From Bayonets to Stilettos to UN Resolutions:
The Development of Howard Green’s Views Regarding War

by

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Author’s Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Abstract

This thesis follows the development of Howard Charles Green’s (1895-1989) views on war and disarmament as both a private citizen and as a Member of Parliament. It draws its conclusions from a large archival base. Beginning with Green’s experiences in the First World War, this thesis charts Green’s views on war through to the United Nations Irish Resolution on disarmament of December 20, 1960. Contrary to current historiography examining the Diefenbaker period, it proves that Green’s beliefs about war only changed after his appointment as Secretary of State for External Affairs in June 1959, and even then it took time for his new ideals to “harden.” Prior to his “conversion” he believed that war remained a viable aspect of foreign policy and often encouraged its fuller prosecution.
Acknowledgements

Researching this thesis required close to two months of archival research and many further months of reading. Thus I need to thanks the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) for financing this extensive research. The patience and generous assistance of archivists and staff at Library and Archives Canada was always appreciated. I also need to thank the City of Vancouver Archives and University of Victoria Special Collections for allowing me to stay past normal visiting hours so that I could finish in time to catch my flight home. I also need to thank the Green family for their willingness to fill in holes in the archival record.

The support I received from many individuals also needs to be acknowledged. Both as an undergraduate and as a MA candidate, Dr. Whitney Lackenbauer has taught me more than he will ever admit. Without his guidance this thesis would not have been possible. Lastly, and most importantly, I need to thank my family and extended family; there are too many people to thank for their varied tasks, but I am ever grateful for their continuing support.
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## Glossary of Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEF</td>
<td>Canadian Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>COTC</td>
<td>Canadian Officer’s Training Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Department of External Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>Observation Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Other Ranks</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSEA</td>
<td>Secretary of State for External Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNDC</td>
<td>Ten Nation Disarmament Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAEC</td>
<td>United Nations Atomic Energy Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDC</td>
<td>United Nations Disarmament Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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Introduction

“Yeah but he was nuts!” In casual conversation with peers and professors, this is often the sort of attitude (and sometimes the comment) I first encounter when discussing the subject of this thesis. Howard Charles Green (1895-1989) served as an Opposition Member of Parliament for twenty-one-and-a-half years, exerting considerable influence and fame as a prominent Tory and British Columbian politician. When the Progressive Conservatives under the leadership of John G. Diefenbaker won a minority government in 1957, Green was appointed Minister of Public Works and Acting Minister of Defence Production. After the death of Sidney Smith, Green was appointed Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) on June 4, 1959. Within months of assuming his new position, Green began a crusade for disarmament that lasted until his defeat in the 1963 federal election. However, the Diefenbaker government had also committed itself to several roles and weapons systems that required nuclear warheads. By holding steadfastly to his disarmament convictions, Green contributed to the cabinet deadlock that eventually toppled the Diefenbaker government in early 1963.

Both the Department of National Defence (DND) and the American government desired an array of nuclear weapons for Canada. Erica Simpson has dubbed this group of organizations “Defenders,” (of Canada’s nuclear option) and their viewpoint has generally dominated the historiography to date given that their beliefs ultimately prevailed with the election of the Pearson government. The views of the “Critics” who opposed them have been analyzed in less depth.1

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Few authors have devoted significant portions of their studies to the Department of External Affairs’ (DEA) position and perspective. Studies by Knowlton Nash, Peter Newman, Patrick Nicholson, and Denis Smith all focus on the acquisition perspective at the expense of the contrary goal of disarmament. In short, they examine the question through a Defender rather than Critic lens. Initially, under the supervision of Diefenbaker, and subsequently Sidney Smith, the Department of External Affairs (DEA) exhibited the traits of a Defender rather than a Critic. However, Sidney Smith’s death on 13 March 1959 allowed Diefenbaker to choose a new SSEA. The appointment of Howard Green soon reversed DEA’s position to a Critic perspective, and competition ensued to control both Canada’s role at international disarmament negotiations and its pending acquisition of nuclear weapons. Again, this conflict continued with increasing fervour until the fall of the Diefenbaker government in 1963.

When Green’s motives and actions are discussed, the discussion is usually uneven and lacks sympathy. Diefenbaker’s memoirs are self-serving and unreliable. Peyton Lyon narrates and analyzes Green’s efforts from 1961-1963 and disparages Green’s choices. Richard Preston’s interpretation of Green’s disarmament efforts from 1959-1961 is more sympathetic, but his study could not draw upon the archival materials now available. Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann provide readers with a detailed narrative of Canada’s conduct at the various disarmament negotiations, but their brief descriptions of Green’s motives are usually


accompanied by sarcasm.\textsuperscript{6} By contrast, Michael Tucker’s study of Canada’s disarmament policy from 1957-1971 recognized Green’s contradictory distastes of communism and nuclear weapons, providing a more complex and nuanced individual than other authors. Tucker’s argument that Green used disarmament as a vehicle to assert Canadian sovereignty, while valid, is overstated, and he erroneously describes Green as harbouring an “aversion” to NATO.\textsuperscript{7} Like Preston, the chief limitation of Tucker’s work was his lack of access to the vast archival resources now available. Patricia McMahon drew upon some of this material, and her thesis provides fresh interpretations about Green’s development, but her focus on Diefenbaker precluded rigorous assessment of Green’s views.\textsuperscript{8} A focused study on Howard Green is needed to better understand Canadian decision-making during the nuclear crisis of the early 1960s.

How Howard Green acquired his strong disarmament convictions remains a key unanswered question. Chapter 1 begins to analyze this question by examining Green’s experiences in the First World War. Several authors claim that Green’s later aversion to war was “Above all… stirred by memories of the horrors of World War I.”\textsuperscript{9} Foremost among these horrors is the myth that Green was wounded. An examination of Green’s letters and war record challenge these conclusions. During this early period Green was stirred by ideals of manhood and the righteousness of the British war effort, and although he participated in remarkably little combat, was never wounded and never fully lived out his bloodthirsty rhetoric in combat, he did witness the horror of war. While his views on war matured because of these experiences, he re-entered “civvy” with many of his ideas about war intact.

\textsuperscript{9} See for example: George Ignatieff, \textit{The Making of a Peace Monger}, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 188.
Chapter 2 narrates the development of Green’s views on war from the inter-war period until the 1957 election. Contrary to current Diefenbaker historiography that portrays him as a peacemonger following the Great War, Green continued to believe that war was a necessary component of foreign policy. During the Second World War, Green repeatedly called for a more total war effort, including full conscription. Throughout this period he was also a constant advocate for Canadian veterans, as he was both proud of their efforts and empathized with their suffering.

V-J Day did not end Green’s interest in conflict. The detonation of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki revealed the destructive power of atomic energy to the world, and Green quickly realized its potential. His primary interest was the technology’s civil application but he obtained an education in its war potential as well. In spite of the knowledge he gained in House of Commons committees, he did not fear atomic warfare and continued to believe that it was survivable. During the Korean conflict, Green again pushed for a heightened war effort and even advocated policies that could have expanded the war beyond the Korean peninsula. More generally, Green’s continued interest in external affairs throughout this period informed him about possible international roles for Canada. Intellectually he agreed with Canada’s multilateral post-war role, however emotionally he continued to cling to the Commonwealth. Thus, during the Suez Crisis of 1956, Green was torn between these two ideologies. Nevertheless, and significantly, Green failed to profess opposition to war from the 1920s to the late 1950s. Little in the preceding chapters will surprise those who have studied this period in depth, but this narrative does not align with Diefenbaker historiography.

The last chapter of this thesis examines the development of Green’s views on war from 1957 to the adoption of an Irish Resolution on nuclear proliferation at the United Nations.
General Assembly (UNGA) in 1960. The chapter explains why Green only developed his aversion to war after June 1959. Using material declassified material, the thesis also describes the events by which Green’s courage and conviction gradually hardened. This study ends in December 1960 with Canada’s participation in the 15th Session of the UNGA, where Green’s conduct correctly led to his designation as a crusader for disarmament. Green continued as SSEA for another two-and-a-quarter years, but these events would, and indeed have, required entire theses to evaluate adequately. Moreover, at this stage Green’s conversion was complete, and these later years allowed Green’s convictions to play out rather than to substantively develop further.¹⁰ In order to understand Green’s actions, we must begin at the eve of what became known as the Great War.

¹⁰ This thesis is not intended as a biography. Themes such as Howard Green’s family life, activities in British Columbian politics, his love for the British and the Commonwealth, his interest in the developing world, and several aspects of NATO policy (including the struggle for consultation), are unexamined except when they contribute to understanding of how Green’s convictions regarding nuclear warfare originated and developed.
Chapter 1: Bayonets

Howard Charles Green was born on November 5, 1895. His father Samuel owned part of a general store in the mining town of Kaslo, British Columbia. His mother Flora, was a devout Baptist but, because the town lacked a Baptist church, the family followed his father’s side and joined the Methodist church.¹ Flora’s family traced their roots to Nova Scotia where some had arrived as Empire Loyalists and others pre-dated the American Revolution.² As such, Howard, like a great many of his peers, developed a strong affinity for the British Empire.

His initial schooling was in a three-room schoolhouse. His elementary schooling took place in a single room. High school was in the next room where one teacher taught all subjects.³ The curriculum further indoctrinated him in the ideals of Empire and manliness. He was a strong student and his family “scraped” together the money to send him to university.⁴ Howard was the first of his family to do so. Arriving at the University of Toronto (U of T), Green began second year courses towards a Bachelor of Arts degree.⁵

Green was eighteen when Britain declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914. Many of his peers left university to enlist. Instead of following, Green joined the Canadian Officer’s Training Corps (COTC) (even though it was not formally established at U of T until mid-

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² Green interviewed by Stursberg, LAC MG31 D-78 Vol 34 File 13, 6.
⁵ Green had nearly completed his first year’s course load by passing a series of standardized tests while still in Kaslo after additional study. Green interviewed by Stursberg, LAC MG31 D-78 Vol 34 File 13, 13-14.
October of that year). Created in 1912, the program was designed to allow male university students to develop junior officer skills while continuing their academic studies. Upon completion of COTC curriculum, students wrote a “series of standardized written and practical examinations produced by the war office.” If students passed, they were qualified for a commission as a lieutenant or captain.

Unsurprisingly, given his context, Green had no qualms about war. First, he believed that Britain and its allies fought with just cause. He explained to his father in January 1915 that those who deemed the war unnecessary “don’t see the whole justice of our cause, the danger in the german [sic] system, and the self-sacrificing way in which the British have entered it.” Second, as a citizen of the British Empire, he believed he had an obligation to serve. In letters to his parents, he frequently explained how his “conscience” would not allow him to remain safe while others died in Europe: “You know yourself dad how a man will feel in future years who had done nothing in this crisis.” Green even tied obligation to benefit. “This war is going to do one thing for us it will make us strong and the Empire strong even if it does take many valuable lives for the making.” War for Green was a positive, rather than negative, phenomenon. Gender roles also provided motivation. When German U-boats sank the Lusitania in May 1915, Green wrote:

[[6 Difficulties between U of T and the federal government delayed an official COTC program. The exact date Green signed up is unknown. The Vancouver City Archives holds few letters from Howard Green for this period. However, his Attestation Paper stated that he had attended the COTC for “8 months” which would mean that he had enlisted in the COTC within a few weeks following Britain’s declaration of war. LAC RG150 Acc 1992-93 166 Vol 3777-48, Green, Howard, Charles; James William Noel Leatch, “Military Involvement in Higher Education: A History of the University of Toronto Contingent, Canadian Officers’ Training Corps”, PhD. diss. University of Toronto, 1995, 42, 91-96.]

[[7 Leatch, “Military Involvement in Higher Education”, 32, 39.]

[[8 Ibid, 41.]

[[9 Howard to Dad, 3 January 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 4, 7.]

[[10 Howard to Dad, 10 January 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 4, 5; Howard to Dad, 18 February 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 4, 3.]

[[11 Howard to Dad, 3 January 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 4, 7-8.]]
Those dirty sneaky [illegible]… of germans [sic] can’t be content with fighting men but must fight women. If I could just feel myself putting a big bayonet right through one of the skunk’s stomachs and rip him from toes to head. I’d be content to get one myself.\textsuperscript{12}

In his anger, even Green’s usual written coherence suffered. It seemed “civilization” itself was at stake.\textsuperscript{13}

Like many of his COTC peers, Green wanted to join the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) as an officer. For those who lacked any militia training, the COTC was a means to qualify for officer status; continuing his education was therefore both practical and self-serving. Moreover, as a prideful Westerner, Green wanted a commission in a British Columbia battalion, preferably raised in the Kootenays that he still considered home.\textsuperscript{14} Having been in Ontario during the initial recruitment rush, he missed the raising of BC’s two initial battalions. Luckily for Green, recruitment exploded in 1915.\textsuperscript{15} When he received word that the federal government had authorized the raising of the 54\textsuperscript{th} Kootenay battalion, he immediately sent a letter to the intended Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Mahlon Davis, asking for a commission. It was months before he received a reply.

In the meantime Green continued with his COTC training. Students received instruction in “drill, elementary battle tactics for small units, military law, administrative procedures, shooting and army organization.”\textsuperscript{16} One of this highlights of training occurred after his exams in May 1915, when the COTC held a two-week training camp at Niagara-on-the-Lake. Activities included parades with an Inspection by the Minister of Militia Sam Hughes, tactical exercises,

\textsuperscript{12} Howard to Folks (Parents), 9 May 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-1 File 7, 4.
\textsuperscript{13} Howard to Dad, 25 March 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 8, 2.
\textsuperscript{14} Green also believed that he faced too much competition in Ontario and that his chances for a commission were higher in BC. Howard to Dad, 10 January 1915, 4-6.
\textsuperscript{15} Morton, \textit{When Your Number’s Up}, 58-60.
\textsuperscript{16} Leatch, “Military Involvement in Higher Education”, 41.
and musketry.\(^{17}\) Green particularly enjoyed taking a turn at drilling some of his peers and firing fifty rounds with the new Mk III Ross Rifle that he described as a “beaut.”\(^{18}\) His conceptions of war were likely normal: idealized and even naive. After months of anxious waiting he finally received notice in early May that he could serve as a Lieutenant in the 54\(^{th}\) battalion, and by the 20\(^{th}\) the eager Lieutenant entered Camp Vernon on Vancouver Island BC.\(^{19}\)

* * *

So began six months of basic training. The program was typical. Green rose at 0530 for “physical jerks” (physical training) at 0545. After the physical training came a cold shower followed by breakfast at 0700. Drill and marches dominated the remainder of the day, with breaks for lunch and meetings with the colonel. Drill ended at 1630 with dinner at 1900 and lights-out by 2200. Though Green seems to have adapted fairly quickly, he confessed to sometimes feeling like a “round peg in a square hole.” Never an early riser, he found the early mornings particularly trying.\(^{20}\) On occasion he also found it difficult to suppress his opinions and quickly recognized that “it will pay to keep my mouth shut.”\(^{21}\) However, like those around him, he quickly learned from his mistakes and developed confidence in his unit and himself.

Green’s training was highly gendered. Popular belief held that masculine attitudes would help achieve national ends on the battlefield.\(^{22}\) Robert Dean has explained that: “To be

\(^{17}\) Ibid, 105-106.
\(^{18}\) Howard to Mother, 6 May 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-1 File 7, Howard to Folks, 9 May 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-1 File 4, 2-3.
\(^{19}\) Howard to Dad, 25 April 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 4, 1; LAC RG150 Acc 1992-93 166 Box 3777-48, Green, Howard, Charles.
\(^{20}\) Howard to Mother, 16 June 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-C-6 File 12, 1-2; Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 80-81.
\(^{21}\) Howard to Mother, 4 July 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-C-6 File 12, 2.
\(^{22}\) Mosse, The Image of Man, 109-110.
recognized socially (as an affirmation of ‘masculinity’ or ‘femininity’), the individual must deploy a narrative (or narratives) that fall within a range of culturally accepted types."\textsuperscript{23} Green was no exception and exhibited a variety of accepted traits. For instance, though Green was no scrapper, frustration caused him to engage in:

\begin{quote}
    a strenuous fight [with his tent mate Lieutenant Frank Davidson Smith] … He [Smith] got what they call a double nelson on me I had to give in. Have a good stiff neck as a result. No wiser I licked him on Wednesday incidentally making his nose bleed so there are no hard feelings.\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

As both men inflicted bodily harm to the other, their self-respect remained intact and they continued as tent mates until shortly after their arrival in Britain. Similarly, the battalion’s four-month-old black bear cub mascot named “Jerry Koots” also facilitated displays of manly prowess.\textsuperscript{25} At first Green described the bear as “cute” and commented that “sometimes the bear will play like a dog but at other times he snaps at you.”\textsuperscript{26} Over time the bear became much less amicable. On one occasion Koots “swiped” Green’s hand when offered a cherry and at two other times he either escaped or, as Green suspected, was let loose. In the later case, the bear ran from tent to tent for half an hour before someone “lassoed his hind leg” and even then the bear scratched several of its captors before it was subdued.\textsuperscript{27} The soldiers of the 54\textsuperscript{th} expected to tame both man and beast.

Green’s beliefs about war remained unchanged during his initial training. On the one hand, he had enlisted after the battle of 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ypres and was well aware of the abhorrent casualties

\textsuperscript{23} Robert D. Dean, \textit{Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy}, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), 6.
\textsuperscript{24} Howard to Mother, 1 October 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-C-6 File 14, 3. Green only ever refers to him as “Smith” in letters. Only by comparing Green’s letters with war records was his full name uncovered. LAC RG150 Acc 1992-93 166 Vol 9307-42, Smith, Frank, Davidson.
\textsuperscript{26} Howard to Sister, approx late June, 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-C-6 File 12, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{27} Howard to Rowland (brother), 11 July 1915, CBA, 593-C-6 File 12, 1-2; Howard to Mother, 28 August 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-C-6 File 13, 5-6.
in Canadian units.\textsuperscript{28} However the training seems to have lacked realism in both practice and conception. In October, Green wrote:

This morning the Colonel intended to have the battalion practise attacking and let certain men and officers drop out as casualties so that it would be more real. However the rain sort of put a stop to the scheme. When it does come off I am scheduled to be killed at the first crack. It should be good practise and also good fun.\textsuperscript{29}

In hindsight it is perverse that units bound for the Western Front cancelled training exercises because of the weather. Moreover, Green’s attitude remained strikingly positive. Though he was aware of the trials that awaited his unit in Europe, he failed to fathom war’s true horror. In another case, a course was held on “bombing” in which the class was shown how to both build and throw live bombs.\textsuperscript{30} Green devoted a series of enthusiastic letters to the topic that in one case included small hand-drawn pictures of each type of bomb constructed and did not envisage their terrible effects.\textsuperscript{31} Green recognized but did not yet empathise with war’s destructive potential. Surely this was common at the time, but it is important to note that Green was no peacemonger.

* * *

Upon arrival in England, the Kootenay battalion was moved to Bramshott Camp where it was more adequately prepared for war. With the exception of their Ross rifles, deficient

\textsuperscript{28} Howard to Folks, 9 May 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-1 File 7, 5.
\textsuperscript{29} Howard to Rowland, 23 October 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-C-6 File 14, 3.
\textsuperscript{30} Bombs, known as “grenades” today were not mass produced in England until 1916 and during this period hand made by troops in the field. Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps 1914-1918, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 55-58.
\textsuperscript{31} Howard to Sister, 3 November 1915, Howard to Mother, 5 November 1915, Howard to Rowland, 9 November 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-C-6 File 14.
Canadian equipment was replaced with British kit. The training took the usual forms of drill, marches, musketry, and bombing. Green continued to enjoy bayonet training and stabbed the sacks of straw “just as if I had a big fat german [sic] on the point.” Some became specialists. Smith became the battalion’s bombing officer and he and Green saw less and less of each other. Eventually the two found new tent mates.

Breaks from the training allowed Green to visit many of the sites about which he had so often read and idolized. He was granted leave to London close to New Year’s, and like others, enjoyed visiting many of the sites he had long read about. He saw the Prime Minister’s house, museums, and the crown jewels. He allowed himself to be thoroughly engrossed while listening to a debate in Parliament on conscription and devoted several pages of a letter to detailing some of the speeches he overheard. These happy occasions further endeared him to the empire and likely influenced his foreign policy statements for the next half century. Other disruptions were less enjoyable. Measles reached near epidemic proportions in March 1916 at Bramshott. Green was hospitalized for a few weeks under quarantine. This episode marked the only occasion during the war when Green was hospitalized. Howard Green carried no wounds when arguing for disarmament decades later.

Gendered ideals continued at Bramshott. Sports were integral to maintaining physical fitness and boasting. Platoons played against each other and instilled abundant unit pride; Green

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32 Bailey, *Cinquante-quatre*, 4; Morton, *When Your Number’s Up*, 90.
33 Howard to Mother, 18 January 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 file 5, 4-5.
34 Howard to Rowland, 23 January 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 6, 2; Howard to Dad, 13 February 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 7, 2.
35 Howard to Dad, 31 December 1915, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 3, 9-14; Howard to Rowland, 2 January 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 5, 2-12; Howard to Sister, 2 January 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 5, 8.
37 Despite George Ignatieff’s claims to the contrary, there is no evidence suggesting that Green was later wounded in 1917. Howard to Mother, 6 March 1916; Howard to Rowland, 19 March 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 8; Interview with George Ignatieff by Roger Hill et al, date unknown, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security Fonds, Audio recording, LAC RG154 Acc. 1994-0067, ISN 238242, Consultation Copy A4 2007-11-0014, track 2.
personally believed that his platoon “should have no trouble cleaning up the [soccer] league.” As it turned out his confidence was justified and his platoon finished on top. Green particularly enjoyed observing his men’s physical development and watching it translate into increased competitive edge. He and his men felt fit and ready for war.

Green did not accept all manhood ideals. As Robert Dean points out: “There is always a tension between the lived experience of individual masculinities and cultural ideals of manhood” because “the demands of social life are not uniform but multifaceted and contradictory.” For instance, when Sam Hughes reviewed the Kootenay battalion, Green had difficulty taking the Minister of Militia and Defence seriously. At one point his “Ministerial Majesty,” aware of Green’s connection to Robert Green (MP for Kootenay, later Kootenay West), approached the young Lieutenant and asked whether Green was going to discard his glasses. To please Hughes, Green lied and replied in the affirmative, and Hughes replied: “That’s good.” Though Green shared many of the gendered ideals of his time, he had his limits.

The conflict between ideals and reality, combined with the monotony of training, facilitated self-reflection. Green often wondered about how he would react when under fire for the first time. On each occasion he concluded that he would fulfil his obligations. One such reflection is worth quoting at length:

I think I am as ready to go over as I ever shall be for I shan’t learn much more of the work here [Bramshott] and I think I am now at the stage where I don’t care whether a bullet gets me or not. I hope so anyway for if one spends much time worrying about them he can’t fight. It is amusing sometimes to think that I’m really ready to go over. Was always supposed to be such a studious, peaceful brute[.] You can hardly understand how it worried me, not being good at athletics

38 Howard to Dad, 9 April 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 9, 6.
39 Howard to Mother, 3 May 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 17, 3.
40 Being a lifelong teetotaller, Green also appreciated sports as a distraction from drinking. Howard to Mother, 6 April 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 9, 2-4.
41 Dean, Imperial Brotherhood, 6.
42 Howard to Mother, 30 March 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 8, 1-4.
and sort of looked down on in some circles on that account. The war has given me a chance and I wouldn’t have missed it for anything. If I do get back I can know that I’m not a coward and that I’ve done my duty.\textsuperscript{43}

Confidence in his training, his own abilities, his men, and his battalion further reinforced this conviction.

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The 54\textsuperscript{th} crossed the English Channel as part of the 11\textsuperscript{th} Brigade in Canada’s 4\textsuperscript{th} Division, landing in Le Havre on 14 August 1916.\textsuperscript{44} Green’s experiences during the next year were typical for an infantryman. He received considerable gas training, including exposure to real gas. Some passed-out from fright, but despite Green’s subsequent propensity for fainting he did not falter.\textsuperscript{45} Within the first day of his company entering the trenches, Green lost Lance Corporal Jack Hannah whose jugular was cut by a shell fragment. According to Green, his men handled the loss – the first in the battalion - “like veterans” and were solaced by their own artillery’s reprisals.\textsuperscript{46} He saw rats, ran from the path of incoming shells, and even heard a mistaken gas

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[{43}] Howard to Little Mother, 16 April 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 9, 4-5.
\item[{44}] Though unrelated to this thesis, when asked in 1961 if he had learned French during his service in France, Green claimed that the only phrase he had learned during his service in World War One was “quarante-huit chevaux and eighteen hommes” or the capacity of boxcars used to transport men and horses to the front, Ignatieff, The Making of a Peace Monger, 197. However Green’s letters demonstrate that he possessed a limited but useful French vocabulary. Moreover, when discussing his riding skills he quickly corrected “à la cheval” to “aux cheval” demonstrating a rudimentary grasp of gender in French grammar. Howard to Sister, 15 February 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 6, 2. Unfortunately, Green’s pronunciation seems to have remained dismal as he described pronouncing “deux” as “duck.” Howard to Sister, 3 September 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 12, 3. As early as 1936 he lost his confidence and resorted to English while in Quebec and subsequently required translation in the House of Commons. Howard to Mother, 12 April 1936, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-1 File 2, 9; Howard to Donna, 2 March 1956, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-3 File 1, 4.
\item[{46}] Green interviewed by Stursberg, LAC MG31 D-78 Vol 34 File 13, 22; Howard to Little Mother, 22 August 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 12, 2-3; Green War Diary, 21 August 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 5.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
alarm. Conditions were actually better than he had expected and he confided to his diary that: “Life in the front line [was] not so bad after all.” Over time, Green settled into the routine and rotation of trench warfare. He covered his helmet with a sandbag to prevent the shiny metal from drawing the attention of the enemy. Bathing became less regular. He saw and understood trench warfare, and his confidence grew. By mid-September he believed he could “stand ordinary trench warfare and hope to be able to test myself in the more active kind of war... such as raiding.” He admired “fatalists” who “work at night quite in the open, standing still when a flare goes up and dropping when the machine guns strafe.” Before joining their ranks, however, he hoped to further develop his nerve.

An opportunity arose at the bloody Somme battles. Canada’s other three divisions had tried and failed to capture Regina Trench. The 54th battalion entered the theatre near Albert on 11 October. On 21 October, Green joined one of three carrying parties of twenty men into no-man’s land while the 87th and 102nd battalion staged their own attack on a 600-yard section of Regina Trench. Likely carrying ammunition or bringing the wounded back to the Canadian lines, Green remained “right up around” the attack. The operation achieved its objectives and Green was enthused. Though he had not served in a combat role, he had ventured over-the-top. To his frustration, this was the extent of his involvement in attacks on the Somme. The 54th was subsequently involved in capturing Desire Trench, but Green did not participate. Due to high

48 Green War Diary, 29 August 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-G-6 File 5.
49 Howard to Brother, 4 September 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 12, 3-4.
50 Howard to Dad, 13 September 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 12, 4-5.
casualties among officers, only half of the battalion’s officers went forward with each attack. Green joined his men when preparing for the attack but after the operation was twice postponed a waiting officer took his place. When the attack finally commenced on November 18, Green remained in his trench. This successful operation concluded the battalion’s major operations on the Somme.

Green was saddened by the experience. On the one hand the casualties from the battle were appalling. A long list of his friends, including Smith, were wounded; others were dead. Despite these facts, Green described himself as having been “unfortunate enough to be left right out of the whole show and on the Home guard so to speak. It is a poor feeling one gets when one is left back like that.” G.W.L. Nicholson wrote that, in seven weeks of continuous fighting on the Somme, the 4th Division “won its spurs.” Green felt personally unable to share in that claim.

After spending a few weeks rest in Ourton, the 54th marched to Vimy Ridge where Green’s hatred for the enemy remained strong. On Christmas Day 1916, Green was in the front line and the battalion to the right of the 54th right mingled with their German opposition in no-man’s-land. When six German soldiers opposite the 54th’s lines arose from their lines hoping to share in similar festivities they were forced to flee under Canadian fire. The Germans reciprocated by heavily strafing the Canadian lines. 54thers shared the common belief that

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53 Perhaps the 54th’s officers were still entering no-man’s land wearing much of their distinctive uniform and thereby advertising their seniority? Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 106.
“We’re here to kill huns and the more we kill the sooner we get home.”

Even on Christmas, Green maintained a combatant spirit and looked forward to being able to say that he had spent a Christmas in the front lines.

The Canadian front remained relatively quiet in January and February 1917. The battalion war diarist had little to record other than that the weather was “cold and clear” and occasionally “clear and cold.” Several other Canadian battalions began a raiding campaign and competition soon ensued to capture most prisoners or wreak the most destruction. On 17 February the 54th began preparing for the largest raid of the war, employing 1,700 men from all battalions of the 4th Division. The plan was to use gas to overcome the enemy’s particularly strong defences on Hill 145. Unfortunately the plan misjudged the effects of gas warfare. The battalion CO, Lieut.-Colonel Kemball, objected to the raid because of the unpredictable winds. The commander of the 75th battalion also objected, and even General Odlum subsequently questioned how the men would cross no-man’s-land if the gas failed to perform as expected. Postponements of the attack resulted in a few of the gas canisters being punctured by German artillery and alerted them of the upcoming attack. However Lieut.-Colonel Ironside (GSO 1, 4th Canadian Division) overruled any objections and insisted that the raid go ahead as planned. Kemball, believing the raid ill advised, planned to personally head his battalion’s assault.

58 Howard to Mother, 28 December 1916, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-D-2 File 15, 8.
61 The gas would require a strong wind to carry it up a hill against gravity. At Vimy, the wind often blew in the wrong direction and lacked strength. Cook, “A Proper Slaughter”, 9-10, 14, 18-21.
Green was again spared the risks of combat. Just prior to the attack on the night of 27 February, Kemball ordered Green to go on a five-week course at 1st Army School near Boulogne. Green asked the colonel to reconsider: claiming that he was serving as second in command of his company because its captain was drunk. Kemball insisted that the company captain would lead the attack and that Green would leave for the course. Green departed the following morning. In later years he reflected that Kemball was a friend of Green’s father and this may have led to Green’s timely absence.

News of the attack’s utter failure reached him a week later. The Canadian artillery had failed to cut the barbed wire defences, and because the Germans were prepared for the gas they cut down the incoming Canadians. The 54th battalion suffered the heaviest losses with 226 casualties. On 3 March the Germans offered a ceasefire, removed Kemball’s body from the barbed wire, and placed it in front of the Canadian lines. Green was devastated by the news. He particularly mourned the loss of Kemball and thought of revenge: “The loss of the Colonel has changed my views of the war a good deal and I hope it will not be over until I can bayonet 5 Bavarians for myself and 4 for the OC.” The tragedy of war did not compromise Green’s rhetoric, it strengthened it.

Green moved on. The five-week course included training in the usual infantry skills. Once again Green focused on bayonet training in his letters, remarking that “whenever they teach bayonet work they make you see red [Green’s emphasis].” Like many generals, Green

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63 According to Green’s letters, this new Captain had a history of drunkenness. Howard to Dad, 27 January 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 1, 5.
64 Green interviewed by Stursberg, LAC MG31 D-78 Vol 34 File 13, 27; LAC RG150 Acc 1992-93 166 Vol 3777-48, Green, Howard, Charles. Howard Green evidently shared this belief with his family as they still retell it today. Like Howard, they recognize that the truth will never be known. Marian Ennis interviewed by Author, 9 December 2007.
66 Howard to Dad, 9 March 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 2, 1-3.
continued to believe that “the side that is best at close range is bound to win in the end and now that we have artillery to back us it looks like a sorry day for the Huns” and still hoped to put his developed skills to use. Again, the war was not making him a peacemonger; at times it had the opposite effect.

The course ended in time for Green to witness the Canadian Corps’ attack on Vimy Ridge. Like all units, the 54th had been practicing for weeks and Green’s long absence disqualified him from participating except as a reserve. He desperately wanted to be in the attack but, to his chagrin, he was never ordered forward. For the first few days of the operation he remained well behind the lines and did not see the battlefield until the 13th; describing it as a “rather awful sight.” After the battle Green walked through the field, picking up a variety of items including a German helmet and “ridge mud” to send home to his family. Like others, he considered the attack a great victory. Furthermore, he believed Germany had to be soundly beaten with more attacks. “Everything is going our way” Green boasted, “there will be plenty of casualties yet but the end is possible now.”

Things were also going Green’s way. Shortly after Vimy he was recommended for acting captaincy of C company. Though he was saddened to leave his comrades in A company,

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67 Howard to Mother, 2 March 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 2, 2-3. Until recently, Canadian academics have been unanimous in pronouncing the bayonet as obsolete in modern warfare; Generals who continued to advocate its use later in the war are derided. (Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, 205; Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 82, 284n58). Recent research by Aaron Miedema challenges this assertion and though his current research focuses primarily on 1914-1916, his claim that the bayonet remained an integral tool of infantrymen throughout the war deserves further investigation. Regardless of whether Green’s bayonet fixation was warranted or indicative of his inexperience in actual hand-to-hand combat, the fact that his rhetoric remained unchanged despite exposure to the front remains noteworthy. (Aaron Miedema, “Bayonets and Blobsticks: The C. E. F. Experience of Close Combat 1914 to 1918”, Unpublished article, April 2006).
68 Howard to Dad, 8 April 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 3, 4; Green War Diary, 13 April 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 5; For details of this training see Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare, 87-100.
69 Howard to Mother, 14 April 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 3, 1; Howard to Brother, 20 April 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 3, 3.
70 Howard to Dad, 17 April 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 3, 2.
he had long desired a promotion.71 The move was likely eased by the fact that he barely
recognized his battalion after the arrival of so many replacements. Though he missed his old
friends he knew it was time to make new ones and again enjoyed the camaraderie among these
“Green” men despite experiences such as being caught off guard by a sudden gas attack.72

Unfortunately the dissatisfaction of others changed the course of Green’s war experience.
Kemball’s death brought Lieut.-Col V.V. Harvey to the 54th battalion. Though Green liked him,
many did not. Apparently the colonel made several “foolish” (and never described) mistakes
during the month of May. Though Green considered these errors “small” and refused to testify
against his CO, three senior officers in the battalion felt otherwise and Harvey was ostensibly
removed because he was an “easterner” in a western battalion, (the truth is far less clear).
Regardless, Green’s stance left him alienated and he arranged transfer to the 44th battalion under
his former superior, colonel Davis, if trouble arose in the 54th.73 Major E.A. Carey assumed
command of the 54th on May 21 and decided that until the battalion returned to regular service in
the front lines there would be no promotions. Though rather “disgusted at times,” the still acting
captain pressed on.74

A chance to prove his worthiness for promotion arose in late July. Deployed near Hill 65
on the Vimy front, B and C Companies entered the front line. On July 27, B company withdrew
all but one of its platoons, which passed command of the remaining platoons to Green. The next
day Carey ordered the battalion to “push” its outposts closer to the German lines. At 1800 hours

71 Ibid, 1.
72 Green describes coughing profusely from the exposure. There is no record of this gassing in the Battalion’s War
Diary. However Green’s personal diary corroborates his letters. Though the personal and official narratives do
not match, it is more likely that the Battalion diarist failed to record then event than that Green lied in his own
diary. 54th Battalion War Diary, LAC RG9, Militia and Defence, Series III-D-3, Volume 4942, Reel T-10748-
10749 File: 445 Part 1, 11 June 1917; Howard to Mother, 15 June 1917, 593-E-1 File 5; Green War Diary, 11
73 Howard to Dad, 3 June 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 5, 3-5.
74 54th Battalion War Diary, LAC RG9, Militia and Defence, Series III-D-3, Volume 4942, Reel T-10748-10749
Green ordered sections over the top. Three outposts were quickly established with little opposition. Over the course of the night one post had to be retaken after suffering continuous attacks from the enemy’s infantry. During subsequent action a fourth “strongpoint” was established and one prisoner captured.75

The young Lieutenant believed he had conducted a successful, though admittedly limited, operation. In his diary he noted that he could have been more aggressive but took pride in only suffering two casualties for pushing 150 yards into no-man’s land where “life is worth a lot.”76 However, Carey deemed Green “unfit to command a company and that I [Green] was to come away on a course, letting somebody else step in [to command C company].”77 Infuriated, Green asked for and received permission to transfer from the 54th. Though crestfallen, he received solace from his men:

The men supported me and they told me that they thought I was O.K. and we parted friends – every one… It looks rather bad to lose a Company and of course promotion. Really mother dear I am fed up with some of these fellows they don’t worry about the lives of the men and they do worry about dirty underhanded tricks.78

Green blamed his situation on his passive support for Harvey several months previous. As it turned out, this occasion concluded his service as an infantryman.

* * *

Green proceeded to the three-week camp at the Canadian Corps Infantry School as ordered, and once again excelled. He proved particularly adept in bayonet drill where the

76 Green War Diary, 29 July 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 6.
77 Howard to Mother, 8 August 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 7, 1.
instructor claimed to be afraid of his prowess. When the course ended, Green was the only student of his class of fifty-five ordered to remain as an Assistant Drill Instructor. At first Green was upset; he wanted to be at the front. However, he took comfort in continuing to demonstrate skills that Carey claimed he lacked.\(^7\)

Green struggled with his conscience throughout his stay at the school. Initially Green was only to stay at the camp for one month. He enjoyed being an instructor, both disciplining and encouraging his “company” of men (it was a composite group). Like any good teacher he derived satisfaction from their individual progress but “would just as soon be up the line.”\(^8\) However he was unable to leave his new position. His offer from the 44\(^{th}\) seems to have evaporated and his application for a staff job also failed to yield any response. The school still needed him, and after serving for a few months his position became permanent.\(^9\) Green’s feelings remained mixed. Because he was technically on loan from the 54\(^{th}\), any promotion would come from its headquarters and he knew that as an instructor “the battalion will consider me yellow and all that and it means no promotion nor advancement.”\(^10\) Even though he felt like a “miserable piker [quitter],” he decided to stay at the camp and try to work his way into a more auspicious position rather than try to transfer back to the 54\(^{th}\). In subsequent months he remained an able instructor and enjoyed his time at the camp, but continued to hope to re-enter the front lines before the war’s completion.\(^11\)

\(^7\) Howard to Brother, 9 August 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 7, 1; Howard to Dad, 28 August 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 7, 1-2.

\(^8\) Howard to Mother, 9 September 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 9, 1; Howard to Mother, 18 September 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 9, 1; Howard to Dad, 16 September 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 9, 1.

\(^9\) Howard to Mother, 1 October 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 10, 1.

\(^10\) Ibid, 2.

\(^11\) Ibid, 2, 4; Howard to Dad, 15 October 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 10, 1-2; Howard to Dad, 8 December 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 12, 4-5.
The German Spring Offensive of March-April 1918 heightened Green’s guilt for being far from the front lines. He went so far as to appeal to Carey to take him back and after commenting that Green was foolish to want to return, the 54th’s CO agreed, if there were heavy casualties. However, the Canadian Corps was not targeted by the German assault, thereby limiting Canadian casualties and forestalling Green’s wish to return to the front.84

Green’s luck changed in April when his application for a staff position was accepted. The appointment as Staff Learner meant the loss of his acting captaincy, but Green did not care; the new job was an opportunity to ease his conscience definitively.85 Originally assigned to the Quartermaster, Green found this work boring and by 23 April managed to secure a transfer to Intelligence.86 The learning curve was steep, and he knew it would be a long time before he would have any opportunities for promotion, but he found his work extremely “interesting,” and, more importantly, he believed he was making a difference. He wrote intelligence reports, and on at least one occasion was present during the interrogation of German POWs. He frequently visited battalions in the field, sometimes visiting the front lines and “OPs” (Observation Posts). On one occasion Green was gassed while in the line and there is evidence that he took part in at least one patrol.87 Green recognized that living conditions at Brigade Headquarters were far better than those in the trenches, but his work at the front was more harrowing than that of an instructor and he felt he was making a far more valuable contribution to Canada’s war effort.88

85 Green War Diary, 7 April 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 7.
87 Green War Diary, 13, 18, 21-22 May, 1, 17 June 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 7.
88 Howard to Mother, 5 May 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 3, 3; Howard to Dad, 13 May 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 4, 1; Howard to Mother, 3 August 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 7, 1-2.
Green’s superiors agreed and recommended him for promotion to staff captain. This stamp of approval increased his enthusiasm for 6th Brigade and the war, even though final confirmation involved a long process requiring months. He wrote to his father:

I hope to be in any finishing smash and especially with this Brigade for they can, have and will fight in a way that could not be beaten. The morale is excellent and training thorough and the leadership splendid. Just watch us!

The dramatic penetration of enemy territory achieved at Amiens in August 1918 justified Green’s enthusiasm. Open warfare complicated communications and Green was often employed as a liaison during this period. Sarcastically, his only complaint was having to “walk fast enough to keep up with the hun.” However he did not forget the cost of these victories writing that: “It is hard to look at the dead but such things must be.” On a more personal note, his friend Smith was again wounded and “was not expected to live.” Nevertheless, Green believed that: “The way the offensives are being run this year is much better than ever before and we have done much more work with much lighter casualties. It gives one great confidence and I feel sure now that the war will end next year...” Offensive war, though costly, was paying dividends.

Green spent the final day of the war east of Mons in the villages of Havre and Boussoit, establishing communication lines with signallers. He noted the casualties of the day, including one death, without comment. Like many of his peers Green was shocked by the war’s sudden completion. Perhaps too startled to share his feelings with family thousands of miles away, he confided with his diary: “It was a great day alltho [sic] the armistice made everything so unreal.

89 Howard to Mother, 29 July 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 6, 2-3.
91 Howard to Brother, 14 August 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 7, 1.
92 Smith later recovered from his wounds despite their severity. Green War Diary, 7/8 August, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 7; Howard to Mother, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 13 August 1918, 2.
93 Howard to Mother, 30 August 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 7, 1.
94 Green War Diary, 11 November 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 8.
The hun sat on one side of the valley and we in the bottom of it. Nobody could realize that the war was to all intents and purposes over."96 By 13 November Green managed a very brief letter to his mother expressing disbelief, pride in Canada’s contribution, and consolation that she could now stop worrying about his safety.97 In all the Canadian Corps had advanced 86 miles into German occupied territory during the Hundred Days campaign and, despite Canada’s 45,830 casualties, Green considered it “a great privilege to be here now.”98

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On 16 November Green’s battalion received instructions to march to Germany as part of the initial occupation force. Canada’s First and Second Divisions, as part of Britain’s Second Army received the honour of being part of the march to Bonn and Cologne. Like most of his peers, Green greeted the operation with enthusiasm.99 The Canadian Corps began its march two days later. On 4 December Green rode into Germany beside the Brigade’s commander General A. Ross as the 29th battalion’s band played “O Canada”. Rather than despising the war for its costs, Green considered it an honour to be part of this march demonstrating Canada’s contribution to victory.100

Although Green only spent a few weeks in Germany he seized upon every opportunity to humble his former foes in manly fashion. According to regulations, all males from former belligerents had to either salute or remove their hats in the presence of British or Canadian officers. Green commented that: “It must have gone against the grain of the Bosche to salute our union jacks.”101

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96 Green War Diary, 11 November 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 8.
97 Howard to Mother, 13 November 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 10, 2.
98 Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory, 209; Schreiber, 133; Howard to Mother, 13 November 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 10, 2.
99 Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory, 214.
100 Green War Diary, 4 December 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 9.
101 Green War Diary, 4, 6 December 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 9.
By December 10, the 6th Brigade reached Bonn and Green insisted that German males salute him despite the fact that the city had not received orders to do so. When a group of students failed to oblige he:

rode up to one student and told him to take off his hat and as he [the student] hesitated; I made him hold it right up in the air – just then a street car passed and the girl driver turned around and gave me a killing look at and her mouth moved – uttering some fierce word. Oh my but they do love us.102

On December 13 the 1st and 2nd Divisions crossed the Rhine with bayonets fixed. On this occasion Sir Arthur Currie received their salute. Though Green believed in the British sense of fair play, he considered himself and his peers “conquerors.”103 He was not alone.104 Dan Dancocks claims that the German population was either shy or friendly, and generally eager to obey orders. Bonn’s population certainly cooperated with its occupation guests, but they resented expressions of defeat. As a prosecutor of these policies, Green described Bonn’s population as “unfriendly.”105 Though angered when this policy was overturned, Green subsequently found his hosts more amicable.106

On December 21, Green accepted a position at General Headquarters (GHQ) at Montreuil at the Movements Branch and departed for his new post five days later. Very little evidence survives regarding his specific duties but his central concern was the movement of Canadian soldiers from France to England for demobilization in Canada. He worked with over fifty British staff officers so his job was likely specialized.107
This prolonged stay in France afforded Green multiple opportunities to tour many of the war’s battlefields. At Vimy he noted that each of the camps sported Canadian names. Despite having witnessed the rubble of Lens on previous occasions, the destruction still impressed him. Passing by the area where he had first entered the trenches in 1916, Green recognized a few spots but noted that the “face of the country” was marred beyond recognition. More generally he found the utter destruction from years of fighting in the Ypres salient “awful.” On another trip with friends, he stopped at Hill 60 and walked up the hill noting that “it is an awful mess, barb wire, busted rifles and even bones[;] of course some very heavy fighting took place there.” They then proceeded to Passchendaele. Green noted the “obliterated” forests and the commanding view of German pillboxes. Like others, he wondered why the attack had occurred and concluded: “The cost was terrible.” However these experiences did not diminish his conviction regarding war’s necessity.

Despite continued exposure to the sheer destruction of war, Green’s primary concerns lay elsewhere. Many of his gendered ideals remained intact. Green now smoked a pipe, though he promised to stop when he returned home. He also continued to crave promotion, but remained doubtful of his CO’s promise to try to secure one for him in light of the war’s conclusion. A decoration was also unlikely as he realized his service paled in comparison to the sacrifices of regular infantry. Above all, Green did not want “to go home the way I had enlisted with nothing


Howard to Sister, 17 April 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 17, 2-5.
Howard to Dad, 21 April 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 17, 5-7.
It is unclear when he began to indulge this habit. However, upon returning home his mother buried his pipe in the backyard before he had a chance to quit. Howard to Mother, 15 February 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 15, 11; John Green (son of Howard Green) interviewed by Author, 15 December 2007.
to show for good work.”\textsuperscript{111} He feared the appearance of having failed to distinguish himself and continued to crave recognition for his contributions despite telling himself that his conscience was clear and that he should be proud regardless of his rank.\textsuperscript{112} In early February he was at last promoted to the rank of captain. Regulations, however, required Green to maintain his status for six months prior to being struck off strength in order to gain a captain’s gratuity. Because his promotion was backdated to late December, this meant remaining in the forces until late June.\textsuperscript{113} Elated, Green could now return home with concrete proof of his worth and contribution to victory.

Having witnessed war’s terrible cost, Green doubted a lasting peace. He did not believe that “the individual man has become better and wiser as a result of the war and I doubt if we can build up a better plan for controlling the world.”\textsuperscript{114} He thought President Woodrow Wilson was “very idealistic” and commented: “I think of the misery caused by war and wonder how we can prevent wars in the future. I don’t believe people are big enough to do it.”\textsuperscript{115} Green also noted the rise of Bolshevism and believed opposing it would require a “strong hand.”\textsuperscript{116} Instead of a League of Nations, he continued to prefer an alliance including England, America, France, Italy and Japan as a mechanism to maintain stability. The war’s victors had demonstrated their prowess in coercing peace and he hoped their success would continue. Writing in his diary on the day prior to his departure for England and thereafter to Canada, Green summarized his

\textsuperscript{111} Howard to Mother, 5 January 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 14, 2.
\textsuperscript{112} Green War Diary, 17, 20-29 January 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 9.
\textsuperscript{113} Howard to Dad, 21 April 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 17, 1-2; Howard to Mother, 5 May 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 18, 2.
\textsuperscript{114} Howard to Dad, 12 January 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 14, 7.
\textsuperscript{115} Howard to Mother, 30 January 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 14, 5.
\textsuperscript{116} Howard to Dad, 12 January 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 14, 6-6.
feelings: “It is the end of what I am sure will prove to be one of the most interesting periods of my life. Here is to the British Empire.”

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The preceding narrative corrects two historiographical errors. First, several factual errors have developed regarding Green’s service in the First World War. Peter Newman claimed Green did not venture overseas until 1917, when he had in fact been in England since December 1915. Less trivially, several authors have claimed that Green was wounded during the war. This myth was likely propagated in interviews with George Ignatieff and has since been reiterated by both Erika Simpson and Knowlton Nash. In his book Ignatieff claims that Green communicated the wounded myth as an explanation for inviting two elderly women for tea and biscuits during his first visit to Europe since 1919. If this is what Green said, the lie may have been to cover embarrassment for the women’s real association: they may have been some of Green’s former girlfriends or the nurses who looked after him when he contracted measles in 1916. Either way the lie would have been out of character for Green, who never lied about the details of his service throughout his public life. Alternatively, Green may have provided a vague explanation and Ignatieff assumed the rest. The truth will never be known.

117 Green War Diary, 14 June 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-6 File 10.
120 Howard Green was an exceptional flirt throughout the majority of the war and dated many Canadian nurses. His relations were always honourable, but he enjoyed female companionship tremendously. See for example: Howard to Mother, 12 March 1917, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-1 File 2, 2-3; Howard to Dad, 19 March 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 16, 6-7; Howard to Sister, 30 April 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 17, 1.
Second, and more interestingly, Green’s war experience has been linked to his later advocacy of disarmament. Michael Tucker believed that Green’s stance was “a likely product of his involvement with the war of carnage, the First World War.”\textsuperscript{121} Ignatieff also wrote that “above all Green, stirred by memories of the horrors of World War I, found… enthusiastic allies in his determined fight for arms control and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{122} Most recently, Jennifer Hunter asserts a similar link.\textsuperscript{123} Unfortunately these claims do not describe whether Green became a peacemonger immediately after the war, or whether his military service informed his later advocacy of disarmament. However, neither claim is accurate.

The source of this wartime service myth appears to have originated with George Ignatieff. In an interview Ignatieff claimed that:

Howard Green, having been a veteran in the First World War, and wounded, and seen at an early age what a hell of a thing world war is, was a convinced pacifist and was absolutely against the nuclear commitment in any form. He was for the elimination of nuclear weapons. He’d have been a leader in the peace movement if given the chance.\textsuperscript{124}

Erika Simpson later quoted this same passage, adding that Green’s experiences had been “horrific.”\textsuperscript{125} Knowlton Nash also interviewed Ignatieff prior to composing his monograph. Though war is terrible, Green rarely defined his experiences as horrific and was keenly aware that his experience was limited compared to those of infantrymen who fought in the front lines throughout the war. Green had experienced trench warfare, although he was never involved in a frontal attack. He tasted gas, and saw the mass death mechanized warfare could create. His

\begin{footnotes}
\item[121] Tucker, “Canada’s Roles in the Disarmament Negotiations”, 81.
\item[122] Ignatieff, \textit{The Making of a Peace Monger}, 188-189.
\item[125] Simpson, \textit{NATO and the Bomb}, 177.
\end{footnotes}
friends and peers had most notably suffered the futility of trench war at the 1 March gas raid, at Vimy, and at the Hundred Days battles. In the majority of cases, however, Green witnessed Canadian soldiers overcoming great odds and successfully taking objectives during the last year and a half of the war. He recognized that bloody sacrifice could yield results. To him, and the vast majority of his Canadian peers, these ends provided sufficient incentive to continue the fight. Though Green did not like war, he did not hate it either: rather, he reluctantly believed in it. As Jonathan Vance observes:

The Hun had been vanquished, and civilization had been saved from the threat of barbarism. Still, there was no guarantee that the salvation was permanent, and the memory of the war accepted that such a struggle might well have to be waged again. In a way, it acted as a powerful antidote to pacifism, for it assumed that the truest lovers of peace were those people who were willing to fight for it.126

Like many of his peers, including the subsequent Minister of Defence George Pearkes, or his later disarmament advisor E.L.M. Burns (who commanded the 1st Canadian Corps during the Italian campaign during the Second World War), the Great War made Green aware of the cost of war, but it did not make him a peacemonger.127

Interestingly, Howard Green was asked this heritage question in 1971:

Mr. Nelson: How did that wartime experience affect you? Did it give you strong feelings about war and the conflict between people and so on or did you…

Mr. Green: Well for it was a very wonderful experience although I was particularly lucky, but it came just at the time in one’s life when impressions were made that were very deep and for me it was very beneficial.

Mr. Nelson: But you didn’t come out with strong feelings for or against war as a public policy?

Mr. Green: Well war is a lot of nonsense. I mean it is about the worse show of union activity you could have, isn’t it?128

128 Howard Green interviewed by Mr. Nelson, LAC MG31 E-83 Vol 27 File 8, 9. The interviewer’s full name does not appear on the transcript.
Green never answered the question satisfactorily. If his later actions in the 1960s been had motivated by his experiences in the First World War one would expect him to have provided a strong, clear, affirmative reply. His first reply could have just as easily been made in reference to his university education. Moreover the second part of his reply is abstract rather than reflective of his beliefs in 1919 and only makes negative reference to his experiences as an afterthought. The evidence shows that Green left Europe in 1919 filled with zeal for the British Empire and did not consider war a dysfunctional display of unity. This belief would continue for many additional decades.

Undoubtedly Green’s beliefs about war changed moderately during the conflict. Though he had enlisted after the battle of 2nd Ypres he did not accurately anticipate the experiences that awaited him. Like most Canadians, Green developed a greater respect and lack of appetite for war. Unsurprisingly, he also expressed great appreciation for the Canadian Corps’ improved tactics that reduced casualties and increased effectiveness. He continued to believe that these casualties were justified in light of Germany’s perceived aggression. Moreover, his continued desire for promotion demonstrated his desire to be associated with wartime success. Above all, his sense of duty and justice demanded that he continue to fight for his country and empire throughout the war. The friends and comrades he left behind in France “died in [pursuit of] the best cause that anyone could die for.”\textsuperscript{129} He left the First World War with more mature views about war, but these views remained favourable to renewed conflict should the international situation require it. War had lost much of its glamour, but to the future peacemonger it had not yet lost its utility.

\textsuperscript{129} Howard to Dad, 13 May 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 4, 3.
Chapter 2: Stilettos

“The hon. Member of Vancouver-Quadra [Green] is an extraordinary citizen. He goes around the parliament buildings with a smirk on his face, a bible in his hand and a stiletto up his sleeve.” C.D. Howe on Howard Green’s conduct in the House of Commons.¹

Green returned home in July 1919, and like hundreds of thousands of other veterans resumed a normal life. He continued to think positively about the great adventure that he had survived. After meeting a former comrade he composed a letter to his mother in which he repeated the narrative of Colonel Kemball’s decision to lead the 54th to what he believed was imminent death: “What an inspiration a man like that is.”² Instead of hating war as has been alleged by historians of the Diefenbaker period, Green continued to push for increased Canadian participation in times of conflict as a necessary and justified part of Canadian foreign policy.

Having considered several professions during the Great War, Green chose law and fulfilled the requirements to write his bar examinations in the fall of 1920, graduating second in his class. Settling in Vancouver, he established his own firm with F.K. Collins (who later became a Supreme Court Judge) and hoped that his profession would springboard him into politics.³ Shortly thereafter he met and married Marion Jean Mounce and fathered two children: Lewis and John. He was also active as a Young Conservative during this period. By 1930 he was President of the Vancouver-South Conservative Association and managed Leon Ladner’s unsuccessful bid for that riding’s federal seat. When a candidate could not be found to run in the 1935 federal election, Howard Green volunteered. Though he was not favoured to win, his work

¹ Canada, House of Commons Debates, 15 May 1950, 2488.
² Howard to Mother, 24 November 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-3 File 1, 3-4.
³ Green’s rapid progress through the program was due to the program’s acceleration for returning veterans. Howard Charles Green, interviewed by Peter Stursberg, “An interview”, 21 November 1978, LAC MG31 D-78 Vol 34 File 13, 38-41, 44-52. Howard to Dad, 9 December 1918, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 11, 2; Howard to Mother, 5 January 1919, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-2 File 14, 3.
in the community, in addition to a visit from R.B. Bennett (the Party’s leader), and a split vote between the CCF and Liberals, led to a narrow margin victory of approximately 300 votes.\(^4\)

Green set out for the first session of Canada’s 18\(^{th}\) Parliament in early February 1936. Suffering from a self-described “inferiority complex,” he initially resisted urges to speak, or even ask questions. When he finally summoned the courage to give his first brief speech, he “shoved [his chair] out in the aisle so that I had room” to fall in case he fainted.\(^5\) Though this lack of confidence continued for some time, Green soon found that he loved “the battle” of debates and over the next few years became an increasingly prominent Tory.\(^6\)

* * *

From the outset Green took an interest in Veterans Affairs or, as it was then called: “returned soldiers problems.” To some degree he became involved in the subject by default as it “was the only thing I knew much about.”\(^7\) This expertise reaffirmed that Green was aware of the costs of war. From retraining for new professions to caring for the maimed, he was deeply interested in the successful reintegration of veterans and despite his later disagreements with the Department of Defence, he continued to value the military throughout his life.

By June of his first year in Parliament, Green delivered a speech asking that the parameters of the *War Veterans Allowance Act* be widened to ensure adequate incomes for

\(^5\) Green had previously fainted defending an important court case. Tim Creery, “Green Had Reputation As Most Stubborn Tory”, publication unknown, 30 August 1957, LAC MG32 B-13 Vol 13 File 7; Howard to Mom and John, 10 March 1936, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 3, 2-3; Howard to Mom and John, 18 February 1936, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 6, 5.
\(^6\) Howard to Folks, 16 March 1936, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 3, 5; Howard to Mother, 8 February 1939, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 4, 1.
\(^7\) Green interviewed by Stursberg, LAC MG31 D-78 Vol 34 File 13, 54.
veterans who, prior to the age of 60, were either “burnt out” or disabled. This appeal was successful. Quickly becoming the “Veterans Affairs critic” for the Conservative Party, Green was a determined advocate throughout the interwar period for Canadian veterans of all previous conflicts. His efforts were appreciated: he received a marble desk set complete with a nameplate from widows grateful for his assistance in obtaining the pensions of their deceased husbands. Though he regretted that the widows had resorted to such extravagance, he knew the item could not be returned.

Although Green fought the so-called “second battle” with vigour, his concerns were quickly eclipsed by the failure of appeasement to prevent a Second World War. Like others, Green noted the increasing probability of war and, as a spokesman for his constituency and his country, lobbied for increased defences. Although there was little that Prime Minister Mackenzie King could have done to change the course of international events, Green continued to find King’s foreign policy frustrating. He wrote to his father in April 1939, “he [King] has so many ‘ifs’ and ‘butts’ and grunts and groans that I consider him a positive menace to the Canadian people.” King’s government initiated a modest rearmament program, but Green believed it should have done more. Initially his lobbying took the form of moderate requests for increased anti-aircraft and mounted naval guns on the West coast, but as Japanese victories

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9 Briefly, the War Veterans Allowance Act as passed in 1930 was designed to supplement the income of veterans of the First World War over the age of 60 or who had received a disability pension prior to that age. Walter S. Woods, *Rehabilitation (A Combined Operation)*, (Ottawa, 1953), 387, 395.
11 Howard to Folks, 27 December 1939, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-4 File 1, 6-7.
12 Morton and Wright, *Winning the Second Battle*.
13 Howard to Folks, 3 October 1938, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 3, 6-7.
14 Interestingly Green admired Ernest Lapointe and described him as a “statesman.” Howard to Dad, 1 April 1939, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-4 File 1, 2.
mounted, so did Green’s requests. He described Canada as being at a “forked road” where it had to choose whether it would defend itself or allow others to do so, thus relegating it to obscurity.\textsuperscript{17} He urged the immediate construction of a strong Canadian Navy and encouraged its presence on the Pacific Coast. The Vancouverite even suggested borrowing reserve ships from Britain until Canadian replacements could be constructed. In a similar vein, Green advocated joining a defensive alliance with Pacific Commonwealth countries as well as the United States.\textsuperscript{18} He also requested the creation of “dominion arsenals” to ensure sufficient production of infantry, light artillery and anti-aircraft guns at any war’s outset.\textsuperscript{19} In short, Green advocated anything that would deter an external threat or, if that failed, would make a war more winnable. To his surprise few took his more radical suggestions seriously.\textsuperscript{20}

When it became clear that war was imminent in late August 1939, Green’s mood was mixed. On the one hand he was “depressed… and unable to grasp the terrible truth that this world is almost into another war” and wondered “whether our civilization deserves to continue.” On the other hand:

\begin{quote}
Its seems perfectly clear that someone, sometime has to smash this madman Hitler and the sooner it is done the easier the job will be… I am certain that there will have to be real leadership shown [by the government] and great steadiness in our people – the result may be to make us a better nation or it may be just the opposite.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

After Canada declared war on Germany on September 10, Green repeated his hope that the war would make Canada a better nation.\textsuperscript{22} To Green, war remained a necessary part of foreign policy and could lead to a country’s betterment; although he despised the deaths war would bring, he did not view it as an evil to be avoided at all costs.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 13 May 1938, 2874.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 2875, 3 April 1939, 2555.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, 10 March 1939, 1784-1787; 16 May 1939, 4131, 4134, 4139, 4151-4152.
\textsuperscript{20} Howard to John, 15 May 1938, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-1 File 4, 6.
\textsuperscript{21} Howard to Folks, 27 August 1939, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-4 File 1, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{22} Howard to Little Woman (Marion), 13 September 1939, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 4, 3.
Green believed that nothing short of a “total war effort” would suffice.\textsuperscript{23} He remained frustrated by Mackenzie King’s cautious policies designed to maintain national unity. Green’s two primary areas of concern were economic mobilization and manpower. He often asked questions in Parliament about the status of military equipment production in Canada. In May 1940, for example, he asserted that Canada required the capacity to equip its own troops with gear, and went on to claim that if Britain fell on hard times “we [Canada] may have to become the arsenal of the British empire.”\textsuperscript{24} More generally Green asked that Canadian industrial capacity be used to its fullest extent, and sought to ensure that sufficient personnel were available for continuous production. Though the government assured Green that production difficulties were only slight, Green repeatedly advocated industrial training for women and older men so that those eligible to fight would be free to do so. This would ensure more full and efficient deployment of Canada’s human resources. These demands were issued in advance of the mass deployment of Canadian troops and Green’s requests evaporated when worker shortages became a real problem.\textsuperscript{25} Green’s attention, like other Conservatives, changed to conscription for overseas service where he again pushed for maximized commitment.

After Canada declared war, Green believed that Mackenzie King was not going to send troops overseas. King’s address to Parliament on September 7 failed to promise the creation of a Canadian Expeditionary Force and Green believed that the Prime Minister opposed this measure. Green’s party feared that King was creating the impression that Canada only subscribed to a “half-heated” war effort and Green joined the push for an overseas contingent. Even if Britain

\textsuperscript{23} This phrase aptly summarizes Green’s position throughout the war. Howard to Folks, 8 February 1942, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-4 File 5, 3.
\textsuperscript{24} Canada, House of Commons Debates, 23 May 1940, 154; For a less rhetorical appeal see: 28 May 1940, 294.
did not require it immediately, he felt such a force would eventually be required and because battalions took time to raise and train. Indeed, the King government originally hoped to fight a war of “limited liability” and Green opposed any restraint.26 “Freedom” was threatened and he believed Canada had to do everything in its power to aid its mother country.27

The excitement of mass enlistments quickly swept across most of Canada, and Green was not immune. By December 1939, Green watched Vancouver’s Seaforth Highlanders march through the city before embarking on the long journey east, then overseas. He recognized the second-in-command as well as many of the other officers, and remarked that the sight was “sad but inspiring – the ordinary people are the ones who pay the price in these wars.” However despite this concern he added that: “today for the first time I wished I had stayed in the Militia – but I did not dream that there would be another war.”28 Saddened that he could not take part, he hoped that he would be able to go to England and France as part of a Parliamentary Committee at some future date.29 Although Green realized that many would die in the war, this did not cause him to oppose Canada’s part in the conflict. In fact, this consideration led him to pursue it doggedly.

When bad news arrived from Europe in May and June 1940, Green again demanded a more whole-hearted war effort. The Liberal government enacted the National Resource Mobilization Act (NMRA), which included conscription for home defence. Thus Canada’s Army was split between General Service volunteers who could serve abroad, and NRMA conscripts who would only be asked to serve in Canada. Civilians could enlist under either

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27 Howard to Little Woman (Marion), 13 September 1939, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 4, 3.
28 Howard to Folks, 18 December 1939, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-4 File 1, 4-6.
29 Ibid, 6.
program. He was frustrated by this noticeable limit to full service and continued to push for more overseas troops. In the House he demanded that Canada raise a third division and that “recruiting should be thrown wide open so that every fit Canadian wishing to serve in our fighting forces may do so.” He believed that Canada would require “a million men” in uniform to defend itself at home and abroad. Privately, he believed that conscription would soon be necessary and frequently pressed for a minimum training regiment for all males of military age towards this end.

It was not until early 1942, when the Liberals announced a national plebiscite to release the government from its pledge not to send conscripts overseas, that the Conservative Party began to lobby openly for conscription. Like many in his party, Green believed that the plebiscite was another way for the Liberal government to avoid taking responsibility for its decisions. He believed that the prime minister was “thinking more of retaining votes for his party in Quebec than he is of strengthening our war effort.” Furthermore, to Green, overseas conscription was a symbolic measure of Canada’s commitment to the war. Green hoped that Canada’s population would discern this scheme and support a Conservative campaign for conscription.

When the “yes” vote prevailed in all but Quebec, the Liberals possessed the power, but lacked either the will or justification, to invoke conscription. At the time, Canada’s manpower

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30 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 32-34.
31 Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 23, 1940, 152.
32 Ibid, 4 July 1940, 1356.
33 Howard to “Lover” (Wife), 17 June 1940, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-1 File 6, 2; Canada, House of Commons Debates, 14 March 1941, 1544, 1545.
35 Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record: Volume 1, 333.
needs were not dire and conscription was not an immediate necessity.\textsuperscript{36} Green thought otherwise and found the government’s reinforcement program ambiguous and detrimental to the war effort. He complained that individuals eligible to serve did not know whether they would be conscripted and thus found it difficult to find jobs in war industry.\textsuperscript{37} Concerned for his Pacific constituency, he lobbied for NRMA personnel to be part of the Pacific offensive campaign that would have to be fought both to secure Canada’s security and to “avenge Hong Kong.”\textsuperscript{38} More generally Green favoured conscription because it afforded “equality of sacrifice among young men, because a young man may [currently] choose whether he will serve where he is needed or at home in Canada.”\textsuperscript{39} Again, Green believed the government’s policy compromised the war effort by placating Quebec at the expense of the wishes of English Canada. He was not alone. As C.P. Stacey points out, the plebiscite results were not necessarily a wholehearted endorsement of conscription by English Canada. Arthur Meighen’s failed by-election campaign was based on a platform of full conscription for overseas service. It seems more likely that, as J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman suggest, many in English Canada believed they had released the government from non-conscription rather than demanding mandatory overseas service. Green was vaguely aware of this political manoeuvring, but dismissed it as a distortion of the vote. He thought English Canada would consider King a “liar” for not implementing mandatory overseas service after the vote.\textsuperscript{40}

Green’s discontent was most obvious in his bid for leadership of the Conservative Party in 1942. He was often frustrated when his own party failed to push as hard as he wanted for a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[36] Granatstein and Hitsman, \textit{Broken Promises}, 172.
\item[37] Canada, \textit{House of Commons Debates}, 1 June 1942, 2939-2941.
\item[38] Ibid, 1 May 1942, 2066-2067.
\item[39] Ibid, 22 June 1942, 3515; see also 17 February 1943, 501.
\end{footnotes}
more total war effort, including full conscription. He knew that victory was beyond his reach but a leadership bid provided him with a platform to voice his concerns. In subsequent interviews, Green claimed that he ran to protest what amounted to the coronation of Manitoba Progressive premier John Bracken. Green resented that Bracken was overwhelmingly preferred despite being “from the outside” as he was not a Member of Parliament. Bracken even insisted that the party rename itself the “Progressive Conservatives” to accommodate Bracken’s former political allegiance. However, Green’s convention seemed disastrous. Slightly underweight, tall, extremely nervous, and lacking any supper, Green took the stage to give his nomination acceptance speech -- only to pass out mid-sentence. Despite coming in a distant fourth place on the first ballot and giving only brief follow-up remarks, the episode seems to have helped rather than hindered Green’s political future. Having demonstrated his concern for the war effort, it was also clear that he would not run again. Therefore Green was a safe weapon to deploy in the House of Commons. Green’s position in the frontlines of the now Progressive Conservative Party was assured.

Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, initiated the Italian campaign that generated the first serious test of Canada’s reinforcement policy. At the time, the event prompted Green to reminisce about Canada’s successful attack on Vimy Ridge (where he did not fight) and, as at the start of the war, he thought of both the casualties and the glory that would

41 Howard to Folks, 26 May 1940, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-2 File 3, 7; Howard to Mum, 1 June 1940, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-1 File 7, 1; Howard to Folks, 14 June 1942, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-4 File 5, 2.
43 Howard Charles Green interviewed by Peter Stursberg, “2nd interview”, 23 May 1979, LAC MG31 D-78 Vol 34 File 14, 22; Howard Green, interviewed by Peter Stursberg, 26 October 1971, LAC, MG31 D-78 Vol 78 File 16, 2.
result from Canada’s involvement. Throughout this period, he continued to ask for Canadian troops to fight in the Pacific theatre, but with little effect. The Minister of Defence J.L. Ralston correctly pointed out that Canada’s contribution of units had peaked and that any troops remaining in Canada would either be used for home defence or reinforcement purposes; no further divisions would be sent abroad. Ralston still insisted that volunteerism was a sufficient method of reinforcement and that Canada was doing as much as it could but Green continued to demand a more total war effort.

Combat in Italy and subsequently in Northwest Europe after the invasion of France in June 1944 soon drained Canada of sufficient replacements for infantry losses. Since the very outset of the war, Green had lobbied for the complete training of Canada’s soldiers based on his own war experience:

I have all of the old soldier’s horror of rushing half-trained men into war, which would mean not giving these fine young Canadians who will compose the expeditionary force a fair chance for their lives. Any war should be fought by properly trained men.

Moreover, because Green had pushed for conscription for well over a year, the current shortage seemed inexcusable. Since the summer of 1944, the government had sought to re-muster non-infantry soldiers to fill the shortages amongst the infantry. When Ralston resigned in early November 1944, King installed General A.G.L. McNaughton as Minister of Defence to attempt to salvage a volunteer service model. A personal dimension was added to Green’s frustration

45 Howard to Marion, 10 July 1943, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-2 File 5, 1; Howard to Folks, 11 July 1943, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-4 File 7, 1.
46 Canada, Commons Debates, 14 February 1944, 461-462. The truth was more complex, infantry shortages were already apparent due to higher than expected casualty rates. The government was pursuing an active campaign to convince NRMA troops to “convert” to general service. The tactic worked for a time, but diminishing returns soon devalued its significance in Ralston’s mind. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 424-432.
47 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 11 September 1939, 101; see also: 23 May 1940, 153; 27 July 1942, 4780.
48 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 437-439, 444, 457-465, 469.
when his son Lewis was converted in July 1944 from artillery to infantry with significantly less training than NRMA conscripts.49

Entering Parliament on November 23, Green embarked on a line of questioning that more closely resembled a prosecutor cross-examining a witness. On repeated occasions he asked McNaughton to either deny or verify that General Service clerks were being sent to the front with between six and eight weeks training while NRMA troops with full training remained in Canada. After considerable sparring Green asked whether, in an emergency, untrained personnel would be rushed to the front. The Minister of National Defence finally admitted: “Under those conditions, when the fate of the battle depends on it, it is the duty of every man, regardless of his qualifications or training, to do the best he can.” Rebuking the Minister, Green replied: “Government members are applauding. What does the general think the duty of the men who are in the home defence army fully trained in combat training should be?” To this McNaughton could only feebly repeat the government’s increasingly dubious hope that NRMA men would volunteer for General Service abroad.50 Again, Green wanted a total war effort, with equality of sacrifice. Though he had no love for war, he did not fear casualties. Rather, like the last war, he could only justify them under certain conditions: and inexperience was unacceptable.

After Germany surrendered in May 1945, Green continued to call for mandatory overseas deployment in the Pacific. The Liberal government preferred a limited Canadian role and planned to send a single volunteer division (compared to five in Europe) to the north Pacific. The Liberal policy, derived from the country’s overall domestic mood, would have resulted in another reinforcement shortage had the division been deployed in serious operations for any considerable period. (This was not the case, of course, and it is possible that any of King’s fears

49 Howard to Folks, 15 July 1944, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-4 File 8, 1-3.
50 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 23 November 1944, 6528-6534; Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, 225-226.
were lessened by personal knowledge of the American atomic bomb project.) But Green had strongly encouraged Canadian involvement in the Pacific theatre throughout the war and he argued that it should now focus its resources on the remaining belligerent. He asked that NRMA men be used so that veterans from the European theatre would not have to fight again. At the very least he hoped that NRMA men would be sent to Europe to relieve general service troops so that Canada would make a larger contribution to the Allied assault in the Pacific. These views coincided with his party’s platform; however the proposal found little favour outside of British Columbia. According to J.L. Granatstein, it “reinforced the impression that the Conservatives were bloodthirsty.” As a BC MP, this impression mattered little to Green. His continued push reflected his genuine belief that continued fighting was necessary for the security of Canada’s Pacific coast.

Like the First World War, Green’s experiences in the Second World War did little to change his views on armed conflict. Throughout the war, he believed that armed conflict was a necessary part of foreign policy that, when required, be pursued to the fullest extent possible. Where Prime Minister King constrained Canada’s war effort to ensure that Canada’s contribution did not compromise Canadian unity, Green continued to believe that his own perspective was correct and in fact reflected the majority of Canadians. While this was an accurate assessment of the mood in British Columbia, it overestimated the willingness of the vast majority of Canadians for continuing the fight. Again, far from detesting war, Green was more willing than most Canadians to see the war to its full conclusion.

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51 Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 483-484; Pickersgill, Mackenzie King Record 2, 447.
54 Howard Green’s involvement in efforts to evacuate and “repatriate” Japanese Canadians during the Second World War does not concern this thesis. Green’s advocacy of the evacuation and “repatriation” was due to a fear of potential “fifth column” activities rather than racism. Though this thesis examines to Green’s views on defence, a full examination of this important but delicate subject requires focusing on recent and past allegations of
Hope for the war’s successful conclusion restarted significant consideration of veterans’ affairs in the House of Commons. The Liberal government had begun modest contemplation of veterans’ concerns as early as December 1939, and had continued under the guidance of Ian Mackenzie and other officials throughout the war. Green continued to speak on veterans’ subjects throughout the war, focusing particularly on veterans returning from the new war prior to its conclusion as well as dependents of men in the armed forces. But these debates proved minor compared to other issues such as conscription. As Green himself described in April 1945:

During these last five years [the Second World War] the main job of Canada and of the Canadian parliament has been to wage war; but complementary to the waging of war there is always the care of those who are doing the fighting, and care for their dependents. I suggest to hon. Members that the time will be here very soon when the first concern of the Canadian people and of the Canadian parliament will be the care of these young men and women and their dependents.

Green understood that Parliament’s duties in wartime extended to soldiers’ lives both on and off the battlefield. Part of Green’s contribution to the war was therefore managing its successful dénouement.

During the immediate post-war period, Green’s efforts pertaining to veterans were concentrated in the Special Committee on Veteran’s Affairs. Walter S. Woods described the Committee’s task of creating what amounted to the “Veteran’s Charter” (a collection of

 racism and is thus inappropriate here. My research on Green’s actions in this unfortunate chapter of Canadian history will be published soon in an academic journal.

56 Canada, Commons Debates, 21 November 1940, 293; 12 November 1941, 4330-4332; 18 June 1943, 3798-3814; 3 April 1945, 373-378.
57 Ibid, 3 April 1945, 373.
legislation to ease the resettlement of veterans into civilian life and ensure an adequate livelihood thereafter) as nothing short of “Herculean.” Green attended virtually every all of the Committee’s meetings from 1945-1946, which sometimes exceeded three in a single week. Green enjoyed the work and believed he was making a real contribution to its proceedings. Green, and many, if not all of his peers generally agreed with the government’s legislative program. As such, Green participated in few weighty or extended debates in the Special Committee on Veterans Affairs. Instead of accepting the legislation as sufficient, however, Green dug deeper, looking for exceptions, or possible unintended consequences of the proposed legislation.

For instance, Green took repeated exception to the phrase “wilfully concealed” in the Pensions Act. The pension provided funds to persons disabled during the course of service in Canada’s armed forces. If a veteran knowingly hid a pre-existing condition at the time of enlistment that would have resulted in the state refusing their services, and that condition was exacerbated to the point of debility by their service, the state held that the veteran was not entitled to a full pension. Of course an enlistee would likely hide a condition to maximize his / her chances of acceptance. In addition, it was often difficult to prove whether a person was aware that previous symptoms posed a real health risk. Alternatively, a veteran could have hidden a precondition and after the war filed for a pension without suffering any added debility from his / her service. Of course, very few individuals would enlist with the hopes of securing a pension in the future but the possibility of post-war exploitation existed nevertheless. A heated debate ensued regarding whether veterans were more likely to be protected by this phrase or

58 Woods, Rehabilitation (A Combined Operation), 21. Although is well beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the creation of the Veteran’s Charter and its many intricate facets a short summary of Green’s efforts therein is warranted to demonstrate his continued concern for veterans.

59 Howard to Marion, 18 October 1945, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 3, 4; Howard to Marion, 24 July 1946, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608F-2 File 1, 2-3.
penalized by it. Green used his Great War experience to inform his views admitting that he had had to look through cracks between his fingers when taking an eye exam prior to enlistment for the First World War and that he did not think that the state should penalize men who hid personal deficiencies so that they could serve their country.\textsuperscript{60} Many in the committee agreed with him. Eventually, Green’s motion that the words “wilfully concealed” be removed from the legislation was put to a vote and carried 18 to 16.\textsuperscript{61} However a few weeks later Leslie Mutch (Winnipeg South) moved that the words “wilfully and deliberately concealed” be added, with the obvious intent of ensuring that those who had intentionally concealed deilities be penalized while those who had not been aware of their condition remained protected.\textsuperscript{62} Whether a compromise or not, Green continued to feel that veterans were treated as guilty until proven innocent and continued to lobby, albeit with limited vigour and regularity, for a fuller reversal of this principle.\textsuperscript{63}

An aspect of Veterans Affairs that received more stubborn attention from Green was Merchant Seamen; indeed an article by Don Mason declared Green their “champion.”\textsuperscript{64} These men had served in the merchant marine sailing ships in convoys during the Second World War. Because they remained civilians, they were only apportioned partial benefits.\textsuperscript{65} Noting the high casualty rates among this force, Green lobbied throughout the 1940s and 1950s for Merchant Mariners to receive fuller benefits under the Veterans Charter. Several particular Acts received continued attention. Perhaps Green’s most frequent request was that these men be fully eligible

\textsuperscript{60} Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, Canada, Special Committee on Veterans Affairs: No. 18, 17 May 1946, 538-539.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid: No. 9, 16 April 1956, 299-310; No. 17, 16 May 1946, 498-517; No. 18, 17 May 1946, 528-542; No. 19, 21 May 1946, 248-259.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid: No. 29, 7 June 1946, 849-856.
\textsuperscript{63} Canada, House of Commons Debates, 8 March 1948, 1966; 11 July 1956, 5868.
\textsuperscript{64} Don Mason, “Law ‘Second’ With Green”, publication unknown (likely the Vancouver Daily Province), 17 November 1949, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-G-1 File 1.
\textsuperscript{65} A summary of legislation concerning this group can be found in: Woods, Rehabilitation (A Combined Operation), 228-243, 247.
for vocational training under the Veteran’s Rehabilitation Act.\(^{66}\) Green frequently complained that Canada’s merchant marine was shrinking and this left mariners without work.\(^{67}\) Similarly, he lobbied that these men be eligible for pensions on the same grounds as Veterans. Merchant Mariners were not under the “Insurance Principle” that underlay all legislation in the Veteran’s Charter, which briefly put, ensured coverage for all veterans for any debility incurred while serving, regardless of whether it was received in combat or not. As such, the dependents of a mariner who died after falling overboard from a ship in London during a blackout could not collect his pension. Green repeatedly asked that pensions be more readily accessible to these men and their families.\(^{68}\) To him, these individuals deserved better.

Green respected his comrades in arms, past and present, and though this may not be surprising, it is worth noting in light of his later opposition to the Department of Defence. In the 1940s Green continued to believe that Canadians needed to serve in war and that the state held an obligation to care for them as well as their loved ones after their service was complete. By drawing on his own military experience to inform his views about veterans’ policy he persevered on numerous occasion for particular interests that he felt had been overlooked.

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\(^{66}\) The Veterans Rehabilitation Act was designed to equip veterans for the workplace. In part, it allowed veterans to chose between state sponsored education (such as university or vocational training), land settlement (under the Veteran’s Land Act), or a re-establishment credit (money often used finance the purchase of a home or start a business). Barrow, *A Post-War Era*, 20. For Green requesting these benefits for merchant seamen see: Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 8 August 1946, 4474; 8 March 1948, 1963-1964; 16 April 1948, 3067; 7 October 1949, 629; 11 May 1950, 2418-2419; 3 March 1954, 2641.


The end of the war naturally also changed Canadian politics and diplomacy. Given Green’s later “obsession” with disarmament while SSEA, it is interesting to note that his focus on atomic energy and weaponry developed long before 1959. 69 Erika Simpson has written that:

Exposure to information about the dangers of limited nuclear war and the effects of nuclear and conventional weapons of mass destruction impelled many Critics to oppose the buildup of both sides’ defence systems. Such exposure included belated reports about the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientific studies about the global effects of ‘nuclear winter,’ and revelations about the inadequacy of civilian defence in case of a nuclear, chemical, or biological war. Critics found information surfacing about the effects of a nuclear explosion difficult to ignore... The opposition of Howard Green and Norman Robertson to nuclear weapons was partly based on their exposure in the late 1950s to the disturbing facts about the dangers of nuclear war. As Basil Robinson explains, both Green and Robertson were exposed to the anti-nuclear arguments propounded in the mid-fifties by the peace movement, first in the United Kingdom and later in Canada. 70

Simpson’s footnotes only concern Robertson and, while Green’s ultimate decision to advocate disarmament did stem from studies from the late 1950s concerning fallout (see chapter 3), he acquired exceptional knowledge about atomic weaponry more than a decade earlier. Surprisingly, this early knowledge did not make him a peacemonger.

Throughout the war the only Canadians aware of the American Manhattan project to develop a nuclear devise were C.J. Mackenzie (until 1944 Acting) President of the National Research Council, who served as the chief bureaucrat of Canada’s early atomic development; C.D. Howe; and the Prime Minister. It was only with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 that the rest of Canada, and the world, were alerted to a new era in

70 Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, 206-207.
weaponry. After the war’s conclusion, Howe quickly announced that Canada would not develop the atomic bomb, but would continue work to harness the atom for peaceful purposes.

Although futile, international events moved at a rapid pace. Nuclear weapons were a major concern at the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in 1946. These discussions created the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) to consider the question of nuclear disarmament. It was composed of all members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Canada. In this early example of “functionalism,” Canada’s expertise in nuclear technology, as a leading supplier of uranium, and having built the first operational reactor outside of the United States, made it an important atomic player. It was thus the only power to be guaranteed a seat regardless of whether it currently served on the UNSC, and Canada’s representative, General A.G.L. McNaughton, often played a prominent role in the negotiations. However, these talks quickly stalled despite McNaughton’s conciliatory initiatives. Though it was not entirely appreciated at the time, the difference was partly due to a fundamental conflict in interests. The United States, then enjoyed an atomic monopoly and was extremely reluctant to surrender their atomic warheads to international control unless they could be reasonably sure that no other power (particularly the USSR) was developing its own nuclear program. Thus the Western Allies focused on what came to be known as “control” measures to police any atomic disarmament agreement. Such measures would include regular inspections of all potential nuclear powers. The USSR on the other hand, possessed a crash atomic program and viewed the Western proposals as little more than “legalized espionage.”

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therefore asked for nothing short of the immediate destruction of all nuclear weapons. Because the USSR maintained a vast army, the destruction of the American nuclear monopoly would strengthen its position against Western Europe. This weaponry difference continued and therefore perpetuated the West’s calls for control and the USSR’s desire for disarmament. The degree to which Green understood this dichotomy is difficult to determine, but he was at least aware of these early negotiations. However his interest in nuclear technology was limited to its production and development rather than disarmament.

In 1946 Green began what became a crusade for parliamentary education in atomic energy technology. When C.D. Howe (then Minister of Reconstruction and Supply) proposed legislation to create the Atomic Energy Control Board, Green asked what role Parliament would have in atomic research and vaguely suggested the creation of a parliamentary committee. Upon second reading a week later, Green provided a more elaborate supporting argument and request. His speech posed many thought-provoking questions ranging from international agreements to patents, crown companies, and the creation of a “watchdog” committee. Green realized that the body, if created, would not wield supreme authority due to necessary secrecy as well as its limited expertise, but he felt the body’s creation would educate legislators and result in more informed policy formulation. This pertained to both military and civilian applications of atomic energy. In the United States three committees monitored the atomic industry and Green saw no reason why at least one body could not be created in Canada. His request received support from many and all agreed that his points were worthy of further consideration. Howe, however, refused to relent and the bill passed without a committee being formed.74

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74 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 3 June 1946, 2121; 11 June 1946, 2370-2404.
Early in the 1947 Green continued his push for the creation of a special committee, which Howe considered ill-advised due to the “very sensitive” nature of atomic research. However he promised to discuss the matter with the government and reply late in the session.75 During the session Green, as a member of the Standing Committee on External Affairs, attended a meeting where General McNaughton was questioned about Canada’s role in the UNAEC and the nature of atomic warfare. McNaughton described in minute detail how the destruction of atomic weapons derived from the initial blast and subsequent suction wave. He then described the heat created by the weapon that would reach approximately “5,000,000 degrees centigrade… it destroys their skin, it destroys their eyes.” Lastly he described the subsequent gamma ray radiation that would penetrate “a nine or ten foot concrete wall and still knock a man out.”76 These comments naturally spawned questions regarding decontamination. McNaughton’s answer was mixed: he admitted that decontamination was possible but cautioned his audience against assumptions of an easy or complete fix.77 The general’s comments regarding further advancements in weapons technology were grim:

…the actual efficiency of the explosion of the [atomic] bombs that were exploded at Nagasaki was only a fraction of 1 per cent of the total energy of mass in the bombs, and it would be highly unlikely if, with further engineering developments, its efficiency were not multiplied several fold.78

An even more earnest response was evoked when Thomas Kidd (Kingston) asked:

Q[uestion] - …if an enemy, whoever it might be, entered into chemical and bacteriological warfare, are we going to be in a position to counteract that and meet them on the same ground? - A[nswer]. I am going to ask not to answer that if I may.


75 Ibid, 4 February 1947, 81.
76 Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs: No.9, 5 June 1947, 245-246.
77 Ibid, 233, 261.
78 Ibid, 261-262.
(Off the record)\textsuperscript{79}

The lengthy and sombre meeting surely impressed upon Green the stakes involved in any future conflict. He did not ask a single question during the meeting. Whether Green had prepared questions cannot be known, but what is certain is that he was content to sit and absorb the disturbing insights of Canada’s disarmament negotiator.

The meeting also solidified Green’s conviction that parliament needed to be better informed about atomic technology. By July Green grew impatient and inferred that Atomic Energy Canada was operating without any parliamentary control. Again he demanded the creation of a watchdog committee. Howe continued to play for time, asking that “the matter be allowed to stand… for another year, and that, at the next session I shall be glad to review the” the government’s position on the creation of a committee.\textsuperscript{80} Green relented, though he again found supporters during the debate.

Green continued to bide his time until June 1948 when he pushed yet again for the creation of a special committee. On this occasion Howe downplayed the importance of Canada’s atomic energy program, insisting that because of its purely peaceful focus there were “no great decisions to make.” Recognizing that the parliamentary sessions was in its closing days, Green acknowledged that nothing could be done immediately, but again asked that consideration be given to the creation of such a committee in the next parliament.\textsuperscript{81} When Green again recommended a watchdog committee on atomic energy in 1949, Howe interjected that “the government would have no objection to the creation of such a committee.”\textsuperscript{82} Prolonged discussions regarding the committee’s size and composition ensued and as Howe “is quite fussy

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, 248.
\textsuperscript{80} Canada, \textit{House of Commons Debates}, 12 July 1947, 5507-5508, 245-246.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, 19 June 1948, 5528-5531.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, 1 February 1949, 143-144.
about who goes on.” In October 1949 the Special Committee on the Operations of the Atomic Energy Control Board was finally created and Green took the opportunity to make what might be termed a “victory speech” wherein he recalled his crusade and the major reasons for the creation of the committee, including the recent detonation of an atomic device by the USSR. Though he was clearly aware of the military potential of the weapons, Green’s primary justification throughout his crusade focused on parliamentary oversight rather than the possibility of war and international diplomacy.

The committee met in early November and over the following month received a lengthy and remarkably frank briefing from C.J. Mackenzie (President of the National Research Council) whom Green trusted as a former fellow lieutenant in the 54th battalion. Though he warned the committee that the majority of what he shared could not be published, he would answer any questions to the fullest extent of his ability. The brief included a detailed history of the development of Canada’s uranium and atomic industries. The most striking feature of this brief and the question it spawned is just how little Canada’s parliamentarians knew about atomic energy as their questions were often thoughtful, though rudimentary. What was heavy water? What were the differences between Canada’s atomic program and the United Kingdom’s? How did the federal government manage uranium prospecting? In every case Mackenzie provided patient answers in layman’s terms wherever possible, repeating himself when necessary. Even with this care, several commented that there was simply too much knowledge to absorb.

83 Howard to Mum, 2 April 1949, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 2, 4.
84 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 31 October 1949, 1275-1277.
85 Whenever referring to Mackenzie in the meetings of 1949 and 1953 Green’s tone was always particularly trusting and amicable. Though the extent of their relations during the war remain a mystery, their former affiliation was definitely important to Green. RG150 Acc 1992-93 Vol 6963 File Mackenzie, Chalmers, Jack.
86 Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, Canada, Special Committee on the Operations of the Atomic Energy Control Board, No. 1, 4 November 1949; 8 November 1949; No. 2, 10 November 1949.
The committee then ventured to Chalk River (the centre of Canada’s atomic research) for a two-day visit on November 16 and 17. The meeting was “off the record” and is rarely mentioned in the minutes of subsequent meetings. However, like Mackenzie, Chalk River’s employees were instructed to answer all the questions posed by MPs. Contrary to Green’s modesty and admiration for the employees of Chalk River (he claimed to have been “more confused than ever” by the trip), the trip informed his subsequent concerns and his questions became more policy based. He asked about the degree to which isotopes were being employed in industry and what policies were in place to facilitate their wider use. Was Canada’s atomic program more focused on development or pure research? Were American secrecy laws disadvantaging Canada’s atomic industry or limiting Western advances relative to that of the Soviet Union? The latter question again prompted off the record discussion. Though Green generally focused on civilian aspects of atomic energy, others asked about military aspects. For instance: could radiation fallout be removed from warships? Again Green demonstrated no unusual concern about atomic warfare and in fact was more interested in its civil applications.

Green’s concern for atomic technology continued throughout the remainder of his time in Opposition. He continued to press for another Special Committee on Atomic Energy. Even after suggesting that the committee only examine civilian matters to prevent security infringements, C.D. Howe continued to resist. However in 1953 the committee was established and focused on civilian concerns. Green spoke on a variety of subjects and again expressed concern about the limits on the exchange of information between Canada and the United States due to the

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87 Ibid, 9-10.
90 Ibid; 69.
91 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 31 March 1952, 967-969.
McMahon Act and how it could compromise Canada’s competitive edge in the international civilian market (rather than proliferation). In the end even this committee failed to satisfy Green’s appetite for knowledge on atomic advancements. Over the proceeding years he repeated asked for the House to create a Standing Committee to investigate atomic developments. As might be expected these requests were not taken seriously as a Standing Committee would have been a remarkable step and given the limited size of Canada’s program. Nevertheless, Green’s concern regarding atomic energy is worth nothing.

Green’s education in atomic technology Green was unparalleled for non-scientists in Canada. Yet his attitudes regarding war were not refashioned by his awareness of the fundamental change in weaponry taking place among the militaries of the great powers. While he might have realized that the limited number of warheads available meant that humanity would survive a nuclear war for the time being this does not explain his silence in the mid and late 1950s when the Soviets possessed many more warheads. Regardless, despite this knowledge his views on the viability and even survivability of war remained intact.

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Green was also active throughout this period in the field of External Affairs. Many writers discussing Green’s appointment as SSEA have described him as naïve. For instance, Peter Newman describes Green as having possessed “little interest in world affairs” and many

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93 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 2 June 1953, 5409; 23 January 1956, 398-399.
authors cite Green’s limited travelling from 1919 to 1959 as evidence of this disinterest.\textsuperscript{94} In reality, this fact was not indicative of disinterest in external affairs and was instead the result of several causes. In 1945 he had hoped to go to San Francisco for the opening sessions of the United Nations, but he knew more prominent members of the party would “elbow” him out. In the same letter he expressed his annoyance at not going on a trip “overseas” with party leader John Bracken: “As you know I have taken the head in external affairs and it will be awkward for them to be passive if more than one Conservative is to go.”\textsuperscript{95} On another occasion he was pressured by his party to be a delegate to the Empire Parliamentary Association convening in Bermuda but refused because he did not think the meeting would discuss anything substantial. Furthermore he did not want to miss an upcoming debate in the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{96} Lastly, maintaining a home in Vancouver and an apartment in Ottawa required him to continue to work as a lawyer when Parliament was not in session.\textsuperscript{97} Thus Green’s extremely limited travels should not be equated with disinterest in international affairs.

A few authors cite Green’s nine-year membership on the Standing Committee on External Affairs to challenge this alleged ignorance, but it is doubtful that they examined the committee’s minutes.\textsuperscript{98} Green initially failed to attend any of the meetings since other commitments (particularly the Special Committee on Veterans Affairs) demanded most of his attention. He was not able to attend a meeting of the Standing Committee on External Affairs until June 1947, over one-and-a-half years after his appointment to the committee and it is likely


\textsuperscript{95} Howard to Folks, March 1945, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-4 File 9, 3.

\textsuperscript{96} Howard to Folks, 11 July 1943, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-4 File 7, 4-5.


that Green made time for this particular meeting because General McNaughton was being questioned about Canada’s role on the UNAEC (see above). Green had been aware of schedule conflict from the outset but still agreed to serve. That Green remained on the committee despite this continuing schedule conflict demonstrated a personal as well as party interest in keeping him as informed as possible. At the very least, membership on the committee afforded access to its minutes and thereby helped him to remain informed on the subject. However, several key aspects of his foreign policy remained underdeveloped and even naïve.

Green’s conception of Canada’s place in the international arena has been the subject of ridicule and though the following does not directly pertain to the development of his beliefs about war, it provides the background for Green’s famous comments during the Suez crisis and more relevantly provides critical insights into the development of the diplomatic strategies that he would subsequently deploy when fighting for disarmament.

Green often referred to Canada as a “world power.” It is important not to dismiss this statement as mere rhetoric (as some have done) since Green was never foolish enough to expect Canada to become a superpower. Borrowing the phrase from a speech made by Mackenzie King on Canada Day in 1943, Green provided his own definition:

[First,] a foreign policy is required that will give the Canadian people a vision of their nation taking a stand on world questions as they arise, and not simply waiting outside the door for some of the larger nations to hand out a decision. Canada herself must take a stand on world questions as they arise. Secondly, a vision of Canada boldly acting for the sort of world that Canadians believe in as individuals. Thirdly, Canada must be willing to assume her fair share of

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100 Howard to Marion, 20 October 1945, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-1 File 5, 6.
102 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1 July 1943, 4226.
responsibilities, of whatever burdens there may be entailed in order that a better world may be developed after this war.\textsuperscript{103}

Few would disagree with a policy advocating that Canada pursue its own interests towards a more peaceful. However Green was not yet finished speaking.

Green then endeavoured to expand on this definition and buried himself in contradiction. First he suggested that Canada “develop within the British commonwealth [sic]” and that “the British family of nations should speak with one voice in foreign affairs.” He suggested this because he recognized that Canada’s influence would be limited if it remained outside a multilateral framework and therefore hoped that Canada could at least partially wield a more weighty Commonwealth voice.\textsuperscript{104} As Lord Halifax subsequently discovered (as the British wartime Ambassador to Washington), suggestions implying a unified Commonwealth foreign policy were generally unpopular in Canada.\textsuperscript{105} However Green’s conception of Canada’s place in the world was not merely based in anglophile sympathies. He also prescribed working with the United States and went so far as to advocate Canadian membership in the Pan-American Union “it being understood of course that we are not to be taken thereby as weakening our connection with the British commonwealth [sic] of nations.”\textsuperscript{106} He also hoped to join a world organization (the UN was not yet been fully conceived). On this occasion Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence) took Green to task. He explained that the Commonwealth included regions across the globe with a wide variety of different, and possibly conflicting interests. While he advocated consultation and hoped that agreement could be reached, expecting unanimity was absurd. He went on to point out that a single Commonwealth foreign

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, 9 July 1943, 4563-4564.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, 1943, 4564.
\textsuperscript{106} Canada, House of Commons Debates, 9 July 1943, 4565.
policy would also preclude Canada’s membership in other organizations such as the Pan-American Union as their interests were bound to eventually conflict.\(^\text{107}\)

This last criticism is important in that it highlights the conflict in Green’s foreign policy as he then conceived it. His ideas were not entirely thought out, and were at times contradictory. If his speech and defence is read as a whole rather than as the sum of its parts (as Claxton did), however, it is clear that Green wanted Canada to be an independent actor, working within international organizations whose policies coincided with Canada’s. Undoubtedly Green was overzealous about the Commonwealth and would have been disappointed had he pursued the policy he suggested, but he would not let it constrain Canadian foreign policy. Independence of action was Green’s underlying argument. He felt able to advocate such a policy because he continued to believe that the interests of Canada and Britain (and indeed the Commonwealth itself) were intertwined. Green did discover the falsity of this belief when he became SSEA, but at that time he remained divided: intellectually, like most Canadians, Green was a multilateralist; emotionally he remained an anglophile.

The threat of communism similarly divided Green’s thoughts. One of Green’s ongoing concerns was the spread of communism around the Pacific where he repeatedly asked whether Canada was interested in a “Pacific Pact” similar to the then pending NATO treaty, or at least a stronger defence relationship with New Zealand and Australia.

There are communist armies swarming over China; a greatly increased communist vote in Japan; communist uprisings in Malaya and in Burma, and a communist problem in India. In fact in that part of the world it looks as though the soviet [sic] is winning by default... It may be that while we are bolting the front door by the North Atlantic treaty we are leaving the back door open by doing nothing in the Pacific.\(^\text{108}\)


\(^{108}\) Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 7 April 1949, 2412; See also: 1 February 1949, 146.
Collective security seemed a safe response. In March 1950, after the communist takeover in China and the American announcement to develop the hydrogen bomb, he asked that Canada “take the lead in bringing the nations of the Pacific together” against the emerging threat of guided missiles in submarines and remarked that “just as surely as night follows day… in the event of a third world war Canada will be in the position of Belgium in the first one.”\textsuperscript{109} When Lester Pearson doubted that conditions in the Pacific required the same concern as in the Atlantic, Green countered: “But they may be wrong.”\textsuperscript{110} Green continued to advocate increased Canadian participation in the Pacific well into the 1950s.\textsuperscript{111} Far from the patient negotiator he would become a decade later, he continued to believe that Communism was something to be contained and even combated rather than a force with which to negotiate in good faith.\textsuperscript{112} These comments were not the result of fear mongering; in his letters he remained wary of excessive opposition to communism.\textsuperscript{113} Green’s comments were inspired by fear, not politics, and he believed his position was balanced.

War on the Korean peninsula in late June 1950 confirmed Green’s fears. His immediate concerns were alarmist, emotional, and he again pushed for Canadian involvement in the war. He asked in the House if events in Korea had changed the government’s position on a “Pacific defence council”? Was Canada in a position to defend itself against airborne attacks mounted from the air or sea?\textsuperscript{114} Lastly, as Denis Stairs points out, Green “was particularly prominent” in

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid, 2 March 1950, 400-401; 9 June 1950, 3416-1418.
\textsuperscript{110} Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs: No. 4, 4 May 1950, 102.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, 30 March 1954, 3476; 1 April 1955, 2614
\textsuperscript{113} Howard to Folks, 6 June 1947, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608F-1 File 4, 2; Howard to Son, 25 April 1948, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-2 File 5, 6.
\textsuperscript{114} Canada, \textit{House of Commons Debates}, 26 June 1950, 4217-4219
pushing for Canada’s forces to be included in a Commonwealth Division. He legitimized this desire based on his First World War experience when Canadian forces so often fought beside British, Australian, New Zealand and other (now) Commonwealth forces. When Pearson rejected this appeal by emphasizing Canada’s commitment to United Nations rather than Commonwealth units, Green dismissed the argument as “pussyfooting.” Though the Canadian Brigade would later be deployed in a Commonwealth Division, this was for reasons of supply and equipment rather than due to any emotional or historic bond. Green was keenly interested in events but lacked insight regarding their complexities.

Green’s alarm escalated. Struck by China’s entry into the war in late 1950, he became convinced that the spread of communism had to be stopped at all costs: “There must be less emphasis put on trying to keep from offending the communists and far more put on victory.” Claiming that Canada “has not done her share to date” he demanded that Canada send all three battalions of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade to Korea. The reputation of the United Nations and thus possibly its very existence relied on the United Nations forces achieving all of its goals, and Green believed Canada was duty bound to assist these ends. Green went on to propose actions that would have likely escalated the conflict such as blockading China as well as bombing airbases on its territory near the Korean border. He even advocated the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea (which might have also sparked a wider conflict).

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119 Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 7 February 1951, 161-164; 7 May 1951, 2782; The PPCLI had been deployed but the other two newly created battalions were still training at Fort Lewis and indeed the Canadian government continued to hope that they would not have to be deployed in Korea. Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint*, 194-196
Claxton commented that Green’s suggestions “would increase the risks of a general war, without increasing the opportunity for bringing about a successful termination of hostilities in Korea upon terms which would be acceptable to those nations” and went on to doubt that Green’s party backed him. 121 Indeed it seems that Green was muzzled after this speech: aside from a brief jab asking whether Canadian policy “means asking Canadian troops in Korea with hand to fight in Korea with one hand tied behind their backs,” he made no further comments in the House of Commons. 122 Howard Green was still no peacemonger. As in the Second World War he had no love for war, but he nevertheless continued to encourage rather than discourage Canadian military involvement and expressed frustration when he believed Canada was shirking its responsibilities.

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Despite his knowledge regarding nuclear arms, there is no record of Green discussing other nuclear developments in any depth. For instance, in 1954, NATO governments admitted that it was impossible to achieve parity with the Soviet Union’s conventional forces and therefore agreed in principle to develop and deploy tactical nuclear weapons as a “force equalizer.” Green never commented on this decision, either positively or negatively, while in Opposition. Though he did periodically mention other weapons developments such as the American decision to produce the Hydrogen bomb and its subsequent testing, these remarks were superficial. Moreover, Green continued to believe that nuclear war was survivable. In one case he advised that Canada disperse its industry so that it could continue to fight after suffering a

121 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 7 May 1951, 2800.
122 Ibid, 14 May 1951, 3012.
nuclear strike.123 Aside from commonplace mention of disarmament negotiations, Green did not discuss the subject in the House of Commons.124 Again awareness did not translate to opposition. Like his fellow Canadians, Green seems to have been more concerned about everyday life.125

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Lest readers gain the impression that Green was a warmonger, Green’s involvement in the creation and running of the Department of Defence Production demonstrates that he was not a fearmonger; he believed that preparation for conflict had to reflect external threats. With the Korean War in full swing and international tensions on the rise, the Canadian government embarked on a massive rearmament program. Defence expenditures quickly became the largest portion of federal spending and the Canadian government sought a department to coordinate and supervise defence production.126 A mandate of this size required “wide powers” and the Progressive Conservative Party did not oppose the department’s creation. Speaking for the party, however, Howard Green opposed the extent of these powers.127 In the initial debate Green sought to limit the department’s powers to what he believed world tensions warranted:

…this bill interferes drastically with the rights of the individual Canadian, and also overrides parliament to a degree which we believe unnecessary and unwise at this time – in fact, to a degree which is justifiable only when the nation is in the

123 Ibid, 23 February 1951, 626-627.
125 Hunter, “‘Is It Even Worthwhile Doing the Dishes?’”.
midst of a war; and even under those conditions the wisdom of using some of those powers is very questionable.\textsuperscript{128} 

He went to describe the Act as a “war bill” and pointed out that: “the country is not in a third world war.”\textsuperscript{129} The legislation empowered the government to force an individual to accept a contract, and to take over the business if cooperation was not forthcoming. The bill’s failure to ask the department to file an annual report was also a cause for concern. Green asked on behalf of his party that these and a few other powers be removed from the bill. His efforts achieved little.\textsuperscript{130}

When the government sought to make the Department of Defence Production a permanent entity, Green again agreed that the Department was necessary, but continued to object to its encompassing powers. Though he recognized that the invention of Hydrogen bombs, supersonic planes and guided missiles were changing the nature of any future war, he continued to doubt that the international situation justified such powers.\textsuperscript{131} Then, as Green so aptly described a previous encounter with C.D. Howe (the department’s Minister) in the Commons: “the fur began to fly.”\textsuperscript{132} He accused Howe of coveting his power; Howe accused Green of being “the king of exaggeration.”\textsuperscript{133} According to Robert Bothwell: “It became a popular indoor sport to listen to Green’s nasal tones sapping Howe’s patience and undermining his defences.”\textsuperscript{134} In the end Howe got his department and Green ironically became Acting Minister of Defence Production in 1957.

Howard Green only pushed for increased military readiness or participation when he considered it justified; he was not a warmonger who used every excuse to empower the military.

\textsuperscript{128} Canada, \textit{House of Commons Debates}, 2 March 1951, 839. 
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid, 840-842; 8 March 1951, 1048-1051. 
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid, 4 July 1955, 5658. 
\textsuperscript{132} Howard to Marion, 14 March 1952, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-E-4 File 3, 3. 
\textsuperscript{133} Canada, \textit{House of Commons Debates}, 8 June 1955, 4550, 4552; 4 July 1955, 5957. 
\textsuperscript{134} Bothwell and Kilbourn, \textit{C.D. Howe}, 239.
Moreover, it is worth noting that by the mid-1950s he believed that the international situation was under control and therefore fought against expanding the government’s powers. This moderation was not the result of fearing war, but rather the result of an increased faith in deterrence. Green was not yet exhibiting the traits of Erika Simpson’s Critics.

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The Suez crisis of 1956 provided Green with what became the ultimate clash of his two sets of values regarding the Commonwealth. Briefly, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956 after the United States refused to guarantee a loan from the World Bank to finance Egypt’s Aswan Damn project. Britain and France approached Israel which promised to attack Egypt and jeopardize safe passage in the canal. Britain and France would then issue an ultimatum asking both sides to cease operations and, when Egypt failed to heed this warning, the two countries would seize the canal, ostensibly as a disinterested party. Most countries, including Canada and the United States, were not informed of this machination, and when both the US and USSR objected to the actions of Britain and France, fears abounded that the conflict would spread. Canada’s minister for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, intervened during an Emergency Session of the UNGA and secured the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that eventually divided the forces of Egypt and Israel and facilitated the peaceful withdrawal of Britain and France while minimizing damage to their prestige.135

During the crisis Green provided outspoken support for Great Britain, France and Israel and condemned many of Canada’s actions. Indeed, John English describes Green as “the most vociferous Conservative critic.”136 At the height of the debate Green famously proclaimed that the Liberal government’s actions:

made this month of November, 1956, the most disgraceful period for Canada in the history of this nation… it is high time that Canada had leadership more in line with the forthrightness and the courage of the Canadian people. It is high time Canada had a government which will not knife Canada’s best friends [the UK and France] in the back.137

This angry denunciation marked the final blow in a fiery speech that he began the previous day. At first glance these comments, as well as his subsequent remarks, appear to criticize almost every action taken by the government at the UNGA. However, in subsequent interviews, Green commented that his angst was not raised by Pearson’s actions so much as the way they were carried out, and most importantly the way they had been presented by the Prime Minister on November 26 in the House of Commons. Green had long thought that prime minister St. Laurent harboured “bitterness against anything British.”138 St. Laurent’s defensive speech attempted to defuse many of the allegations against his government by the Acting Leader of the Conservative Party Earle Rowe (Dufferin-Simcoe). Most infamously, after describing how France and the UK had abused their vetoes in the Security Council by using them to paralyze the body while continuing their plans, the Prime Minister commented that “the era when the supermen of

136 English, The Worldly Years, 142.
137 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 27 November 1956, 51.
138 Howard to Mother, 9 March 1947, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 608-F-2 File 3, 3; In 1956 Green claimed that the actions of Britain and France were justified, though he implicitly admitted that they were in bad taste. Canada, House of Commons Debates, 26 November 1956, 40-42; 27 November 1956, 49-50; For Green’s repeated comments on St. Laurent’s conduct see: Howard C. Green, interviewed by Howard Lentner, 16 August 1974, LAC, R11232, Vol 2, File Green, Howard, 6; Howard Green, interviewed by Peter Stursberg, “His Memories of Lester Pearson as Prime Minister and Diplomat”, 24 March 1978, LAC, MG31 D-78 Vol 35 File 29, 11; Green interviewed by Stursberg, “2nd interview”, 23 May 1979, LAC MG31 D-78 Vol 34 File 14, 55; Howard Green, interviewed by J.L. Granatstein, 1 April 1969, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-D-1 file 2, 8.
Europe could govern the whole world has and is coming pretty close to an end.” 139 St. Laurent’s anger was the result of Britain’s choice to lie to Canada about its conduct. 140 However Green did not know this and perceived St. Laurent’s comments as anti-British and unjustified.

Thus, a large portion of Green’s speech concerned St. Laurent’s comments. “The feature of the speech the Prime Minister delivered today, Mr. Speaker, was the anger, almost the hatred he showed in his remarks,” Green observed. 141 He frequently referred to the Prime Minister’s “supermen” comment and other “slurring remarks.” 142 When St. Laurent interrupted Green to argue with some of these points Green rebuked him: “The Prime Minister once again is attempting to prevent free discussion in the house.” 143 On the whole Green’s speech is best described as a rant, providing more rhetoric than reason. For instance, though he was careful to never say so, Green implied that Canada should have voted against the American sponsored Resolution 997 that requested a ceasefire because its intentionally neutral language did not judge either side when asking that hostilities cease. In Green’s view, this neutrality devalued Britain’s actions and was therefore intolerable even though the resolution was designed to create peace. Moreover, if Canada had voted as Green had wished, it would have jeopardized Canada’s subsequent intervention. 144 Green’s famous comments were premeditated, he was not speaking off the cuff; his illogical message remained the result of emotions rather than his intellect. 145

Even in this thick rhetoric, other themes existed. Though submerged beneath a thick coat of anglophile rhetoric Green’s reasoning was more complex (albeit barely) than that of “a

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141 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 26 November 1956, 41.
142 Ibid, 41; 27 November 1956, 49, 51.
143 Ibid, 27 November 1956, 50.
144 Canada abstained during this vote to preserve its appeal to all sides, including the non-aligned. John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the search for world order 1943-1957 Volume 2, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 358-359; Canada, House of Commons Debates, 26 November 1956, 41.
145 For Green’s notes from the speech see LAC MG32 B-13 Vol 7 File 8.
colonial chore boy running around shouting, ‘Ready, aye, ready’” as Pearson alleged. First, Green complained repeatedly that Canada had followed the United States at the expense of Britain. He believed that the Americans had caused the crisis by withdrawing their funding from the Aswan dam project in an attempt “to get the United Kingdom and France out of the Middle East” and that by not opposing the United States “Canada’s policy seems to be the same.” As he perceived Canada’s interests to be similar to Britain’s, he considered this choice unreasonable. Far from an independent actor, Canada had become a “chore boy” of the United States.

Second, Green believed Nasser was susceptible to communist influences and that Canada’s efforts to prevent the retaking of the canal were unwise. Again, in Green’s mind, Canada should have treated the intervention of France and Great Britain more sympathetically because it was in Canada’s interest to do so. More generally, as political commentator Maxwell Cohen observed, “the plain truth is that Mr. Green probably had no real opportunities in a busy Parliamentary life to formulate a philosophy of Canada in the world other than the working, inarticulate assumptions shared by many within his party and outside.”

On the whole, it is fortunate that Lester Pearson rather than Howard Green was SSEA in 1956. It is doubtful that Canadian support of Britain during the Suez crisis would have improved Britain’s position; indeed, it is likely that Britain would have fared worse as few other statesmen could have filled Pearson’s shoes. To a considerable extent Green was blinded by an emotional attachment to Britain. However his rage was provoked to a considerable extent by the rhetoric of the Prime Minister rather than by the actions of Lester Pearson. Some claim that Green and

149 Maxwell Cohen, “Howard Green; And the Direction of Canadian Foreign Policy”, *Saturday Night*, 15 August 1959, 13.
others like him should have seen through the British-French-Israeli plot. Others, such as Bruce Hutchinson, are more sympathetic: though Green “misunderstood” the crisis he was “ignorant of the contrary facts” that might have led to him to be more reserved. Patricia McMahon ventures so far as to claim that: “more Canadians rejected the government’s position than supported it.” Indeed Green received 64% of the vote in his riding in 1957 (he received 44% in 1953) and, though it is difficult to determine how much of the vote to attribute to his performance in the Suez debates, the Pipeline debates, Diefenbaker’s campaigning, or the general unpopularity of the Liberals, Green believed his performance in the Suez debates contributed to his remarkable electoral success.

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On the eve of the fall of St. Laurent’s Liberals in 1957, Howard Green was still far from his disarmament future. Over the previous two decades he had risen to become a leading Tory in the House of Commons, famous for his wit and love of debate. Throughout the Second World War he fought for a total war effort. Similarly in the Korean War, Green issued requests so radical that his own party seems to have taken the rare measure of muzzling him. In the Suez debates Green fought with equal passion for Canada’s mother countries, though in this case his stance was in part provoked by Liberals expressing frustration about their contemporaries across the Atlantic. On the other hand, he attended an increasing number of meetings of the Standing

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150 For example see: English, The Worldly Years, 133.
Committee on External Affairs and acquired knowledge on the varied aspects of external affairs. Throughout this period he had also pushed for and received more information about atomic energy. In short, well before June 1959 all of the pieces required to make Green a disarmament advocate were in place, but he consistently acted otherwise. Both during the Korean War and after the Suez crisis Green continued to ask that Canada take actions more provocative than its Liberal leaders preferred. It was not that Green itched for war; on the contrary he dreaded war like any public leader should; rather he continued to view it as a necessary part of foreign policy.
Chapter 3: UN Resolutions

In election June 1957, the Progressive Conservative party led by John Diefenbaker won a minority government. Howard Green was named Minister of Public Works. He excelled in this role for two years, and, except for being too strict about ending patronage within the department, he was widely praised for his service.¹ On numerous occasions he served as Acting Prime Minister in Diefenbaker’s absence. In March 1959, the death of Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith created a new job opening. After careful deliberation, Diefenbaker selected Green as his next SSEA, and was appointed to his new post on June 4, 1959.

The choice shocked many. Green had favourable traits: he was known for his integrity and ability to engage in seemingly endless detailed debates in the House of Commons. However, many political commentators believed he was ill-matched for his new portfolio because he lacked the necessary experience in foreign affairs to succeed at his new post. For example, in a department known at the time for its diplomatic functions and generous alcohol consumption, Green was a teetotaller. Aside from a brief trip to the United States, Green had not been overseas since the First World War. Unlike Louis St. Laurent, Lester Pearson, or Paul Martin, he had not served in any Canadian foreign delegations. Moreover, though his activities in external affairs debates and committees were known, only a few years had passed since Green had blasted Lester Pearson (then SSEA) for not supporting Britain and France during the Suez

¹ Ending patronage was part of Green’s appointment mandate but under his guidance it was nearly impossible for any Conservative to get a contract or job under Public Works. “Paring Down Patronage”, Globe and Mail, 25 July 1957, 6; Diefenbaker. One Canada: The Years of Achievement, 41; H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 98; Newman, Renegade In Power, 253; Lyon, The Policy Question, 113.
Crisis. This exchange continued to dominate his critic’s memories. Even Green admitted that, at 63 years of age, he had much to learn about his new department.

Many believed that Green’s inexperience would render him impressionable. Some feared that Diefenbaker, who had twice held the External Affairs portfolio in 1957 and 1959, appointed his close friend Green so that he could retain tight control of the department. The Liberal *Toronto Daily Star* went so far as to suggest that:

> Mr. Green’s very innocence of foreign affairs is unlikely to dispose him to argue much with his boss. This is a one-man government and you can’t have a strong minister at external affairs if the P.M., who must have a big say anyway, is determined to run all foreign policy himself.

How mistaken they were. Similarly, several academics commented in the course of conversation with this author that Howard Green might have fallen prey to the intellectual prowess of his Under-Secretary Norman Robertson, who had long sympathized with disarmament. This would certainly explain Green’s relatively sudden conversion to disarmament crusader. Indeed, only days before Green’s appointment Robertson forwarded an editorial to Diefenbaker advocating unilateral nuclear disarmament (directly opposing the Western position that required “balanced concessions”) and a focus on conventional arms. – Robertson’s cover letter explained that his views “coincide with those of the author.” In the course of researching this thesis, however, every credible academic source argued against such influence. J.L. Granatstein emphasizes a

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4 Ironically the opposite has also been alleged: the Diefenbaker selected Green because he would not be controlled by “Personailities” in DEA. Hilliker and Barry, *Canada’s Department of External Affairs: Volume 2 Coming of Age*, 148.
5 John Bird, “New External Affairs Minister P.M.’s Charming Stoooge?: Everybody Likes Howard Green But…”, *Toronto Daily Star*, Saturday 6 June 1959, 7. This editorial is situated beside an amusing and unusually large political cartoon of Diefenbaker manipulating a marionette of Howard Green.
6 HBR to PM, 2 June 1959, LAC, MG31 E-83 Vol 8 File 8.; Christopher Hollis, “Strength out of Weakness”, *The Spectator*, 1 May 1959, 609, 611.
7 See for example: Arnold Heeney, *The things that are Caesar’s: Memoirs of a Canadian public servant*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 166.
partnership between Green and Robertson wherein the latter’s role was to “supply Green with arguments.” An internal American brief described the Under-Secretary as “the ‘Grey Eminence’ behind Diefenbaker and Green.” Robertson certainly made Green more effective, but that was his job. Green appreciated Robertson’s empathy, but required little encouragement when pursuing independent policies. Moreover, Green did not always accept his Under-Secretary’s advice and sometimes pushed beyond Robertson’s advice (generally with negative results). Green was not manipulated.

Given his longstanding Protestantism and his propensity to refuse to work on Sundays, some may assume that Green’s disarmament crusade was, at least partially the result of religious conviction. The authors of *Canada Since 1945* state that: “Rereading the arguments twenty years later, one detects the last gasps of the Protestant conscience in an incompletely secularized disguise.” George Pearkes also described Green’s convictions as having an “evangelical” route, although his evidence stems more from Green’s style than his motivation. More generally, religion was often used to buttress Critic arguments and clerics were often avid supporters of disarmament. However membership in the most prominent of these organizations often spanned beyond religious and even ideological lines. Though Green’s stand was frequently moralistic, he almost never linked his disarmament convictions with religion. The only notable exception occurred when Green concluded a speech to a joint meeting of the Empire and Canadian Clubs in 1959:

Add Canada’s good record generally, her growing economic strength and the courage, common sense and God-fearing character of her people and you will agree with me that we can give leadership in the finest sense of the word.\(^\text{13}\)

Again this comment is an exception to Green’s otherwise secular justification for his disarmament initiative. Though the two sets of values were in many cases complimentary, one of Green’s sons continues to contend that humanitarian rather than religious concerns inspired his father’s fight for disarmament.\(^\text{14}\)

A remaining explanation is that Green’s second wife Donna Kerr, as a former “scientist with a lively and informed concern for the human condition,” educated Green about the effects of atomic radiation.\(^\text{15}\) (Green’s first wife passed in 1953 from stomach cancer.\(^\text{16}\)) In 1956 Howard Green married Donna, a long-time friend of the family who had excelled in her work and retired as Assistant Director of the Provincial Public Health Laboratories in Vancouver and a lecturer in Bacteriology across B.C.\(^\text{17}\) While Donna may have provided Green with insights into the hazards of atomic warfare, Green already possessed more than adequate background from his committee work in the House of Commons. Moreover, my research failed to uncover evidence corroborating any assistance from Donna on Howard’s decision-making.

Instead, Green developed his strong beliefs about disarmament independently. In notes summarizing an interview with Green, John Hilliker best summarized Green’s conversion as

“[Green’s] own response to events.”18 The future SSEA did not make the switch to peacemonger until shortly after his appointment. Green himself later commented:

Quite early in the game, it became very apparent to me that the main problem for Canada was the danger of nuclear war. Before that, if you remember, there had been a lot of nuclear tests, and they were big tests, and both the Americans and the Russians were conducting them. Canada happens to be in one of the worst fallout zones of the world… And if there is a nuclear war, Canada probably would be the main battleground. I think that would be the end of Canada. This is where we had to put our stress. So that was what we did.19

Green had been aware of the destructive power of atomic weapons for the previous decade but he was not familiar with Canada’s geographical vulnerability to radioactive fallout. Sometime in June or July 1959, however, Green learned that radiation fallout from atomic tests or nuclear war fell disproportionately in temperate zones, where most Canadians live (in the Northern Hemisphere roughly 30ºN and 60ºN).20

Scientists had previously assumed that radioactive particles would disperse across the entire planet (rather than remaining relatively latitudinally stationary) and thereby diffuse the fallout. During McNaughton’s testimony in 1947 before the Standing Committee on External

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20 For early scientific explanation of this phenomenon see: W.F. Libby, “Radioactive Strontium Fallout”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol 42(6), June 1956, 365-389. Weather occurs in the troposphere, the layer of the atmosphere nearest to the earth’s surface. The radiation from low-yield aboveground detonations throws radioactive debris into this layer and returns to the earth in rain where it then contaminates the food supply. This phenomenon is known as “tropospheric fallout.” Larger yield detonations, as well as detonations from higher altitudes, throw radioactive weapons debris into the stratosphere (the layer above the troposphere) and the resulting wind currents and lack of weather cause it to form a “narrow band girding the globe” composed of isotopes including strontium-90 that eventually mix with the troposphere and again return to the ground in rain. Because the half-life of strontium-90 and other substances is measured in decades rather than days or months, long-term exposure becomes a concern with either type of detonation. Temperate zones tend to be high rainfall regions and this results in their reception of large deposits of fallout from both high and low yield detonations. Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan (ed). The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1977), 442-450.
Affairs, Green had been briefed on this effect and though McNaughton said that these particles could remain in the air “for weeks and they drift with the wind currents for thousands of miles” he added that during their transport “they were so thoroughly dissipated that they were harmless.” Therefore, Green’s considerable knowledge of atomic weaponry did not warn him about this threat, though it did provide him with the ability to understand its potential once the earth’s true fallout patterns were better understood.

Two sources likely created this awareness. First, after his appointment Green read a multitude of memoranda and it is likely that he learned about fallout during this education. Second, Hilliker claims that Green only developed a strong concern for fallout after witnessing its discussion at the 14th session of the UNGA. Regardless, Green concluded that:

No one escapes in any part of the world… The whole world will be suffering, and no part of the commonwealth will be suffering more than Canada, because here we are between the two main contenders… Further, we are in a temperate zone where fall-out is far more serious than it is in other zones of the world. Canada is the nation in the commonwealth which will have the most to lose if there should be a nuclear war.

Green’s updated understanding, combined with his previous knowledge and newfound ability to act on his convictions, led to his conversion to a peacemonger. War no longer seemed survivable. On June 4, 1959, Diefenbaker did not know that he was appointing a man who would interrupt and later attempt to overturn the government’s established trajectory towards acquiring nuclear weapons. Green likely shared in this ignorance.

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21 Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs: No. 9, 5 June 1947, 246.
22 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 8 July 1959, 5708.
23 Hilliker and Barry. Canada’s Department of External Affairs: Volume 2 Coming of Age, 151-152. When discussing Green’s interest in fallout, Hilliker and Barry do not refer to Canada’s temperate zone location, but rather to its position between the two superpowers and the inevitable fallout that Canada would suffer during an atomic conflict.
24 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 14 February 1960, 141.
By June 1959 two important forces were shaping Canada’s atomic policies on the world stage. First the Diefenbaker government was well on its way to acquiring nuclear weapons. Briefly, in 1957, the newly elected prime minister had joined his NATO colleagues in reaffirming the planned deployment of tactical nuclear weapons as “force equalizers.” The government’s acceptance of the North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD) was also an implicit agreement to homogenize Canada’s air defences with their US counterparts by adding nuclear weapons. In September 1958 the Diefenbaker government announced its intention to acquire the BOMARC surface-to-air missile of the defence of North America that it claimed could “be used with either a conventional high explosive warhead or a nuclear warhead.” Five months later, while announcing the termination of the Avro Arrow program, Diefenbaker specified his commitment to nuclear warheads for the BOMARC and other weapons vehicles destined for deployment on both Canadian and European soil:

"The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads... We are confident that we shall be able to reach a formal agreement with the United States on appropriate means to serve the common objective... [Moreover, to prevent the expansion of the nuclear club] we consider that it is expedient that ownership and custody of the nuclear warheads should remain with the United States."

Though no agreement was yet signed, the Diefenbaker government had committed itself to equipping its military with nuclear warheads. Moreover, there was also a long and progressive

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25 George Pearkes later doubted that the Prime Minister understood what he was agreeing to. George Pearkes interviewed by Reginald Roy, 31 March 1967, Interview 60, George R. Pearkes Collection, University of Victoria Special Collections, Vol 5 File 11, 14.
history of the United States deploying nuclear weapons in aircraft over Canadian territory. By 1959, negotiations were underway by the United States Air Force (USAF) to store the MB-1 defensive air-to-air tactical nuclear rockets at American bases on Canadian territory. Patricia McMahon points out that as Acting Minister of Defence Production Green should have been aware of these developments and one numerous occasions failed to mount any opposition. Green later claimed that the repercussions of these decisions were not fully understood by the cabinet at the time, and while this is possible (though scary), the most important note is that Green felt no need to investigate the matter further.

The second force in the international arena was disarmament. With few exceptions, progress during the past decade had been disappointing though the two sides had at least moved from their more diametrical positions and the remaining disagreements were more fully understood. There had been no body for continued negotiations on disarmament since 1957 when the Soviet Union left the Disarmament Sub-Committee meetings in London citing the fact that it was alone against four Western countries. Eventually the great powers created the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC), which was composed of five Western countries (including Canada) and five Soviet countries. Many hoped that this new body would facilitate

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29 For a brief summary of this history see John Clearwater, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Canada*, (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 1999), 49-58.
31 Howard Green interviewed by J.L. Granatstein, Oral History Programme, 1971, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 605-D-1 File 2, 28-29. Most authors to date discussing the nuclear arms crisis accept the Defender argument that the military was very clear when proposing nuclear roles for the Canadian Forces. Research for this thesis suggests that the military was less clear than they purport. If true, Green (and possibly Diefenbaker given his sovereignty concerns) would have had little reason to oppose the roles they were approving. However, this contention is only preliminary and presentation at this stage would be premature. In my doctoral studies I hope to pursue this question in considerably greater detail.
fruitful discussion. “World hope for general and complete disarmament was never more prevalent than during 1959 and 1960.”34 With these two strong and (as Green came to believe) opposing forces in play, Howard Green entered the fray.

Howard Green, George Ignatieff, Norman Robertson, and many others believed that their cause was both important and carried some possibility of progress. This possibility was worth pursuing because failure to negotiate could have heightened tensions. Though Canada had clearly committed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, many at DEA continued to believe otherwise or at least hoped that this aim could be changed. It is only by examining the actions and motivations of Critics within the narrative of Canada’s acquisition narrative that Canada’s nuclear arms crisis can be fully understood. Paralleling the acquisition and disarmament narratives demonstrates that though the government’s decision remained simple in principle (i.e. whether to acquire or not acquire nuclear warheads), its underlying complexity made it vulnerable to opposition.

Green’s antagonism was not immediate, contrary to the impression provided by some authors.35 Careful examination of the archival record proves that Green did not move against nuclear weapons from the outset; instead his tenacity developed over a much longer period of time. Moreover, Canada’s SSEA recognized that outright opposition to nuclear warheads was unlikely to succeed, so his department facilitated delay after delay so that the indecisive Diefenbaker could avoid the final step in Canada’s nuclear path: a formal diplomatic agreement.36

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34 Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, 170; William Epstein, Disarmament: Twenty-five Years of Effort, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1971), 9-11.
Some writers on the nuclear arms question move from Green’s appointment in June 1959 to his opposition to Operation SKYHAWK from late August to September. These authors create the false impression that Green opposed American defence plans from the outset. Patricia McMahon astutely observes that key decisions as well as negotiations regarding nuclear weapons continued between June and late August of 1959. During this period, Green’s apparent indifference to Canada’s atomic trajectory continued.

Throughout this early period, the Diefenbaker cabinet considered a variety of roles that required nuclear warheads. The most dominant concern was the conversion of Canada’s F-86 interceptor squadrons in Europe to the strike/reconnaissance role. On June 19th and 30th the cabinet discussed this new role. Even though Pearkes explicitly explained that the role required the use of nuclear weapons, Green voiced no significant opposition. In July and August, Green watched the government commit itself to the CF-104 aircraft and begin the tendering process without expressing any opposition. Thus, at this stage Green did not exhibit Critic beliefs. As already mentioned, McMahon continues to attribute Green’s relative silence to “a lack of knowledge” despite previously stating that should have been aware of Canada’s trajectory during his work at the Department of Defence Production. Alternatively, his silence may have

39 RG2 B-2, Privy Council Office, Cabinet Conclusions, 19 June 1959, 4-7; Cabinet Conclusions, 30 June 1959, 2-4.
40 Cabinet Conclusions, 2 July 1959, 2; Cabinet Conclusions, 14 August 1959, 4-6; Robertson also failed to mount significant opposition: NAR to Minister: “Re-Equipment of the Canadian Air Division”, 2 July 1959, Diefenbaker Papers, MG01/XIV/D26(2) Vol 10, 9-10.
resulted from understanding the consequences of the government’s path. A seasoned politician, Green must have known that opposing a cabinet decision of atomic magnitude alone was futile. Only with confidence and a proven track record could he have any hope of changing the government’s direction. Moreover Green’s previous knowledge of atomic weaponry meant that he was one of the more informed members of the cabinet and by no means naïve. The most likely explanation is therefore that Green lacked confidence in either himself, or the legitimacy of his concerns and therefore failed to act at this early stage.

On August 11, 1959, the Canadian government discovered joint plans with the US for an air-defence exercise, Operation SKYHAWK, that included the use of Canadian territory. Though the Americans had been planning the exercise with Canadian NORAD officials since January of that year, the operations initially proposed were routine. On July 29th the decision was made to ground all aircraft in North America for a six-hour period so that a large-scale radar-jamming test could be conducted. By this point the Americans had spent millions of dollars preparing for the exercise and had assumed Ottawa would agree that this additional measure was necessary. The Department of External Affairs, however, considered the grounding of Canadian civil airliners “ill-advised” and provocative in light of Khrushchev’s recent visit to the United States. Green agreed with this interpretation and the Cabinet’s dissent for the entire exercise was garnered on August 26. According to subsequent diplomatic reports American officials were “mad as hell.”42 Three days later, the American Ambassador met with Diefenbaker to request Canada’s reconsideration of the exercise. Despite assurances from the Ambassador that the Americans had delayed the planned exercise from August to October to allay any possible Soviet concerns, Diefenbaker stood firm. The Prime Minister believed that the exercise would heighten international tensions, and the lack of political consultation

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demonstrated an alleged unwillingness of military officials to consult with their civilian masters. Shortly thereafter, the Americans cancelled the exercise.\textsuperscript{43}

Green’s specific actions on a day-to-day basis remain unclear. Some have attributed Canada’s rejection to Diefenbaker and minimized Green’s influence.\textsuperscript{44} However, Knowlton Nash attributes the inspiration for Canada’s opposition to Green. More generally, J.L. Granatstein writes:

\begin{quote}
this was Green’s first victory in Cabinet as Secretary of State for External Affairs, the first time he had managed to translate his concerns about war and the United States into policy. That he could carry the Prime Minister with him was significant.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{quote}

Green had successfully opposed a military exercise that he believed would heighten world tensions. However, he required further impetus before he was willing to take more active measures against nuclear weapons.

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Green’s first visit to the United Nations (UN) in the fall of 1959 provided him with the “inspiration” he required to more actively combat the arms race. The previous UNGA meeting had failed to produce any progress in disarmament. One briefing summarized the previous year’s congregation as “disagreeable, disturbing, and unproductive” as the session had devolved into power bloc voting.\textsuperscript{46} Neither the Soviets nor the West had managed to gain the support of the non-committed members as neither side demonstrated credible leadership. From the outset,

\textsuperscript{43} Robinson, \textit{Diefenbaker’s World}, 110; Cabinet Conclusions, 26 August 1959, 7-8; Memorandum for Diary File, “Operation Skyhawk”, 31 August 1959 MG31 E-83 Vol 2 File 12.

\textsuperscript{44} McMahon, “The Politics of Canada’s Nuclear Policy”, 104-105.


\textsuperscript{46} “General Assessment of the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly”, 8 April 1959, LAC, MG32 B-13 Vol 11 File 12, 1-2, 6-7.
Green was determined (as were many others) to use the United Nations as a vehicle for Canada to make progress towards international agreement in a bi-polar world.

At the 14th session, Green planned to focus on select topics on which he and his department believed progress was possible. Chief among these was his concern about atomic radiation. In his maiden speech to the United Nations on September 24, Green proposed that the world conduct more research regarding the hazards of radiation. Standardization and greater coverage in sampling were both required for the world to fill knowledge “gaps” regarding the effects of radiation from both natural and human (nuclear detonations) sources. Though the initiative was admittedly meek in scale, Green’s selection of this subject to initiate his work at the UN emphasizes his concern regarding fallout.47

Contrary to his former opposition to negotiating with Communists, Green’s speech introducing the draft resolution offered several olive branches to the Soviet Union. Green praised recent Soviet achievements in space and acknowledged the Soviet desire for real arms reductions. It should be recalled that in past disarmament negotiations, the Soviet Union had long emphasized arms reduction at the expense of credible verification while the West had emphasized the need to verify disarmament at the expense of arms reduction.48 Though Green never left the West’s position, he recognized the veracity of Soviet concerns: “Without control, the mutual confidence required to disarm would be lacking… Without disarmament control of course would be irrelevant.”49 In Renegade in Power, Peter Newman implies that Green did not understand the content of his own speech. As evidence he cites an example where a reporter asked Green to explain the predicate of this statement without quoting the former. After a

47 Howard Green, “Canada’s Views on World Problems”, 24 September 1959, Statements and Speeches 59/30, 5.
48 Epstein, Disarmament: Twenty-five Years of Effort, 12.
prolonged response, Green replied: “Oh, I thought it was just put in there to round out the sentence.”\textsuperscript{50} Green’s response was motivated by far more complex motives than ineptitude. When reporters focused on Green’s comment acknowledging the Soviet perspective, Green had three choices: 1) repeat the Western perspective, 2) defend his statement with a lengthy and complex defence sure to bore his audience, 3) deflect the question. The first two options would have damaged the potency of Green’s non-partisan appeal, and he therefore chose his only remaining option: telling a joke at his own expense (thereby taking neither side). Though some continued to refer to the section of his speech as a “weakness,” other reporters found no fault with Green’s answer.\textsuperscript{51} His comment demonstrated astuteness rather than ineptitude. More generally, the Canadian proposal was front-page news in \textit{The Globe and Mail} and was therefore important to Canadians.\textsuperscript{52} Green’s confidence was growing.

The press continued to follow the progress of Green’s initiative as it neared a vote.\textsuperscript{53} Eventually Argentina, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Norway sponsored the resolution. On November 17\textsuperscript{th}, the UNGA unanimously passed the Canadian initiative as Resolution 1376 with 78 states in favour, none opposed or abstaining, and 4 absent.\textsuperscript{54} The news received headline attention on the front pages of both \textit{The Globe and Mail} and the \textit{Vancouver Province}.\textsuperscript{55} Despite its limited scope, the global consensus on a subject that deeply concerned Green must have been moving. He had both discovered and

\textsuperscript{50} Newman, \textit{Renegade In Power}, 257.
\textsuperscript{53} “Canada’s Hits the Target”, \textit{Cape Breton Post}, 24 November 1959.
\textsuperscript{54} “UN Backs Canada Plan to Study World Fallout”, \textit{Globe and Mail}, 18 November 1959; “East, West, Support Canada on ‘Fallout’”, \textit{Vancouver Province}, 18 November 1959.
demonstrated that global consensus on limited but important aspects of disarmament was possible. He was now proud to have “an accomplishment” at the UN.\textsuperscript{56}

During the session, Green also supported the disarmament initiatives of other states with increasing conviction.\textsuperscript{57} Perhaps most controversially, Canada voted for a Moroccan resolution asking France to “refrain” from conducting any atomic tests.\textsuperscript{58} France’s independent nuclear bomb project had been known for some time. In 1958, the US, USSR and UK had all agreed to a voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests and France’s plans to detonate their first atomic device in early 1960 threatened to destabilize this agreement.\textsuperscript{59} World opinion was therefore generally against France’s plans and the Moroccan resolution voiced this discontent. However, Canada was a strong proponent of NATO, and France’s choice to pursue an independent nuclear path spurred from dissatisfaction with the alliance. Western unity was therefore crucial. If Canada voted against France, it would do so outside of the Alliance’s position. Green advocated and secured Cabinet’s permission to do so, and when Canada announced its plans the French Ambassador requested an immediate meeting with Canada’s Prime Minister entreatning him to reassess Canada’s position. The ambassador was particularly concerned because “Canada had a great deal of influence in the Assembly and quite a large number of Delegations would follow the Canadian lead.”\textsuperscript{60} Though Diefenbaker refused to reconsider at the meeting, he later met with some of his ministers who considered Green’s plans harsh. David Fulton was asked to

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\item \textsuperscript{56} Howard to Mother, 22 November 1959, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-5 File 6, 7.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Space does not permit a description of each disarmament resolution proposed during this session. Moreover, since Canada consistently voted for all of these resolutions a full discussion is unnecessary to understand the development of Green’s disarmament viewpoints.
\item \textsuperscript{60} HBR to Under-Secretary, “French Nuclear Tests in the Sahara”, 16 November 1959, LAC MG31 E-83 Vol 2 File 14, 4.
\end{itemize}
contact Green to discuss the situation. However, “Green was canny enough to not be reachable, and thus Canada came out against the French bomb tests as Green had been determined to do all along.” 61 Most of Canada’s allies, including the US and UK, abstained. Though the resolution was futile, Canada’s symbolic stance against the expansion of the “nuclear club”62 was critical in Green’s mind.

Again, Canada’s vote was front-page news in Canada.63 During the 14th session of the UNGA, Canada’s SSEA discovered that he was not alone in his convictions. Canada’s radiation resolution demonstrated that countries from around the world desired greater international stability and could agree despite their differing allegiances. Thus the UNGA’s 14th session produced optimism for the future and while it is easy to dismiss Canada’s limited success in the shadow of more pressing concerns like France’s planned nuclear tests it is doubtful that Canada’s resolution would have been possible five years earlier.64 Basil Robinson aptly concludes that: “The government had a tough and influential peacemonger as its external affairs minister, and he was just at the dawn of his new incarnation.” 65 Green had established a platform against nuclear weapons for Canada at the UN; maintaining this policy at home in light of Canada’s defence commitments would prove more difficult.

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61 Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 111-112.
62 “Nuclear club” refers to countries that possess the ability to produce or otherwise employ nuclear weapons independently. Despite some claims by Diefenbaker and Green, Canada never questioned this point, as it was contrary to American law and Canadian foreign policy.
64 Howard Green to Joint Meeting of the Empire and Canadian Clubs of Toronto, “Canada in World Affairs”, No. 59/43, 26 November 1959, LAC MG32 B-13 Vol 12 File 16, 7;
65 Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World, 112.
Canada’s government continued to struggle with the question of whether to allow nuclear weapons onto its soil. Beginning in August 1959, Howard Green wanted more control over any warheads stored on Canadian soil. On September 22 the cabinet approved a draft note for American consideration regarding the possibility of deploying MB-1s at American bases. The Americans replied with their own revisions on January 14, 1960. The exchange of these drafts emphasized the remaining problem of “custody” (the right to manage access and conditions for the nuclear warheads while in storage) and “control” (the right to deploy weapons systems once armed with nuclear warheads). Green claimed that Canadian sovereignty could only be protected if custody and control of nuclear weapons on Canadian bases was “joint.” He feared what Erika Simpson dubs “entrapment” -- the concern that Canada’s alliance system would drag it into a war it did not want to fight. Undoubtedly, if an all-out attack occurred, Green and his department fervently believed that Canada needed to fulfil its commitments. However, Green (and Diefenbaker) distrusted the American military. Under US law, ownership of warheads had to remain solely American and the Americans also demanded that custody remain their sole domain. The US argued that these measures were necessary to prevent the expansion of the nuclear club. While Green recognized the legitimacy of American concerns he continued to argue that Canadian sovereignty could only be adequately protected via joint custody. Pearson also shared these concerns for several years.

66 Cabinet Conclusions, 22 September 1959, 2.
67 Simpson, NATO and the Bomb, 159.
68 See for example Howard to Lewis (son), 26 June 1960, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-F-1 File 3, 6; Roy, For Most Conspicuous Bravery, 340.
69 Green reiterated this point when subsequently interviewed: Howard Green interviewed by Charles S.A. Ritchie, “Interview with the Honourable Howard Green for the Historical Division of the Department of External Affairs”, 31 July 1972, LAC MG31 E-83 Vol 27 File 10, 8.
Initially Green heeded DEA’s repeated advice against insisting on joint custody, as its officials believed the existing control arrangements were sufficient.\(^{71}\) In Cabinet on September 11, 1959, he explained that: “his advisors… were reluctant to recommend that Canada should insist on joint responsibility for the physical security of these nuclear weapons on leased bases” and went on to support his department’s conviction by explaining that the US “would have good legal grounds for not agreeing to the request.”\(^{72}\) His subsequent choice to resume demands for joint custody demonstrated a new and powerful tactic to deter Canada’s nuclear trajectory: exploitation of Diefenbaker’s sovereigntist sympathies as well as his indecisive nature. Moreover, George Pearkes later agreed the Diefenbaker was “emotionally on Green’ side.”\(^{73}\)

Given that Canada had already agreed in principle to the provisioning of American interceptors based at Goose Bay and Harmon Field with the MB-1, Green had little chance of reversing the decision.\(^{74}\) All knew the principles established in this agreement would be used in subsequent negotiations regarding warheads for the Canadian military. Green therefore prolonged the negotiations hoping that time and more successes would win the government over to his Critic perspective.\(^{75}\)

Green continued to utilize this argument against the deployment of MB-1s on American interceptors through to the end of 1960. By March of 1960 the Americans had examined the Canadian proposal and rejected Green’s demand for joint custody. Remaining insistent in principle, but willing to compromise in form, Canada added a section to the draft agreement.

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\(^{72}\) Cabinet Conclusions, 11 September 1959, 7.

\(^{73}\) George Pearkes interviewed by Reginald Roy, 13 April 1967, Interview 62, George R. Pearkes Collection, University of Victoria Special Collections, Vol 5 File 11, 9.

\(^{74}\) Cabinet Conclusions, 12 January 1960, 2.

\(^{75}\) Roy, *For Most Conspicuous Bravery*, 340-341; Robinson, *Diefenbaker’s World*, 113-114.
providing some degree of joint custody: “Canada will provide a representative or representatives at each base.” Thus, by the opening months of 1960, Diefenbaker retreated from his statement of February 20, 1959 that ascribed both control and custody of nuclear warheads as a sole American responsibility. The Prime Minister now embraced Green’s argument that “joint control” was necessary for any warheads based on Canadian soil for American aircraft.

Diefenbaker also embraced the more general argument that Canada had a right to joint control of any warheads deployed by the Canadian military. Though the negotiations were informal, they received weighty consideration in Cabinet. Originally the United States asked that it retain full custody of warheads for Canada’s armed forces. However, Diefenbaker, Green and Pearkes all agreed that this was unreasonable. Pearkes suggested that Canadian forces provide an “exterior” or perimeter security around nuclear storage bunkers on Canadian bases and that this arrangement for joint custody was acceptable to the US. This arrangement would ensure a Canadian veto over any deployment of the warheads. Thus Diefenbaker’s insistence on this principle was not Green’s achievement although his presence may have moulded Pearkes’ suggestion.

Nonetheless, the SSEA continued to foster the impression that the Americans were not meeting Canada’s demands throughout 1960. In January, prior to a planned statement by Diefenbaker on Canada’s nuclear policy, Green implied that Diefenbaker’s draft did not adequately emphasize Canada’s right to joint control. Diefenbaker admitted that the government's statements had been “rather foggy” and that “It was absolutely necessary that the

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77 Cabinet Conclusions, 12 January 1960, 2-3; Cabinet Conclusions, 15 January 1960, 2-3.
79 Cabinet Conclusions, 12 January 1960, 2-3.
Cabinet be quite clear in its attitude towards nuclear weapons for Canadian forces.” In his statement to the House of Commons, however, the prime minister remained decidedly unclear. On the one hand Diefenbaker claimed that “the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile to be effective would require nuclear warheads.” In the same speech he also used a variety of phrases composed by Green to argue against any immediate decision. Appealing to Diefenbaker’s indecisive nature, Green’s handwritten suggestions provided Diefenbaker with the diction and logic to justify continued postponement of any decision. Reiterating the document’s emphasis of a Canadian choice rather than obligation to acquire nuclear weapons, Diefenbaker quoted prose such as, “may have to have” and “if and when they are required.”80 The Prime Minister understood the dichotomy in his speech as he highlighted both sections on his personal copy.81 Thus under Green’s direct encouragement Diefenbaker not only failed to reaffirm his government’s commitment to atomic warheads, he distanced himself from it.

Despite an increasing awareness that the operational deployment of Canada’s new weapons systems approached, Diefenbaker continued to emphasize the need for joint custody in July 1960 and his SSEA continued to buttress this belief. For example, in a Cabinet meeting in the summer of 1960, Green claimed that: “So far the U.S. had not accepted Canada’s views in regarding to control.”82 More generally Diefenbaker continued to emphasize that negotiations were ongoing and that details would be forthcoming if agreement was achieved.83 The government’s ministers followed Diefenbaker’s lead and remained equally ambiguous.84 A frustrated Paul Hellyer (Trinity) asked: “Does the minister believe that within the year the policy

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80 Howard Green, “May have to have”, 1. MG32 B-13 Vol 10 File 10; Canada, *House of Commons Debates* 18 January 1960, 73.
82 Cabinet Conclusions, 4 July 1960, 2.
of atomic John will have an honest capability?" He received no reply. Though committed to nuclear roles, Canada’s official position was becoming less and less certain.

* * *

Green’s foreign policy was now more mature. He avoided describing Canada as a “world power” in the House of Commons but continued to agree with the description when others suggested it. His designs for Canada in world affairs were remarkably similar to his intellectual ideals of 1943. Canada did not have to hesitate before acting independently. Its destiny in world affairs was not to be an “honest broker” because it needed to assert its own opinions rather than bring the US and UK together. The Commonwealth remained an important part of Canada’s identity but in 1960 he was more concerned about the UN. He described Canada as a leader of the world’s “small nations” and envisioned Canada as a leader of global opinion, not a superpower. In short in Green’s intellectual vision for Canada role in world affairs now dominated his foreign policy; his actions more the result of an identity reordering than a crisis.

He remained almost eternally optimistic, continually describing his reasons to believe that the disarmament negotiations would progress in the near future and that despair was out of the question and even went so far as to declare that Canada “has only friends and no enemies.” Paul Martin, Peyton Lyon, Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann similarly criticize Green for his optimism, though Lyon admits that it might have been an “façade.” Perhaps his rhetoric was

85 Ibid, 5 July 1960, 5722.
88 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 10 February 1960, 930.
89 Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs: No. 2 4 March 1960, 58; No. 13 7 April 1960, 326-328; Lyon, The Policy Question, 114; Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, 355.
overzealous, but Green believed optimism was necessary since: “If we all went into these negotiations convinced that nothing was going to happen, that there would be no success, I think there would be no chance whatever of success. The issues are so great that in my personal opinion we must have hope that there will be success.”

Canada’s increasingly independent positions became a source of contention. Unsurprisingly France continued preparations to detonate its first atomic device despite the Moroccan resolution. Anticipating this event, Green was asked for Canada’s position and was obviously angered. “There is nothing further we [Canada] can do” Green eventually exclaimed: “we are against further nuclear tests, period.” This statement was a marked break with the Western position that demanded adequate assurance that a device could not be detonated secretly. Scientific advances generally ensured adequate verification and aside from the question of inspection, one of the few outstanding concerns was how to distinguish between the relatively similar seismic signatures of earthquakes and the underground detonation of atomic devices with yields smaller than 20 kilotonnes (or 4.75 on the Richter scale). Initially the Liberals did not condone or condemn this new position. When France detonated its first device on February 13, 1960, the policy change became more controversial.

By the beginning of March 1960, the Liberals were more critical of Green’s position and Lester Pearson asked Green to elaborate on his short but blunt policy statement in the Standing Committee on External Affairs. After describing his empathy for the three-power-talks’ continued to focus on verification measures, Green added:

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90 As Green grew more and more independent in subsequent years Martin’s criticism became more congruent with Pearson’s. Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs: No. 2 4 March 1960, 58; No. 13 7 April 1960, 326-328; Lyon, The Policy Question, 114.


92 Discernment of larger detonations was possible by 1960. For a full discussion of the problems and advancements regarding seismic detection of nuclear blasts during this period see: Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, 330-335.

93 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 10 February 1960, 942-943; 11 February 1960, 958-959.
We are not, however, in the nuclear business and so far as we are concerned we believe there should be no more tests. That is the reason why we have taken that stand very clearly. If we had taken the other stand which you [Pearson] seem to imply, to the effect that we want to have a control system worked out first and, once there is a control system, that when we favour no more nuclear tests, it would not have helped very much. We believe it is of value for Canada to come right out and take the position that she believes there should be no more tests.94

When Pearson asked if Green recognized that this was a departure from the Western position, Green replied: “We have been in disagreement with them in the past and probably will be in the future.”95 Other Conservatives quickly rallied to Green’s cause, asserting that the cessation of tests, rather than control, should be the goal of negotiations and Canada’s position was therefore correct. At the next meeting Green was repeatedly asked whether he had really meant “no tests period” and the SSEA reiterated his stern position ad nauseam. When pressed about the problems of seismic detection, Green commented that, although the problem remained, “It is always a little dangerous to impute motives, but I think certain countries want to have certain types of tests.”96 More generally, Green continued to fear fallout radiation from these tests and simply wanted the tests to cease.97 Aside from their obvious concern about the break in Western unity, the Liberals still did not contest the merit of Green’s stance. Similarly, Norman Robertson seems to have been uncomfortable with the policy because his suggested statements for the Minister focused on Green’s declaration against further tests and avoided the sensitive issue of verification.98 Green was no puppet; he was now more than willing to choose his own policies.

95 Ibid, 60.
96 Green’s subsequent comments suggest that he believed a detection breakthrough was close at hand and therefore it can be inferred that he thought the inability to verify small underground tests was temporary and therefore would not threaten Western security. Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs: No. 3, 10 March 1960, 71.
97 Minutes and Proceedings of Evidence, Canada, Standing Committee on External Affairs: No. 3, 10 March 1960, 72.
The issue might have died had the communiqué from Diefenbaker’s June 1960 meeting in Washington with President Eisenhower not included a brief statement requiring “effective international control” in any test-ban agreement that directly challenged Green’s position.99 During question period on June 7 Paul Martin asked the government to account for this discrepancy. Green had little choice but to insist that there was no divergence and continued to assert that the government was against any further tests. Unsatisfied, Martin continued to press and only with the intervention of the Speaker and assurances from Diefenbaker that Canada was for “the complete termination of nuclear testing” was the issue dropped.100 When Pearson persisted, Green implicitly admitted that the communiqué was contrary to his position but insisted that the Prime Minister remained committed to the espoused policy of “no tests period.”101 The Opposition would continue to remind the government of its inconsistency until the Partial Test Ban Agreement in 1963.102

Why Diefenbaker’s aides agreed to the communiqué’s text given the SSEA’s unequivocal stance is puzzling. Perhaps it was a rare oversight? Diefenbaker memoirs add another layer of confusion: the former Prime Minister claims that he had always “instructed [Canadian officials] to give equal emphasis… to the need for both a cessation of testing and… adequate safeguards.”103 Given the events described above, this was obviously not the case, though it may have been Diefenbaker’s preferred policy stance. General E.L.M. Burns implies that this discrepancy continued into 1963.104 Was Green’s declaration unplanned and indeed against Diefenbaker’s inclinations? Was it calculated to move Diefenbaker towards a more

99 The communiqué is reprinted in: Canada, House of Commons Debates, 6 June 1960, 4594.
100 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 7 June 1960, 4598-4599;
103 Diefenbaker, One Canada: The Years of Achievement, 124.
104 Burns, A seat at the table, 152-153.
liberal position on testing? Whatever the case, political scientist Peyton Lyon denounced the SSEA’s position as naïve and ill-conceived, insisting that it reduced Canada’s influence among its allies and also left its disarmament negotiators with little room to manoeuvre. While Burns recognizes this later criticism, he minimizes its significance. Moreover Lyon’s charge seems unfair: the statement pushed the Canada’s delegation to seek exactly what Green wanted, the cessation of tests. Green overestimated Canada’s influence, but he believed that the superpowers would respond to world opinion if it were sufficiently mobilized. Green hoped to lead the way, not act alone.

As might be expected, Green’s fight in Geneva at the TNDC was very different from his home front skirmishes. His conduct during the first six months of 1960 has received little attention in the Diefenbaker literature. After all, until June progress was slow. Nevertheless, the discussions were central in Green’s mind, and he ensured Canada contributed wherever possible hoping for real progress. While presenting the Estimates for External Affairs, he exclaimed that the TNDC “literally carries with it the hopes of mankind.” This persistent optimism motivated his decision to move General E.L.M. Burns from his work in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to become Canada’s Disarmament Ambassador as well as the advisor to Cabinet on the subject. His hopes would soon be disappointed.

106 Burns, A seat at the table, 153.
107 Green’s absolutist stance had its limits. During the remainder of 1960, several non-aligned and African countries attempted to follow-up the Moroccan Resolution by securing the necessary majority vote in the UNGA for an Emergency Session regarding France’s nuclear weapons program. Given France’s NATO membership, the limited fallout caused by the detonations, and wavering support in the UNGA, Green consistently decided against supporting the resolution despite active and continuous canvassing by supporting states that cited Green’s anti-test stance. Green believed in symbolic gestures, but when world approval was unlikely and success would only result in fruitless propaganda exchanges he rightfully opposed the initiative despite his own possible sympathies. For details of this prolonged campaign see LAC, RG25 Vol 6010 File 50271-L-40 pt 2.1.
108 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 10 February 1960, 931.
109 Ibid, 932.
Early talks quickly deadlocked over the same historically problematic themes, and a recess called in anticipation of Eisenhower and Khrushchev’s planned summit in May. Unfortunately, Khrushchev cancelled the summit after Gary’s Powers’ U-2 spy aircraft was shot down over Soviet airspace on May 1st.\(^\text{110}\) Despite the gloomy atmosphere, the TNDC resumed negotiations and received a new Soviet proposal on June 7, 1960. This new plan offered some significant concessions to the West. Foremost among these was the Soviet recognition of the need for “strict and effective international control” (verification of disarmament).\(^\text{111}\) Though Burns recognized the “strong political and propaganda appeal” of the new Soviet proposal, he believed the Soviet concessions were “genuine” and concluded: “It is therefore more necessary than ever to be prepared for serious negotiations.”\(^\text{112}\) Green echoed his advisor’s views and urged that the Soviet compromises be reciprocated.\(^\text{113}\) Despite the setback of early May, for Green it seemed that the negotiations were again acquiring momentum.

The Western counter proposal took time to develop. Before the plan could be tabled at the TNDC it had to be formulated, approved by the five Western members of the TNDC, and then NATO.\(^\text{114}\) Throughout this period of consultation the Soviets continually demanded answers to their policy questions from the understandably quiet Western delegations.\(^\text{115}\) In response, on June 27, the Eastern delegates, led by the Soviet Union, withdrew from the negotiations.

\(^{110}\) This setback did not prevent Burns or Robertson from continuing to use disarmament to justify delay or reconsideration of Canada’s nuclear trajectory. Burns to External, “‘Disarmament: Western Approaches to Soviet Proposals”, 20 June 1960, LAC, MG32 B-13 Vol 8 File 2 pt 2, 3; Conversation with Mr. Spaak”, 20 June 1960, LAC, MG31 E-83 Vol 3 File 9, 4-5.


\(^{112}\) DisarmDel to External, 4 June 1960, LAC, MG32 B-13 Vol 8 File 2 pt 1, 1-2. Remaining problems included the Soviet provision demanding that foreign bases be abandoned in the first stage of disarmament. The West had long rejected this suggestion because it would have rendered Europe virtually defenceless.


accusing the West of avoiding serious negotiation and merely stalling so that it could continue its own arms build-up.\textsuperscript{116} This walkout caught the West by surprise. Even on the morning of June 27, Canada’s officials in Paris continued to send messages to Ottawa regarding rushed NATO consultations regarding the West’s plan.\textsuperscript{117} Green wrote an optimistic letter to his son the evening before,\textsuperscript{118} Frustrated, he called the Soviets a “stupid lot of double-crossers.”\textsuperscript{119} In the House of Commons he said that the Soviets had “scuttled” the TNDC and after summarizing Canada’s position expressed “regret” for “having to give such a report.”\textsuperscript{120} Though Canada’s SSEA suggested “that Canadians should not be downhearted” his words did not match his mood.\textsuperscript{121}

Green quickly rebounded and realigned his department’s focus to picking up the pieces of the disarmament negotiations. Even in his disheartened speech of June 27\textsuperscript{th}, he had insisted that Canada would “continue to be very much in earnest and will do everything we possibly can to work out some solution to the problem.”\textsuperscript{122} To Green, the simplest means to ensure progress was to secure the resumption of negotiations via instruction from the UNDC. At first, most Western governments agreed with Green’s position and also pushed for an early meeting of the UNDC in which to contrast their good faith with the Communist walkout.\textsuperscript{123} However Western interest

\textsuperscript{116} DisarmDel to External, “Disarmament Conference – 47\textsuperscript{th} Meeting”, 27 June 1960, LAC MG32 B-13 Vol 8 File 4 pt 3, 1.
\textsuperscript{118} Howard to Lewis, 26 June 1960, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-F-1 File 3, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{119} Howard to Lewis, 28 June 1960, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-F-1 File 3, 4.
\textsuperscript{120} Canada, \textit{House of Commons}, 27 June 1960, 5416-5417.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, 5417.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
quickly cooled with France being the most obstinate.124 Norman Robertson described Canada’s reasons for pushing for an early meeting of the UNDC:

The main reasons in taking the initiative now in the Disarmament Commission are to demonstrate Western willingness to negotiate, to expose the Soviet tactics of evasion, to undermine the Soviet position in the General Assembly, and at the same time to strengthen the Western position there. More importantly for the West, however, the imminence of a Commission meeting serves to maintain the pressure for producing a unified Western plan.125

Robertson went on to describe the limits of Canadian influence:

Canada alone could not bring about a meeting of the Disarmament Commission, and it would not be desirable for us in any case to break ranks with our Western partners... However, it seems entirely appropriate and desirable that we should continue to press the other four to make a move in the Disarmament Commission.126

Alone Canada’s influence was limited; however, it could lobby its allies as well as any other country that would listen to create the necessary pressure for a meeting. Under Green’s direct orders, Canadian ambassadors in Western capitals lobbied for an early meeting. By July 15 the Eisenhower government changed its position and now agreed to ask the world for a meeting of the UNDC in August.127 With this decision the US’s allies fell into line and even France agreed not to oppose the US move. All efforts would be made to limit discussions to procedural matters, including the resumption of negotiations rather than disarmament itself, and this suited the Canadian view.128 Canada then began to lobby governments all over the world to come to the meeting, again emphasizing the need for the resumption of negotiations. The vast majority of countries responded favourably with only the Soviet bloc (and Finland) responding negatively

126 Ibid, 5.
and India temporarily withholding its consent.\textsuperscript{129} Canada’s interpretation of international politics and resulting actions were puissant:

USSR is going to extraordinary lengths in its efforts to persuade Asian, African and other uncommitted countries that it would not r[e]p[e]at not be useful to have a meeting of the disarmament commission at this time. In the past few days soviet reps have given numerous luncheons on the per[manent] rep[resentative] level to expound their views and have been lobbying intensively in the corridors in combination with all other members of the Soviet bloc. From the magnitude of the Soviet lobbying it appears that they have a real fear of being placed in an unfavourable light if a meeting of the disarmament commission takes place. [After Canadian counter-lobbying] an increasing number of the wavering countries are coming to see that the Soviet objections are excessive and exaggerated in terms of the modest and relatively non-controversial objectives the Western countries have in mind.\textsuperscript{130}

Most significantly, throughout this lobbying campaign, the Soviets refused to announce a boycott of the meeting should it occur.\textsuperscript{131} Encouraged, Green and his department continued to press for a moderate Western stance and in the end the Soviets bloc and India agreed to attend the August 16 meeting.

Speaking to the UNDC on the opening day as the only Foreign Minister present, Green’s message was forceful, but as non-partisan as possible to make his message for renewed negotiations more palatable. He complained that the negotiations “need never have been broken off” and, while he admitted that progress “was unsatisfactory” and that differences could only be overcome with difficulty, he maintained that the talks had led to some congruence.\textsuperscript{132} Over the next three days, Green and his delegation chiefly focused on the non-aligned draft-resolution

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\textsuperscript{131} Ibid, 2
\end{flushleft}
requesting resumption which unfortunately accommodated Soviet desires at the expense of the West. Though they need not be recounted here, Canada eventually proposed three revisions on August 18 that strengthened the resolution’s call for renewed negotiations by a small body (rather than at the UNGA as the Soviet’s wished). This effort seems to have had the desired effect and the non-aligned sponsors continued to negotiate with the UK and US with hopes of reaching a compromise.\textsuperscript{133} After more talks a resolution accommodating all of Canada’s proposed amendments was unanimously passed requesting “the earliest possible continuation of international negotiations.”\textsuperscript{134}

Green’s initiative paid off. Despite initial opposition in the West and continued opposition from the Soviets, Green and others succeeded in mobilizing world opinion to achieve consensus on a modest though important resolution. Green took great pride in Canada’s contribution. It had fought hard for the meeting as well as making the non-aligned resolution more palatable. Though generally supportive of the West’s position, Canada had applied pressure to all sides. Green bragged about the success in the House of Commons, describing the resolution as a product of Canadian efforts. When asked to describe a particularly memorable event in his career, Green called the events of July and August 1960 a “great triumph for Canada because we had taken the lead throughout.”\textsuperscript{135}

Unfortunately little resulted from Canada’s initiative. First, an American election was only a few months away and all states recognized that the outgoing Eisenhower administration


\textsuperscript{134} PerMisNY to External, “Disarmament Commission-70th Meeting”, 18 August 1960, LAC, RG25 Vol 5993 File 50271-A-40 pt 38, 1, 4-5; Burns, A seat at the table, 88.

\textsuperscript{135} Canada, House of Commons Debates, 20 December 1960, 966-967; Howard Green interviewed by Mr. Nelson, LAC, MG31 E-83 Vol 27 File 8, 4.
was not going to commit to any dramatic or binding disarmament measures. Green was aware of this problem, but because the Soviets demanded that disarmament negotiations be resumed at the 15th session of the UNGA, Green believed a resolution from the UNDC would actually facilitate earnest negotiations by removing substantial discussion of disarmament policy from the propaganda prone UNGA. Second, the non-aligned members of the United Nations (and UNDC) had long desired inclusion in the negotiations. Although there was consensus about the reasonableness of this demand, difficulty arose regarding selecting which countries would be invited. Until the problem was resolved, there was little chance of resumed talks. Therefore Green’s demands for reconvening negotiations before the 15th session of the UNGA were unreasonable and somewhat devalued his cause, but his earnest desire for resumed negotiations is noteworthy. He continued to believe that the only way to break the deadlock in negotiations was for world opinion to apply “terrific pressure” on the nuclear powers to come to an agreement. Thus Canada’s SSEA prepared to again push the world to resume disarmament negotiations.

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By mid-October 1960, the time seemed right for Green to propose his new initiative. The UNGA’s fifteenth session was in full swing and a variety of countries proposed disarmament measures.

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136 Legault and Fortmann, *A Diplomacy of Hope*, 176
139 Howard to Mother, 23 October 1960, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-5 File 8, 2.
measures. In a speech on October 19, Green suggested a variety of measures that he believed would rekindle the disarmament negotiations, including the appointment of a neutral chairman for any future negotiations. In addition, Green proposed that the UNDC create an “advisory committee” of approximately ten to twelve non-nuclear states not currently serving on the TNDC to offer “advice and encouragement to the negotiators.” Green hoped that this body’s disinterest in nuclear proliferation and diverse geographical representation would result in compromises that the bi-polar TNDC (and its predecessors) had been proven incapable of supplying. Despite some objection from Burns, Canada’s SSEA had long expressed a desire to see the non-aligned states involved in the disarmament negotiations. The major powers would maintain final power over any agreement, but Green’s hope was that this body would facilitate: “hard bargaining about concrete measures, pursued in good faith with patience and determination to reach agreement.” This policy formulation and pressure role quickly became a stumbling block for the great powers, and especially the US, that feared that it would detract from their ability to control the agenda.

On November 1, Green formally introduced these ideas in draft resolution 255, co-sponsored by Norway and Sweden. In his speech, Green emphasized the “universal desire and

140 Prior to this point in time, the Soviet Union had pushed for disarmament and a few other issues to be discussed in plenary, rather than in the First Committee. Though the Soviet initiative was ultimately unsuccessful, it delayed the First Committee’s progress.


143 WasDC to External, “Disarmament”, 18 October 1960 No. 2628, LAC RG25 A-3-B Vol 5904 File 50271-B-40 pt 2. This document contains early commentary, is entirely negative, and fails to either provide useful improvements or a viable alternative beside limited British initiatives. Given Green’s genuine desire for real progress and the Western failure to provide such measures, it is not entirely surprising that Green decided to try to improve the Canadian draft resolution rather than abandon it despite US objections.

need” for “revitalized” negotiations. He reiterated many of the suggestions from his earlier address, but because of opposition from the great powers he substituted the advisory committee for an ad hoc committee. Though the committee’s mandate would be to foster the resumption of negotiations the name now suggested a temporary and flexible rather than permanent status and thereby perpetuated the major powers’ control. Legault and Fortmann have suggested that expecting the major powers to agree to the creation of another organization allowing more states to influence the negotiations “was akin to believing that the Moon is made of ‘Green’ cheese.” They were correct. Norman Robertson began to caution Green against pushing too hard should the course of debate preclude Canada’s initiative, but the SSEA would have none of it. Even General Burns admitted that Green’s actions “sometimes put Canadian diplomats in the position of being asked to make bricks without straw.” Legault and Fortmann also imply that Green only realized this impossibility late in the draft resolution’s formulation. Actually, the resolution underwent ongoing changes to combat this precise concern. The SSEA renewed solicitations for sponsorship with any country that would listen and a variety of countries obliged. He also redoubled discussions with the United States because their approval would reduce the hesitation of others. At first US officials were pessimistic but willing to talk. A variety of revisions were considered and eventually the US committed to voting for a revised version of the Canadian resolution. The revised Canadian resolution now assigned the UNDC

146 Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, 192.
148 Burns, A seat at the table, 171.
149 Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, 192-193.
the duty of “watch-dog” but still asked that the UNDC give “consideration to the appointment” of an *ad hoc* committee if circumstances proved auspicious.\(^{151}\) Green’s fundamental goal was to secure the early resumption of negotiations; if that required compromise, he was willing to bend. This further revised resolution garnered a variety of new co-sponsors and, it was believed, “had good prospects of carrying if put to a vote.”\(^{152}\) Even Norman Robertson regained some optimism.\(^{153}\)

Opposition remained. The USSR was against the Canadian initiative, and the UK promised to support it only “out of friendship for Canada.”\(^{154}\) Other resolutions also stood in Green’s way. The 15\(^{th}\) session of the UNGA had proven fertile ground for disarmament draft resolutions. Many of these were designed for propaganda rather than facilitation. India experienced considerable difficulty attracting support for a resolution attempting to establish principles of disarmament that both sides could accept. Opinions differed regarding whether the Indian and Canadian draft resolutions were complimentary or competing, but since the Indian initiative remained unpopular, the Canadian delegation had not worried.\(^{155}\) Unfortunately, the session was nearly complete, and insufficient time remained for votes on all of the draft

\(^{154}\) It might surprise researchers to know that the USSR’s opposition troubled Canadian officials the least. This is because as early as October 21\(^{st}\), Canada’s delegation increasingly believed that the Soviets would walkout of the First Committee of the UNGA at least when disarmament was being discussed and thus their dissent did not receive much attention. NAR to Minister, “Disarmament at the Assembly”, 21 October 1960, LAC, RG25 A-3-B Vol 5904 File 50271-B-40 pt 2; CanDelNY to External, “15\(^{th}\) UNGA: Disarmament-CND Resolution”, 3 November 1960, LAC, RG25 A-3-B Vol 5904 File 50271-B-40 pt 3.
resolutions and only three drafts had non-partisan support in the UNGA. Because the Canadian resolution did not have Soviet support, many UN representatives wanted to group it with the more contentious resolutions despite its relatively widespread, albeit lukewarm, support. India asked that the Canadian resolution be grouped with the contentious resolutions rather than the ones likely to pass. At this juncture the Canadian delegation as well as the majority of its co-sponsors became convinced that pursuing a vote was hopeless. Nonetheless, Green demanded that a vote be held. A roll-call vote was held, and India won 29 in favour, 17 against, with 26 abstentions. Eleven of Canada’s co-sponsors abstained or were absent during the vote. When Green heard the results he “remarked pretty sourly that at any rate now we knew who are our friends were.”

Legault and Fortmann aptly conclude that by insisting on a vote, Canada lost prestige. Their comment that “Green believed come hell or high water he could change the world by his incessant appeals for negotiation… [and that] he found it more important to talk to a brick wall than to relinquish the right to speak” is unfair. Certainly, Canada’s SSEA was forced to admit that his country’s power was more limited than he had estimated, however, he had always acknowledged the supremacy of the nuclear powers and the resolution’s raison d’être had been to safeguard this while encouraging greater non-aligned participation. Indeed, both the US and UK voted against postponing a vote on the Canadian resolution. Green simply wanted to ensure that the nuclear powers continued to talk and took solace in having demonstrated that he “meant

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157 Ibid; Burns, A seat at the table, 92-93.
158 Legault and Fortmann, A Diplomacy of Hope, 573.
business." In future he would be more mindful of the limits of Canadian influence, but he would continue to push that influence to its limit.

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Howard Green’s focus on disarmament did not occur in a vacuum. Throughout the later half of 1960 pressure mounted regarding nuclear warheads. When the Canada-US Committee on Joint Defence met at Montebello in July 1960 United States accepted Canada’s demand that the US not exercise sole custody of warheads at Goose Bay. Given this concession, Green received a letter from Pearkes on September 21 asking that DEA accept the new American proposal. Again, on November 30th, R.B. Bryce demanded that Canada “should proceed now without delay to conclude the agreement” regarding Goose and Harmon and also asked that negotiations leading to the acquisition of warheads for the Canadian military also begin. Frustrated, Pearkes retired from the Diefenbaker government to become British Columbia’s Lieutenant-Governor. His replacement, Douglas Harkness, also applied pressure but was moderated for a time by assurances from Diefenbaker that the agreement would be signed once Green would no longer feel embarrassed. This led to a Cabinet decision on December 6 to resume negotiations regarding warheads for Canadian forces. Before speaking with the US,

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159 Howard to Mother, 23 December 1960, CVA Add. MSS. 903, 593-E-5 File 8, 4-5.
160 Burns, A seat at the table, 154.
Green and Harkness proposed a draft agreement which was ready for Cabinet by December 30. Green secured his demands for joint control via Canadian responsibility for the external security of sites. However this progress should not be overemphasized Diefenbaker also insisted that Canada could only accept nuclear weapons on its soil if agreements for all warheads be decided as a “package.” The prime minister insisted on this measure, at least in part, because he believed it would preserve Canada’s bargaining power in other negotiations such as any Swap deal.165 Any decision on weapons for American forces on Canadian soil was therefore postponed.166 However, now more convicted than ever, Green went further than merely fostering reasons for delay. He pushed for a genuine, though temporary refusal of nuclear arms.

Ireland provided Green with this additional means to delay. Since 1958, Ireland proposed increasingly strong resolutions in the UNGA condemning the spread of nuclear weapons.167 The 1960 Irish initiative in part called “upon Powers not possessing such [atomic] weapons, on a similar temporary and voluntary basis, to refrain from manufacturing these weapons and from otherwise attempting to acquire them.”168 Any states that voted for the resolution therefore “temporarily” promised to only arm its militaries with conventional warheads. Though the spirit of this resolution had been long known, the specific language was crucial, and thus, the Diefenbaker government waited for the resolution to mature before forming any policy. DND asked that Canada abstain from the vote or propose amendments that would

165 The Swap negotiations concerned Canada’s acquiring American F-101 Voodoos to replace its aging CF-100s via a deal to exchange these aircraft for Canadair CL-44 transport aircraft. When this deal failed, negotiations moved to Canadian production of the CF-104 for export to NATO countries as well as Canadian manning of more PINETREE radar stations. Though Green later contested these negotiations because the Canadian military intended to arm the CF-101 with tactical air-to-air missiles, concerns during this period were limited to the exchange of aircraft and little concern regarding their future payload appears in archival records. As such these negotiations are not discussed in this thesis since they do not relate to Green’s concerns about nuclear weapons from 1959-1960. Smith, Rogue Tory, 375, 384.

166 Negotiations did not resume until well into 1961. Cabinet Conclusions, 6 December 1960, 8-10; McMahon, “The Politics of Canada’s Nuclear Policy”, 174-175.

167 Office of Public Information, the united nations and disarmament, 186-190.

168 Ibid, 190.
allow the acquisition of nuclear weapons under the aegis of another country’s control.\textsuperscript{169}

Originally, Diefenbaker agreed.\textsuperscript{170}

A few weeks later Diefenbaker turned again when he rejected a brief but moderate note from Harkness asking that Canadian troops be trained in the use of nuclear warheads “If and when nuclear weapons are required.”\textsuperscript{171} The Prime Minister told his audience at the Canadian Club that Canada required joint control and that, despite his personal doubts regarding advancement, “no decision will be made while progress towards disarmament continues.”\textsuperscript{172} Diefenbaker’s commitment to nuclear warheads for Canada’s forces was increasingly unclear.

Because it had been long intended that the Harmon and Goose Bay agreement be signed first, the Irish resolution and Diefenbaker’s changing views threatened to jeopardize all of the acquisition negotiations.

More generally the Irish resolution was eclipsed by other unrelated concerns until December 1, when a UNGA vote was imminent. The Department of External Affairs recommended that Canada vote for the Irish resolution. Since “Most N.A.TO. countries intended to abstain” to prevent any constraint on nuclear developments with the NATO alliance, and because the government believed it had not yet announced its nuclear policy (despite having ordered weapons systems requiring nuclear warheads), the Cabinet elected to instruct the Canadian delegation to abstain “because to support it would imply a contradiction of these recent statements.”\textsuperscript{173} Here was a principled objection to Green’s position at the UN. When Green received Cabinet’s instructions he deliberately kept them from the delegation. Both Green and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{169} Legault and Fortmann, \textit{A Diplomacy of Hope}, 187.
\textsuperscript{170} HBR to Under-Secretary, “Irish Resolution on Prevention of Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons”, 9 November 1960, LAC, MG31 E-83 Vol 9 File 3.
\textsuperscript{171} Harkness to Diefenbaker, “Memorandum for the Prime Minister”, 17 November 1960, Diefenbaker Papers, MG01/XII/F/100 Defence – Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons n.d., 1959-1960, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{172} Prime Minister Diefenbaker to Canadian Club, “Foundations of Canadian External Policy”, No. 60/41, 24 November 1960, LAC MG31 E-83 Vol 7 File 5, 4, 6.
\textsuperscript{173} Cabinet Conclusions, 1 December 1960, 8-9. Legault and Fortmann, \textit{A Diplomacy of Hope}, 187-188.}
Robinson appealed on DEA’s behalf, claiming that, because of Green’s reputation regarding disarmament, he would “suffer severe loss of prestige” if Canada abstained.\textsuperscript{174} The Prime Minister agreed to reconsider the vote in Cabinet.

On December 6 Green received his hearing. After making it clear that a positive vote would not be consistent with the majority of NATO countries, he explained that: “Abstention would place him in an impossible position.” He then presented the Irish resolution as a further opportunity to delay a decision on nuclear weapons. “The terms of the Irish resolution would only be binding until next September at the latest [presumably the following UNGA session],” he explained. Support for the resolution was thus merely “a statement at the time” rather than a long-term declaration. Moreover, he supported the idea of a brief speech tying a positive Canadian vote to further progress regarding the spread of nuclear weapons. If significant progress did not result “Canada would have to reconsider its position.”\textsuperscript{175} Green’s interpretation at once minimized the commitment to a positive vote and exaggerated the commitments entailed by abstention.

Others in the Cabinet challenged Green’s interpretation. Canada’s new aircraft and missiles were quickly nearing their initial delivery deadlines and their deployment would require a payload decision. In the end Diefenbaker cautiously sided with Green, declaring that “The Cabinet should not decide at this time whether or not nuclear weapons should be acquired” and that his previous policy statements were sufficient for the time being.\textsuperscript{176} He feared the resignation of either Green or Harkness, and therefore “emphasized again the necessity for

\textsuperscript{175} Cabinet Conclusions, 6 December 1960, 6.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid, 7-8.
remaining silent so far as possible on these matters.”177 Yet again, Green’s delay argument won Diefenbaker’s favour.

A few days before the vote, Canada announced its intention to vote for the Irish resolution and at the same time expressed doubt that states could perpetually abstain from nuclear weapons without progress in disarmament negotiations.178 Through sheer determination, Green secured the right to continue his disarmament crusade into 1961, though only barely. Neither the Cabinet, nor the Prime Minister (who feared the label of “disarmament party”) empathized to any considerable extent.179 Nevertheless, Green had noticeably braked Canada’s nuclear odyssey. His conversion was now complete.

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By December 1960, reporter Peter Trueman wrote: “There is no stiletto [or bayonet], no Bible anymore, just a conviction that the world should not be allowed to go up in a mushroom cloud as long as countries like Canada have vocal chords.”180 This conversion had not occurred overnight, requiring a year-and-a-half. As Green’s courage grew, his department generated tactics and policies to support his initiatives in the UN and in Cabinet. Arguments regarding Canadian sovereignty, disarmament successes, and improved bargaining positions delayed acquiring nuclear warheads. When Diefenbaker began to beat Green to the punch, Green buttressed the Prime Minister’s initiative. Clearly Green’s convictions were very different than a

177 Ibid, 8.
179 Cabinet Conclusions, 6 December 1960, 8.
year-and-a-half previous when he agreed with (or at least failed to oppose) his fellow Cabinet members regarding Canada’s nuclear trajectory. However, his new ardent views on disarmament were diametrically opposed to those of Pearkes and Harkness.
Conclusion

Howard Green was a man of conviction, and was described as such throughout his life. This thesis has applied this label to Green’s intellectual and political development through his evolving ideas about war from the Great War to 1960. Green felt an obligation to enlist in the First World War and believed in the righteousness of the Empire’s cause. Nearly a year in the trenches did not dampen his belief in the cause for which he and his comrade’s fought, and his pro-war rhetoric remained thick even after the conflict’s conclusion. When exiled to the Canadian Corps Infantry School as an instructor, Green felt guilty for being insulated from the dangers of the frontlines. His later transfer to the 6th Brigade as a staff learner calmed his anxiety and he excelled in his duties until war’s end. He remained proud of Canada’s victory, enjoying the triumphal march to the Rhine and rubbing it in when in the presence of young Germans. Green craved a promotion and was overjoyed when he received this recognition of performance while in the service of his country. He left Europe aware of the costs of war, but never doubted that armed conflict would continue to be a worthwhile endeavour under the right circumstances.

Green reaffirmed his conviction about the necessity of war and its proper prosecution during the Second World War. Though he understood the costs of war, he believed that a total war effort was necessary. When Mackenzie King proved unwilling, Green and his party lobbied unceasingly. The government’s reluctance to conscript Canadian males for overseas service is the most obvious example of this desire. Even at war’s end, Green continued to press for conscripts to be deployed in the Pacific theatre. Though unpopular amongst most Canadians, this commitment exemplified his continued belief in war as a legitimate part of foreign policy.
Green’s efforts shifted to other subjects at the end of the Second World War. He returned to his long-held interest in veterans’ affairs and fought hard for a more inclusive Veteran’s Charter. His continued pride for Canada’s veterans demonstrates no disgust with war. Moreover, Green’s statements during the Korean conflict demonstrate that, far from fearing war, he continued to believe in its necessity and that, when embarked upon, it needed to prosecuted to the fullest.

He made these provocative statements despite his considerable knowledge of advancements in nuclear arms. His interest in nuclear technology stretched back to 1946 when he fought for Parliamentary oversight of Canada’s atomic programs and policies. Over the next decade he received a remarkable education in atomic technology, including its effects if deployed in weaponry. Yet he remained unmoved by the destruction these weapons could wreak, and despite subsequent events (such as the test at Bikini Atoll) he did not embrace disarmament.

Interest in external affairs also remained a constant throughout his career. He acquired considerable knowledge on the subject but his early ideas remained undeveloped and contradictory. The Suez Crisis evoked these emotional responses and it was only after careful thought and guidance from External Affairs officials that Green’s love for the Commonwealth moderated to a less militant strain. That his long held views changed so quickly suggests that his intellectual ideals matched his new policies. The change was an evolutionary shift, not a revolution.

The most remarkable alteration to Green’s foreign policy concerned disarmament. Further scientific advancements regarding the impacts of nuclear war in the late 1950s convinced Green to pursue the cause of disarmament. New studies regarding the effects and global
distribution of fallout led Green to believe that nuclear war was no longer survivable. At the outset he remained uncomfortable with his new convictions. His first initiative at the UNGA was therefore cautious; but the unanimous passage of the Canadian resolution, as well as Canada’s expressed opposition to France’s nuclear weapon program, fortified Green’s courage and conviction. During 1960 Green provided Diefenbaker with means to delay a decision on whether to acquire nuclear warheads or to permit American forces to deploy them on Canadian soil, while concurrently pushing harder for progress at international disarmament negotiations. When the negotiations at the TNDC failed, Green persevered and again secured, at least in principle, what he desired: a promise to renew negotiations at the first available opportunity. While the countries which would compose the negotiating body and the principles that would govern its discussions, remained undefined, Canada and other countries attempted to shape the debate. Canada’s initiative failed in the end, but Green continued to push for disarmament – despite increasing Cabinet conflict – and thereby contributed to Diefenbaker’s failure to fulfil his promise to acquire nuclear weapons. Despite the ongoing turmoil in both Cabinet and the House of Commons it was only after Lester Pearson became Prime Minister in 1963 did Canada finally fulfilled its promise to accept nuclear weapons.¹

Green’s conversion in the summer of 1959 surprised many observers. The previous, linear narrative suggesting that Green’s opposition to atomic weaponry stemmed from an aversion to war developed in the trenches of the Western Front, is clearly incorrect. Understanding why individuals such as Green, Burns, and Robertson supported disarmament against such overwhelming opposition, and in Green’s case against his own past beliefs, is crucial to understanding why the Diefenbaker government behaved as it did. To date, authors

have generally focused on the Defender narrative. They have dismissed Green’s hopes as unreasonable and have concluded that he and his supporters were either naïve or irrational. While Critics in the late 1950s and early 1960s misjudged their surroundings, these men were intelligent and should not be dismissed as naïve. They viewed the world through a different lens than many of their contemporaries: one which dictated that they surmount incredible opposition or face imminent destruction. For better or worse, they were also in a position to try to do something about it. Although the nuclear Critics did not achieve their desired ends, historians need to carefully situate their subjects in historical context, resisting the temptation to paint simple portraits that can belie understanding when and why they developed the stances that they did: exchanging bayonets for UN resolutions can be natural and logical after all.
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¹ The treasure trove of documents in the City of Vancouver Archives includes Green’s personal letters and a variety of other material including his diaries and newspaper clippings. The Green family donated this material over a period of several years and each contribution was processed separately by the archive. More recently when these holding were amalgamated into the present fond (Add. MSS. 903) a new filing system seems to have been implemented. As a result, the citations from researchers who visited the fonds prior to this amalgamation are out of date. Unfortunately I have been unable to “translate” these old notes into the fond’s present-day organization for my own research. With this in mind, my footnotes are as detailed as possible to furnish researchers with precise information for any future studies drawing from or challenging this thesis.

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