2000, a presidential statement by Richard Holbrooke further acknowledged the importance of HIV/AIDS in the security discussions. As well, during the 31 January 2000 SC meeting, the threat and relevance of HIV/AIDS was again discussed. The meeting on the 9th of March 2000 was important because it was followed with another presidential statement that explicitly “encourages the UN to

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198 Ibid., 4.
sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS.”

The April 19th meeting resulted in the adoption of Resolution 1296, which focused on civilians in armed conflict, and included a section detailing the importance of making peacekeepers aware of the threat of HIV/AIDS. These discussions all contributed to the final adoption of Resolution 1308. Because the Security Council facilitated and hosted the initial meeting and those that followed, it validated and contributed to the increased acceptance of the arguments put forth during the January 10th meeting.

The Security Council Resolution 1308 that was later passed was much more reserved and focused than the discussions that preceded it. As a resolution, it provides very little substance or support for action; it is most powerful in its symbolic nature. There is no explicit use of security language in connection with HIV/AIDS and Resolution 1308 refrains from ever referring to HIV/AIDS as a security issue. It does provide a faint connection to the discussions on January 10th by “stressing that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security.” Whose security and stability is not discussed, and this leaves the potential to widen the discussions from simply that of Africa, to a more global context. In general, it maintains traditional HIV/AIDS language by describing HIV/AIDS as a pandemic and crisis. As well, it remains further restrained by stating that the UNSC is ‘deeply concerned’ as opposed to being threatened and urging for attention.

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205 Security language is used to describe the words that UN and all government documents were coded for. For this study, those words are: Fight (fights, fighting), threat (threats, threatening), and combat (combats, combating).

Comparing the meeting on the 10\textsuperscript{th} of January to the finalized SC Resolution 1308, there is a dramatic difference and it becomes quite clear how reserved the resolution actually is; so much so that it is of little practical value. The difference is clear in the language and the open discussions of the security implication during the January 10\textsuperscript{th} meeting. At the meeting Kofi Annan was also quoted as saying that, “the fight against AIDS in Africa was an immediate priority and must be part and parcel of the international community’s work for peace and security on the continent.”\textsuperscript{207} Many other high level experts spoke on the security implications of HIV/AIDS. Referring back to Al Gore, who further “recognized the real and present danger to world security posed by the AIDS pandemic” and elaborated that “the threat of AIDS was real for all people and every nation. Borders could not keep it out. AIDS was a global aggressor that must be defeated.”\textsuperscript{208} One of the most poignant excerpts came from Mark Malloch Brown, who was the administrator for UNDP and Chairman of UNDP, as he “congratulated Richard Holbrooke, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, for the vision to go beyond the old definitions and bring to the table a discussion of the world’s most dangerous insurgency.”\textsuperscript{209} The resolution is ultimately focused on peacekeeping operations and simply suggests establishing several practices for preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS by and within peacekeeping forces.\textsuperscript{210}

While the stark difference between the resolution and the meeting is clear, the difference is likely due to social constraints and the unlikelihood of the resolution being passed if it contained the same language that was expressed during the meeting. Again, the influence of this resolution

\textsuperscript{207} Ibid.
ultimately lies in the action taken by the Security Council and not so much in what it resolved.\textsuperscript{211} Thus, the international understanding of Resolution 1308 as the defining moment where HIV/AIDS becomes framed as a security issue is in many ways unjustified, because it was actually the January $10^{th}$ meeting that laid the groundwork. It is instead the very act of the UNSC passing the resolution that imbues HIV/AIDS with an unstated sense of security awareness. It is especially for this reason that it is later argued that the Copenhagen process of securitization is inadequate for studying this issue.

The passing of Resolution 1308, by the United Nations Security Council can also be considered as a reaction to the January $10^{th}$ meeting and it is argued here that the adoption of the resolution fulfils the three main criterions for securitization: HIV/AIDS is \textit{presented as an existential threat} (a stretch, but within the meeting, HIV/AIDS was identified as a direct threat to the security and stability of Africa. Within the political sector, Buzan et al recognize that regimes can be existentially threatened by situations that undermine the rules, norms and institutions that constitute those regimes)\textsuperscript{212}, there was a \textit{call for emergency action} (present and clearly argued), and \textit{action beyond normal political measures} (also present, and confirmed by the meeting itself, and the passing of the historic Resolution 1308). Finally, the passing of the resolution also confirmed internal audience acceptance, with the audience being members of the Security Council involved in passing the resolution.

The ensuing chapters review how successful the move for a \textit{global (external)} securitization has been.\textsuperscript{213} The UN, and many representative actors, have already presented HIV/AIDS as an existential threat to Africa. Within Resolution 1308, the UN argued for what should be

\textsuperscript{211} Note in Appendix 2, the vast difference in the prevalence of the language. In its most basic form, securitization is about discourse, and those who involve themselves in it.
\textsuperscript{212} Buzan et. al., 22.
\textsuperscript{213} See Appendix 1 for the full resolution.
considered extreme measures, which were beyond normal political (United Nations) procedure. Specifically, the Security Council explained that it was “deeply concerned by the extent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic worldwide, and by the severity of the crisis in Africa in particular.”\textsuperscript{214} As a result, within the resolution they engaged in what could be called groundbreaking recommendations surrounding how member states should begin to address the issue within their own peacekeeping troops. The following excerpt demonstrates the extent of the Security Council recommendations:

Encourages interested Member States to increase international cooperation among their relevant national bodies to assist with the creation and execution of policies for HIV/AIDS prevention, voluntary and confidential testing and counselling, and treatment for personnel to be deployed in international peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{215}

The referent object that is most clearly argued is Africa, when the Security Council explains that it is “Deeply concerned by the extent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic worldwide, and by the severity of the crisis in Africa in particular.”\textsuperscript{216} Furthermore, the threat is to the stability and maintenance of peace and security. However, there are underlying references to a more global security threat. To ensure conceptual clarity, and in order to test securitization most effectively, the main referent object that is identified is Africa, the epicenter of the pandemic. However, when the framing language and security discourse within the United Nations and the four selected case studies connects HIV/AIDS and global security, it is also identified. These references indicate a more generalized global securitization of HIV/AIDS. Within the resolution, the Security Council recognizes global pandemic when it stresses:

the need for coordinated efforts of all relevant United Nations

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 1.
organizations to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic in line with their respective mandates and to assist, wherever possible, in global efforts against the pandemic.\textsuperscript{217}

Beyond Resolution 1308, there were other facilitating conditions that variably affected the acceptance of the attempts to securitize HIV/AIDS. Later Security Council resolutions and meetings helped to further internalize the connection between HIV/AIDS and security and contribute to the extent of the external securitizing move, as various UN members attended the meetings. The include: SC Resolution 1296 (19 April 2000); SC Resolution 1318 (7 September 2000); SC Resolution 1325; SC meeting 4259 (19 January 2001); SC meeting 4288 (7 March 2001); SC meeting 4339 (28 June 2001); SC meeting 4859 (17 November 2003); SC meeting 4970 (17 May 2004); and SC meeting 5228 (18 July 2005).\textsuperscript{218} Between 2000 and 2005, the connection between HIV/AIDS and security became widely accepted within the UN, particularly within main organs of both the Security Council and the General Assembly. The willingness of the Security Council, in particular, to partake in the original discussions is symbolic of the larger role that the UN is playing in the expansion of the global understanding of HIV/AIDS and security, particularly in the securitization of HIV/AIDS within Africa.\textsuperscript{219}

\textit{Success of HIV/AIDS Securitization Attempts}

After reviewing a wide range of UN documents, starting with those of the Security Council, the General Assembly and finally UNAIDS, a pattern has emerged.\textsuperscript{220} The research began by focusing on all Security Council meetings and resolutions that addressed HIV/AIDS in general.

\textsuperscript{218} See Appendix 2 for the entire collection of UN documents that were reviewed for this study.
\textsuperscript{219} It is important to also acknowledge the influence of the UN Millennium Development Goals that were established in the Millennium Declaration that was adopted September 2000. The UN established eight development goals, that each set targets to achieve by 2015. The sixth goal calls for international commitment to “Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases.” "Millennium Development Goals," http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml.
\textsuperscript{220} An extensive search through the UN database was done by searching for any resolutions or meetings that had the words HIV/AIDS in them.
Official resolutions and minutes from meetings were reviewed in an attempt to identify an increase in references to HIV/AIDS as security issue, as well an increased sense of obligation. Notably, the importance and influence of UNAIDS remains present throughout both the meetings and resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. UNAIDS provides a common thread that unites the discussions. Through a review of the rest of the UN documents, it is clear that HIV/AIDS is regularly addressed by the Security Council and security language is continually used to frame HIV/AIDS as a security issue. In order to identify how the UN framed HIV/AIDS, the documents were coded for security related words. The security language was chosen because their use frames HIV/AIDS as a security issue by employing war related language. As well, by framing it in such a way, it necessitates a group effort to address it. Meaning that one person does not address a threat, an army does. This was especially important when reviewing UN documents. The discussions of HIV/AIDS within these documents also explicitly called for a joint international front to stop the virus, i.e. the global fight.

From 2000 through 2003, there was a dramatic increase in the number of United Nations meetings and resolutions that address HIV/AIDS and an equally dramatic increase in the frequency of security language in those documents. After 2003, the frequency drops off, but not entirely. This is demonstrated through the chart containing the security language coding frequencies of UN documents, in Appendix 2. The connection between HIV/AIDS and security remained within most UN documents that were reviewed. From the UNSC’s sessions on HIV/AIDS in 2000, to the 2001 United Nations Millennium Development Goals, to UN General Assembly’s Special Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) in 2001, to the follow ups to UNGASS in

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221 See Appendix 2, for a full list of the resolutions, meetings, and reports that were reviewed.
222 As mentioned earlier, the following tenses of security language were coded for: fight, fights, fighting; threat, threats, threatening; and combat, combats, combating. These were selected because they were most frequently used to describe HIV/AIDS. There are other words that have been used to describe it, however, it was necessary to limit the number to a manageable level.
2003, there was a great deal of attention focused on the global AIDS epidemic during those three years. The gained momentum from 2000 and 2001 pushed on until 2003, after which the attention did not disappear, but instead leveled off. This reduction could be explained as the result of widespread acceptance of the argued threat and an internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. In other words, the urgency within the UN seemed to dissipate, as it became clearer that the epidemic was only increasing and was not going to recede. Within the UN after 2003, annual reports continued and follow-ups to the UNGASS were regularly revisited. To date, the security language has not disappeared; it has only reduced with the lessening of intensive attention given to the AIDS epidemic. As such, it has arguably become internalized and the connection is now commonplace within the UN. To supplement discourse analysis, increases in HIV/AIDS funding are used to demonstrate a commitment to HIV/AIDS.

Figure 3: Total Annual Resources Available for AIDS, 1986-2007 (UNAIDS, 2007)\textsuperscript{223}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure3.png}
\caption{Total Annual Resources Available for AIDS, 1986-2007 (UNAIDS, 2007)\textsuperscript{223}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{223} UNAIDS, "2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic," Figure 7.1.
As demonstrated above, there is a definite increase in AIDS funding between 2000 and 2002. This increase in AIDS funding highlights how the global understanding the HIV/AIDS pandemic changed after that period of time. This is further reviewed within each country case study, by tracing national annual spending on HIV/AIDS to help supplement the discourse analysis. It is interesting to note that the flurry of meetings, documents and arguments towards the severity of the threat posed by HIV/AIDS slows down around 2003, yet funding only continues to increase after that period of time. This underscores the argument that HIV/AIDS as a security issue became widely accepted within the UN and that it then became the focus of efforts to reduce the threat, most easily done through funding efforts.

While the security discourse has demonstrated that the United Nations participated in the framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, successful Copenhagen securitization requires the existence of more than just internalized security discourse. As discussed earlier, in the case of the United Nations, the three key requirements have all been met in the case of the internal securitization: presenting the issue as an existential threat, justifying emergency measures and requiring action beyond normal political procedure. The fact that the Security Council allowed for the discussion of HIV/AIDS as a security issue for Africa meets a stretched version of existential threat, this requirement is applicable to both the internal and external attempts at securitization. However, with regards to the external attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS, the other two requirements have clearly not been met. The UN has not argued for emergency measures to be put in place and it has not gone beyond normal organizational procedures and argued for states to react in such a manner. It has only required that states submit annual UNGASS reports, other than that, it has only made recommendations for urgent (but not emergency) measures that fall within normal political and UN procedures.
The following chapter continues to trace the process of securitization, as initiated by the United Nations, by reviewing how the audience (states) accept and react to the claim of the global security threat of HIV/AIDS. In order to demonstrate this, there is in depth discourse analysis of the audience’s (states) acceptance, internalization and use of security language when discussing and addressing the problem of HIV/AIDS.
CHAPTER FIVE: GOVERNMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES ON HIV/AIDS

In order to test the global securitization of HIV/AIDS as initiated by the United Nations, two western countries, Canada and the United States, were chosen to test the securitization of HIV/AIDS and to provide clarification of how they identified HIV/AIDS within the international system. They were selected because of their relationship with the United Nations and thus it was assumed that they would likely share more similar viewpoints concerning issues of security. As well, Canada and the United States have differing approaches to foreign policy and it was important to see how each approached and framed the issue of HIV/AIDS within the global system. On their own, they each approach the issue differently; however, with the influence of the UN they have more similar understandings of HIV/AIDS and security. Through studying the foreign policies of Canada and the US with regards to HIV/AIDS, it begins to demonstrate the extent of the success of the global attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS, as initiated by the United Nations.

Through a similar review of two African countries, Zimbabwe and Botswana, it becomes clear that they have also followed suit. These two countries were identified for their proximity to the epidemic centre, and because in comparison with other SSA countries, they had two of the highest rates of HIV/AIDS in 2001, and two of the largest reductions in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates since 2001. 224 There are several possible reasons for this reduction and it was not possible to extensively analyze why such reductions occurred; however at the very least it was assumed that in order to occur it was necessary to have some form of governmental cooperation. As a result, Botswana and Zimbabwe would have governments who are at least recognizing HIV/AIDS as a problem, and making efforts to address it as such. Their approaches to HIV/AIDS reduction and

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224 See Figure 2, page 29.
how they frame HIV/AIDS within their policies are important for this study. They are not considered representative, but begin to provide clarity on how far securitization has reached within the global system.

**Canada and HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue**

*Background Information*

Canada is considered part of the global north, a developed country that is actively involved in the global community. It has an estimated population of 32,876,000 and a GDP per capita of US$ 39004 as of 2006. Canada is not experiencing the epidemic-like spread of HIV/AIDS that is occurring elsewhere in the world; but it is still a pressing national issue and a recognized national problem that the government is addressing. As of 2005, approximately 58,000 Canadians were living with HIV/AIDS, and a total of 13,300 Canadians had died of AIDS. In other words, approximately 0.18% of the Canadian population is living with HIV/AIDS. In light of the nature of the virus and the global impact, the Canadian government has been increasing its involvement in addressing HIV/AIDS both nationally and internationally.

Nationally, the government established the Federal Initiative to Address HIV/AIDS in Canada, in 2005. The Federal Initiative links together the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), Health Canada, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research and finally the Correctional Service of Canada. National spending on HIV/AIDS has remained steadily the same, even though the number of programs funded by the government has increased. Between 1994 and

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1998, the Canadian government budget allocation for domestic HIV/AIDS spending was $42.2 million. When the Canadian Strategy on HIV/AIDS (CSHA) replaced the National AIDS Strategy in 1998, the budget allocated to the CSHA for the period of 1998-2008, was still $42.2 million.228

Internationally, Canada has been more readily increasing its monetary involvement in addressing the epidemic. The exact statistics are difficult to track due to the multitude of departments involved in the distribution of international aid. The main departments that are currently involved include: the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Federal Initiative (which includes Public Health Canada, Public Health Agency of Canada, Health Canada, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research and the Correctional Services of Canada). Cumulative annual statistics on total amounts spent on Global AIDS support are unavailable; however from a review of the various organizations involved, it is clear that following 2000/2001, a notable increase in funding occurred.

The Canadian government has been regularly increasing its international budget for global HIV/AIDS spending. In 1998, before the widespread recognition of the global crisis posed by HIV/AIDS, the Canadian government spent approximately US$ 14.8 million on global AIDS support.229 By 2001, it had committed US$ 270 million, to be spread out over the following five years.230 In 2005 it again increased its committed funds, to approximately US$ 515 million, to be

distributed between 2005 and 2007. In between 2000 and 2007, there were various amounts of funds promised and spent on the global AIDS crisis. The exact amount is difficult to track, because beyond the lump sums committed by the government for a period of several years, there were annual commitments made, such as in 2004, when Canada committed funds to the World Health Organization for the 3 by 5 initiative. As well, in 2005, it also increased its commitment to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund). CIDA has estimated, between 2000 and 2005, Canada committed a total of over US$ 800 million. Most recently, Canada announced a pledge of US$ 450 million to the Global Fund over the next three years (2008-2010). It is important to also note that there is a difference, sometimes dramatic, in commitments versus actual spending. It is clear that there is more tracking and research needed into this aspect of Canada’s international HIV/AIDS involvement. The above-outlined Canadian financial commitments to the global AIDS crisis have demonstrated Canada’s increasing awareness of the problem at hand. Regardless of the exact amounts spent, the increases in international spending demonstrate a dramatic change in how the health problem was recognized and addressed by the government. The following section further details how the Canadian government participated in the securitization of HIV/AIDS, by examining specific government documents and discourses.

**Process of Attempted Securitization of HIV/AIDS**

As discussed above, the Canadian government has several government departments that have an input on how HIV/AIDS is addressed. As a result, many departments and other

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organizations are involved in formulating the Canadian perspective on HIV/AIDS and security. This departmental delegation proved to be a challenge and an issue in maintaining consistency while collecting data. However, through an extensive review of Canadian government reports, bills, meetings and, particularly, reports from the Canadian International Development Agency, between 2000 and 2008, it is clear that there is a regular and arguably an ingrained connection between HIV/AIDS and security. As such, the Canadian perspective on HIV/AIDS within the international system has become clearer.\textsuperscript{234}

Various linkages between security language (identified in this research as either: threat, combat, or fight) and HIV/AIDS are consistently employed within these official documents. HIV/AIDS is regularly framed as a threat and thus as an opponent that can be subdued. From 2000 to 2003, the framing of HIV/AIDS with security language existed and became slowly more prevalent. In 2002, CIDA released their report “CIDA Takes Action Against HIV/AIDS Around the World.”\textsuperscript{235} In the report, CIDA clarifies its role in the Canadian framing of HIV/AIDS when it explicitly outlines that, “fighting HIV/AIDS is an important part of the work of the Canadian International Development Agency.”\textsuperscript{236} The report also explains that, “CIDA’s programs are making a difference in the fight against HIV/AIDS.”\textsuperscript{237} The majority of the report does discuss HIV/AIDS in the context of a pandemic and the other health related outcomes. However, by referring to the fight against HIV/AIDS, several issues are conveyed to the audience, whether intentionally or not. First and foremost, it elevates HIV/AIDS beyond that of a serious health issue, such as cancer, to something more ominous and rallying. It also imbues the virus with a

\textsuperscript{234} After contacting the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, I was forwarded onto CIDA, who then forwarded me to their website. From this, it was assumed that the official views of the Canadian government on HIV/AIDS and foreign policy are represented within the CIDA documents.


\textsuperscript{236} Ibid. Message from the Minister.

\textsuperscript{237} Ibid., 2.
sense of purposeful intent, one that can be addressed, punished and subdued. It then becomes more of a security issue, and less of a health issue. Secondly, by referring to the fight against HIV/AIDS, it also references a more global initiative. Within Canada there is not a pandemic and there is not such a level of urgency surrounding the spread of HIV/AIDS. In turn, it becomes clear that the so-called fight against HIV/AIDS is occurring elsewhere and that Canada is joining an ongoing initiative (arguably this references the UN establishment and recognition of HIV/AIDS as a security issue).

In 2003, the Canadian government published a report from the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, “HIV/AIDS and the Humanitarian Catastrophe in Sub-Saharan Africa.” This report delves not only into the issue of HIV/AIDS, but also the concurrent crises that affect the spread of HIV/AIDS. The report contains numerous references to the Canadian approach to HIV/AIDS as a security issue, repeatedly framing it in the context of a war against HIV/AIDS. The report claims “failure to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic will leave many countries in a condition of structural famine and structural economic problems that will make development all but impossible.” By discussing HIV/AIDS in this manner, not only is the spread of the virus connected to security, but also it is argued that by not combating HIV/AIDS, the stability and development of the affected countries is threatened. This takes the attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS a step further and provides even greater pressure to address the spread of the virus in a security manner. Throughout the report there are numerous references to the fight against HIV/AIDS and the need to combat HIV/AIDS. The following excerpt further demonstrates how the committee understands and frames the virus within Canadian foreign policy:

239 Ibid., 18.
The Sub-Committee believes that concerted and well-funded international action to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic is urgently needed, and that Canada can and should make a real difference in this global effort. This effort must involve all stakeholders, but rich countries in particular are called on to mobilize the financial resources that are urgently needed to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic.  

From 2004 onwards, HIV/AIDS continued to be regularly framed as a security issue within reports, bills and sessions, with the exception of 2006. The only report that was reviewed for 2006 was a “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Canada and the Melinda Gates Foundation.” This contained none of the security language the research coded for. As well, within the government bills and sessions that were analyzed from 2006, there was very little security language used. There were only two occurrences of threat language (and these were not actually referring directly to HIV/AIDS), which is noticeably reduced from the previous years as well as all reports, bills and meetings from ensuing years. The year 2006 seems to be anomalous; perhaps it has to do with the lack of government attention directed to HIV/AIDS during that year. In Appendix 3, Canadian government reports have been separately organized from government bills and meetings, in order to demonstrate the differences between reports and official bills and sessions. It was assumed that reports would have more freedom to frame HIV/AIDS as a security issue.

Ultimately, as is demonstrated through the chart in Appendix 3, the connection between HIV/AIDS and security is clearly internalized within Canadian foreign policy and is still actively used within the Canadian government. The phrase fight against HIV/AIDS has become somewhat of a slogan and is widely applied to describe to the action that the government is undertaking in order to address the global spread of HIV/AIDS. This action is most clearly

\(^{242}\) See Appendix 3, to see the frequency of threat language.
identified through monetary support and contributions, as demonstrated in the previous section. It seems clear that the process of securitization, as initiated by the United Nations, is accepted and is occurring within the Canadian government, to the extent of the continuation of the speech acts. The Canadian government in this case is the audience and has successfully internalized the concept as a security issue; is now not only accepting it, but also attempting to address the international threat posed by HIV/AIDS, first and foremost through large financial contributions.

As far as confirming the Copenhagen process of securitization, it cannot be proclaimed as successful. The three key components that need to occur, have not, and will not occur with regards to the global securitization of HIV/AIDS as accepted by Canada. In order for an issue to be recognized as a security threat, there needs to be: an existential threat; demonstration of emergency measures taken to address the threat; and action taken to conduct the emergency measures that is beyond normal reactive measures. While the UN framed HIV/AIDS as an existential threat within Africa, it has not argued successfully for the other two criteria. As well, Canada has not demonstrated an attempt to participate in the promotion of the UN prompted securitization; none of the three criteria are argued within any of the reviewed documents.

**Facilitating Actors**

The above section has focused on the Canadian government’s acceptance of the United Nations argument that HIV/AIDS is a security issue, both within Africa and globally. However, there are other Canadian actors that have played a role in how the Canadian government understands HIV/AIDS. These facilitating actors have helped to form and solidify the Canadian understanding of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. It is beyond the scope of this paper to trace every possible facilitating actor involved. As a result, it recognizes the more general role of civil society
actors in the securitization of HIV/AIDS. The most involved facilitating actors are HIV/AIDS organizations, specifically international NGOs, and IOs. Canadian newspapers, specifically The Globe and Mail, have also played a role, as they have continued to discuss the concept of HIV/AIDS as a security threat.

UNAIDS\textsuperscript{243} and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria have explicitly argued for support in the \textit{global fight against HIV/AIDS} and have particularly been relied on by the Canadian government for information on the global state of the AIDS pandemic. Throughout the discourse analysis of Canadian documents and speeches, these organizations have been repeatedly mentioned. Their information and statistics have also been relied on to keep the Canadian government up to date on the global AIDS rates and the necessary requirements to address the virus. Other Canadian NGOs are actively involved in tackling HIV/AIDS internationally and they have regular contact with the Canadian government, invariably influencing the government’s opinion of HIV/AIDS as a global issue. These organizations are generally viewed as experts in their field; as a result, how they frame and discuss HIV/AIDS is taken seriously and inevitably affects how Canada perceives the issue.

The extent of Canadian newspapers’ role in the securitization of HIV/AIDS is also beyond the confines of this paper, but a general review of how HIV/AIDS has been framed since 2000 reveals how the Canadian understanding of HIV/AIDS has also evolved and changed. Through a general review of articles published in The Globe and Mail, between 2000 and 2008, it is clear that HIV/AIDS security language existed within some articles that were published even in 2000, however it was very infrequent. Generally, most articles that were published during 2000 and

\textsuperscript{243} While UNAIDS is a United Nations organization, it has markedly different views from that of the main organization. UNAIDS is focused entirely on HIV/AIDS, and it openly discusses HIV/AIDS in the context of a global security issue. The organization was involved in the original meetings in 2000, suggesting that some of their views are different than the main organ of the United Nations. As a result, its influence here is recognized as more of a facilitating actor in the securitization of HIV/AIDS.
2001 that contained HIV/AIDS references were focused on other topics, and HIV/AIDS was mentioned in passing. Through a general archives search between January 1, 2000 and January 1, 2001, there were fifty-eight results for articles that contain the words HIV/AIDS. The headings were focused on AIDS drugs and medical technologies, AIDS education, and even Aboriginal AIDS rates. The focus was more Canadian, although there were several articles that discussed the state of the AIDS epidemic in Africa, and a few articles reviewed the UN meetings that were held during that year. In 2000, there was only one article that hinted towards AIDS as a security issue, with the heading of “Plan fights AIDS crisis.” The general number of articles written about HIV/AIDS steadily increased after 2000: from January 2001-2002 there were 78 articles published; January 2002-2003, 91 articles; January 2003-2004, 140 articles; January 2004-2005, 133 articles; January 2005-2006, 121 articles; January 2006-2007, 200+ articles; January 2007-2008, 152 articles; and finally, between January 2008-2009, 180 articles published. Each year, the issues addressed in the articles became more international, more focused on the global epidemic and more focused on the role of the UN. Increasingly, there were more and more references to the ‘AIDS war’ and to the ‘global fight against HIV/AIDS.’ What this demonstrates is the parallel role that civil society plays alongside the government in the process of securitization. In essence, the newspaper helped the argument about HIV/AIDS as a security issue to transcend the governmental structures and to become instilled within general society. In


turn, as it becomes more widely recognized within general society, there is more pressure placed on the government to pay attention and take action.

**Success of Securitization Attempt**

The Copenhagen process of securitization requires an issue to be designated as an existential threat in order to be recognized as successful. HIV/AIDS does not itself pose an existential threat to Canada and it has not been argued to be one. There is more of an argument for the global implications of HIV/AIDS spreading as a global pandemic; however, that still stretches the existential threat requirement and has not been successfully argued. As a result, the first requirement has not been met. The second requirement of emergency measures has also not occurred. While Canada is financially and supportively participating in the international effort to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS, nothing that can be identified as emergency measures have been taken. The Canadian approach is quite in keeping with the actions of many other countries committed to reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS and they are not much different than the actions that would be taken for other prevalent diseases or international crises. The third requirement, that action taken is beyond normal reactive measures or beyond normal political procedures, has also been left unmet. There have been no instances of the Canadian government or government actors reacting to the spread of HIV/AIDS by sidestepping normal political procedure. This is the case both nationally, and internationally. Securitization remains incomplete.
United States and HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue

Background Information

The United States, like Canada, is part of the global north. It is regarded as one of the most influential and powerful countries in the world. Its support and involvement in issues of global concern is both expected and greatly sought after. As a result, how it approaches the global HIV/AIDS crisis, both nationally and internationally, is quite relevant. The United States has both the human and monetary resources to engage effectively in the global initiative to address the virus. As of 2006, the US population was estimated to be 305,826,000 with an estimated GDP per capita of US$ 43,562. With regards to the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, the United States has almost two times the number of people living with the virus than Canada; as of 2003, approximately 1,112,000 people were living with HIV. In other words, over 0.36% of the American population is living with HIV/AIDS.

The United States has separate national and international programs that oversee the US approach to addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis. Nationally, the United States addresses the issue of HIV/AIDS mainly through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). However, national spending is divided between care and assistance, research, and prevention. Therefore the budget is allocated to a wide variety of organizations. National spending has increased, from approximately US$ 9.6 billion in

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For the American international approach to the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, the United States government established The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003, prior to which United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was responsible for the US global approach to HIV/AIDS. The American budget for international HIV/AIDS spending is much greater than the Canadian budget and it has remained quite high since before 2001. This likely has to do with the early recognition of the so-called nation threat posed by the virus in 2000, when the Clinton administration officially declared the global AIDS epidemic to be a national security issue for the United States.

According to PEPFAR, the United States has spent a great deal on the global epidemic over the years, as is demonstrated by the following estimated annual spending: 2001, $840 million; 2002, $1.2 billion; 2003, $1.5 billion; 2004, $2.3 billion; 2005, $2.7 billion; 2006, $3.3 billion; 2007, $4.5 billion; and in 2008, $6.0 billion. However, there is a noticeable increase in US global HIV/AIDS funding even before the establishment of PEPFAR, when USAID was still responsible for HIV/AIDS funding. Between 2000 and 2001, there is leap in USAID funding for global AIDS support. In 2000, just under US$200 million was spent by UNAIDS, however, by 2001 the amount had increased by about seventy five percent, to just under US$350 million dollars. This was a dramatic and marked increase in global AIDS funding, because between 1993

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251 PEPFAR Website, About PEPFAR. Accessed online at: [http://www.pepfar.gov/about/index.htm](http://www.pepfar.gov/about/index.htm)


and 1998, funding had remained relatively stable at approximately US$125 million.\textsuperscript{254} The United States has a much clearer record of its funding for HIV/AIDS than Canada and this is likely a result of the singular departmental delegation. Before PEPFAR took responsibility for the US global approach to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, USAID was similarly efficient in its records of spending. USAID can provide records of its global HIV/AIDS funding back to 1986 when it spent $0, to the period between 1987-1992 when it increased from US$0 to approximately US$100 million and to the final amount of around US$325 million distributed in 2002.\textsuperscript{255} The above outlined changes in global HIV/AIDS spending demonstrate a clear change in approach and understanding of the impact of the virus for the United States. The reason and extent of the change is explored in more depth through the following detailed review of American documents and discourses.

\textit{Process of Attempted Securitization of HIV/AIDS}

The American foreign policy on HIV/AIDS was much more readily available compared to the Canadian policy. The United States has a relatively new department devoted to addressing the global issue of HIV/AIDS. The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was established in 2003 and has been actively involved in promoting the global fight against HIV/AIDS.\textsuperscript{256} Most recently, at the October 21\textsuperscript{st} 2008 US White House Summit on International Development, President George Bush reiterated the purpose and role of PEPFAR. In his address to those who attended the White House Summit, President Bush explained that “[Liberian

President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf talked about our fight against HIV/AIDS. And it’s a noble battle and it’s a necessary battle. In 2003, as she had mentioned, we launched PEPFAR. The program is the largest commitment by any nation to combat a single disease in human history. This quite clearly situates the American perspective on HIV/AIDS and reiterates the global approach that the American government takes in addressing HIV/AIDS. It openly frames HIV/AIDS in security language and whether intentionally or not, it presents the virus as a threat that can be fought and subdued. Ultimately, it is not framed as an existential threat.

Through a review of American reports from PEPFAR, the United States Agency for International Development, as well as government bills and meetings from 2000 through 2008, a clearer understanding of the American framing of HIV/AIDS has emerged. Again, the research began with the year 2000 because of the attention the UN focused on HIV/AIDS following the January 10th meeting as well as with the passing of Resolution 1308. Since PEPFAR was not established until 2003, there is a slight gap for reports between 2000 and 2003; however USAID helps to provide insight into how the United States framed HIV/AIDS during that period of time.

The 2001 USAID report “Leading the Way: USAID Responds to HIV/AIDS,” begins demonstrating the potential top down influence of the United Nations and the increasing acceptance of the UN framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. This USAID report writes, that “[2000 was] the first time that HIV/AIDS was discussed as a global security threat at such a high level. The Security Council repeated its warning in July...In September, the international community again stressed the need for and commitment to a coordinated attack on HIV/AIDS.”

This shows the US recognition of repeated attempts by the UN to prompt the so-called

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259 Ibid., 45.
international community to follow suit and join together in a global effort to combat HIV/AIDS, or to join the *fight against HIV/AIDS*. It is clear that the UN framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue did not go unnoticed, and within Canada and the United States (at the very least) it seems that it was not challenged but was readily accepted.

An interesting phenomenon that is identifiable (see Appendix 4) starting in 2005, with the first PEPFAR report to congress, is a steady increase in security language until 2008, when it drops dramatically. The reports from 2005, 2006 and 2007 each had extremely high frequencies of security language used to frame HIV/AIDS. The 2005 report repeatedly uses the exact phrase, *fight against HIV/AIDS*, 27 times and refers to it in various other combinations throughout the report, including repeatedly using phrases such as the *global HIV/AIDS fight, to combat HIV/AIDS, or combating HIV/AIDS*. These same sentences are found in the following two reports from 2006 and 2007. In the 2006 report, *the fight against HIV/AIDS* was referred to 29 times, and in various other combinations. In the 2007 report, it was referred to 39 times, as well as numerous other combinations totaling 91 references to *fight, fights or fighting*. The frequency of this language cannot be interpreted as accidental. The United States openly accepts and seemingly goes beyond to promote the UN conception of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. HIV/AIDS is framed in the reports as an enemy, and by invoking it in such a way action is deemed necessary.

The frequency of the language in the reports varies from the frequency of the language used in government bills and meetings, but the security language does not disappear. As Appendix 4 demonstrates, the threat language is much more reduced within the acts of Congress and the bills and meetings reviewed from 2000 through 2008. In part, this is because some of the bills and acts reviewed did not directly deal with HIV/AIDS, unlike the reports, which were solely focused on HIV/AIDS. As well, unlike the reports, the resolutions and bills are drafted very specifically,
briefly and directly. Ultimately, when HIV/AIDS was discussed in resolutions and bills, it was framed in a similar manner to the reports. In 2000, in the “World Bank AIDS Marshall Plan Trust Fund Act,” the phrases *to combat HIV/AIDS* and *to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS* were used to discuss the action needed to address HIV/AIDS.\(^{260}\) In the “Global AIDS Research and Relief Act of 2001,” (Introduced in Senate on June 28\(^{th}\))\(^{262}\) HIV/AIDS was framed as a threat, and the phrase *to combat*(*ing*) *HIV/AIDS* was repeatedly used. Furthermore, in 2002, in the “United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2002,”\(^{263}\) the preference to employ security language when discussing the approach to addressing HIV/AIDS continued, as *to combat HIV/AIDS* is repeatedly employed. This continues in the reports reviewed for 2003 through 2008.\(^{264}\) Like Canada, the United States uses security language to refer to the global epidemic but does not employ the same language when discussing HIV/AIDS in a national context.

It is necessary to address the spike in frequency of security language for 2008. The “Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008”\(^{265}\) is an act “that was passed to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 to provide assistance to foreign countries to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, and for other purposes.”\(^{266}\) The increased frequency in security language in the act is partially due to the fact that the security language is now

\(^{260}\) HR 3519 RFS, 106th CONGRESS, 2nd Session. In the Senate of The United States, May 16, 2000.
\(^{261}\) HR 3519 RFS, 106th CONGRESS, 2nd Session. In the Senate of The United States, May 16, 2000.
\(^{262}\) S 1120 IS, 107th CONGRESS, 1st Session. The Global AIDS Research and Relief Act of 2001 (Introduced in Senate June 28).
\(^{264}\) In 2004, one of the reports reviewed contained no security language, however that is likely because it was a report on National AIDS day.
\(^{266}\) HR 5501 EH, 110th CONGRESS, 2d Session. Passed the House of Representatives April 2, 2008.
engrained in American foreign policy with regards to HIV/AIDS. The purpose of the act is explained: “to strengthen and enhance United States global leadership and the effectiveness of the United States response to the HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria pandemics and other related and preventable infectious diseases in developing countries.” The act goes on to elaborate section by section the American strategy and the American effort to address the global AIDS pandemic. This act explicitly describes how the American effort is focused on combating HIV/AIDS. It also goes further and expands its focus to tuberculosis and malaria, and describes initiatives to combat malaria and to combat tuberculosis. (This is an interesting expansion beyond HIV/AIDS, moving to include other diseases as threats. This is an important step beyond the original intent of the United Nations. However, this is beyond the scope of the research). This act clearly demonstrates how, by 2008, HIV/AIDS is fully accepted as a security issue by the United States and is being addressed and managed as such.

To build upon this conclusion, the United States it the largest monetary contributor to the so-called fight against HIV/AIDS. PEPFAR is one of the largest individual contributors to global HIV/AIDS expenditures. As of 2006, it accounted for 21% of the global funding to HIV/AIDS activities. In addition to PEPFAR’s contributions, as is demonstrated in the chart below, the United States is one of the largest, if not the largest single contributor to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. In reviewing the global acceptance of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, the establishment and influence of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria in 2002 requires review. The very mandate of this organization is to increase resources

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268 Sections 301 to 303. HR 5501 EH, 110th CONGRESS, 2d Session. Passed the House of Representatives April 2, 2008.
269 The World Bank and UNAIDS contributed 22%, the Global Fund contributed 21%, Bilateral sources provided an additional 28%, and finally Private donations accounted for 8%. Information accumulated from the Global Health Council, available online at: http://www.globalhealth.org/hiv_aids/needs/#10.
to dramatically *increase the fight* against these three diseases.\(^\text{270}\) This confirms that the United States has successfully internalized the critical threat posed by HIV/AIDS, as initiated by the United Nations. The United States should be understood as another member of the audience in this case, and it could be further argued that they have gone above and beyond the role of the audience and are now demonstrating their own plan of action, through their monetary commitments, and are further promoting the securitization of HIV/AIDS through their frequent and extensive security rhetoric.

**Figure 4: Pledges and Contributions to the Global Fund**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: The Global Fund Progress Update, April 14(^\text{th}), 2008.(^\text{271})</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Contributions to date</th>
<th>Contributions for 2007</th>
<th>Pledges for 2008</th>
<th>Total pledges through 2010 (^1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td>2,540 (25%)</td>
<td>531 (21%)</td>
<td>840 (26%)</td>
<td>4,073 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td>5,745 (56%)</td>
<td>1,483 (58%)</td>
<td>1,889 (59%)</td>
<td>12,770 (65%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan and others</strong></td>
<td>1,473 (14%)</td>
<td>319 (13%)</td>
<td>365 (12%)</td>
<td>2,015 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private sector / other</strong></td>
<td>586 (5%)</td>
<td>185 (7%)</td>
<td>112 (3%)</td>
<td>755 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10,324 (100%)</td>
<td>2,518 (100%)</td>
<td>3,226 (100%)</td>
<td>19,813 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Facilitating Actors*

In general, the same conclusions that were drawn about Canadian facilitating actors apply to the United States case. American civil society plays an understated but influential role in the securitization of HIV/AIDS. However, first and foremost, it is clear that the US has played a considerable role as a facilitating actor in the global securitization of HIV/AIDS. The US has been extremely vocal in proclaiming the need to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic. American


representatives played an important role as advocators for the initial January 2000 Security Council meetings on the issue of HIV/AIDS and they have continued to be quite vocal in their argument of HIV/AIDS as a national and global security issue. Since the United States involvement in the January 2000 Security Council meetings, their interest seems to have only gained momentum from that point onward. The United States has openly argued for the need to join together to address the threat of HIV/AIDS. Some of the most influential individuals include Al Gore, and Richard Holbrooke who played key roles in the lead up to the January 2000 SC meeting, as well as both the Clinton and Bush Administrations who openly declared HIV/AIDS a national security threat. In public the slogan *the global fight against HIV/AIDS*, has been repeatedly invoked by countless American government representatives, particularly in the national arena. The United States has the financial capacity, a vested interest, and the influence to partake in the international promotion of HIV/AIDS as a security threat. As a result, it is one of the most important facilitating actors in the global securitization of HIV/AIDS.

With regards to the role of civil society as facilitating actors for the American acceptance of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, both American newspapers and NGOs play diminished roles in comparison to that of the government. With regards to newspapers, it seems that they play a different role in the United States than in Canada. The New York Times was reviewed in the same way the Canadian Globe and Mail was reviewed. An annual search for articles containing the words HIV/AIDS was undertaken, between 2000 and 2008, searching for headings that used security language in connection with HIV/AIDS. With regards to content and frequency of HIV/AIDS discussions, The New York Times is quite different than The Globe and Mail. The New York Times maintains a more national focus and very infrequently discussed HIV/AIDS in general, let alone in the context of security. The fight against HIV/AIDS was mentioned in a
heading on June 1, 2001: “After Meeting, Asia-Pacific Health Ministers Vow to Fight AIDS.”

It was only explicitly mentioned one other time, on August 30, 2005, when the heading explained that, “U.S. Blamed for Condom Shortage in Fighting AIDS in Uganda.”


With regards to NGOs and IOs, the same conclusions drawn in the Canadian case apply. The influence of organizations such as UNAIDS and the Global Fund are still important, as they are relied upon by the American government for key statistic information, and therefore, how they frame HIV/AIDS is also taken seriously. Ultimately, the role of the US government as a facilitating actor, with regards to monetary support, precedes the potential influence of such organizations. Since the United States government itself has been at the forefront of HIV/AIDS securitization efforts, any outside efforts to persuade the US either for or against the securitization of HIV/AIDS would likely be moot.

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Success of Securitization Attempt

Even though there is successful internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue and active involvement in internationally promoting HIV/AIDS as a security threat, this does not mean that there is a successful case of securitization. Ultimately, the same conclusions that were drawn in the Canadian case study apply the case of the United States. While the UN framed HIV/AIDS as an existential threat within Africa, it has not argued successfully for the other two criteria. While the United States has demonstrated an interest in promoting HIV/AIDS as a security issue none of the three criteria are argued successfully within any of the reviewed discourses. According to the Copenhagen process of securitization, HIV/AIDS has not been framed as an existential threat. Furthermore, extreme measures have not been established and no action has been taken to address the epidemic either nationally or internationally, that are beyond normal political procedures.
Botswana and HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue

Background Information

Politically, Botswana continues to remain a fairly stable, democratic and peaceful African country. In 2007, Botswana’s population was estimated to be 1,882,000.275 Until recently, it was presided over by President Festus Mogae, who retired from office in 2008. Socially, the outlook is not necessarily as positive. The government has been trying to reduce poverty, increase employment and reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS. Poverty reduction is being negatively affected by the slow employment rates and increasing numbers of unemployed university graduates. Furthermore, the spread of HIV/AIDS is affecting the government’s efforts to reduce poverty, as the virus reduces the ability of those who are infected to work, it also gradually reduces their savings and finally it creates new groups of vulnerable individuals as others become infected.276 Economically, in the past Botswana was recognized as one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. However, in the past couple of years its economic growth has been noticeably slowing. As of 2006, its GDP per capita was approximately US$ 4755.0.277 The recent reduction in economic growth is due mainly to the unpredictable nature of the diamond mining sector which, for Botswana, is a major force affecting the economy.278 Current economic boosts are due to government investment in mining, power generation, and irrigation.279

According to the 2008 UNGASS Progress Report from Botswana, the country’s HIV prevalence rates increased slightly from between 270,000 and 290,000 adults and children living with HIV in 2001, to between 280,000 and 310,000 adults and children living with HIV in 2007. The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in 2001 was estimated to be 26.5% of the population, and by 2005 it was estimated to have dropped to 24%. In 2007, adult HIV prevalence rates were estimated to have declined to approximately 23.9% of the adult population aged 15-49. The government further estimates that as of 2007, approximately 113,000 people had advanced stages of HIV infection.

According to Botswana’s UNGASS Progress Report, HIV/AIDS funding has been steadily growing. In order to address the spread of HIV/AIDS within the country, the government has been increasing spending to address the epidemic: in 2002, US$ 69.8 million was dispersed nationally; in 2003, it remained the same at US$ 69.8 million; in 2005, it jumped to US$ 165 million; and finally in 2007, it was slightly reduced to US$ 148.6 million. What is deceptive about these numbers is that they include both domestic and international donor aid, but regardless of the uncertain nature of the funding, the numbers do clearly demonstrate increased attention and

funding appropriated to the issue. The following chart differentiates between recent domestic and international funding.

Figure 5: Botswana Resource Tracking by UNAIDS

![Expenditures by Finance Source and Spending Category](chart.png)

Although it continues to have one of the highest HIV/AIDS rates in the world, Botswana is now proving to be a fairly good case of successful HIV/AIDS reduction. Between 2000 and 2007, it has shown a steady decrease in prevalence rates and the government has been front and center in the effort to address HIV/AIDS within the country. Former President Festus Mogae was especially committed and involved in the effort. One of his most noted attempts to increase

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287 See Figure 2, page 29.
public awareness and to reduce stigma was when he took a public HIV test. Recently, in October 2008, Former President Mogae received an award recognizing his leadership on HIV/AIDS; he won the Mo Ibrahim Annual Award for Good Governance. For these reasons, Botswana was selected as a case study to contrast with the ensuing review of Zimbabwe. How these very different governments approach HIV/AIDS within their own countries and whether they address the global pandemic as a security issue, is quite pertinent in tracing the extent of global securitization of HIV/AIDS.

**Process of Attempted Securitization of HIV/AIDS**

While the Botswana government does not explicitly frame HIV/AIDS as a national security issue, on its National AIDS Coordination Agency (NACA) webpage, it openly explains that the Coordination involves “the identification of key strategic priorities in the war on HIV/AIDS, the development and support of programs and policies that can deliver on these priorities, and the development of tools and mechanisms to monitor and evaluate progress in the war on HIV/AIDS.” The government does not provide open access to its policies and approaches to HIV/AIDS. Those that are accessible are divided between the government Department of Health and the National AIDS Coordination Agency. In order to gain a better perspective on how the Government of Botswana frames HIV/AIDS, presidential speeches were supplemented with government reports and reports from the NACA.

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291 See Appendix 5 for detailed list of reviewed documents.
Unlike the Canadian and American governments, there were no speeches collected for Botswana prior to 2003 and the earliest document that reflected government perspectives on HIV/AIDS was the “NACA Status of the 2002 National Response to the UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS.” The phrase *fight against HIV/AIDS* was repeatedly used in the report and it repeatedly discussed strategies to combat HIV/AIDS. This understanding of HIV/AIDS was unexpected because it was originally thought that African governments would actively avoid framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue because of the potential negative affects. Although the security language, particularly *fight against HIV/AIDS*, is not employed to the same extent that the Canadian and American governments frame their policies, it is still visible and thus has impact. The “2002 NACA Technical Report” also referred similarly to the *fight against HIV/AIDS* and explained in the introduction that “[HIV/AIDS] poses a paramount threat to development in the country as the vast majority of the affected adults are in the prime of their productive and reproductive lives.”

The remainder of the reports that were analyzed from 2003 through 2004 all contained similar references to those outlined above. The “National AIDS Coordination Agency’s National HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework for 2003-2009” contains several references to the *fight against HIV/AIDS*. In the foreword to the report it is explained that, “this Framework brings all stakeholders from every level into the fight. Having declared HIV/AIDS a national emergency, this National Strategic Framework is my Government’s pronouncement on how we will continue

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292 Republic of Botswana, Ministry of State President. NACA. Status of the 2002 National Response to the UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS.
to address this emergency.”

As well, the report also outlines how HIV/AIDS is openly understood as a threat by explaining that, “HIV/AIDS poses a significant threat to national security in terms of loss of human resources and the ability to mobilize for the protection of national interests.” This is quite significant in that this report, even more so than UN documents, acknowledges that HIV/AIDS is a security issue. The exception, to the government framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, is the “NACA report to the National AIDS Council Meeting of the 26th of November.”

This report contained none of the words that were coded for, however this is likely due to the nature of the report, which was focused on data and detailed facts and did not discuss government approaches beyond testing, training and condom distribution.

The speeches that were reviewed provided more evidence of HIV/AIDS being understood and accepted as a threat and a security issue. Not including all of the State of the Nation Addresses and the Inauguration Address by H.E. Lieutenant General S.K.I. Khama (they contained no references), the remainder of the speeches included direct references to the fight against HIV/AIDS. Although there is no dramatic increase in the frequency of security language from 2002 to 2008, the concept of the fight against HIV/AIDS is repeatedly and consistently referenced. For example, in the 2003 BBC interview with President Festus Mogae, the fight against HIV/AIDS was discussed throughout. Most recently, the 2008 Budget speech illustrates the extent of the internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue and in part how the Botswana government approaches it. The following quote demonstrates this fairly effectively:

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297 Ibid.
299 Ibid.
300 BBC Talking Point Programme. Transcript of H.E. the President Festus Mogae’s interactive interview, 30 November 2003.
“Mr. Speaker, I should, in light of these positive developments, express Batswana’s gratitude to all our development partners in the fight against HIV/AIDS. In particular I wish to single out the USA President’s Emergency Programme for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), Africa Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP) and the Global Fund, for their invaluable assistance in the battle against the HIV scourge.”

The Botswana government seems to be quite aware of the urgency and potential threat that HIV/AIDS poses internally. It is especially aware that it cannot address it alone, explaining that, “Botswana cannot win the war against HIV/AIDS on its own.”

In the external (global) securitization of HIV/AIDS that was initiated by the UN, Botswana should be understood both as the audience and as a referent object. Through this review of government documents and speeches, it is clear that Botswana as the audience, has accepted the general international consensus prompted by the United Nations, and has internalized HIV/AIDS both as a critical security issue and as national security threat (but not as an existential threat). Botswana as the referent object is identifying HIV/AIDS as a security threat that it cannot free itself from alone and it is calling for and accepting outside assistance to help reduce the increasing threat posed by HIV/AIDS. The United Nations explicitly argued for the acceptance of HIV/AIDS as a security threat within Sub-Saharan Africa in their securitizing move in 2000. To reiterate, according to the proposed expanded process of securitization, Botswana (as the referent object) has been unable to free itself from the threat posed by HIV/AIDS and it required outside help in order to address it. This supports and justifies why the United Nations initiated the securitization of HIV/AIDS within Sub- 

Saharan Africa. The United Nations has demonstrated a plan of action and has initiated it with global support, acceptance and particularly with global aid.

**Facilitating Actors**

Nationally, Botswana has a fairly good relationship with civil society, particularly national HIV/AIDS organizations. These organizations are increasingly being relied on to help coordinate national efforts to address HIV/AIDS. Reviewing the extent of the role of civil society in Botswana’s acceptance of the securitizing claims of the UN is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the fact that civil society plays an important role in how HIV/AIDS is being addressed within the country, hints to the likely influence that they have on how HIV/AIDS is understood and therefore securitized. The involvement of outside organizations is also important to recognize, especially since the country is unable to deal with the epidemic on its own. The various organizations, including UNAIDS and the Global Fund, all contribute to Botswana’s approach to HIV/AIDS reduction. This leads to a great deal of outside influence in how the government recognizes the problem of HIV/AIDS. While beyond the capabilities of this study, it is necessary to acknowledge the role of facilitating actors such as national and international civil society, in the securitization of HIV/AIDS within Botswana.

It was difficult to annually track the impact of Botswana’s newspapers on the national understanding of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. The archives of the Mmegi Online only contain articles as far back as 2003, and it was not possible to search

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annually. A general search for HIV/AIDS resulted in a total of 977 articles. Through a general and unsystematic review of the articles, it is clear that the newspaper openly and regularly reviews some of the most pertinent issues associated with HIV/AIDS and openly discusses both the national and international fight against HIV/AIDS. An article in 2008 clearly connects HIV/AIDS and security by proclaiming that “Botswana's political commitment to fight HIV/AIDS is a well known and is an enviable fact regionally and internationally.”\(^304\) In another article from 2005, “[Andrew] Kamanga [Botswana’s National Olympic Committee Coordinator] went further to challenge the coaches to fight HIV/AIDS through sport as it is threatening to reverse all the developments that have been achieved by this country since independence in 1966.”\(^305\) As demonstrated by the above excerpt, discussions of the impact and severity of HIV/AIDS pervades a wide variety of topics discussed in the newspaper. The fight against HIV/AIDS is regularly mentioned, is frequently connected to the government and discussed as if it is a national policy. The Mmegi Online provides public access to the views of both government and public figures, through a fairly open dissemination of information, and in this way, the newspaper becomes an important facilitating actor in the securitization of HIV/AIDS.

**Success of Securitization Attempt**

In the same way that Canada and the United States have internalized HIV/AIDS as a security threat, the above sections have demonstrated that Botswana


has accepted and internalized HIV/AIDS as a security threat that needs to be fought. However, as far as the Copenhagen process of securitization goes, only one of three requirements has been met. HIV/AIDS has been argued to be an existential threat within Africa and in turn, Botswana, by the United Nations. The government recognizes and openly proclaims the severe threat to both citizens and state from the spread of the virus. Ultimately, that alone does not confirm securitization. There needs to be extreme measures taken and actions that are beyond the norm for the government. Neither of these two conditions has been met and in many ways it is still being physically addressed as a health issue within the health department.
Zimbabwe and HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue

Background Information

Politically, Zimbabwe has been experiencing long-term instability, political unrest, political violence and widespread intimidation. For almost three decades President Robert Mugabe has maintained a heavy-handed approach to his political reign, with widespread reports of human rights abuses and blatant acts that undermine democracy and rule of law. Mugabe has made concerted efforts to draw international attention away from his questionable policies and abuses of power and towards other issues, particularly focusing on the land distribution issue. Recently, the elections in early 2008 brought about more widespread unrest and equally widespread violence and intimidation. However, as of February 2009, Morgan Tsvangirai began sharing power with Mugabe, as prime minister, the result of a power-sharing deal that was originally signed in September 2008. The ensuing months will shed even more light on the political stability and political future of Zimbabwe. Socially, the country is experiencing fairly widespread devastation. The population, estimated in 2007 to be 13,349,000, is experiencing increasingly prevalent poverty and unemployment, with frequent food shortages and an ongoing cholera epidemic that is worsening. The spread of HIV/AIDS is only adding to the critical nature of the situation as it invariably affects poverty, unemployment, and food security. As a result, development is stagnant, and severely threatened. Economically, Zimbabwe is experiencing similarly severe problems; in particular, inflation rates have reached an estimated 10

million percent. GDP declined an estimated one third between 1999 and 2006 and in 2007 it is estimated to have declined a further six percent.\footnote{The World Bank was reviewed, because the OECD did not have any reports on Zimbabwe beyond 2004. The World Bank. “Country Brief: Zimbabwe,” (October 2008). Accessed online at: http://web.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/ZIMBABWEEXTN/0,,menuPK:375746-pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:375736,00.html} As a result, GDP per capita was approximated to be US$ 133 as of 2006.\footnote{United Nations data, Country Profile for Zimbabwe, accessed online: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Zimbabwe}

Zimbabwe’s capacity to deal with the spread of HIV/AIDS has been seriously reduced as a result of the current political, social and economic issues it faces. According to 2007 UNAIDS data, national adult HIV prevalence rates were estimated to be around 15.6\% and it was further estimated that a total of 1,300,000 individuals were infected with HIV.\footnote{UNAIDS Country Responses. “Zimbabwe,” accessed online at: http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/zimbabwe.asp} This is a significant drop from 2001, when adult HIV prevalence in Zimbabwe was estimated to be around 26.5\%.\footnote{Government of Zimbabwe. “United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) Report on HIV and AIDS: Follow up on the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS,” Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, (2008), 4. Accessed online at: http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/zimbabwe.asp} Total prevalence estimates between 2001 and 2005 are slightly higher, with estimate of total HIV prevalence in 2001 estimated to be 33.7\%, and total HIV prevalence in 2005 estimated to be approximately 20.1\%.\footnote{UNAIDS “AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2007.” In Executive Summary. (Geneva, 2007), 11.} The government notes that the decline in prevalence is attributable to both mortality and a decline in infection rates due to behavioral change.\footnote{Government of Zimbabwe. “United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) Report on HIV and AIDS: Follow up on the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS,” Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, (2008), 4. Accessed online at: http://www.unaids.org/en/CountryResponses/Countries/zimbabwe.asp} In order to deal with HIV/AIDS, the Government of Zimbabwe dispersed US$14,700,000 in 2005, US$63,437,000 in 2006, and US$86,256.00 in 2007.\footnote{While the estimates for 2007 seem drastically lower, this was the number that was repeatedly reported as the amount dispersed in 2007.} The funding comes directly from the Ministry of Finance;
the amount includes the National AIDS levy, which is approximately 3%.\textsuperscript{317}

\textit{Process of Attempted Securitization of HIV/AIDS}

Unlike Botswana, Zimbabwe has not had and nor will it in the immediate future, a stable government capable of committing the necessary attention to HIV/AIDS. However, regardless of the ongoing political turmoil, Zimbabwean HIV/AIDS prevalence rates dropped significantly between 2000 and 2007.\textsuperscript{318} This is questionable in a country that has been experiencing regular and frequent social and political uncertainty. While it would be a very positive achievement for the country, there are other potential explanations for the dramatic decrease in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. The most likely alternative is an extremely high rate of mortality, which would offset the HIV/AIDS prevalence rates.\textsuperscript{319} While a full discussion and review of this issue is highly pertinent, it is beyond the expanse of this research. Zimbabwe was selected as a case study to contrast with Botswana. While they have two of the highest AIDS rates in the world,\textsuperscript{320} they have different government involvement and commitment to the issue of HIV/AIDS. To compound this, they have two very different presidential approaches to national policy formation and, as a result, they are likely quite opposite in their approaches to framing HIV/AIDS. It is also likely that if security framing of HIV/AIDS is in fact present and regularly used in Zimbabwe, it is attributable to the outside influence of the United Nations. Particularly since 2000, the UN has

\textsuperscript{318} According to UNAIDS estimates. See Figure 2, page 29, for details.
\textsuperscript{320} Botswana was estimated to be at 26.5% in 2001 and 23.9 in 2007, while Zimbabwe was estimated to be at 26% in 2001 and 15.3% in 2007. Swaziland actually has the second highest prevalence rate to Botswana, with 26.3% in 2001 and 26.1% in 2007, however it experienced virtually no decrease in prevalence and as a result, it was decided it would not be a good case study for this research. UNAIDS estimates from UNAIDS Global Report 2008.
been involved in working with African countries to reduce the prevalence of HIV/AIDS rates. The close interaction of the UN with the governments inevitably affects how the government approaches HIV/AIDS and thus how they understand it. This is a major assumption and it is not meant to be final or comprehensive. It is meant to acknowledge the influence of the United Nations and to build an argument for future research into this topic. With very little previous research on this issue, some assumptions are necessary in order to move forward.

Zimbabwe presented a similar pattern to that of Botswana, with repeated references to the fight against HIV/AIDS and the threat to security/development recurring throughout many presidential speeches, albeit not with as much frequency. Also similarly to Botswana, there was an increased prevalence of security language within reports, as opposed to the speeches. While the details of their approaches to HIV/AIDS reduction may differ, the framing language remains very similar between the two countries. It is necessary to note that three of the speeches that were coded contained no security language referring to HIV/AIDS. The first was the Address to Parliament on the 22nd of July 2003, the second was State of the Nation the Address by President Mugabe on the 6th of December 2005, and the third was the Address by the President on the 27th Independence Anniversary on April 18th 2007. When HIV/AIDS was discussed, such as during the Seventeenth State of the Nation Address by President Robert Mugabe on the 9th of December 2004, Mugabe describes it as “by far the biggest threat to the health of the population.” He further elaborated at the Asian Africa Summit in 2005, when he explains that “further challenges

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321 The speeches were originally coded to check for the use of variations of threat, fight and combat. Afterwards, a review of the concordances was done to ensure that the words were actually used in conjunction with HIV/AIDS. Address by His Excellency the President Comrade R. G. Mugabe on the occasion of the opening of the fourth session of the fifth parliament of Zimbabwe Tuesday, 22nd July 2003; State of the Nation Address By His Excellency, the President, CDE R.G. Mugabe, House of Assembly, Parliament Building, Harare, 6th December 2005; Address by His Excellency the President, Comrade R.G. Mugabe, On the Occasion of the 27th Independence Anniversary, Rufaro Stadium, Wednesday 18 April, 2007.
322 Seventeenth State Of The Nation Address By His Excellency The President Of The Republic Of Zimbabwe Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe Parliament, 9th December 2004.
323 Ibid.
include growing cases of transnational crimes, poverty and the HIV/AIDS pandemic, all of which constitute a formidable threat to the new world we would like to bequeath to our posterity.”

Although brief, and not discussed in depth during speeches for the majority of Mugabe’s speeches that discuss HIV/AIDS, he uses security language. Within Zimbabwean reports however, HIV/AIDS is frequently and explicitly described using security language. In particular, within the National AIDS Council (NAC) 2004 Annual Report, the review of the status of the Millennium Development Goals and the Zimbabwe HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan for 2006-2010, HIV/AIDS is framed in the same manner as the three previous countries. The NAC was bestowed the responsibility of coordinating and managing the government of Zimbabwe’s HIV/AIDS strategy. The 2004 Annual report clarifies that “the Government of Zimbabwe realized its responsibility to provide the required leadership to mobilize national efforts to combat the HIV and AIDS epidemic.”

The Council’s function is made even more explicit under the section, Functions and Powers of the Council, where it is explained that the role of the Council is to “do all things which in the Board’s opinion are necessary or appropriate to combat HIV and AIDS and to ameliorate the effects of those diseases.” The Zimbabwe Millennium Development Goals 2004 Progress Report continues in the same direction and further incorporates the framing of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. There is an increased use of security language in this particular report but it diverges away from the usual choice of fight against HIV/AIDS; this likely results from the UN’s original choice of

325 This could be a reason why there has been a dramatic decrease in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates, as the NAC is separate from the unstable political environment, and has been given full authority to act alone. Again, this is one possibility, if the decrease is a real phenomenon unaffected by mortality rates.
327 Ibid., 6.
language when drafting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).\textsuperscript{329} The framing of HIV/AIDS in the UN’s Millennium Development Goals is different than the language choice of most countries; it uses \textit{combat} instead of \textit{fight}. The language in Zimbabwe’s Strategic Plan for 2006-2010 returns to favouring the phrase \textit{fight against HIV/AIDS} and thus clearly situates Zimbabwe with Botswana in the process of securitization.\textsuperscript{330}

Like Botswana, the Zimbabwean policy documents and numerous speeches regularly invoke what this paper has identified as security language. The review of Zimbabwean material further demonstrated the frequent use of the phrase \textit{fight against HIV/AIDS}. It is clear that the security language is not accidental. Zimbabwe has internalized HIV/AIDS as a critical security issue and a national security threat. Like Botswana, Zimbabwe is both the audience for the external securitization of HIV/AIDS, and the referent object. As the audience, through the internalization of HIV/AIDS, Zimbabwe has accepted the securitization as argued by the United Nations. As the referent object, Zimbabwe was unable to manage or reduce the increasing threat posed by HIV/AIDS and it required outside help in order to address the threat posed by HIV/AIDS. With such high prevalence rates, it required urgent and immediate attention. In turn, the UN and other international organizations are now actively involved in helping to reduce HIV/AIDS within Zimbabwe.

\textit{Facilitating Actors}

Unlike Botswana, it has been argued that Zimbabwe does not have conciliatory relations.

\textsuperscript{329} Goal 6 is to combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Other Diseases. This word choice openly frames HIV/AIDS with a security initiative and as a result all who join this initiative will assume this same approach.

\textsuperscript{330} Zimbabwe National HIV and AIDS Strategic Plan, 2006-2010.
with national and regional civil society.\textsuperscript{331} As a result, the likelihood that civil society has an impact on how Zimbabwe identifies HIV/AIDS is quite low. The most likely facilitating actors for Zimbabwe are international organizations that directly affect the budget that Zimbabwe receives for HIV/AIDS. As a result, UNAIDS and the Global Fund are again the most likely influences for how Zimbabwe perceives the securitization of HIV/AIDS. Jake Batsell clarifies why Zimbabwe has failed to rely on NGOs for HIV/AIDS support, by explaining that “a political regime primarily concerned with preserving its own power can undermine the capacity of NGOs to respond to a public health crisis, either by overtly intimidating the NGO sector or by simply choosing not to fully engage the NGO.”\textsuperscript{332} Zimbabwe can choose not to engage with national and regional civil society but it must to some extent engage the major HIV/AIDS funding organizations. The UN funding organizations likely have the easiest and most consistent contact with Zimbabwe and in turn the most influence.

A full archives search of The Sunday Independent revealed a large number of articles discussing not only HIV/AIDS but also the so-called battle against HIV/AIDS. Beginning in 2002, and annual search for ‘HIV/AIDS’ was completed. Between January 1, 2002 and January 1, 2003, there were 167 articles published on HIV/AIDS; between January 1, 2003 and 2004, 205; between January 1, 2004 and 2005, 221; between January 1, 2005 and 2006, 142; between January 1, 2006 and 2007, 146; between January 1, 2007 and 2008, 152; and finally between January 1, 2008 and 2009, 120.\textsuperscript{333} As demonstrated above, the newspaper published repeated articles that discussed HIV/AIDS, including those with headings such as: “Boost for Fight


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The newspaper provides fairly open and direct access to how outside organizations and states are addressing and framing HIV/AIDS. In this way, the newspaper plays an active role in transferring the international understanding of HIV/AIDS to readers of the newspaper.

**Success of Securitization Attempt**

With regards to the success of securitization efforts, according to the Copenhagen school process, they have been unsuccessful. Like Botswana, one of the three requirements has been met; the existential threat requirement has been argued by the United Nations. However, neither within the UN nor within Botswana have the other two requirements been met. No measures that can be considered as emergency measures have been put in place and no actions have gone beyond the normal political procedures. Although HIV/AIDS as a security issue is internalized and frequently invoked, securitization itself has not been completed.

The following chapter provides a summary of the overall success or failure of the securitization efforts within the UN and within all four of the governments’ that were reviewed. As well, it offers future research directions and questions that should be pursued before any further solid conclusions can be made about a global securitization.

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CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Results

This paper has traced the Copenhagen process of securitization by employing it to analyze how HIV/AIDS is being globally framed and addressed as a security issue. In order to do so, this paper focused first and foremost on the discourse of the United Nations as the ultimate norm promoting international organization. It traced whether UN attempts to externally (globally) securitize HIV/AIDS were successful, by first and foremost using discourse analysis. It discovered that starting with the 2000 prompting of the United Nations, there was an increase in attention and priority given to HIV/AIDS within the four selected countries. There was also a discernable increase in what has been deemed security language when the countries each referred to and discussed how to address HIV/AIDS.

From the analysis of UN documents and the visible increase in attention given to HIV/AIDS and security, it seems clear that within the organization, HIV/AIDS has successfully been internalized and accepted, however, this does not mean it has been successfully securitized. The security discourse has become internalized and incorporated into most UN debates that surround the increasing prevalence of HIV/AIDS, the impact of HIV/AIDS on African stability and the debates surrounding the global threat that HIV/AIDS poses. Action plans have been developed and are in the process of execution. Furthermore, the UN continues to explore and promote, through various discourses, the concept of HIV/AIDS as a security issue and as a security threat.

With regards to the external attempt to securitize, it has not been successful, as concluded below in the section on the success of securitization attempt. However, the continual attention and reiteration of the argument has extended the argument beyond the confines of the United
Nations. The internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue is now identifiable within the national governments. The internalization may be globally occurring but this paper can only reflect the extent of it within the four country specific case studies. Before discussing the failure of securitization, the following will briefly review the extent of the internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue.

Within Canada and the United States, following 2000 and 2001, increased attention and debate on HIV/AIDS as a security issue did noticeably occur. Reports and bills have been published and passed, and departments have been allocated responsibility for dealing entirely with the issue of HIV/AIDS in the global context. Overall, Canada takes a more reserved and classic Canadian humanitarian foreign policy stance, while the United States takes a more militaristic stance, also in keeping with their traditional foreign policy roles. The United States presents more rhetorical and grandiose statements on the topic of HIV/AIDS and security and in some ways the high prevalence of the associations between HIV/AIDS and security language demonstrate an attempt to further promote this concept. With regards to policy approaches to HIV/AIDS, both Canada and the United States have committed large sums of money. There were substantial increases in funding from both countries following the United Nations meetings on HIV/AIDS and resolution 1308 in 2000. From this study, it seems clear that these two governments have internalized and continue to identify HIV/AIDS as a global security threat.

Within both Zimbabwe and Botswana the results were not as expected; however, they further supported the occurrence of a top down, global internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue. Before beginning the research, it was postulated that the African countries would only discuss HIV/AIDS within the context of a health issue. However, this was not the case. In part, this may be attributable to the close relationship that the United Nations has with African
countries regarding their national AIDS strategies. Both countries, despite their very different government structures, framed HIV/AIDS with security language. In some of the speeches that were reviewed, language that resembled rallying discourse was used; meaning that, the way in which the speeches were formed and the references to battles and wars against HIV/AIDS, seemed to demonstrate that the governments were calling on the citizens to join with them in addressing the epidemic. There is regular communication maintained with the UN and several UN organizations play a key role in helping to reduce HIV/AIDS prevalence rates within African countries. Both countries are employing monitored approaches to addressing the spread of HIV/AIDS.

What the analysis demonstrated was a wide spread internalization of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, not only within Africa but also more globally. By tracing the impact of the UN meetings and resolutions from 2000, the role of the United Nations was also clarified. Between 2000 and 2001, there was a clear change in all four governments approaches to HIV/AIDS globally and also nationally within Botswana and Zimbabwe. Budget increases particularly demonstrated how seriously they took the claims. After 2000, the increase in references to the global fight against HIV/AIDS, and the widespread prevalent use of the phrase as a slogan in presidential speeches, civil society reports and newspaper headlines, reveals how internalized and accepted it has become.

**Success of Securitization Attempts: Conclusions**

Although there is a clear acceptance of HIV/AIDS as a security issue, and clear international attention given to address the issue, ultimately, audience acceptance of speech acts alone does not lead to successful securitization. After reviewing each of the case studies, it is
clear that according to the Copenhagen school, the securitization of HIV/AIDS has been unsuccessful. The United Nations was the securitizing actor, and it made key securitizing moves toward referent objects that initiated a successful internal securitization of HIV/AIDS, that lead to an external securitization of HIV/AIDS, which has ultimately failed.

All of the initial steps successfully occurred; however, the three main criteria for successful securitization are missing; they need to occur, in order to confirm successful securitization. With regards to step one, while HIV/AIDS was framed in such a manner that it could be understood as an existential threat to Africa, it was not framed as such for a global securitization. While this step was present and accepted in the case of Africa, it is a moot point, because neither of the other two steps took place. First, extreme measures were not taken to address HIV/AIDS within the United Nations, or in any of the four countries reviewed. Second, there was no action initiated through channels beyond normal political procedures. Every action that took place in order to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic fell within the political norm.

While the key above-outlined steps were unsuccessful, the final necessary step, audience acceptance, was successful in certain respects. To clarify, as the audience to the United Nations’ attempt to securitize HIV/AIDS within Africa, Canada and the United States have readily accepted the argument that HIV/AIDS is a security issue. Furthermore, each Country’s financial contributions, international support and international participation go far beyond a focus on African security alone, confirming their recognition of HIV/AIDS as a global security issue. However, according to the Copenhagen school of securitization, the audience has not accepted HIV/AIDS as an existential threat, which in turn justifies emergency measures beyond the norm.

Botswana and Zimbabwe have both supported and internalized HIV/AIDS as a security issue, as both the audience and the referent objects for the United Nations securitization attempts.
As both the audience and the referent objects for the securitization of HIV/AIDS, they were actively involved in the process. As far as the attempt by the United Nations to securitize HIV/AIDS within Africa, both countries actively accepted the argument. As the audience, they have internalized the national threat of HIV/AIDS and are using it within their own government documents and speeches. As the referents, they have both prompted and accepted the proposition that HIV/AIDS is a security threat within Africa. This is confirmed as they both identified that they needed outside help and they both required outside intervention and aid in order to reduce and manage the internal threat posed by the virus.

As demonstrated above, regardless of how much the various audiences accepted the speech acts by the United Nations, the Copenhagen process of securitization was not successful. This paper has established, for those who argued that HIV/AIDS is not a security issue, that it is in fact being framed as such by both the United Nations and by the reviewed national governments. The attempt to internally securitize HIV/AIDS within the UN is argued to be successful but the UN attempt to externally securitize HIV/AIDS, has not been. While this paper traced the securitization of HIV/AIDS according to the Copenhagen school process of securitization, and found it unsuccessful, this paper finds it not necessarily a failure of the attempt but actually a flaw of the Copenhagen process of securitization. It is argued that the framework itself has failed.

In essence, it has become clear that the current Copenhagen school process of securitization is inadequate and lacking the ability to fully engage in the study of new and emerging non-traditional threats. Particularly, it cannot take into account how the international system has changed, how the roles of states have changed and how states react and engage each other to reduce threats that are international in nature. Furthermore, it is found that there are
specific remnants of traditional security studies that are impeding the effectiveness of this framework. The three main criteria that are required for successful securitization are no longer able to fully engage in the study of how actors securitize today’s threats. The existential threat requirement is at the same time vague and restrictive. There are many people who are constantly existentially threatened but their state of being is not considered an urgent security issue. As well, threats are not always framed or identified by the actor as existential in nature but they are framed in such a way that they are called upon to be immediately addressed for the sake of stability and security. With regards to emergency measures, again, this designation is no longer encompassing of how states in the international system regularly deal with security issues. The same critique applies to action beyond normal political measures. A state, or actors within a state, would not react to current security issues by avoiding measures and rules guiding their actions in such a situation. There is a great deal of accountability in place and to react in such a manner is no longer internationally or nationally accepted. This is not to say that securitization in this form will not occur, but simply that these criteria are somewhat outdated and therefore the analyst can miss or overlook key instances of security and securitization.

As such, this paper finds it necessary to further develop the current Copenhagen process of securitization. This is not a suggestion for an alternative method of analysis but instead a development of the current framework, which is still quite useful and insightful. In an attempt to further clarify where these major weaknesses are and to propose potential solutions, the following section provides a review of the key concepts that are identified as preventing the framework from fully engaging in the study of current security issues.
Beyond a Copenhagen Process of Securitization

After testing the Copenhagen process of securitization it is argued that there are flaws within the framework itself and there should be a clarified understanding of securitization. A different understanding of securitization is most needed, because the process in its current state is unable to properly engage in the analysis of how HIV/AIDS is being framed and elevated to the level of a security issue by the United Nations and various national governments. Traditionally, in security studies, security issues were only recognized as falling within either military or political sectors. Buzan et al. support the generally accepted broadening of the sectors under which security issues can be recognized. The process of securitization can be more widely employed than it was originally intended. The main areas of concern that have become clear after testing the theory are the following requirements: labeling as an existential threat; emergency measures; action beyond normal political procedures. Additional areas that should be further reviewed include: the threat recognition by actors and the labeling of referents as objects rather than actors in the process. It is within these areas that the following sections attempt to develop the Copenhagen process of securitization. Each of these areas is addressed and an alternative proposed that would allow for a more holistic study of how actors are engaging in security discussions. Keeping in mind the potential of the security trap discussed earlier, and the fact that HIV/AIDS as a security issue remains a contentious connection, this paper finds it necessary to update the Copenhagen school process of securitization in order to ensure that the framework is capable of analyzing today’s non-traditional security issues. Therefore, the following sections provide both a critique of the current Copenhagen process of securitization and suggestions of areas where it can be expanded and developed to allow for better analytic application.
Key Requirements for an Expanded Copenhagen Process of Securitization

The conditions that threats are presented as existential threats, require emergency measures, and actions beyond normal reactive procedures, are in many ways reminiscent of traditional cold war security approaches. Current national and international security threats are generally addressed much more diplomatically, carefully and according to specific predefined actions and laws. Emergency action that goes beyond normal political channels is taken very rarely and as a last resort. Most security issues are currently addressed through political channels and with action that cannot be classified as extreme. These three requirements assume that current security issues are presented and addressed immediately, and extremely. These requirements may now have become detrimental to the applicability of the Copenhagen process of securitization.

First and foremost, the existential threat requirement does not provide the conceptual clarity that it should. Depending on various factors, including the region under investigation, the same threat can pose differing levels of danger. Furthermore, today’s emerging threats are not necessarily immediately existentially threatening, nor are they always going to affect the existence of an individual or state. On the other hand, many ethnic or national groups are existentially threatened for extended periods of time but it is not necessarily recognized nationally or internationally as a security issue, nor will it benefit being labeled as such. This paper suggests re-labeling it as a critical threat rather than an existential threat. Critical was chosen because it refers specifically to an urgent or dangerous issue that has to be immediately addressed.337 This paper proposes that critical in this sense is directly associated with the ability of the state to manage the issue and to reduce its potential harm. An issue may become critical

when it can no longer be managed, or the harm prevented, by the referent or the actor that is meant to protect the referent. Thus, depending on the region and the referent being analyzed, the point at which it becomes critical will vary. The designation of critical allows for a wider recognition of issues than those that are existentially threatening but it also narrows the potential issues to only those that are most imminent. Issues that reach a critical level may not always be existentially threatening, but they will likely have more widespread, more devastating, and long-term destabilizing effects, thus leading to greater overall insecurity and potentially greater loss of life. Today’s non-traditional threats are not necessarily intentionally causing a threat, and many threats are not capable of demonstrating intent, as is the case with HIV/AIDS. The existential threat definition excludes many of these emerging non-traditional security threats, including those related to insecurities associated with health, water, food, and climate change. The importance of critical in this process of securitization is further elaborated in following section that explains the proposed critical threshold.

With regards to extreme measures and actions beyond normal reactive procedures, since few would risk going outside mandated procedures, these requirements are overly limiting. As security concerns have become more global, and consequences of action more widespread and sensitive, national and international action has become much more regulated. International security decisions generally follow specific procedures; one exception to this rule is the American administration’s disregard of the United Nations decision not to invade Iraq. Within Canada and the United States, most decisions with regards to issues of security are made after much political debate and review. Even most recently, with regards to the widely proclaimed financial crisis and the global security threat posed by the financial crisis, normal political procedures were followed.
There is also more clarity needed surrounding the identification and recognition of threats. By analyzing and judging threats based on their individual traits (war, hunger, disease, natural disasters) the full extent of the insecurity created can never be understood. The reality is that the severity of the threat is inextricably linked to the referent actors who are involved, and their ability to pacify it, and the context of the situation. While a threat may not be identified as existentially threatening, it may have long-term, widespread and more severe impacts for the referent. Is the referent a state, or a region, or the international system as a whole? If it is a region, what is the historical background and context that put the region in the situation? Are there other situations ongoing that affect the region to deal with the threat? These are all context specific issues that can be overlooked. Furthermore, the complexity of the international system adds to the problematic nature of the current Copenhagen process of securitization. Take the financial crisis for example: while it has been heralded by some as a security issue in itself, it is arguable indirectly affecting the security and stability of many developing countries. In effect, the financial crisis poses a security threat for developing nations. How is it going to affect their access to critical international aid? How is it going to affect their jobs, their access to food, their political stability? These are complex dynamics that this paper argues the Copenhagen process of securitization is not capable of grasping.

Security scholars should not be arguing for or against a widening or narrowing of the paradigm, but instead for a new method of analyzing the threats that arise on an individual case-by-case basis. This paper suggests doing that by arguing for the inclusion of a critical threshold, which allows for the potential identification of new and emerging threats. The threshold (see below) would be used as an indicator for when issues should be addressed and treated as security threats in policies and government actions. Itemizing a permanent list of what does and does not
constitute a threat is not a beneficial approach to the global problems at hand. The status of a threat is ultimately dependent on the context, the affected actors, the system and the ability of the system to address the threat.

How an issue reaches the point of identification by the securitizing actor as a threat is not extensively explored within the Copenhagen school but it is arguably an important part of the process. The ensuing critical threshold has been proposed in order to expand the potential applications of the process of securitization. It has greater analytic potential, due to the fact that it does not restrict what issues can become potential security issues. Instead, it offers a context specific tool, that aims to help identify how and why issues become recognized as security issues, regardless of the sectors within which they fall. In essence, the critical threshold demonstrates when issues have become so significant, to the point where their impact should be visible to securitizing actors, and in turn the likelihood or probability that they will become securitized is greatest. It may also be useful as a policy tool to recommend or argue when an issue should or should not be securitized. Furthermore, the critical threshold could provide further legitimacy for securitizing actors and policy makers by demonstrating which issues are the most pressing, and potentially threatening.

In this situation the term critical means that an issue has become dire and in need of urgent attention; in other words, if left unresolved it may lead to the devastation of the threatened system or actor and to the inability of them to function properly in their intended role. The critical threshold is intended to help identify when existent issues of insecurity become critical, by identifying when the referent actor can no longer manage the threat, or reduce the insecurity posed by the issue. The use of critical instead of existential avoids some of the problems and misgivings that the use of existential threat implies. As well, the use of critical imposes a tipping
point urgency to the recognition of the threat. This paper proposes that it is the inability of the referent actors to manage and reduce the harm from certain issues that warrants the identification of them as critical. Thus, it is the referent actors’ inability to achieve freedom from the potential threat, without outside intervention or help that indicates when the issue has surpassed the critical threshold. The critical threshold is not predefined and it will be different for each case. In order to identify when the critical threshold has been met, regional differences need to be accounted for. In this paper those regional differences are divided between developed and developing countries. The following model especially focuses on the critical threshold within developing countries.

Freedom or the inability to achieve freedom from a threat is used as the indicator for when an issue has become critical and therefore identifiable as a potential security issue. When an issue has become critical, it is capable of threatening the stability and security of the referent actor. At this point, the securitizing actor is able to identify the issue as a security threat and if the actor does, the proposed process of securitization will be initiated, thus openly identifying it as a critical threat. It will not become recognized as a security threat until securitization is successful.

It is important to add that when an issue passes the critical threshold, it does not guarantee that an actor will identify it as a security issue in a securitizing move but it demonstrates an increased likelihood that it will be visible as a potential security issue. Whether a securitizing actor identifies an issue as critical and thus in need of securitization ultimately depends on the actors perceived understanding of what is critical and what is a threat. This understanding of securitization is not intended to be all encompassing and it certainly does not prevent an actor

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338 Outside help, in this case refers to either states or international organizations, through: military support, humanitarian aid, monetary donations or loans, and all other sorts of outside help that is given to countries experiencing insecurity within their economic, social or political realms.

339 Refer to Figure 3, page 76, for a demonstration of the transition from existent threat to critical threat.
from securitizing a non-critical issue, or not securitizing a critical issue. Finally, the threshold is not only intended for the expansion of the process of securitization, it can also help to clarify for analysts and practitioners when and which issues may become understood as security threats.

**Proposed Updated Process of Securitization**

The following chart demonstrates the suggested updates to the Copenhagen process of securitization, including the pre-securitization threat recognition. The process is as follows. Step one, the critical threshold: An existing issue of insecurity, in this case HIV/AIDS, becomes elevated to an unmanageable level by other existing factors. These factors are specific facilitating conditions (demonstrated through the grey circles) that interact with the existent issue to increase the threat posed and the probability that it reaches a critical level. The factors are conditional on the type of issue, threatened actor and the region under investigation. In the case of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa the conditions may be poverty, political instability, economic instability, migration, conflict, lack of access to medicines, or some combination of all of the above. These factors are problematic on their own, but in combination and based on the ability of the state to manage them, they can exacerbate the system to the point where the state is no longer able to manage the most pressing potential threat, thus exacerbating the overall state of insecurity. This failure of the referent to break free from the greatest insecurity, posed by HIV/AIDS in this case, indicates that the issue has reached a critical level.

Step two: Once the issue has become critical, it passes the critical threshold and can be recognized as a critical threat. This does not guarantee it will be securitized, but it has increased the probability and should be visible as a potential threat. The likelihood that it will be securitized is much greater.
Steps three through five: There are many issues that may meet the above criteria; however only when a securitizing actor recognizes and then identifies the issue, can it begin the process of securitization. The process is initiated through various discourses (speech acts), and the issue is framed as a security threat towards the referent actor. Steps six through seven: In the actor’s speech act, the issue is presented as requiring action and requiring immediate and urgent attention but does not need to be framed as an existential threat; rather it needs to demonstrate that there will be clear security implications if action is not taken. As a result, in order to achieve successful
securitization, there needs to both be a demonstration of a plan of action that may or may not go beyond normal reactive measures, and a demonstration that the plan is being executed.\textsuperscript{340} Step eight: Finally, only after an audience accepts the issue as a real and urgent security threat, can it be considered or identified as securitized. The audience acceptance does not have to be explicit, it can be similar to norm internalization, and can be reflected in the audience’s own referral to the issue as a threat. This may be identifiable through clear and traceable changes in discourse, and in the acceptance and use of the securitizing language. As well, it is traceable through action taken towards the identified threat.

\textit{Final Conclusions}

This paper concludes by proposing that the benefit of updating the Copenhagen process of securitization is especially applicable within developing, third world, and failed states. These are areas where understandings of security and insecurity are constructed quite differently than within developed countries. As a result, it is much more pressing to develop a method of securitization that can be applied to study how security issues are approached and securitized, as well as how security threats are being identified within developing countries.

This paper has attempted to highlight the active role that the United Nations is playing in the international system, particularly with regards to the international understanding of HIV/AIDS and security. While the overarching attempt to test and demonstrate the successful securitization of HIV/AIDS was effectively unsuccessful, this study helped to demonstrate clearly that HIV/AIDS is not simply being addressed as a health issue. Governments are actively participating and engaging in discussions about the severe implications from the spread of the

\textsuperscript{340} This paper finds Sjöstedt’s work in this area is very informative and has incorporated it into this proposed model. Sjöstedt, "Exploring the Construction of Threats: The Securitization of HIV/AIDS in Russia," 10.
virus. Furthermore, while a failure in practice, this study has helped to highlight some areas where the Copenhagen process of securitization can be further developed in order to provide even more intellectual clarity.

In summary, and perhaps most importantly, the impact and repercussions of framing HIV/AIDS as a security issue needs further study, as it invariably changes international relations, resource allocation, and global security more generally.
Appendix 1

Resolution 1308 (2000)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4172nd meeting, on 17 July 2000

The Security Council,

Deeply concerned by the extent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic worldwide, and by
the severity of the crisis in Africa in particular,

Recalling its meeting of 10 January 2000, on “The situation in Africa: the
impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa”, taking note of the 5 July 2000
report from UNAIDS (S/2000/457) which summarized follow-up actions taken to
date; and recalling further the letter of its President dated 31 January 2000
addressed to the President of the General Assembly (S/2000/75),

Emphasizing the important roles of the General Assembly and the Economic
and Social Council in addressing HIV/AIDS,

Stressing the need for coordinated efforts of all relevant United Nations
organizations to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic in line with their respective
mandates and to assist, whenever possible, in global efforts against the pandemic,

Concerning the efforts by UNAIDS to coordinate and intensify efforts to
address HIV/AIDS in all appropriate forums,

Recalling also the 28 February 2000 special meeting of the Economic and
Social Council, held in partnership with the President of the Security Council, on the
development aspects of the HIV/AIDS pandemic,

Welcoming the decision by the General Assembly to include in the agenda of
its fifty-fourth session an additional item of urgent and important character
called “Review of the problem of HIV/AIDS in all its aspects”, and encouraging
further action to address the problem of HIV/AIDS,

Recognizing that the spread of HIV/AIDS can have a uniquely devastating
impact on all sectors and levels of society,

Reaffirming the importance of a coordinated international response to the
HIV/AIDS pandemic, given its possible growing impact on social instability and
emergency situations,

Further recognizing that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is also exacerbated by
conditions of violence and instability, which increase the risk of exposure to the
disease through large movements of people, widespread uncertainty over conditions, and reduced access to medical care.

Stressing that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security,

Recognizing the need to incorporate HIV/AIDS prevention awareness skills and advice in aspects of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ training for peacekeeping personnel, and welcoming the 20 March 2000 report of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/54/839) which affirmed this need and the efforts already made by the United Nations Secretariat in this regard,

Taking note of the call of the Secretary-General in his report to the Millennium Assembly (A/54/2000) for coordinated and intensified international action to reduce the HIV infection rates in persons 15 to 24 years of age by 25 per cent by the year 2010,

Noting with satisfaction the 13th International AIDS Conference, held from 9 to 14 July 2000 in Durban, South Africa, which was the first conference of this type to be held in a developing country and which drew significant attention to the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa, and further noting that this Conference was an important opportunity for leaders and scientists to discuss the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS and estimates of resources needed to address HIV/AIDS, as well as issues related to access to care, mother to child transmission, prevention, and development of vaccines,

Bearing in mind the Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

1. Expresses concern at the potential damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of international peacekeeping personnel, including support personnel;

2. Recognizes the efforts of those Member States which have acknowledged the problem of HIV/AIDS and, where applicable, have developed national programmes, and encourages all interested Member States which have not already done so to consider developing, in cooperation with the international community and UNAIDS, where appropriate, effective long-term strategies for HIV/AIDS education, prevention, voluntary and confidential testing and counselling, and treatment of their personnel, as an important part of their preparation for their participation in peacekeeping operations;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to take further steps towards the provision of training for peacekeeping personnel on issues related to preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS and to continue the further development of pre-deployment orientation and ongoing training for all peacekeeping personnel on these issues;

4. Encourages interested Member States to increase international cooperation among their relevant national bodies in assisting the creation and extension of policies for HIV/AIDS prevention, voluntary and confidential testing and counselling, and treatment for personnel to be deployed in international peacekeeping operations;

5. Encourages, in this context, UNAIDS to continue to strengthen its cooperation with interested Member States to further develop its country profiles in
order to reflect best practices and countries' policies on HIV/AIDS prevention education, testing, counseling and treatment;

6. Expresses keen interest in additional discussion among relevant United Nations bodies, Member States, industry and other relevant organizations to make progress, inter alia, on the question of access to treatment and care, and on prevention.
Appendix 2

Coding of United Nations Documents for Security Language

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<th>Documents Coded</th>
<th>Categories for Security Coding Words</th>
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## Coding of United Nations Documents for Security Language

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## Appendix 3

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### Coding of American Documents for Security Language

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Appendix 5

Coding of Botswanaen Documents for Security Language

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<td>Republic of Botswana, Office of the President. Opening Remarks by His Excellency Mr. Festus G. Mogae, President of the Republic of Botswana, at the National HIV Prevention Conference 2005. Tati River Lodge, Franschhoek, Tuesday 20th of September 2005</td>
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### Coding of Botswana Documents for Security Language

#### Speeches from 2008

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<td>XVII International AIDS Conference. Newmaker Interview with President Festus Gomlamba Mugae. August 5, 2008</td>
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#### Government Documents and Publications

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<td>Republic of Botswana, Ministry of State President. NACA. Status of the 2002 National Response to the UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS</td>
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<td>Republic of Botswana, National AIDS Coordinating Agency Ministry of State President. NACA Report to the National AIDS Council Meeting of 26th November 2004.</td>
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* = There was none of the threat language coded for, but the word war was used to describe the approach to HIV/AIDS
### Coding of Zimbabwean Documents for Security Language

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<td>Statement by His Excellency R.G. Mugabe, President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Comrade R.G. Mugabe, on the Occasion of the Asian-Africa Summit, Jakarta, Indonesia, 22 April, 2005.</td>
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References


BBC Talking Point Programme. Transcript of H.E. the President Festus Mogae’s interactive interview, November 30, 2003.


UNAIDS. Botswana Country Profile. Accessed online at:


Glossary

ACHAP: Africa Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership
AIDS: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ARV: Antiretroviral, medicine that can help reduce the onslaught of the AIDS virus, and prolong a patient’s life.
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CIDA: Canadian International Development Agency
CSHA: Canadian Strategy on HIV/AIDS
CSS: Critical security studies (overall security paradigm, not to be mistaken with CSS, the Welch school within CSS)
CSWs: Commercial Sex Workers
DFAIT: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canadian)
DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations)
DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOSOC: UN Economic and Social Council
FAO: Food and Agricultural Organization
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
Global Fund: The Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
HDR: Human Development Report
HHS: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IOs: International Organizations
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals
NACA: National AIDS Coordination Agency (Botswana)
NAC: National AIDS Council (Zimbabwe)
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations
PEPFAR: The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PHAC: Public Health Agency of Canada
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa
UN: United Nations
UNAIDS: The United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
UNGASS: United Nations General Assembly Special Session on AIDS
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
WHO: World Health Organization