Improving strategy for the Canadian Wildlife Service: A comparative study with the Parks Canada Agency and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans

by

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Author's declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Abstract

This research evaluates the development of strategy and planning undertaken by the three federal protected areas management organisations in Canada. These organisations and the protected areas they manage are: the Canadian Wildlife Service (National Wildlife Areas and Migratory Bird Sanctuaries), the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Oceans Act Marine Protected Areas), and the Parks Canada Agency (National Parks, National Marine Conservation Areas, and National Historic Sites).

As non-renewable resources become more valuable, urban centres expand, and the climate changes, protected areas will face an increasing number of threats, the mitigation of which will require significant new financial resources. In order to acquire these new resources, protected areas management organisations will have to compete with other aspects of the government’s agenda. In this research, strategy is identified as an important component of successful competition. A review of literature from various disciplines explains some of the main theories of strategy development: strategic planning, strategic management, and collaborative planning. Management planning for protected areas helps to understand the congruence between strategy and site management.

Using a qualitative approach, the research triangulates the results of interviews, reviews of documents, and participant-observation to evaluate the way that each of the organisations develops strategy and understands management planning activities. The research also includes a model strategic plan for the Canadian Wildlife Service protected areas network. The model plan stems from data collected during this research.

This research supports the results from a previous study (Foresta, 1985) that found Parks Canada (now the Parks Canada Agency, or PCA) has been actively pursuing a coherent strategy through systematic management planning since the late 1960s. The PCA can attribute a significant degree of its ongoing success in creating and managing National Parks to its consistent strategy and systematic planning efforts. Another important part of the PCA success has been its
external orientation, which demonstrates its awareness of the importance of maintaining public satisfaction and its high public profile.

No prior research on the development of strategy or of systematic planning at the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS) or the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) was uncovered. This research concludes that the CWS, which has many strategic plans on paper, has not actively pursued strategic or management planning. The lack of strategic thinking and planning contribute significantly to the relatively low budgets of the CWS, and to its low public profile. The DFO has decided to take a “learning approach” to its protected areas, by creating a set of pilot marine protected areas and then identifying the policies and procedures needed to manage the sites. The public profile of the DFO protected areas is even lower than that of the CWS. The CWS and the DFO are internally-oriented, do not have significant public outreach programs, long-range or strategic planning, and do not seem to have champions.

The most important contributors to the PCA’s success are the finite nature and the simplicity of their goals, which Parks staff can easily communicate to decision-makers and to the public. The external orientation of the PCA, demonstrated by extensive public outreach programming, such as natural history interpretation and the provision of camping opportunities, is also an important part of its success. Another important contributor, identified in this research, is the support of a small number of key political champions.

This research identifies means by which organisations could improve their competitiveness, including by improving public profile. The research highlights the importance of externally-focused strategic plans that include certain elements that are well-defined in the literature, and the importance of strategic thinking. The results suggest that there is a need for a new approach to developing strategy, and proposes the exploration of collaborative planning as a potential model. This research contributes to the academic literature and to planning practice by identifying key elements that created conditions of success for the PCA. The PCA experience highlights the importance of strategic thinking, in the context of developing a strategic plan.
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<td>CWS</td>
<td>Canadian Wildlife Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFO</td>
<td>Department of Fisheries and Oceans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFO SP</td>
<td>Department of Fisheries and Oceans Strategic Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Environment Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGO</td>
<td>Environmental Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBS</td>
<td>Migratory Bird Sanctuary (EC/CWS protected area)</td>
</tr>
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<td>NMCA</td>
<td>National Marine Conservation Area (PCA protected area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Park (PCA protected area)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPSP</td>
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<td>National Wildlife Area (EC/CWS protected area)</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
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<td>PA</td>
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<td>PASP</td>
<td><em>Protected Areas Strategic Plan</em> (CWS)</td>
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<td><em>Sea to Sea to Sea</em> (PCA NMCA System Plan)</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1 Context

The biological diversity of the Earth is an important component of nearly every human activity, from food production to the discovery of new pharmaceuticals, from breathing to recreation. Biological diversity (colloquially shortened to biodiversity) is, “what must be conserved if we do not want to lose the biological inheritance bequeathed to us” (Sarkar & Margules, 2002, p. 300). Sarkar and Margules argue that, “all endangered biological phenomena … can be accommodated” as long as there was an awareness that the “appropriate target of conservation action must always be a place, or a network of places” (Sarkar & Margules, 2002, p. 302 [emphasis added]).

Efforts to conserve various aspects of biodiversity have been ongoing for many years. What we call the conservation movement had its origins in the “very beginnings of the colonial era and concerns about falling game levels which resulted from changes in the natural environment caused by rapidly rising population levels in some countries” (Dasman, 1976, as cited in Kozlowski & Vass-Bowen, 1997, p. 245). As an organised endeavour, the conservation movement emerged fairly early in the post-European history of North America; after a slow expansion from its beginnings during the colonial era, the conservation movement supported the establishment of the world’s first national park in the United States in 1872 (US National Park Service, 2007). Canada followed soon thereafter (1885) by creating a national park in what was then the Northwest Territories (now known as Banff National Park in Alberta).

Concerted efforts to protect wildlife, or at least important game species, began soon after the establishment of national parks. In Canada, the first area of land set aside specifically for the conservation of wildlife was Last Mountain Lake, Saskatchewan (then known as Long Lake) in 1887 (Burnett, 1999). This demonstrates that Canadians have long realised that “wild life, [sic]
which constitutes one of our most valuable natural resources, can not [sic] exist in many places without the reservation of land and water areas for its needs” (Henderson, 1932, p. 1). The realisation that biodiversity is irreplaceable is also not new.¹ An early leader in the Canadian conservation movement asked:

Of what does our wild life [sic] consist; what is its value; what are the factors that are responsible for its reduction and ultimate extermination; what steps are we taking to conserve it; and how can we improve on present methods with a view to conservation of a valuable natural resource, the constituent parts of which cannot be replaced once they are lost? (Hewitt, 1921, p. 2)

Scientists and conservationists have addressed many of these questions, although the answers are not yet complete. One question, however, still requires a great deal of work: “How can we improve on present methods”?

In the years since the establishment of the first refuge at Last Mountain Lake in 1887, Canadian governments have carried out a series of actions aimed at protecting wildlife: National Parks began to protect wildlife and natural areas, the Canadian system of wildlife refuges expanded, a series of marine protected areas have been created by the Parks Canada Agency, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and the Canadian Wildlife Service. Conservationists realised that biodiversity was threatened by many things, and that “habitat loss is the most important factor causing the current species extinction event” (Fahrig, 1999, p. 87). Some of the reactions to this threat included the ratification of the Convention on Migratory Birds (1916), the 1973 Canada Wildlife Act, and the adoption of the federal Species at Risk Act (2002), which protected the most severely impacted species. However, reactions to the need for conservation have not always translated into successful action:


One particularly important promise was the *Tri-Council Statement of Commitment to Complete Canada’s Networks of Protected Areas*, in 1992 (Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, the Canadian Parks Ministers Council, and the Wildlife Ministers Council, 1992). The Councils, made up of federal, provincial, and territorial ministers responsible for the environment, parks, and wildlife, committed to completing Canada’s networks of representative protected areas by the year 2000. The *Statement* also committed governments to expanding other types of protected areas, such as those specifically for wildlife. Not long before the target date, Environment Canada itself acknowledged the need for action, “Canada remains at risk of losing more of its natural heritage. So we must take action to secure our natural legacy by recovering species at risk and saving habitat” (Environment Canada, 1998, p. 17).

Conservation of the natural environment is also an important element of planning practice, which is recognised in the Canadian Institute of Planners *Statement of Values*. The third clause of the *Statement* reads, “to value the natural and cultural environment. CIP members believe that both natural and cultural environments must be valued. They assume roles as stewards of these environments, balancing preservation with sustainable development” (Canadian Institute of Planners, 2005, n.p.). However, the natural environment has often been set aside in the face of competing priorities and points of view. Strategic planning, which addresses competition, may be one contribution that the discipline of planning can make to the improvement of biodiversity protection.
Even while environmental problems are widely recognised, creating appropriate responses to the problems remains difficult. The problems are ubiquitous and diverse, and creating policy responses is complicated by the fact that environmental problems have an “interaction with conventional economic or social problems” and environmental policy making is “also complicated by major uncertainties about what constitutes critical time horizons and ‘points of no return’; who should take responsibility as well as leadership roles ... and the consequences of the economic and political trade-offs for action or inaction” (Desveaux, Lindquist & Toner, 1991, p. 499). These uncertainties mean that civil servants involved in environmental policy making need tools to assist them to create viable conservation policy.

The realisation that efforts to protect biodiversity need to go beyond simply creating law is a long-standing one. In 1921, Hewitt (who headed the Park Service Wildlife Unit that was the predecessor of the Canadian Wildlife Service) wrote that:

under the peculiar conditions that exist on the North American continent [e.g. agriculture and railroads] … other measures than the promulgation of game laws, which at the best are difficult to enforce completely, are necessary to insure the preservation of what wild life remains. Of such protective measures by far the most important is the establishment of Wild-Life reserves, refuges, or sanctuaries in which native mammals and birds are protected. (Hewitt, 1921, p. 235)

Hewitt also stated that, “the provision of refuges is indispensable” (Hewitt, 1921, p. 19). More recently, Hockings (2003, p. 823) agreed with his statement saying, “protected areas are the cornerstone of most conservation strategies.” Protected areas, even when they are created to conserve a specific species or population, also protect the other wildlife and plants found within that area.

Extensive pressure to convert undeveloped land will likely continue to grow, and, “the resulting losses of habitat pose severe threats to biological diversity … One important conservation strategy is to establish a biological reserve network composed of a set of natural
reserves or parks” (Arthur, Haight, Montgomery, & Polasky, 2002, p. 81). The establishment of reserves or parks\(^2\) is, “the most effective tool for conserving biodiversity” (Lawler, White, & Master, 2003, p. 1762). However, we do not know “how much habitat must be conserved to ensure persistence of populations” (Fahrig, 2001, p. 65). According to Fahrig’s simulations, most species’ survival probabilities drop off dramatically when that species’ habitat threshold (modelled as survival probability vs. habitat amount) is crossed. For Fahrig, “this implies that predicting extinction thresholds before they are crossed is extremely important for conservation” (p. 70). Because the literature has not been able to predict extinction thresholds for all species, Fahrig ended with the conclusion that, “in summary, the simulations suggest that … the first priority for conservation must be habitat preservation and restoration” (p. 72).

So, if we want to ensure that biodiversity is conserved, and believe that protected areas are one of the best ways of going about it, how can we ensure that protected areas (PAs) are created and maintained? The process is complicated because, “many of the benefits of conserving natural areas are difficult to measure and are not exchanged in markets – consequently, the value of conserving, rather than developing, an area is often underestimated” (Dixon & Sherman, 1990, p. 3). In order to ensure that PAs are created and biodiversity is protected, “our responses to the biodiversity crisis will have to focus on questions of human organisation” (Brechin, Wilshusen, Fortwangler, & West, 2002, p. 42).

In Canada, the federal government has a variety of responsibilities for biodiversity protection. Federal protected area management organisations include the Parks Canada Agency (PCA)\(^3\), the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), and the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS), which is part of Environment Canada (EC).\(^4\) However, there are jurisdictional complications that occur because of the Constitutional division of powers. Because “the

\(^{2}\) Herein called protected areas, or PAs, for simplicity.

\(^{3}\) The Parks Canada Agency is an operational agency that reports to the Minister of the Environment. Environment Canada is the line department, the Ministry of the Environment.

\(^{4}\) Collectively, these are referred to as the PA organisations or the protected areas management organisations.
environment” was not an issue at the time of Confederation, it is unclear where jurisdiction lies.
Under the Constitution, residual power for terrestrial natural resources lies with the provinces.
Accordingly, the federal role in protecting wildlife and habitat is limited. Specifically,
“jurisdiction over the various groups of wildlife is not clearly stated in the Canadian constitution
and is characterised by divided responsibilities based in interpretation and ad hoc arrangements
arising from sometime convenience” (Munro, 1961, as cited in Loughrey, 1977a). However, this
restriction has not limited the federal government in the creation of a very large area of federal
estate in national parks, national wildlife areas and national bird sanctuaries.

The PCA may acquire land for National Parks (NPs) because the *Canada National Parks
Act* allows it to negotiate acquisitions with the provinces and with First Nations. The CWS has
authority to create Migratory Bird Sanctuaries (MBSs) because of the international treaty on
migratory birds, the *Migratory Bird Convention* (signed with the US in 1916, ratified using the
*Migratory Bird Convention Act* in 1917). The 1973 *Canada Wildlife Act* extended the mandate of
the CWS into wildlife matters of national interest, allowing the CWS to create National Wildlife
Areas (NWAs).

In addition to the terrestrial protected areas of the PCA (National Parks) and the CWS
(National Wildlife Areas and Migratory Bird Sanctuaries), all three PA organisations are able to
create marine protected areas (MPAs) because the marine environment is a clearly federal
responsibility. National Marine Conservation Areas (NMCAs) are created in both Canada’s
oceans and in the Great Lakes; the PCA must negotiate creation of NMCAs in a similar manner to
the National Parks. The DFO creates MPAs under the auspices of the *Oceans Act*. A 1994
amendment to the *Canada Wildlife Act* allows the CWS to create Marine Wildlife Areas (MWAs)

Strategy

Public organisations, such as PA organisations, develop strategies to compete for the
political recognition that they need for access to the scarce resources with which to do achieve
their goals (Boyne & Walker, 2004). Positive public awareness tends to lead to political currency and thus to resources. The federal organisations, such as the PA organisations, face competition both from other government agencies and from private sector organisations (Bryson, 1995). Public environmental organisations need a competitive advantage in order to attract resources needed to maintain environmental conservation. Accordingly, PA organisations must have a comprehensive understanding of their mission and stakeholders to know how to “sell” the services they provide. For example, as a federal manager of conservation areas, the CWS competes directly for funding (i.e., the federal government allocates the budgets for each of them) with the PCA and the DFO, and indirectly in the larger societal arena with environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) such as Ducks Unlimited or the Nature Conservancy of Canada, all of which are in the business of managing areas for conservation. Recently, the federal government granted a significant amount of money to the Nature Conservancy of Canada in order to acquire conservation lands, making ENGOs direct competitors with government conservation organisations. The CWS must therefore demonstrate that it not only provides value-for-money, but that it can play a role distinct enough from the other conservation area managing organisations to warrant a separate organisation. In addition, the protected areas organisations must compete against other government priorities: health care, defence, job creation, to name a few. How, then, are public sector protected areas organisations to gain a competitive advantage? However, organisations should account for the potential that the importance of competitive advantage may only be a temporary one. If all public sector organisations were to adopt the same degree of sophistication in their strategies, it is possible that the benefits of developing a strategy may no longer hold. Nonetheless, a strategic document is currently considered an important component of any organisation’s plans.

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5 This definition of competition takes the point of view of the organisation and its success in meeting specific goals assigned by the government of the day. A different, more holistic view would take the point of view of the end goal of conservation more generally. In this light, the funds given to the Nature Conservancy of Canada is an unqualified victory.
While the PA organisations have faced certain mutual challenges in trying to conserve biodiversity, there are differences. Although the missions of the three PA organisations are similar, the resources given to each are not. The Canadian Nature Federation (now Nature Canada) found that, while Parks Canada spent $8.84 per hectare for managing protected areas (including revenue earned from the provision of visitor services), the CWS spent only $0.15 per hectare to manage its protected lands (Canadian Nature Federation, 2002). Since the publication of that report, the budget for CWS PAs rose to approximately $0.35 per hectare, in large part due to the addition of funds for managing species at risk. However, the CWS budget as a whole, and the protected areas budget in particular, remains well below that of the PCA (see Chapter 4 for more details). The DFO protected areas budget was somewhere in between that of the CWS and the PCA, although the area protected was much smaller, as will be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. How did such a significant discrepancy in financial resources and management capability arise?

The literature on competition indicates that strategic planning is a model that could be used to develop competitive advantage (Powell, 1992). Strategic planning is a way to promote the profile of an organisation (Bryson, Freeman, & Roering, 1986; Steiner, Gross, Ruffolo, & Murray, 1994; Liedtka, 1998). Additionally, strategic planning can aid in the development of an understanding of the “dynamics of strategy” which is necessary for establishing the best approach to achieve organisational goals (Wechsler & Backoff, 1987, p. 34). In addition to strategic planning, strategic management (Bonn & Christodoulou, 1996) and collaborative planning (Healey, 2006) both provide approaches for developing strategy.

An organisation needs a strategy to be able to achieve its goals. However, a generic strategy, based on the literature, is not enough; the literature indicates that using strategic planning to approach this set of challenges provides a well-developed research framework for identifying the key issues, as well as a guide for the creation of strategies that are more likely to be successful. The literature suggests that part of the reasons strategic planning has not proved to
be as valuable as predicted is the fact that environments change too quickly to be able to adapt written plans. Strategic planning could thus be particularly applicable in the case of land-owning conservation organisations: because they exist to hold land for its conservation value in perpetuity, the dynamism of the organisation’s political environment would be limited. However, the number of conservation-oriented organisations that have had their strategic planning reviewed in academic journals is low.  

An organisation also requires strategic thinking. While strategic planning is described as a potentially significant component of success, there is a decline in the number of articles that describe strategic planning in the public sector. This prompts questions about whether strategic planning continues to be used as a model of strategy development. Alternatively, are there other models of strategy development being used in the public sector?

There are many definitions of strategic planning, and it is often identified as a series of steps, such as the “Normative Steps in Strategic Planning,” that include mission, objectives, external environmental analysis, internal environmental analysis, development of strategic alternatives, strategy selection, implementation, and control of the strategy (Ginter, Rucks, & Duncan, 1985). Strategic planning is of benefit to public and not-for-profit agencies for many reasons. Hendrick (2003, p. 506) reported that her “findings are consistent with evidence from the private sector that firm performance is improved in organisations with more formal, comprehensive, and rational planning processes.”

1.2 Terminology

There are a variety of terms used throughout this work, derived from planning and management literatures. Many of these terms sound quite similar, although there are some key

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6 A search of the ISI Web of Knowledge using the term “strategic planning” yields 2,897 articles. Qualifying the “strategic planning” search with “national park” identifies 7 articles, “protected area” results in 11 articles, and “wilderness” finds 2 articles.
differences in use. As discussed above, there are also multiple definitions for the terms in the literature, an indication that the field is still evolving. In reviewing the literature, it is clear that some of the terms below are used interchangeably. While the terms will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, this section provides a brief overview of the main terms for the purposes of clarity.

Strategic planning: a method that considers factors inside and outside the organisation when creating a plan.

Strategic management: uses a similar method to strategic planning, but the final plan includes consideration of the implementation of the plan.

Strategic thinking: involves most of the strategising and planning components of strategic planning, but does not result in a written plan.

Collaborative planning: a process of strategy development that focuses on communication between the parties.

1.3 Goals of the Research

Harmon (1994) advocates creating relationships between protected area managers and researchers to improve protected areas, and he even states that this partnership is critical to the success of protected areas. The current research employs a qualitative paradigm, which advocates a reciprocal learning partnership, and fits within Harmon’s suggested relationship.

The research described in this thesis has several purposes. First, through a review of the literature, it aims to discover the historical, political, social, and affective factors that have influenced the strategy development in private and public sector organisations. Second, that initial information informs questions posed to key informants within each of the three PA management organisations, as well as a few individuals who work in related environmental non-government organisations. Through interviews, document analysis, and participant-observation, the researcher
forms a comprehensive understanding of the planning and organisational dynamics of the PA organisations. Third, the research data identifies some of the factors that could promote or impede the development of strategy in conservation agencies. Finally, the results are evaluated for their potential to contribute to the academic literature, and to planning at the PA organisations. To illustrate the potential contribution of a carefully considered strategy to PA organisations, the evaluation is used as the basis of a model strategic plan for the CWS.

This project emphasises the CWS for a variety of reasons. The researcher had excellent access to research participants due to employment in the CWS. Access to key people in the other two organizations was more limited. There was also a lack of published research on the CWS as a subject, making the CWS a more unexplored subject for study (however, CWS scientists have an extensive record of publication on wildlife research, as described in Burnett, 1999). Finally, the need for attention to the CWS’ network of protected areas is encapsulated in the following citation from a consultant’s report:

The CWS’s NWA network functions as a pale shadow of its initial intended vision. The network is operating in survival mode characterised by declining ecological integrity, lack of resources to provide effective management, poor public profile7 and weak operational links with other current conservation programs. (Turner, 2000, p. 2)

The DFO was not subjected to a similar degree of scrutiny because of a lack of access to internal information. A small number of participants, coupled with a complete lack of archival information, meant that the researcher was unable to prepare conclusions based in empirical data.

Ultimately, the goal of the research is to identify some means by which competitiveness in environmental conservation organisations could be improved. If it is true that setting aside areas of land is the best tool for conserving biodiversity (and this research assumes that is the

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7 The low public profile of the CWS continues: a recent poll by Ipsos-Reid, commissioned by Environment Canada, found that only 43% of Canadians were “somewhat familiar” or “very familiar” with the Canadian Wildlife Service. It is interesting to note that the same survey found that only 61% of Canadians were “somewhat familiar” or “very familiar” with Environment Canada (Ipsos-Reid, 2007).
case), then improving the ability of conservation organisations to attract funding for effective management would be a substantial contribution to conserving biodiversity.

1.4 Overview of the Research

The research carried out for this study is qualitative, presented in the form of case studies of the three PA management organisations in the Canadian federal government. A short, selective, history of each organisation is presented because, “phenomena are not only influenced by the factors of time and context but derive their very meaning from them” (Guba, 1985, p. 99). However, the focus of the research is on the current planning systems and plans in place in each organisation. The three organisations have broadly similar mandates in terms of their missions to protect areas of land and water. Each organisation has their own specific criteria for creating protected areas, but all are guided by legislation created by the Parliament of Canada. By focusing on one level of government, some of the variables are controlled (e.g., the budgets were allocated by the same decision-makers at each point in time).

The research questions ask if strategic planning positively influences the political and financial competitiveness of a protected areas organisation. Specific questions about strategic planning include:

- is strategic planning a technique that should be used by environmental conservation organisations?
- do those organisations understand strategic planning?
- do documents published by those organisations demonstrate the use of strategic planning or other approaches to developing strategy? And,
- does the management of the organisations’ protected areas networks demonstrate the use of strategic planning or other approaches to developing strategy?

Specific research methods include:
• review of current government documents;
• review of archival documents, with a focus on documents relating to planning and resources given to the protected areas;
• semi-structured interviews with research participants (see Appendix 1 for a list of interview questions);
• researcher’s observation of day-to-day operations at the CWS.

Documents are reviewed in order to obtain an overview of what policies the protected areas are operating under, to identify interview questions, and to create an understanding of some of the historical influences on the PA organisations. Interview questions solicit information and opinion from individuals involved in the day-to-day operation of the protected areas networks. Because there is a substantial amount of unpublished information held by a relatively small number of people, interviews are the logical research method. Finally, the opportunity to undertake a period of observation at the CWS means that the researcher’s conclusions are substantiated with an understanding of the day-to-day operations of the national protected areas office, and the constraints placed on one of the organisations involved in the study (the PCA was approached with a similar proposal, without success).

Strategies need to be evaluated, but there is “no fixed and universally applicable set of criteria for evaluating whether improvement has occurred” as a result of strategic planning (Boyne & Walker, 2004, p. 368). Accordingly, the research includes the development of a specific strategic planning evaluation framework for the cases under study. Also presented is an evaluation of the effectiveness of the strategic plans, using an evaluation model from Dyson & Foster (1980).
1.5 Considerations and Limitations

The original descriptors of the naturalistic paradigm write, “if it is true (as we surely believe) that inquiry is inevitably value determined, then any given inquiry will necessarily serve some value agenda” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 9). The researcher’s value agenda is that protected areas provide a valuable service to the biosphere. It is important, then, to identify ways that the PA organisations continue to provide those important services. According to Lincoln & Guba (1985, p. 37) it is impossible to identify causation, because, “all entities are in a state of mutual simultaneous shaping.” Accordingly, the conclusions can only be generalised in limited circumstances, but they may provide some guidance for other PA organisations.

The discussion of the DFO planning efforts was constrained by the fact that only two individuals were willing to be interviewed. There were also few recent documents available - especially those related to the DFO - in the National Archives. No documents were located for any period that the DFO had been planning and managing MPAs. In addition, all of the PA management organisations reported financial figures at a high level, so there was a lack of precise figures. Information was somewhat limited by the fact that very few participants had been involved in PA management for more than five years.

There was some debate among research participants as to whether or not the CWS protected areas could be considered on their own, or if they could only be considered within the context of the CWS in Environment Canada. Responses from participants did not resolve the debate. The researcher refers to “CWS” in the majority of the discussion, for reasons of space and clarity. The CWS also pre-dates Environment Canada, and using the term increases the consistency of references.

While the research focuses on a narrow range of management techniques, it is important to remember a warning given by Henry Mintzberg, who “believe[s] our greatest mistake in dealing with organisations … is in pretending that there is “one best way” to manage every
organisation” (Mintzberg, 1989). While it is obvious that, in accordance with Mintzberg, there are many ways to manage an organisation, this research focuses on a strategic planning approach, as that has been the dominant paradigm in organisational management. Finally, it is important to note that the protected areas professionals apparently already know many of the criticisms and suggestions made in this work. In many cases, they simply lack the resources to take action.

1.6 Chapter Outline

Chapter 2 is a review of the literature, focusing on strategic planning and the alternative approaches of strategic management and collaborative planning. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology, including reasons for selecting a qualitative approach and for the choice of case studies. Chapter 3 also includes a discussion of the research methods used in this study. Chapter 4 describes a brief history of each case study organisation. Chapters 5 and 6 present the research results. Chapter 5 concentrates on the strategic planning processes and strategic plans at each PA organisation, while Chapter 6 discusses broader strategic issues in the context of network and site management, with consideration of a potential alternative approach to PA planning in Canada. Chapter 7 summarises the research, identifying some recommendations for the PA organisations in the study. The Appendices include a short chronology of some of the highlights of each organisation’s history, a map of federal protected areas in Canada, organisation charts that illustrate the current structure of each PA organisation, a list of research questions, and a model strategic plan created for the CWS protected areas network.

1.7 Major contributions of the Research

This research discusses some issues related to long-term planning and strategy development that face protected areas management organisations in Canada. By evaluating the existing planning efforts and comparing them to current literature-based best practices, the
research project provides suggestions and guidance to protected areas managers and management organisations for means by which they can improve their competitiveness over the long term. The research identifies a lack of strategic planning in the case study organisations and makes some suggestions for a new approach to developing strategy.

Although it is impossible to prove definitively the conclusion that strategy and systematic planning have been the source of the PCA’s success in creating and maintaining National Parks, the strong support for this argument from all of the PCA respondents indicates that there might be some significant gains made if the CWS and the DFO were to adopt a more systematic approach. This may be a lesson that other protected areas management organisations could also benefit from. Strategic thinking was a significant component of the success of the PCA, as they have enacted a series of business plans to implement the original strategy created by Parks Canada. Extensive collaborative relationships built by the PCA also contribute to its success.

Based on the success of the PCA, a conservation-minded government organisation should adopt a long-range strategy to create the conditions for success. In addition, protected areas practitioners should recognise that, in order to receive the resources that they require, they should be externally-oriented and, accordingly, they have to engage effectively with the public. Examples of this include on-site interpretation, public participation in planning processes, media coverage, and working with advocates. In addition, the organisations must monitor the impact of their outreach activities, especially in terms of the number of people that benefit from the protected areas.
2. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Literature related to strategy exists in several fields. The primary fields explored in this document are public administration, public policy, business, and, of course, planning. In terms of developing strategy, whether it is for an organisation or for a particular project, strategic planning has been the dominant paradigm (as discussed below). Accordingly, the first part of this chapter discusses the development of strategic planning as a tool. The second part of the chapter reviews the potential utility of strategic planning in the context of environmental conservation, and a brief overview of protected areas planning more generally. The chapter ends with a discussion of contemporary planning theory, and how strategic planning relates to several current theories, and an introduction to collaborative planning.

2.1.1 The origins of Strategic Planning

The beginnings of strategic planning are in the military sector. Indeed, the term strategy, derived from the Greek strategos, describes the rank of general (Simpson et al., 1989). According to the Oxford English Dictionary (Simpson, et al., 1989), the first modern use of strategy was in 1810 in the Military Dictionary. By 1837, non-military users adopted the term. The military sector was an area where strategy was highly effective (Baker, 1992) and was one of the few non-business sectors to adopt strategic planning before the 1970s (Bryson, 1995). Business has since adopted the term, and labelled it corporate planning. However, strategic planning is a technique that can successful in any organisation, regardless of orientation (Bryson & Einsweiler, 1988).

Strategic planning emerged out of corporate long-range planning, beginning in the late 1950s (So, 1984). The first strategic planning in the public sector was the introduction of Planning Programming Budgeting Systems in the United States Department of Defence (Boyne, Gould-Williams, Law, & Walker, 2004). Through to the 1970s, strategic planning was mainly a
reactive, retrospective process (Gluck, 1986). In the 1980s, there was a decrease in the popularity of private sector strategic planning, exemplified by General Electric dismissing half of its strategic planning department (Gluck, 1986). Concurrent with the decline of strategic planning in the private sector, adoption of strategic planning in the public sector gained momentum (Prebble, 1983; Bozeman, 1983).

Some of the influences at this time included Olsen and Eadie’s 1982 classic *The Game Plan*, and a 1987 issue of the *Journal of the American Planning Association* that featured discussion of strategic planning in the public sector. While strategy originated in the military, strategic planning as we now know it originated with the corporate sector, and the idea of environmental scanning had roots in Lewis Mumford’s work in urban planning (Kaufman & Jacobs, 1987).

### 2.1.2 The Development of Strategic Planning

Broadly speaking, a strategy “is a comprehensive plan or stream of decisions that relates the strategic advantage of a firm with its external opportunities and threats in order to accomplish organisational goals and objectives” (Stead & Stead, 2004, p. 104). Strategy “defines the relationship of the total organisation to its environment and ... gives guidance to administrative and operational activities on an ongoing basis” (Denhardt, 1986, p. 179). Although they are similar (Table 2-1), strategic planning is different from the more traditional rational-comprehensive planning (which is seen as mainly setting goals and objectives), through the way it “emphasizes the present and future context within which the organisation will operate, and it does so in order to arrive at specific steps which can be taken today in light of that knowledge” (Denhardt, 1986, p. 179).
Table 2-1 Five steps in developing a plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Plan (Barry, 1998)</th>
<th>Rational-Comprehensive Plan (Hodge, 1998)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Get organised</td>
<td>Identify problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review history and current environment</td>
<td>Design alternatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify the desired strategic direction</td>
<td>Compare/evaluate alternatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refine the strategy and adopt it</td>
<td>Develop plan of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement the plan</td>
<td>Maintain plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than forty years after its widespread adoption, strategic planning remains a somewhat amorphous concept. As Heracleous states, “strategic planning is often used to refer to a programmatic, analytical thought process ... although there are frequent usages of the terms in the above ways, various authors still use these terms in fundamentally different ways” (1998, p. 481). This confusion is illustrated by the variety of definitions listed in Table 2-2.

Table 2-2 Selected definitions of strategic planning over time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Planning is the design of a desired future and of effective ways of bringing it about.”</td>
<td>(Ackoff, 1970, p. 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“a tool to aid management in strategic decision making.”</td>
<td>(Lorange, 1980, p. 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“a disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions shaping the nature and direction of governmental activities”</td>
<td>(Olsen &amp; Eadie, 1982, p. 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Strategic planning focuses specifically on a government corporation or agency and on what it can do to improve its performance.”</td>
<td>(Bryson, Freeman, &amp; Roering, 1986, p. 65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a “disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organisation … is, what it does, and why it does it.”</td>
<td>(Bryson, 1995, p. x)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the most significant innovations of strategic planning is the external environmental analysis, also called an *environmental scan* or otherwise identified by the question *how are we doing?* (So, 1984). Other key differences are the emphasis on clarification of the mission, orientation toward the future (Steiner et al., 1994) and a focus on action (Bryson & Roering, 1988a). The Harvard policy model is the most widely used version of strategic planning, especially its environmental scan model, known by the acronym *SWOT*. The Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) model is also used independently of strategic planning in some instances (for example, see Houben, Lenie, & Vanhoof, 1999; Paliwal, 2006; Witte, 2006). The SWOT model focuses directly on internal factors (strengths and weaknesses) and external factors (opportunities and threats) that affect the strategy of the organisation. Kaufman & Jacobs (1987) find that SWOT is the model that transfers best to public sector strategic planning.

The literature on strategic planning suggests that many private-sector organisations greatly decreased their strategic activities and analyses in the 1980s. Instead, organisations were “increasingly engaged in activities that [were] more in the nature of issue management rather than an episodic ‘strategic planning’ activity … This integrated cycle was complemented by a continuous scanning activity coupled to an issue management process” (Camillus, 2003, p. 108). Camillus also discusses the importance of communication during the planning process.

Dean and Sharfman (1996) ask what creates effective decisions, hypothesising that there are two control variables: procedural rationality and political behaviour, and that rational procedures lead to decisions that are more effective. They report that, “there is limited evidence that strategic decision-making processes influence decisions’ effectiveness” (Dean & Sharfman, 1996, p. 368). Their study of 24 companies in 16 different industries finds that, as predicted,
procedural rationality is “positively related to decision effectiveness” while political behaviour is “negatively related to effectiveness” (p. 387). They conclude that, “environmental instability and quality of decision implementation play important roles in influencing decision effectiveness” (p. 389) but they are unable to determine the relative importance of each variable.

Table 2-3 Models of strategic thinking and strategic planning in the literature (Heracleous, 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mintzberg</td>
<td>strategic thinking should precede strategic planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter</td>
<td>strategic thinking is (and should be) analytical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Dutch Shell</td>
<td>strategic planning is to improve strategic thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonn &amp; Christodoulou</td>
<td>strategic planning has evolved into strategic thinking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Heracleous (2003) finds four major views in the literature (Table 2-4), although he thinks that strategic planning and strategic thinking are interrelated; both are necessary for strategic management and each on its own is necessary, but insufficient. Instead of the contrasting model, Heracleous (p. 50) proposes a model of “normative, but achievable, best practice”. In Heracleous’ model:

strategic thinking and planning occur iteratively over time, where there is a continual quest for novel and creative strategies which can be born in the minds of strategists or can emerge from the grass roots; as well as employment of analytical processes to determine such issues as the strategies’ desirability and feasibility, and to plan for their realization.

(p. 50)

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8 Procedural rationality is defined as “the extent to which the decision process involves the collection of information relevant to the decision and the reliance upon analysis of this information in making the choice” in their study (Dean & Sharfman, 1996, p. 373).
In the 1990s, strategic planning became increasingly recognised as a part of good strategic management (Bonn & Christodoulou, 1996), rather than as an independent process. The shift from planning to management is identified as a “reconceptualization” (Montanari et al., 1989).

The literature also reports a shift of responsibility, a switch from planning staff to managers; a process where corporate planners’ roles shifted from “doing” the planning to co-ordinating planning done by managers (Bonn & Christodoulou, 1996). The literature recommends that planners develop for themselves a role supporting the managers’ planning activities, in order to stay involved in the strategy process (Wechsler & Backoff, 1988).

Grant (2003) reports that the balance of evidence does not indicate that strategic planning is in decline (referring to one of strategic planning’s most prominent critics, Henry Mintzberg), but rather that there are “fundamental changes in the ways in which companies undertake their strategic planning” (Grant, 2003, p. 494). The evidence presented by Grant (2003, p. 512) points to the possibility that the debate over whether strategies are planned or emergent are the result of the “perpetuation of misconceptions of the reality of strategic planning” and instead, the strategic plans prepared by large companies over the period of the late 1990s are best described as “planned emergence.”

Strategic planning has survived these challenges and remains a highly cited model of planning. It is a model widely used in both the private and public sectors. However, there are some differences between the private sector strategic planning and management (the main source of the above descriptions) and public sector strategy. The following section describes some of the conditions required for successful public sector strategic planning.

2.2 Public Sector Strategic Planning

The previous section broadly describes the development of strategic planning. The following section describes some of the specific aspects of strategic planning in the public sector.
Why differentiate between public and private sectors? It has long been suggested that management in the two sectors was different enough that direct transfer of management tools would be inappropriate. Factors such as considering a broad set of stakeholders (Bryson & Roering, 1988a), institutional setting, personnel system, marketing situation, traditions (Rogers, 1981), dedication to the public interest (Seasons, 1991), public goods and market failures (Perry & Rainey, 1988), bureaucratization (Hendrick, 2003) and culture (Eldridge, 1989) set apart the public sector, although Boyne (2002) states that the main distinction is ownership. Boyne and Walker (2004, p. 232) suggest three substantial issues that decrease the transferability of private sector strategies to the public sector:

- false conflicts between strategy typologies that are supposedly competing but are actually complementary;
- simplistic and unidimensional classification systems that seek to locate different organisations in mutually exclusive boxes; and,
- a failure to recognize the distinctive characteristics of management in the public sector.

The strategic planning literature is much better developed for the private sector (Boyne & Walker, 2004); although the research on public sector strategic planning has increased, “most studies focus on organisations in the private sector” (Hendrick, 2003, p. 491). What are the differences between public and private management? Among other factors, public sector managers are often not the ones making policy, since policy is typically created by elected officials (Shapek & Richardson, 1989) and the constraints of legislation limit the flexibility available to public sector managers. However, the literature also states that public management and private management really are similar. At least as far back as 1975, the literature suggests that increasing government regulation of private sector activities, coupled with an ideology of increasingly business-like public management, mean that the two forms of management are not

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9 This view may be an American one. In the Canadian system, public sector employees often lead policy, although final decisions always rest in the hands of the government. Steurer and Martinuzzi (2005) report a similar leadership role in Europe.
distinct (Murray, 1975). More recently, Boyne (2002) reviews the conclusions of 34 studies and finds that although there are differences between public and private sectors, “the available evidence does not provide clear support for the view that public and private management are fundamentally dissimilar in all important aspects” (p. 118). Accordingly, this research adopts the principle that management techniques are largely transferable (although there are some accommodations that may need to be made). The literature from strategic planning experiences in both the private and public sector help to enlighten the research process and findings.

Widespread adoption of strategic planning by the public sector in North America began in the early 1980s, concurrent with its decline in the private sector. By 1991, over 264 US state agencies had adopted strategic planning (Barry, 1994). However, this adoption may have only lasted a decade. Brehney (1991) suggests that deregulation under Thatcher ended strategic planning in the UK. Increasing emphasis on balanced budgets and an ideological focus on reducing government made it seem appropriate to seek management techniques from the private sector in North America (Goldsmith, 1997; Barry, 1994). Devolution of responsibility from the federal government to state governments in the US is a “compelling” reason for the use of strategic planning in government, though the conditions had “long been inviting” (Olsen & Eadie, 1982). A comparable process in Canada is not described in the literature.

Some authors argue that “productive organisations … have much in common whether they happen to be corporations in the private sector of society or government agencies in the public sector” (Summer, 1980, p. 3), thus indicating that management techniques should be interchangeable. Strategic planning is appealing because it has a high degree of perceived success, as “companies that adopt planning programs are more successful than they were before. Given results such as these, public sector organisations are now beginning to evaluate the applicability of strategic planning to their agencies” (Denhardt, 1986, p. 179).

10 There was no comparable Canadian study. The conditions under which strategic planning was popularised in Canada thus remain unclear.
Other factors, such as the proliferation of computers and the development of non-quantitative planning techniques, facilitate the use of strategic planning in organisations that cannot afford a planning department (Mulhare, 1999). In the 1990s, strategic planning also re-emerged as an important management technique in the private sector (Brehney, 1991).

Table 2-4 A public-sector strategic planning process
(Bryson & Roering, 1988a, p. 11)

| Initial agreement (purpose, who should be involved, topics to be addressed, etc.) |
| Identify mandates confronting agency |
| Clarify of mission and values |
| In parallel: identify external opportunities and threats, identify internal strengths and weaknesses |
| Identify strategic issues |
| Develop strategy (followed by implementation, then evaluation) |
| Describe organisation’s potential future |

Reasons for public agencies to engage in strategic planning include: providing clarity and direction, helping to choose among competing priorities, and for helping to cope with “unexpected shifts in the environment” (Denhardt, 1986, p. 179). Although the public administration literature shows scepticism about the adoption of business management techniques (Boyne, 2002), Boyne concludes that the consideration of strategic planning (or other rational planning methods) is appropriate, but the imposition of such processes on public sector agencies is not (Boyne, 2001). A public sector strategic planning process is summarised in Table 2-5.

Denhardt did indicate that there were some differences between public and private sector organizations, so managers should be cautious about adopting private sector models without careful consideration of those differences.
Public sector managers may have two advantages over the private sector: the slower pace of change, and the realisation that increased inclusiveness was needed in processes (Kissler, Fore, Jacobsen, Kittredge, & Stewart, 1998).

Mulhare (1999) attributes part of the adoption of public sector strategic planning to the concurrent professionalisation of not-for-profit management. However, the success of the strategic planning efforts in her case study was limited. Many organisations adopted strategic planning because of direction from their funding agencies (as has been found in other studies: Boyne, 2001; Bowman, 2003; Llewellyn & Tappin, 2003), rather than under their own initiative. In the end, it was only the larger organisations – who had been using strategic planning all along – that continued to use strategic planning when it lost its ‘trend’ appeal (Mulhare, 1999).

One discussion not found in the literature reviewed for this research is the question of decision-making power. While corporations have a board of directors to report to, the day-to-day operation of the company is under the control of the company itself. Accordingly, if the company sponsors a strategic planning process, the final decisions and implementation rest in the hands of the company and its staff. In contrast, decision-making power in the public sector does not rest in the hands of a unit director. Inevitably, public servants must respond to the priorities of the government of the day. For example, spending cuts (or increases) can happen for political reasons, rather than a process where budgets are decided on a rational basis. As a result, while Ministries or units within Ministries can undertake strategic planning, the staff carrying out the planning process will not be in control of many of the factors required to implement the plans. This poses an additional challenge for a process that is frequently prone to failure (Bryson, 1995).

2.2.1 Public Sector Governance

An issue that arose, to some degree, in parallel with public sector strategic planning is the more general issue of public sector governance and public sector reform. Perhaps most famously, this took the form of the New Public Management (NPM) in the United Kingdom, which also
spread to other countries, such as Denmark (Greve, 2006). Ferlie & Andresani (2006) argue that NPM and “‘Third Way’ ideas” are the two dominant models in use to explain public management reform. The NPM model includes such concepts as greater use of private-sector mechanisms, stronger management and weaker professions and unions (Ferlie & Andresani, 2006), and results-based management (Swiss, 2005). Generally, these approaches put more emphasis on strategic planning, outcomes as a measure of performance, customer/client satisfaction, and more “cross-functional” teams (Swiss, 2005). While this is not the sole issue that arose in the broad field of public sector governance, it is the major issue found in the course of this review. Others issues include decentralisation (De Vries, 2000), co-production with the third sector (Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006), and increased emphasis on public involvement in government (Boyte, 2005).

2.3 The Impact of Strategic Planning

The impacts of strategic planning can be both positive and negative, depending on many factors including the circumstances under which the plans are developed, and who the intended audience is. The following section describes some of those impacts, both positive and negative, and the factors that promote each, with a particular focus on how the factors may apply to environmental conservation organisations.

2.3.1 Benefits of Strategic Planning

In evaluating the success of strategic planning, the most critical factor is the direction set by, and the involvement of, the chief executive of the organisation (Olsen & Eadie, 1982). Also important are: the availability of resources, limiting planning to a small number of functions, prior experience/existing expertise in planning (Boyne & Walker, 2004) and formalization (Pearce, Robbins, & Robinson, 1987). Strategic planning can be a way of changing the balance of

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12 The government of Canada has been increasingly adopting results-based management in its departments, including Environment Canada.
power in an organisation, especially where the staffers are mainly professionals (Baker, 1992; Llewellyn & Tappin, 2003). Generating new ideas is another key result of strategic planning processes. Indeed, “ideas are what strategy is all about” (Liedtka, 1998). An important step towards proper implementation of strategy is the ability to “define and visualise processes” (Cascella, 2002, p. 63).

Management involvement also extends to their commitment to creating a strategic plan. Sometimes a great deal of time is required from executives and senior management, but this can be quite beneficial to the organisation. Campbell quotes one of the four-star generals involved in a strategic planning process at the United States Air Force, who said, “the fact that we were locked in this room and they threw pizzas at us and wouldn’t let us out until we finished achieved a sense of commitment from the participants that was very useful” (Campbell, 2002, p. 442).

Competition is one of the drivers underlying strategic planning. Firms undertake strategic planning in order to gain a competitive advantage over their rivals. In the public sector, competition is not as obvious, as there is no overt market within which organisations interact. Governments have limited resources and all public organisations compete with one another for those resources (Gortner, 1981). A first test of the assumption that more resources increase the likelihood of strategic planning finds that increased resources does improve the chances of having formal planning documents (Boyne & Walker, 2004). Strategic planning can aid in improving the competitiveness of an organisation, and it is able to aid in understanding the “dynamics of strategy” which is necessary for establishing the best strategy for achieving organisational goals (Wechsler & Backoff 1987).

Ensuring adequate resources is a constant challenge for public and not-for-profit agencies, and conservation organisations are no different in this. Boyne and Walker (2004) write that, a “major part of the strategy focus of public organisations is ensuring that they have sufficient revenues” (p.242). While Boyne finds that empirical evidence only moderately supports the conclusion that increased resources lead to better services, he does suggest that the evidence
likely underestimates the positive impact of resource availability (Boyne, 2003). Strategic planning exists to create the means to attract new resources. Funding is a, even the, major challenge for protected areas organisations, even in locales where the size of the area protected is considered adequate ecologically. Another resource that conservation agencies often lack is political attention (Fischman, 2003). Strategic planning could draw internal political attention (e.g. from executives/senior management), creating ‘buy-in’ among the people charged with implementing the plan (Burstein, 1999).

A positive facet for public strategic planning is the slower pace of change in that sector (Kissler, et al., 1998). Making and implementing decisions can take a very long time in conservation. In a memo from 1947, H. F. Lewis of the Dominion Wildlife Service discusses a proposal to survey the Northwest Territories for areas that should be set aside as bird sanctuaries (Lewis, 1947). Implementing the Northwest Territories Protected Areas Strategy,13 in effect what Lewis had proposed, began in 2005.

| Table 2-5 Guidelines for public sector practice in strategic planning

“Avoid hype” around innovation

Agencies need a “credible, well-communicated, reason for introducing strategic planning.”

Strategic planning must have a tangible result.

Strategic directions and visions need the support of resources.

Continuous support derived from management and elected representatives.

A clear, easily communicated planning process.

Planners should respect existing departmental “turf”

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13 The NWT PAS is a collaboration between governments and local communities to offset the impacts of the proposed Mackenzie Valley pipeline. See www.nwtwildlife.com/pas/ for more information.
The large-scale ownership of land, as is the case in resource management agencies, can create an ideal environment for very long range planning (Seasons, 1991). Seasons identifies seven factors that facilitate strategic planning in the public sector (Table 2-6). In a meta-analysis of public sector strategic planning studies, Boyne (2001) reports, “a majority of the evidence shows that planning works” (p. 79). Further, his analysis finds that there are many unresolved issues, which means that caution is required when transferring private sector planning to the public sector. Boyne concludes that, “although planning is, on average, a contributor to organisational success, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for high performance …” (p. 85), the implication being that it is acceptable to encourage public sector organisations to explore strategic planning, but not to impose the process on them.

Miller and Cardinal (1994) control their evaluation of strategic planning for a variety of factors such as firm size and capital intensity. They report that previous researchers, such as Henry Mintzberg, who had concluded that planning was not generally beneficial, “appear to have been incorrect” (p. 1661). Further, they find that “it appears that methodological differences across studies have been largely responsible for the inconsistent findings reported in the literature and largely responsible for the debate concerning the value of strategic planning” (p. 1662). Boyd (1991) reports that research supports the idea of benefits occurring from strategic planning. Boyd reminds us that there are usually significant measurement errors in research, which result in underreporting of benefits. Liedtka also sees some value in strategic planning. To her, the value is in the role that “strategic planning processes play ... to legitimize a developmental dialogue around strategic issues, the outcome of which is both better strategy for an organisation and better developed strategic thinking capabilities in its members” (Liedtka, 1998, p. 124). Even Mintzberg et al. find some benefit to strategic planning, although their benefits are faint praise:

We function best when we can take some things for granted, at least for a time. And that is the major role of strategy in organisations: it resolves the big issues so that people can
get on with the little details – like targeting and serving customers instead of debating which markets are best. (Mintzberg, et al., 1998, p. 17)

D. G. Simpson argues that, “the key elements of success are ... an overall sense of direction and an ability to be flexible” (1998a, p. 477). His conclusion is that, “strategic planning is about ideas, not about forecasts or projections” (p. 478). The idea that planners can “tell the future” is also rejected by Bozeman, who states that the objective is rather to “minimize surprise” (Bozeman, 1983, p. 4). The creation of strategic plans is useful for creating ideas and minimising surprise because, “writing clarifies thinking and commits people in a way that talk does not” (Llewellyn & Tappin, 2003, p. 973). While, “the literature draws a sharp dichotomy between the creative and analytic aspects of strategy making,” it is apparent that “both are clearly needed” (Liedtka, 1998, p. 121). Using strategic planning to clarify thinking is a clear benefit.

Using what are traditionally business management models may increase the comfort of business with public agencies (So, 1984), which could in turn increase business’ interest in funding conservation organisations. In a study of strategic planning in British and American national parks, the study’s authors find that parks have generally developed “paper” strategic plans for the consumption of regulators. However, when they are required to seek external funding, park management undertake development of clear, useable, strategic plans (Llewellyn & Tappin, 2003).

Problems that planners examine are “inherently wicked” (Rittel & Webber, 1973; Jänicke & Jörgens, 2000), which causes enormous challenges for decision-making. Environmental problems are also wicked problems. The outcome(s) of decisions are difficult to predict, which leads to the development of ideas such as the precautionary principle (United Nations Environment Program, 1992). Various criteria identify a wicked problem, but the attributes of wicked problems most relevant to this discussion are that they have no particular set of solutions, and there is no way to prove that all potential solutions have been reviewed (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Unfortunately, Rittel and Webber also conclude that “planner[s] have no right to be
“wrong” (p.166), which likely contributed to the decline of strategic planning. If it is impossible to identify all the possible outcomes of a decision, what would be the point in having a planner forecast? It is only recently that has strategic planning begun to examine conservation problems explicitly, which are among the most “wicked” problems facing humanity.

An aspect of strategic planning that could be of great benefit for conservation is the ability to deal with uncertainty (i.e. wicked problems). While ideas such as the precautionary principle provide important guidance, they do not provide sufficient guidance for decision-making. Using the precautionary principle in tandem with strategic planning could be very successful. For example, Jänicke and Jörgens (2000) examine various national Green Plans in the context of, “strategic environmental policy planning”. They find that when plans are kept up-to-date, strategic environmental policy planning (a variation on strategic planning) “seems to be the best available mechanism of environmental policy” (Jänicke & Jörgens, 2000, p. 628).

Scenario planning is another technique that could be of great relevance to conservation agencies because it includes uncertainty (Pesonen, et al., 2001). Scenario planning was very famously successful at Royal Dutch Shell (De Geus, 1988). Examples of conservation projects that have used scenario planning include integrating land uses in the Danish countryside (Tress & Tress, 2003) and mitigating the potential loss of ecosystem services in Wisconsin, USA (Peterson, Cumming, & Carpenter, 2003).

The integration of the natural environment in planning processes is a relatively minor trend in strategic planning. In one example, Bhat (1992, p. 54) advocates using pollution abatement to support a firm’s strategic plan, in light of the increasing costs of lawsuits and remediation, and also advocates using pollution abatement as a “shrewd competitive weapon.” In another example, Judge and Douglas (1998) propose a model that puts environmental issues at the centre of the planning process. They argue that the natural environment has become “critically important” in strategy and competition, although there has been a “dearth” of studies that empirically evaluate the ways in which organisations have been responding to the emergence of
the environment as a strategic issue. Stead and Stead’s (2004) book about strategic planning includes conservation explicitly throughout the text.

Strategic ecosystem management, where many stakeholders coordinate motivations and capacities in order to develop a mutually beneficial land use vision (Bissix & Rees, 2001), is an important concept in conservation, and one that is also taken up in the strategic planning literature. Stead and Stead (2004) coin the term “sustainable strategic management” to identify “strategic management processes that are economically competitive, socially responsible, and in balance with the cycles of nature” (p. 6) which seems to adopt a great deal of the philosophy of the popular book *Cradle to Cradle* (McDonough & Braungart, 2002) and the philosophy of no net growth. Stead and Stead criticised strategic environmental/ecosystem management because it does not question the dominant economic model under which firms operated.

In Finland, the Forest and Park Service (FFPS), which manages most public lands, uses a process of “strategic natural resource planning” on a regional scale (Pesonen, et al., 2001). The FFPS thus creates natural resource plans that, through a participatory process, allocate different land uses, consider objectives of different stakeholders, and review sustainability of the social, ecological, and economic elements of the plan (Pesonen, et al., 2001). However, the FFPS had difficulty in the integration of the SWOT analysis with the rest of the natural resource-based plan. To solve this problem, they developed a hybrid decision support system, combining elements of the Analytic Hierarchy Process with SWOT analysis, with the result known by the acronym A’WOT. This method uses “pairwise comparisons between SWOT factors” (Pesonen, et al., 2001, p. 536) and analyses the results statistically. The A’WOT method thus allows quantification of the SWOT analysis results, which increases its utility to the FFPS.

There are, however, many examples of the application of strategic planning or strategic management to environmental or conservation organisations or actions (as opposed to processes). Scott, Wehtje, and Wehtje (2001, p. 263) advocate a model of strategic planning where government agencies and restoration ecologists “must jointly identify species and ecosystems at
risk, and locations that can be restored, and prioritize the order in which these areas are restored.” They stated that this form of strategic planning “must take place to maximize the benefits of restoration to species and ecosystems in jeopardy.”

The ultimate example of the application of strategic planning in environmental conservation occurs is in Corning (2005), where the author advocates creating a strategic plan for “spaceship earth.” As an opinion piece, the article does not contain much in the way of detail, but it does indicate that conservation scientists are aware of the ideas of strategic planning.

A significant problem for conservation agencies is a lack of necessary data (Pesonen et al., 2001). For example, if basic data about endangered species were missing, a decision requires new data collection and a precautionary approach (Watchman, Groom, & Perrine, 2001). Even with new data, it is impossible to know every aspect of an ecosystem when making decisions. Accordingly, conservationists investigate proxies, such as surrogate species, which stand in for the unstudied species or groups of species in the environment (Sanderson, Redford, Vedder, Coppolilli, & Ward, 2002; Bibby, Collar, Crosby, Heath, Imboden, et al. 1992). Alternatively, land classes could be a surrogate (Lombard, Cowling, Pressey, & Rebelo, 2003).

Translating science for general consumption is also a challenge, for example when presenting population models to a lay audience (Theobald, Hobbs, Bearly, Zack, Shenk, et al., 2000). In the case of conservation agencies, most of the stakeholders would likely lack some of the technical knowledge of conservation.

In one of the few empirical studies of strategic planning in protected area management organisations, Llewellyn & Tappin (2003) found that, in the national parks they studied, the process of strategic planning was “a triumph of form over substance” (p.969). However, when the organisations undertook strategic planning with the desire to achieve more than a “paper plan,” strategic planning was still useful. Strategic planning offers a way to trade off various scenarios, which can be of assistance in conservation.
Other significant elements of strategic planning that could contribute to conservation organisations include focusing on competition, promoting strategic thinking, paying attention to management effectiveness, increasing funding agencies’ confidence with organisations, and understanding dynamic processes (which can lead to uncertainty). One of the main outcomes of strategic planning is to clarify the goals of an organisation (Boyd, Marra, & Swanson, 1997) and it can generally help to “build momentum and sharpen focus” (Barry, 1998, p. 35).

Changing human demography, coupled with new responsibilities for conservation agencies, require strategic understanding on the part of conservationists. Incorporating factors of human organisation are going to be required, since nature protection is a “societal and political process” (Brechin, et al., 2002, p. 42). Integration of various criteria, such as physical, socio-economic and biological, is a potential outcome of strategic planning, one that would be desirable from a conservation perspective (Barrett & Peles, 1994). Indeed, considering conservation without acknowledging politics could result in “important observations that breed inadequate solutions for saving species” (Wilshusen, et al., 2002, p. 29).

Strategic planning can improve the effectiveness of management (So, 1984). Indeed, “the assumption that strategic outcomes stem from managerial actions is the very raison d’être of the field of strategic management” (Dean & Sharfman, 1996, p. 368). Management is also important in conservation. Conservation sites need to be managed in a way that “ensures continuity, stability and effectiveness” which is the optimal result of a plan (Fox & Madsen, 1997, p. 2). Further, ensuring ecological protection is helped by a “long-term land-use planning and management approach that embraces an ecological perspective” (Lajeunesse, Domon, Drapeau, Cogliastro, & Bouchard, 1995, p. 481). One of the foremost scholars in the field of conservation biology suggests that conservation requires unification of the various fields of decision making, such as planning, research, and monitoring, the amalgam of which he identifies as “adaptive management” (Noss, 1999). Strategic planning could be a foundation for such a model, since the “main instrument that designs the management of a protected area” (Amend, et al., 2003, p. 60).
An important issue in conservation is understanding the dynamism inherent in the natural environment, that processes in the environment are not static (Noss, 1994). The parallels to the dynamic environment in which strategic planning arose should be obvious. Both require that managers learn how to make planning more flexible in order to cope with uncertainty. Strategic planning could be a means to facilitate discussion of the main issues facing an organisation (sometimes referred to as strategic issues), which could build the capacity of an organisation to understand the issues facing it, and thus develop better strategy (Liedtka, 1998).

Society recognises that environmental protection is more of a choice of how much damage to allow, rather than to eliminate damage altogether (Wright, 1996). As a result of being developed in political environments, strategic planning is a tool for balancing the divergent objectives in the process of making conservation decisions. Indeed, gap analysis is a widely used tool in conservation decision-making (Wright & Scott, 1996) that has the potential to be useful for strategic planning.

There are several more areas where strategic planning may be useful for conservation agencies. These areas are less discussed in the literature, but remained valuable. For example, an organisation could enhance its control over its future through use of strategic planning (Gimpl & Dakin, 1984). The organisation may also improve its position, or status, through active management (Haynes, 1980). Goldsmith (1997) identifies strategic planning as one of the means governments have used to improve efficiency and effectiveness. In reviewing experiences with strategy development, he emphasises that “strategic thinking” needs to be separated from “strategic planning” because there is little evidence that “the strategy framework is a solution for lack of competitiveness in business – let alone in the public sector” (p. 26). However, others such as Hendrick (2003) and Berry (1995) report survey results that find municipal and state officials value strategic planning.

Accordingly, although there are many challenges to overcome before a successful strategic plan can be created, the process is of value and the results may be important. As stated
more than 20 years ago by Olsen and Eadie, “whatever its limitations in practice, strategic planning does offer an extensively tested approach to identifying and making the fundamental choices” (Olsen & Eadie, 1982, p. 106).

2.3.2 Impedances to Strategic Planning

Many factors may impede the use of strategic planning in the public sector. Bryson (1995), a leading proponent of strategic planning, suggests that it is “inherently prone to fail” due to the confrontational nature of the process. Organisations are not generally comfortable when asked to question their current routines and thus the process of strategic planning requires strong leadership (Bryson, 1995). However, with careful management, Bryson suggests that organisations can overcome all impedances.

Mintzberg is strategic planning’s most prolific critic. His opinion on the impact of strategic planning is rather negative:

strategic planners … leapt into prescription in the face of almost total ignorance about how strategies form. We barely had any empirical evidence on strategy making … It was simply assumed that the “rational” approach was better. Now we do have some evidence, and it shows how naïve the assumptions that underlie strategic planning really were. (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 350)

Referring to many authors, but in particular to Mintzberg, Liedtka writes that, “the critics of strategic planning are as confident of the promise of strategic thinking as they have been of the pitfalls of strategic planning” (Liedtka, 1998, p. 120). Mintzberg’s criticisms of strategic planning are varied, but can be summarised with the idea that, as processes become more formalised, innovation is stifled. By requiring new strategic plans on a regular interval, those developing the plans become more interested in meeting their deadlines than in innovating new approaches.

Mintzberg favours strategies that emerge from careful thinking, rather than the formalised processes that many organisations adopt. As discussed below, Mintzberg suggests that planning is
the most significant impedance to strategic planning (preferring instead the approach of emergent or intuitive strategy).

Cascella (2002) identifies three signs of poor strategic planning, which are that: (1) levels in an organisation not aligned strategically, (2) organisations misallocate resources, and (3) operational measures insufficient for the task. Failure in strategic planning can be very serious, as it has the potential to send an organisation in the wrong direction (Barry, 1998). Success in strategic planning can provide the means to guide the organisation in the most appropriate directions.

A significant problem faced by an organisation adopting strategic planning is perception, both internal and external. For the organisation, adapting to a new management technique can be problematic. From the perspective of external users, clients, and decision-makers, strategic planning can undermine public trust in an agency because it is a technique adopted from the private sector (Checkoway, 1986). For staff, strategic planning may seem to be another aspect of bureaucracy between them and the work they do. Public sector organisations are also subject to closer oversight from regulatory agencies than are private firms (Nutt & Backoff, 1987). For example, performance bonuses that link the implementation of strategic plans to financial rewards are a significant incentive for private sector managers. However, this a practice that the Canadian public service has also adopted for its managers (personal observation). Trying new techniques without incentives could have been a limit on the appeal of strategic planning in the public sector. However, in the public sector, contracts and union rules often mean that the agencies cannot tie financial rewards to performance to the same degree as the private sector (Daniel, 1992). Cognitive inertia is also a significant impedance to strategic planning. Cognitive inertia occurs when management does not notice major changes in the environment because they do not change their understanding of the phenomena that affect the organisation (Hodgkinson & Wright, 2002).

When designing the planning process, it is important that an organisation uses the correct time scale. For example, when the United States Air Force (USAF) undertook a process of
strategic planning in the early 1990s, the General in charge developed a process to plan for a thirty-year time horizon, which was met with great scepticism from other members of the USAF. The other members considered this too far into the future to plan (Campbell, 2002). On the other hand, plans that span too short a period require organisations to undertake planning too frequently, which imposes unnecessary costs.

Paper plans, or plans written simply for external consumption, are often created at the behest of supervisory agencies (Llewellyn & Tappin, 2003). In contrast, organisations sometimes create invisible plans – plans purely for internal consumption – because there is the potential for negative repercussions if the actual strategic plan is made public. Peattie (1993) quotes one anonymous interviewee, a manager involved in strategic planning, who said, “you seriously expect me to write down all the things that could go wrong with this project after a 2 year fight to get it authorised?” (p. 12). For example, if a plan identifies negative-sounding items that the organisation must address, such as a lack of strategy, it may create problems obtaining resources from funding agencies. The dynamics of the public sector make it less likely that invisible plans would be a factor, since trade secrets and new products are much less of an issue among public agencies, as most information can be requested via Access to Information.

On occasion, planning is simply a “ritual” that has to be gone through to appease a decision maker (Goldsmith, 1997). In a study of hospitals in Quebec, researchers find that most hospitals that claimed to have adopted a strategic plan had, instead, either co-opted the process, or had only superficially adopted it (Lozeau, Langley, & Denis, 2002). Only two of 26 sites “appeared to involve forceful attempts at transformation” and only one of those was successful (p. 546).

Politics inside the organisation can also be a factor that impedes the progress of a strategic plan. A study of British companies finds that almost all of the managers believe that,

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14 Co-optation means, in this case, the process “may be captured and used to reproduce existing roles and power structures” (p. 539).
without intra-organisational politics confounding the planning, the benefits would have been much more significant (Peattie, 1993). Public sector organisations face similar intra-organisational politics as different groups within a department compete for funding and recognition. Another confounding factor that involves politics is the potential for sudden changes in resources allocated to the agency, or changes in policy, which could greatly affect the strategy of an organisation (Shapek & Richardson, 1989).

Resources are another important factor in the success (or lack thereof) of strategic planning. To achieve adequacy in planning efforts, sufficient resources must be provided (Ramanujam, Venkatraman, & Camillus, 1986). As policies have to be approved by elected officials, there is always the potential for changes as political fortunes shift. Sometimes as a result of politics, there can be a failure to communicate plans. This often occurs because of a lack of employee involvement in the planning process which takes away from the potential success of a plan, as “plans developed by senior executives in isolation, printed on glossy paper and handed down to employees for implementation seldom succeed” (London, 2002, p. 26). The cost of formal planning efforts can also be high, in financial terms, but also in terms of time (Bryson, 1995), and the costs have the potential to outweigh the benefits derived from the plan (Barry, 1998). Even those who hold forth on the benefits of strategic planning agree that it has costs (Powell, 1994).

Several minor impedances are also identified in the literature. One is the problem of ambiguous goals in public sector organisations (Nutt & Backoff, 1987). Another problem for strategy developers is being able to tell what good strategy is, or even if it would be better not have a set strategy at all (Mintzberg, 1987). Proving effectiveness can also be a problem, as management may not be able to prove that the use of a strategic plan is a significant factor in changing the organisation’s circumstances (Hendrick, 2003). Also, it is suggested that the existing models for measuring public sector strategic planning are “narrow” or “flawed” (Boyne &
Walker, 2004), which further limits the ability to prove effectiveness. Finally, the sheer number of
and variability in the models found in the literature have added confusion to the planning process.

2.3.3 Negative Impacts of Strategic Planning

Mintzberg’s Grand Fallacy of Strategic Planning states that, “because analysis is not
synthesis, strategic planning has never been strategy making” and “strategic planning should
therefore be called strategic programming” (Mintzberg, et al., 1998, p. 77). Accordingly,
Mintzberg et al. find that there are no real strategic benefits from planning and it is simply an
administrative hoop that organisations jump through. Mintzberg et al. go on to say that, “any
discussion of strategy inevitably ends up on a knife-edge. For every advantage associated with
strategy, there is an associated drawback or disadvantage” (Mintzberg, et al., 1998, p. 15). For
example, while the strategy can set the direction (“chart the course”) it can also “serve as a set of
blinders to hide potential dangers” (Mintzberg, et al., 1998, p. 15).

Mintzberg (1998) points out another fallacy in his discussion of the Auditor General of
Canada’s competitiveness audits (also known as value for money audits). Although originally
created to measure performance, the Office of the Auditor General found itself “stymied
frequently by performance that could not be measured.” Because something needs to be
measured, “the office fell back instead on the ascertainment of the presence of good management
technique, including systematic planning. In other words, if the department in question planned, it
had to be effective” (Mintzberg, 1994a, p. 139). The biggest danger in strategic planning is that
people spend their time planning rather than actually implementing plans (Mintzberg, 1994a).
That is to say, individuals involved in management of an organisation often spend significant
periods of time creating strategic plans, without devoting sufficient attention to the factors
required to implement the plans. This often results in high-quality strategic plans that end up
being paper plans. Flynn & Talbot (1996, p. 28) point out that “in the public sector as a whole, the
level of formal strategic planning corresponds quite closely to the degree to which organisations are required by central government to have a business or corporate plan.” Without genuine interest on the part of the organisation doing the planning, it is even more likely that the result will be a paper plan.

2.4 Implementation

Throughout the literature on strategic planning, authors acknowledge or even castigate strategic planning for various failures (cf. Mintzberg). One common issue that arises from the acknowledgement of strategic planning’s failures is the realization that, “planning alone was little more than a ritual with little real-world impact” (Goldsmith, 1997, p. 31) and it is therefore necessary to consider the implementation process when developing strategies. Mintzberg went so far as to suggest that viable strategies should not include strategic planning, but rather should consist of “strategic thinking connected to acting” (Mintzberg, 1994b, p. 18). This is where strategic management becomes most relevant, as strategic management is linking of strategy with implementation. As Nutt and Backoff say, “strategic management in public organisations is undertaken to prompt action and discover agendas of activities that fit within political time frames and respond to consensual demands for change based on peer review” (1992, p. 48).

In the more specific context of public sector strategic management, there is a relatively small body of work. While “we know it is important to plan strategically, the process of strategy implementation has not received sufficient attention in academia” in general (Heracleous, 2003, p. 76). In many cases, research focuses on the differences between the private sector (the focus of the majority of the research) and the public sector. Some question the ability of public sector organisations to develop their own strategy, because in “many respects public strategy at the agency level is set by the legislature … law defines how, where, and when the agency will compete” (Toft, 1989, p. 7).
In order to implement a plan, members of the organisation must be involved because, “unless we can motivate the people in our organisation to execute the plan, the work in its development is all for naught … Action is all that counts” (Simpson, D. G., 1998a, p. 626).

Generally, most approaches to strategic management “tend to neglect social and organisational factors in the strategy process” (Heracleous, 2003, p. 19).

There are a variety of reasons that plans often go unimplemented. Of these, the most important, as identified by Heracleous (2003), is that identifying “where the organisation should be headed [is much easier] than effectively to lead it in that direction; and it is much easier to make a single important mistake in implementation and fail than it is to get most of the things right and succeed” (Heracleous, 2003, p. 78). Especially in cases where the organisation requires “transformational change,” the culture of the institution limits the degree of change that is possible (i.e. cognitive inertia); the “taken-for-granted nature” of culture in many institutions could “effectively preclude cultural values from open debate” (Heracleous, 2003, p. 91). Further complicating the introduction of new strategies to an organisation, Eldridge (1989) emphasises the differences in culture between the private and public sectors. However, both sectors have in common the need to exploit the environment, which is where strategic management becomes most important (Rabin, Miller, & Hildreth, 1989). In 1989, Eldridge stated that there were four major ideas that need to be kept in mind when applying strategic management in government:

- Governments have less competition than business (p. 321)
- “Customer influence” is likely to be weaker in government (p. 323)
- Measuring governmental work performance is more difficult (p. 324)
- Governmental supervisors are more likely to view themselves as “professionals” rather than “managers” (p. 330).

In the federal government in Canada, competition among departments is increasing, measuring performance is growing in importance (e.g. Auditor General value for money audits), and public sector management is becoming increasingly professionalised.
Another important factor in implementation is the orientation of a plan. Intuitively, plans that are completely internal (thus requiring only the cooperation of the organisation’s staff) are easier to implement. Borrowing from marketing theory (which in this case is drawing on organisational behaviour), an organisation should be market-oriented in order to succeed. Market orientation is “the organization culture … that most effectively and efficiently creates the necessary behaviours for the creation of superior value for buyers and, thus, continuous superior performance for the business” (Narver & Slater, 1990, p. 21). Day (1994, p. 37) suggests that market orientation “represents superior skills in understanding and satisfying customers.” Market orientation consists of customer orientation, competitor orientation, interfunctional coordination, long-term focus, and profitability (Narver & Slater, 1990, p. 21). In non-profit organisations, the analogue to profitability is survival (i.e., keeping key constituencies satisfied) (Narver & Slater, 1990). Slater and Narver (1995, p. 63) argue that market orientation must be accompanied by “entrepreneurship and appropriate organisational structures.”

Organisations use market information to implement “marketing strategies to ensure the realisation of decisions” (Moorman, 1995, p. 320). Moorman’s conceptual framework contrasts internally-oriented and externally-oriented organisations. Day (1994) suggests that more market-driven organisations tend to have processes that are oriented towards external factors. Deshpardé, Farley, and Webster (1993, p. 33) contrast “internal maintenance (i.e., smoothing activities, integration)” with “external positioning (i.e., competition, environmental differentiation)” and find that external goal orientation tends to increase the amount of customer orientation. This suggests that, even in the public sector, organisations should look outward and make an effort to satisfy their customers, however that is defined (e.g., customers could be Members of Parliament, the general public, conservationists, etc.).
2.5 Strategic Management

As the literature on strategic planning began to consider a variety of changes in approaches, it appeared that strategic planning transformed into strategic management (Wilson, 1998). However, definitions of strategic management are even less precise than those of strategic planning; selected definitions are found in Table 2-3. Strategic management is essentially an integration of strategic planning with the implementation phase of a plan. Some authors distinguish strategic management from strategic planning, while in other papers the terms are used interchangeably (Houben, et al., 1999; Crow & Bozeman, 1988; Hoskisson, Hitt, Wan, & Yiu, 1999). Some authors use strategic management interchangeably with other concepts, such as results-based management (Swiss, 2005). Heracleous (1998) places strategic management as an intermediate between strategic thinking and strategic planning, while Eadie (1989) calls strategic management an updated version of strategic planning. Bonn and Christodoulou (1996) state that the change to strategic management happened in the 1980s, echoed by Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998, p. 82) who state that, “the field [had] … adopted the name of ‘strategic management’ in the early 1980s.” In 1980, Ansoff identified strategic management, along with strategic issue management as “recent newcomers” (Ansoff, 1980, p. 131).

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<th>Definition</th>
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<td>“Simply stated, strategic management involves the development of contingent managerial strategies that can effectively respond to changeable policies and priorities. It encourages stability and a commitment to longer time horizons but, at the same time, allows for adaptability to change.”</td>
<td>(Bozeman, 1983, p. 3).</td>
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Table 2-6 Selected definitions of strategic management.

<table>
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<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>“Strategic management… is a frame of mind and a set of behavioural patterns that can be reinforced and enhances – although not created – by tools, methodologies, systems, and procedures”</td>
<td>Gluck, 1986, p. 1.33</td>
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<td>Strategic management “broadens the traditional notions of strategic planning to include implementation as well as formulation and acting as well as thinking.”</td>
<td>Nutt &amp; Backoff, 1987, p. 44</td>
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<td>“Strategic management… is an advanced and coherent form of strategic thinking, attempting to extend strategic vision throughout all units of the organisation, encompassing every administrative system.”</td>
<td>Toft, 1989, p. 6</td>
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<td>“…strategic management is formalised strategic policy making that targets the organisation’s primary tasks.”</td>
<td>Hendrick, 2003, p. 492</td>
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Several authors remark upon this change, attributing it to the continued search for improvement in the process (Wilson, 1994), or even calling it a paradigm shift (Montanari, Daneke, & Bracker, 1989, p. 305). In contrast, Cunningham (1989, p. 124) writes that Kuhn would likely describe strategic management as a “preparadigmatic (or protoscientific) field of study.” Referring to Mintzberg’s arguments against strategic planning, Heracleous writes that, “not only is ‘strategic planning’ still used in a variety of ways, but the situation is made even more complicated by the introduction of a more recent term, ‘strategic thinking’” (Heracleous, 2003, p. 38). Heracleous (1998, p. 486) proposes that instead of being completely separate processes, “strategic thinking and strategic planning are interrelated in a dialectical process, where both are necessary for effective strategic management, and each mode on its own is necessary but not sufficient.” There are no clear definitions of strategic thinking in the literature, although it is usually contrasted with strategic planning and found to be a more creative approach. Confusion arises, according to Heracleous, because “although there are frequent usages of the
terms in the above ways, various authors still use the terms in fundamentally different ways” (1998, p. 486). The balance of the literature indicates that organisations should be pursuing strategic management instead of strategic planning alone. Poister and Streib write that, “the results that a government jurisdiction or agency can achieve through strategic planning depend on the effectiveness of its overall capacity for strategic management” (2005, p. 46).

In recent writings, Mintzberg and his colleagues have proposed a new approach to strategy development. Recognising the failures of both strategic planning and the emergent approach, a new model is proposed. In discussing the development of strategy, Mintzberg and his colleagues identify ten approaches, or schools. Included among these schools are the planning school (a structured strategic planning approach) and the learning school (an approach that is highly incremental). They are now advocating a model that includes some of the best features of several of the schools, creating an approach they call the configuration school (Mintzberg et al., 1998). In the configuration school, development of strategy involves the entire organisation, maintaining flexibility under changing circumstances is important, and there are formal planning documents at the end of the process. The model of the configuration school is a strategic management approach because it also highlights the need to make the implementation of the strategy an integral part of the planning cycle.

2.6 Strategic Planning and Planning Theory

As implied in the links to Mumford’s work (mentioned in section 2.2.1), strategic planning did not simply evolve out of military manoeuvres. Earlier models of planning also influenced the development of strategic planning. Rational-comprehensive planning, with its emphasis on rational and analytically derived decisions, resembles the original interpretation of strategic planning as the product of detailed analysis. According to Hudson, rational-comprehensive planning (or synoptic planning) is “the point of departure for most other planning
approaches” (1979, p. 2). Strategic planning is no different. Although it arose in a specific context, strategic planning also relies on the rational-comprehensive approach of identifying goals, identifying alternatives, evaluating the alternatives, implementing the chosen alternative, and the evaluating the results. Strategic planning’s contribution to planning theory is that the evaluation of the alternatives considers both internal and external circumstances.

The link made between synoptic planning and strategic planning broadly contrasts with the work of strategic planning’s critics (e.g. Henry Mintzberg), who advocate an incremental approach, arguing that it is impossible to plan for every contingency. The failings identified by Mintzberg, and others, could be equally applied to rational-comprehensive planning itself. Much in the same way Mintzberg decries the predictive powers of strategic planning, Rosenhead (1980, p. 210) describes the rational-comprehensive model as one that puts an “emphasis on prediction and certainty, and neglects the problems which may result from uncertainties, or from human fallibility or fickleness.”

A third approach to planning, mixed scanning (Etzioni, 1989), is also related to strategic planning. Mixed scanning is a two-stage process that involves setting broad goals, objectives, and approaches for an organisation, but intermediate decisions are made incrementally. Etzioni’s approach resembles some of the later scholarship on strategic planning, in which advocates begin to acknowledge that neither a completely analytical nor a completely incremental strategic plan would be feasible. Etzioni’s approach is acknowledged by Mintzberg (1998), who describes managers’ need to take a certain number of things for granted when planning for an organisation.

However, strategic planning itself remains as more of a planning technique than a true planning theory. As has been discussed in relation to scenario planning (Hodgkinson & Wright, 2002), the multitude of definitions and described processes reflects the lack of a unifying theory of strategic planning.

When considering strategic planning from the point of view of the public service as a whole, planning in the public sector is a zero-sum game. While improvements in strategic
planning can result in some competitive advantage for an under-performing organisation (such as the CWS), the eventual result of all organisations adopting strategic planning would be something akin to a strategic arms race. In the end, the total envelope of government spending is relatively inelastic. While there is some discretionary prioritising by the government of the day, there is nothing like the free choice that exists in the market. It is consumer choice that makes strategic planning so potentially valuable in the private sector - it is possible for competition to drive a company out of business. In the public sector, it is relatively rare that an organisation is completely disbanded. Accordingly, the devotion of significant resources to strategic planning, per se, may not be necessary. Strategic thinking - the development of strategy - could be sufficient. However, there may also be the potential to wed strategy development to another planning model, which could result in broader gains. Collaborative planning, “the most significant school of planning theory to emerge in the last two decades (Allmendinger, 2002, p. 15) may be such a model.

2.7 Collaborative Planning

Collaborative planning is a relatively recent concept that is both a methodology and a planning theory, described by Healey (2006) as an emerging model. Based to a significant degree on communicative action theory (Harris, 2002), collaborative planning owes an intellectual debt to Habermas and, in Healey’s conception of the model, to Giddens (Healey, 2006). Healey also credits Lindblom’s ideas as “an innovative precursor of the current discussion of interactive approaches to developing planning strategies” (Healey, 2006, p. 24). For Healey, this new theory “presents a way forward in realising the practical meaning of participatory democracy in pluralist societies” (p. 5).

Collaborative planning focuses on the agreements that can result from communicating with other people. The theory suggests that strong and defensible strategies will emerge by discussing the various interests that stakeholders have in an issue. One of the most important
outcomes of collaborative planning, and the currency that ensures decisions can be made, is the “generation of social and intellectual capital” (Healey, 2006, p. 70). Healey goes on to suggest that public policy should then also be judged on whether or not “new links were forged and maintained, appropriate to the particular history and current circumstances of an area” (p. 70). She considers that collaborative planning is likely to be a successful approach to meeting this criterion and thus for developing strategy. For Healey (p. 244), strategy making “requires participants to shift the systems of meaning about a set of problems which they have used in the past. In Kuhnian terms, strategy-making is a process of deliberative paradigm change.”

There are several leading authors in the emerging area of collaborative planning. These authors include Healey, Booher and Innes, and Forester. Innes (1996) presents cases where a collaborative process is successful in developing a plan that is considered to be in the broad public interest. Innes reports that these collaborative plans are almost all successfully adopted by politicians and by the public.

An important feature of the collaborative approach is that there is no common structure for every collaborative planning process, aside from communication. Processes should be tailored to each situation. When designing processes for strategy development, the challenge is to set in motion processes through which to review and reflect upon existing ideas and organising routines, and to generate new ones, which are widely owned among the relevant stakeholders. To be effective in achieving such social ownership, new ideas and organising routines need to grow out of the specific concerns of stakeholders. (Healey, 2006, p. 268)

One key consideration for collaborative processes is that communication should take place between all who feel that they are stakeholders in the issue. According to Healey, this means that “for a consensus group to claim to speak for a public interest, it must be widely representative of the viewpoints within that public. In almost all the cases, groups included a spokesperson for any
interest group that wanted to be involved” (Healey, 2006, p. 465). Innes (1996) suggests that planners should develop stakeholder groups that can advise decision-makers on an ongoing basis. A web of networks is a concept raised by Healey, which could be useful in protected areas management. She provides the example of environmental non-governmental organisations that “develop their power base by making links with other groups and promoting ideas which capture the attention of other groupings” (Healey, 2006, p. 58-59)

Booher and Innes make their contribution to collaborative planning by describing their experiences as practitioners. One of the outcomes of collaborative planning they describe is “network power” which “emerges from consensus building and other forms of collaborative planning” (Booher & Innes, 2002, p. 222). For Booher and Innes, network power is important because “networked agents [can] improve the choices available to all of them as a result of collectively developed innovative ideas” (p. 226). The three basic conditions that are needed for network power to emerge are: diversity, interdependence, and authentic dialogue. “Self-interest and rational choice drive network power” (p. 227).

However, Booher and Innes’ discussion of power - the very subject they hope to prompt discussion on - is narrow. When they discuss their approach with academic audiences, they hear concerns about power relations, and how consensus building is not really possible when power is unequally distributed, etc. They attribute this scepticism to an understanding of power as “the ability of one player, organisation, or class to make another person or group do something they would otherwise not do (Galbraith 1983).” Booher and Innes go on to say that this idea of power, although relevant to planning, is “a limiting concept for contemporary times.” However, they do not indicate how they determined that their audiences had this idea of power. Booher and Innes dismiss the role of power much too easily.

Power remains an important component of collaborative planning that is still unresolved. Flyvbjerg & Richardson (2002) critique communicative planning theory by suggesting that it “fails to capture the role of power in planning.” As a result of this failure, communicative
planning “is weak in its capacity to help us understand what happens in the real world” (p. 45)
Blumenberg (2002, p. 161) offers a caution about collaborative planning, writing that “this
consensus-based approach assumes equal power among participants.” While advocates of
collaborative planning acknowledge that there are great difficulties “in accommodating
collaborative forms of planning within existing planning frameworks” Harris thinks that “the
possibilities of these being overcome are exaggerated” (2002, p. 38).

The other major challenge to the collaborative planning paradigm involves questioning
the degree to which it departs from the rational comprehensive model, and, on author goes so far
as to dismiss any real differences between collaborative and rational-comprehensive planning
(Harris, 2002, p. 26). Indeed, the configuration school (Mintzberg et al., 1998) appears to have
much in common with collaborative planning. The most relevant elements of Mintzberg’s model
are: the involvement of all stakeholders; ensuring that the process is adaptive; and, that the
strategy development remains flexible are all characteristic of collaborative planning. The
configuration school is notable as it marks Mintzberg’s integration of several elements of the
rational-comprehensive approach to his more emergent approach to strategy.

2.8 Protected Areas Planning

Although the majority of this research focuses on the strategic planning and management
of protected areas, some information about the design of protected areas networks is important, in
order to provide context for the research. Functional protected areas are sites, landscapes, and
networks that “maintain focal ecosystems, species, and supporting ecological processes within
their natural ranges of variability” (Poiani, Richter, Anderson, & Richter, 2000, p. 136). The
characteristics of such areas include:

- design characteristics determined by focal ecosystems and species, and that support
ecological processes;
• sites selected and managed to maintain focal biotic/abiotic patterns and processes within the natural ranges of variability over time frames relevant to conservation planning and management (the authors suggested 100-500 years);
• site protections that do not necessarily preclude human activities; and,
• at all scales, the preservation/maintenance of processes may require ecological management and/ or restoration to maintain functionality (e.g. prescribed burns).

Some authors argue that the selection of conservation reserves, which has largely opportunistic - in the areas of the least productive land, or areas that are less desirable or accessible for other purposes (Beazley, 1997), means that reserves are easily superseded by other land use decisions (Pressey, Humphries, Vane-Wright, & Williams, 1993). Andelman and Willig (2003) report on a GIS study that finds that the distribution of strict protected areas (IUCN categories I and II) in the Western Hemisphere is “skewed, both geographically and in terms of size” to the extent that only twenty-three quadrats (areas of 250 km by 250 km) have at least 10% protection and of those 23, 11 were in Alaska (Andelman & Willig, 2003, p. 819). Indeed, Andelman and Willig find that 35% of all protected areas (35% of 602,675 km²) in North America are in Alaska (p. 819). However, the designation of “opportunistic” does not apply to Canada’s national parks, where the National Parks System Plan (Parks Canada, 1997) is among the most successfully implemented conservation plans anywhere in the world, as discussed later in the current research.

Optimisation and complementarity are two of the central ideas in conservation planning (Lawler, et al., 2002). These ideas are also found in strategic planning, indicating that there is enough common ground to make strategic planning highly useful for conservation agencies. In North America, early conservation emphasis on hunted waterfowl or other economically valuable animals led to a large number of reserves that had been planned for the needs of a select number of species (Erwin, 2002; Barrett & Peles, 1994). This opportunistic approach could have been a factor in the lack of resources provided to many resource management agencies because the logic
behind site selection was unclear to decision makers. In contrast, after 1970 Parks Canada had developed a highly systematic approach to identifying park sites, their resources and area protected increased much more quickly than in the past. The first volume in the IUCN Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines – *National Systems Planning for Protected Areas* – features Parks Canada as one of two case studies in best practices (Davey, 1998).

Strategic plans, in the context of protected areas, are discussed in a recent text on management plans for protected areas. In it, strategic plans are “a tool for change and the main instrument that designs the management of a protected area” (Amend, Giraldo, Oltremari, Sánchez, Valarezo, et al., 2003, p. 60). However, the authors do not evaluate the utility nor the success of strategic plans; rather, they describe how a strategic plan should be created (matching one of Mintzberg’s most pointed criticisms of strategic planning).

More systematic approaches to protected area planning are needed because “reserves rarely have been and rarely still are selected because they are the best sites for representing unprotected natural features” (Pressey, Bedward, & Keith, 1994, p. 352). Rather than using scarce resources to protect the less valuable sites, “there are calls for de-proclamation of poorly situated reserves so that resources can be better spent on biological conservation elsewhere” (Pressey, et al., 1994, p. 352). While sites are not all poorly situated, “most existing reserves have not been selected on the basis of representation or persistence” such as in the US, where most protected areas are at high elevation or in areas of poor soil (Lawler, et al., 2003, p. 1763). In Europe, “nature parks represent ... a splendid mosaic, not a real ‘system’ of protected areas” (Gambino, 2002, p. 4).

Having management systems in place is important because declared objectives for protected areas “do not of themselves ensure the survival of the protected area values” (Eagles, McCool, & Haynes, 2002, p. 12). Preparing management plans is increasingly important for protected areas, recognised by the fact that 66% of nature parks in Europe have management plans or are developing one (Gambino, 2002, p. 7), and by recommendations by Canada’s
Auditor General to improve the development of management plans at the PCA (Auditor General of Canada, 1996). The World Commission on Protected Areas also recommends that every park and protected area have a management plan and that management planning is an essential step towards ensuring the proper management of protected areas (Thomas & Middleton, 2003).

2.9 Conclusion

The literature on strategic planning is vast and complex. The majority opinion in the literature appears to support the utility of strategic planning – if it is done properly. That is, if there is support from senior management, if there are adequate resources in place, if there is broad consultation, etc. However, the decline in the number of articles discussing strategic planning, particularly in the public sector, suggests that strategic planning may not be as successful as the literature makes it out to be. While there are certainly organisations that employ strategic planning for developing their strategies, it does not seem to be as significant as it was. That is to say, the renaissance in strategic planning, described earlier in this Chapter, may be less significant than anticipated. This discussion leaves several questions unanswered. Are Canadian public sector organisations still employing strategic planning? Are there alternative approaches being used, or that could be used successfully in the public sector? Does the dynamic approach to strategy mesh with the long-term nature of protected areas planning? This research addresses these questions.

Having identified the factors considered important to the success of strategic planning (and thus success in obtaining resources), the next chapter describes the research methods used to determine if the federal protected area management organisations in Canada were following the road to success. Here, success is largely defined in terms of resources. Fundamentally, that is the way that success is discussed within the federal government. However, the collaborative approach
does suggest the need to re-define what success is. This idea will be revisited in a later section of the document.
3. Methodology and Methods

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examines the literature on strategic planning and other approaches to strategy. This chapter lays out the research methodology used to answer the research questions. The questions investigated during this research are:

- is strategic planning a technique that should be used by environmental conservation organisations?
- do those organisations understand strategic planning?
- do documents published by those organisations demonstrate the use of strategic planning or other approaches to developing strategy? And,
- does the management of the organisations’ protected areas networks demonstrate the use of strategic planning or other approaches to developing strategy?

The apparent decline in publications related to government-sponsored strategic planning (described in Chapter 2) prompts questions about whether it is a reduction in academic interest in strategic planning (perhaps it is becoming normative?), or whether it is a reduction in practitioners’ use of the model.

Bryson and his colleagues (1986) suggest that strategic planning concentrates on how organisations can improve performance, thus improving the success of the organisation. This research considers “success” to be the successful completion of an organisation’s mandate. Adequate resources are a necessary, but not sufficient, requirement for this success to occur. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the current paradigm in government largely considers success with respect to resources first, and mandate second.
The first part of this Chapter describes the methodology: the research approach, the use of qualitative methods, and case studies. The second part of the Chapter describes the specific research methods: semi-structured interviews, document analysis, and participant-observation.

3.2 Research Approach Methodology

Two major approaches focus and guide this research, namely qualitative methods and a case study approach. Each is discussed in turn.

3.2.1 Qualitative Methods

Questions for this research study are exploratory and descriptive in nature. The types of questions that the research asks demand a particular approach. Qualitative research is an approach used to develop “holistic description” of a process (Weiss, 1994, p. 9). Another description of qualitative research is, “any type of research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other methods of quantification” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 10). When studying a particular organisation, qualitative methods allow a more thorough description of events, and provide the researcher the opportunity to learn from the participants, which is particularly useful if the researcher is an outsider.

This study uses qualitative methods because they provide the appropriate model to allow for description of the planning and management processes at the different organisations. There are several major approaches to qualitative research in the literature. Among the most cited authors are Lincoln and Guba (1985), who describe their method as follows:

once in the field, the inquiry takes the form of successive iterations of four elements: purposeful sampling, inductive analysis of the data … development of grounded theory
based on the inductive analysis, and projection of the next steps in a constantly emergent design. (p. 187)

Lincoln and Guba advocate repeating the process until data became redundant, corroborated by Weiss who suggests researchers “stop [recruiting] when you encounter diminishing returns” (Weiss, 1994, p. 21).

However appropriate for the current study, qualitative methods have some challenges. Many of the defining elements of positivist research (e.g. generalisability, replicability, and causation) do not easily fit the qualitative model, and there are limited means by which researchers can judge quality and relevance. Theorists of qualitative methods provide a series of alternative means for judging the quality of research. Hammersley identifies the provision of “information that is both true and relevant to some legitimate public concern” (1992, p. 68) to be the function of research. He suggests that, accordingly, there were only two criteria upon which research should be judged: truth-validity and relevance.

For Strauss & Corbin (1998), objectivity in qualitative study “means openness, a willingness to listen and to ‘give voice’ to respondents, be they individuals or organisations” (1998, p. 43). Lincoln and Guba (1985) prefer the idea of transferability to generalisability. They “suggest … the degree of transferability is a direct function of the similarity between the two contexts, what we shall call fittingness … which is the degree of congruence between sending and receiving contexts” (p. 124). In order to determine fittingness, researchers must create “thick description” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 125). Believing that causality is too beleaguered to be viable, Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 150) replace it with the idea of “mutual simultaneous shaping.” For Weiss, the demonstration of causation “rests heavily on the description of a visualisable sequence of events…” (1994, p. 179), emphasising the need for thick description.

Lincoln and Guba (1985), and many others, recommend the use of field journals as a way to build trustworthiness. The fieldwork journal is a “record of work” that includes personal feelings, and the various involvements of the researcher (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 192).
Other methods of improving trustworthiness, as suggested by Lincoln and Guba, include: triangulation, peer debriefing, negative case analysis, referential adequacy, and member checks.

Hoskisson and his colleagues highlight one aspect of qualitative methodology as a detractor development in the field of strategic management. This problem is that, “the heavy emphasis on the case approach and lack of generalization did not provide the base necessary for continued advancement of the field” (Hoskisson, et al., 1999, p. 424).

3.2.2 Case Studies

Case studies are the preferred method for qualitative studies that ask “why” or “how” questions, “when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin, 2002, p. 1). For research undertaken with qualitative methods, “the aim is not to obtain a representative sample, but rather to gain insights into the subject” and it is therefore acceptable, even understood, that a small sample size is to be used (Schenk, Hunziker & Kienast, 2007, p. 70). Indeed, “context-dependent knowledge and experience are at the very heart of expert activity. Such knowledge and expertise also lie at the centre of the case study as a research and teaching method or to put it more generally still, as a method of learning” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 222). For Flyvbjerg, who discounts the potential for social sciences to develop predictive theory:

the closeness of the case study to real-life situations and its multiple wealth of details are important in two respects. First, it is important for the development of a nuanced view of reality, including the view that human behaviour cannot be meaningfully understood as simply the rule-governed acts found at the lowest levels of the learning process and in much theory. Second, cases are important for researchers’ own learning processes in developing the skills needed to do good research. (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 223)
In a review of articles written about public sector planning in the *British Journal of Management* over a ten-year period, comparative case studies were found to be an important research method (Ferlie, Hartley, & Martin, 2003). Yin identifies three purposes for doing a case study: explanatory, exploratory, and descriptive (p. 3). First, “case study research designs have not been codified” (Yin, 2002, p. 20), so Yin’s work provides some of the sole published guidance on the design of case study research. According to Yin, the design of case study research should “maximize four conditions related to design quality: (a) construct validity, (b) internal validity (for explanatory or causal case studies only), (c) external validity, and (d) reliability” (p. 19). Yin advises that studies exploring multiple cases are likely to be stronger than those that investigate a single case (p. 19), which is corroborated by Weiss (1994), who advises researchers to include comparison cases.

Yin also lists some “overriding principles” for effective data collection in case study research. The three principles are: 1) using multiple sources of evidence, 2) creating a case study database separate from the final report, and 3) maintaining a chain of evidence, that is to say, “explicit links between the questions asked, the data collected, and the conclusions drawn” (p. 83). For the multiple sources principle, Yin lists six sources of evidence that researchers may use for qualitative case studies: “documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artefacts” (p. 83).

### 3.3 Research Methods

The methods for interviews of key informants used in this study are methods commonly used in research on strategic planning. All in-depth studies of strategic planning described in the literature review (Chapter 2) use interviews. All studies of strategic planning consulted during this research use document analysis. For example, Cuervo-Cazurra (2003) uses documentary evidence (annual reports, industry analyses, periodicals, public and company archival data) and
interviews (semi-structured, with 4-12 managers, former managers, directors, and industry experts from each firm) to reach his conclusions about strategic management in a variety of firms. For this current study, the same research methods are used in all three cases. The exception is the participant-observation where, in addition to the methods described above, the researcher was a participant-observer at the CWS for approximately 18 months during the data collection and writing phases of this research. Bryson and Roering (1988b), leading authors in the field of public sector strategic planning, take a similar approach in their research (combining interviews, observation and document analysis).

One concern for qualitative researchers is the credibility of observations or, as in Hammersley’s list, truth. As suggested by various authors (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995) the researcher has a daily log that describes activities and interactions stemming from the work with the CWS. Another method for establishing credibility (i.e. trustworthiness) is to triangulate research methods. In this study, triangulation compares the interview data with published and archival documents created by the organisations under study, put in the context of interactions with co-workers at the CWS (and occasional interactions with employees of both the DFO and the PCA).

Another important aspect of qualitative research is the idea of learning from participants. In order to verify the research conclusions, the researcher shared results with participants at two points in the research. Immediately after the transcript was prepared, each interviewee verified the transcript of their own interview (except in a very few cases, described below). Second, once the analysis was complete, the researcher provided participants with a summary of the major conclusions. Comments in response to the conclusions were received from approximately half of the participants. Table 3-1 summarises the major research questions and their associated research methods.
The Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo approved the research protocol. All research activities were carried out in accordance with the approved protocol. Interviewees completed a consent form and agreed to have their words cited anonymously.

### Table 3-1 Summary of research questions and methods used to respond to them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Document Analysis</th>
<th>Observation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is strategic planning a technique that should be used by environmental conservation organisations?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do the case study organisations understand strategic planning?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there sufficient resources for planning?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do documents published by those organisations demonstrate the use of strategic planning or other approaches to developing strategy?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the management of the organisations’ protected areas networks demonstrate the use of strategic planning or other approaches to developing strategy?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3.3.1 Interviews

Weiss suggests qualitative interviewing is the best approach to “describe the structure and functioning of a federal agency” (1994, p. 9). Accordingly, interview research forms the basis of
the case studies. Information is from a variety of perspectives, in an attempt to examine the understanding, vision, choices and decisions that have gone into the planning of Canadian federal protected areas (Houben, et al., 1999; Weiss 1994; Wechsler & Backoff 1988; Summer 1980). Rubin and Rubin (2005) state that, “qualitative interviewing projects are especially good at describing social and political processes…” (p. 3). The type of answers sought suggest a topical interview approach, which is an approach “to work out a coherent explanation by piecing together what different people have said, while recognizing that each person might have his or her own construction of events” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 11).

The qualitative interviews are structured, but with open-ended questions. Weiss writes that, “any question that helps the respondent produce the material you need is a good question” (1994, p. 74) while, according to Strauss and Corbin (1998, p. 76), “a good question is one that leads the researcher to answers that serve the developing theoretical formulation.” Strauss and Corbin go on to say that, “so much depends on the particular investigation and the research and professional experience of the inquirer” (p. 76). Rubin and Rubin (2005) informed question design, with their suggestion that a small number of main questions be used in each interview, with follow-up questions designed on the spot that suit the particular nature of the interview.

It is important that the “researcher customizes questions for each interviewee, accommodating both to what the person knows and to the topics that make the conversational partner most comfortable” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 14). Accordingly, some research questions were adapted as the researcher learned new information during the course of the research. The questions asked during the initial interviews were included in all interviews (see Appendix 1); while a few additional questions were asked in the latter interviews. However, most of the questions were standardised, in order to create the opportunity to compare between responses. Fundamentally, the research was designed with the “governing principle ... to strive for a rational process that is both repeatable and documentable” (Seidman, 1998, p. 15).
Research questions focus on more concrete than on theoretical topics. This is important because, in Weiss’ words, “while questions about concrete incidents … may be answered from more than one perspective, they are less likely to be modifiable by the interviewing context” (1994, p. 150). Questions developed through review of government documents (both published and archival) and academic articles.

The initial targets for interviews were identified by searching through a publicly available internet database (the Government Electronic Directory Services). It was searched by organisation (PCA, CWS, DFO), and individuals with position titles that were relevant to the research were contacted. For example, persons with “planner” or “manager” in their title were among the first contacted in each organisation. Some interviewees were identified through the research advisors’ knowledge of particular persons involved in the protected areas programs. For the DFO, an internal contact circulated the request for interviews, with only two successful responses. In all interviews, participants were asked to recommend other persons for interviews. Suggested persons who fit the desired interviewee profile (those involved in either the protected areas management organisations or those having direct contact with their work) were contacted for interviews according to the same protocol as the initial interviewees. Attempts were also made to contact analysts who worked with the Treasury Board Secretariat, although attempts were unsuccessful. Three participants from outside government were also included, in order to provide balance to the responses of the government participants. Two participants were from non-governmental organisations and one was a private consultant in the area of strategic planning.

Interviewing multiple informants from a single organisation can be a component of research success (Walker & Enticott, 2004). However, in most of the studies reviewed for this research, quantitative surveys of strategic planning participants use a single informant for each organisation. Using several informants from a single organisation may elicit more information about values and actions that may not emerge from a single informant (Walker & Enticott, 2004).
Multiple respondents also aids in establishing the reliability of the responses. Accordingly, a total of 9 interviews were carried out with CWS staffers, 4 with PCA staffers and 2 with DFO staffers.

Weiss (1994, p. 56) suggests that interviews should last 30 minutes at a minimum, 60 minutes if the respondent is ambivalent, and 90-120 minutes is “a reasonable expectation.” In most cases, the interviews carried out for this research lasted approximately 60 minutes. In a few cases, the interviews lasted as long as 90 or 120 minutes, and 2 interviews were approximately 30-40 minutes, because of scheduling difficulties. Weiss also indicates that, “it is almost always desirable, if time and costs permit, to interview respondents more than once. You have to keep your frame pretty narrow if you plan to cover it all in a single setting” (1994, p. 57). While multiple interviews would have been highly desirable, interviewees were not available to do so as a rule. In some cases, participants apologised for not reviewing the research transcript or research conclusions because of a lack of time.

Weiss (1994) notes that tape recording can lead to distraction or can make the interviewer relax (rather than focus on taking notes). In the present work, the interviews were recorded digitally, when possible, in order to provide more accurate interview records. In four cases, conversations took place by telephone because of scheduling or distance. Telephone interviews tended to be shorter than in-person interviews, but they are “the next best thing to being there” (Weiss, 1994, p. 59). In cases where interviews were done by telephone and could not be recorded, more detailed hand-written notes were taken, summarising some points and including some direct quotations.

There are a variety of approaches to transcription described in the literature, which generally balance the amount of effort required with the amount of detail obtained (Weiss, 1994). Transcripts created for this research are accurate for the statements made by each interviewee, but pauses and stuttering, among other distractions, are not included because that degree of detail was not considered relevant to the research conclusions. Each interviewee was sent their transcript for review, also known as a respondent check or member check (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Interviewees reviewed the record of their interviews, regardless of the method of recording. In cases where the interview was recorded, it was deleted as soon as the interviewee approved their transcript in order to maintain anonymity. In a very few cases, interviewees did not respond to a request to review the transcript; in those cases, it was assumed that the interviewee did not have any disagreement with the record of the conversation. The transcripts were then used for analysis.

A total of 18 interviews elicited information from key informants within the organisations being studied, as well as two people from ENGOs. A consultant who specialized in facilitating strategic planning for federal departments was also interviewed briefly (questions addressed the consultant’s impressions of strategic planning in the federal government generally). However, the consultant’s comments must be viewed with care, as only a single respondent of this type was available to be interviewed. The researcher determined that the total number of interviews was adequate due to a combination of data saturation and an inability to recruit any more participants.

Recruitment of participants was a challenge for this research project. The response rate was very low before the researcher began working with the CWS, after which there was more willingness on the part of personal contacts to participate in the project. However, this limited the scope of the responses. While it is impossible to determine exactly why there was so much difficulty in recruiting participants, there are several possibilities. The two actual responses received by the researcher indicated that a lack of time was the reason for declining to participate. Other reasons for declining to participate could include a lack of interest, a perceived lack of relevance, few people working in the area (particularly for DFO), and concerns about confidentiality.

3.3.2 Document Analysis

To supplement the interview data and to triangulate the research results (Narayanan, Kemmerer, Douglas, & Guernsey, 2004) archival documents and various documents published by
each organisation are considered. Documents from the National Archives of Canada include draft versions of policy documents, intra- and inter-departmental memoranda, letters written to the Department, and transcripts of various meetings (including Cabinet meetings). Documents were searched for items that were relevant to the matter under study, such as correspondence, budget information, and planning documents. If the subject matter of the document was found to be relevant to the research questions, the document was read in detail and notes on the contents was kept. Information from the document analysis is used to supplement interview data, and to establish the historical background.

A significant amount of information exists in documents, particularly because there were so few participants who had been with their organisations for a long period of time. For documents that were archived by the National Archives of Canada, cataloguing is a significant barrier. The archival documents are not particularly well-catalogued; for example, many boxes are simply labelled “planning” or “management.” In addition, related documents are often filed in different places. Finally, very recent documents (those created within the last decade) have not been catalogued, and in many cases have not yet been transferred to the Archives. Accordingly, it is not possible to consult these records. Published documents include annual budget documents, policy papers, websites, and publications from ENGOs. For more recent records, day-to-day work is largely computerised, and documents are thus primarily electronic and have not been effectively archived in a publicly available manner. Indeed, this is of concern to many jurisdictions and could cause future problems for researchers (for example, see Novaretti, 2001).

3.3.3 Participant-Observation

To further triangulate the research results, the research refers to the participant-observations during eighteen-month period the researcher spent working at the CWS. Rubin and Rubin (2005, p. 89) observe that, “if you immerse yourself in a research setting, you can usually
talk comfortably to the people in that setting” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 89). Weiss also recommends observing from within the organisation under study because he “generally find[s] it better to be an insider to the milieu in which the respondent lives, because it is easier then for me to establish a research partnership with the respondent” (Weiss, 1994, p. 137).

The researcher originally approached the Habitat Conservation Division of the CWS with the suggestion of an internship or a period as a volunteer, in order to improve the accuracy of reporting on the activities that were taking place at the CWS, and especially to develop awareness of the realities of practice within the federal civil service. The PCA were also approached, unsuccessfully. The initial proposal to the CWS was unsuccessful but, a few weeks later, the protected area staff contacted the researcher with the offer of a five-week period of paid work. In what seems to be a not atypical process, the contract has been extended several times, so that the researcher spent most of the next eighteen months working at the CWS. As an employee of the Habitat Conservation Division of the CWS, the researcher assisted with various aspects of business related to protected areas and species at risk. All co-workers were aware of the research, and they were encouraging. As an employee of the protected areas group within the CWS, the researcher had occasion to meet CWS protected area practitioners from across Canada, and also from both the PCA and the DFO. Interactions with both the PCA and the DFO were obviously to a much lesser degree than with the CWS, but the protected areas managers formed such a small community that it was possible to learn a great deal about work in each organisation. However, comments derived from personal observation have been limited to the CWS because of the much greater degree of familiarity. The CWS management was aware of the research being carried out concurrent with the researcher’s employment. Some of the conclusions in the research were developed from personal observations made while at the CWS. For example, some of the budget figures reported in this document were obtained from unpublished documents that were reviewed as part of the researcher’s work. Nothing reported in the thesis is secret information, and it can all be obtained through a Freedom of Information request.
Discussion of specific incidents and people is extremely limited, in order to protect confidential information and individual privacy. It would be unethical to report any more specifically on the researcher’s experiences. Other than participant-observation, research activities were carried out after working hours.

3.4 Analysis

The analysis of the data occurred concurrently with the data collection. The initial document review provided source material for the research questions. In addition, because “analysis cannot be easily distinguished from transcription” (Riessman, 1993, p. 60), analysis of the interviews began during the transcription phase and continued throughout the research period. Analysis took place at several levels. Each interview transcript was examined immediately afterward to suggest topics to pursue, or follow-up questions for future interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). Upon completion of a substantial number of interview transcripts – enough to suggest data saturation – the second level of analysis sought themes and concepts that were common to two or more interviews. This analysis also sought any missing information needed to address elements of the strategic planning process.

Since response rates to interview requests varied considerably between organisations, the analysis of the data focuses on strategic planning and management issues at the CWS. Because research should be considered mutual simultaneous shaping (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), it is also important to return knowledge to those that participated in the research. In addition, because the researcher had an interest in participating in change, it was important to:

remember that successful planning cannot be done to an organisation or for an organisation; it can only be done by the organisation itself ... outside staff [e.g. academic research groups] should be given responsibility for on-the-job training of company personnel in planning staff work. (Ackoff, 1970, p. 132)
While the researcher was not given responsibility for “on-the-job training,” several research participants did express interest in learning from the final results of the analysis.

Transcripts of the interviews were analysed to identify common phrases or concepts that were used by multiple participants. These recurring ideas form the basis of the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6. For the CWS, the primary recurring and key themes centred around the protection of the biophysical environment and the need for increased resources in order to be able to accomplish that task. With the PCA participants, the most frequently recurring idea was the contribution of the System Plan to their relative success, and that the “simplicity” of the plan was a significant factor. For the DFO participants, both participants referred to the “learning approach” they were taking toward the development of their network. The ENGO participants’ responses corroborated those of the government participants.

3.5 Evaluation

Once the research data was analysed, the results of the analysis were summarised in tabular format. Strategic documents and the background information gleaned from the interviews were evaluated on two fronts: the structure and content of the documents (based on the literature review) and the effectiveness of the strategies. Identifying the components of a successful strategy is challenging. What works in one organisation may not be applicable in another, or may even have a negative impact on competitiveness. In order to be effective, strategies must be “products of creative insights combined with tough choices about strategic scope and organisational configuration” (Heracleous, 2003, p. 217). That is to say, the strategic plan must be creative, and combine analysis of the environment with analysis of organisational status.

While the research questions are qualitative in nature, a summary of the results is presented in a tabular format. Each evaluation is summarised by an ordinal ranking, based on an interpretation of how each criterion is or is not met by the plans of each organisation. Translating
qualitative data into quantitative results is not a precise task, and has the potential to exaggerate subtle differences. Quantitative scores also give the impression of exactitude that is often lacking in qualitative research. However, providing a quantitative summary of the results provides a quick, easily understood summary of the evaluation results. It is for this reason that a quantitative summary has been included with the evaluation, while being cognisant of the limits of this presentation.

In the evaluation, the researcher developed a series of ranking criteria that were used to summarise the review of the plans. As discussed above, these are necessarily subjective, but they provide an indication of the relative success of the plans. A zero is assigned when there is no evidence of the criterion, such as for the non-existent DFO strategic plan for its Oceans Act MPAs. A “1” indicates that the criterion is included in the plan, but that very little benefit could be derived from the way the criterion is included. For example, if a concept is present but it is not detailed nor quantified, such as in the CWS Protected Areas Strategic Plan which includes discussion of the need for goals and objectives, but does not indicate what those might be. A “2” indicates inclusion of the element with some degree of quantification, but there is no explanation of the reasoning or need. For example, the CWS Strategic Plan 2000-2010, which includes the following objective: “habitats are conserved, protected, and rehabilitated to meet the objectives of CWS’s conservation plans for migratory birds and species at risk within 15 years.” A “3” is a mid-level ranking, such that the item is included in the plan in detail, although it may not be easily understood or explained, such as the CWS Strategic Plan 2000-2010 objective that “ecosystem approach principles are used when making resource management decisions” (the objective is explained in more detail in the document). A “4” signifies a well-thought-out response to the criterion, such that the concepts are presented simply, in accessible language, and are quantified. For instance, the PCA Finally, a ranking of “5” indicates that, in the opinion of the researcher, the response to the criterion could not be better presented for the purposes of that organisation’s protected areas plan.
3.5.1 Evaluation of Structure of Strategic Documents

Palumbo writes that, “to be effective, evaluations must be based on realistic assumptions about the nature of organisations and the implementation process” (1985, p. 16). D. G. Simpson (1998a, p. 476) argues that, “the key elements of success are, in my judgement, an overall sense of direction and an ability to be flexible.” Accordingly, analysis is carried out with the awareness that much of the development of plans and programs is outside of the direct influence of the organisations in question, as they have to respond to the mandate assigned by Parliament and the department. The ability to be flexible is difficult to measure, and discussion is accordingly limited. Discussion at the end of the results chapter includes reference to the above criteria, but focuses on the more specific criteria outlined below.

Planning Products

Boyd and Reuning-Elliott (1998, p. 189) identify seven indicators that measure an indication of success in strategic planning. The seven are: mission statements, trend analysis, competitor analysis, long-term and annual goals, action plans, and ongoing evaluation. Summer (1980) suggests that there are four “hallmarks” of strategic behaviour. The four are:

- that strategists have broad goals which they visualize should be accomplished;
- these goals are to be accomplished over very long time spans;
- they are to be accomplished by designing an organisation structure, i.e., assigning the goal as a responsibility to specific administrators; and,
- the administrators then elaborate the details of how the achieve goals. They invent, use trial and error, and otherwise ‘make happen’” (Summer, 1980, p. 86).

A synthesis of the two measures results in the following analytical categories: mission statement, broad long-term and more specific objectives, explicit actions with assigned responsibility, and environmental scan. This synthesis is used in the evaluation of strategic planning in the CWS, the
PCA, and the DFO. Communication, both internal and external, is also included as a criterion because this has been shown to be an important element in strategic planning (Camillus, 2003).

3.5.1.1 Mission Statements

Baetz and Bart (1996) state that there is a debate about both the nature and the role of mission statements. From a survey of Canadian companies, they find that 90% of them have or are creating a mission statement; most are oriented toward strategy development rather than strategy implementation. Baetz and Bart (1996) recommend that all relevant stakeholders have some involvement in the development of the mission statement. The organisation must decide on the purpose of the mission statement before undertaking its development. Mission statements should also be inspiring (Bryson, 1995), and they are important elements in the planning process. As elements that are “timeless (or subject to change only infrequently)” (Wilson, 1992, p. 20) mission statements can provide some continuity for an organisation.

Campbell and Yeung (1991) describe a model mission statement developed at Ashridge Strategic Management Centre. In it, mission is a combination of purpose (“why the company exists”), values (“what the company believes in”), behaviour standards (“the policies and behaviour patterns that underpin the distinctive competence and the value system”) and strategy (“the competitive position and distinctive competence”) (Campbell & Yeung, 1991, p. 13). In another model, Wilson (1992) delineates the elements of a mission statement into three components:

- states the basic purpose of the business;
- defines the company’s relationship to other organisations, including competitors; and,
- sets general objectives (p. 20).

Medley describes a 1989 strategic planning exercise undertaken by the U.K. World WF which begins with the development of a new mission statement because they realise that, “if WWF was properly to promote its message and cause, it needed a clear statement of mission
which encompassed all that it set out to do in a succinct and easily transmitted form” (Medley, 1996, p. 66). The mission statement includes two of three elements in Wilson’s model (basic purpose and the general objectives) and three of four Ashridge elements, to at least some degree (values may be inferred). The statement reads:

    WWF’s Mission is to Achieve the Conservation of Nature and Ecological Processes by:
    • Preserving Genetic, Species and Ecosystem Diversity
    • Ensuring that the Use of Renewable Natural Resources is Sustainable Both Now and in the Longer Term, for the Benefit of All Life on Earth
    • Promoting Actions to Reduce, to a Minimum, Pollution and the Wasteful Exploitation and Consumption of Resources and Energy
    • WWF’s Ultimate Goal is to Stop, and Eventually Reverse, the Accelerating Degradation of Our Planet’s Natural Environment, and to Help Build a Future in which Humans Live in Harmony with Nature (Medley, 1996, p. 67).

The WWF mission statement is succinct and clear, identifies the major areas of business for the WWF, provides an indication of the long-term goal, gives some sense of the activities that are to help achieve the goal (“promoting actions”), and also identifies some of the values at the core of the WWF (“for the Benefit of All Life on Earth”, “Humans Live in Harmony with Nature”).

There is a significant amount of information presented in the short paragraph, and it is something that could be shared with government, donors, and the public alike. Although some of the terms may be overly technical for the general public (e.g. “ecological processes”), the WWF identifies the general public as its lowest priority audience.

3.5.1.2 Goals and Objectives

Eagles, McCool and Haynes developed guidelines for creating successful protected area planning objectives in 2002. These guidelines include five characteristics: output-oriented, time-bound, specific, measurable, and attainable (Eagles, et al., 2002). These guidelines help to
evaluate the goals and objectives developed by the protected areas organisations. Elaborating a set of goals is important because goals “provide the overall policy framework for management” (Eagles, et al., 2002, p. 44). Having stated goals allows the organisation to determine its own performance indicators.

3.5.1.3 Explicit Actions

In addition to goals, indicators are needed to monitor progress toward said goals (Seasons, 2003). Monitoring and evaluation, considered to be the last two steps in the rational comprehensive model (Seasons, 2003) that strategic planning is based on, compare performance with a set of targets, measured by a series of indicators. Creating objective measures of performance reduces the likelihood that subjective measures will be used, because performance will always be measured somehow – it is implicit in the questions that stakeholders and sponsors ask (Holzer & Yang, 2004).

One possible set of indicators is a series of explicit actions performed to achieve the stated goals. Accordingly, this research examines explicit actions planned by the organisations under study. The extent of actual, measurable, actions is examined. Any assignment of responsibility is also noted.

3.5.1.4 Environmental Scan

The environmental scan is a key part of the strategy development process. The environment is, “in the very broadest sense … that which is external to and within which some entity exists” (Pitkethly, 2003, p. 225). The environmental scan is the element that differentiates strategic planning from other models of planning. Environmental scanning is important because, “an organisation must achieve a strategic fit between its external and internal environments in order to survive and be successful” (Stead & Stead, 2004, p. 122). The environmental scan is “clearly critical to organisational performance and viability” (Elenkov, 1997, p. 287). Included in the environmental scan is analysis of competitive advantage; Cuervo-Cazurra states that the...
analysis of competitive advantage is “at the core of strategic management” (2003, p. 18). In order to comprehend what is needed for a competitive strategy, an organisation needs to understand “the customer’s definition of value for money, and their perceptions of the products competing for their cash” (Bowman, 2003, p. 414). Organisations also need to be aware that the environment changes; one frequently cited study finds that in high-performing firms, executives scan the environment more frequently, using a variety of media including print and personal connections (Daft, Sormunen, & Parks, 1988).

Although the literature does not seem to require a particular degree of formal consultation, some connection with stakeholders does offer benefit to those creating the strategic plan. Awareness of stakeholder needs is important because, “to win a customer’s business the firm must offer a package perceived to be superior to alternative offerings, to offer more ‘value for money’” (Bowman, 2003, p. 415). In order to distinguish itself from competitors, an organisation must be aware of alternative offerings. Also important is to ensure that all stakeholders are considered.

For the PA management organisations, the environment includes everything outside of the organisation. However, while in the private sector, “the distinction between what lies within and what lies without the firm forms a fundamental analytical divide” (Pitkethly, 2003, p. 226) the same cannot be said for the public sector. While the organisation is the internal, they are each also a part of two other internal environments: the Minister’s portfolio (Environment or Fisheries and Oceans) and the Government of Canada. Accordingly, there is no “fundamental analytical divide” that identifies the best point to end the analysis. In addition, although the PA management organisations are organisations in and of themselves, their management does not have final approval of many decisions, and even more important, management cannot set their budgets independently. These factors make awareness of the environment even more important for the PA organisations. To be successful, “the firm [must] systematically look for opportunities and/or threats in its environment to come up with the best alternatives ...” (Lorange, 1980, p. 4).
3.5.1.5 Communication

The best-designed strategic plan is not be successful if the plan cannot be communicated. Harmon suggests that, “if there is a single key to successful … management, it is effective communication” (1994, p. 69). Communication with other government departments, central agencies, and stakeholders is important for managing; communication with the Canadian public was important for building a constituency. Building a constituency is important because, “effective biodiversity conservation will not take place unless political will is generated” (Angelstam, Mikusiński, Rönnbäck, Östman, Lazdinis, et al., 2003, p. 528).

Understanding what stakeholders value is a challenge; managers’ views of value may not correspond with what the customer/stakeholder values. The lack of comprehension is “a particular problem in industries where executives have a strong ‘technical’ background. They are excited and impressed by the technical features of their products, and they assume that the customer values these features in the same way (Bowman, 2003, p. 411).” The scientific education of most protected areas practitioners would have created a similar mindset. In the conservation community, it is normative that protecting ecosystem diversity and habitat integrity is good. There is not always an understanding of what is needed to communicate conservation needs to stakeholders. It is important to note that there are many individual examples of excellence in all three organisations. However, on the organisational level, obstacles remain.

Engaging the public is a key requirement of further success in mitigating threats to protected areas. Members of the public are responsible for many of the threats to protected areas; some sites depend on public visitation for revenue; ultimately, any publicly supported PA depends on some degree of public pressure or support for maintained funding. Those carrying out:

research in protected areas ought to recognize that the root cause of the myriad threats to the long-term viability of these areas… is a lack of public support. If the public doesn’t understand what’s going on in a protected area, they are much less likely to acknowledge
Evaluation of public interpretation, such as on-site activity, is included in this section.

3.5.2 Evaluation of Strategic Planning Effectiveness

Broadly speaking, there is an increasing interest in including measures of effectiveness in the evaluation of publicly-funded organisations (Wimbush & Watson, 2000, p. 302). In Canada, one example of this is the increasing prominence of value for money audits carried out by the Auditor General of Canada (whose office includes the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development). While evaluations generally must consider value for money, what is the situation in evaluating planning? Evaluating management of protected areas is important because it can:

- enable and support an adaptive approach to management;
- assist in effective resource allocation;
- promote accountability and transparency; and
- help involve the community, build constituency and promote protected area values.

(Hockings, Stolton, Leverington, Dudley, & Courreau, 2006, p. 5)

The contents of strategic plans have been widely evaluated, with recurring debate over incrementalism, the degree of formality, the role of the chief executive, etc. However, the actual results (or effectiveness) of plans has not been studied in detail. Hendrick, (2003, p. 497) reports that:

...at this date much of the research on strategic planning and management in public organisations is descriptive, so there is little agreement on what variables are important among the three dimensions of environment, process, and performance on or how these
dimensions are likely to be related. More fundamentally, there is little evidence on whether strategic planning is useful or effective in public organisations.

One aim of the present research is to ask if strategic planning has been useful or effective in the protected area management organisations.

Although they write over two decades earlier than Hendrick, Dyson & Foster (1980, p. 163) also acknowledge this lack of evidence when they state that, “there is … no concise statement of effectiveness in strategic planning.” No such statement is found in articles consulted for this research; how are we to decide on effectiveness if we cannot define it? Dyson and Foster indicate that the best approach is to define effectiveness in terms of the process, rather than a pure goals/achievement view of effectiveness (which meant that only the results of the plan would be evaluated). Because it “tends to assume a static environment which is not realised in practice” (p. 164), the goals/achievement view could lead to planners setting very modest goals to ensure that goals can be met.

Ramanujam, et al. (1986, p. 347) reports that, “despite the large number of research efforts that attempt to elucidate links between planning and performance, the results of this body of research are fragmented and contradictory.” Hendrick (2003, p. 492) date the start of this evaluation work to the early 1970s. Much of the early work involves comparing performance results of organisations to identify any correlations between success and having formalised strategic planning. Such studies include surveys with large sample sizes, such as Ramanujam et al. (1986) who survey 600 firms. Some studies follow up their surveys with more in-depth interviews, but most studies do not seem to delve very deeply into the contents of strategic plans to identify the elements in a plan that may provide some performance benefit. Dean and Sharfman (1996, p. 371) find the same thing, writing that “the theories tested in the literature have generally not focused on decision effectiveness per se (Eisenhardt, 1989), but rather, on overall firm performance.”
Dean & Sharfman (1996) evaluate strategic decision processes broadly (of which they include strategic planning as one type, although it was “generally not explicitly portrayed as decision making”; p. 370). They write that, “the link between strategic decision processes and effectiveness has not yet, however, been so convincingly demonstrated, and substantial discussion in the literature has focused on the question of whether managerial choice processes matter” (p. 369, emphasis original). One thing to keep in mind is Hendrick’s (2003, p. 495) statement that “the planning process may improve organisational performance directly and independently of the strategies being developed.” As such, the determinations made can only be considered correlations and cannot, therefore, prove causation.

In order to measure the effectiveness of strategic planning, Bolton & Leach (2002, p. 4) suggest that:

in terms of organisational impact and effectiveness, there are two relevant tests. Firstly, to what extent (if at all) do they attract resources (staff, current expenditure, capital expenditure) within the authority’s budget process (by implication, in the current hard financial climate diverting such resources from other possible uses) and/or result in the attraction of new resources through externally sponsored programmes … Secondly, to what extent do they influence the activities and behaviour of existing departments (for example, by evoking a greater environmental awareness in existing service policies).

However, the above models are difficult to judge in a standardised way. As described above, Dyson & Foster (1980) argue for a view of effectiveness that uses evaluation criteria with multiple dimensions. Ramanujam et al. (1986, p. 348) also recognize the need for researchers evaluating planning systems to “recognize their multidimensional nature and the plurality of approaches that can be used to assess their worth.”

There is a model for evaluating management effectiveness in protected areas specifically (Table 3-2). Developed by Hockings et al. (2006), the model examines three “themes” in management (design, appropriateness/adequacy, and delivery) and located the themes on a wheel.
Within each theme, there are two elements that the authors considered important for evaluation. However, this model applies to management actions rather than planning, which is considered as a single element in the model presented by Hockings et al.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Status and threats: Where are we now?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Where do we want to be and how will we get there?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness/Adequacy</td>
<td>Inputs</td>
<td>What do we need?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process</td>
<td>How do we go about management?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivery</td>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td>What did we do and what products or services were produced?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>What did we achieve?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dyson and Foster (1980) do suggest a detailed evaluation model for the effectiveness of strategic planning. Their list of criteria, first published in 1980 and updated in 1982, identifies 13 criteria:

1. Clear statement of objectives
2. Integration of planning function
3. Catalytic action of planning function
4. Richness of formulation (of plans)
5. Depth of evaluation
6. Treatment of uncertainty in evaluation
7. Resources planned
Dyson & Foster outline their model in a series of articles. They use a system of ordinal rankings to rate the performance of the public and private organisations in the study. They also point out that it is important to minimize the “confusion between desired outcomes which ensue because of the planning process and those which arise in spite of it” (Dyson & Foster, 1980, p. 167). Further, it is “likely that the relative importance of the various criteria for effectiveness would vary depending on the organisations considered” (p. 169). Finally, they conclude that, “the notion of aiming to achieve maximum effectiveness on each attribute is to aspire to an ideal, which could well be costly” (Dyson & Foster, 1983, p. 157). Because the model is one of the very few to employ a ranking that specifically includes the public sector context, the Dyson & Foster approach is adopted in the current research, although “assumptions made” is not evaluated because there were very few individuals who were able to speak to the process in any of the organisations.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examines the methodology appropriate for in-depth research into protected areas management. A qualitative, interview-based approach is most likely method to obtain the desired depth of information with which to respond to the research questions. A method for evaluating the success of the strategic plans is also outlined.
The next chapter describes the history and current structure of the protected areas programs in each of the three protected areas management organisations under study. The chapter, based on archival material, interviews and published material, provides the context for the interviews and the research conclusions.
4. Historical Context: The Protected Area Managers

In order to provide some context to the later discussion of planning and management in Canada’s protected area management organisations, a brief discussion of the history of each organisation is provided. Knowing the history of an organisation is important because “ignorance of an organisation's past can undermine the development of strategies for its future” (Mintzberg, et al., 1998, p. 8). Further, “strategy is focused on the future, but most good strategies are well grounded in the lessons of history as well” (Simpson, D. G., 1998a, p. 623-627). The discussion focuses on planning and management aspects of each organisation. Organisational charts for the contemporary form of each protected area management organisation can be found in Appendix 2. A summary table of each organisation’s history can be found in Appendix 3. A map of all federal protected areas in Canada can be found in Appendix 4.

4.1 The Canadian Wildlife Service

The federal protected areas for wildlife (i.e., National Wildlife Areas and Migratory Bird Sanctuaries) have been under the management of the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS) since its founding in 1947. Since 1971, the CWS has been a component of Environment Canada (EC).

4.1.1 Organisational History

Federal protected areas for wildlife in Canada pre-date the establishment of the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS) much in the same way that the National Parks pre-date the creation of the professional park management organisation, Parks Canada (later the Parks Canada Agency). Protecting migratory birds (and later wildlife) arose under the British legal system with the

understanding that wildlife was a public resource. This became the basis of migratory bird protection across North America (Environment Canada, 1993). Out of an emerging realisation that the “myth of superabundance” was, indeed, just a myth, the Canadian government set aside an area of land in 1887 at Long Lake, Saskatchewan (now known as Last Mountain Lake) (Burnett, 1999). This was the first sanctuary set aside specifically for wildlife in Canada and in North America, although it was “promptly forgotten” as soon as it was set aside (Foster, 1978, p. 179).

Parliament created the Parks Branch (which evolved into the Parks Canada Agency) by passage of the Dominion Forest Reserves and Parks Act in May 1911. It included a new Animal Division, headed by Maxwell Graham, that later became the Canadian Wildlife Service. The 1916 Treaty for International Protection of Migratory Birds (colloquially known as the Migratory Birds Convention), and the 1917 passage of the Canadian Migratory Birds Convention Act (MBCA) enabling the Treaty, marked a significant step in wildlife conservation in Canada. The federal government thus had a legal mandate to protect land specifically for its importance to migratory birds, areas that came to be known as Migratory Bird Sanctuaries (MBSs). Soon after the passage of the MBCA, the Parks Branch hired an avid birder, Hoyes Lloyd, as its ornithologist. Lloyd faced a continual problem with a lack of money for conservation programs (Foster, 1978).

In 1947, the Animal Division separated from the Parks Branch, and became known as the Dominion Wildlife Service (Burnett, 1999). After three years, it was renamed the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS), as it continues to be known. The early CWS had a strong focus on waterfowl, to the extent that “ducks and geese dominated the ornithological agenda at CWS, at least during the first 20 years after 1947. Indeed, it was suggested by some … that the initials of the agency really stood for Canadian Waterfowl Service” (Burnett, 1999, p. 38).

The efforts of the CWS were always in the context of the federal jurisdiction on an issue. As reflected in this statement made at the Dominion-Provincial Meeting on Conservation, 1958:
We are aware of the fact that as far as natural resources are concerned they are owned by the provinces and that the provincial governments have the major responsibility in their protection and development. But we always recognize that the federal government shares the responsibility for creating and maintaining a political and economical climate for the orderly development of our human and natural resources. (Minutes of the Dominion-Provincial Meeting on Conservation, 1958)

In 1959, the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources made a statement about the value of wildlife. In it, he stated that:

wildlife is, I think, one of our most neglected resources – perhaps because its economic value is not as obvious as that of some other resources … Must the encroachment of homo sapiens press the fauna of this country to the brink of extermination? Not necessarily, but it can happen if we do not watch out.

Statements from this period often focused on the economic value of species.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was a huge growth in the size of MBSs. In 1957, there were 95 MBSs (13,000 km²); by 1962 there were only 13 more sites (108) but the area protected had expanded to 103,000km² (Burnett, 1999, p. 54).

The Department of Indian and Northern Affairs was created under the name Northern Affairs and National Resources by the Government Organisation Act of 1966. Under this legislation, the Minister had “duties, powers and functions” related to National Parks and to migratory birds and other wildlife (Environment Canada, n.d., p. 88). The mandate of the CWS changed to reflect its new departmental home, placing a focus on wildlife research relating to northern development.

A new policy era for wildlife began with a statement made by the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources in the House of Commons in 1966. The statement outlined a new National Wildlife Policy and Program. In his speech, the Minister stated that the policy and program “had been developed to meet the needs expressed by conservationists and wildlife
officials throughout Canada by means in accordance with principles generally endorsed by responsible Ministers” (p. 2). The statement outlined policy in four areas: a general category, migratory birds, national parks wildlife, and terrestrial wildlife.

Three years later, Cooch, a Staff Specialist on Migratory Bird populations wrote, “there is no doubt that we now require a National Wildlife Act. We required an Act in 1966 when the National Wildlife Policy was submitted to Parliament but were told that the time was not political” (1969, p. 1) although the CWS had used the Minister’s statement to justify the creation of wildlife areas in advance of a National Wildlife Act. In the years between the announcement of the wildlife policy and the tabling of the legislation, the CWS acquired land at 17 different sites (out of a planned 26 sites), both to create new protected areas and to expand existing ones, at a total cost of $3,643,937 (Environment Canada, 1971).

In 1970, the CWS moved to the Department of Fisheries and Forestry and then to the federal Department of the Environment (DoE) in 1971, after the DoE was created under the Government Organisation Act of 1970 (Privy Council, 1970)\textsuperscript{16}. The new mandate of the CWS related to wildlife as a renewable resource. In 1971, the management of Environment Canada (EC) decided that it would have a structure that reflected the nature of EC as a collection of “four broad basic disciplines,” each requiring its own administrative structure. In effect, this meant that the senior management of EC were managing four separate organisations within the Department. The senior management of EC had “considered the possibility of a functional organisation in which all operations would form one group and all research another, and that we came to the conclusion that this would be so cumbersome as to be inoperative” (Shaw, 1971, p. 2). This decision would later have consequences, as the CWS began to be regarded as an organisation that saw itself as separate from the Department (see discussion below).

In 1971, the Lands, Forest and Wildlife Service (LFWS) formed with the combination of the Lands Directorate, the Canadian Forest Service, and the CWS. The senior management of the

\textsuperscript{16} The government soon adopted the term “Environment Canada” to refer to the DoE.
LWFS was supported by a Strategic Planning Branch (Prebble, 1971a). The Strategic Planning Branch was “to support senior management in the Service by providing required staff work and analysis to identify and evaluate strategic alternatives and to evaluate the Service’s overall goals, objectives and strategies” (Prebble, 1971b). The Strategic Planning Branch did not leave a significant record in archival material, and thus further discussion is not possible.

In 1972, a consultant with the firm of Stevenson and Kellogg (Management Consultants) reported that his review of regional and overhead activities and structures found that EC “was formed primarily out of existing structures. Consequently, it inherited their sub-structures, priorities, programs and momentum” (Stevenson & Kellogg, 1972, p. 2). Additionally, separate cultures and motivations from the previous organisations were also maintained. While this maintained the culture of the CWS, it also meant that EC never cohered into a single department, despite the best efforts of EC’s senior managers. Organisationally, this meant that individuals might make decisions that were better for their part of the organisation, rather than EC as a whole. This had been identified as a threat on previous occasions, which initially led to the Stevenson-Kellogg report, and then through various other approaches, culminating in the current (2003-onward) experiment with the horizontal reporting structure (further described below). The Departmental leadership’s reaction to the independent thinking of the various elements of EC has been to attempt to disrupt specific loyalties by breaking up the smaller organisations, creating a single, Departmental, orientation among EC employees.

*Canada Wildlife Act*

In 1971, the federal Cabinet reviewed a request to develop federal legislation for wildlife (Cabinet Minutes, 1971a). The initiative went through a long process of approval, including review by the Cabinet Committee on Federal-Provincial Relations, the Canadian Wildlife Advisory Council, and the Canadian Environmental Advisory Council (Cabinet Minutes, 1971b). Briefing material prepared for the Privy Council showed that the initial idea for the *Canada
*Wildlife Act* came from the 1961 Resources for Tomorrow Conference (Canadian Wildlife Service, 1974a). By March of 1972, Cabinet was discussing amendments to the text of the new *Act Respecting Wildlife In Canada* (Cabinet Minutes, 1972), more commonly referred to as the *Canada Wildlife Act*. In a briefing paper on the proposed Act, the CWS outlined a land acquisition program. The description of the program was quite broad:

> The current habitat preservation program of the Canadian Wildlife Service consists of acquiring land by purchase or by transfer of administration from other federal departments or provincial governments for the primary purpose of preserving habitat for migratory birds. Where compatible with the primary objective the wildlife areas or parts of them are made available for public recreational use such as natural history study, interpretation, hunting, etc. Recreational use of the wildlife areas is of high quality but it must be carefully monitored and controlled to ensure that it does not deteriorate or conflict with the primary purpose. In some areas, agricultural use is permitted or even encouraged where it will benefit the habitat or the migratory birds that use the area.

(Environment Canada, 1971)

In another background paper on the proposed legislation, the CWS explained that the Act was necessary because, although the 1966 Policy allowed them to acquire land, it did not provide a legal basis for its programs. The legality was important, as it would allow the CWS to enforce restrictions on use or to prohibit access to its protected areas (Canadian Wildlife Service, 1971a).

At the time of proposal, there was a great deal of correspondence with provincial governments, who were concerned with the incursion of the federal government into what they saw as an area of provincial jurisdiction. The CWS was aware of some of the potential problems in the legislation, although the problems were always downplayed in descriptions of the need for the legislation, for example:

> There is a need for a national program across the country to set aside and protect unique ecosystems. Because most land is under provincial government jurisdiction, the federal
role might best be played by acting as an initiator and coordinator of programs to reserve the required areas. Not only Quebec is sensitive about federal land acquisition; Ontario, Saskatchewan and British Columbia are as well. (Tener, 1971)

Indeed, the *Canada Wildlife Act* was withdrawn after first reading for amendment in the face of various provincial objections (Canadian Wildlife Service, 1972). The amended *Canada Wildlife Act* (CWA) passed in the House of Commons on the 20th of July, 1973.

Although the new CWA gave the CWS the power to create refuges for any wildlife of national interest:

the CWS viewed itself more like hunter support - there were many more hunters at that time. Most of the areas were put together in the 1970s, very early 1980s, [they were] largely duck habitat. Today’s perspective shows many gaps, for example seabird colonies (CWS8).

At the time that the CWA was written, the CWS recognised the need for explicit planning policy. In responding to a request for “Goals for the 1980s,” A. G. Loughrey (then Acting Director of the CWS) wrote that:

> We … have produced a set of objectives and sub-objectives with a partial listing of means or processes by which those objectives may be attained … My concern is that there is a grave risk in establishing specious goals which are considered to be “realistic” before accomplishing what I consider to be essential prior planning requirements.

(Loughrey, 1971)

Loughrey went on to say that, “a first requirement is the articulation of a departmental philosophy to establish the ... framework upon which departmental policies are based” which included scientific, technical, economic and demographic factors. Only upon completion of that philosophy would it be “possible to formulate intelligent objectives and sub-objectives.” The CWS was working to follow such a model, through activities such as the Migratory Bird Sub-Activity Review carried out by Hugh Boyd in 1969 (Loughrey, 1971).
A few years after the CWS started acquiring land for National Wildlife Areas, the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister (SADM) described the status of the habitat acquisition policy, considered “flexible” as a result of:

the fact that some provinces are more amenable to federal overtures than others. CWS considers the best policy to be one whereby the capital costs of land acquisition would be shared equally by both levels of government, while management and development costs would be assumed solely by the provinces. (Environment Canada, 1974c, p. 6)

The SADM concluded that there were some important questions that had not been answered by the CWS. In particular, the SADM wondered, “why are we in the business of acquiring wildlife habitats when the management responsibility clearly lies with the provinces?” The SADM also pointed out that the Canada Wildlife Act only specified that the Minister may acquire lands, not shall acquire them, so there was no obligation to continue acquiring lands. Although the CWS was perceived by EC to present well thought-out plans (Environment Canada, 1974c), there was an awareness of the need to create larger, more systematic plans (Loughrey, 1971) as the CWS had “a credibility problem to overcome with Treasury Board” that was to be resolved through “logical proposals” and “analysis and priority” (Eagles, D., 1972).

Even with recognition of the need for credible plans, National Wildlife Area (NWA) planning at the CWS got off to a somewhat halting start. In a memorandum to the CWS Director General in 1975, Hugh Boyd (the Director of Migratory Birds Research) reported on CWS goals for 1975-76. He expressed some concern about the NWAs, stating that:

I find that there are plans for very few NWAs and that this omission results from a deliberate decision by Nolan Perret, Gordon Staines and Bill Munro [a former CWS Director General]. Nolan tells me that he didn’t want a policy governing NWAs and had successfully fought off your efforts to get him to produce one. However he now

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17 The CWS currently pays for management and development costs.
graciously agrees that we should have one, if possible prior to five-regionalisation.

(Boyd, 1975a)

In a later memo, Boyd went on to say that:

I’m appalled to find how little there is in the way of policies and objectives in this field and how little the Regions have done to define the purpose and measure the effectiveness of the efforts of the past decade. (Boyd, 1975b)

CWS staff did continue to recognise the need to begin to prepare policies and plans for their new network of NWAs. In the Discussion of CWS Priorities for 1976-77 and 1977-78 (Canadian Wildlife Service, n.d.), the CWS stated:

A policy paper is required outlining a national plan for the management of national wildlife areas, especially those subject to considerable public use near urban centres. The policy paper should be developed to examine whether the CWS should reduce its level of habitat acquisition and concentrate resources on development and management of present areas.

Another memo described a request from the Treasury Board (TB) for the CWS to describe land acquisitions in the context of a long-term plan. The Deputy Minister of EC wrote to the CWS, in support of the request:

I am not surprised by this request. It is not unreasonable that TB Ministers look at individual proposals in the context of a long-term plan which they have proposed [hand-corrected to ‘approved’]. Can you set preparation of such a submission in motion?”

(Seaborn, 1977)

In response, the Director General of the CWS referred to certain points raised in a review of the CWS habitat acquisition program. In particular, there was a reference to action, as:

the long-term plan for habitat acquisition is already in the draft stage. It is a subsidiary part of the revised migratory bird policy program plan which is currently being developed by Mr. Boyd with assistance from the Regions. (Loughrey, 1977c)
Although the plan was drafted, there was no copy available among the archival documents, nor did it appear that the plan was ever implemented. Land acquisition efforts were curtailed as budgets dropped in the late 1970s.

In 1976, the Department of the Environment was renamed the Department of Fisheries and the Environment. Romeo LeBlanc was named Minister, although the Ministry was still known in statute as the Department of the Environment (Seaborne, 1976). By 1977, there were again “mumblings of reorganisation in the wind” at EC (Burke, 1977). This mumbling later evolved into discussions about separating the Department of Fisheries and the Environment into a Department of Fisheries and a Department of the Environment (DoE).

By the end of the 1970s, the priorities of Environment Canada changed as economic and administrative concerns came to dominate the agenda. The Environmental Management Service’s list of general priorities for 1979-1981 marked the shift, as not one of the dozen priorities was a purely environmental issue:

- Job creation and economic growth;
- Energy;
- Federal-provincial relations and national unity;
- Inter-ministerial relations;
- Data and analysis;
- Setting research priorities;
- Cost recovery;
- Contract work and exchange of technical information;
- Evaluation;
- Policies and priorities on staffing;
- Information; and,
- Budgetary restraint (Environment Canada, 1979)
The document went on to say that, in terms of conserving migratory birds, there was a need for long-term planning of habitat management and acquisition, especially in the highly populated region of southern Ontario. Acquiring land is “absolutely necessary when there is an opportunity to protect natural habitat faced with irrevocable destruction. It is also necessary to conserve habitat by other means than acquiring the land”¹⁸ (p. 17).

After the decline of the initial enthusiasm about conservation that led to the creation of EC in the mid-1970s, budgets also began to decline from relatively generous initial budgets (see discussion below). Declines were relatively slow, but steady, until the end of 1984, when:

in addition to DOE's managerial problems, the newly appointed minister in the Conservative government, Suzanne Blais-Grenier, volunteered a 25 per cent cut in the Canadian Wildlife Service, which caused a public outcry and led to a decline in staff morale. (Desveaux, et al., 1991, p. 515)

Several programs, including the interpretation program, were cut entirely. Many staffers left the CWS. From 1984 to 1987, “environmental policy was not a priority for the Conservative government, but it exploded as an issue during the long hot summer of 1988” (Desveaux, et al., 1991, p. 499). Unfortunately for the CWS, its budget did not explode accordingly. The Mulroney Government’s response to the “explosion” of the environment as a policy issue was the Green Plan. The document set out the goal of protecting 12% of the land area of Canada, and described both MBSs and NWAs as elements in that goal, although without any mention of the CWS as an organisation. Other than the lack of their name, from the perspective of the CWS, the language could not have been more positive:

The federal government intends to meet, head on, the challenge of maintaining and enhancing the health and diversity of Canada’s wildlife. Helping wildlife populations to

¹⁸ Translated from French: L’acquisition d’habitats et leur gestion doivent être planifiées à long terme et, surtout dans le sud de l’Ontario; cet objectif est une nécessité absolue lorsqu’il y a lieu de préserver l’habitat naturel contre une destruction irrévocable. Il faut tâcher d’en arriver à la conservation des habitats par d’autres moyens que l’achat des terres.
survive and flourish must become a national effort, involving all levels of government and the public at large. (Government of Canada, 1990, p. 84)

It is clear that the CWS had a tremendous policy opportunity in 1990 for higher funding for land acquisition and management. However, the Green Plan announcement did not result in any increase in the CWS land acquisition budget. One interviewee described the habitat acquisition program as having, for 30 years, “only what could be scraped together” (CWS8).

In 1990, a major new development in wildlife policy took place when the Wildlife Ministers’ Council (including all provincial, territorial and federal ministers with wildlife interests in their portfolios) announced their approval of A Wildlife Policy for Canada (Wildlife Ministers Council of Canada, 1999). After the announcement of A Wildlife Policy for Canada, many new initiatives were “launched to improve wildlife governance in Canada. The federal government’s Green Plan led the way, in December 1990. For the first time in several years, the CWS was able to access money for its programs, such as the North American Waterfowl Management Plan” (Burnett, 1999, p. 166). For protected areas, two points in the document were especially important:

6.6 Governments will complete and maintain comprehensive systems of protected areas, through legislation and/or policy, that include representative ecological types and give priority to the protection of endangered or limited habitats. To allow species to change their local and regional distributions in response to climate change and other factors, the protected area systems must be designed to:

- Protect the diversity of Canada's physical environments
- Contain a range of environments within each protected area
- Link protected areas by corridors of suitable habitat

6.7 Governments should include conservation of wildlife habitats as a management objective of all sectors using public lands and also provide for conservation of the full
range of wildlife habitats in land use planning, setting regional goals for this purpose. (Wildlife Ministers’ Council of Canada, 1990).

In 1990, the policy environment was very positive for a major increase in wildlife land acquisition and management, but the CWS proved to be incapable of capitalizing on this opportunity. Based on the current research, these goals were not achieved by 2007.

In 1992, the CWS Headquarters developed a list of priority sites for the acquisition of significant wildlife habitat. The protection of the high priority habitat was to be discussed with provinces and others. The CWS proposed that they receive free transfers of ecologically significant surplus land from other government departments (e.g. old lighthouse sites) in order to create new NWAs. The proposal was turned down because Treasury Board regulations required market value transfers, even between departments (Zurbrigg, 1995).

Restructuring

The CWS has been subject to a substantial number of structural changes in its history. In the 1990s, another series of changes affected the CWS, to the point that the “CWS itself was subjected to the stress of unprecedented redefinition. A major departmental restructuring of Environment Canada in 1993, saw CWS functions integrated within the Environmental Conservation Service” (Burnett, 1999, p. 167). In February 1994, the CWS was re-organized into a three-branch service: wildlife conservation, water and habitat conservation, and the National Wildlife Research Centre (Burnett, 1999).

Then, in 1995/96, EC began “a new business planning process. The new process, based on an integrated ecosystems approach, enhances departmental integration and strengthens accountability for the delivery of results, while maintaining and building upon the strengths of its existing programs management structures” (Environment Canada, 1996, p. 10). This shift to the use of matrix management to deliver programs in cross-cutting thematic areas (“business lines”) integrated the existing services and divisions within EC, so that they began to cooperate more
directly with staff in other divisions who worked on the same types of issues. For example, those involved in conservation of wetland habitat in the CWS could work more directly with the water conservation groups in EC.

The business lines became the major reporting structure (which obscured the levels of resources that were devoted to individual programs within the Department). At first, there were five business lines: Atmospheric Change; Toxics; Biodiversity and Wildlife; Conserving Canada’s Ecosystems; and Compliance and Enforcement (Environment Canada, 1996). The next year, “A Healthy Environment” was added to create a sixth business line (Environment Canada, 1997). In 1997/98, the structure changed again and the new four business line matrix consisted of: Healthy Environment; Safety from Environmental Hazards; Greener Society; and Management and Administration (Environment Canada, 1998). The next year, the business lines settled into a different four: Clean Environment; Nature; Weather and Environmental Predictions; and Management, Administration, and Policy (Environment Canada, 1999a; Environment Canada 2004). These remained in place until the Department began shifting to a new structure related to Strategic Outcomes and a Program Activity Architecture (Environment Canada, 2005a; Environment Canada, 2006).

This shift, in 2004/05, saw Environment Canada begin another major structural transformation. EC created a “program activity architecture” that was designed to promote delivery of work on specific projects. The new structure “purported to be, in the mind of that Deputy Minister anyway, a fundamental rethinking of not just the department, but of environmental management in Canada, and derivatively where this federal thing that we call Environment Canada would fit in” (CWS7). The conclusion of the transformation process was the development of a results-based management structure that consisted of a horizontally-oriented reporting structure, designed to cultivate relationships, coupled with the more traditional hierarchical structure. For example, a new Science and Technology Branch was created; many of the researchers in CWS were moved out of the Service and into this new Branch. Although the
researchers no longer reported to the Director-General of the CWS, their work was still required for CWS to conduct its business, so the horizontal structure linked people in the two Branches. The changes that began in 2004/05 were aimed, in part, to fulfil the creation of “one department” (Environment Canada, 2005a) - an effort that had been underway since the Stevenson & Kellogg report of 1972. EC undertook this step, the integration of “policy, programs and management structures,” in order to develop the coherence in its approach to other departments, other governments, and the private sector (Environment Canada, 2005a, n.p.). Seen as “key” to providing “value for money to Canadians,” this process did not seem philosophically different from what was recommended by the 1972 Stevenson-Kellogg commission that evaluated the structure of EC soon after its creation (see above discussion). It would seem that the problems at Environment Canada remained consistent over time. With so many administrative changes, each of them causing a significant degree of upheaval, there was recurring difficulty in achieving operational tasks in the CWA (and Environment Canada more broadly).

The researcher’s period of employment with EC covered about the last year of the approximately three-year transition to the Program Activity Architecture, designed to reinforce the idea of results-based management. Once the Department completed its high-level transition, each of the Directorates was required to restructure to match the new structure of EC. At the same time, the government created heavily bureaucratic new requirements with legislation such as the Public Service Modernization Act (2003) and the Accountability Act (2006). This series of administrative changes led to more delays and confusion in recruitment, difficulty in retaining employees, and challenges in maintaining financial resources.

One proposal as a result of the restructuring process was to re-name the Canadian Wildlife Service. The proposal was extremely unpopular with staff, who did not understand the motivation behind the move (personal observation). Environment Canada commissioned Ipsos-Reid to undertake focus groups with staff, and to add questions to their weekly polling, in order to determine a variety of perspectives on the issue of the change in name. While the change in name
was not made, largely because of the unpopularity of the suggestion, the polling data also provides insight into the public profile of the CWS. In this survey (mentioned in Chapter 1), only 43% of Canadians described themselves as being familiar with the Canadian Wildlife Service.

4.1.2 Strategic Planning at Environment Canada

In 1972, EC explained that strategic planning:

- derives specific time-phased objectives from the normative objectives, establishes strategies, identifies and commits present and potential resources to task and organisational responsibilities. It determines what can be done in a given cycle towards the achievement of the normative objectives. (Environment Canada, 1972a, p. 1)

Planning was defined, in the same document, as “making decisions on the effort of the organisation.” (p. 1) In the same document, EC also indicated that none of its constituent missions (environmental conservation, environmental protection, etc.) had mechanisms in place to report back on progress relative to the original plans, a vital step that was later created by the Treasury Board (e.g. annual Report on Plans and Priorities, Departmental Performance Report).

Environment Canada began long-range planning in the early 1970s (Environment Canada, 1973b; Shaw, 1974; Lupien, 1974) with an exercise that created a ten-year plan for the Department, summarized in the document Long Range Planning Assumptions 1975-1985. While the Assumptions were for the Department broadly, there were some assumptions in the document that related directly to the mandate of the CWS. For example, consumptive use of wildlife (i.e., hunting) was projected to reach a steady state or decline by 1985, which was the case (Boyd, Dickson, & Levesque, 2002). Non-consumptive use of wildlife, such as bird watching, was projected to increase; in 1975, EC predicted that, “the provision of wildlife-based outdoor recreation, both consumptive and non-consumptive, will develop as an activity of private enterprise as increasing scarcity gives it a dollar value that can return as economic benefit” (p. 3).
Indeed, this prediction was overwhelmingly correct – in a survey on the value Canadians placed on nature, Environment Canada reported that Canadians (and U.S. visitors) spent approximately $11.7 billion dollars on “nature-related activities” in 1996 (Environment Canada, 2000).

Also in the Assumptions was a list of “Principal Planning Assumptions” (p. 25) that included three of particular relevance for the CWS:

- that beneficial management strategies and research will arrest the present accelerated trends in species endangerment and extinction and habitat degradation;
- that species now in danger can be rehabilitated by scientific management and transplantation and that their habitat can likewise either be preserved or rehabilitated; and,
- that the preservation of species and their habitat is a valid socio-economic goal expressed as a quality of life for Canadians, their education and recreation.

While this document included laudable goals, the CWS did not achieve them. Species endangerment continued to accelerate, as reflected in the increasing number of species listed by the Committee of the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada, and the large number of species listed in the Species at Risk Act. While the assumption about rehabilitation has technical truth (populations of some species that were considered endangered at the time the Assumptions were published have grown through intervention, such as the notable example of the Whooping Crane), the actual occurrence of this was infrequent. For the third assumption, while the goal of preserving species and their habitat remained valid, the trends indicated that preservation of species and habitat was negative.19

19 I considered a more complete discussion of species at risk issues in Canada tangential to this research. However, habitat loss has been a significant contributor to the loss of species: for example, since 1971, Canada’s urban areas have expanded by 12,000 km² and although approximately half of that expansion has been into agricultural land (Hofmann, 2001), the entire 12,000 km² expansion would have had some impact on wildlife, as farming and wildlife are often compatible (e.g. Last Mountain Lake NWA staff plant some fields with forage crops for migrating birds). For more detailed information about species at risk issues in Canada see, for example: Venter, O., Brodeur, N. N., Nemiroff, L., Belland, B., Dolinsek, I. J., et al. (2006). Threats to endangered species in Canada. *Bioscience, 56*, 903-910
Those early EC long-range plans did not suffer from a lack of ambition, nor from a lack of goals and objectives. In retrospect, it is apparent that the plans of the Department were overly ambitious, at least for the wildlife components, but it was perhaps better to strive for goals and not meet them than to set easily achievable targets and make little long-term impact. The Department did not continue to use its “long-range” planning process for long, as it began to shift toward strategic planning before the first long-range plan was completed.

In 1978, EC carried out an extensive environmental scan, although it was not obviously linked to a strategic plan. This was not unusual; as described in Chapter 2, many organisations, business- and research-oriented, continued to employ a SWOT analysis independent of strategic planning. The 1978 environmental scan identified a list of threats and opportunities and included a statement that referred to the potential for opportunities, as well as risks and threats (Environment Canada, 1978), clearly echoing the language of the Harvard SWOT model. These threats were especially true for EC, and the CWS, which underwent a series of drastic budget cuts over the next few years.

This broad review of the organizational history of wildlife management at the federal level in Canada reveals that the concept of a coherent, planned program for wildlife conservation involving the creation of wildlife reserves, the development of management capability to manage these reserves, and the creation of a management unit to oversee planning and management was substantially lacking over 120 years of activity.

4.1.3 Planning Goals

The CWS attempted to articulate a plan for the entire PA Network on more than one occasion. In 1947, a plan to create a sanctuary system comparable to the one that existed in the

United States was discussed, as the Dominion Wildlife Service (the predecessor of the CWS) realised that the need for a system of sanctuaries:

becomes greater each year, as settlement spreads. Undoubtedly, an adequate sanctuary system can be established with much less expense and less disturbance of private interests at this time than at a later date, when more of the kind of habitat required would presumably have to be purchased from private owners. (Anonymous, 1947)

This kind of strategic thinking undoubtedly contributed to the eventual creation of the National Wildlife Area program.

Due to its role within EC, the CWS would have been involved in strategic planning from the early of the 1970s. As discussed above, early EC-wide long-range planning and strategic planning documents described the role that the CWS (as part of EC) played in wildlife protection. Documents, compiled by the CWS for the 1972 Stevenson & Kellogg task force, indicated an awareness of the need to respond to both government and public concerns. For example, when discussing public interests, the overview indicated that the CWS received more correspondence than the rest of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs put together when it was a part of that Department (Canadian Wildlife Service, 1972c, p. 1). This statement would have made management aware that there was significant public interest in the CWS and its work. To respond to, and increase, public interest in wildlife, the CWS created public service announcements, films, and radio broadcasts. This was not the sole indication of strategic behaviour on the part of the CWS during the 1970s. In 1972, the CWS hired a Bioeconomic Advisor, “in recognition of the potential for conflict between wildlife values and modern economic development activities” (Burnett, 1999, p. 91).

Organisational groups within the federal government were unable to set their own agenda. In an Environmental Management Service (EMS, which included the CWS) Policy “Green Paper” (Environment Canada, no date), the authors stated “as only one part of one department of one level of government, the federal EMS is not able to set [policy] by itself, nor
free to set its priorities in isolation (p. 1).” The paper went on to state that, “encouraging the
development of an attitude of stewardship as widely as possible, and designing our actions and
policies in accordance, will be the most effective general approach to sound environmental
management. It should be overriding (p. 16).” Ideas in this paper remain relevant. The Green
Paper described the increasing demand for outdoor recreation, governed by “the development of
an increasingly affluent, mobile, leisure oriented society … Equally important is the high value
placed on ‘the land’ in Canadian culture and the emotional and psychological needs of an
increasingly urbanized population” (p. 47). In describing the “Present Difficulties in EMS” (p.
71), the report identified the fact that the EMS was made up of “a series of previously
autonomous organisational units that were spun off from a number of federal departments” that
retained their previous structure and directions (p. 71). The conclusion was that the units would
have to be re-directed in their orientation towards “comprehensive environmental management as
a first priority” (p. 74), such as was outlined in the Stevenson & Kellogg report. There were also
more contemporary attempts to bring the CWS more into alignment with EC, such as the
discontinuation of the unofficial CWS logo on communication materials (personal observation).

At various times, the CWS quantified goals for its programs. For example, in the early
1970s, the CWS Director indicated that the CWS wanted to establish 500,000 acres (202,343
hectares) of migratory bird reserves across Canada by the end of the decade (Tener, 1971). There
were other ambitious goals expressed at the time, especially the goal to “achieve in cooperation
with the provinces and others the protection and management of rare and endangered species of
wildlife and their habitat in Canada (through the provisions of the Canada Wildlife Act)” (Tener,
1971, p. 1). Public outreach goals were also included, with the aim to “determine and meet public
demand for knowledge of wildlife and wildlife involvement by establishing nature interpretive
facilities in each of the nine representative ecological areas of Canada ... and by producing films,
TV releases and publications of high standards” (Tener, 1971, p. 2). An additional, interesting,
goal was the establishment of a “wildlife extension program” to provide advice for managing
private lands for wildlife (Tener, 1971, p. 3). This was the sole mention of that proposal found in this research, but it could have been a precursor of the Ecogift and Habitat Stewardship Programs that later existed in the CWS.

In 1976, the Director General of the CWS produced a detailed proposal for expansion of the PA network. Loughrey foresaw acquisition for wetland conservation, endangered species, ecological reserves and interpretation. The proposal was to, by 1990/91, acquire the areas as listed in Table 4-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Sites</th>
<th>Total Area (ha)</th>
<th>Capital Costs</th>
<th>Annual Federal Expenses</th>
<th>Man Year</th>
<th>Annual Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wetland habitat - federal</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>60,800</td>
<td>39,500,000</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>980,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetland federal-provincial agreements</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24,800</td>
<td>35,400,000</td>
<td>1,420,000</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation program</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>5,600,000</td>
<td>1,690,000</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rare and endangered species</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Large Small</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological reserves</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Large Small</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>86,210+</td>
<td>85,000,000</td>
<td>4,930,000</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>1,180,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moving beyond a strictly federal system of protected areas had long been an idea discussed at the CWS. In 1972, the EC Departmental Action Plan included three “urgent thrusts” for the wildlife program, one of which was “to recommend for consideration by all levels of
governments a system of protected areas, or ecological preserves” (Environment Canada, 1972b, p. 26-27). Splitting off responsibilities from the CWS had also been proposed, but this was not given significant attention because, “with such a large and enthusiastic number of supporters the CWS occasionally finds itself unable to fulfil the expectations of its publics” (Loughrey, 1977a, p. 2). The results of splitting off could be serious as, “some of those publics are well organized nationally, and … would, I believe, strongly resist any attempts to fragment federal wildlife responsibilities through splitting off components of CWS programs” (Loughrey, 1977a, p. 2-3). The details of what “splitting off” meant were not discussed.

From 1995 to 2005, EC articulated goals for the PA Network several times. In the 1998/99 Report on Plans and Priorities, EC committed to the development of a NWA system plan in 1998. In the 1999/00 Report on Plans and Priorities, Environment Canada committed to increasing the total area of land protected for wildlife by 6% before 2000. In 2000, the CWS commissioned a discussion paper called A Network Plan for National Wildlife Areas (Turner, 2000). The document referred to a need to do more than “acting on establishment criteria in an opportunistic manner” (Turner, 2000, p. 2). Turner went on to say that, for the NWA Network, “the central challenge … will be to propose a reasonable, measurable basis upon which to anchor the network. It may be based on one or a combination of physical, biological, ecological and/or socio-economic criteria” (p. 3). The Departmental Performance Report (2003a) saw EC commit to creating a protected areas strategy for its PAs, as well as supporting the creation of a broader federal protected areas strategy. In the 2003 Report, the date for preparation of this strategy was postponed from 2002/03 to 2003/04. None of these goals was achieved by the time of this writing in 2007. However, although the specific target of 6% before 2000 did pass unmet, the PA Network did expand later, most notably through the addition of the CFB Suffield NWA in 2003.

The federal Budget of 2004 did not mention of wildlife in the entire 390-page document. However, it did include a review of efforts to expand the national park system (Government of Canada, 2004). Budgets in the following years did include measures to conserve biodiversity, but
without any specific mention of the CWS or its network of PAs, until Budget 2007, when the Budget Speech included specific mention of two proposed CWS wildlife areas, although again no reference to the CWS was included (Government of Canada, 2007b).

Although less examined than in the National Parks, ecological integrity in the CWS protected areas was also under threat. The 2001 Report by the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development examined the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin generally, and included discussion of NWAs and MBSs in the Basin. The report found that:

National wildlife areas and migratory bird sanctuaries are important biological resources in the [Great Lakes-St. Lawrence] basin …We are concerned about the way they are managed. We conclude that the ecological integrity of these areas is at risk and their potential as a conservation tool is unfulfilled. Environment Canada lacks the personnel and resources to manage them well. (Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, 2001, para. 5.3.32)

These concerns had been expressed in other milieus, including the Canadian Nature Federation Report, *Conserving Nature on a Shoestring Budget* (2002).

Less than adequate resources, exacerbated by a series of budget cuts (described below in 4.1.4), and a seeming inability to influence government decision-makers nor succeed when opportunities presented themselves (e.g. 1990 Green Plan), created a situation of very low morale within the CWS through the 1980s and 1990s. This situation had occurred in the past (Tener, 1974; Desveaux, et al., 1991) and will likely continue to occur if the CWS and its circumstances do not change.

### 4.1.4 Financial History

The financial history of the CWS is complex to report. The level of financial detail that departments release changed over time, such that detailed financial information for the CWS is no
longer publicly reported as of 1996/97. As the CWS has moved in and out of various departments, and has had components moved in and out of it, direct comparison of operating dollars is illustrative at best, even when specific information is available. However, some discussion of finances is required in order to provide context for later discussion. Table 4-2 provides an overview of the finances of the CWS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Year</th>
<th>Budget (millions)</th>
<th>Full-Time Equivalents</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962/63</td>
<td>$0.932</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Burnett, 1999, p. 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966/67</td>
<td>$2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Burnett, 1999, p. 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>$4.9</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>CWS, 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/74</td>
<td>$10.71</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Environment Canada, 1973a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/75</td>
<td>$11.34</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>Environment Canada, 1974b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977/78</td>
<td>$13.9</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>Loughrey, 1977a, p. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>$21.8</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>Environment Canada, 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>$30.014</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>Environment Canada, 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/97</td>
<td>$43.9*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Environment Canada, 1997, p. 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total reported for Biodiversity/Wildlife (further budget information may be found in Table 4-7).

For the dates prior to the establishment of the Canadian Wildlife Service, financial information is unavailable, although Burnett wrote that the early period of the CWS “was a period of heady growth” (1999, p. 82). Specific programs within the CWS had significant resources attached to them. For example, the 1965/66 departmental annual report:

envisaged a ten-year prairie wetland preservation program, beginning in 1967, with an annual budget of $5 million. For the first five years, an additional $400,000 would be
earmarked for wetland acquisitions elsewhere in Canada to protect breeding, staging, and wintering areas. The latter amount enabled CWS to begin the process of land acquisition to create a system of NWAs… Once begun, the process of organisational growth continued. In keeping with the increasing scope and scale of its responsibilities, CWS was elevated to the status of a separate branch of the department. (Burnett, 1999, p. 82)

Within a decade, the fate of many environmental programs changed dramatically. From a memo written by the Deputy Minister to the Minister in 1979:

the Department has been “tightening its belt” regularly since 1975. Today it is operating most of the same programs – plus several new ones – with 88% of the resources it had in 1975 (in real terms). This no doubt indicates that there was room for efficiency improvement in 1975; but most of those types of improvements have now been made and there is little likelihood of further significant gains without either (a) affecting delivery of services, or (b) curtailing or eliminating programs. (Seaborn, 1979)

Seaborn also pointed out that salary accounted for 60% the EC budget, that there had been cuts every year between 1975/76 and 1979/80 (Table 4-3), and that some major program impacts were being felt. For example, the funds for habitat acquisition (which had been $1,100,000) decreased by more than 50% to $400,000 over the period. Seaborn’s memo also pointed out that Parks Canada was undergoing similar cuts (from $140M to $82M).

Table 4-3 Annual cuts for Environment Canada, 1975/76 to 1979/80
(Seaborn, 1979).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dollars cut (millions)</th>
<th>Full-Time Equivalents cut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/77</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As discussed above, Departmental- and Service-level constraint was not new. In outlining priorities for 1978/79, the Regional Director-General for Quebec, Marcel Lortie, insisted that plans for the coming year must be defined within the limits of allocated resources and within the constraints the CWS was operating under (Lortie, 1976). This concern was echoed by the Regional Director General in the Pacific and Yukon Region, who advocated that the EMS “circle the wagons” by ensuring that activities were “high in the mandate of EMS, has a substantial federal rationale and a promising pay-off, and is carried out in such a manner as to maximize the effectiveness of a limited resource base” (p. 2).

In the late 1970s, there was a major budget review carried out by the Treasury Board Secretariat. The review “was demoralizing to the dedicated CWS staff, especially when coupled with the uncertainties of learning the ropes in a reorganized operating system” (Burnett, 1999, p. 119). Burnett reported that Environment Canada was one of the first to be subject to the scrutiny. Although the CWS fared fairly well under the review:

the unwritten message was clear. Programs would no longer be supported on the strength of their worthiness alone. Henceforth, it would be equally important to demonstrate that they were being executed in a manner that minimized the need for federal spending while maximizing the potential for economic benefit … The need to protect habitat through strategies other than outright purchase provided the impetus for exploring stewardship agreements and other forms of public-private sector participation in the conservation of wetlands and other critical ecosystems. (Burnett, 1999, p. 120)

This change was also demonstrated in the changing list of departmental priorities discussed above (Environment Canada, 1979).

Although budgets gradually decreased in the late 1970s, the most dramatic change for the CWS (to that point) happened in 1984 under the Mulroney government and Environment Minister Blais-Grenier, when 22% of the CWS staff was dismissed, and some programs were cut entirely (Keating, 1984). The interpretation program was particularly hard-hit, as all 32 of the program
staff were cut. This cut was justified on the basis that, “this was education and thus a provincial responsibility” (CWS8). The CWS was “saved” by the concurrent approval of the North American Waterfowl Management Plan (NAWMP) that gave the CWS another issue to focus on (Burnett, 1999). The CWS continued operating at a much reduced level throughout the 1980s. The long-awaited announcement of the *Wildlife Policy for Canada* in 1990 resulted in some new resources for the CWS (Burnett, 1999).

In the recession of the mid-1990s, Environment Canada saw another major budget cut. The total budget dropped by 39% between 1994/95 and 1997/98 (Burnett, 1999, p. 170) and 64 full-time positions (18%) were also lost (Burnett, 1999, p. 171). With “each round of cuts, not only did the capacity to manage the property decline, but virtually all of the forward looking capacity decayed as well” (CWS8). Budget challenges were not been solely limited to the protected areas program. In the 2002-2003 *Departmental Performance Report*, EC reported that the migratory birds program had not received any new resources since 1986 (Environment Canada, 2003).

Since the 1998/99 fiscal year, the EC financial reports limited budget numbers to the business line level, so detailed financial information for the CWS became unavailable. However, the annual operations and maintenance budget for the CWS protected areas remained at approximately $2 million per year since the mid-1990s (personal observation of documents). Clearly, the federal government financial allocation for wildlife reserve creation and management has been low and declining for over 30 years. This is in stark contrast to the situation in regards to national park creation and management, which has increased considerably over this period and will be discussed later.
4.1.5 Interpretation

The original goal of the CWS interpretation program was to have an interpretation centre in each of the biological zones of Canada (Canadian Wildlife Service, 1974b). Furthermore, the CWS had a plan to establish 10 sites on or very near the Trans-Canada Highway, which were to include both natural areas and sites that had significant human impacts (Loughrey, 1976).

Interpretation was recognised as an important activity by the CWS:

The Director of CWS [David Munro], like his predecessors, was convinced that the conservation, research, and wildlife management initiatives of the Service would be truly effective only to the degree that they were understood and approved by a broad spectrum of the populace. In that centennial year, he dreamed of establishing a professional interpretive program that would enable Canadians from sea to sea to learn about their wildlife heritage first hand. (Burnett, 1999, p. 111)

Wye Marsh was the first site in the interpretive program created. Later those included sites in British Columbia (Creston Valley), Saskatchewan (Last Mountain Lake), and Quebec (Cap Tourmente), (Burnett, 1999). This program had the potential to create a substantial connection between Canadians and the CWS as a federal government organisation responsible for wildlife conservation. It was clearly a political move by the agency to raise its profile with the public, and in turn to create a constituency that would influence governments positively towards the CWS and its conservation activities. Such a move is often seen as a political threat by politicians, especially ones that are philosophically indifferent to environmental issues and to environmental activism by a government department. This sensitivity may be the major reason that the Mulroney government (which had a conservative, right-wing focus) took such a direct aim at the public outreach efforts of the CWS.

The interpretation program was one of the components of the CWS most significantly impacted by the 1984 cuts, as the entire budget was eliminated. Public facilities of some type
existed in various protected areas, although they were operated by partner organisations (Environment Canada, 2006). Additionally, there was no ongoing effort to collect data about visitors to the CWS protected areas, as there were so few enforcement officers that many sites could not even be checked for trespass (CWS1). The lack of public interpretation broke a potential link between the Canadian public and the CWS. The lack of visitor monitoring leads government to the conclusion that Canadians do not visit these sites and therefore are not interested in the associated agency and program.

One interesting example of a contemporary interpretation program is that of Cape Jourimain, in New Brunswick, where the fixed link to PEI bisects Cape Jourimain NWA. The visitor centre is a “logical stop-off” for about 1.5 million bridge users. The CWS became involved in the visitor centre as a public-private partnership with the province, various ENGOs, and Straight Crossing Inc. (which chose this as environmental project stemming from involvement in bridge construction). The CWS is responsible for providing materials for the interpretive centre (CWS1). While one-off examples of interpretation, however successful, are interesting, the lack of any national or region-wide program(s) indicates the lack of priority placed on interpretation since the cuts in 1984. Without an opportunity to reach the public, CWS efforts to build a constituency continue to falter.

4.1.6 Canadian Wildlife Service Marine Protected Areas

Although a significant number of CWS protected areas already included marine portions, the power to include marine areas was limited to areas within 12 nautical miles of the coastline. The 1994 amendment to the Canada Wildlife Act gave the CWS the additional power to create Marine Wildlife Areas. This change was to allow protection of wildlife habitat up to the 200 nautical mile limit of the Exclusive Economic Zone. In the 2007 Budget speech, negotiations to establish two new protected areas under the Health of the Oceans Agenda were announced: Scott
Islands, in British Columbia, and Sable Island, in Nova Scotia. The Scott Islands proposal had been in negotiation for over a decade, although there was little beyond a proposal officially in place. Although discussion over the status of Sable Island had been an ongoing discussion between Canada and Nova Scotia, the National Wildlife Area proposal was more recent, and it was already a Migratory Bird Sanctuary. The proposed area includes Sable Island itself, and thus had to be a National Wildlife Area (NWA) rather than a Marine Wildlife Area. The Sable Island NWA would complement the DFO *Oceans Act* Marine Protected Area in the area (the Gully). Currently, the CWS manages slightly less than 50% of the total marine area protected in Canada (Government of Canada, 2006).

### 4.1.7 CWS Planning Documents

Several historic documents were consulted, and they provided some background for the current discussion. The main documents considered in the review of the CWS’ strategic planning were: the CWS *Strategic Plan 2000-2010* and the *Protected Areas Strategic Plan*, created as part of the Environment Canada *Protected Areas Manual*. Both documents are described below.

In the late 1990s, the CWS created a strategic plan to guide operations in the years 2000-2010 (simply called the CWS *Strategic Plan 2000-2010*). Perhaps illustrating a lack of political shrewdness, the CWS did not create such plan in the early 1990s to take advantage of the momentum created with the Green Plan (discussed earlier). By 2000, the political initiative had been lost. In this 2000 to 2010 Plan, the CWS identified a vision, objectives, and a specific mission statement. Objectives included migratory birds, species at risk, and habitat objectives, although there were no quantitative targets. The section on the strategic direction of the Service identified five key strategies for the agency. These were:

- Renew commitment to wildlife conservation priorities;
- Enable an adaptive CWS institutional capacity;
• Strengthen CWS science capacity;
• Apply diversified policy and regulatory approaches; and,
• Use partnerships. (Canadian Wildlife Service, 2000, p. 15)

The Strategic Plan also included an environmental scan, listing various issues that the CWS was facing in the coming years. However, this CWS Strategic Plan made only one mention of protected areas in the entire document, and neither the NWAs nor the MBSs were mentioned by name. Indeed, only those with foreknowledge of the existing protected areas mandate of the CWS would realise that the discussion of developing a protected areas strategy applied to already existing protected areas! Clearly, the CWS initiative of the early 1990s had been lost, and the issue of land management for wildlife was reduced in profile.

The CWS Habitat Conservation Section (the section of the CWS responsible for protected areas) developed the Environment Canada Protected Areas Manual (Protected Areas Manual) in 2004-05 to provide a national standard for planning and operating protected areas (NWAs and MBSs). One of the major reasons the Habitat Conservation Section created the Protected Areas Manual was in reaction to the failure to obtain further resources from a 2002 Memorandum to Cabinet (CWS4). By providing a standard national reference for protected areas practitioners, the CWS Habitat Conservation group hoped to enhance the Protected Areas Network by, for example, being able to pinpoint resource needs. Included in the PA Manual was the Protected Areas Strategic Plan (PASP). The PASP had various components, including:

• the background and context for the protected areas;
• the existing Protected Areas Network, including links to other federal initiatives and international commitments (e.g. recognition as Ramsar Sites under the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance);
• the approach for renewing the Protected Areas Network, including an explicit mention of the need to increase the public profile of the Network;
• a vision, mission, and guiding principles;
• a strategic framework; and,
• a description of the program administration.

The conclusion to the PASP chapter included specific reference to the evolutionary nature of the strategic plan, and the intention to monitor “its progress, application, and effectiveness” (p. 2-14). To date, the PASP has been partially implemented, where resources allow. The PASP did not include any explicit strategies for increasing the resources available for protected areas (see 5.3.1 for an analysis of the contents of the PASP).

Overall, it appears that the CWS created some strategic and planning documents, but these plans were not complete and applicable to the whole of the CWS mission. Until the development of the Protected Areas Manual in 2005, there had virtually no specific mention of the Protected Areas Network in senior policy documents for the previous 14 years. Various documents, such as the annual Reports on Plans and Priorities, included the need for a protected areas strategy for the CWS (nearly verbatim from the Strategic Plan 2000-2010) but made little or no mention of the existence of the Network of over 140 protected areas. The Protected Areas Manual and the PASP mark another beginning for strategic thinking for the CWS Protected Areas Network, but there is more to be done. Returning to some of the earlier ideas expressed by CWS staff, such as education and outreach programs, or acquiring habitat specifically for endangered species, would provide new impetus for supporting and even expanding the CWS Network, and would all require a strategic plan.

4.2 The Parks Canada Agency

This section describes the history of the national parks agency and national parks strategic planning. The specific planning documents referred to in this section are the System Plans (the National Park System Plan (NPSP) and the Sea to Sea to Sea (S3) marine plan). Reference is also made to the other policies that the PCA is mandated to follow under the Parks
*Canada Agency Act*, including the Corporate Plans. The PCA also has a significant system of National Historic Sites (NHS), which are part of the *National Historic Sites of Canada System Plan* (Parks Canada Agency, 2000a). However, because of the lack of a parallel in the other organisations, the *National Historic Sites of Canada System Plan* is not discussed in any detail in the current research. However, the existence of the Historic Sites Plan indicates that the Parks Canada Agency has a strategy in place to guide future actions in all major aspects of the organization’s mission: national parks, national marine conservation areas, and national historic sites and parks.

4.2.1 Organisational History

The first National Park in Canada (then a Dominion Park) was Rocky Mountain Park, established in 1885, which was later named Banff National Park (Parks Canada Agency, 2006a). In the early years, parks were conceived of individually, generally for tourism and conservation combined. For example, Banff National Park was created to take advantage of the hot springs discovered during the building of the railway (McNamee, 2003). The early proponents of the park focused on the scenic beauty of the site, the potential for recreation and the potential for health benefits. The Hansard record (as cited in Lothian, 1987, p. 22) of the House of Commons debate over the Rocky Mountains Park Act of 1887 illustrated this, as with the following excerpt from the speech of the Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald:

I do not suppose in any portion of the world there can be found a spot, taken all together, which combines so many attractions and which promises in as great a degree not only large pecuniary advantage to the Dominion, but much prestige to the whole country by attracting the population, not only on this continent, but of Europe to this place. It has all the qualifications necessary to make it a great place of resort … There is beautiful scenery, there are the curative properties of the water, there is a genial climate, there is
prairie sport and there is mountain sport; and I have no doubt that that will become a
great watering-place.

In 1889, two years after the Rocky Mountains Park Act had royal assent, regulations for managing
the park were put into place. These regulations included protection of the wildlife and forests, and
“the preservation of natural phenomena” (Lothian, 1987, p. 23). Conservation measures put into
place included planting certain crops to attract and support migratory birds, reforestation of areas
that had been decimated by the railway development, and replacement of the game species that
were over-hunted during railway construction (Lothian, 1987).

Only a few years after the enactment of the Rocky Mountains Park Act, a proposal was
made to add a second National Park at Waterton Lakes, Alberta, in September 1893 (several more
park reserves had been added to the list of protected areas in the meantime). The Waterton Lakes
proposal was not particularly well-received in the Department of the Interior in Ottawa. Lothian
(1987) cites a letter that the Deputy Minister, A. M. Burgess, sent to the Minister, T. Mayne Daly:

There is really some danger that this reservation of parks may be made ineffectual on
account of the number of reservations. I am afraid that if they go on increasing, the public
will begin to think that they are not very sacred. It would be far better to have only one or
two parks at important points, and to have them faithfully and well protected, than a
larger number of reservations none of which the public would regard.

Fortunately, for Canadian conservation, the Minister decided to go ahead and approve the park
proposal, disregarding the advice of his Deputy (Lothian, 1987). Waterton Lakes Forest Reserve
was created in 1895 (Foster, 1978).

In 1908, administration of the parks was assigned to the Forestry Branch, and Howard
Douglas was appointed as the Commissioner (Foster, 1978). Three years later, in 1911, the Parks
Branch was formally established, and James Harkin became the first Dominion Parks
Commissioner (Foster, 1978). In fact, the Parks Branch was the first professional national park
service in the world (McNamee, 2003).
While Douglas had done a great deal to further the cause of wildlife protection in the parks, the new Branch was able to do a great deal more, as it included an Animal Division, responsible for game protection “throughout the Dominion” (Foster, 1978, p. 88). Harkin did a great deal to improve the environmental benefits and protection afforded by the National Parks, through such decisions as ending resource extraction (McNamee, 2003). Harkin also greatly expanded the number of parks to 16 while he was the Commissioner (McNamee, 2003).

The phrase “unimpaired for the enjoyment future generations” was first introduced in the National Parks Act of 1930 (Environment Canada, n.d.) which affected both National Parks and Migratory Bird Sanctuaries. McNamee notes that this key phrase was taken directly from the law that created the US National Park Service, US Public Law No. 235 (McNamee, 2003, p. 30). Although the key ecological language of the Parks Canada mandate, “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations,” has a long history, the National Parks’ management did not always live up to that mandate. For example, the last coal mine in Banff National Park was not closed until 1953 (McNamee, 2003).

In the mid-1960s, the federal government proposed a national protected area system much like the system in place in the US today, with national recreation areas, national monuments, national parkways, national waterways, and national trails (Munro, 1980). There was also a proposal to develop a cost-sharing agreement (between the federal government and the provinces) on national parks that was publicly announced in May of 1970 (Munro, 1980). The diversification proposal eventually considered three broad types of protected areas: 1) natural areas (national parks and national landmarks), 2) recreational areas (national recreation areas, national shorelines, national waterways, and national parkways), and 3) historic areas (national historic parks, national historic sites). After meeting with significant provincial opposition, the proposals were shelved (Munro, 1980).

Up until the early 1970s, National Parks were created “in what you could best call ad hoc fashion” (PCA3). Each park was established for a different reason, some for scenic beauty, some
for wildlife protection, some for tourism, and some for other reasons (PCA3). So, while there were parks established, “if you had said ‘where are we going next’, nobody would have known” (PCA3). This resulted in periods of intense activity and periods with little activity. National Parks have “historically taken a long time to establish, they have never been particularly easy. The ones that have appeared easy, they probably made mistakes, for example going too fast with the consultation” (PCA3).

Although the 1930 *National Parks Act* included the phrase “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations,” Dearden and Dempsey (2004) consider that the actual implications of the phrase were ambiguous. Policy papers published by Parks Canada in 1964 and in 1979 attempted to assert that the National Parks should place the highest priority on ecological integrity and park protection (Dearden & Dempsey, 2004, p. 227), but these policies did not have the force of law. Accordingly, in 1988, various ENGOs persuaded the federal government to amend the wording of the *National Parks Act* in order to signal that protecting natural resources was the top priority of the Park System (Dearden & Dempsey, 2004). The government made several other amendments at the time, including the first official addition of marine parks to the Parks Canada mandate.

The event in the early 1970s that changed the way National Parks were established was the development of the *National Parks System Plan* (NPSP). Canada was one of the first countries to have a system plan (PCA3), although Parks Canada took inspiration from the US National Parks Service (PCA4). The event that sparked the development of the NPSP was the appointment of a new Minister. When Trudeau became Prime Minister in 1968, Jean Chrétien was appointed as Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the Minister in charge of the National Parks. As the Minister, Chrétien “took a real shine to national parks” (PCA4). PCA4, who had met the Minister on occasion, recalled that:

> at the time there was a vision that ... the idea was to use national parks as regional economic stimulation tools. And so he was obviously interested in creating new parks. As well, I think he also believed in parks, and the vision of parks and setting aside areas of
Canada for future generations. So it’s a two-fold thing – as a politician he wanted to get some dollars flowing, but as well he also really believed in parks. (PCA4)

Jean Chrétien’s contribution to the National Parks was confirmed by another interviewee:

… in early speeches, he was saying we need more national parks. We need to have … 40 parks by the turn of the Century. When he was saying that, in the late 1960s or 1970, there was no plan, there was no basis for doing that … My guess is that some of their [the PC staffers] motivation was “look, we’ve got this Minister that says we need all these new parks – so what’s the plan?” So if you were a planner in system planning in 1969 and your Minister kept saying in his speeches we’ve got to have 40, you would start asking “where are we going next?” So I suspect that was part of it. He [Chrétien] also made a bet that he could create 10 new National Parks while he was Minister. And he did. So this whole idea of more parks, and numbers, needed some basis. But I don’t remember the Minister ever saying, “give me a plan.” (PCA3)

Jean Chrétien’s autobiography supports these statements, and describes his philosophy of creating a “community of interest” between bureaucrats and the minister (1994, p. 71). Chrétien also describes the usefulness of the nascent ecology movement for helping to create Pacific Rim National Park, attributing his success in creating those 10 new parks to “harnessing the power of public opinion” (p. 68), although his own political savvy was also important.

The planning staff of Parks Canada saw the opportunity presented by the Minister’s statements. Staffers wanted to direct development for the benefit of National Parks (PCA4). Although there had earlier (circa 1930) been a goal to have a National Park in each province (Lothian, 1987), Parks Canada planners examined a variety of methods for developing a mechanism for identifying a National Parks system. Proposed methods included mathematical formulae, proximity to urban centres, and biogeography (PCA4). Staffers “strategically wanted to put together a plan to guide things” (PCA4).
The eventual choice of a biogeographic framework for the National Parks was laid out in an extensive manual, which set out each of the *national park natural regions*, and listed the parks existing in each region. However, the document was “pretty dry”, so Parks Canada created a map to illustrate the manual, the *National Park System Plan* (NPSP), “to give a little more meaning to the manual itself” (PCA4). The NPSP “basically enjoyed the unanimous approval of the provinces and territories” (PCA4). The framework (manual and map) for the National Parks is referred to as the *National Park System Plan* (NPSP) herein. First published in 1971, the most recent (3rd) edition was published in 1997.

The *System Plan* had 39 terrestrial regions, “39 because the Minister of the day wanted less than 50” (PCA4). Although it was originally a single plan, the terrestrial and marine components each had a different lead author (PCA4) and were later presented as separate System Plans. The NPSP was actually created as a visual illustration of the original park planning manual (PCA4), and showed the entirety of the PCA’s plan for the National Park and National Marine Park systems.

Professional staff of Parks Canada, who had training in fields such as land use planning, geography and natural resources management, created the original NPSP (PCA4). Public consultation was not an important part of the process, as was the case in most planning projects at the time (PCA3). The planners initiated the planning process themselves, because, as one interviewee responded, “I don’t think … that the Minister would have said ‘give me a plan’” (PCA3). The utility of the plan would have been apparent to the government once it was created, but it would also constrain the authority of the Minister, and “Ministers like ultimate flexibility” (PCA3). This constraint on authority echoes a comment of Mintzberg’s (1994b, p. 14) where he suggests that strategic planning was designed to reduce management’s (as opposed to planners’) ability to control strategy development. The NPSP was created to ensure that the government did act strategically, rather than creating a series of “one-offs,” that is, individual parks with no connections between them, as had previously been the case (PCA3). The selection of the
representivity framework was inspired by concurrent work on ecosystem classification, such as Udvardy’s work (Udvardy, 1975) for the IUCN (PCA4). In 1968, the U.S. National Park Service prepared a system plan for their own parks, and the close cooperation of U.S. and Canadian park professionals resulted in some cross-fertilization (PCA4). The U.S. System Plan was published in 1972 as *Part two of the National Park system plan: Natural history* (US National Park Service, 1972). In recent years, global protected area system planning experts have come to see the representivity model as the best approach to national parks planning (e.g. Davey 1998).

When Parks’ staff completed the *National Park System Plan* in 1970, they presented it to the national council of Parks Ministers for approval (PCA4). The new plan, with a target for a specific number of new parks, had “a lot of appeal to politicians, who like to get things done” (PCA4). The Minsters:

liked it as well because of its finiteness. In other words, one more national park in this province and then we don’t have to transfer any more land to the government of Canada for national park purposes. So there’s a sense of knowing what they may be asked to approve in the future, so there’s again that sense of finiteness, but from a different perspective. (PCA4)

The concept of finiteness was considered to be a major contributor to the success in creating new National Parks (PCA1, PCA2, PCA3, PCA4). The NPSP was also appealing to the provinces, because it reassured the provinces that they would be asked to transfer a limited amount of land to the federal government (PCA4).

Although the establishment of new national parks according to the NPSP did not occur immediately, Parks Canada began to progress toward its goal. The NPSP helped to “minimize subjectivity in the process. It’s helped to channel scarce resources to the creation of new parks in unrepresented regions” (PCA4). The NPSP led to resources being devoted to creating new National Parks in un-represented regions, something that would not likely have taken place

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20 A term used to refer to the idea that each of the 39 natural regions should be represented by a park.
without the NPSP (PCA4). Using a simple map – represented areas are green, unrepresented areas are brown – PCA could show its goal and measure its progress. The concept was easily comprehended: “politicians can understand it, Ministers can understand it, and I think the general public can understand it as well … it’s a very simple concept” (PCA4). The other PCA participants highlighted the simplicity, also referred to as clarity, as a factor in the NPSP success.

Although there are recognised problems (further discussed below), the NPSP was followed closely, as one participant reported:

ever since then, very few … off the top of my head I can’t think of any new parks that have not fit into the System Plan. The exceptions were when, in a certain natural region, there was already a park, and people wanted another one. The classic example is Gwaii Haanas where we already had Pacific Rim. Parks Canada’s initial reaction was that we don’t need a park there, we have other priorities, other regions where we don’t have any. (PCA3)

Even with the NPSP in place, Parks Canada did not always have immediate success in meeting the goals of the Plan. For example, the federal Cabinet first discussed the concept of “underwater parks” in the Straits of Georgia in 1971 (Cabinet Minutes, 1971) when they gave approval in principle to the idea of establishing marine national parks. On March 2, 1972, the Cabinet Committee on Science, Culture and Information decided to reconstitute the Task Force established in March of 1971, exploring the issue of underwater parks. By 2002, PCA had been able to create two National Marine Parks, neither of which was in the Straits of Georgia, although there was a feasibility study underway for that site (Parks Canada Agency 2007a).21 Throughout the current research project, the PCA were close to a final agreement with the Province of Ontario to create a NMCA in Lake Superior, the final announcement of which came on October, 2007 (Government of Canada, 2007c).

21 It is interesting to note that the DFO’s first proposed OA MPA was also to be in this area of British Columbia, and it too has had a problematic planning process (see section on the DFO).
Although the Parks Ministers had approved the NPSP upon its introduction in 1971, the relationship with provinces and territories was not without some conflict. Very early in 1980, there was a significant question about provincial jurisdiction brought to PCA. Alberta had set a ceiling so that no more than 8% of the province’s territory could be national parks, so that “new parks would be created at the expense of existing parks” (Director of Inland Waters, 1980). Fortunately, it does not appear that other provinces have followed suit, although establishing new parks in Quebec remains difficult.

By 1980, the PCA systems had 48 natural regions (9 marine and 39 terrestrial), and the park system was considered to be 44% completed (Director of Inland Waters, 1980). Ten years later, the Mulroney government’s Green Plan announced the goal of completing the National Parks System by the year 2000 (Government of Canada, 1990). This event signifies that the strategic plan (the NPSP) survived several changes of government in the two decades, from 1970 to 1990, after its introduction. Although the National Park System was not completed by the year 2000, the subsequent government (which returned Jean Chrétien to a position where he could influence the Park System) also supported the goal, and significant progress was made in the creation of new National Parks.

In 1995, the PCA announced a new system plan for the marine environment, Sea to Sea to Sea (S3). The new S3 Plan recognised 29 natural regions in Canada’s three oceans, and the Great Lakes (differentiating it from the DFO and CWS marine programs, see below). Another significant event in 1995 was the creation of a new policy statement for the National Parks.

The next year, Parks Canada was the subject of a critical report from the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG). The OAG found that many park management plans were out of date: the average age of the plans was 12 years, even though the National Parks Act and other policy documents required that plans be revised every five years (Auditor General of Canada, 1996, para. 31.25). The OAG reviewed plans for six National Parks, and of them, only one (Pacific Rim National Park Reserve) made clear links between ecological integrity and the
initiatives underway in the Park/Park Reserve (para. 31.27). The report was especially concerned with some of the more popular parks (specifically naming Banff and Jasper) and the way that economic and social factors were being valued more than ecological ones (para. 31.28). The OAG made many recommendations to Parks Canada, including that they identify the ecologically acceptable number of visitors to each park (para. 31.36). One important recommendation of the 1996 Report was that, “given the potential for benefiting ecological integrity, Parks Canada should strengthen public education programs to better communicate ecological information to park visitors and Canadians in general” (para. 31.49).

In 1998, the *Parks Canada Agency Act* received Royal Assent. This Act made Parks Canada an agency of the federal government, which gave it a more arm’s length reporting structure than a typical line department. From this point on, the staff of the PCA would report to a Chief Executive Officer (at the time of this writing, Alan Latourelle), who reported directly to the Minister of the Environment. Agency status provided increased flexibility for various operational necessities, such as issuing contracts and human resources arrangements. The PCA was also able to roll over some money from one year to the next (allowing it to save money for major projects) and to borrow money to create new National Parks. The *Parks Canada Agency Act* also specified a series of reporting requirements, such as five-year Corporate Plans and annual Performance Reports (these are analogous to the *Reports on Plans and Priorities* and *Departmental Performance Reports* prepared by line departments). The Act also permitted the PCA to “accept gifts and donations of property” (Dearden & Dempsey, 2004, p. 230).

However, the new status of the (now) Parks Canada Agency was not without flaws. Along with most other departments, “Parks Canada suffered a 25 percent decline in revenue between 1995 and 2000” from all sources (Dearden & Dempsey, 2004, p. 230) and the increased reliance on fees (as opposed to Parliamentary vote) meant that park managers were “scrambling

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22 The Corporate Plans are 5-year business plans, updated annually. These plans demonstrate strategic thinking and enable the strategic NPSP, but they are not considered strategic plans in this research.
to make up differences, sometimes through increasing user fees, visitation and ‘partnerships’ with private businesses, or simply through reducing services” (Dearden & Dempsey, 2004, p. 231). In addition, the ecological integrity mandate was only included in the (non-binding) preamble to the *Parks Canada Agency Act*. Increased contracting with private firms reduced the need for PCA staff, which led to a subsequent reduction in employee morale (Dearden & Dempsey, 2004). As a result of many of the above reports, and the 2000 report from the Panel on the Ecological Integrity of Canada’s National Parks, Parliament passed a revised *Canada National Parks Act* in 2000. The *Canada National Parks Act* modernized Parks Canada’s role, and for the first time defined ecological integrity, including it as the top priority of national park management.

Between 1989 and 2000, the federal government added approximately 6.76 million hectares of land to its protected areas network, the National Parks component of which consisted of over 6 million hectares (Dearden & Dempsey, 2004). Over this period, approximately 89% of all new federal protected areas were created by the PCA. For example, in 2005/06, Torngat Mountains National Park Reserve of Canada was formally established under the *Canada National Parks Act*, an agreement to expand Tuktut Nogait National Park of Canada was signed with the Sahtu Dene and Métis of the Sahtu Settlement Area, and lands were added to Bruce Peninsula National Park (Dearden & Dempsey, 2004). Accordingly, although the year 2000 passed without the completion of the National Parks System, the PCA was making regular progress on its goal.

Part of this success can be attributed to the high degree of public support that Canadians give to the National Parks. An Environics survey (2003) found that 63% of Canadians reported that the National Parks were a “very important” component of Canadian identity. The Parks were the second most important symbol, second only to the Canadian flag, and rated higher than the National Anthem (although the difference is within the margin of error in the survey).

That is not to say that the PCA faced no challenges. In addition to the problems in the *Parks Canada Agency Act* described above, there were flaws in the NPSP recognised by PCA staffers, mainly related to the size and selection of the natural areas. For example, the Aspen
Parkland of the southern Prairies is a distinct landscape, visually apparent to all who pass through, yet it was not considered a separate natural region by the NPSP (PCA4). Another example was the large region of the Central Boreal Uplands (PCA Region 18). The region, beginning in the north-eastern tip of Alberta, stretching across northern Saskatchewan, a large portion of Manitoba, through northern Ontario, and ending in the central part of Quebec, was considered to be represented by one park, Pukaskwa NP (on the northern shore of Lake Superior). Although PCA staff considered Region 18 adequately represented due to the relatively low level of habitat diversity in the natural region, it generated a significant number of questions from people who had difficulty believing that the entire region could be represented by one park, no matter what the size (PCA4). The PCA also faced more general criticism of its national parks natural regions model. Various groups had begun to suggest that the PCA should align its model with some of the more scientifically rigorous models under development (PCA4). However, because the NPSP is so close to completion, and the PCA has invested so much political capital in the NPSP, it is highly unlikely that the agency would agree to make such changes.

Another significant problem for the PCA was the question of declining state of ecological integrity. It had been highlighted in various reports prepared by the PCA, by other government agencies (e.g., the OAG), by ENGOs, and by academics. Dearden and Dempsey (2004) suggested that the Parks Canada Agency Act had exacerbated some of the ecological deterioration, by increasing the reliance on visitation and other revenue-generating activities. For example, in Jasper NP a private firm developed the new visitor centre in partnership with the Park’s administration. The new interpretation centre was “now located in the basement underneath the ice-cream dispensers and moose turd souvenirs” (Dearden & Dempsey, 2004, p. 237), meaning that the profile and importance of natural history interpretation was literally below that of the souvenir shops. Ecological integrity, which is a significant issue for all three PA management organisations included in this research, has been addressed much more thoroughly in the National
Parks, such as in the 2000 *Report on the Panel on Ecological Integrity of Canada’s National Parks*. 23

### 4.2.2 Current Mandate

The PCA manages three major programs: the National Parks, the National Marine Conservation Areas, and the National Historic Sites. In addition, the PCA also manages several other, smaller programs, including:

- Historic Places Initiative;
- Federal Heritage Buildings Program;
- Heritage Railway Stations Program;
- Canadian Heritage Rivers System Program;
- Federal Archaeology Program; and,
- National Program for the Grave Sites of Canadian Prime Ministers. (Parks Canada Agency, 2006c)

In total, areas protected by the PCA comprise one-third of all protected areas in Canada (McNamee, 2003, p. 33), and over 50% (by area) of the federal protected areas. The PCA also represents Canada in a number of international fora such as the UNESCO World Heritage Convention and the IUCN - World Conservation Union (Parks Canada Agency, 2006c).

In 2002, Prime Minister Chrétien announced that the National Parks would add 10 new parks and 5 NMCAs by March of 2008. If this goal is met, it would mean that 34 of 39 terrestrial natural regions would be represented; four of the remaining five unrepresented areas would be in Quebec where jurisdictional conflict precludes any expectation of success in future national park establishment (Dearden & Dempsey, 2004).

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23 The Auditor General of Canada has been among the organisations addressing ecological integrity in the National Parks (and, to a lesser degree, to the CWS PAs). For more detailed discussion of ecological integrity in the context of the PCA, see the 2000 *Report on the Panel on Ecological Integrity of Canada’s National Parks*. 

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4.2.3 Parks Canada Marine Protected Areas

As discussed above, there has been a variety of attempts to create marine parks in Canada. After several failed attempts to start a program of marine parks, a National Marine Parks policy was first approved in 1986 (Auditor General of Canada, 1996). The next year, Fathom Five (in Georgian Bay) became the first “national marine park” (Auditor General of Canada, 1996, para. 31.14). Fathom Five is adjacent to Bruce Peninsula NP.

The 1994 National Marine Conservation Areas (NMCA) Policy updated Parks Canada’s approach to reflect the new NMCA model, and indicated changes in policy to “reflect more adequately the challenges of sustaining marine ecosystems and species” (Auditor General of Canada, 1996, para. 31.14), although Fathom Five kept its status as a marine park. The Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act, which officially created the NMCA designation, received royal assent in 2002 (Parks Canada Agency 2007b). NMCAs are a less restrictive designation than that of a National Park, as commercial fishing remains a permitted activity in NMCAs (Canada National Marine Conservation Area Act, 2002, section 15.2). Even “highly destructive practices” such as bottom trawling are not excluded, although mineral exploration (including oil and gas) is strictly forbidden (Dearden & Dempsey, 2004, p. 232). This means that the PCA has to acquire the subsurface rights for any new NMCAs, which is more or less problematic, depending on the region.

The Office of the Auditor General’s 1996 Report also touched on the marine component of Parks Canada’s activities. In it, the OAG recommends that Parks Canada develop a strategic plan, including a target date, for completing the national marine conservation area system (para. 31.78). Parks Canada responded with two closely-linked paragraphs:

Parks Canada intends to prepare an action plan for establishing National Marine Conservation Areas (NMCA). Until further experience has been gained in establishing and managing national marine conservation areas, it would be premature and unrealistic
to set a target date for completing the national marine conservation area system. Consultations on appropriate NMCA legislation have been authorized very recently.

(para. not numbered) … On October 14, 1996, the Prime Minister announced the start of federal/provincial/public consultations aimed at introducing an NMCA Act in Parliament during 1997. It is considered premature to set a target date for completing the national marine conservation area system. We maintain that our current goal of establishing six areas by the year 2000 is realistic and attainable. (para. not numbered)

The timelines for both of the substantive declarations in Parks Canada’s response were not met. As of this writing, there have been only three marine protected areas established by the PCA, two of which are not NMCAs.

Clearly the presence of a plan, however strategically it is designed, for the systematic creation of marine reserves in not sufficient on its own. Even though Parks Canada has a marine conservation area system plan, the creation of such areas has proceeded very slowly. This illustrates that system planning involves more than the publication of a plan by a government agency, it must also involve high-level political and public support.

4.2.4 Parks Canada Financial History

Understanding the financial history of the PCA is complicated by the fact that the PCA reports its budgets on the basis of broad goals (e.g. establish heritage areas), but does not distinguish according to historic or natural sites. Also, of the more than 800 sites listed in the National Historic Sites of Canada System Plan (Parks Canada Agency, 2000b), only 157 are managed by the PCA (Parks Canada Agency, 2007c).

Although Parks Canada did not face as significant a drop in budgets as the CWS did after the 1984 budget cuts, losses were nonetheless significant. The Agency was also subject to the significant cuts made under the government of Prime Minister Chrétien in the mid-1990s,
regardless of the Prime Minister’s regard for the program. Some of the cuts suffered by the PCA since 1984 include a loss of $70 million between 1984/85 and 1994/95, a $25 million cut in 1995, and another loss of $98 million between 1995 and 1998. In terms of employees, Parks Canada lost 155 full-time equivalents between 1983 and 1993, and a further cut of one-third of the PCA staff began in 1996 (Van Sickle & Eagles, P. F. J., 1998). However, by 2005/2006 the budget was up to half a billion dollars.

Table 4-4 Comparison of PCA budgets over time.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Budget Year</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Full-Time Equivalents</th>
<th>Source</th>
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</thead>
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<td>$12,750,000</td>
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<td>Canadian Wildlife Service, 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2005/06</td>
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<td>4,120</td>
<td>Parks Canada Agency, 2006c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3 The Department of Fisheries and Oceans

4.3.1 Organisational History

Canada has a long history of regulation in the marine environment. The first *Fisheries Act* was given Royal Assent only a year after Confederation, in 1868. The Department of Marine and Fisheries had come into being a year earlier with Confederation on July 1, 1867 (National Archives of Canada, 2007). In 1884, the government passed the *Act representing the Department of Marine and Fisheries* that separated the two sections of the Department, until they were re-joined in the Department of Naval Services in 1914 (National Archives of Canada, 2007). The Marine and Fisheries Department was an early adopter of regionalisation; with British
Columbia’s entry into Confederation in 1871, the federal government created a semi-independent fisheries office in Victoria.

In 1930, the federal government again created a separate Department of Fisheries (National Archives of Canada, 2007). Fisheries then stood alone until it was combined with Forestry to create a Department of Fisheries and Forestry in 1969. In 1970, the CWS was added to this Department (see CWS Chronology, Appendix 3). The Department of Fisheries and Forestry was disbanded with the creation of the Department of the Environment (DoE) in 1972, and its Branches were absorbed into the new DoE. In 1979, the Government Organisation Act created the separate Department of Fisheries and Oceans.

In recent years, budget issues have troubled the DFO just as they have the CWS. A Senate review of the policy framework for managing fisheries and oceans reports that, “it became obvious early on in our hearings that years of budgetary restraints had had a pervasive effect on DFO” (Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, 2005, p. 14).

The history of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) protected areas program is quite short. In 1996, the Oceans Act received royal assent and became law in 1997. Among many other things, the Oceans Act allows the DFO to create Marine Protected Areas (Oceans Act MPAs). Under the OA, section 35 defines an MPA as:

an area of the sea that forms part of the internal waters of Canada, the territorial sea of Canada or the exclusive economic zone of Canada and has been designated under this section for special protection for one or more of the following reasons:

(a) the conservation and protection of commercial and non-commercial fishery resources, including marine mammals, and their habitats;

(b) the conservation and protection of endangered or threatened marine species, and their habitats;

(c) the conservation and protection of unique habitats;
(d) the conservation and protection of marine areas of high biodiversity or biological productivity; and,

(e) the conservation and protection of any other marine resource or habitat as is necessary to fulfil the mandate of the Minister. (Oceans Act, 1996)

The DFO’s Oceans Act MPAs are created within their broader oceans management strategy and integrated management plans, both required under the Oceans Act. The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans is also mandated to lead the creation of a “national system of marine protected areas on behalf of the Government of Canada” (Oceans Act, 1996, section 35(2)). This directive resulted in the Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy (FMPAS), jointly created with the PCA and the CWS in 2006.

With approximately 251,000 hectares (as of 2007) of ocean protected as Oceans Act MPAs, the DFO is by far the smallest of the three protected areas networks. However, the DFO commitment under the Oceans Act (1996) and the FMPAS (2006) is to take an integrated approach to planning protected areas in the oceans. In addition to MPAs, the DFO has many other restrictions (e.g. fisheries closures) that they can put in place to manage/protect particular features or habitats (DFO).

Since the Oceans Act was enacted in 1997, the DFO has classified Canada’s oceans into 17 ecoregions based on a variety of criteria (DFO1). These criteria were used to delineate the Large Ocean Management Areas, which are the geographic areas that the DFO uses for its planning. The DFO takes an approach of “learning by doing” (DFO1), piloting its efforts in 5 Large Ocean Management Areas (Pacific Northwest, Beaufort Sea, Scotian Shelf, Gulf of St. Lawrence, and Grand Banks/Placentia Bay), rather than trying to plan for all 17 areas at once (DFO1). The goal is to gather as much ecological information as possible in each ecosystem (DFO1). DFO staffers “keep the big picture in mind” but they have also established individual pilot sites (the first MPAs were established in 2003) to learn what tools they would require and
also to learn how to manage sites, as according to one participant, the DFO staffers are “still trying to figure out our own” tools and authorities (DFO2).

For each Large Ocean Management Area, the DFO prepares *Ecosystem Overview and Assessment Reports* which describe the ecosystem, especially identifying various threats and human impacts on the area. These Ecosystem Overview and Assessment Reports are used to identify Ecologically and Biologically Significant Areas, Ecologically and Biologically Significant Species, and areas which are particularly degraded. From there, the DFO identifies Areas of Interest (AOI) that may eventually become MPAs (DFO1). DFO uses the Ecosystem Overview and Assessment Reports, Ecologically and Biologically Significant Areas information, and an eventual socio-economic framework (under development at the time of this research) to prepare an Integrated Management plan for the Large Ocean Management Areas in question (DFO1).

Figure 4-1 Simplified DFO process for identifying Marine Protected Areas.

The DFO’s stated goal is to create an integrated management plan for each of the marine areas it has identified in Canada. According to one of the DFO participants, “there are many questions that remain to be addressed before this will be possible, such as what kind of governance structures are needed, who should be involved in the process, etc.” (DFO1). The DFO is “moving forward toward a more systematic approach” to the MPA networks in the LOMAs (DFO1).

While the DFO planners are keeping abreast of important new ideas in conservation, such as the importance of corridors, implementing new ideas is difficult for DFO because, “the marine environment is so fluid. So we are trying to create something similar [to corridors] through
integrated management.” These corridors will be important for the MPA network, but also to the larger area (they are “interlinked”) (DFO2). One of the DFO participants describes their Department’s role in conservation as, “two words: significant and under-acknowledged.” With its involvement in many areas of conservation activity, “we do so much that is unrelated to establishing a system of MPAs” such as examination of fish habitat during road construction (DFO2). However, the conservation success of the DFO is arguable.

At the time of the research, the DFO had six *Oceans Act* MPAs. The first DFO protected area was designated March 7, 2003. This is the Endeavour Hydrothermal vents (located near the southern extremity of Canadian territorial waters, 250 km southwest of Vancouver Island). The second *Oceans Act* MPA (the “Gully”) is an underwater canyon located near Sable Island, about 200 km off of the southern tip of Nova Scotia. This was designated on May 14, 2004. Three more *Oceans Act* MPAs were designated October 11, 2005 (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2007a). The three sites were: Basin Head (on the eastern tip of Prince Edward Island), Gilbert Bay (on the southeast coast of Labrador) and Eastport (in Bonavista Bay, Newfoundland).

The sixth site, the Musquash Estuary in New Brunswick, was added to the MPA network after the completion of interviews for this study, on March 7, 2007 (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2007b). The process was a fairly fast one (relative to the PCA and some CWS timelines) as the site was first identified as an Area of Interest in 2000, with final consultations beginning in 2005 (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2007b). The site was established in cooperation with the New Brunswick government, which transferred a small area of intertidal lands to the DFO for inclusion into the MPA (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2007b). The DFO has been successful in launching their MPA program. However, without changes to their approach, such as actively engaging with the public, it is more likely that their MPA program will follow the pattern of the National Wildlife Areas (initial success, then loss of program support) than the National Parks (slow building but more long-term success).
There are four more Areas of Interest identified by the DFO: the Bowie Seamount (near the Queen Charlotte Islands), Leading Tickles (Northeast Newfoundland), Manicouagan (near Baie-Comeau, Quebec), and Race Rocks (near Victoria, BC) (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2007c). As discussed above (in 4.2.1), it is interesting to note that Race Rocks was intended to be the first Oceans Act MPA (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2000) but conflict over the Draft Regulations for the MPA (as published in the Canada Gazette) led to local First Nations writing to the Minister in protest, which in turn halted the regulatory process in 2000 (LeRoy, 2002). Although further negotiations took place (LeRoy, 2002), Race Rocks remained a candidate site as of this writing.

In addition to the Oceans Act MPAs, there is another type of protected area managed by the DFO. Called a “coral conservation area”, the protection is created under the Fisheries Act rather than the Oceans Act. The protection is created by restricting the types of gear allowed within the conservation area, but the site is not off-limits to fishing (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2004a). It is interesting to note that neither DFO interviewee specifically referred to the coral conservation areas during their interview, although they did refer to the general potential for using the Fisheries Act to protect organisms or habitat.

**4.3.2 Department of Fisheries and Oceans Planning Documents**

The DFO recently published a Strategic Plan for the period 2005-2010, which was a follow-up to the 2000-2005 Strategic Plan (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2005a). The DFO Strategic Plan 2005-2010 (DFO SP) contains both vision and mission statements, discusses the DFO mandate, and references staff, partners and clients. DFO’s vision is of “excellence in service to Canadians to ensure the sustainable development and safe use of Canadian waters” (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2005a, p. 4). The DFO SP also outlines the DFO’s strategic context, which is “issues Canadians have identified as priorities as well as global and domestic
trends that affect operations on a daily basis” (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2005a, p. 9).

Two strategic objectives are identified:

- Deliver programs that reflect the priorities of Canadians and are part of a fully integrated policy approach; and,
- Support DFO’s dedicated, professional workforce by equipping it with the tools it needs.

These strategic objectives are broad, but a list of priorities clarifies how the elements are to fit together. The Oceans Act MPAs are not in this list of priorities; only those previously aware of the DFO’s MPA program would know the Oceans Act MPAs are a part of the Oceans Action Plan. Each of the priorities is further described in the DFO SP. The Oceans Act MPA program is mentioned once in the section that describes the Oceans Action Plan, one of the priorities, as an example of how DFO is contributing to the health of Canadian oceans.

An important element in the DFO SP is that, while it is designed to cover a five-year period, there is a commitment to review the priorities annually and to “adjust them as required” to ensure that the vision continues to be fulfilled (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2005a, p. 28). Another key element is the first annex, which consists of one-, three-, and five-year targets, plus deliverables, for each of the priorities. For the Oceans Action Plan priority, within one year the DFO was to finalize the Federal Marine Protected Area Strategy. Within three years, the DFO is to “ensure critical protection in place and designate up to five DFO MPAs” while the five-year target is to add as many as four more MPAs (p. 29). It should be noted that only the one-year target is a concrete target – the others only specify a maximum (rather than a minimum), so in theory the DFO has already achieved its five-year targets.

An under-emphasized, but important section of the DFO SP is the section that highlights successes the DFO had in the period covered by the previous strategic plan. Pages 1 and 2 include some discussion of achievements, primarily the development of policy frameworks for the three major program areas (oceans, fisheries management, and aquaculture) and the completion of the
Departmental Assessment and Alignment Project, which was a “full-scale assessment of
departmental human and financial resources, policy and program priorities, and management
practices” (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2005a, p. 1). While the section on achievements
is brief, it is prominently displayed at the beginning of the document, lending credibility to the
strategic planning process at the DFO.

Another important part of the document is the explicit consultation process, outlined on
page 3 of the DFO SP. Again, description is brief; however, the background consultation
documents that informed the DFO SP are available on the DFO’s web site. Consultations relied
mainly on focus groups (Créatec, 2004; Pollara, 2005) and the overall number of participants was
small: the Créatec study of 16 focus groups had only 95 participants. However, the existence of
this external consultation does indicate a significant investment in environmental scanning.

The DFO SP concludes with an illustration of the Departmental planning cycle. This
cycle illustrates the planning elements that are required of all departments on an annual basis
(e.g., the DPR). The illustration of the planning cycle is useful for DFO staff (summarised in
Table 4-5), creating awareness of upcoming deadlines, and of what future requirements might be.
It could also provide central agencies and parliamentarians with an indication that planning
processes at the DFO are well-organised.

However, there is no plan for the Oceans Act MPA network. Indeed, the Oceans Act
MPAs are simply a collection of sites created for various reasons, much like the early National
Parks. Because this research concentrates on protected areas specifically, evaluation (especially
positive evaluation) of the strategic planning was limited by the lack of protected area-specific
plans.
Table 4-5 DFO Strategic Objectives and their related priorities
(Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2005a).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliver programs that reflect the priorities of Canadians and are part of a fully integrated policy approach</td>
<td>Oceans Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Governance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Fisheries Renewal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aquaculture Governance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coast Guard Rejuvenation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental Process Modernization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Science Renewal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support DFO’s dedicated, professional workforce by equipping it with the tools it needs</td>
<td>Human Resources Modernization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Management Accountability Framework</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Integrated Planning and Reporting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Integrated Risk Management</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Departmental Renewal</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4.3.3 DFO Financial History

In the same way that the CWS had to fit itself with the other elements in EC, the 1997 Oceans Act meant that the new MPA network staffers had to slot their activities with the rest of the DFO. This was a particular challenge because of the strong orientation of the rest of the DFO toward promoting the Canadian fishing industry. This low intra-departmental profile has meant
that the financial history of the DFO MPA program has been poor (DFO1, DFO2) and poorly reported.

The financial history of the DFO is presented for selected years during which the DFO was responsible for marine protected areas (Table 4-6). The data are difficult to interpret, as the early data reported very little detail on the specific oceans management budget. The most recent Report on Plans and Priorities does have more detail. Accordingly, and much like in the previous sections, the only supportable conclusion is that there is a significant amount of money devoted to the DFO’s efforts.

Table 4-6 Comparison of DFO oceans management budgets over time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Full-Time Equivalents</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997/98</td>
<td>$48,800,000*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>$92,700,000*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/04</td>
<td>$92,700,000*</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2004b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>$21,600,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2006b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes habitat management, oceans management (incl. Oceans Act MPAs) and environmental science (e.g. included environmental assessments)

The Oceans Act MPAs are administered by Oceans and Habitat (OH), one sector of the DFO, which is dwarfed by the Fisheries and Aquaculture sector. The budget for the entire OH sector, less than half of what was spent on Fisheries management alone ($163.2 million vs. $364.8 million) represents about 11% of spending in the DFO, which was nearly $1.5 billion in 2005-2006 (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2006a). The OH section reported spending of $21.7 million in 2005-2006, not all of it for the PAs (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2006a).
4.4 Comparison of Organisational Financial Resources

As stated above, financial data are very difficult to compare over time, as reporting standards have changed several times over the period. Since archival records are inconsistent in what they report, one may only conclude definitively that Parks Canada has been the recipient of higher budgets than wildlife conservation and marine conservation units in CWS and DFO, since the 1960s.

The impact of the National Park System Plan (NPSP) to the National Parks program is best illustrated by changes in their financial resources relative to the CWS and EC. For example, the 1970 estimated expenditures for administration and maintenance in the National & Historic Parks was $12,750,000 compared to a total budget of $4,900,000 for the CWS as a whole (Canadian Wildlife Service, 1970). In 1984-1985, Parks Canada had a budget of $310,463,000 in comparison to an EC-wide wildlife conservation budget of $29,504,000 (Environment Canada, 1984). In those 15 years, the ratio of Parks to CWS budgets went from approximately 2.6:1 to 10.5:1. This shows that the Parks’ budget increased approximately four times more than the CWS budget in the same time period. The current budget for CWS as a whole is approximately $93 million dollars, with a protected areas budget of approximately $3.5 million (personal observation of unpublished documents), compared to a PCA budget of approximately $525 million, bringing the ratio down to approximately 5.6:1.

In a further example, in the financial year 1987/88, when the PCA had an estimated budget of $323,843,000, the total estimated spending by EC was $775,159,000. In other words, the National Parks accounted for nearly 42% of the entire department’s spending in that year. In earlier years, the difference was not quite as large, such as in 1983/84 when the Parks Canada program accounted for 33% of EC’s annual spending. The difference was more as a result of a previously larger EC budget ($952 million in 1983/84), rather than an increase in the Parks
budget (which was $314 million in 1983/84). This shows clearly that the national parks program was more successful politically than the other programs of EC over this time period.

In the 10 years since the *Oceans Act* was proclaimed (1996-2006), budgets for environmental conservation have risen and fallen, but the gradual trend has been an upward one. Table 4-7 includes the best publicly available figures for each organisation in this study. Figures are reported in as much detail as possible, based on the annual Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP) that is produced by departments and agencies of the federal government. In addition to the absolute budget figure for each organisation, the allocation is presented in the form of its overall proportion to the rest of the organisation’s budget, illustrating that in many instances, the increase in the absolute figure is more as a result of the overall increase in the budget of the department or agency. There is some difficulty in presenting an overall statement about budgets over the last ten years, because of variation in the way budget figures have been reported.

The DFO reported in 2000/01, and again since 2005/06, more specific figures related to ecosystem conservation in the ocean environment. Judging from the relatively consistent proportion of the overall budget allocated to this activity, it is likely that the same relative amount was given to ocean conservation in the intervening years. The emphasis on results-based management likely directed the reporting away from the traditional organisational structure that would have included specific budget figures for a program like the Marine Protected Areas.

The overall proportion of the PCA budget is only relevant in the first year. After the proclamation of the *Parks Canada Agency Act* in 1998, the PCA was assigned a budget independently of the ministry with which it was associated. For the PCA, which started with a relatively comparable budget to the CWS, the dramatic rise in their budget indicates a substantial degree of public, and especially political support.

For the CWS, specific budgets have not been reported during the course of the last decade. Over that period, the organisational structure has emphasised the regional hierarchy, rather than a national program, and budgets have been reported accordingly. In addition, EC
began to emphasise a results-based management structure in parallel to this regionalism. As a result of those changes, the importance of the CWS as an organisation within EC was minimised, and budgets were reported as part of the overall role of EC to protect biodiversity. While the budget numbers for biodiversity conservation have continued to rise, it is apparent that they come nowhere near to matching the budget for the PCA (the latter figures for the PCA discount the administrative budget, as is the case for the other organisations). It is also important to note that while the overall budget for biodiversity conservation was rising, interviewees reported that the CWS protected areas budget remained static, illustrating that they were unable to capture the momentum other programs generated. At a more global scale, Dearden et al. (2005) report that over 60% of their protected area survey respondents indicated that they have increased budgets, although nearly two thirds did not feel that the increases had been sufficient to meet increasing demands. Nonetheless, when compared to the survey results, the CWS appears to be in the minority of protected areas management organisations, those that had a budget that was smaller at the end of the decade (2002) than at the beginning.

4.5 Comparison of organisational mandates and clienteles

The three organisations in this case study share a common mission to create and manage protected areas. There are a number of common elements that emerge for all three organisations, but there are also some notable differences. The mandate of each organisation is also related to the clienteles that each organisation serves. Finally, the organisations share some key challenges in their role as managers of protected areas.

As the three organisations have a mission to create and manage protected areas, they are each required to seek out areas that require protection in order to fulfill their respective mandates. Accordingly, each organisation has a requirement to be aware of the ecological heritage of Canada (e.g. the DFO should be aware of fish spawning areas and the CWS should be informed
as to locations where migratory birds congregate). Arising out of their role in managing protected areas, each organisation has a mandate to organise visitors, to plan for appropriate use of the land and/or sea within the protected area, to monitor illegal activities, and to oversee the resources required to carry out all of the above tasks, plus many others. The organisations all must fulfill the directions given by Parliament, which represents the shared clientele of all three - the Canadian public.

However, there are important areas where the individual mandates diverge, and it is here that some of the explanation for the more particular clienteles emerges. In many ways, there is a reciprocal relationship between organisational mandates and clienteles. For example, the DFO website indicates some of the reasons why creating marine protected areas is important: “threats to the biodiversity, productivity and ecological integrity of marine ecosystems must be addressed, not only because we value our oceans but also because coastal communities and regional economies depend on healthy productive oceans” (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2007a). The main departmental mandate for the DFO is the extraction of marine resources, and marine protected areas are created to support that mandate. That is not to say that there is no ecological awareness within the DFO, but the Department is also very aware of its clientele - coastal communities that largely depend on the extraction of marine resources.

The Migratory Bird Sanctuary program emerges in the early 20th Century as a reaction to overhunting of waterfowl. The emergence of the National Wildlife Area program, nearly sixty years later, does not change the focus of the CWS’ protected areas program to a significant degree - many of the NWAs are also key waterfowl habitat. The Canadian Wildlife Service retains many of the early biases toward migratory bird habitat, as this is a key element of the Service’s mandate. Collaborating with hunting groups, notably Ducks Unlimited, resulted in a variety of projects that successfully increased the population of waterfowl in North America. While the CWS does have a mandate to conserve habitat for any species of national interest, it is only recently that more than a handful of protected areas are targeted to protect species other than
migratory birds. This focus on migratory birds reflects the clientele/supporters of the CWS, which have largely been those interested in hunting (and many CWS staff hunt themselves - pers. obs.). As the population of hunters in Canada declines (as discussed elsewhere in this document), the CWS is in the process of developing new alliances.

The Parks Canada Agency has a mandate to create representative National Parks and National Marine Conservation Areas (and National Historic Sites, etc.) across Canada. This mandate is relatively simple, compared to the wide-ranging ecological and economic targets that the DFO and CWS protected areas support. The nature of the PCA mandate is deliberately close-ended, which allows the PCA to discuss the concept of completion. The PCA also have a strong mandate to present natural and cultural heritage to the Canadian population. As such, visitor services are a strong component of their mandate, to the degree that there are some significant ecological impacts from the visitors. However, the PCA is clearly aware of its primary clientele - the Canadian public - and it has not significantly restricted visitation to its sites (or they have not discussed any restrictions publicly). One may observe the importance of clientele to an organisation by examining the PCA’s earlier clientele, focusing on tourism and economic development, in some of the remaining infrastructure, such as ski hills, golf courses, and town sites.

The three organisations also share some key challenges in fulfilling their missions. All three compete for funding with various other government priorities. Each organisation must collaborate with provincial, territorial, aboriginal and community groups, often balancing diverging priorities. Each faces similar challenges in maintaining the ecological integrity of their protected areas, especially in light of the changing climate. Finally, all of the organisations face the challenge of managing a network of protected areas across a country as vast and as diverse as Canada.
4.6 Conclusion

This Chapter presents the historical context of the protected areas management organisations. While the CWS and the PCA began as part of the same management organisation, different approaches to management, especially public interaction, have defined and cemented the differences between the two organisations. The advent of a federal marine protected area program saw the addition of the DFO to the roster of federal protected areas management organisations. While the PCA budget supports many more responsibilities than do the CWS and the DFO (e.g. visitor services, historic buildings) the strategy of the PCA is inseparable from these responsibilities. The PCA is responsible for the development of many areas of spending, such as the visitor programs, that have also resulted in higher budgets. The CWS also has a mandate for visitor education (to the extent that they can create National Wildlife Areas for reasons of wildlife interpretation) but it has been unable to leverage this mandate into money to run extensive visitor programs. This historical information will help to put the management and planning information, found in the next chapter, in context.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>CWS/EC Budget</th>
<th>DFO Budget</th>
<th>PCA Budget</th>
<th>% CWS/EC</th>
<th>% DFO</th>
<th>% PCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997/98</td>
<td>Biodiversity/Wildlife</td>
<td>$42,300,000</td>
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<td>Habitat Management and Environmental Science</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.6*</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>$39,300,000</td>
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<td>Biodiversity/Wildlife</td>
<td>$41,300,000</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>Habitat Management and Environmental Science</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>Conservation of biological diversity</td>
<td>$68,100,000</td>
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<td>Conservation and sustainable development of Canada's oceans</td>
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<td>Habitat Management and Environmental Science</td>
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<td>Year</td>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>CWS/EC Budget</td>
<td>DFO Budget</td>
<td>PCA Budget</td>
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<td>2002/03</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
<td>Stewardship of National</td>
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<td>Stewardship of National</td>
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<td>Biological diversity is conserved</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Stewardship of National</td>
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<td>Biological diversity is conserved</td>
<td>14.3</td>
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<td>Establish heritage places;</td>
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<td>Promote public appreciation</td>
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<td>Quality visitor experience</td>
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<td>2006/07</td>
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<td>Enhance visitor experience</td>
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</table>
* as part of the Department of Canadian Heritage

^ includes spending on National Historic Sites program

+ calculated as percentage of combined total estimates of EC and PCA

Figures are based on annual reporting of “planned spending” in the annual Budget Estimates, Part III, although some amendments may have occurred in the course of each fiscal year. For example, in 2003-04, DFO reported planned spending of $84.8 million, but actual spending (as reported in the 2004-05 Report on Plans and Priorities) was $92.7 million. In order to provide as much consistency as possible, the single series of numbers is reported here.
5. Strategy Development in the Protected Areas Organisations

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 introduces the literature on strategy, particularly strategic planning, and established the connection between strategy, planning and environmental conservation. Chapter 4 provides some background on the protected areas organisations under study, including a few comments made by interviewees. Chapter 5, through its evaluation of strategic planning in the three protected area management organisations, furthers the narrative by providing the first part of the research results. This Chapter reports results by evaluating the content of the plans and the way the three PA organisations developed their strategies.

To evaluate the development of strategies by the PA organisations, Chapter 5 considers several documents created by the protected area management organisations. For the CWS, this includes the Strategic Plan 2000 (SP 2000) and the Protected Areas Strategic Plan (PASP); for the PCA, this includes both the System Plans (NPSP, S3) and their series of Corporate Plans; for DFO, this includes the Strategic Plan 2005-2010 (DFO SP). Interview information provides context for the documents and insights into unwritten information. Review of the documents indicates that strategic planning is the approach used in many of the documents, and it is the dominant approach in the literature, so questions in this Chapter focus on the strategic planning model.

5.2 Context in terms of the Broader Government

While the research is related to mainly internal circumstances of the case study organisations, there is also a significant question related to the role played by the broader government. The organisations are entities in and of themselves, but these entities are also part of the broader whole. There are two important considerations that emerge from this reality. First,
there is an important oversight role played by the central agencies of the federal government (particularly the Treasury Board Secretariat). Second, improvements in strategy and competitiveness come in the context of the government as a whole. Each will be discussed in turn.

5.2.1 The Role of the Treasury Board Secretariat

The Treasury Board is a Cabinet Committee that oversees many of the most important aspects of the government’s mandate. Specifically, the mandate of this Committee is to oversee “accountability and ethics, financial, personnel and administrative management, comptrollership, approving regulations and most Orders-in-Council” (Treasury Board Secretariat, 2008a). The Treasury Board Secretariat, formerly part of the Department of Finance, is its administrative arm (Treasury Board Secretariat, 2008a). The Secretariat, made up of civil servants rather than politicians, is responsible for providing advice to the Cabinet Treasury Board Committee (Treasury Board Secretariat, 2008b). Broadly responsible for overseeing the government’s financial resources, the Treasury Board Secretariat must scrutinise and approve any new funding requests, including those already approved by Cabinet. Accordingly, unless a program receives money re-assigned from other areas in a department (e.g. money from chemical management is shifted to the protected areas), the Treasury Board Secretariat will play a key role in obtaining new resources.

The Treasury Board Secretariat lists a single strategic outcome for its activities: “Government is well managed, accountable, and resources are allocated to achieve results” (Treasury Board Secretariat, 2008c). The most obvious effect of this from the perspective of the case study organisations is that, as discussed above, Treasury Board Secretariat analysts will review every submission for new money. However, departmental staff have limited interaction with the analysts, making it extremely important that the case for new funds is well-argued. As
observed by the researcher at the CWS, program staff often does not know what the analysts will ask for, or what they are seeking in a funding proposal. This is a potentially significant limitation on the power of strategic planning in the public service, if the departments’ staff accept the status quo.

While the somewhat mysterious nature of Treasury Board analysts’ expectations is a limiting factor for departments and agencies, a potential strategic advantage could also be realised. If program staffers are able to develop a better understanding of the expectations of the Treasury Board, there is the potential to improve the success of financial requests. As discussed in Chapter 4, the PCA and the CWS have demonstrated this potential when the approved Memorandum to Cabinet resulted in new funds for the National Parks, but no new funding for the CWS protected areas.

While the apparently distant decisions of the Treasury Board Secretariat can be seen as a limitation on the potential for strategic planning, a truly robust strategic planning exercise would take this into account. One highly strategic move for departments would be to recruit staff with Treasury Board experience, or to facilitate a secondment for their own staff with the Treasury Board Secretariat. Having policies and procedures in place to ensure compliance with Treasury Board policies, such as their policy of ensuring value-for-money (Treasury Board Secretariat, 2008b).

5.2.2 The Whole Government Context for Strategic Planning

Before discussing the details of strategic planning in the case study organisations, the context of strategic planning in the government must be discussed. Strategic planning originally evolved in the private sector, where firms competed for customers. Accordingly,

In the public sector, departments and agencies compete for funding from a pool of funding that is essentially limited. As a result, it is possible that encouraging strategic planning
would mean that all departments adopt strategic planning as a competitiveness tool. This could result in increased investment in strategic planning without any improvement in the competitive position, leading to a waste of resources. However, when authors such as Drew (1997) advocate learning from competitors (“benchmarking”) to improve strategic planning, it suggests that the likelihood of this outcome is small - one firm/department or another will find a way to innovate and to advance the practice. In addition, there is a certain unspoken check against the addition of too many employees with responsibility for planning rather than program delivery. As one of the concerns of the Treasury Board (as described above) is value-for-money, having a large number of staff devoted to organisational (rather than program delivery) tasks would be a competitive disadvantage.

5.3 Participants’ Understanding of Strategic Planning

Study participants were asked why a strategic plan might be created.24 Interviewees provide a range of responses, many of which correspond closely to the reasons for strategic planning outlined in the literature. The CWS participants identify strategic planning as a way to “step back and see what has changed” (CWS2), and suggested that their organisation had undertaken strategic planning because it “lacked connector between operational and strategic level in terms of wildlife programs” (CWS1). Strategic planning is also important because, “fundamentally, when you have a large, complicated set of responsibilities, it is a way of organizing your thoughts on how to approach a problem, how to move forward, and actually have some success in achieving what you want to achieve” (CWS3).

For the four interviewees from the PCA, reasons for undertaking strategic planning are similar to those articulated by the CWS interviewees. Strategic plans are a medium to “tell the story ... what we want to do” (PCA1). It is “key,” as the primary means by which the PCA

24 See Appendix 1 for a list of questions.
communicates with stakeholders (PCA1). Strategic planning is a way to “organize effectively a large group of people for a good outcome” and it is important that sufficient resources be allocated to the planning process (PCA2).

However, there is some disagreement on which document(s) should be considered the PCA strategic plan(s). The first participant referred to the series of Corporate Plans produced by PCA as their strategic plans (the Corporate Plans do include a “Strategic Planning Framework”). Another PCA interviewee thinks that the System Plans are documents that are equivalent to strategic plans in other organisations, while the Corporate Plans are more tactical (PCA2). The other two participants each share a similar view, indicating that the System Plans are the consistent element in the PCA’s strategy over the years. “At any point in time, it has a part of the overall strategy, and it has its own plan. But you will see other things becoming part of the strategy, for example visitor services, ecological integrity” (PCA3). In this, the PCA appears similar to Mintzberg and Rose’s (2003) description of the emergence of strategy at McGill University, whereby the University grew through diversification.

The two Department of Fisheries and Oceans interviewees each respond differently to the question about the reasons for undertaking strategic planning. For one interviewee, the DFO has a mandate to create MPAs using a “hot spot” approach, and so representivity or strategic planning, such as the approach used by the PCA, is not appropriate for the DFO (DFO1). This is a conflation of two different concepts; while the PCA does use representivity strategically, strategic plans for protected areas do not necessarily require representivity. In contrast, the second DFO interviewee responds much like participants from the other organisations. S/he suggests that, while the reasons “depend on your point of view,” a strategic plan is useful as a communication tool that illustrates the contribution of the MPA system; they are able to provide “high-level connections”; and they are “a way to have departments go to Treasury Board” and demonstrate

25 Although the DFO interviewee (DFO1) did use the term “hot spot” to describe the DFO’s approach to selection of OA MPAs, it is not according to the methods developed by Myer and used by Conservation International (who publish discussions at http://www.biodiversityhotspots.org/xp/Hotspots/)
competence in planning. Departments may have legislation and policy, but “they need more” because “without one [a strategic plan], it's the classic trying to find your way without a roadmap” (DFO2).

Generally, interview participants across the organisations share common views on the uses for strategic planning in an organisation. They all think that strategic planning allows an organisation to set priorities and direct resources for the organisation as a prime reason for undertaking the process (CWS1, CWS2, CWS3, CWS6, DFO2, PCA1, PCA2), especially for organisations with scarce resources (CWS5), or in very large organisations (CWS7, PCA2). Referring to his/her belief that Canadian environmental conservation organisations – in both the private and public sectors – operate with fewer resources than they require, CWS5 states that “it really is necessary to think about what your niche is, what your priorities are, and where you put available resources … [t]he best way I know for doing that is to put it in the framework of a strategic plan …” Strategic planning is also described as “a way of organising your thoughts on how to approach a problem, how to move forward, and actually have some success in achieving what you want to achieve” (CWS3). Further, strategic planning “helps to articulate where the organisation is going with that particular program in mind” (CWS4), providing a “talisman” for the organisation, an indication of the larger goal that employees should work toward (CWS7). Strategic planning is used not only because it is “only sensible to do” but also because it is no longer possible to justify activities simply because they had been done in the past (CWS2). While a complete strategic planning exercise should not be done annually, an organisation could examine how current activities “fit” within its mandate, especially when new activities are added, because organisations have often simply layered the new activities over top of the old ones (CWS2). Strategic plans are communication tools, for both internal and external use (CWS1, CWS3, CWS6, PCA1). Strategic planning helps to identify synergies, helping “to identify the common approaches that allow you to achieve multiple objectives at the same time” (CWS3).
These descriptions rely on strategic thinking as an important component of the strategic planning process.

Participants also think that strategic planning is useful when dealing with central agencies. “When the centre comes calling, saying okay, what are your priorities, and we can’t tell them with any clarity, we don’t have a good story to tell, they go away thinking ‘these guys don’t have their act together and we’re sure as heck not funding anything new’” (CWS2). One risk with strategic planning is that the plans may become plans on paper – the strategic plans “are simply ‘to-dos’ and once they are ‘to-dones’ they just go on the shelf and everyone seems to not behave that way anymore” (CWS7).

To summarize, the interviewees identify many commonly cited reasons to undertake strategic planning, such as managing resources and identifying new opportunities (see Chapter 2). One interviewee synthesises strategic planning, saying, “basically, it provides longer-term guidance for carrying out the program … How to support the goals and objectives of the organisation; and help to direct the necessary resources that are available to carry out those tasks. I think it’s fundamental to have a strategic plan” (CWS4). However, while the participants do understand the benefits provided by strategic planning, the application of strategic planning does not appear to follow the models provided in the literature. Chapter 6 explains this conclusion.

First, strategic planning documents from each organisation are evaluated.

5.4 Formal strategic Planning at Environment Canada and the Canadian Wildlife Service

In 1981, Environment Canada created its first formal strategic plan. In a memo describing the plan, the Deputy Minister writes:

26 Central agencies are the organisations at the centre of the federal government. For example, all major initiatives must be approved by each of the central agencies before presentation to Cabinet. The central agencies are the Privy Council Office, the Treasury Board Secretariat, and the Department of Finance.
The Plan reflects our best judgement at the moment as to the direction in which our Department is moving and what we intend to accomplish over the next ten years. The Plan will be our roadmap until events occur which indicate a change to the Plan – and they will occur – they were occurring even as the Plan was being assembled. (Seaborn, 1981, n.p.)

The early EC strategic plans follow the literature with a reasonable degree of fidelity. The 1981 Plan identifies a series of issues that were of relevance to EC. Priorities are identified, and a subset of issues is selected to receive particular attention. Statements in the Plan emphasize that shifting priorities or resolution of the issue could alter the list.

The 1982 Strategic Plan identifies eight issues, and ranks them by priority. The eight, in order, are (p. 8-10): toxic substances, acid rain, the forest sector, water management, environmental impacts of energy development, The North, maintaining the land resource base, and climate change. All continue to be issues to some degree or another. It is important to note that habitat protection through wildlife areas and migratory bird sanctuaries is not one of the priorities of EC in the 1981 plan. A third, similar, plan followed in 1983, and is the first to include natural heritage protection as a priority for EC. While EC obviously did not lack ambitious goals, it is also clear, through the lack of success, that there was a failure to implement effective and sustainable programs in the priority areas.

Unfortunately, if there were further strategic plans created at EC after 1983, they were not uncovered during the review of documents in the National Archives, and therefore this research is unable to offer an analysis of how EC may have continued to employ formal strategic planning. However, reporting and planning did not cease. Financial information and priorities are included in the annual departmental estimates, which are key documents in the budgetary process.

The reporting structure changes in the 1996/97 fiscal year, when the government of Canada developed a new way of reporting the Part III Estimates, re-naming it the Report on Plans and Priorities (Treasury Board of Canada, 2001). EC participates in the second year of this
pilot, providing a high-level overview of the Department for these reports; details at the level of the CWS were scant. The Reports on Plans and Priorities chronicles various events, planned activities, and opportunities in the departments. Each department reports their accomplishments in the companion series of Departmental Performance Reports (DPR).

In 1999, the EC Report on Plans and Priorities indicates that the government will complete a National Wildlife Areas strategic plan that same year; this is accomplished in the PA Manual in 2005 (see below for analysis of the Protected Areas Strategic Plan). In the 2001-2002 DPR, EC commits to the development of a protected areas strategy for itself, and indicates intent to participate in the development of a federal protected area strategy (Environment Canada, 2002); this is postponed by a year in the 2002-2003 DPR (Environment Canada, 2003a). The strategy has not been completed, although the marine component exists as the Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy.

While there have been some successful and strategic undertakings, such as the 2003 re-launch of the Hinterland Who’s Who public service announcements (Environment Canada, 2003b), EC is not generally proactive in promoting the CWS program. The 2003-2003 DPR description of accomplishments for the protected areas network is hardly inspiring. It reads:

Protecting and Conserving Habitats: Environment Canada maintains 143 National Wildlife Areas and Migratory Bird Sanctuaries. The 12 million hectare National Wildlife Areas/Migratory Bird Sanctuaries system contributes to the conservation of biological diversity in Canada, including species at risk. The Department continues to work closely with other government departments and national non-government organisations on this file. (Environment Canada, 2003a)

In the 2004-2005 DPR, the two performance highlights for the CWS Protected Areas include an agreement to ensure year-round human presence on Sable Island (a MBS that hosts a weather station) and the completion of the “marine component of a federal protected areas
strategy.” Completion of the Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy (FMPAS) is an important milestone, and deserves more attention than it receives.

In the 2004 DPR, most of the habitat conservation segment is devoted to two granting programs, the Habitat Stewardship Program and the Ecogifts Program. Both programs are highly successful; the programs reward those who are willing to protect land, either by active stewardship of land (Habitat Stewardship Program) or by restricting development of their property or by donating the property outright (Ecogifts). The Habitat Stewardship Program concentrates on habitat that is important to species at risk, especially critical habitat.\(^\text{27}\) In the 2004-2005 Departmental Performance Report, the government commits to an investment of up to $10 million per year for the Habitat Stewardship Program. The total contribution of $44 million since 2000 has been leveraged to obtain $94 million more in cash and in kind: by 2005, the total financial impact of the program was $127 million (Environment Canada, 2006). The Habitat Stewardship Program contributes to the protection of 250,000 hectares of habitat, an amount approximately equivalent to the DFO Oceans Act MPA network. While the Habitat Stewardship Program and the Ecogift Program are obviously useful and effective, they do indicate that the government needs to focus on its responsibilities as a landowner, as the entire CWS PA Network management budget is generally in the range of $1.9 million to $2 million per year. The Habitat Stewardship Program and the Ecogift Program are worthwhile; however, the federal government does not appear to put as high a priority on meeting the minimum management requirements for the CWS protected areas as it does on incentives for private landowners.

In the 2007 Federal Budget, the federal government makes an important conservation commitment, devoting $225 million to the conservation of sensitive ecological land. Employees of the CWS are encouraged by the announcement, and the commitment of the federal government. However, the fact that the contribution is to the Nature Conservancy of Canada, an

\(^{27}\) "Critical habitat" means the habitat that is necessary for the survival or recovery of a listed wildlife species and that is identified as the species’ critical habitat in the recovery strategy or in an action plan for the species (Species At Risk Act, 2002, section 2).
ENGO (Government of Canada, 2007a) is disheartening. Again, much like the resources devoted to the HSP and the EGP, the government demonstrated commitment to conservation but withdrew federal leadership on the issue in favour of private sector solutions. A mere 10% of the total money, or $22.5 million, provided to the Nature Conservancy of Canada is nearly the total amount needed for complete re-investment in the CWS’ network of protected areas (Canadian Wildlife Service, 2006). This most recent event shows that the CWS is unable to capture federal government attention in the field of land conservation. In this instance, the CWS could not compete with an ENGO for critical federal government funding. This shows an astounding lack of public and political support for the land management efforts of the CWS and EC.

Based on the review of the documents and the interview data, EC and the CWS lack an overall vision for the PA network. The 2004-2005 DPR contains a section called “looking forward” in which EC describes the mounting pressures “to expand the use of National Wildlife Areas as a key mechanism to enhance federally protected areas across the country” (Environment Canada, 2005a). The expanded role that EC is being pressured to create is linked with the need for partnerships with non-government organisations, which is an admirable, cooperative and inclusive approach. However, the same segment does not discuss the need for EC to re-invest in its own network, nor does it discuss the reason(s) why the NWAs would be a key mechanism. This could have been an important declaration of a desire to advance the PA Network; instead, it seems as if EC is to rely on the private sector (industry, academia, etc.) to bring “expertise, resources and alternative approaches to the table” (Environment Canada, 2005a, n.p.). Again, this is reflected in the Harper Government decision to fund an ENGO rather than the CWS for land conservation in the 2007 budget.

The 2005-2006 DPR aligns conservation success with the adoption of a landscape or ecosystem approach to protection and management. The document speaks to the need to influence “a wider range of public and private lands by engaging in networks of stakeholders in habitat conservation strategies” (Environment Canada, 2006, n.p.), a theme that occurs regularly in the
conservation literature (Hackel, 1999; Riley, Siemer, Decker, Carpenter, Organ, et al., 2003). The
2005-2006 DPR does improve on the previous years’ description of the PA Network, although
not substantially so. In it, the PA Network is described as a contributor to biodiversity and species
at risk conservation in Canada. The text also touches on the fact that EC “continues to work
closely with other government departments and national non-government organisations (NGOs)
to expand the network and to improve the management of existing protected areas” (Environment
Canada, 2006) although details of the close working relationships are not provided. Curiously, the
DPR indicates that EC “continues to implement its Protected Areas Strategy in collaboration with
other key departments” although in nearly two years at the CWS, the researcher heard no mention
of implementing such a Strategy. There have been iterations of such a strategy proposed, but
unless the statement referred to the Marine Protected Areas Strategy, the document is
exaggerating or in error.

Two CWS interviewees speak about the current EC-wide reorganisation and the strategic
implications thereof. One interviewee, who had been working in the government for 18 years at
the time of the interview, reported that in 2006, the Department was dealing with a new
government, a “completely untested Minister” and an “activist Deputy Minister” who instituted
changes of a magnitude not seen in his/her entire career. The new Deputy Minister launches a
“mammoth strategic planning exercise” (CWS2), although the results focus on the structure of the
Department. Department-wide, managers identify “forward-thinking individuals ... So there was a
series of phases in order to do the strategic plan, which subsequently ended in the re-organisation
that we have today” (CWS6). When asked why the reorganisation was undertaken, the
interviewee states that:

he [the Deputy Minister] wanted – I think this came from his marching orders from
central agencies – he wanted a lot more rationalization of environmental policies,
programs, and laws vis-à-vis competitiveness, a much greater fusion of thought between
environmental policy and economic and social policy, and how it affected Canada’s competitiveness in the world. (CWS7)

With this context, it would obviously be important for organisations trying to increase their profile and resources to indicate how they would contribute to competitiveness, although the researcher did not find any evidence that the CWS was particularly successful at doing so.

When this research began, EC no longer published Departmental strategic plans, although some of the elements that made up EC (CWS, Meteorological Service of Canada, etc.) still did. EC does produce various other strategies, such as a Sustainable Development Strategy. Departmental reporting was through Reports on Plans and Priorities and Departmental Performance Reports. This change in the reporting mechanism is somewhat problematic, as indicated by one of the research participants:

I’ve never pulled up the full department RPP and combed all the way through it, although there are layers you have to get all the way down into the nitty-gritty to find the specific stuff. But it is a process that does some of the same things. The trouble from a perspective of a particular conservation tool, conservation management or habitat protection or whatever, is that the final presentation is at such a high level, it becomes hard to see the context for the Ecogifts program, or the National Wildlife Areas program ... it’s a question of scale. (CWS5)

In order to concentrate on strategic planning specifically for the protected areas, the next section evaluates general strategic planning within the CWS and also strategic planning specific to protected areas.

5.4.1 Strategic Planning Within the CWS

As previously indicated, the CWS budgets began to decline in the mid-to-late 1970s (Rubec & Turner, 2003). The first cuts merely set the stage for the major cut in Brian Mulroney’s
1984 budget. The impact of this 1984 cut is more than that of a short-term budget cut because it diminishes the visibility of the CWS, and thus much of its opportunity to continue building a constituency. Further cuts occur in the mid-1990s program review under Prime Minister Chrétien, with an approximate 30% loss of the protected area budget (CWS8). The CWS highlights their budget problem: “the NWA–MBS program has been in decline since 1977, with a drop from 27 to 12 staff positions, a 90% drop in capital resources supporting the network, and essentially no increase in operational budgets over the 25-year period” (Rubec & Turner, 2003, p. 1). It is worth noting that the “decline in the federal budget allocations for habitat acquisition coincided with a major increase in concern about habitat protection and preservation on the part of wildlife professionals and concerned voluntary organisations” (Burnett, 1999, p. 98). How is it that an increasingly interested public does not correspond to government providing an increase in resources for the CWS? Could the strategizing and planning done by the CWS be a contributing factor? CWS interviewees commented on both strategic planning documents (SP 2000 and the PASP). Because most interviewees have experience with both plans, discussion of the two plans is integrated.

The SP 2000 developed through a process described by some interviewees as participative, a “bottom up” process (CWS1) making it “quite a broadly inclusive process” (CWS5). However, another interviewee (who began working at CWS after the plan was created) states that “[I] don’t know many folks who felt that they had a lot of input into that plan,” although the interviewee felt that s/he did not have sufficient knowledge to call it a top-down or bottom-up process (CWS3). One interviewee remembers that the “principal group engaged was ... what we called the CWS Executive, which was the headquarters and regional directors within CWS” (ten Directors plus the CWS Director General) (CWS5). The plan’s authors consult various managers at points in the process; Directors circulate drafts for consultation (CWS5). Not all interviewees could respond to this question, as only two participants were employed by the CWS when the SP 2000 was developed.
One reason for developing the SP 2000 is to provide a connection between the strategic and operational goals of the CWS. “[We] wanted to be able to communicate ... what we were up to” (CWS1). Communication is something that the CWS has been deficient in for a significant period. Although apparently much less difficult for the PCA, conservation messages can be difficult to get across, which is the case for the CWS:

that’s what, as a group, we’ve had a hell of a time trying to convince people. ‘Why is it important to save ducks, why is it important that sparrows can continue to migrate?’

We’ve done an abysmal job of explaining that to people, and a really well-done strategic plan can help with that. And we don’t have that. (CWS3)

While the SP 2000 is developed by “wildlife service folks ... a lot of people had involvement with it”, such as ENGOs and the industrial sector (CWS1). The planning process “sparked” debate about “what should we do” “should we focus on this?” etc. (CWS1). The planning team did “try to explicitly think about the context within which the CWS was operating” (CWS5). There is awareness among the interviewees that the SP 2000 reflects the current orientation of the CWS, rather than creating a vision or setting a new strategic direction (CWS3). However, this is not necessarily considered problematic because, “the circumstances under which the SP 2000 was developed signalled that it “was a useful time to try to consolidate ‘what’s our role as CWS’” (CWS5).

When asked about the minimal focus on habitat in the SP 2000, one interviewee states, “I think that we’ve always ... known habitat issues were fundamental to achieving the other objectives, but our focus is not on the conservation of habitat per se in CWS ... [it is] for habitat in support of population goals” (CWS5). When asked about protected areas specifically, the participant goes on to say that, “Yeah, protected areas, but ... the CWS protected areas program is not based on representation” (CWS5). There seems to be confusion between strategic goals for a PA network and the idea of representivity, confusion echoed in comments from DFO1 (above).
The PASP was developed to contextualise the protected areas in terms of both the SP 2000 and EC’s strategy, because PA staff “wanted to make sure that we are satisfying the mandates of the Department, based on all the legislation, the authorities that we have” (CWS4). Another reason for the development of the PASP is that there are “so many variables that come into play, that it is important to have a common approach in moving forward, in reaching those goals set out for the department and the Canadian Wildlife Service” (CWS4). In 2002, a Memorandum to Cabinet on the topic of protected areas was presented by the CWS in collaboration with Parks Canada. While the Memorandum to Cabinet was approved, only the section on the National Parks initiatives was funded by the Treasury Board Secretariat. The CWS PA program was not permitted to prepare a formal submission for funding; instead, Treasury Board analysts directed staff “to pull together our policies and procedures” (CWS4). Respondents perceive that it is only in the last decade that the CWS has faced criticism for their lack of standardised policies and procedures for the PA Network (CWS4). However, previous generations of administrators have experienced similar criticisms (see discussion in Chapter 4). Regardless of the length of time the CWS has been receiving these criticisms, the CWS developed the PASP as the direct result of its failure to obtain further resources from the Treasury Board. Although it should be noted that not every Memorandum to Cabinet receives funding, the PCA’s funding request - in the same Memorandum to Cabinet - was granted.

In order to address the directive to “pull together,” the CWS’ protected area staff identified key personnel in each region, and examined various examples of “strategic protected area structures that were out there” (CWS4). Various protected area employees assembled to create a working group that developed the PA Manual; the first step in that process was to refine the strategic direction from the Memorandum to Cabinet into a strategic plan. The PA staffers “made sure that it reflected the necessary Environment Canada and CWS mandates, as well as habitat conservation mandates that we had already articulated” (CWS4) with the aim of building on previously approved elements, “recognizing the history as to where we came from, and
building from there. That was kind of the process” (CWS4). The PASP, then, is “not just a question of being aware, it’s saying okay, this is where we build from so we are not doing something all on our own” (CWS4).

One participant reports involvement in yet another strategy, the development of a habitat strategy in the late 1990s, “which was approved ... by the CWS executive of the day” although the final strategy was not approved by the senior management of EC (CWS9). The process begins with “strategic thinking,” and, as staff considers it “mostly an internal process,” there is no external consultation. In the end, the strategy is detailed to the degree of “identifying ecosystems or areas across the country that we certainly would want to operate in if we had the opportunity to do so” (CWS9). However, because of long-established external partnerships, “the fact that we didn’t do formal outside consultation ... I don’t think that it was limiting to us at the time” (CWS9). The interviewee also points to opportunities to contribute to Memoranda to Cabinet as opportunities to create strategy.

In the process of developing the SP 2000, there are “no planners per se involved at all,” which is both good and bad (CWS1). The SP 2000 is used as an indicator that “wildlife people” can think strategically but the Plan “doesn’t plug itself as well into the departmental planning community as well as it could” which is the “same old Wildlife Service problem ... [it] does its own thing and then ... [the result] comes back in a way that isn’t always helpful” (CWS1). This suggests that the involvement of trained planners could have been helpful. Another interviewee indicates that, “several people had a little bit” of planning-related education. Overall:

very few people have expertise in strategic planning. Most people look at what comes out of the department from a planning perspective as “drivel” – they actually used those words to me when we sent our plan out for review. ‘It’s refreshing to look at something from HQ [headquarters] that is not drivel.’ (CWS3)

The interviewee believes that some education in strategic planning for Department personnel is warranted, because:
when people actually get educated about how strategic planning works, what it is, etc, they don’t get as upset about where their areas/topics are located in the plan. Usually, they want to be included in goals/objectives even when they really might be activities (because they don’t know the mechanics of planning). They confuse their place in the plan with how important it is. (CWS3)

The people involved in the preparation of the PASP have gained most of their planning education “through experience” (CWS4).

Interviewees were asked if the CWS employs a strategy of developing two strategic plans, one for publication and a second for internal use. While there are internal documents that direct the operation of the CWS, the “CWS strategic plan is as you see” because the planning process is a public exercise, and the result is a public document (CWS1). Other participants indicate that “plans are written knowing that anything could be subject to an Access to Information request, so operate with full knowledge that anything written could be distributed” (CWS3). Accordingly, as soon as plans are approved by management, they are all available to the public (CWS4).

Strategic plans are actively disseminated to varying degrees; most visible is the SP 2000, due to publication on the CWS website. There is “some discomfort from folks about sharing the entirety of the plan” although most people “probably wouldn’t look at the whole plan anyway” and “parts will likely be publicized in a more simplified way ... so partner organisations can see what we are doing, how we plan to do it” (CWS3). One way around the internal vs. external plan dilemma is to make the plan “generalized down, usually to some pretty basic, broad-stroke stuff” although the participant does not advocate that approach, considering it a method that disrespects “the public’s ability to absorb complex ideas” (CWS7). There is also a significant degree of unwritten planning, the unwritten one being “the one you take and juxtapose against the political realities of the day” because the degree of tolerance for various programs changes (CWS7). The interviewee goes on to say that:
I think that’s where strategic planning differs significantly from the private sector. It’s that, obligatorily, there’s the bureaucracy, which is the business of government, and then there’s the politics, which is the direction of government, and the tolerance of the government to change its direction and do things. I think there’s probably an element of that in the private sector with shareholders and what have you, but it’s what sets us apart – there’s that political element. Politicians are elected to implement their direction, as bureaucrats you can’t get in front of that – that’s democracy. But it may confound your plans, at times. (CWS7)

However, it is possible to avoid, or at least reduce, the confounding of plans through proactive measures. For example, the PCA approach of interacting with the Canadian public, and ensuring that politicians are aware of the value placed on the National Parks has meant that the PCA System Plan approach weathered several dramatic political changes (although not without its share of budget cuts).

Several comments were made that provide insight into participants’ perceived utility of the plans. Generally, the SP 2000 is no longer consulted, even though it is supposed to last until 2010. For example, “[I] scanned it when I started at CWS, scanned it when I started our planning process, but haven’t otherwise paid much attention to it” (CWS3). Another participant is aware of the SP 2000, but circumstances “ha[ve] changed tremendously in the last three years” (CWS4). The problem is summarized by one of the interviewees, “[s]o this [plan] is no longer valid, this strategic plan from 2000. For that matter ... it applies to an organisational unit that no longer exists ...” as a result of the major restructuring that had taken place (CWS5). Instead, CWS employees focus their planning on the abovementioned Reports on Plans and Priorities, and on documents they create for EC’s results-management process.

While Mintzberg’s recurring comments that strategy cannot be made according to an exact schedule are valid, there should be regular updates in a strategic plan to reflect major changes in organisational circumstances. The Departmental re-organisation makes the SP 2000
more difficult to apply (because of changed structures). There are other significant events that also go unmarked. The passage of the *Species at Risk Act* (2002) creates a significant increase in the workload and the degree of planning required of the CWS. While the SP 2000 refers to the federal-provincial Accord on Species at Risk, and to the draft *Species at Risk Act* (SARA), the extent of discussion of the new Act is as follows: “A further evolution [in mandate] is expected with the passing of the *Species at Risk Act* (SARA) to address the protection and recovery of species at risk, formally expanding the department’s mandate” (Canadian Wildlife Service, 2000, p. 8). This new Act and its administration is one important reason why the SP 2000 needs to be updated to accommodate new responsibilities.

One significant problem for the SP 2000 that the interviews highlight is that “there are problems with terminology and fitting in with other departmental plans” (CWS1). This is symptomatic of various problems the CWS staff has in realising ways that it can better incorporate itself into EC. In the absence of a clear direction and mission for EC, CWS staffers are not always able to explain clearly how the CWS helps to achieve the goals of EC. This is especially true because “it’s difficult with Environment Canada to tell which strategic plan you are operating from” (CWS7). The creation of a well-designed strategic plan (one that identifies goals and objectives, prioritises them, and integrates the CWS with the rest of the Department’s goals) could assist in creating other plans. For example, “I think it [the strategic plan] would help us hugely going to places like Treasury Board. When you have a well-written strategic plan, it makes a Treasury Board submission ... a lot easier” (CWS3). Ultimately, the creation of a strategic plan would be a highly useful process, because “if it’s well-done, if it’s really clear, people who do not know the program, do not know science, do not know wildlife science, can understand it” (CWS3).

There is some question about how useful strategic planning could be for the CWS. Describing the failure to obtain additional resources in the 2002 MC, CWS9 muses:
I think strategic planning wasn’t necessarily the issue, it was the fact that the government doesn’t support, once we have these things [protected areas], maintaining them, nor being able to follow any kind of strategy (other than Parks’) other than to put these things in place.

The interviewee goes on to say that strategic planning for areas protected for wildlife would be quite different from the strategic planning for national parks, because:

it’s quite a different challenge when you are trying to run and manage what are essentially wilderness areas, or areas protected by conservation. And the difference is that parks are for people, although parks people probably wouldn’t tell you that, but at the base parks are for people and protected areas are for animals. (CWS9)

Although the National Parks were originally created for people, by the same token, so were wildlife areas. Canada’s wildlife areas were created to provide sufficient waterfowl for people to hunt, as reflected by the number of refuges created for game species. A further concern expressed by the participant is that:

animals don’t vote. I mean, if you distil it right down to the problem, it’s fine to do strategic planning for areas for conservation, it’s quite another thing to actually get support to do that, both in the public and in the government. (CWS9)

Animals’ lack of voting rights is also mentioned by one of the PCA participants as a reason that some of the more remote national park natural areas are not yet represented (PCA4).

Conservationists must acknowledge that they operate in a human-created political system, and obtaining resources for planning and other conservation activities requires acknowledgement of the human role in every activity.

Finally, neither strategic plan attributes actions to any particular individual or group. Although the plans both contain laudable goals, “when plans are vague and ambitious with few actors named and no budgetary data attached, the potential for controlled implementation is limited” (Lozeau, et al., 2002, p. 548).
5.5 Strategic Planning at the Parks Canada Agency

Part of Parks Canada’s success with the System Plan approach is that the same plan is continually presented to politicians and the general public; the *National Park System Plan* (NPSP) is virtually unchanged since it was first created in 1970 (PCA4). This is a remarkable record of longevity for a major government policy. The NPSP is a long-term strategy that is enabled by regularly updated plans. An important component in the implementation of the NPSP is that it is explained to all those who become involved with Parks Canada, “every new Minister, every new manager that comes in ... has had the same storyline given to him or her” (PCA4). Another important factor, “I think probably the first, and most important thing” in the success of the *System Plan* was “that it describes a finite [emphasis added] system of national parks” (PCA4).²⁸

The PCA also has a requirement to prepare *Reports on Plans and Priorities*. The PCA’s defining legislation (the *Parks Canada Agency Act*) outlines the requirement to table a certain number of reports each year, including a Corporate Plan and business plans (PCA1). Staffs streamline their efforts by creating a single report that meets each set of requirements (PCA1). There is also provision for monitoring the implementation of plans, in order to guide changes to legislation, principles, and system plans. Corporate planning is a three-part process of setting objectives, determining program activities to achieve the objectives, and identifying planned results for each (PCA2). In terms of the corporate planning process, the “whole organisation is involved to some degree” (PCA1).

The PCA Strategy and Planning group, where four full-time employees tend to be educated in planning, public policy or business, carries out much of the environmental scanning, document preparation and consultations, providing context in order that each part of the PCA can create their own input to the Corporate Plans (PCA1). The CEO and the Executive Board meet every June to set specific priorities for each of the eight major program activities, and to examine

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²⁸ This finite system is in contrast with the networks of the CWS and the DFO, which have no targets.
the associated expectations. The Executive Board evaluates progress, identifies resources needed to achieve the objectives for each activity, and determines if the plans are still satisfactory. The Corporate Plan takes the results of this process and puts them in the context of operations (PCA2). The Corporate Plan is developed to achieve a certain number of objectives, mainly leading from legislation and government priorities such as ecological integrity and the Kyoto Accord (PCA1). Although the PCA prepares its Corporate Plans for both internal and external consumption (PCA1), at over 100 pages, it is unlikely that most casual readers ever review the entire document, so the PCA also produces a summary version in order to inform stakeholders. The fact that each Field Unit has specific expectations listed, with the aim of increasing accountability (PCA1), is a significant strength of the Corporate Plans. One area of weakness is in the follow-up to plans (PCA1). Accordingly, measures to improve review and evaluation processes are being developed because “what is measured is done” (PCA1), and the PCA intends to ensure that they are doing everything that they are supposed to be. Although one interviewee comments that a problem for the PCA has been that their mandate would change between acting as a land protector and acting as a recreation provider, depending on the Minister or Deputy Minister in charge at the time (CWS8), this may have in fact been an advantage, allowing the PCA to develop its current political strength and political champions. Since the PCA’s mandate is set out in the Parks Canada Agency Act, making changes is now much more difficult. The National Park System Plan also has weaknesses that are candidly acknowledged by the research participants, such as the improper delineation of regions in some cases. Some of the weaknesses are identified in a 1985 study of Parks Canada (Farista, 1985).

A major weakness of the NPSP is a result of the success that PCA has had with the NPSP. Because the NPSP is finite, and tied so closely to the national park natural regions, changes to the NPSP are nearly impossible, or in the words of one interviewee “it’s never going to happen” (PCA4). Because of the state of science at the time of the NPSP’s development, the PCA National Park System does not necessarily correspond well to more recent park planning
techniques, such as clustering (PCA4). For example, the ecological land classification of Canada identifies a hierarchical system of regions – ecozones, ecoprovinces, etc. (Wiken, 1986). The problem arises in that each classification system has settled on a different number of regions, so for PCA, who “for 36 years, we’ve been telling people ‘39 regions, 39 regions, 39 regions’” a change to a more scientifically rigorous taxonomy would mean political disaster. Provinces, especially, would balk at any increase in number, and the conservation implications of lowering the number would be negative (PCA4).

This review shows that the Parks Canada Agency (and its predecessor) has focused on system planning for nearly 40 years. The initial strategy in early 1970s included plans for terrestrial and marine national parks. In 1995, Parks Canada separated the marine component and created a System Plan for the National Marine Conservation Areas.29 Although more strategies than strategic plans in the academic sense, the System Plans demonstrate strategic thinking, they are implemented strategically, and the System Plans have guided site selection and development ever since they were implemented. More typical management plans (e.g. the Corporate Plans as set out by the Parks Canada Agency Act) guide the development of objectives, annual priorities, business goals, and new legislation. The PCA also pays careful attention to the circumstances in the environment (PCA1) in the development of their documents and plans. The ongoing process of setting goals, gaining both public and political support for the goals, and reporting on the achievement of the goals (or identifying the resources that would be needed to achieve the goals) has contributed to the PCA’s financial resources and political capital. This success is demonstrated by the PCA’s budget that continues to be significantly larger than that of the entire CWS, let alone the CWS’s protected areas (see Section 4.4).

29 In addition, the PCA updated the System Plan for its National Historic Sites in 2000. The first System Plan was produced in 1981, although Parks Canada began developing historic sites in an organised way in the mid-1950s (Lothian, 1987).
5.6 Strategic Planning at the Department of Fisheries and Oceans

The DFO Strategic Plan (discussed in Chapter 4) is a comprehensive and well-developed document, but one that makes little mention of the DFO’s responsibility for protected areas. DFO interviewees state that there is no existing strategic plan for the DFO network of *Oceans Act* Marine Protected Areas (*Oceans Act* MPAs). DFO does not have a target or plan “to create a specific number of sites.” So, while “the intent, the aim is there ... [the] written plan isn't there” and any documents produced relate mainly to day-to-day operations (DFO2).

However, both interviewees believe that DFO participation in the refinement and advancement of the *Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy* (FMPAS) is a type of strategic planning. The DFO leads the planning process to develop a cohesive federal strategy for marine protected areas, although each federal protected areas organisation is proceeding with the development of its own protected areas concurrent to the FMPAS process. Even in the absence of a strategic plan, the DFO has achieved some political success, as demonstrated by the announcement in the 2007 budget to create 10 new marine protected areas (although 2 of the 10 were for the CWS).

5.7 Discussion

Olsen and Eadie (1982) identify the key challenge of strategic planning:

it has become all too common for an organisation to design an elaborate long-range planning process that yields very little strategic benefit because it is focused on the documentation of current activities and includes only a perfunctory scan of the environment. (Olsen & Eadie, 1982, p. 75)

An organisation must look to its environment for threats and opportunities, but always in the context of its own future. The PCA’s first *System Plan* was developed in 1970 as a result of both
taking advantage of contemporary political opportunities and of seeking to direct the future
development of the organisation. Even though it approaches its 40th anniversary with many
regions still not represented, the PCA uses the NPSP to create an environment that allows it to
become increasingly successful. Ultimately, this suggests that the PCA System Plan model should
be treated as a successful strategic document.

In contrast, strategic plans created by the CWS and the DFO largely describe current
activities, with the inclusion of some degree of environmental scan, thus mimicking Olsen and
Eadie’s (1982) description of planning that yields little strategic benefit. Is it any coincidence,
then, that the PCA has so many more resources for its PAs than do the other two management
organisations? Healey (2006) would agree, as she characterises successful strategy as a paradigm
shift. To be fair, the DFO has not been involved in protected areas for very long. Therefore,
judgement should be reserved on the success of their efforts. However, one might ask why it took
so long for the DFO to consider that aquatic and marine ecosystems could benefit from specific
conservation areas?

If the experience of these organisations offers any lessons, PA planners must have a long-
term strategy. One research participant responded to the initial research conclusions by arguing
that the CWS had spent the period between 1995 and 2004 focused almost entirely on the Species
at Risk Act. Because of that focus, “protected areas tended to stay in the background, as did
everything else” (CWS8). While seemingly intended to defend the CWS, it instead suggests that
the CWS reacted to external political pressure and failed to foresee the increased burden created
by the SARA (which was nearly a decade in development). It also ignores the fact that protected
areas must be a major portion of any program for conservation of species at risk.

When comparing budgets, the PCA incurs increased costs, compared to the CWS and the
DFO, for public services such as campground maintenance and park interpreters. Even with the
differences in services, there is an obvious failure in the competitiveness of the CWS and the
DFO to attract budget resources. Although the amount spent per hectare by the DFO is estimated
to be high, this figure is artificially expanded because of the small size of the current DFO network. The addition of new sites will rapidly decrease the per hectare figure. In addition, the DFO faces high costs for surveillance at its offshore sites.30

The PCA 2006/07-2010/11 Corporate Plan describes total annual planned spending of $587,435,000 over $200 million of which is specifically allocated to establishing and conserving heritage resources31 (Parks Canada Agency, 2006b), which corresponds to over $7 per hectare (exact figures cannot be calculated because of the inclusion of historic sites in the budget). With an annual operation budget of approximately $2 million dollars32, the CWS PAs operates on slightly more than 1% of the operations budget of the PCA. The Oceans Management program (home of Oceans Act MPAs) reports spending of $21.7 million dollars in 2005-2006 (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2006a) which, while representing slightly more than 10% of the PCA budget, is not all spent on protected areas. Because the figures are reported in such a vague fashion, it is impossible to exactly compare budget by area managed, but Table 5-1 illustrates an approximate ratio.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approx. area managed (ha)</th>
<th>CWS</th>
<th>DFO</th>
<th>PCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,800,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>26,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (operations)</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>4,340,000*</td>
<td>200,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate budget, normalised by ha</td>
<td>$0.17</td>
<td>$17.36</td>
<td>$7.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on a review of the listed activities in each program activity, an estimated 20% of the DFO Ocean Management budget was devoted to MPAs.

31 Including national historic sites because PCA did not report separate figures.
32 Personal observation and verified by calculating 11.8 million hectares x $0.19 per hectare (Canadian Nature Canada, 2007).
As an organisation, the PCA has several important advantages over the other two federal PA managers. The first advantage is its recent status as an Agency (see Chapter 4). This is something that has been considered by the CWS (CWS8), and could prove to be helpful for the CWS, although there is some question as to whether the government would approve this change (CWS5, CWS8). The PCA faces similar challenges to the CWS, but it has been able to create the circumstances under which Parliament granted them agency status. The other significant advantage is the nature of the PCA mandate. The entire PCA focuses on creating and maintaining national parks, national marine conservation areas, and national historic sites. They create a well-developed visitor interpretation program to enhance the visitor experience, thus creating a positive image of national parks by interacting with Canadians, thus creating a political constituency without appearing to do so deliberately.

Because of its status as an Agency, the PCA’s CEO reports directly to the Minister of the Environment, bypassing the typical departmental structure (faced by the CWS and the DFO). Accordingly, the resources allocated to the PCA remain within its network of sites, and are not subject to departmental re-distributing. The CWS and the DFO PAs are both part of larger departments with a variety of aims; in the case of the DFO, the role of habitat protection and oceans management may conflict with its main role as a proponent of the fishing industry. For the CWS, the conflict is not as severe, but it remains both the protector of wildlife and the main regulator of the waterfowl hunt. The CWS also faces significant challenges from applications for various development projects within its protected areas, such as permitting gas wells in the Kendall Island Migratory Bird Sanctuary. The status of the CWS and the DFO protected areas programs as components of a broader departmental mandate also complicate their ability to create strategy and make financial decisions.

The CWS has relied on hunters as a major source of political support (CWS3, CWS5, CWS6, CWS7). This is of concern because the number of hunters has been in decline since the mid-1980s, although the membership of every traditional hunting support organisation has not
declined. Groups, such as Ducks Unlimited, work to attract non-hunting conservationists (CWS1). The CWS needs to address this change in constituency by identifying other organisations that can provide significant support (this topic is addressed in the model strategic plan, Appendix 5).

In an effort to develop normative standards for strategic planning, Camillus (2003) studied various firms and their degree of success in strategic planning, using criteria from previous studies and a survey of executives. Results show that less effective organisations generally use a calendar (i.e. a specific time in a planning cycle) as the trigger for their strategic planning, while the more effective organisations use a combination of triggers (but less than half of them use a calendar). In a large bureaucracy such as the federal government, there will always be some requirement for cyclical reporting based on the calendar. Performance measures are included in the budgeting process, and it is to the advantage of a department or agency to have positive measures to report. However, a strategy could be developed without regard to the calendar, as long as reporting continued on schedule. For example, the original Parks Canada NPSP was developed at one point in time. Since then, annual updates have not significantly changed the NPSP (i.e. the strategy) but the strategies and tactics (e.g. those set out in annual Corporate Plans) do change as appropriate.

5.8 Evaluation of Strategic Documents

The evaluation criteria are summarised in the form of ordinal ratings. Detailed descriptions of each criterion can be found in Chapter 3, and the determination of each ranking follows in the rest of Section 5.8. Evaluations are summarised in tabular format in table 5-2. Each evaluation is summarised by an ordinal ranking, based on an interpretation of how each criterion is or is not met by the plans of each organisation.
Table 5-2 Evaluation of key elements in strategic documents for protected areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CWS</th>
<th>DFO</th>
<th>PCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission Statements</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals &amp; Objectives</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Scan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.8.1 Mission Statements

How do the three organisations in this study compare in their mission statements? For the CWS, the mission statement of the PA network is found in the *Protected Areas Strategic Plan* (PASP). The mission statement is obviously related to the mission statement of the CWS itself, which is to “conserve wildlife and the ecosystems of which they are a part, with a particular focus on migratory birds and species at risk” (Canadian Wildlife Service, 2000, p. 12). The protected areas mission statement reads more like directions for the practitioners responsible for PAs than for the protected areas themselves, because the mission is:

for EC to identify, designate, and manage - using an ecosystem approach - a comprehensive protected areas network comprised of National Wildlife Areas, Marine Wildlife Areas, and Migratory Bird Sanctuaries that contribute to the conservation and protection of Canada’s wildlife and the ecosystems of which they are a part, with a particular focus on migratory birds and species at risk. (Canadian Wildlife Service, 2005, p. 2-6)

How does the CWS PA mission statement correspond with the two models discussed in Chapter 3? In terms of Wilson’s (1992) approach, the basic purpose of the CWS - to protect migratory birds and species at risk - is identifiable, although it is not presented as a statement of purpose.
There is no definition of a relationship with other organisations, although a great deal of the responsibility for species at risk (and wildlife conservation more broadly) is provincial. Finally, a reader would likely understand that the operation of a “comprehensive protected areas network” is the objective, since that was the lead element. However, during the interviews, participants emphasized that they consider the PA network to be a tool to carry out the objectives of wildlife conservation. As for the Ashridge four-part model (purpose, values, behaviour standards, and strategy), the CWS PA mission statement included some degree of the first three elements, but each has to be inferred. Although there are no obvious behaviour standards outlined, from a scientific point of view, the ecosystem approach may be considered such a standard.

The PCA has a mission statement for the Agency as a whole (therefore including reference to historic sites). In it, the PCA states that:

On behalf of the people of Canada, we protect and present nationally significant examples of Canada's natural and cultural heritage, and foster public understanding, appreciation and enjoyment in ways that ensure the ecological and commemorative integrity of these places for present and future generations. (Parks Canada Agency, 2006b, inside front cover)

Its purpose is quite clear: to protect and present nationally significant examples of heritage, and to foster public understanding. Values are less explicit, although they can be inferred (e.g. it values intergenerational equity). The statement does not reference relationships with other organisations, but it does discuss the Canadian public, so the relationships element of the Wilson model is partially included. Strategy is not explicitly discussed. Objectives are clearly stated (ensuring “ecological and commemorative integrity ... for present and future generations”), which is useful for maintaining/improving organisational coherence.

The DFO mission statement is brief, and to the point, but it does not provide any real indication of the work that the DFO does. As stated in the DFO SP, “it is our mission, as DFO employees, to deliver to Canadians the following outcomes: Safe and Accessible Waterways;
Healthy and Productive Aquatic Ecosystems; and Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture” (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2005a, p. 4). Because it only refers to the main outcomes, the mission statement does not provide a great deal of information to those who read it. While it refers to the purpose of the DFO, none of the other elements – from either model – occur in the DFO mission statement. This mission statement appears to be useful only for those who have prior knowledge of what the outcomes entailed.

5.8.2 Goals and Objectives

For the CWS, the PASP does not specifically identify any goals. In fact, the first “strategic direction” listed in the PASP is to “Establish Program Principles, Policies, Goals, and Priorities” (Canadian Wildlife Service, 2005, p. 2-7). The lack of goals indicates that the PASP is inadequate. Whatever the reason for non-inclusion, by presenting a document that does not contain goals, the CWS protected area practitioners missed an opportunity to direct the development of their program. Because planning is, in many ways, about the achievement of goals, the PASP lacks an important element. This is a significant omission from the point of view of a planner, but perhaps less obvious to a biologist without training in strategic planning.

The CWS SP 2000 (p. 14) includes two program objectives for habitat:

- Habitats are conserved, protected and rehabilitated to meet the objectives of CWS for migratory birds and species-at-risk conservation plans within 15 years;
- Ecosystem approach principles are used when making resource management decisions.

The document does not identify intermediate steps that could mark achievement of goals and objectives. Of the two specified objectives, the first seems quite ambitious, perhaps overly so. The second objective is ambiguous. Does it refer only to the CWS, or to government more broadly? Or even to society at large? This is of concern because the CWS has very limited involvement in resource management decisions outside its protected areas, and even inside many
PAs (i.e., those not on EC-owned land). Beyond that, neither meets the criteria set out in Eagles et al. (2002). The first objective did meet the time-bound criterion, although it is perhaps measurable, and neither objective meets the other four criteria (output-oriented, specific, measurable, and attainable).

The PCA has several goals and objectives, elaborated in different documents (especially in the System Plans and the Corporate Plans). The PCA aims to represent areas of the terrestrial and marine environment for the benefit of Canadians (as outlined in the System Plans). Within that broad goal, there is a series of objectives. The most recent set was contained in the federal Action Plan that commits the PCA to creating 15 new protected areas, in addition to expanding three other parks, by March of 2008 (Parks Canada Agency, 2006b). The PCA Corporate Plans list a series of performance expectations that can also be considered objectives. Each of the levels of goals contribute toward the ultimate goal of completing the system, as well as to supporting goals such as visitor experience and ecological integrity. The PCA’s goals and objectives do meet the Eagles et al. (2002) criteria.

The DFO identifies a series of five-year goals related to each of its main areas of business. For the Oceans Action Plan (OAP), the goal is:

for Canada to consolidate its place as a world leader in oceans management. Within DFO and across the federal government, the focus will be on making significant progress in delivering key commitments under each of the four pillars of the OAP. (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2005a, p. 15)33

The goal is a lofty one, but it is difficult to quantify what being a world leader requires, and what “significant” progress is. There is no indication of timing and no way to measure achievement other than a yes or no. The goal makes no specific mention of protected areas.

33 The four pillars are: International Leadership, Sovereignty and Security; Integrated Oceans Management for Sustainable Development; Health of the Oceans; and Ocean Science and Technology (Government of Canada, 2005, p. 5).
More specifically for the *Oceans Act* MPAs, the DFO’s objective is, “to conserve and protect the ecological integrity of marine ecosystems, species, and habitats through a system of Marine Protected Areas, as per the *Oceans Act*” (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1999, p. 7). The goals under this objective are:

- To proactively conserve and protect the ecological integrity of each MPA site;
- To contribute to the social and economic sustainability of coastal communities by providing for uses which are compatible with the reasons for designation;
- To further knowledge and understanding of marine ecosystems. (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1999, p. 7)

Again, these are lofty goals, and they are attainable, but they are difficult to quantify, not very specific, and they are not time-bound.

### 5.8.3 Explicit Actions

Under sections headed by each of the strategic directions, the CWS’s PASP included some more specific actions. For example, on page 2-10, the list under Strategic Direction 4 (Protect the Integrity of Existing Sites) includes four actions:

- Increase the use of NWA/MWA designations to afford comprehensive year-round habitat protection on ecologically important sites;
- Enhance site protection through compliance and enforcement initiatives as well as local education and outreach initiatives;
- Integrate EC Protected Areas into the local and regional planning process for the ecosystem in which they are located by incorporating the use of buffers and other ecosystem management approaches;
- Local to regional level planning with neighbouring land owners, including federal, provincial/territorial, municipal and private.
While the comprehensiveness of the listed actions is lacking, their presence indicates an understanding of the need to make long-term goals more concrete through short-term actions. However, any achievement would be difficult and time-consuming to measure. Nonetheless, they are important actions that offer some direction to managers and staff. No specific assignment of responsibility is made.

The PCA’s 2006/07-2010/11 Corporate Plan includes planned results and performance expectations. Each planned result has between one and four performance expectations associated with it. Performance expectations are specific actions that the PCA identifies as necessary steps to achieving its goals. For example, under Planned Result 1, the PCA identifies “increase the number of represented terrestrial regions from 25 in March 2003 to 34 of 39 by March 2008, and increase the number of represented marine regions from two in March 2003 to eight of 29 by March 2008” as its performance expectation (Parks Canada Agency, 2006b, p. 28). The hierarchy of results and expectations are set out in the PCA Strategic Planning Framework (Parks Canada Agency, 2006b, p. 20). This gives the PCA staff an exact understanding of what is expected of them, and provides an indication of performance to those outside the PCA. The monitoring of the goals and objectives, and reporting on performance against the objectives reinforces the goals/objectives and the model. The precision of the Planned Results indicates that the listed actions are appropriately explicit.

The DFO SP includes a table of “targets and deliverables” for the following five years (p. 29), divided into those that could be achieved in one, three, and five years (Table 5-3). While they are not labelled as such, these could be considered the objectives that would be met in order to achieve the DFO’s goals. Specifying the period over which the various actions/objectives are to be accomplished provide a sense of priority, or the relative difficulty of accomplishing the task. The deliverables are comparable to the PCA’s Planned Results, although the DFO’s are at a higher organisational level, and some of them apply to the DFO’s protected areas.
Table 5-3 Deliverables for the DFO under the *Oceans Action Plan*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One-year</th>
<th>Ecosystem overviews for at least 3 of 5 priority Large Ocean Management Areas</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finalize federal Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish common regulations or standards to address impacts of seismic activities in conjunction with provincial governments and offshore regulators</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support commercialization of key Canadian ocean technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three-year</td>
<td>IM Plans are in place for priority LOMAs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure critical protection in place and designate up to five DFO MPAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promote Canadian ocean technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish regulations or standards for other marine activities as appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five-year</td>
<td>Designate up to four more DFO MPAs</td>
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5.8.4 Environmental Scan

For development of the CWS SP 2000, there was some review of the external environment. As stated by one interviewee, “did we try to explicitly think about the context within which the CWS was operating? Yes” (CWS5). In the CWS SP 2000 there is no overt mention of the environmental scan, however it does include a list of “conservation challenges for the coming decade” that include habitat quantity, climate change, and cumulative human impacts (p. 4-5). This is followed by a list of “influencing factors – the changing Canadian context” that discusses important factors such as the change from consumptive to non-consumptive uses of wildlife, changing mandates for the CWS, and increasing the role of Aboriginal peoples (p. 6-9). Included in this list is the fact that the CWS is facing “limited resources and capacity” (p. 9). Although there is some scanning, interviewees involved in the development of the PASP do not report any consultation; staffers at the CWS considered themselves sufficiently aware of the environment, through collaborations and other interactions, to skip consulting on the external
phases of the strategic plan. However, this dismisses potential gains to be made in learning from others, and particularly in improving relations with other conservation groups.

The PCA originally developed the 1970 NPSP in-house, although they were reacting to environmental cues. More recently, the PCA has begun to carry out extensive consultations with the public, through such occasions as the biennial Minister’s Round Table on Parks Canada, where approximately 90 Canadians gather together to make recommendations to the Minister. Extensive internal consultations take place during preparation of each Corporate Plan (PCA2). These consultations provide occasion for the PCA to communicate with interested individuals, to learn from any suggestions made, and to indicate to government that they are fulfilling their mandate to engage Canadians.

One interesting element in the DFO SP, and an indication that it is considering the external environment, is a section called “In real terms, what do we do?” which describes the major tasks of the DFO in colloquial – and emotional – terms (e.g., first on the list is “save lives”). There is no specific mention of the MPA program, although the list does include “study, conserve and protect aquatic ecosystems” and “create the conditions to support a vibrant and sustainable aquaculture industry” (Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 2005a, p. 5) that are both potential benefits that could be provided by a MPA (Halpern, 2003). As there is no strategic plan for the Oceans Act MPA network, there is no environmental scanning process to discuss.

5.8.5 Communication

In the late 1970s, there was a significant change in Canadians’ attitudes toward wildlife; perhaps the change could be attributed to a similar “small group of remarkably dedicated civil servants who were able to turn their own goals of wildlife preservation into a declared government policy” over a period of about 35 years in the early part of the Twentieth Century (Foster, 1978, p. 3). Although civil servants had been responsible for significant changes in
government policy, there was no corresponding leap in public interaction, and this was not something that the CWS had generally been able to do well. Early on, one CWS staffer wrote that, “many of our failings are due to inadequate communications” (Boyd, 1969, p. 23). The idea that simply sharing a conservation message will result in an increase in conservation behaviour continues today.

The need for improved public engagement is not a surprise to staff at the CWS. One interviewee states that, “at some point you’ve got to be able to engage the public” (CWS7). The lack of resources seems to be a significant cause of the communication failure, but also indicates that communication has not been a priority. In recent years, the increased centralization of communications within EC (rather than CWS) is also a problem, and may preclude efforts to increase public outreach by the CWS. For example, as of 2006, all Departmental communication is required to use the federal Canadian flag logo; the (unofficial) CWS loon logo and the CWS name are no longer permitted on publications (personal observation). The DFO MPA program has never had its own logo. The PCA, as an agency, has increased autonomy from EC structures and continues to use its beaver logo, which is included on all of its publications.

The PCA has an excellent record in the area of public outreach. Visitor experiences are well-planned, satisfaction is evaluated, and the important role of the public acknowledged repeatedly. Even the PCA mandate includes explicit reference to the need to “foster public understanding.” By engaging Canadians, the PCA makes it significantly more difficult for governments to cut their budget. This does not, however, signify that the PCA believes it receives totally adequate funding. The PCA has announced on several occasions its need for additional capital funding, and for funding to restore ecological integrity (e.g. Parks Canada Agency, 2006b). The PCA also undertakes a significant degree of collaboration when it initiates new park proposals. For example, the feasibility study for the South Okanagan-Lower Similkameen National Park Reserve includes representation from the PCA, several British Columbia Ministries, and two local First Nations (Parks Canada Agency, 2008).
The DFO appears to have done little outreach to the broader public. Indeed, the DFO protected areas were a surprise to the researcher, discovered through contacts developed during the research. A review of DFO publications reveals a few press releases to mark the establishment of the *Oceans Act* MPAs (all found on the DFO website), but establishment of the protected areas is not widely reported in the national media.

The way that organisations respond to site visitors is an important aspect of communication. The PCA keeps careful count of total visits, with information available on their website. In 2005-2006, there were more than 12.2 million visits to national parks in Canada. The DFO does not appear to have a policy or program for visitor use monitoring or reporting. This means that the agency is unable to report to government, to Parliament or to the people of Canada that their sites are used by Canadians. For some of the DFO’s offshore sites (i.e. Endeavour Hydrothermal Vents and the Gully), monitoring visitors would be a difficult task because of the distance from shore. However, for the more near-shore *Oceans Act* MPAs, such as the new Musquash Estuary MPA, monitoring could be undertaken quite easily.

For the CWS, as protection of wildlife is its primary role, visitor services are not considered central to the mandate (especially after the loss of interpretation funds in the 1984 budget cuts). However, there are sites that receive a significant number of visitors (e.g. Cap Tourmente hosts more than 50,000 visitors each year), but there is no formal tracking mechanism. Many sites are closed to visitors at certain times of the year (e.g. MBSs during nesting season) or year-round (e.g. privately-owned MBSs) and so have limited or no on-site facilities.

As in many other elements of the CWS strategy, at least some staffers are aware of the need for public outreach. In his historical review of the CWS, Burnett reports that, “public awareness and education had always been recognized as important but under funded elements of the CWS strategy” (1999, p. 82). The Canadian Wildlife Service has no policy or program for

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34 However, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the US has developed monitoring protocols using remote sensing (Eagles, P. F. J., pers. comm., 2007). The DFO could also extend their program of fisheries surveillance described earlier in this research.
visitor use monitoring or reporting. The corresponding lack of data means that the agency cannot report accurate visitation levels to the government, meaning that site managers are forced to provide access to visitors and respond to visitor impacts without the appropriate resources.

While the programs of the DFO and the CWS are not oriented towards visitors, reaching the public is an important part of developing a constituency that would improve their chances of obtaining further resources. Involving public in an indirect fashion, such as through brochures or TV ads (i.e., Hinterland Who’s Who), provides a much lower level of personal impact than visiting a site and observing it first hand. It has been possible to combine management of wildlife with public involvement: in the United States, the Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) emphasizes that there is a wildlife refuge in each of the fifty states, and at least one refuge within an hour’s drive of each major U.S. city (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, n.d.). In addition to having an active program of visitor monitoring and reporting (Robinson, Leung, & Eagles, 2005), the USFWS also promotes visitation to its sites through the creation of an annual pass in cooperation with other federal land management organisations35 (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2007).

The USFWS also publishes a series of reports on the economic impact of their sites; this has been done on occasion by Environment Canada (the Value of Wildlife to Canadians surveys) but is not something the CWS has promoted. Economic valuation can offer PA managers several advantages, as having an array of funding options can “help to identify potential threats to the protected area, and lead to a justification for additional funding from existing sources” (Task Force on Economic Benefits of Protected Areas & IUCN Economics Service Unit, 1998).

The most important aspect of the PCA public outreach strategy is the way that each aspect of its work is couched in terms of the value to Canadians. For the PCA:

35 This included the National Parks Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the National Forest Service, and the Bureau of Reclamation.
descriptions of Parks Canada’s program activities (PA) further illustrate how the Agency provides benefits for Canadians … Parks Canada protects nationally significant examples of Canada’s natural and cultural heritage so that citizens of today and tomorrow can experience and be inspired by the special places and rich stories of our nation. (Parks Canada Agency, 2006b, p. 16)

Parks Canada is also highly aware of the changing demographics of Canadian society. The 2006/07-2011/2012 Corporate Plan includes reference to plans for reaching people in urban areas, and to youth in particular. The PCA also plans to create programs for schools, in addition to increasing the number of Web-based materials produced (Parks Canada Agency, 2006b). The CWS used to have a much more vigorous interpretation program, but these efforts were greatly reduced by the budget cuts of 1984 (“Volunteers rally,” 1985). Several CWS protected areas have interpretation programs, but they are not developed nor run by the CWS, although some financial support has been provided (personal observation). The CWS interpretation program has deteriorated compared to what it was in the 1970s.

5.9 Effectiveness of Strategic Planning

This section summarises the discussion in Chapter 5 and presents the results in Table 5-4, the evaluation of strategic planning effectiveness at the three PA organisations, based on the criteria set out in Dyson & Foster (1982, p. 78). In the early 1980s, Dyson & Foster developed one of the few strategic planning evaluation frameworks that included public organisations in its empirical verification. Accordingly, the current research uses a modified version of the Dyson & Foster framework to evaluate the effectiveness of the strategic planning in the three PA organisations (two criteria are omitted due to the difficulty of evaluation with the data gathered in this research). As described in Chapter 3, the evaluation of each criterion is reported as an ordinal ranking, on scale from 0 to 5, with 5 being the highest ranking (for more detailed descriptions, see
Chapter 3). Each criterion is assessed independently, as comparisons across the table would be completely arbitrary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-4 Comparison of likely effectiveness of strategic planning at three PA organisations (for PA-specific plans)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criterion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clear statement of objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integration of planning function</td>
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<tr>
<td>Catalytic action of planning function</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richness of formulation (of plans)</td>
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<td>Depth of evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Treatment of uncertainty in evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources planned</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data used</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iteration in process</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quantification of goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control measures (responsiveness to uncertainty)</td>
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The DFO receives a series of zeros because there is no plan specific to their protected areas. The DFO-based participants forecast that there will be significant changes to the planning regime as intra-organisational planning for marine protected areas develops. However, at the time of writing, only the high-level Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy and the DFO Strategic Plan identify any objectives for the Oceans Act MPAs, and these are very limited.
5.9.1 Clear statement of objectives

The CWS plans are, as discussed above, lacking in several areas. As stated in the CWS
Strategic Plan 2000-2010, the mission of the CWS is to: “Conserve wildlife and the ecosystems
of which they are a part, with a particular focus on migratory birds and species at risk.” This
statement does indicate the overall objective of the CWS, but it is unclear in many ways. For
example, there is no explanation of why the focus is on migratory birds and species at risk. There
is no indication of who the CWS is working for, nor the areas in which they work, nor is there an
indication of the scope or significance of that work.

For the PCA, the mandate (comparable to the CWS mission) statement indicates that:
On behalf of the people of Canada, we protect and present nationally significant examples
of Canada’s natural and cultural heritage, and foster public understanding, appreciation
and enjoyment in ways that ensure the ecological and commemorative integrity of these
places for present and future generations. (Parks Canada Agency, 2006b, inside front
cover)

The PCA mandate describes their constituency (the people of Canada), indicates the reasons for
their work (national significance), and some of the ways that the PCA goes about protecting the
examples of heritage (fostering public understanding and appreciation).

5.9.2 Integration of planning function

For the CWS plans, the planning function is moderately integrated, because the
practitioners themselves perform the planning functions. Accordingly, the users of the plan are
well acquainted with the material and more likely to integrate it into their daily activities.
However, there is no information that is accessible to readers of the plan from outside the
organisation.
The PCA integrates their planning function into the overall structure of the PCA, to the extent that they have a planning office. All of the PCA research participants appear to understand the planning goals. There is some description of the planning function in the PCA Business Plans, such as linking the budget figures with their associated priorities.

5.9.3 Catalytic action of planning function

There is no evidence of the planning function providing catalysis in the CWS plans. The Protected Areas Strategic Plan (PASP) has not been put into action. The CWS Strategic Plan 2000-2010 coincided with increased resources related to the species at risk program, although it is evident that the planning for the new Species at Risk Act and its implementation predated this Plan.

The PCA’s two System Plans provide clear catalysis for its activities, and have done so since the introduction of the NPSP. The System Plans and other strategic documents reviewed during this research make clear links to other documents (e.g. the reports from the Parks Canada Roundtables), reinforcing their mandate. The number of new National Parks that correspond to the NPSP is the best illustration of the catalytic action of the plans.

5.9.4 Richness of formulation (of plans)

For the CWS, the richness of formulation is lacking, because the plans largely reflect the status quo. CWS management has not seized the opportunity to change the orientation or status of the program when preparing their strategic plans, even though the Protected Areas Strategic Plan was prepared as part of a broader undertaking to change the fortune of the CWS protected areas.

The PCA’s plans are generally well done, clear, and contextualised. Although the plans do include extensive discussion of the status quo, they also extend the discussion to include emerging areas of work (e.g. experiences of immigrants).
5.9.5 Depth of evaluation

The depth of evaluation for the CWS plans is unclear. While it is clear from the interviews that there was a great deal of effort that went into the CWS plans, this is not always evident in the documents themselves. The plans describe the status quo in many cases, such as the example of the Species at Risk Act. Rather than analyze the potential changes that were to occur as a result of the (then) new legislation, the SP 2000 indicates that a “further evolution” in the CWS mandate would take place after the Species at Risk Act became law (p. 7). Later, the SP 2000 refers to the Species at Risk Act as “far-reaching legislation” and that “related initiatives” would “provide essential new resources” without identifying what any of those initiatives might be (p. 17).

In contrast, the PCA’s NPSP displays a great depth of analysis, as it launched an entirely new approach to protected areas in Canada, and has become one of the leading examples of system planning globally (Davey, 1998). The analysis behind the NPSP involved a survey of Canadian biophysical features, analysing the suite of these features, and using that analysis to divide the country into the national park natural regions. While the analysis is not directly evident in the NPSP map, the analysis was also described in text. The source of the data used in the Corporate Plans are not attributed, and therefore internally-derived, but there is a great deal of information conveyed in them.

5.9.6 Treatment of uncertainty in evaluation

CWS plans do discuss issues for which the outcome is uncertain, such as climate change and cumulative impacts of anthropogenic stress, although the discussions are somewhat cursory. These issues are addressed mainly by listing the sources of uncertainty and without indicating whether contingency plans exist.
The PCA plans are also unclear about how they treat uncertainty. The NPSP manual gives the impression that the national park natural regions are definitive, although some interview results suggested that these natural regions were not as concrete as originally thought (i.e., PCA4). The Corporate Plans skirt the topic of uncertainty, referring to some areas (e.g. ecological integrity) that are inherently uncertain without engaging in a discussion of the potential for results inconsistent with planned outcomes.

It should be noted that limitations put on public government documents (e.g., documents must all be reviewed by communications advisors - personal observation) and the need to appear in control of issues would limit the discussion of uncertainty for both organisations.

5.9.7 Resources planned

The CWS plans have very little mention of resources associated with the activities, and are thus given a low ranking for this criterion. For example, the SP 2000 discusses the SARA, and indicates that “related initiatives will provide essential new resources to make these plans a reality” (p. 17). The CWS SP 2000 does refer to the need to explore cooperative projects, such as the North American Waterfowl Management Plan, as “resources dwindle” (p. 7). The limited nature of the CWS’ resources is addressed explicitly on page 9, although the discussion is limited to a very general description of some areas of need.

In the PCA Corporate Plans, there are clear links made between each activity and the resources need to achieve them. Figures throughout the Corporate Plans identify specific projects that will achieve the PCA’s objectives. These figures associate needed financial and human resources with each project. Planned spending on each of the major areas of business (e.g., establishing parks, visitor services) is also listed in the Plans. The NPSP itself does not refer to resources.
5.9.8 Data used

When reading the CWS planning documents, it is unclear where the data used came from. When asked about the process for developing the plans, interviewees described compiling and refining the knowledge of existing staff into the content of both plans. This does not eliminate the potential success of the plans, but it does indicate that the plan is internally-focused, and the CWS missed an opportunity to consider new data. The data within the plans is qualitative in nature, which could make the plan less compelling for politicians and decision-makers because there is a need to read the plan in more depth to understand the message.

For the PCA, the NPSP manual describes the sources of physiological and biological data that were used to develop the national park natural regions. These sources were among the more current scientific studies at the time. The Corporate Plans do not indicate the source of their data, but the Plans do include qualitative and quantitative data. This combination allows for quick summaries that highlight the identified resource needs. Figures identify the breakdown of costs, priorities and other important aspects of the PCA’s work, which allows for rapid identification of key information.

5.9.9 Iteration in process

Both CWS plans - the Strategic Plan 2000-2010 and the Protected Areas Strategic Plan - do refer to the need for iteration, but it does not appear that either plan has actually been updated since publication, even in the face of very significant changes in mandate (e.g., the CWS SP 2000 still refers to the proposed Species at Risk Act).

The System Plans are not intended to be updated (although there were clear iterations in the marine system plan), as the final goal is the completion of the National Park System, and a changing target would be politically counter-productive. However, the PCA Annual Reports and the Corporate Plans are explicitly designed to go through annual updates.
5.9.10 Quantification of goals

There is very little quantification of the goals in either plan. For example, in the CWS Strategic Plan 2000-2010, the two habitat conservation objectives eschew quantities: “habitats are conserved, protected, and rehabilitated to meet the objectives of CWS’s conservation plans for migratory birds and species at risk within 15 years” and “ecosystem approach principles are used when making resource management decisions” (p. 14). Even the objectives referred to in the conservation of the CWS’s two key areas of responsibility (migratory birds and species at risk) almost are without quantity. For example, “migratory bird populations are sustained at healthy levels by the year 2020” (p. 14) and “species at risk are protected through continuing implementation of the Accord for the Protection of Species at Risk in Canada by all jurisdictions” (p. 14). The quantifiable objective is that, “no species of special concern under federal jurisdiction is listed as threatened or endangered” (p. 14).

In contrast, the PCA System Plans are explicitly quantified. The whole point of the NPSP is to have a certain number of National Parks, the number that is deemed to adequately represent the diversity of Canada’s natural regions.

5.9.11 Control measures (responsiveness to uncertainty)

The CWS plans do not discuss control measures in any detail, and several of the objectives do not seem feasible over the presumable length of time that the CWS was planning for (i.e., 2000-2010). The SP 2000 does include sections called “Conservation Challenges for the Coming Decade” and “The Changing Canadian Context” that discuss some of the uncertainties facing the CWS, but the text does not refer to specific means to respond to these uncertainties. For example, in discussing the shift in wildlife use from consumptive (i.e. hunting) to non-consumptive uses (e.g., bird watching), the SP 2000 concludes that, “overall, there is a gradual shift in focus towards these nonconsumptive uses, adding correspondingly to the pressures that
both wildlife and resource management agencies are under” (p. 6) without identifying how the shift towards non-consumptive uses adds to pressures.

PCA documents (except for the System Plans) refer to potential uncertainties in the environment tangentially. For example, the Corporate Plans discuss progress being made in National Park establishment, but do not provide a timeline to completion. Ecological integrity is monitored in the face of changing environmental conditions, although this is an emerging area of work.

5.10 Conclusion

The research results indicate that protected areas’ staff generally understand the types of benefits that can be provided by a well-prepared strategic plan. However, some research participants seem to conflate strategic planning and system planning, the latter used so strategically by the PCA. Each organisation has its own reasons for creating protected areas, and those reasons could add to or detract from the strategic planning process (often for reasons of misperception, such as the linking of strategy and representivity).

The planning and management difficulties found in the CWS are not new for them. While the impression gathered from working with the CWS is that problems have recently become more pronounced, the archival evidence suggests that many difficulties have been long-standing. For example, in a draft of his *Review of the Migratory Bird Sub-Activity* Hugh Boyd (1969) reports that:

> at all levels within the Canadian Wildlife Service there is growing uncertainty and anxiety about what we are trying to do and how particular activities fit, or fail to fit, into the general scheme. At the same time, there is strong evidence that the government intends to restrain the growth of Departmental expenditures sufficiently to make nonsense of projections contained in the CWS Program Forecast. (p. 1)
For the PCA, the initial success of their original 1971 System Plan was, in part, because Minister Chrétien and the federal Cabinet supported it. The Parks Canada planners who created the National Park System Plan paid careful attention to their political environment, and seized the advantage of having a sympathetic Minister. Since then, many subsequent Ministers, Governments and the leadership of Parks Canada have continued to support the System Plan approach, creating a consistent message and reinforcing the public interest in supporting Parks Canada. While it is inappropriate to suggest that there has not been any leadership from CWS or DFO senior bureaucrats or from the government itself (successes such as the adoption of the FMPAS would contradict such a suggestion), the leadership has been insufficient. PA management organisations require additional resources to plan and carry out the various tasks set out for them. Long-term visions, such as that offered by the PCA System Plans, provide a goal for leaders to support. Other than the goal provided by the PCA System Plans, this research does not have data to determine why the PCA is able to attract more political championship than the other two PA organisations. While it is speculative, a potential reason is the economic benefits provided by a National Park, which are much beyond anything provided by the CWS or the DFO sites. The importance of a political champion is difficult to overstate. For example, Jean Chrétien describes volunteering to fill a Cabinet role in the Treasury Board in order to have access to the Cabinet’s most senior decision makers. In his autobiography, Chrétien describes remaining to the very end of Treasury Board meetings in order to be able to speak privately with the Minister of Finance, which resulted in successful park proposals (Chrétien, 1994).

For both the DFO and the CWS, there is a vicious circle occurring. There is a need for leadership to get a plan adopted, but the organisations have not been able get sufficient attention from departmental leadership or the government, and without a plan in place, they are unlikely to receive much attention from outside of their organisations. Altering this would be an important step. Porter states that, “the challenge of developing or re-establishing a clear strategy is often primarily an organisational one and depends on leadership” (1996, p. 77). Attracting increased
public interest would be an important step in attracting further political attention. At some point, the CWS and the DFO will need to re-direct existing resources to improve communications, if they are interested in expanding their limited constituencies.

The process of strategic planning is “inherently prone to fail because it is deliberately disruptive” by questioning current routines and agreements, and all the existing ways of doing things (Bryson, 1995, p. 63). The CWS processes do not seem to question the status quo. While the strategic documents are available to anyone interested in them, the primary intent is obviously to inform the protected areas practitioners. This is especially true for the PASP, given the extremely limited distribution of the PA Manual. In contrast, the PCA has done much to create and maintain an environment that benefits itself, although it has not been a constant environment of success. Again, the DFO does not have a plan for their protected areas.

In an age of increasing concern about government (and civil service) accountability (e.g. the 2006 federal Accountability Act) having measurable goals and objectives is an important way to demonstrate value for money. Putting goals into the context of the political language of the day has long been a practice in the public sector (CWS7). The next step should be to increase the degree to which the CWS and the DFO do this, while not affecting the long-term viability of the program by aligning it too closely with a particular government or policy. The PCA has been able to do this for many years; while parks were originally important for economic development (PCA3, PCA4) the increasing emphasis on visitor experience and ecological integrity has resulted in a successful transition of the National Parks program.

Examining the cases of the CWS and the DFO, which have had a virtual absence of strategy over many years, the role of the strategy would seem to be much more important in its presence than its absence.

The presence of high-level strategic planning, such as the DFO’s department-level strategic planning, is typical of departments in the federal government. The private sector strategic planning consultant interviewed for this research stated that, “department level strategic
planning is pretty widespread” but there is a “decreasing amount as you go down in an organisation.” Accordingly, it should not be a surprise that the DFO has a strategic plan for the department, but not for its protected areas. Not a surprise, but an absence that will likely impact on the long-term success of the DFO protected areas network.

While strategic planning has the potential to improve management, readers should note that, “strategic planning systems should be seen as only one part of a total approach to strategic management” (Bonn & Christodoulou, 1996, p. 550). Strategic planning is also not the only approach to strategy. If neither the CWS or the DFO are producing successful strategic plans, and since the PCA have been successful without strategic plans (in the strictest sense of that term), it may be time to pursue a new model for strategy development. Accordingly, the next chapter discusses the potential roles of strategic management and collaborative planning in potential improvements in Canadian federal protected areas planning. Chapter 6 also discusses some issues of network management that tie into the development of strategy. The factors identified in this Chapter are synthesised to create a model strategic plan for the Protected Areas Network of the CWS, found in Appendix 5. This model strategic plan is an example of the type of plan that would include the components recommended by the academic literature.

6.1 Introduction

After reviewing and evaluating the strategic plans of the federal protected areas organisations in Chapter 5, this Chapter examines issues of network and site management, resources and the broad environment that the protected areas organisations operate in. Examining the approach to network management can inform strategy development by identifying, in Healey’s words, the “cracks” which can become opportunities with a potential for “real change” (2006, p. 270). Once the cracks are identified, the organisation must determine the approach it will use to widen those cracks and develop opportunities. Some of those opportunities may be in the form of alternatives for developing strategy, such as strategic management and collaborative planning.

The ultimate opportunity for protected areas in Canada is a series of government commitments to establishing protected areas. To date, this is also a missed opportunity. The failure to complete the protected areas networks, as promised by the three Councils of Ministers in 1992 (Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, the Canadian Parks Ministers Council, and the Wildlife Ministers Council) may be attributed to the decisions of many people, to: senior management within the organisation, the Cabinet, who decided matters of policy, central agencies, which allocated financial resources, and others. This chapter contrasts the ability of the PCA to implement their system plans with the difficulty that the CWS has had in implementing high-level national strategies and protected areas goals. This parallels some of the problems that the CWS has had in implementing their strategies and plans. What is the source of these failures?

This Chapter examines the question from several angles. First, there are the themes in the literature that identify the key aspects needed for implementation of plans. Second, there are
many issues of network or site management that impinge on the ability of the CWS staffers to accomplish tasks. Basic issues of resource availability limit the number and the range of tasks that can be undertaken. The two foci of this Chapter are the system-wide management decisions, and on the more specific management decisions that protected area management organisations make. For the DFO, there is no comprehensive approach to their protected areas planning, so discussing network and strategic management is extremely difficult, and DFO-related content is thus limited in this Chapter. Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of the potential for alternate management approaches for protected areas in Canada.

6.2 Strategic Management

Olsen and Eadie perfectly describe the need to move from strategic planning to strategic management (which incorporates implementation into strategic planning) when they say, “why are the products of so much precious human time and energy consigned so often to oblivion? The reason is relatively simple: very little time and thought are devoted to implementing plans” (Olsen & Eadie, 1982, p. 47). Although Olsen and Eadie write that passage in 1982, they describe an old problem, one that remains unsolved. Indeed, this problem seems to be the root of a significant number of issues for the CWS, as multiple plans have been made and not implemented. In contrast, the PCA seems to have devoted a significant amount of time and effort to the implementation of its plans as evidenced by, among other things, the 10 or more years involved in the negotiation of new National Parks. For the DFO, efforts focus more on the implementation of the Large Ocean Management Areas, rather than anything specifically related to their protected areas. Accordingly, it produces no protected area plans. Judging the implementation of the protected areas plans for the DFO is thus impossible.

In addition to the issues around implementation, there is also a need to examine resource adequacy. Most protected areas management organisations, wherever in the world they are
located, are under funded (Task Force on Economic Benefits of Protected Areas & IUCN Economics Service Unit, 1998). Protected areas advocates have known from the beginning of the conservation movement that resources have a significant impact on the ability to carry out conservation activities. F. H. H. Williamson, who later became the Canadian Parks Commissioner, put it bluntly in the early part of the 20th Century saying, “conservation cannot be successfully carried out without money” (cited in Foster, 1978, p. 12).

Various governments have committed to goals and targets over the history of protected areas in Canada. In 1990, the Mulroney government’s *Green Plan* set out a goal of completing the National Parks System by the year 2000. However, as of early 2008, there are eleven natural regions not represented by a park or a park reserve. The DFO set out a goal to create five MPAs by 2001, but met the goal only after three years’ delay (Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, 2005). Since the 1990 *Green Plan*, the CWS, lacking any quantified goals for their protected areas failed to make significant progress toward advancing their protected areas network.

### 6.3 CWS Strategic Management

Integrating strategy with implementation will be a key step for CWS protected areas. Vision statements abound, such as the one created by the Wildlife Ministers’ Council of Canada (1990, p. 19), in which the Council states that, “Governments will complete and maintain comprehensive systems of protected areas, through legislation and/or policy, that include representative ecological types and give priority to the protection of endangered or limited habitats.” The document includes a further statement that, “adoption of this policy includes a commitment to implement it” (p. 28), which did not happen. Only a year later, in 1991, the federal government published *A Protected Areas Vision for Canada*. In it, the government-sponsored Canadian Environmental Advisory Council (now disbanded) states that there must be,
within a decade, a “nation-wide network of protected areas that represents Canada’s wildlands, wilderness landscapes, marine areas and wildlife habitat” (Canadian Environmental Advisory Council, 1991, p. 13). Again, more than 15 years after publication of the Vision, there is no nation-wide network of protected areas. That is to say, Canada does have many different protected areas, managed by the federal government, by provincial and territorial governments, and by private organisations, but there is no national coordination for these protected areas.

There are a number of strategic issues that present opportunities and/or threats for the CWS. A strategic issue is defined as, “a problem or opportunity that, if action is not taken on it now, is likely to saddle the organisation with unbearable future costs” (Eadie, 1989, p.172). In order for management to be truly considered strategic, it “must focus on those critical, core activities that foster uniqueness and competitiveness” (Toft, 1989, p. 23). The strategic issues faced by the CWS are introduced here, and are discussed throughout this Chapter. The major issues, identified by interviewees and personal observation, are:

- resource availability and operational capacity;
- planning for the network;
- cooperation with other organisations;
- increasing workload stemming from the SARA;
- public outreach; and,
- reputation.

Interviewees were confident of their understanding of the issues facing the CWS because in addition to their acquired understanding of the organisation’s internal circumstances, they are “continually tapped into the habitat community and what’s going on” (CWS9). While this may be acceptable for a strategic planning or strategic management process (scan the environment), from the perspective of collaborative planning theory, the CWS has missed an important opportunity by not including all stakeholders.
The CWS does not have a strong sense of purpose linking their protected areas. This lack of a unifying purpose is a long-standing situation. In 1969, one staffer wrote that:

‘Fortuitous’ is about the gentlest epithet that could be applied to our acquisition proposals across most of the country, with the exception of the Maritime Provinces. The reasons seem to be, first, lack of clear preconceptions of what purposes our acquisitions are intended to serve, and second, ignorance of the present value to waterfowl of many wetlands (despite the efforts of the Canada Land Inventory Surveyors). (Boyd, p. 17)

Part of the reason for the lack of purpose may be the irregular, but frequent, changes to the structure of the CWS. The lack of purpose also means that the CWS is unfocused in its planning, and does not approach their protected areas in a particularly strategic way. Although some sites provide habitat for similar species, the sites are a network of protected areas by virtue of common management and for no other reason. In 2007, there is still a lack of unifying purpose for the national protected areas program. Beyond “protecting wildlife,” the acquisition of any new sites is purely opportunistic.

6.4 CWS Network Management

One of the major issues for the CWS is its ability (or lack thereof) to manage its network of protected areas. Because of a chronic lack of resources, CWS protected areas staff devote nearly all of their attention to crises, leaving very little time to concentrate on longer-term approaches to planning their PA Network. Without a dedicated budget for land acquisition, a national purpose, or a plan to identify priority areas, site establishment can only occur on an opportunistic basis. The lack of assurance of additional operational funds to manage new protected areas is a significant disincentive against acquiring new land. However, that is not to say that CWS employees are unaware of the need to become involved in longer-term activities. For example, CWS participation in the Northwest Territories Protected Area Strategy (NWT
PAS\textsuperscript{36} is evidence of staff taking advantage of high-profile opportunities to promote long-term conservation. Under the NWT PAS, the CWS agrees to sponsor at least three new sites as NWAs. Funding for this project came in Budget 2007.

Interviewees were asked if the CWS has the capacity to manage their Network of Migratory Bird Sanctuaries (MBSs) and National Wildlife Areas (NWAs). While there are exceptions, the vast majority responded in the negative. “Absolutely, categorically not” (CWS1) and “not even close” (CWS2) are representative of the responses. One participant replies, “we don’t even have the capacity to have proper management plans for them” (CWS3). The missing capacity is on two levels: both the data for sites, the “intellectual framework … as if it’s 1966 rather than 2006,” and the capacity to operate each site, are below what is required (CWS7).

Participants from other organisations gave similar responses: the ability of the CWS to manage its sites is “sketchy” largely because staffers are “spread pretty thinly … not a lot of people on site” (DFO2). Another participant believes that, “for the resources they have, they work really hard and try and do good stuff” (NGO2). Respondents are aware of the problems, and the opportunities, inherent in the PA Network; even those outside the CWS see the management problems to be simply the result of a lack of resources (DFO2). However, the results of the document analysis indicate that there are more problems than just resources; there is a need for a more strategic approach to the PA Network.

In contrast to the majority opinion that the CWS lacks essential resources, there is an indication from some interviewees that the lack of management resources is not necessarily a problem. For example, rather than being an absolute question of capacity, one interviewee suggests that, “the answer to that depends substantially on what you mean by ‘manage its protected areas’ and that goes back to the reason for which they were established” (CWS5).

\textsuperscript{36} The NWT PAS is a strategy developed by the government of the NWT, Aboriginal groups with land claims in the study area, various federal government departments (especially Indian and Northern Affairs, the CWS and the PCA), industry, and a series of ENGOs. The new proposal to build a pipeline through the Mackenzie Valley prompted the development of the NWT PAS. For more information, see http://www.nwtwildlife.com/pas/default.htm
CWS manages its sites “through a process of benign neglect” (CWS9). That is to say, the CWS acquires properties but does not manage them beyond setting boundaries and fencing (CWS9). For sites such as Vaseaux-Bighorn NWA, these interviewees suggested that fencing off the site and allowing the ecosystem to manage itself was sufficient management intervention. According to them, the CWS network is not necessarily under funded because, “there is no need for the CWS to approach the level of funding given to the PCA, and it is unclear what the money would be used for if they did get it” (CWS5). However, this group of respondents acknowledged that for heavily utilised sites, such as those near urban areas, management activities such as trail maintenance is “nothing like probably we should be doing,” so management capacity is missing in those particular areas (CWS9).

This research is unable to identify the exact amount of resources devoted to the CWS protected areas. Varying figures are reported, including $0.12/ha (CWS1), $0.16/ha (CWS4), and $0.19/ha (Nature Canada, 2007). Uncertainty is likely the result of differences in what items are included in the total resources. Regardless of the range of reported resources, they are all well below the amount CWS staff estimate is needed for adequate management, which was at least $1.50/ha (CWS4), or ideally about $25 million for the Network (CWS2) which would be approximately $2.12/ha. The author observed (during participation at the CWS) that ongoing operational funds for the protected areas are in the order of $1.9 to $2.0 million per year (Cdn).

One interviewee pointed to the US Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS) refuges as a good comparison to CWS sites, saying that they run an “almost identical process” but they spend about US$26/ha (CWS1), which is close to two hundred times more spending, per hectare, even higher than the PCA spending.37 One of the NGO respondents seconded the comparison to the USFWS, suggesting that the appropriate estimate of the CWS budget could be obtained by “tak[ing] the USFWS budget for refuges and divide by 10 to get our relative economic strength, then multiply

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37 However, Nature Canada reported spending of $12.61 per hectare (Cdn); Nature Canada, 2007.
by 1.5 for size of country, and that’s the bare minimum” (NGO2). If the CWS were to spend the same amount per hectare as the USFWS, the CWS protected areas’ budget would be in the order of $149 million. However, it should be noted that the USFWS wildlife refuges do include significant visitor services not provided by the CWS.

The CWS PA staff recently conducted a Management Review (Canadian Wildlife Service, 2006) that compares management requirements, as set out in the PA Manual, to existing processes on a site-by-site basis using a representative sample of sites. The Management Review extrapolates the findings and identifies the approximate figure of $25 million per year required for ongoing management of the PA Network (CWS2). However, there is a requirement for even more resources, to carry out important activities such as in-filling existing protected areas, and increasing control over boundary areas (essentially, creating buffer zones), both of which would require resources for land acquisition (CWS2). The CWS has not had a specific land acquisition budget since the cuts in 1984, although one-off purchases of land have occurred on occasion.

Overall, the CWS is “magnitudes of order less per acre of investment than any other protected area” (CWS9), to the extent of being described as Parks Canada’s “poor cousin” (NGO2). The summary of the interviewees’ responses is that they think that the CWS manages its protected areas network as well as it can, given the level of resources allocated to it. However, doing little to manage the protected areas is not seen as a significant problem, particularly for some respondents.

While the CWS struggles to avoid comparison to the representivity goals in the PCA’s System Plans, this should not negate the need to create a national plan, or to state the reasons for which the CWS staff thinks it should acquire land. This is not a new observation. In 1974, the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister (SADM) in EC undertook a review of activities in the

38 The 2008 Budget proposal for the USFWS was a total of nearly $2.1 billion. Actual spending on the National Wildlife Refuge System in 2006 was US$382,501,000 with nearly 2,946 full time equivalents (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2007b). According to this rough estimation, the CWS PA budget should be approximately CAD$57.4 million, assuming a similar provision of visitor services.
Environmental Management Service (the division of EC that the CWS was part of at the time). While the SADM acknowledges that discussion with the CWS left the impression that “activities of this directorate are indeed well thought out and managed” there were many unanswered questions (Environment Canada, 1974a, p. 5). Those questions include a significant one, namely “why are we in the business of acquiring wildlife habitats when the management responsibility clearly lies with the provinces” (Environment Canada, 1974a, p. 6), a question that remains unanswered, or at least unarticulated. One PCA interviewee (PCA3) volunteers that there is a need to “ask the system question: What is Canada’s objective with this family of National Wildlife Areas? What is the plan?” She/he believes that the question needs to be asked because “it’s just not as simple for them [the CWS] – the basis wasn’t as obvious as ours was.” The PCA: are used to dealing with something that has a plan … What is it [CWS plan] based on? Is it based on endangered species, or a range of key species, are we dealing with calving grounds of caribou? I mean, what is the target? Where are we going with this? There are all sorts of good questions. I know that people at the Wildlife Service have done a lot of work on this. I’m just not familiar in detail with their system thinking. I don’t recall it in a form that is simple enough that I’ve been able to say “bingo, I get it.” Because I don’t think that there is a simple answer for what they’re up to. (PCA3)

So, if an individual from an organisation that works closely alongside the CWS, in a closely related area of work, cannot identify the objective(s) of the CWS PA Network, it is clear that there is a gap in policy (or at least publicity). How would the government be able to decide on the long-term resources they would provide to the CWS if the organisation does not even know what the point of the activity is?

Additional resources

Interviewees were asked to identify the resources they think the CWS requires in order to meet the management expectations set out for the PA Network. Resources identified by the
interviewees are mostly financial, although there are some more abstract resources suggested.
Financial resources, that is to say capacity to undertake many of the minimum requirements for
site management as outlined in the PA Manual, figure prominently (CWS1, CWS2, CWS4,
CWS5, CWS7, CWS9). In an example highlighted by several interviewees, the habitat program in
the Atlantic region has two staff, and an annual operations budget of approximately $60,000
(CWS8, CWS9), which is considered insufficient for maintaining health and safety, ecological
integrity, and the ability to enforce laws, to name a few. CWS staffers cannot visit some sites in
the Atlantic region because they lack access to boats that met the Department’s occupational
health and safety standards (CWS7).

Outstanding issues with regard to infrastructure (CWS6), health and safety (of both staff
and site visitors) remain (CWS1, CWS4, CWS5, CWS6, CWS7), as does enforcement capacity
(CWS1). One specific area identified for financial investment is to complete individual protected
areas, in cases where the CWS has not yet been able to acquire all of the land parcels in the area
they wish to protect (CWS9). The financial situation of the CWS PAs is so poor that it is
sometimes thought to be exaggerated or in error, such as in this example:

back in 2002-2003, when we were desperately trying even to get people to recognize the
issue at the Minister’s office, and the Deputy Minister’s, we would come forth with our
presentation, and a lot of people would just find that we were exaggerating. You know, so
you’ve got the second largest protected area network in the country, half the size of
Parks, one of the biggest ones in the world. Sites all over the place, in the High Arctic,
offshore, Atlantic and everything else. And we’ve got 1.9 million dollars – “that’s got to
be a decimal error, it’s got to be 19, right?” – “no, no, it’s 1.9 all right.” (CWS7)
The lack of awareness in EC of the basic lack of resources for the CWS PAs suggests a serious
lack of communication and management ability on the part of the CWS. If for no other reasons,
significant liability issues associated with the lack of resources for CWS protected areas in areas
such as health, safety and trespass would argue for additional resources.
In terms of non-financial resources, interviewees suggest a variety of other shortcomings. One interviewee wants senior management “to decide, or not, if we are in the protected area business” which would entail having appropriate resources for site management, and having staff with knowledge of land management, among other things (CWS3). Related to this is the need to manage a modern PA network “operating off of modern strategic goals” (CWS7). Scientific and technical capacity is highlighted, through such examples as remote sensing for ecological conditions (CWS3), having better biological inventories and biodiversity information (CWS5), and understanding of system processes and trends (CWS7).

Management capacity, especially because of staff turnover, is also an area identified as lacking (CWS6). A lack of corporate memory is cited as a reason for several difficulties (CWS5, CWS8), including a challenge in obtaining clear responses to some of the interview questions. Finally, the CWS protected areas need to “focus on a series of goals” (CWS6). Without the identified goals, or a strategy to refer back to, any attempts to justify significant new resources will likely be met with failure.

6.5 Network Management at the PCA

Parks Canada participants were asked about some of the items that had provided advantages to the PCA. Specific questions ask about the benefits provided by agency status, strategic planning, and the System Plan. The PCA participants are aware of a number of areas in which they have advantage over the CWS and the DFO. One advantage of the PCA is financial. It has approximately $100 million in annual revenue (PCA2) from visitor fees and charges that are retained within the Agency. Public visitation is also an advantage that PCA interviewees identify. Because the National Parks (and Historic Sites) are so visited and visible, citizens have “warm feelings” about them, and accordingly want to protect them (PCA3). PCA respondents do not see it as a case of the CWS and the DFO having the wrong model, because:
I’m not saying that they’re wrong - there is no reason that they should turn themselves into what PC is doing. It’s just that there is a big advantage to being in the tourism business, and Parks Canada is. And I think that’s part of what they are wrestling with.

(PCA3)

This public profile advantage must be kept in mind when comparing the situations in each management organisation.

Parks Canada became the Parks Canada Agency with the proclamation of the *Parks Canada Agency Act* in 1998. The most important advantage provided to the PCA as an Agency is financial flexibility, as the PCA has the ability to carry forward revenue. Unlike the CWS or the DFO, there are no lapsing budgets (PCA1). Described as being “more like a business” (PCA2), this gives the PCA the ability to save money for large projects, rather than having to spend or return money at the end of each fiscal year. Another aspect of financial flexibility is the fact that the PCA can manage its own contracts, rather than having to apply through the Treasury Board (PCA2).

There is a perception within the PCA that it has “lost” in every move made between Ministries (such as between EC and Canadian Heritage, and back). Tied to this is the feeling of being “inordinately cut” as each previous Minister protected the “core” of their Ministry at the expense of Parks Canada budgets (PCA1). While there is an annual budget within departments, the Deputy Minister has the ability to change the allocation during the year. Departments switch money between functions as priorities change throughout the year, which can cause significant problems for the functions that lose money. Indeed, “it wasn’t uncommon for departments to ... use some of Parks Canada’s money for their purposes” (PCA4).

For Parks, the change to agency status is also “supposed to provide hiring flexibility, but this hasn’t really been taken advantage of” (PCA1), since the Treasury Board is still the final arbiter of the PCA’s budget, and employees remain in the same union. This is potentially
important for the PCA because of the highly seasonal nature of its employee base – while the PCA had approximately 6,000 employees, there are only 4,000 full time equivalents (PCA2).

When asked about the proportion of Parks Canada’s success that could be attributed to strategy, the interviewees are generally convinced that this is a significant contributor. Both senior managers and politicians are credited, as a “great deal of our success is due to the strategic thinking and planning of both the present and former CEO.” Success “also had a lot to do with the vision of Pierre Trudeau (Nahanni) and Jean Chrétien (La Mauricie and several far north parks) ... [they were] visionaries in a way” (PCA1). As a result of their strategic approach to planning, “Parks has been enormously successful ... All the new funding received in Budget Plans 2003 and 2005 are a direct result of being able to demonstrate that our plans fit into the broad government agenda” (PCA2). The PCA is “very successful in channelling park dollars to the creation of new national parks, to protect parts of Canada, or samples of Canada that were not protected before. If you didn’t have a plan like this, it probably would never happen” (PCA4). One interviewee states that, “I think having the System Plan was a very important factor in Parks Canada’s success” (PCA3). The Plan is included with each submission to Cabinet, presented at briefings with the Minister, and in public outreach, something that maintains its credibility and its currency (PCA3). In terms of obtaining new resources or, in other words, “was it important in us getting money? Absolutely. I think if we’d come in the door and said, well, we dreamt this up and the province seems to want it, we would have not been nearly so successful” (PCA3).

While the PCA is criticised for the length of time that it takes to establish a new park, part of the political stability of the System Plan is a result of those timelines. Because the negotiation processes are so long, a new government “comes in ... [to] the middle of a whole host of opportunities ... So there’s an inclination, I think, to drive it to a conclusion and be the one to say we did it” (PCA3). One factor that is a significant contributor to the length of time for establishing new National Parks is the collaborative nature of the PCA process. As discussed in Chapter 5, the process for creating new National Parks requires the involvement of various
stakeholders. While this process improves local community support for the park, it also exposes one of the potential weaknesses of a collaborative process, the dependence on the good will and continued involvement of all participants. If anyone withdraws, completing the process becomes extremely difficult.

However successful the PCA has been, politics remains a confounding factor. One participant recounts a story about a presentation she/he gave soon after beginning with the PCA.

The interviewee:

gave a presentation on possible new national parks in Quebec for the Minister of the day who was, of course, Jean Chrétien. So we had this map of Quebec, and beautiful photographs of different areas that we had come up with. One area he always came back to … because we had some really great shots, and it is a magnificent area, which we have proposed as a national park, which clearly the province has not accepted. At the end of the presentation, he went back to the … area and said “maudit que c’est beau, mais les oiseaux ne votent pas.” So, “[Damn] what a gorgeous area, but birds don’t vote.” So we’ve not had success in putting that area aside, and there is a political element to that, at least in his opinion. (PCA4)

Even with an extremely supportive Minister, there are some limits for the PCA. It can be seen that no matter how successful the organisation’s plan, politics still plays an enormously important role, one that is out of the Agency’s control. Accordingly, organisations must develop programs and elements that can support them politically, such as the PCA’s well-developed visitation program.

6.6 Jurisdiction

As discussed in Chapter 4, information found in the National Archives indicates that the establishment of the NWA program was controversial, particularly because of perceived overlaps
with provincial jurisdiction. Research participants were asked about the nature of the controversy, if it persists, and if there is any justification for the provinces’ concern. One interviewee justifies the federal role in wildlife protection by indicating that:

> almost every modern Western democracy has protected areas that are specifically for conserving areas that are important to wildlife. That is a mandate that is dramatically different from what national parks is required to do. There is no doubt about it that Canadians as a whole see us as having a role in that. (CWS3)

The federal role in ecosystem conservation is important because “we have a very broad, Canada-wide view of the protected areas paradigm” and that the federal government can provide a certain minimum level of ecosystem conservation, something that could be supplemented by each province or territory as they so desire (CWS6). The CWS could also play the role of a mediator, bringing various parties to the table to conserve wildlife (CWS6).

Some interviewees clarify the question to say that the debate concerns wildlife more generally, rather than protected areas for wildlife (CWS1). The federal responsibility for migratory birds only arose from the fact that the *Migratory Birds Convention* with the United States is an international treaty (making the federal government responsible), and an Imperial treaty. Accordingly, any changes to the *Convention* could cause jurisdictional problems (CWS5). Related to the negotiation of the *Convention*, one of the important roles of the CWS is to represent Canada in wildlife conservation at an international level (CWS6), for example with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. In general, the CWS has withdrawn from areas of work as a province’s wildlife management community became stronger, e.g. mammalogy, especially ungulate research and management (CWS1).

Provinces tend to be more comfortable with a “surgical approach – identifying areas that are of particular importance for migratory birds habitat, and making sure those get protected” (CWS1). Nationally, there is an acceptance of the federal role in species at risk protection (CWS2). Provinces also tend to operate from the principle that, “as long as you are contributing
and it’s not costing us money” the CWS can do what they wish (CWS1). In addition, the tendency of the CWS to identify small sites, largely in wetland areas (which have less potential for development) means that provinces have “tended not to be too, too worried” (CWS1). Depending on the circumstances, the CWS does work closely with provincial colleagues, determining together the best way to protect an important site (CWS9).

However, if the CWS undertakes a large, new, acquisition program, it “probably would create new tensions” (CWS1) and would have the potential to create jurisdictional problems (CWS7). Adding protected areas means increasing the number of regulations that apply to a piece of land, which is “always sensitive” (CWS7). This is corroborated by another interviewee who explains the lack of jurisdictional conflict to be the result of not being “in an acquisition phase, and that’s when you have an uneasy relationship” (CWS5). Others agreed, saying “I don’t think it’s a problem because we haven’t gone ... south of 60 [degrees of latitude] in so many [years] ... I mean the only site south of 60 that’s been established in the last decade is Suffield [NWA]” (CWS7). Provinces tend not to welcome federal contributions in areas related to land use planning, and especially environmental assessment (CWS2). Respondents agree that there should be a role for federal involvement in land acquisition, such as “holding conservation easements over private land in areas adjacent to NWAs or, for example, in areas covered by MBSs” although there is an “aversion” to using the instrument, however appropriate it would be to do so (CWS3). One interviewee specifically mentions the utility of strategic planning in the context of jurisdictional overlap. The need for “identifying all the different players, and how they are approaching protected areas, and then we determine how we fit into that exercise, so that we’re not overlapping, we’re not duplicating,” could be met through strategic planning (CWS4).

In the end, it is likely not surprising that all of the CWS respondents believe that there is an important federal role in the conservation of Canadian wildlife. The message is summarised by one respondent: “should we be in the business? Yeah, I think we should. It’s just a darn shame that we can’t do it better than we are doing it now” (CWS9).
The PCA has also had conflict with various provinces over time. As discussed in Chapter 4, there are significant difficulties establishing new National Parks, particularly in Quebec. In other cases, the PCA have experienced conflicts with Aboriginal groups, or local landowners. For example, the first proposed marine National Park was to be in the Georgia Straight in British Columbia, and this site is not yet established. The PCA’s park establishment process has become very time consuming, in part because of the required jurisdictional negotiations.

6.7 Interpretation

On-site activities at National Parks include a range of services, such as natural history education, campgrounds, hunting or fishing, golf courses and ski hills. Only some of these activities fit into the category of “interpretation.” Several of these activities pre-date the current awareness of ecological integrity, but precedent allows them to continue (e.g. golf courses, ski hills). Although both the CWS and the PCA have explicit mandates for interpretation, only the PCA embraces that mission. For the DFO, there is no mention of an interpretation program, accordingly, the following discussion does not include mention of a DFO interpretation program. As stated above, several of the DFO’s sites are in locations where interpretation would be quite difficult, but not impossible. There is more potential, and utility, to develop interpretation programs for near-shore Oceans Act MPAs, to build public support.

6.7.1 The Canadian Wildlife Service

The CWS interviewees are asked about the role that interpretation should play in its operations. The question is phrased in a way that asks directly whether or not the CWS should be in the business of interpretation on its sites. Under the Canada Wildlife Act, the CWS has the authority to acquire land purely for the purpose of interpretation. However, CWS interpretation
activities take place on sites acquired for other reasons. For example, Cap Tourmente NWA in Quebec was established to protect an important staging area for greater snow geese. Currently, it is one of the most popular sites for visitation in the CWS network, according to internal (unpublished) estimates.

Acknowledging that, “there is quite a raging debate about” interpretation, CWS7 nonetheless sees it as an important role for the CWS, though it is not given unqualified approval (CWS1, CWS2, CWS4, CWS6, CWS7). Interpretation is important, but:

I don’t think it’s important in all protected areas. It’s not the role of every single one.

That certainly adds to the complexity of protected areas. Because there are certain roles that some have and some definitely do not have. (CWS6)

Using a different qualifier, one interviewee responds that interpretation is important, but that it should be pursued “in a highly partnered way” (CWS7), which could be through formal school programs, through ENGOs, or through the media.

The CWS has “failed abysmally at communicating” (CWS1). Although the CWS “didn’t lightly give up its interpretation mandate” as a result of the 1984 budget cuts (CWS1), most of the interpretation, even on CWS sites, is no longer delivered by the CWS. However, there has been a “stealth” return to providing natural history interpretation, such as with the previously discussed interpretation centre at Cape Jourimain NWA. In another example, the physical plant at Creston Valley NWA was built by the CWS, but the site no longer has a visible CWS presence; the Creston Valley Authority Trust and Ducks Unlimited run the centre (CWS1). While there is a role for the CWS in site interpretation, “the important part is that people get the information, and have the opportunity to visit because the land speaks to people, so you need to put people on the sites in order for them to understand” conservation values (CWS1). While the conservation message rightly is the most important aspect of an interpretation program, the lack of a visible presence at the visitor centres means that other organisations benefit from the earlier efforts of the CWS, and CWS does not. With such a significant lack of resources, the CWS should take every opportunity
to promote public awareness of its efforts. Participants are aware that interpretation is, overall, about communicating with people, for example, “I mean, it’s always important to inform people as to what you are doing. It’s about communication as far as I’m concerned” (CWS4). However, not all participants think that visitor services are an important investment. According to one interviewee, “in one sense, if Canadians don’t know where National Wildlife Areas are located, that’s just fine. Because it’s not our intent to create significant traffic in or through. In fact, most of our areas are signed ‘keep out’” (CWS5). Nonetheless, some degree of interpretation and outreach is desirable, if for nothing else but to educate the public as to why they are required to keep out.

National Wildlife Areas are sites that should be used for wildlife education, but “we don’t do it as well as we could and should” (CWS1). Interpretation could be offered “in those more popular locations” which would be a useful and important undertaking because “interpretation is a tool that helps educate and build awareness as to why that site is set aside as a protected area, but also just the broader conservation mandate” (CWS4). Targeting interpretation activities at youth is identified as a strategic approach to outreach (CWS7). The CWS “don’t do it [interpretation], and that really limits our department as a whole. It’s not just about wildlife, but nature in general, to be able to educate the public about conservation” (CWS9).

One interviewee (CWS1) identifies interpretation as the third most important priority for the CWS, after health and safety, and “filling out” the network. Interpretation is important because “our role as government isn’t necessarily just to apply regulations but to bring public knowledge to some sort of minimum level” (CWS9). The role of CWS as an interpreter of wildlife and the value of ecosystems is highlighted by one interviewee:

if we have this mentality that we are going to take large chunks of real estate and landscape and lock it up and protect it, we will never succeed with that vision. That vision is old, it’s done. That time is past – there’s no room left … So what we have to figure out
is a system whereby we have landscapes ... where we’re using the landscape ... an experiential and a use kind of thing that, ultimately, more people can relate to. (CWS1)

In order to have a landscape that people can relate to, they have to be able to see it and understand it. Not only is interpretation a desirable goal, “wildlife areas are ideal places to do that” (CWS9).

From the point of view of the CWS, having interpretation on its sites would “probably be best for CWS” as it would be important for raising its profile (CWS2). However, many interviewees are “torn on that” (CWS2) meaning that they are uncertain about the impacts that visitors would have, because many sites would not lend themselves well to hosting visitors. According to one interviewee, “they are not set up as tourist attractions, and there is no mandate to require that. They are set up as habitat conservation, and in many cases, the disturbance of so-called ‘non-consumptive uses’ would mitigate against any advantage [derived from tourism]” (CWS5). This point seems to ignore the heavy impacts caused by the consumptive use of hunting on or adjacent to protected areas. However, many of the sites in close proximity to urban areas (those that would be most conducive to visitors) could be appropriate for educational purposes because ecosystem values have already been impacted (CWS7). From a public policy point of view, such as accounting for public spending, there is some question as to whether interpretation “should be a priority” (CWS2). This fits into the mindset that sees conservation education eliminated from the CWS budget in 1984 because education is a provincial responsibility (CWS8).

Interviewees indicate that it is hard to think about long-term priorities when the network only has a budget of $2 million (CWS2). The CWS considered developing a visitor program, and: the question of tourism or even entry fees to national wildlife areas has been looked at a couple of times, and we’ve always come to the conclusion, or we always came to the conclusion, that the cost of implementing the program was beyond our capacity, and that without significant seed funding ... It couldn’t become self-supporting for a period of time, and we couldn’t support it while it wasn’t self-supporting. (CWS5)
However, the approach has not been strategic, to the point where one interviewee states, “I don’t sense a strategy behind it – what are you trying to get across to these folks? That wetlands are wonderful? Or that wetlands are part of a system?,” and goes on to advocate a more systematic approach to interpretation and to network development as a whole (CWS7).

Overall, CWS interviewees indicate qualified support for the idea of involvement in interpretation on their sites. Most interviewees would agree that, “we can’t achieve conservation on a broad scale without the basics of doing public outreach, and compliance promotion, and interpretation” (CWS9).

### 6.7.2 Parks Canada Agency

Although the PCA program is identified as a role model for the CWS, their visitors’ program is not without problems. Significant tourism-related pressures exist at several popular National Parks, such as Banff or Point Pelee. The PCA also lacks explicit goals for tourism (Zealand, Zou, Eagles, Bickis, & Aspinall, 2006), although they are in the process of developing a strategic plan for visitation. The educational aspects of visitor services could be enhanced, as suggested by the Auditor General of Canada who writes, “given the potential for benefiting ecological integrity, Parks Canada should strengthen public education programs to better communicate ecological information to park visitors and Canadians in general” (Auditor General of Canada, 1996, para. 31.49). Some of the services within the National Parks remain as relics of the era before ecological integrity became the primary focus of the PCA, such as ski hills in Banff NP and Jasper NP, and golf courses in Banff NP and Cape Breton NP.

Nonetheless, the PCA’s visitor services are well planned and often extremely popular. The PCA also has a national plan for communication, *Engaging Canadians*. Sites in the National Park System have become extremely identifiable icons on the Canadian landscape, to the point
where the National Parks are consistently ranked as the third most important symbol of Canada, tied with the flag (Bronson, 2004).

6.8 Another Management Model for Canadian Protected Areas

Competition in government “is created by the political system because the laws that establish the agencies have created overlapping jurisdictions and intermixed missions” (Gortner, 1981, p. 61). This results in inefficiencies. In 2001, Samson and Knopf wrote an article for the Forum section of the journal *BioScience*, where they argue that the major public land managers in the United States39 should be merged into a single “Department of Natural Resources” in order to respond to the “varying stages of crisis” in each of the organisations. Samson and Knopf argue that, “the mechanics of conservation in the future demand a different structure and paradigm in natural resource conservation” (p. 873) and that by creating a “Department of Natural Resources” the US federal government would be able to address needed changes in the structure and functions of its natural resources organisations.

In the early 1970s, a similar model to that proposed by Samson and Knopf existed in Environment Canada. Lands, forests and wildlife were all grouped “in one major mission” but “their preservation as identifiable and readily accessible elements of the department was fully justified by program content and extensive and well established ‘client’ relationships” (Prebble, 1971a). Similarly, in the late 1970s, the Director General of the CWS suggests creating a “heritage department” that would consist of the CWS, the National Parks, and the National Museums (Loughrey, 1977a), which would have been the mid-1970s version of the 1990s-era Department of Canadian Heritage (which only lacked the CWS protected areas).

Bissix and Rees (2001) provide support for Samson and Knopf’s case when they ask “whether strategic, multi-interest, multi-agency management regimes can effectively guide

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39 The Bureau of Land Management, the US Forest Service, the US National Park Service, and the US Fish & Wildlife Service.
working ecosystems toward greater sustainability over an extended period” (p. 571) in their review of the Nova Scotia *Forestry Improvement Act* (1965-1986). They find that Nova Scotia’s organisation of forestry regulations across agencies failed. Stating that, “success in ecosystem management is most common in situations where a single agency holds effective sovereign power” (p. 570), Bissix and Rees question the approach of a single dominant agency, used in land use and conservation planning.

Although Samson and Knopf put forward a persuasive case, their point of view is not universally accepted. In a book about the US Fish & Wildlife Service, Fischmann writes that: consolidation of the public lands into fewer management systems would reduce opportunities for experimentation and innovation. What we most desperately need in the field of conservation is a wider range of case examples of sustainability. Diversity in management regimes, not consolidation, best serves that end. (2003, p. 203)

Although Canadian natural resource organisations are not directly analogous to those in the United States, there are nonetheless significant parallels. The Park Service, Forest Service, and Fish & Wildlife Service all have direct analogues, and the Bureau of Land Management has a close Canadian equivalent in the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Canada (INAC), which controls significant areas of public lands in the area north of the 60th parallel. With such obvious parallels between the two systems, and similarity in the crises faced, it seems obvious to ask interviewees about the potential for creating a Canadian “Department of Natural Resources.”

As discussed above, this is not a new idea. In addition to the above-mentioned cases, there was a proposal in the 1960s to create a new “Department of Conservation, Recreation and Parks” to “co-ordinate nation-wide planning of outdoor recreation” (Munro, 1980, n.p.) although the proposal was withdrawn because of jurisdictional conflict with provincial governments.

In order to narrow the focus and have the question correspond with the rest of the questions, interviewees were asked about the creation of a federal protected areas management organisation rather than a broader natural resources department. Overall, interviewees are
ambivalent about the idea, although one of the NGO interviewees indicates that this was not surprising, because, “I think they are too vested in the current ineffective approach” (NGO2). One of the most significant concerns with the idea relates to the potential subsuming of one mandate by another. Some of the concern stems from the idea that one organisation would maintain control. For example, if “CWS were merged with DFO, the wildlife interest would almost certainly be subsumed under the fishery interest” (CWS3). A similar subsuming would likely occur if the CWS were merged with the PCA, although the mutual fit of mission is more obvious to various respondents (CWS3).

More broadly, interviewees indicate that “bigger isn’t necessarily more efficient” (CWS3). Some interviewees respond that there are many potential structures that could increase efficiency because, “the longer I spend in government, the less convinced I am that any particular model is better than the next” (CWS2). Generally, “if you’ve got sound, competent, management, any different governance model can work” (CWS4), so the idea is seen as worth exploring, but “whether it really bears scrutiny is another thing” (CWS7). The potential for cultural clashes is also mentioned (CWS3). Having the appropriate fit between the organisations would be required for success in this area, because:

- when you have different mandates that are different enough and you try to house them because at some level they make sense under the same roof there is no guarantee of success. On the other hand, if the mandates were close enough, you could achieve a certain number of synergies and it could be an effective way of dealing with natural resources. I’m just not sure that the mandates are close enough. I don’t know if it would work. (CWS2)

Another challenge for the creation of a protected area management organisation would be the time and resources required to make the change. The creation of such an organisation would require “chang[ing] a lot of attitudes, a lot of legislation, and it’s going to take a hell of a lot of commitment” (CWS6). It may be a good idea but, “sometimes what seems to be a good idea may
in fact be a good idea, but getting there would be so difficult and so time consuming and so
destructive that you end up losing as much that you gain” (CWS2), to the point that the costs
required would make the re-organisation “pointless” (CWS1). Such administrative changes have
occurred in the past; however, in the words of one interviewee, “I see changes happen so often in
government. Every time there are new masters, they find new solutions as to the way things are
set up, so they want to change it. So, I’m not fully convinced it’s the way to go” (CWS4). Recent
divergences between EC and the PCA are also identified as reasons to avoid a merger, with one
participant stating, “I don’t think that it would make that big a difference to have them in a single
agency. I don’t think that the evolution of programming would lend itself to that anymore. I think
maybe 10 years ago it was more of a possibility” (CWS5).

One respondent even points to the advantages of the small size of the CWS, suggesting
that it makes the organisation more “nimble” and has provided the opportunity to become:
relatively successful at partnership conservation. The reason we’ve been able to do that
over the years is that we’ve always been small. And because we’ve always been small,
and had small budgets, we learned how to work in collaboration with provinces, and the
private sector, NGOs, decades ago. (CWS9)

The participant acknowledged that having a small size has also affected the CWS’ ability to
garner political support. However, by creating a larger organisation, with presumably larger
bureaucracy, the new protected areas management organisation would lose some of its ability to
work at a small scale (CWS9), thus losing some of the collaborative relationships that have been
established by PA staff. However, despite its large size, the PCA is still able to form effective
partnerships.

Some respondents indicate that the idea of merging the CWS protected areas with the
PCA is appealing because of the potential for significant attention from senior management,
something that has been lacking for the CWS (CWS4). The current (re-organised) EC has a
mandate for conservation and protection, but the PCA acts outside of the main EC structure
(CWS1), so amalgamation could have a desirable result. It would have some particular advantages for the CWS, because there is “certainly ... more concordance in terms of views and values [between the CWS and the PCA] than say ... the pollution people in Environment Canada” (CWS8). However, the rest of EC would lose its most visible advocate for biodiversity (CWS8).

Participants also point out that this unified PA management model would not be a new one; in the early 1970s, the predecessor of EC was the Department of Fisheries and Environment (CWS5, CWS8). In addition, the CWS has connections with the PCA that extended to the beginnings of both organisations (CWS5). Governments combining natural resource and/or protected area management organisations is not novel, as one interviewee reported amalgamations in Australia, and in Mexico, that resulted in significant administrative savings through advantages such as increased purchasing power (CWS1). For marine protected areas, one interviewee indicates that, “I think it would be a lot better if the government had it being operated out of one agency” (CWS9).

Overall, there is support among CWS staffers for the idea “to have a conservation agency that works on both fish and wildlife and habitat-related issues, because they really are cross-pollinating” (CWS3). However, support of the change requires “envisioning a bit of a utopic department” (CWS6). Having seen the “contradictory mandates concerning conservation” that exist in various departments, creating a single organisation that “make[s] some fundamental changes to recognize values and to deal with them correctly” (CWS6) would be a desirable outcome. The interviewee goes on to say that, in addition to the creation of a protected area management organisation, it would also be fundamental to address the “incentives that we have to destroy landscapes” such as those that exist in the taxation system (CWS6).

The PCA participants question the advantages offered by such a pairing, to the degree that one respondent saw “no advantage to it” (PCA1). Another indicates that the relationship between the various PA management organisations could be changed, but “it would be messy, it would be complicated” (PCA3). There is a range of response in the interviewees’ familiarity with
the idea, with one interviewee expressing a lack of awareness of any such discussion (PCA1), and another explaining that it is a topic of ‘water-cooler’ conversation at the PCA (PCA4). One participant does not believe that the issue would ever be discussed because PCA’s “mandate is far broader than what is natural” because of programs such as the National Historic Sites, Heritage Railways, and Prime Ministers’ Gravesites (PCA1). The CWS is also a great deal more than its protected areas program (PCA1). However, “there has been talk over the years, for example, for national historic sites to be carved off to national museums, and these kinds of things” (PCA4). Another participant questions the need by asking about other levels of government; s/he thought that there might be “some merit” to the proposal, but “do we really need a single agency – what about provincial and municipal protected areas?” (PCA2). PCA interviewees also expressed concern about the differences in the objectives that the respective networks were established to achieve, especially with respect to accommodation of visitors (PCA3).

One interesting comment points out that the diverse number of categories of protected areas (NWAs, MBSs, Oceans Act MPAs, NMCAs, etc.) may seem superfluous to outsiders, but insiders do not believe that there is any overlap of effort (PCA4). Another challenge on the long list of protected areas management organisations is how “no one can tell how much protected area is in Canada because of so many groups” for the federal marine protected areas, in addition to several provincial designations (PCA3). There are some challenges in the PCA’s relationship with DFO because of confusion between NMCAs and the DFO equivalent (PCA1). Generally, there is a need for the protected areas organisations to “work together to see how the different mandates complement each other” (PCA2).

Reducing the number of protected area categories, while not necessarily the objective of such a re-structuring exercise, could provide some benefit. The protected areas organisations receive questions about the multiple categories of protected areas, especially in the marine environment. “In fact we’ve had central agencies, and we’ve had politicians ask us ‘how come
you guys have ... why three marine programs? How come the GOC [Government of Canada] is involved in three marine programs?” (PCA4).

A scheme involving a single organisation managing three different classes of marine protected areas significantly assuage the concerns of central agencies and of politicians. Although there are efforts underway to streamline the planning of marine PAs (see description of FMPAS process in Chapter 4), individual organisations continue to have the final decision about establishing a protected area.

The DFO participants disagree on the idea of creating a new combined protected area management organisation. One reports that s/he “ha[d] thought about this a lot, and I have two different sides.” From one point of view:

working with other conservation-minded groups, PCA, CWS, would create benefit from shared experience and expertise, and would strengthen the programs. Some sort of conservation-minded group or department would be a better home for MPAs, which are the poor cousin, the NGO of DFO. Such a department would have more clout, and could create more awareness of conservation. (DFO1)

On the other hand, the DFO is concerned that its main stakeholders are fishers, who are also the primary clients and eventual beneficiaries of the MPA program. This is illustrated by the fact that the DFO’s surveillance concentrates on fisheries violations. By staying within DFO, “using the inside route, we can push for things internally” (DFO1). However, those in the MPA program “struggle for support within the department” where creating protected areas is considered “a nice thing to do” but “not the reason the department existed” (DFO1), which finally makes such a structural change desirable.

The other DFO participant suggests that the new organisation would not be a better model. While acknowledging that when work started on the Oceans Action Plan “people were outraged” because there are so many different types of marine protected areas, having “different kinds of mechanisms” is good (DFO2). The outrage is attributed to the assumption that people
generally have a poorer understanding of processes in the water; because of better information about the types of ecosystem functions that take place on land, there tends to be more awareness of the need for different classes of terrestrial protected areas (DFO2). The DFO also has other tools available for protecting the marine environment, which allows a variety of mechanisms to be used, such as closing a local fishery rather than making an area completely off-limits (DFO2). Having people who work in conservation in various departments expands the number of voices that are speaking to the need to conserve important ecosystems and functions (DFO1). Although this is a generally held belief:

it is difficult because the PA people in DFO tend to feel they have more in common with conservation practitioners in other departments than they do with people working within DFO, who may have a more resource- or economic-based view. (DFO1)

The DFO approach of Integrated Management, “harmonizing across departments, coordinating rather than collapsing” (DFO2) offers a potential alternative to creating a single organisation. By drawing all of the stakeholders and decision-makers into an integrated planning exercise, it is possible to achieve some of the efficiencies that a single protected area organisation would entail.

Several interviewees suggest their own variations on the model in the original question. One suggests a governance model that “create[s] a single wildlife program that combined federal and provincial responsibilities across the country ... some form of national commission that took the mandate from each provincial and federal legislature, but operated as a single agency” (CWS5). This model could have some political traction because “every provincial jurisdiction has similar problems with funding its wildlife program, to the point where the provincial and federal agencies formally cooperate on some things that would normally be part of a program for any one of them” (CWS5). One example of how the model could work (provided by CWS7) is the Canadian Cooperative Wildlife Health Centre, which has support from several federal departments, the provinces and territories, Canada’s four veterinary colleges and some private organisations (Canadian Cooperative Wildlife Health Centre, 2007). Another example, suggested
by CWS5, is the Canada Revenue Agency, which is responsible for administering tax laws “for
the Government of Canada and for most provinces and territories” (Canada Revenue Agency,
2007).

Another alternative involves amalgamation of the operational responsibilities of the
various PA organisations (e.g. enforcement, inspections) while maintaining separate policy
responsibilities (CWS7). Because the mandate for each PA network is different, merging the
policy responsibilities may not offer any additional benefit (CWS7). Financial efficiency would
be a potential benefit of merging the PA management organisations, which would also be realised
by using the alternative structure proposed by CWS7. One way that creating a new PA
management organisation:

makes sense is perhaps from a management, operational perspective. For example, if you
are in region 13, you have Grasslands National Park, you have some MBS, a wildlife area
or two, perhaps managed by the same agency. You’ve got staff in the field … You can
break up the management units, perhaps there’s savings in that perspective. (PCA4)

Finally, closer cooperation with ENGOs is a possible model. Again, this is not a new suggestion.
In 1972, the Director General of the CWS wrote to senior managers that:

one suggestion that may be made to you is that DU [Ducks Unlimited] should begin to
acquire wetlands by purchase, which they have hitherto deliberately refrained from doing,
and hand them over to government agencies for management. As the costs and manpower
requirements of continuing operations are not regarded favourably by TB [Treasury
Board], we would be inclined to suggest the opposite procedure, that Ducks Unlimited
might undertake the management of areas owned or purchased by governments. The
Ducks Unlimited policy of building structures and then moving on, though helpful to the
Canadian Wildlife Service and provincial agencies on occasion, no longer seem sufficient
to meet the present and future needs of the resource. (Loughrey, 1977b)
There have been similar proposals made in the years since, with the CWS contributing funds to acquire ecologically valuable land but leaving control of the sites to the non-government partner.

Another option may be to create a structure that links the three protected areas management organisations, while maintaining their individual mandates. This could be built on the model of the FMPAS, and would provide opportunities for the PA organisations to collaborate on operational requirements, such as enforcement activities, while allowing the organisations’ ongoing policy work to remain separate. One interviewee suggests that, in Canada, a “proper federal working group could work” (DFO2). For example, the group would work “between DFO and CWS to transfer sites that are surplus lighthouses.” Although the CWS “can't pay market value” the DFO could “broker the deal” to help maintain the conservation values of the site (DFO2). This would eliminate any requirement to make legislative changes.

6.9 Collaborative Approaches to Strategy Development

One important aspect of the participant suggestions (above) is that many of them focus on actions that could be advantageous to all parties. Indeed, these suggestions seem like ones that could emerge from a collaborative process. The PA managers work so closely together, it is akin to an ongoing collaborative discussion, although their interests do not always align. The next step will be for the PA management organisations to adopt a collaborative approach. The PCA have elements of this approach in their National Park planning, although their strategy has long been set in place. For the CWS, which lacks a specific strategy for its protected areas, collaborative planning could be the approach it needs to fulfil its mandate more successfully. In a few cases, the CWS manages sites in collaboration with local Aboriginal groups (e.g., Nisutlin National Wildlife Area in the Yukon) or with ‘Friends of’ groups (e.g. Cap Tourmente National Wildlife Area), and this practice could be used as a model in other CWS protected areas, and eventually to the national processes.
The PCA does undertake a collaborative process in its planning and management activities. This involves many groups with a stake (real or metaphorical) in the National Parks. The CWS could learn from the PCA in the process of adopting national collaborative processes. However, collaborative processes can be extremely lengthy, such as the previously discussed example of the Georgia Straights, or as in the East Arm of Great Slave Lake, which has been identified as a potential National Park since 1971.

Healey specifies that strategy making requires “deliberative paradigm change” (2006, p. 244). It is apparent from reviewing the CWS strategic documents that the organisation did not go through a paradigm change; in contrast, the PCA System Plan did mark a significant change in the model the organisation was following. For such significant change to take place within the CWS, it will require significant support from senior EC management. It will likely require a political champion to ensure that the changes are successful. How, then, could the strategy process begin?

Transparency in government and stakeholder interaction are important values in the public service. Developing a process for more extensive public engagement in the CWS protected should be something that senior management within EC supports. Once the public process is underway, it would be more difficult for the government to disregard the results of the exercise. By developing a strategy that emerges from concerns presented by the stakeholders, the stakeholders will feel that they own the end product (Healey, 2006). This would create a new constituency for the CWS, and it would also have the potential to identify new approaches and opportunities that had not been previously considered.

The process would include both government and non-government participants, and the details of any process would have to be negotiated by the participants (as per Healey’s 2006 suggestion). For example, non-government participants might include environmental non-government organisations, First Nations, industrial representatives, and unaffiliated citizens (as in the Parks Canada Agency Minister’s Round Table). Strategy processes should not take place on a
particular schedule, however. Healey (2006, p. 270) remarks that “one of the critical resources at this stage is the capacity to ‘read the crack’, to see the opportunities for ‘doing things differently’, and to be able to widen a crack into a real potential for change.” While it is not evident that the CWS has always known how to do this, involving a larger number of stakeholders increases the chances that a planning effort will result in cracks to exploit.

Although there are concerns about the potential role of power in collaborative processes (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002), many of the potential participants in a collaborative process would generally be people with relatively similar status, such as ENGO representatives. Care should be taken to ensure that any other participants have comparable opportunities to express their ideas. The question of how long the collaborative planning process would last is another potential conflict. However, the CWS will be able to continue with its existing processes while the new strategy is being developed.

While there may be nothing to lose, the CWS has everything to gain. Public awareness, political awareness, and resources for fulfilling their mandate are all assets that the CWS needs. Healey suggests that collaborative processes can result in new institutional resources, particularly “social, intellectual and political capital” all of which are particularly needed by the CWS (Healey, 2006, p. 311). In order to cultivate this new resource, the process must be free from negative political interference.

6.10 Conclusion

All three protected areas management organisations identify the need for some increase in financial resources. Each organisation has a different strategy for developing its network, and a different approach for dealing with the public. While the organisations have varying degrees of performance, using strategic planning to communicate in the language of business is important because, “to receive resources, the public sector now has to explain what it is doing and why it is
doing it – in managerial terms” (Llewellyn & Tappin, 2003, p. 956). However, communicating in the language of business does not mean that the process itself has to follow the model of strategic planning. Collaborative planning can be used to develop new ideas and approaches that could then be explained in managerial terms.

There is little discussion of the DFO protected areas in this Chapter. Because the DFO lacks planning documents specifically related to its protected areas, and participants were unable to refer to specific MPA planning processes, comments on its planning system are impossible to make. While a lack of planning has not harmed its initial success in developing new protected areas, over the long term the DFO should expect that the central agencies will begin to expect more formalised approaches, as can be seen in the history of the CWS.

The PCA provides a positive example of network and site planning in this research, and illustrates some of the pitfalls and successes that result from collaborative planning processes. While this Chapter does not delve into every detail of network and site management at the PCA, extensive discussion of PCA management can be found in various documents cited in this research. While the activities of the PCA are not perfect, they are nonetheless considered an example of best practice.

Interviewees were asked to discuss an alternative governance model for protected areas management. Federal protected area participants are generally ambivalent about the idea of merging their three organisations. They generally agree that the costs and effort required to create the new organisation would likely outweigh the benefits that could result from the merger. Participants offer various suggestions for alternative approaches, such as creating a joint federal-provincial protected area organisation, or creating a simpler protected areas operations group rather than an entirely new governance structure.

Finally, the Chapter discusses the potential for collaborative planning to contribute to the development of strategy in the CWS. Undertaking such a process could re-define the way the CWS defines success. While there is extensive collaboration with both government and non-
government organisations, there is still a tendency to see success from the point of view of your own organisation. Accordingly, the $225 million given to the Nature Conservancy of Canada (as discussed in Chapter 1) was something of a bittersweet success. Certainly, the cause of protected areas was advanced, but there was a feeling that some of the success was at the expense of government protected areas programs. Expanding the definition of success in this way would fit with the collaborative model, but would require significant changes in the way success is defined in public sector organisations.
7. Conclusions

7.1 Introduction

This research project examined the way the three federal protected areas management organisations strategise for and plan their protected areas. The research described in this thesis had several purposes. First, through a review of the literature, it aimed to discover ways in which organisations develop strategy. Having identified three significant theories (strategic planning, strategic management, and collaborative planning), the research examined strategy development, with a focus on the most commonly described method (strategic planning) in private and public sector organisations. This information was used to develop questions that were posed to key informants within each of the three departments, as well as a few individuals who work alongside them. The research data was used to identify some of the factors that promote or impede success in conservation agencies. Finally, the research results were evaluated for their potential to contribute to planning at the PA organisations and this evaluation was used to create a model strategic plan for the CWS organisation.

The researcher collected data using a qualitative approach, through interviews, document analysis, and participant observation. Because of the focus on the strategic planning model, interview questions largely related to strategic planning, including: is strategic planning a technique that should be used by environmental conservation organisations? do those organisations understand strategic planning? do documents published by those organisations demonstrate the use of strategic planning or other approaches to developing strategy? And, does the management of the organisations’ protected areas networks demonstrate the use of strategic planning or other approaches to developing strategy? This Chapter summarises the research conclusions, includes recommendations for strategy development in protected areas. The Chapter ends with a description of the contribution this research has made.
The research questions were answered through several research methods, including a review of current documents; review of archival documents; semi-structured interviews with research participants; and, participant-observation at the CWS. Interviews with individuals currently or recently employed by the protected areas organisations and with individuals employed by conservation organisations that advocate on behalf of protected areas provided data relevant to the current situation. Historical data were obtained largely through archival sources, because many participants had only recently (i.e., within ten years) worked with the PA organisations. However, some interviewees were able to confirm historical data through their own experience with the organisations, having been employed with the PA organisation for several decades. Participant-observation was used when the researcher was hired to work at the CWS in the habitat conservation section. Observational data were used to substantiate other data and to create relationships that supported the interview research.

The methodology acknowledged Yin’s (2003) four conditions related to design quality in case study research and incorporated three of the four: (a) construct validity, (c) external validity, and (d) reliability. The fourth condition, (b) internal validity, is used in studies that attempt to attribute causation. In terms of construct validity, the research focused on a narrow range of questions related to organisational planning and performance, included several sources of evidence (interviews, published documents, unpublished documents, personal observation), and had participants review the conclusions that were made. External validity was addressed by employing a research design that included three case studies. Reliability was ensured by using a consistent list of questions and recording any additional questions that were asked during interviews, by keeping a detailed transcript of each interview, detailed notes on the documents that were reviewed, and by keeping a journal about daily observations made by the researcher.

Readers should put these conclusions in the context of several limitations in the research process. There were a widely varying number of participants from each organisation in the study. This biased the results to include significantly more discussion of the Canadian Wildlife Service
than the other two organisations. The number of participants from ENGOs was also very small, although their responses were very similar. Finally, there were also difficulties in obtaining archival materials, particularly within the last 10 years, which also limited the discussion of contemporary issues in planning and strategy.

By comparing the history and current profile of the Canadian Wildlife Service, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and the Parks Canada Agency, the importance of consistent strategy was highlighted. Political support, often generated through public outreach, was also highlighted as an important factor in the PCA’s success, although the relative importance of each is difficult to determine because of their parallel development. While Parks Canada did not begin with extensive resources for its planning functions, support from senior management, including the Minister at the time, led to the development of the National Park System Plan (and the related plans for historic sites and marine areas). The success of this plan, measured through progress toward completion and through the resources obtained by the PCA, has led to increased emphasis on strategic and long-range planning and visitor services within the PCA. That is not to say that the PCA has always enjoyed universal success, but their record of accomplishment shines in comparison to the CWS. Although they were part of the same organisation in the first half of the 20th century, the division of the CWS in 1947 marked the beginning of two different trajectories. Although the budgets of the CWS and Parks Canada were comparable in the early years (see Chapter 4), the years after the development of the National Parks System Plan saw a dramatic climb in Parks’ budget, without a comparable rise in that of the CWS. The difference in normalised budgets was very significant, with the CWS pennies compared to the PCA dollars.

The DFO, a relatively recent addition to the roster of federal protected areas managers, was largely untested in this area. Having only gained authority to create protected areas in 1996, the DFO is still taking a “learning approach” (DFO1, DFO2) to creating its MPAs. It is unlikely this strategy could continue over the long term, if lessons drawn from the experience of the CWS and the PCA are any indication. Politicians and managers demand accountability, which is
generally expressed in terms of goals and objectives met. Without accountability, increases in funding are unlikely. Without a defined or quantified set of objectives (much like the CWS), the DFO MPA program risks losing the support of senior management.

Research participants generally thought that there were insufficient resources for system planning, especially related to the case of the CWS. Although there was some legitimacy to the argument that the organisations required resources to begin planning, the failure to obtain further resources under the 2002 Memorandum to Cabinet (among other attempts) suggests that the CWS no longer has a choice but to begin, if its protected areas are to survive over the long term. The CWS must create strategic plans, with defensible and easily explained objectives, to provide an indication of their intentions to decision makers. Increasing pressures from competing land uses, climate change, and visitors will require the CWS to carry out more intensive management. Kareiva et al. (2007, p. 1869) state that, “In the modern world, wilderness is more commonly a management and regulatory designation than truly a system without a human imprint.” The extent of human influence on “wilderness” will increase as the global population continues to grow, and the mobility of urban residents increases. Instead of concentrating on laissez-faire management, the CWS should pursue the resources it needs to protect its protected areas against becoming overly degraded.

The PCA also faced some challenges in managing its parks, due to the heavy visitor use at many parks. Even Northern parks, which had little on-site management because of their remote locations, faced increasing threats from climate change, resource exploration, and visitor access. The DFO faced less pressure from tourism, but more pressure from resource extraction, and a lack of resources for its management of marine protected areas. This suggested that the CWS and the DFO should have made (and continue to make) the development of strategies a priority, using it to obtain necessary resources (for planning and management, for surveillance, for access to the public) to carry out their basic mission of preserving the natural environment. Existing strategic
plans were found to be deficient, as compared to the recommendations derived from the literature, and did not provide guidance to the organisations in question.

Only two of the three organisations actually had strategic plans for their protected areas networks. Of those two, the PCA plans generally met the criteria set out in the literature. The CWS strategic plans (there were many, created at different scales) met few of the criteria. In addition, the CWS plans were not regularly updated, which made the plans rapidly irrelevant as political and financial climates changed. The DFO, as per their “learning approach,” had not yet created a protected-area strategic plan at the time of this research. However, their Departmental strategic plan, which made brief mention of protected areas, did meet some the criteria identified in the literature.

In terms of protected area management, interviewees all suggested that the resources provided for site management of protected areas were insufficient. Even the PCA, with a very large annual budget, faced shortfalls when examining the sum total of all requirements. Most terrestrial protected areas faced the prospect of deteriorating infrastructure, whether that be boundary fences or visitor centres. Significant investments were also required to assist in adaptation for climate change, invasive species, and expanding human settlements.

A collaborative approach is a method that focuses on strategy derived from communication among stakeholders. For example, this could be done by pooling operational resources (as suggested by interview participants). A direct collaboration between the CWS and the PCA should improve conditions, particularly for the CWS, and would have the potential to provide some degree of efficiency, for example by increasing the volume of purchasing. The idea of merging protected areas organisations into a single organisation (such as suggested for a Department of Natural Resources in the United States by Sampson & Knopf, 2001) - was not supported by interviewees.

The biggest threat facing protected areas organisations is a lack of resources. The research suggests that any management model, such as strategic planning, that offers the potential
to assist in securing increased resources for protected areas should be pursued as quickly and as thoroughly as possible, especially by the CWS and the DFO. However, the research did not identify strategic planning as a sufficient model. The above-mentioned flaws in the existing strategic plans - or the lack thereof - suggest that the organisations in question (CWS, DFO) require a new approach. Modelled after the PCA approach of a long-term strategy, the research suggests that collaborative planning may be a more appropriate model to use in the development of new strategies.

7.2 Evaluation

The effectiveness of protected areas strategic planning was evaluated and, in terms of the evaluation criteria, the PCA proved to be the most successful organisation. For both the results of the plan content evaluation (Table 5.2) and the evaluation of potential strategic plan effectiveness (Table 5.4), the CWS had most of the elements, but did not fulfil those elements to the same degree as the PCA. The DFO was moderately successful in the contents of its plan (based on the Departmental-level plan) but was assigned a series of zeros for the potential strategic plan effectiveness, because there was no protected area-specific strategic plan to evaluate.

Research participants all expressed some familiarity with the concept of strategic planning, providing reasons for adopting strategic planning that reflected the reasons provided in the literature. However, some interviewees seemed to confuse strategic planning and system planning, when they suggested that strategic planning would only be appropriate for the PCA. In terms of the contents of strategic plans, the PCA System Plans (with the associated Corporate Plans) met the content criteria to a much higher degree than either the CWS or the DFO plans. While there was some disagreement amongst the PCA participants about whether it was the System Plans or the Corporate Plans that should be identified as the strategic plan, when taken together the PCA approach has been very strategic. The DFO was left out of the evaluation
because it did not have a protected-area-specific strategic plan, although it did have a strong Departmental-level strategic plan. The CWS did have strategic plans for each of the organisation and its protected areas, but these plans did not meet the criteria to the same degree as did the PCA’s (see Table 5-2). While many of the elements were present in the CWS protected area plan, the content was not of sufficient precision and depth to satisfy the criteria.

When evaluating organisational success more broadly, there are many criteria which can be used, such as budget, total area managed, and reputation. In terms of achievement of mandate, the PCA has made evident progress, especially on its terrestrial plan, although it did miss several completion targets. The CWS has not been especially successful overall. Relative to resources provided, the CWS certainly had some remarkable successes in the creation of protected areas, but this was in part due to the remoteness of many of its protected areas (and thus a lack of competing interests). The DFO, only involved in protected areas for just over a decade, has had moderate success in creating *Oceans Act* MPAs, but it was difficult to determine if they had success against their objective, due to its lack of quantification.

This evaluation seems to support the literature review, in that there is less of an interest in strategic planning in the public sector. Infrequently updated plans, and plans that took too broad a view to be useful for the protected areas organisations suggest that it may be time to adopt a new approach to developing strategy. While the PCA approach could be described as a strategic planning approach, the consistent strategy over nearly 40 years is unusual.

### 7.3 Benefits of Long-term Strategy and Planning for Protected Areas

Within the limits of the study, particularly the difficulty in obtaining archival data, evaluation of the Parks Canada Agency’s strategy demonstrates that having a long-term goal that was both simple and quantifiable was an important contributor to its success. Having been aware of their external political environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Parks Canada seized the
opportunity to create a long-term strategy for itself. The *National Park System Plan*, which originally included both the terrestrial and marine environments, was scientifically defensible and fit with the most current ecological thinking at the time. More importantly, the *National Park System Plan* created a goal that was simple to understand (e.g. it could be explained on a single map) and easily defined and quantified. This allowed the agency planners to explain their goal very quickly and eased political concerns over the potential for an endless growth of the National Parks System. Because of the close adherence to the politically-approved System Plans, the PCA’s plans have been widely accepted as the goal for National Parks. Politicians and ENGOs all discuss the idea of “completing” the National Park System, without questioning whether “completing” the National Park System is an appropriate target.

One development in protected areas planning that may prove to be advantageous to the DFO and the CWS is the recent recognition of the need for broader landscape-level approaches to protecting biodiversity. The CWS and the DFO, which have more flexible models than does the PCA, may benefit and be able to contribute to the development of such a model in Canada, which would be to their benefit (the developing DFO planning paradigm explicitly includes integrated planning). The CWS has recognised the need for integrated planning, stating in the PASP that, “to meet the modern context of conservation programming and the role of Protected Areas within it, the Network must continue to evolve to serve a broader biodiversity conservation role in an integrated conservation movement” (Environment Canada, 2006, p. 2-5).

### 7.4 Strategic Planning Recommendations

The effective protection of biodiversity “requires management; management, in turn, requires money; and this, ultimately, is often the most serious constraint on protection” (Dixon & Sherman, 1990, p. 62). Accordingly, protected areas organisations should adopt systems that promote the acquisition of new resources.
Although the PCA employees were divided on whether or not the System Plans should be called strategic plans, they all agreed that a substantial degree of their success (referring to public recognition, political capital, and progress toward stated goals) as an organisation could be attributed to the System Plans. The two most important characteristics of the System Plan are: 1) simplicity and 2) finality. Another factor for the PCA is its engagement with the public, which is a significant element of a collaborative approach. Finally, the role of the political champion (similarly to a process sponsor in strategic planning) was also important.

In the 11 years since the *Oceans Act* of 1996, the DFO has created 6 MPAs. There was no indication of long-term targets for the creation or management of marine protected areas, rather, the DFO took what one interviewee described as a “hot spot” approach\(^40\) where areas that were considered to be ecologically and biologically significant would be identified as candidate *Oceans Act* MPAs. While such an ad hoc approach may seem like the simplest approach, it leaves the potential number of *Oceans Act* MPAs open-ended, it does not allow for quantification, and it cannot be explained in simple terms. The *Oceans Act* MPAs may benefit from being part of the larger integrated management process underway at the DFO, since it will likely produce some significant results, but this cannot be judged in advance of any evidence.

For the CWS, strategic plans were changed infrequently, and CWS staffers were unsure as to which plan they should be following. For example, the CWS has not updated their Strategic Plan 2000-2010 (which is still the plan in force) in the 8 years since publication. The PASP identifies a strategic direction for the Network, but does not provide an indication of why the six strategic directions are important nor does it prioritise them. Through all the plans, the ultimate goal of the CWS Protected Areas Network remains elusive. This, coupled with the failure of the CWS to have a widely-supported strategy, is a significant contributor to the ongoing troubles at the CWS.

\(^40\) Although it does not correspond directly to the original hot spot approach popularised by Conservation International.
Theoretically, the concept of strategic planning is readily applicable to protected area management organisations because of the long timelines on which these organisations operate. They also operate within a relatively steady policy climate, such that the protected areas have been managed by the same organisations for decades. The general understanding of protected areas as a social good limits the willingness of governments to make significant negative changes to protected areas. This does not limit them from allowing the slow deterioration of the ecosystems that the PAs protect because of the lack of adequate funding.

7.4.1 Simplicity

The CWS and the DFO should create simpler explanations for their networks highlighting, for example, (in the case of the CWS) more than just the benefits for migratory birds. The idea of setting a clear strategy and end target for the network should be discussed because of the importance that the PCA respondents have given to the finality of their plan.

In terms of land and water conservation, the PCA has one ultimate advantage that neither the CWS nor the DFO have, above and beyond any planning documents. The most important part of the PCA’s mandate (as set out in the various Acts) is the task of land preservation and representation, regardless of any conflicts in implementation (e.g. skiing in Banff National Park). Policies and procedures are designed to support this goal, such as the major policy to engage Canadians. In contrast, the CWS and the DFO employ protected areas in support of other goals; policies and procedures are directed at their main goal (e.g. protecting species at risk or migratory birds). Policies for public engagement are not a priority. The preservation aspects of the CWS’ and the DFO’s mandates must compete for internal attention from their respective organisations. The lack of broad public understanding and support for the CWS and DFO protected areas is one major reason for the under funding of their respective protected areas.
7.4.2 Acting Proactively

Like all bureaucrats, the CWS’ protected areas professionals must second-guess the political climate and present information that seems to be appealing to the government of the day. However, the CWS’ actions have been very reactive, instead of taking action that may foster an environment of support for the PA Network (such as the PCA’s visitor programs). This suggests that EC/CWS management does not have the interest (conceptually or administratively) in creating leading-edge policies and plans that drive, or at least anticipate and properly respond to, political agendas. Recently, the Director General of the CWS indicated interest in changing the way the organisation’s protected areas are operated and managed, including the possibility of transferring site(s) to other organisation(s), which could include other federal organisations, provincial governments, or ENGOs. This was not the first occasion that such a change was considered, although the idea was previously met with rejection.

The DFO respondents mentioned that they do not feel urgency over the creation of MPAs because of the other tools at their disposal, such as fisheries closures under the *Fisheries Act*. For example, recent changes to shipping lanes were made by Transport Canada, at the request of the DFO, to protect the whales in the Bay of Fundy (DFO2). Alternatives to the creation of an MPA were easier for the DFO, and likely easier to have approved by senior management. Accordingly, there was an expectation that Oceans Act MPAs would continue to be created on an opportunistic basis, at least until the completion of the Large Ocean Management Area process.

7.4.3 Another Management Model: Creating a Single Conservation Organisation

Participants were ambivalent about the idea of merging all three protected areas organisations into a single entity, although some participants recognized that there was the potential for some cost savings in this approach. While it is important to have conservation in as
many departments as possible, it seems likely that, over the long term, some increased cooperation would assist each protected area organisation. It would also have the potential to create synergy among the various protected areas professionals from each organisation. Over the short- to medium-term, creating a protected areas operations group, whereby relevant CWS, PCA, and DFO employees could cooperate in the day-to-day management of protected areas, would provide operational efficiency while avoiding the need to change legislation.

### 7.4.4 Collaborative Planning

In order to take advantage of the potential benefits provided by having a strategic plan, organisations should update them regularly, with enough frequency to reflect substantial changes in the organisational environment. However, strategic plans per se do not seem to be used by the PA organisations. This research suggests that it may be time for a new paradigm in protected areas strategy. As a public sector organisation, protected areas organisations should define success broadly, and in consultation with all stakeholders. Collaborative planning is a model that purports to consult all stakeholders, and as such warrants further investigation. In undertaking a collaborative process for achieving new strategies, protected areas organisations should design their processes so that many groups have a stake in any plan(s).

While this research argues that collaborative planning could provide a successful new approach to developing strategy for protected areas, strategic planning does still offer potential as a technique. The PCA already includes many collaborative aspects in its park planning process. Because the PA management organisations do not have the final authority to make decisions, there may be no choice other than to continue with a more conventional approach (for the CWS, DFO). That is not to say that the organisations should not adopt aspects of collaborative planning. Rather, it may be a case of selecting the most relevant elements and merging them into a more conventional approach.
7.5 Contribution to Theory

Environment Canada, including the CWS, and the PCA both had strategic plans (of some description or another) in the early 1970s, which was earlier than most literature references have dated public sector strategic planning. Staff members in each organisation were aware of strategic planning and the potential benefits that strategic planning can lead to, although their plans generally did not fit the public sector planning models in the literature. This suggests that strategy is more important than strategic planning.

Because strategy is more important than strategic planning, it behoves protected areas organisations to develop strategies with the potential for success. Because of the public nature of protected areas – the benefits are to the public good, and the organisations depend on public support – a collaborative process may be the best approach to developing strategy for the protected areas. Collaborative planning, while it is a very important theory, still requires a better description of the circumstances under which it can be successful. For example, there are still outstanding questions about the role of power in collaborative processes. Protected areas management, where interested stakeholders tend to have relatively similar degrees of power is an area appropriate for investigation.

For ecosystem conservation to succeed, a coherent approach is needed. Piecemeal creation of protected areas is insufficient to achieve long-term conservation (Noss, 1994). The federal government must decide to coordinate conservation as a whole, not on a department-by-department basis. There is some degree of awareness of this issue, such as in the adoption of the Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy. Support for conservation initiatives will also require close cooperation with provincial and territorial governments, as in the Northwest Territories Protected Areas Strategy. All this is to say that, over the short term, protected area managers may achieve small victories, but over the long term, their actions will be insufficient unless there is concerted and coordinated action. That does not undermine the importance of those small
victories – if we are to have any biodiversity left with which to develop the long-term vision, protected areas must exist, and they must be managed in a way that will ensure their ecological survival.

This study re-confirms the importance of a logical, long-term approach to planning large projects such as protected areas networks. The dramatic difference in the resources allocated to the CWS and to the PCA, a difference that appeared after the advent of the PCA’s National Park System Plan, demonstrates the key role that planning goals and objectives can play in the success of an organisation. This study suggests that collaborative planning should be experimented with by protected areas management organisations.

7.5.1 Internally- vs. Externally-focused Organisations.

Another idea in this research is the important contrast between internally- and externally-oriented organisations. The internally-focused organisation concentrates on its own agenda, carrying out research or policy projects and sharing the results with a small circle of interested onlookers (e.g. the CWS limiting most of its interactions to ENGOs). Although they may well be creating extremely valuable results, the number of people who know about those results is relatively small. The externally-focused organisation, on the other hand, carries out its own agenda but also ensures that as many individuals as possible know about the results and the value that those results provide (e.g. PCA). This organisation learns about what its stakeholders value in order to shape this message. This organisation is creating opportunities to share their results with new groups, while ensuring that existing supporters continue their allegiance. The externally-focused organisation is always aware of the political winds of the day, but is more likely to change the content of their message than the content of their results.

The CWS has been a classic internally-focused organisation. As cited earlier in this document, CWS staffers tended to believe that, if only they could get their message across to
Canadians, everyone would understand the value of wildlife conservation. However, by concentrating on the internal agenda and maintaining a network of protected areas that limited public access, the CWS created a result where many Canadians are totally unaware of the work that they do. Based on interview data, the CWS, and their small circle of interested onlookers (e.g. Friends of Cap Tourmente, Nature Canada), are very aware of the valuable role that the CWS protected areas plays in wildlife conservation. Nevertheless, the majority of Canadians – especially decision-makers – remain unaware of the Protected Areas Network, its importance for conservation, and the extreme paucity of the resource allocation given to the CWS PAs. That is not to say that the CWS staffers have been completely unaware of the need to engage the broader public. Staff has presented proposals, such as a series of nature interpretation centres, which would have provided the basis to develop a broader public engagement program. However, these ideas were not valued by the CWS organisation, or by Environment Canada as a whole.

In contrast, the PCA has had a market-driven focus (see Chapter 2.4 for definition) and an external orientation for most of its history. The first director of the Parks Branch, James Harkin, worked hard at making connections between the national parks, the federal cabinet, Members of Parliament, the railways and the Canadian public. The National Park System Plan was designed to appeal to the broader public (and to politicians) in a way that makes intuitive sense. Although Parks Canada has experienced budget declines at times along with other departments, their message, and their name, has become synonymous with Canadian identity. The contrast with the Canadian Wildlife Service could not be more striking.

Since ENGOs and policy makers alike have embraced the System Plans, it has meant that external political pressure to support the National Parks continued, regardless of the party in power at the time. The public also demonstrate a high degree of support for the National Parks. This potential for public pressure is important for continued development, as “policy innovation in government departments is often externally induced by ministers and officials at the centre ... following significant public pressure” (Desveaux, et al., 1991, p. 501). Although some ENGOs
supported the development of protected areas by the CWS and the DFO (e.g. Nature Canada), the broader public adoption of the cause has not occurred. Better engagement with the Canadian public may be a way to begin to change this situation.

The DFO Marine Protected Areas program, still in relative infancy, could presumably adopt either a strategic planning or a collaborative approach as it expands. To date, the program has been very internally-oriented, communicating mainly with those directly involved with the sites themselves. A brief survey of Canadian ENGO websites (including the David Suzuki Foundation, the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, Nature Canada, and World Wildlife Fund Canada) found mention of the DFO protected areas program on only one of the four.

The experiences of both the CWS and the PCA provide an important contrast and thus a lesson for other conservation organisations (including the DFO). While conservation projects are important, organisations cannot rely solely on the innate virtue of the program to “sell” their project. Engagement with politicians and decision-makers (either directly, or by creating broad support among the population) is a key factor in the eventual success of an organisation. Some programs can continue to survive weakly on the innate value of the program (such as the CWS), but the long-term viability of the program will be under continual threat. In the end, externally-focused organisations are those that are capable of and value strategic thinking. Intuitively, externally-focused organisations are also more likely to be successful in collaborative planning. An organisation that develops strategic plans without considering the external environment is not creating a theoretically-based strategic plan. However, rigorous strategic thinking can overcome a significant number of challenges.

7.5.2 Institutionalizing Strategy Development

The early and extensive involvement in strategy development continued in the Parks Canada Agency, contributing significantly to its status as a robust, well-resourced and effective
organisation. Unlike the majority of the cases in the Bryson & Roering (1988b) study, the strategic planning process at Parks Canada has been able to survive the departure of key actors, such as Jean Chrétien, because the plan’s advocates have institutionalised it. The PCA has also institutionalised elements of collaborative planning, particularly the extensive involvement of stakeholders.

For the Canadian Wildlife Service, the early promise of Environment Canada strategic plans did not continue, demonstrating the pitfalls of paper plans (Llewellyn & Tappin, 2003). The best description of the incremental changes in the CWS is probably Lindblom’s (1959) “muddling through”. Any significant changes to the CWS, as described during this research, were imposed on the CWS from without. The organisation itself appeared to be content with incremental changes and a generally laissez-faire approach to strategy.

The outcome of the DFO MPA establishment process remains to be seen.

7.5.3 Strategic Thinking

Although described by Heracleous (2003) as a dialectical process with strategic planning (see Chapter 2), the role of strategic thinking seems to have been the most significant factor differentiating the results of planning at the PCA and the CWS. The PCA set out its strategy more than thirty years ago, while the CWS has set several strategies over the years. Theoretically, neither approach is ideal. As discussed in the review of the literature, some sort of regular review of strategy is considered necessary, although an annual review is not necessarily optimal. Neither organisation followed this direction, although the CWS would likely have followed this suggestion more closely. Completing the NPSP has been the PCA’s strategy since the Plan was developed. The PCA did review their tactics regularly (e.g. the annually-updated Corporate Plans), but in the end, it seemed that one of the most important elements in the success of the PCA strategy has been the very consistency of their approach. Contrary to what was experienced
in some of the US Air Force planning exercises (Campbell, 2002), a 30-year time horizon was in fact a good planning period. This affirms that, at least in some cases, strategic thinking (and the continued support of senior management) is the deciding factor in the success of a strategy, rather than any specific approach to strategy.

The CWS and the PCA have both followed a strategic planning approach to strategy development - no explicit integration of implementation (as in strategic management) occurs in the most prominent strategic documents (the CWS plans and the NPSP). Again, although this is somewhat contrary to existing strategic planning/management doctrine, the case of the PCA demonstrates that it is possible to work towards a specific strategic outcome over the long term by maintaining support for the outcome through various tactics. Indeed, the PCA seemed to adopt some degree of adaptive management, as they have altered their tactics (i.e., implementation of the system plans) to fit the various environments en route to their ultimate goal. Noss (1999) advocates adaptive management for protected areas managers.

Indeed, for public sector strategy development, having one specific strategic outcome may be the ideal approach. The short four-year election cycle, coupled with the “sound byte” approach to journalism, means that public sector organisations are unable to communicate a complex message to their stakeholders (i.e. politicians and the public). However, a single outcome, such as completing the network of representative national parks, facilitates getting the message across to politicians and to the public. For organisations with more complex objectives, such as the CWS (which derives its protected areas mandate from several pieces of legislation), there is a need to simplify the message, however galling it is for conservationists. The CWS has yet to identify the single “sound byte” that they can use to communicate the need for their protected areas network, and this has contributed to the current lack of resource for their protected areas.
7.6 Lessons for Practice

According to the literature, strategic planning offers an essential advantage - any organisation should be able to use it to succeed. Based on the data collected, one cannot unequivocally say that a perfect strategic plan would have increased the resources available for the CWS and the DFO. However, the data suggest that the development of strategy should provide an advantage in the circumstances that the CWS and the DFO find themselves in. Based on the success of the PCA, conservation organisations should adopt a long-range strategy to create the conditions for success.

Although strategic planning can be successful, providing benefits to the organisation, “planning adherents … concede that formal planning is not a costless activity …” (Powell, 1994, p. 125). While the PCA has incurred monetary costs for planning, it seems apparent that it has received a handsome return on investment. Protected areas organisations should take the time and resources to create well-researched, defensible, and simple strategies. Any plans that emerge from strategy development should identify objectives for the short- and medium-terms. Collaborative planning is a relatively new approach that could offer significant opportunity to PA management organisations. As transparency and stakeholder involvement are areas of concern for the federal government, a collaborative approach to strategy could provide a non-threatening means for the CWS and the DFO to increase their public profile and cultivate support, even political champions.

In addition, protected areas practitioners should recognise that, in order to receive the resources that they require, they must engage with the public. For the CWS, this may be in the form of visitor services, where practicable, or as educational materials that could be made available to teachers in an extension of the existing Hinterland Who’s Who program. Ideally, this would include a collaborative strategy development process. Regardless, the organisations must have a plan to monitor the impact of their activities, especially in terms of the number of people that have benefited from the protected areas.
The PCA has a significant advantage through its mandate to represent the various biogeographic areas of Canada. The different mandates of the CWS and the DFO, to adopt sites that meet network criteria on an opportunistic basis, would make the creation of a System Plan more challenging. The political appeal of both the CWS and the DFO protected areas is handicapped by the multi-part criteria for site selection, and the open-ended nature of the mandates. This open-ended approach also does not put any pressure on government to act, because there is no goal to meet. Conversely, the PCA plan is finite, with political and popular discussion about completing the plan. Research participants reported that there is significant appeal to the concept of a finite goal that is reachable.

The strong support for the idea that the strategic approach/System Plan adopted by the PCA has been the source of its relative success indicates that there might be some significant gains made if the CWS and the DFO were to create and adopt a more systematic approach. Before the PCA embarked on its System Planning paradigm, the budgets of the PCA and the CWS were similar. Today they are significantly different. Adopting plans with finite and easily understood goals should be one of the first steps for CWS and DFO.

Having the status of an Agency allowed the PCA to retain revenue generated in the Parks, as well as protect its own Parliamentary appropriations from departmental raiding. The CWS should pursue conditions that would allow it to become an agency, much like the PCA. Some participants expressed concerns about obstacles to agency status, such as the lack of revenue streams. However, the increased independence and operational flexibility afforded by being an agency would offer the CWS some valuable opportunities to change its organisational dynamics. Being able to generate revenue and increase its responsiveness to external issues would assist the CWS in carrying out its role as the manager of protected areas.

As stated above, in Section 7.5.1, it is important for organisations to have both an internal and an external focus to their activities. In public sector organisations, those that depend on government transfers must maintain a broad public appeal, or they must at least appeal to a
smaller group of dedicated and vocal supporters. However, the second approach is not without risk. The CWS, which had largely depended on the small number of Canadian hunters for support, began to experience a declining public profile as the number of hunters began to decline in 1978 (Boyd, Lévesque, & Dickson, 2002). For the PCA, which targeted its appeal to a much larger proportion of Canadians, the risk of having its support concentrated in a small number of groups was much less. Protected areas organisations should appeal to as large a constituency as possible, in order to offset the potential challenges posed by the loss of a key group of supporters. This is a danger that the DFO appears headed towards, with the relatively low public profile of their Oceans Act MPA network and a seeming lack of interest by the agency in broad public engagement.

Although there are no studies in the academic literature about planning at the CWS, this is not the first research to identify some of the planning issues that the CWS faces. As described in other chapters, many relevant reports exist within the library of the CWS. For example, there have been previous attempts to create network and system plans for the NWA/MBS Network. None of these appears to have gone beyond the draft stage.

### 7.7 Future Research

First, future research should be designed in a way that would overcome some of the limitations that are part of the current study. Having access to more individuals within the various departments would be a good first step. Particularly useful would be identifying participant(s) from within the Treasury Board Secretariat, although this could prove quite challenging. Access to internal documents that were not available through the National Archives would also be a rich source of data.

This study relied heavily on interviews with protected areas practitioners at a specific period in time. A longitudinal study that examines changes in approaches to and understandings
of strategic planning is an important potential research undertaking. This would meet Van de
Ven’s suggestion (1992) to begin studies before the final outcomes of the strategic processes are
known. This type of prospective research would be a change from most strategic planning studies
in the past, which are comparable to the present study in their reliance on data gathered at one
point in time.

Another study should promote and support a collaborative process for developing
strategy. While this research proposes that collaborative planning be used as a model for creating
strategy in the case study organisations, the feasibility and applicability of this process in practice
requires further study.

Fourth, the major protected area organisations in the United States (US Fish & Wildlife
exhibit close similarities in structure with Canadian administration. This suggests that a study of
the parallels would provide useful data. The current study includes some initial comparisons to
the organisations in the United States, but a detailed and rigorous comparison study would add to
the conclusions made in this research. Interviews could help to determine the reasons why the US
National Park system plan was not publicised or adopted while the Canadian plan, which was
inspired by the US plan, has been followed for 36 years.

Finally, a fifth area of research would be to extend the study into the third sector,
philanthropic and voluntary organisations that engage in environmental conservation, such as the
Nature Conservancy. How do these organisations, which do not seem to be subject to as many
mandated planning schemes as government, undertake strategic and system planning? During the
current research, one of the NGO participants provided a copy of the organisation’s public
strategic plan, while indicating that there was also a second, internal, strategic plan. Is the
practice of dual strategic plans, as is relatively common in business, also common in third sector

41 A reference to this plan is not provided as NGO participants were promised that their organisations
would also remain anonymous.
conservation organisations? If so, how do the public and internal plans differ? What are the motivations for such organisations to engage in strategic planning? When they do acquire tracts of land, is it according to a long-range or system plan, or is it mainly opportunistic? Such questions would provide an interesting contrast to the conclusions of this study, or confirm the results to be applicable to environmental conservation generally.

7.8 Final Conclusions

The research described in this thesis had several purposes. The literature review identified strategy as an important component of an organisation’s success. The review then explained the historical, political, social, and affective factors that influenced the evolution of the strategic planning process in private and public sector organisations. This information was used to develop questions that were posed to key informants within each of the protected areas organisations, as well as a few individuals who worked alongside them. Through interviews, document analysis, and observation, the research formed a comprehensive understanding of the planning and organisational dynamics of the PA organisations. The research identified some of the factors that promoted or impeded strategic planning success in conservation agencies. Finally, the strategic and network planning efforts of each organisation were evaluated for their contribution to the success of the PA organisations. This evaluation was used to create a model strategic plan for the CWS organisation (Appendix 5). The research also identified collaborative planning as a potential alternative for developing strategy in the protected areas organisations. The nature of the stakeholders in protected areas management means that the players would be of relatively equal status and experience. This suggests that the potentially troubling power dynamics in many collaborative planning processes may not be as significant in this case.

While “all land management is biodiversity management, whether intended or not” (Noss & Cooperrider, 1994, p. 28), not all activities are conducive to biodiversity protection.
Accordingly, it is appropriate to identify areas of land that should be set aside to protect the biological heritage of Canada. Referring to the United States, Noss and Cooperrider (1994, p. 142) state that, “none of our national parks is big enough to maintain its diversity over time.” Given the size of some of the areas in Alaska, such as Wrangell-St. Elias National Park and Preserve which covers approximately 5.3 million hectares (U.S. National Park Service, 2006), this conclusion presents some significant challenges for protected areas practitioners. It is apparent that biodiversity will not be able to maintain itself in the wake of human activity. Accordingly, there will be a requirement for human intervention and management.

Given that saving places is the appropriate model for biodiversity conservation (Sarkar & Margules, 2002), it will be most important to identify ways to ensure that this happens. Canada’s existing protected areas organisations have had varying degrees of success in their efforts, with the Parks Canada Agency enjoying a relatively high degree of success. The results of this research indicate that the PCA’s strategic approach, which maintained consistency and actively developed a political constituency, provides an important model for other protected areas organisations. While not a panacea, a long term strategy supported by regularly updated implementation plans seems to be the most successful model for protected areas organisations in the federal government.
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Appendix 1: Interview questions

CWS/PCA/DFO questions

- What would you say is the purpose of your organization?
- How would you describe what your organization does?
- How would you define the single most important reason for the existence of your organization?
- Why have a strategic plan?
- Why this strategic plan?
- Who was involved in the planning process?
- Any education in strategic planning?
- Describe process used to develop strategic plan?
- Is there an Internal Strategic plan or Environmental scan?
- Does CWS have the capacity to manage NWAs/MBSs?
- What resources would be needed to properly manage the network?
- Should CWS be in the business of wildlife areas?
- Would a single agency for Parks and Wildlife be better (more efficient, more effective, etc)?
- Any further comments?

ENGO questions

- What are your impressions of Parks Canada and the CWS?
- Describe the SWOT of CWS.
- Was your organization consulted during the CWS strategic planning process?
- Do you think the NWA/MBS network is well-managed?
- Is the CWS the proper group to run the NWA/MBS network?
- Would making a single natural resources agency in Canada be a good idea?
- Any further comments?
Appendix 2: Organisational Charts for PA Organisations

A selective organisational chart is presented for each of the relevant organisations. Detail and specificity vary with the amount of information publicly available or observed by the author.
Environment Canada/Canadian Wildlife Service
Department of Fisheries and Oceans

Parks Canada Agency

Appendix 3: Selected events in the history of the Canadian Protected Area organisations.

**Chronology of selected events in the history of the CWS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>First wildlife refuge created at Long Lake, Saskatchewan (Burnett, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Creation of the National Parks Branch Animal Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Treaty for International Protection of Migratory Birds signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Migratory Bird Convention Act passes in Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Hoyes Lloyd appointed Dominion Ornithologist in Dominion Parks Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>First Federal-Provincial Wildlife Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>National Parks Act received royal assent (Act recognized all established bird sanctuaries as federal preserves)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Department of the Interior becomes Department of Mines and Resources; Parks Branch becomes a division of the Lands, Parks and Forests Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Dominion Wildlife Service is formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Mines and Resources is re-organized; Lands, Parks and Forests Branch becomes Lands and Development Services Branch (incl. Dominion Wildlife Service, National Park Service, Northwest Territories and Yukon Services, Engineering and Construction Division, and Lands Division)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Department of Mines and Resources becomes Department of Resources and Development; Dominion Wildlife Service is renamed Canadian Wildlife Service; second re-organisation, Development Services Branch becomes three Branches: Northern Administration and Lands, Engineering and Water, and the National Parks Branch (incl. National Parks and Historic Sites, Wildlife, and National Museums)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Department of Resources and Development becomes Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>CWS establishes first two regional offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>CWS elevated from Division to Branch status; Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development replaces Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources: main units are Indian, Northern, Administration, and Conservation (incl. National and Historic Parks, CWS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>CWS transferred to Department of Fisheries and Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Department of the Environment is created, CWS is made a Branch in the Lands, Forest and Wildlife Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Inland Waters moved into Lands, Forest and Wildlife Service (Shaw, 1972)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Department of the Environment is re-organized into four parts: Planning and Financial Services, Fisheries and Marine Service, Environmental Protection Service, Environmental Management Service (four Directorates, Canadian Forestry Service, Inland Waters, Lands, and CWS); CWS head elevated to Director-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>CWS moves from two regions to five (Boyd, 1975a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Regional DGs begin reporting to Regional Directors-General instead of the CWS DG (Burnett, 1999, p. 138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Green Plan creates new funding for CWS programs (Burnett, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Significant amendments to <em>Migratory Birds Convention Act</em> (allowing subsistence harvesting in Northern Canada) and the <em>Canada Wildlife Act</em> (incl. creation of Marine Wildlife Area designation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Canada-USA-Mexico Trilateral Committee for Wildlife and Ecosystems Conservation and Management holds its first meeting (Burnett, 1999, p. 167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td><em>Species at Risk Act</em> passes in Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Regional DGs begin reporting to CWS Director General (personal observation)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: preface to Record Group 109 inventory file, National Archives of Canada, except where noted
**Chronology of selected events in the history of the DFO.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>“Seacoast and inland fisheries” designated as one of the exclusive responsibilities of the new Dominion Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td><em>Fisheries Act</em> creating the Department of Marine and Fisheries given royal assent May 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>Fisheries Branch of the Department of Marine and Fisheries employs nearly 700 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>Department renamed Department of Fisheries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>Department renamed Marine and Fisheries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Standing Committee on Marine and Fisheries founded in Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>First <em>Fish Inspection Act</em>, Department renamed Naval Services – Fisheries Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Department renamed Marine and Fisheries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Department renamed Department of Fisheries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Major departmental reorganisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td><em>International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries</em> signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>First federal-provincial ministerial conference on fisheries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Department merged with Forestry, renamed Department of Fisheries and Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Department renamed Department of Environment – Fisheries and Marine Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Department renamed Department of Fisheries and the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Canada extends fishing waters from 12 to 200 nautical miles (along with 100 other coastal states)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Department separates into Department of Fisheries and Department of Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Sparrow Decision in Supreme Court gives First Nations inherent right to fish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td><em>Oceans Act</em> proclaimed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td><em>Species at Risk Act</em> given Royal Assent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2003  First *Oceans Act* MPA created at Endeavour Hydrothermal Vents
2004  The Gully named as second *Oceans Act* MPA
2005  *Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy* announced; Three more MPAs created (Basin Head, Eastport, Gilbert Bay)
2007  Musquash Estuary named as sixth MPA

Sources:
Department of Fisheries and Oceans. (1993). *DFO Factbook*. Ottawa, ON: Minister of Supply and Services.
DFO website (www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca)
Chonology of selected events in the history of the PCA.

1885  Canada's first national park created.
1911  The Dominion Parks Branch created.
1930  Canada's first National Parks Act passed in Parliament.
1937  First federal-provincial agreement to establish a national park: Prince Edward Island National Park.
1964  First comprehensive statement of national parks policy tabled in the House of Commons.
1971  First National Park System Plan approved.
1979  Parks Canada introduces Ecological Integrity as a guiding principle.
1988  Amendment to the National Parks Act formalizes the principle of Ecological Integrity.
1996  Minister of Canadian Heritage approves first System Plan for National Marine Conservation Areas; Banff-Bow Valley Study published
1998  Saguenay St-Laurent Marine Park Act passed; Minister appoints Panel on the Ecological Integrity of Canada's National Parks; Parks Canada Agency Act is proclaimed.
1999  Minister of Canadian Heritage introduces Marine Conservation Legislation (Bill C-8) in Parliament. Minister signs Nunavut Inuit Impact and Benefits Agreement to establish three Arctic Parks; Canada's southern-most point, Middle Island, is purchased and added to Point Pelee National Park of Canada.
2000  Minister of Canadian Heritage introduces revised Canada National Parks Bill (Bill C-27); Panel on the Ecological Integrity of Canada's National Parks reports to Minister of Canadian Heritage.

Appendix 4: Map of federal protected areas in Canada
Appendix 5: A Model Strategic Plan for the Canadian Wildlife Service

Introduction

In order to further the argument about what should be incorporated into a protected areas strategic plan, this Appendix consists of a model strategic plan for the CWS protected areas. For improved presentation, endnotes reference ideas and to provide more detail about why the elements are in the plan. The model plan is a strategic management plan; as such, it includes ideas related to both long-term planning and implementation. Below, the method of identifying the long-term planning goals is discussed. Following the discussion of planning goals, the chapter introduces an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the CWS, as identified by this research. The remainder of the chapter is the strategic management plan.

This project emphasises the CWS for a variety of reasons. The researcher had excellent access to research participants due to employment in the CWS. Access to key people in the other two organizations was more limited. There is also a lack of published research on the CWS as a subject. Finally, there is the need for attention to the CWS’ network of protected areas, as described in the introduction.

The model strategic plan draws upon the strategic planning and management literature for the leading research and models for strategic planning, with specific citations and examples of how the plan illustrates these “best practices” in the endnotes. The structure of the plan combines elements from several authors, especially Davey (1998) and Bryson (1995).

The plan should also be easy to read, visually appealing, and the points should be clear (Davey, 1998). This plan attempts to fulfil these criteria. Davey puts a special emphasis on action, stating that “plans are only as good as the action they lead to” (1998, p. 41). According to Davey, a system plan should include:

- a realistic appraisal of what is achievable;
- a discussion of the resource implications;
• a clear identification of who is responsible for each task;
• direct links to the action that is needed in each locale; and,
• an outline of monitoring and evaluation plans.

Bryson (1995) includes the following elements in the structure of a strategic plan:

• Clarify organisational mandates and mission;
• Establish an effective organisational vision for the future;
• Assess the environment to identify strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats;
• Identify strategic issues facing the organisation;
• Formulating strategies and plans to manage the issues;
• Implementing strategies and plans successfully; and,
• Reassessing and Revising Strategies and Plans.

Although important parts of strategic planning, implementation and evaluation are beyond the scope of this exercise. However, references to how the CWS could go about this are included in this model plan.

**Long-term Goals**

Based on interview data, and a review of documents related to the CWS, this model strategic plan proposes three long-term goals. First, the CWS should define a “complete” protected area network as one that protects all of the critical habitats of federal species at risk and other important migratory bird habitats. Second, the CWS should become an agency of the federal government, rather than part of a line department. Third, the CWS should begin to create appropriate circumstances to launch a national landscape planning exercise.

The first goal fits with the current mandate of the CWS, and would provide some guidance on the long-term goals of the CWS to the federal government, to other levels of government, and to the Canadian public. The CWS is the lead organisation, on behalf of Environment Canada, for protection of all terrestrial species at risk (except those found within the
National Parks). Purchasing critical habitat would improve the certainty over conservation on those sites. This proposal could be a model of dynamic equilibrium, much like the original conception of the Migratory Bird Sanctuary system. The CWS would protect land for as long as the species of concern requires it, and then the site would be de-listed. This could be illustrated by a map similar to the PCA *National Park System Plan* map. However, the new CWS System could be akin to the National Historic Sites in its inclusion of privately-owned areas. The CWS stewardship programs, the Ecological Gifts Program and the Habitat Stewardship Program, represent significant investments in conservation on privately owned land. Acknowledging the growing role of private conservation would enhance partnership opportunities for the CWS.

The idea of protecting critical habitat by purchase has been proposed before. In the summer of 1947, David Munro (later the Director of CWS), proposed to buy marginal farmland that was important to the migration of sandhill cranes. Munro’s “idea of purchasing critical habitat for management purposes was viewed as highly unconventional at the time” (Burnett, 1999, p. 36). Later, Loughrey (1971) identified an objective for EC that read, “where necessary, put under federal control the habitat required to permit continued existence of endangered species or ecosystems (by determining habitat requirements of rare and endangered species, particularly in historic range, and by preserving habitat through various means and by international agreements and conventions world-wide” (Loughrey, 1971). This memo also mentioned quantitative targets (e.g. 50 wildlife areas, 1 million acres of habitat).

More recently, the Protected Areas Manual refers to the possibility of establishing new NWAs for the purpose of protecting critical habitat. Government programs, such as the Habitat Stewardship Program, provide financial support to conservation efforts on private land important for species at risk. Finally, the announcement of a $225 million contribution to the Nature Conservancy of Canada (discussed in Chapter 4) for acquisition of ecologically sensitive land indicates government support for this type of initiative.
A long-term goal of the CWS should be the establishment of the CWS Agency. It would be important because, much like the PCA, most of the CWS’ work has to do with operations: managing protected areas, enforcing legislation, managing the migratory bird hunt. Some of the advantages to agency status that were identified by the PCA participants included increased control over their financial resources, increased flexibility in administration, and the ability to save some money year-over-year. By separating the Service from the structure of Environment Canada, the CWS would have more control over a variety of operational factors. One advantage would be that Agency status would separate the CWS from Environment Canada, and permit the CWS to promote itself more broadly, unlike the current situation where publications are supposed to refer to Environment Canada, not smaller organisations within the Department. The CWS should begin to direct its operations in a way that would eventually allow for its own Agency Act, focusing on operational issues, creating new revenue streams, and by expanding its political support.

Recent projects, such as the NWT Protected Areas Strategy, the Greenbelt in Ontario, or the Spirit Bear Rainforest Initiative in British Columbia, and announcements (such as the Budget 2007 money for the Nature Conservancy of Canada) indicate that governments are beginning to recognise that more than just parks need to be planned ahead of development. These projects indicate that there is a broader recognition of the need to engage in comprehensive landscape-level planning in advance of development, and that governments are willing to provide money in order to ensure that those plans will be implemented. While they are all, to some degree, experimental, the cooperative planning approach they represent is likely the best - and perhaps last - opportunity for landscape level planning in Canada’s vast territory. Climate change, industrial development, and invasive species (among others) are threats to the continued health of biodiversity in Canada.

42 An initiative of First Nations, several charitable foundations, and the BC and federal governments. For more information, see: Environment Canada, 2007
As the federal organisation responsible for species at risk protection on non-federal lands, the CWS has the responsibility to promote the development of landscape-level planning in Canada. By working with provincial and territorial governments to identify areas of land and water for conservation - outside of the land set aside for National Parks - the CWS would be providing needed federal leadership as well as promoting its own public profile. That is not to say that this would be an easy or a fast undertaking, but if Canada is to protect its biodiversity for the long term, it is a necessary one.

**SWOT**

In analysing the CWS protected areas program, there are a number of issues or aspects of the program that could be labelled according to the SWOT model. Classifying the program in this way could have helped the CWS to develop a robust strategic management plan, as well as to identify strategic issues that need to be managed by the CWS. Some respondents were specifically asked to identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, while other participants volunteered the information over the course of their interviews. In this section, they are presented in no particular order. The question was designed to solicit suggestions for the SWOT in order to compare them to the published plans, as well as to provide input for the preparation of the model strategic plan found in Appendix 1.

Readers should keep in mind that, “only the effective use of strategic resources can create a competitive advantage” (Sanchez, 2003, emphasis added). Accordingly, while a list of strengths and opportunities (i.e., strategic resources) could provide some direction to an organisation, those strategic resources must be understood in the context of the weaknesses of and threats to the organisation. Much like Nutt & Backoff (1992), this following description of SWOTs “is more faithful to the Harvard model, in which attention is directed toward the values of key stakeholders, not just senior managers, in determining strengths and weaknesses” (Nutt & Backoff, 1992, p. 178).
Strengths

Broadly, strengths are the history of the CWS, its employees, existing protected areas that include sites of high biological value, its legislative mandate, and its international reputation. The Canada Wildlife Act (CWA) is identified as an advantage by many interviewees, who state that the CWA, “presented in the right strategic context ... could be a tremendously valuable tool” (CWS7). Because the CWA allows some use of protected areas when the activities do not interfere with the conservation of wildlife (e.g. hunting or grazing where the conservation values allow) it is more likely to be acceptable to provinces and territories than a more restrictive designation (CWS1, CWS7).

Provinces could participate in the advancement of the “conservation mission” but “they [didn’t] have to give up a lot” (CWS1). The CWA is described as “a remarkable tool given when it was created” although it has “never [been] used to the strategic purpose that it was invented to do. By the time it reached the point where they were ready to use it, all the resources went away – 1984” (CWS7). According to Hendee, Stankey and Lucas (1990, p. 16), the guiding rule of wilderness management is that, “wilderness managers should do only what is necessary to meet wilderness objectives and use only the minimum tools, regulation, and enforcement to achieve those objectives.” Thus, the NWA designation, which is flexible enough that the regulations can be tailored to individual sites - to a certain degree – matches well with the guiding rule of wilderness management.

While staff (and the culture associated with them) is not always considered a positive contributor, they are important factors to consider whenever a strategic management process is undertaken. In an organisation, the:

current practices, culture, beliefs, and traditions form a foundation on which change must be built. The first step in strategic management is to review and uncover and then explore these historical commitments to reacquaint decision makers with the basis on which the organisation was built. Changes flow from an appreciation of what must be preserved in
these practices. A dialectic between the old and the new is created to produce a new synthesis on which to build the future. (Nutt & Backoff, 1992, p. 151)

The staff of the CWS is repeatedly identified as a strength of the organisation. Historically, staff were extremely dedicated and mission-driven, producing results beyond what had been expected. This dedication allowed the CWS to survive periods of staff demoralisation and scarce resources.

Another important strength is the history of the CWS, also identified as a significant strategic advantage for the CWS (NGO1, NGO2, CWS1, CWS6). The history provided a sense of mission and of continuity for the employees of the CWS, which was especially important during some of the more troubled times. Connected to the history is the value of CWS brand, through programs such as Hinterland Who’s Who, and outreach activities with rural landowners (Burnett, 1999). While more associated with wildlife activities than their protected areas, CWS staffers feel that they have a good reputation among landowners, the scientific community, and NGOs (both nationally and internationally). This group is smaller than it should be for the CWS to truly succeed - staffers do not mention politicians or the Canadian public, for example. However, by capitalising on the positive qualities associated with its history and name, the CWS could strengthen its work, although staff needs to take care that the history does not become a “boat anchor” (CWS1).

**Weaknesses**

Weaknesses are clearly identified as being resource-related, be they financial or management resources. “Capacity” is a broadly used term (NGO1, CWS6, CWS7) that refers both to finances (NGO1, CWS7) and also strategic thinking, including public outreach (NGO1, NGO2, CWS6, CWS7). One specific weakness of the CWS is a lack of monitoring of their sites. Because “knowledge of public use activity, location and volume is needed to evaluate and preserve viable natural ecosystems, including endangered and threatened plant and animal species” (Hornback & Eagles, 1999, p. 12), the lack of systematic monitoring on CWS sites is a weakness. It is, however, a weakness that the CWS is aware of. Attempts have been made to
quantify some of the risks, e.g. the publication of the *Status of Federal Protected Areas for Wildlife* report that examines various risks to protected areas (Canadian Wildlife Service, 2002). However, a more robust monitoring program (some were suggested in the PASP), especially for monitoring human visitors, would be very valuable for the CWS.

**Opportunities**

Opportunities focus on the existing elements of the CWS. For example, the “unique conservation tools they have” (NGO1) are also valued internally, as the CWS staff identify that “there is a thirst out there for tools that are flexible, that are realistic” (CWS7). The clear “passion” that many CWS employees have is something that could be harnessed as an opportunity (CWS6, NGO2). The new resources that arrived with the *Species at Risk Act* in 2002 are identified as an opportunity for the CWS protected areas (CWS8). Marketing is also identified as an opportunity (CWS6).

As a major strength of the CWS, the *Canada Wildlife Act* (CWA) provides one of the best opportunities for moving forward with conservation. The importance of the CWA arises from: the way the legislation is created - it provides incredible flexibility for creating the type of modern protected area that truly is needed on the landscape to do system-scale networking, using these protected areas as foundations of broader landscape health. (CWS7)

One interview participant advocates the idea that the CWA could be offered to provinces as an option for conservation, where:

we would have to do all the mechanics, because it’s a federal law ... But I think that, strategically, we need to present it to the community, the land management community, as a federal tool that we’re not forcing on anybody ... We’re basically saying that we have this tool that’s really, really flexible, it allows you to heighten the regulatory protection and management around a certain piece of land, but not to the point of a national park ... we would have the provinces ... operate these sites in concert with their own protected
areas network, and with land management in general. Because they control land use planning and land use management at the more general landscape level. (CWS7)

Although the CWS is not currently taking this approach, “that was kind of the vision that we had struck in 2002, to offer it up as a broader tool for land, for ecological land use planning and land management” (CWS7). The CWS could act in an enabling role via the provision of the NWA designation (CWS7).

Another potential opportunity for the CWS protected areas is the federal ownership of many islands, especially in the Atlantic region (where they support lighthouses), and:

in terms of our future, that’s where we want to make sure that we have protected areas ...
in many areas, it's the last refuge for many species. And islands are still largely untouched, and still largely in the hands of government. (CWS9)

The CWS has had trouble in trying to take advantage of this opportunity, such as site contamination and remediation requirements, and the fact that other departments sometimes require fair market value for the land (CWS9).

Partnerships offer a series of potential opportunities to the CWS. Through the “North American Waterfowl Management Plan partnerships, and partnerships with Nature Conservancy and other land trusts” (CWS9) the CWS continues to achieve conservation goals with fewer federal resources. Because “by and large … nobody has a lot of money” conservation organisations act “by working together.” By acting alone, “we don’t always get what we want, in terms of where we want things protected, but we often ... through working with partners, achieve that” (CWS9).

An opportunity to improve the profile of the CWS protected areas could come from a more robust survey of site use. Better information about the number of people visiting the CWS sites is be important because:

under-reporting gives a misleading impression in government, in the public and in business about the level of use of a park and of a parks system. This in turn can lead to
lower levels of policy emphasis in government and to depressed budget levels. (Hornback & Eagles, 1999, p. 14)

The survey would be complicated by the fact that many sites have no on-site staff, and in some cases cannot be safely visited by CWS staff (CWS7, CWS9). Accordingly, a complete inventory of visitors could become a longer-term goal, with a census of some of the most popular sites in the meantime.

Brechin et al. (2002, p. 58) note, “one of the main advantages of reorienting conservation strategies to explicitly incorporate social justice is that the agreements produced by the resulting dialogue would carry greater legitimacy” and is something that the CWS already do, to some degree. Another opportunity for the CWS could come from further increasing partnerships with First Nations. Highlighted in the PASP, which identifies “Aboriginal culture protection” as one of the elements of the new approach to the CWS network (p. 2-5), collaboration with First Nations could be a key for network stability and perhaps growth. Especially in more remote areas, where costs of surveys and enforcement are prohibitive, partnerships with local First Nations may provide one of the key approaches to future CWS sites, such as in the Northwest Territories Protected Areas Strategy.

**Threats**

Interviewees identify a long list of threats, and not all of the threats were external. As identified by Nutt and Backoff, “the internal-external distinctions that are made in the Harvard model do not apply to public and third-sector organisations … Publicness brings with it the notion of internal threats, such as professional values, that can conflict with organisational aims” (Nutt & Backoff, 1992, p. 180).

Broadly speaking, the threats are related to senior civil servants and the government of the day, and the lack of support that those groups have provided to the protected areas. “Constant changes in style,” frequent changes in CWS Directors General, and several re-organisations have

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43 Publicness is a description of institutions that are in the public sector.
created a great deal of uncertainty within the CWS (CWS6, CWS8). A lack of understanding and interest in protected areas at senior management levels is repeatedly identified as a threat. This includes the lack of “serious upper level [management] understanding of migratory birds or the NWA mandate for a long time” (CWS8). The “government itself, depending on the government in power” was a threat (CWS6), which is similar to comments from NGO1 who suggests that “the political climate” is a threat and NGO2 who describes the “miasma that government goes through.”

Another threat, related to the on-going re-organisation process, is the loss of internal science capacity (personal observation). The CWS, which continues to be a science-based organisation, has recently lost much of its internal science capacity. As part of the re-organisation, Environment Canada consolidated many of its science functions in a new Science & Technology (S&T) branch. For example, the National Wildlife Research Institute, long affiliated with the CWS, moved to the S&T branch. Science is not the only area in which the CWS lost capacity; changes are to the degree that one interviewee stated that, “I am of the firm opinion that our reputation has declined in the last 10 years, significantly” (CWS3).

As noted by Nutt and Backoff (1992), professionals (such as the scientists and policy analysts within CWS) can be a threat to organisational aims, especially if they do not understand those aims. For the CWS as an organisation, staff could be a threat, due to their primary loyalty to conservation rather than EC, and because of organisational loyalty to the CWS rather than EC (personal observation).

Soon after beginning her tenure as Director General in 2006, Brenning (the first Director General appointed from outside the wildlife management community, although not the first from outside the CWS) began a process designed to review the role of the CWS protected areas, in an effort to identify the “what to do about it in the future” (CWS6). Recognising that chronic under-resourcing is a threat to the protected areas, the stated aim of the process is to identify options for the future of the Network. Under-resourcing of the protected areas is a threat on two levels. Not
only does it create biological threats (NGO2), but the legal liability posed by deteriorating infrastructure and a lack of site supervision could prompt senior management to eliminate sites rather than investing in them (CWS7). CWS protected areas are considered to be “weak enough that they could be given away easily” (NGO2). The CWS itself is threatened by the drive to create a more cohesive Department (reprising the 1972 Stevenson & Kellogg report), something identified by two respondents (CWS6, CWS8). Several threats are identified by single interviewees, such as the significant administrative burden created by the Species at Risk Act (CWS8), the “lack of political awareness” within CWS (NGO1), and Parks Canada (NGO2).

There are also more general external threats faced by the CWS. Any time that a government aims to restrict the uses of a piece of land, there is the potential for conflict. As conservationists aim to increase the number of protected areas in Canada, “the resource industries are all lobbying not to do that” (CWS7). Another industry with the potential to create confrontation is tourism. Eagles, et al. (2002) foresee a rise in tourism, even in the most remote protected areas. For the CWS, and the PCA, the rise in tourism could impinge on their ability to successfully manage visitors.

The CWS protected areas face significant threats to their ecological integrity, summarised in the SOFPAW report (Canadian Wildlife Service, 2002). Threats reported on ten or more protected areas include (in order of frequency): tourism, other human disturbances, pesticides/fertilisers, exotic vegetation, climate change, petrochemicals, poaching, land ownership, urbanisation, agriculture, and mining. Tourism, human disturbance and pesticides are also qualitatively identified as the most important stressors facing the Network. Land ownership is an issue for two reasons: one was the difficulties in developing landscape-level plans when ownership was fragmented (especially when developers or speculators are among the land owners) and the other is related to the privately owned status of some protected areas (Canadian Wildlife Service, 2002). Land ownership and ecological integrity contribute to the status of network integrity, which could be a threat to the CWS.
Employee and visitor health and safety is identified as one of the most immediate threats facing the CWS (CWS1, CWS4, CWS7, CWS9). Without adequate resources to provide equipment, replace missing or vandalised signs, or carry out other necessary management activities, the CWS faces a potential legal threat, in addition to all of the other threats described.

Finally, delisting sites can be seen as an opportunity or as a threat. There is provision in the Migratory Birds Convention Act to de-list sites if they no longer play a role in conservation. For sites that no longer provide significant conservation value, the CWS should pursue de-listing, which would provide the opportunity to devote resources to the remaining sites (CWS7). However, whether or not there is still conservation value, the CWS would be seen as an organisation that destroyed a protected area, which could pose a threat to various relationships, especially with ENGOs. Previous attempts to de-list sites have met with significant opposition, even though the biological reason the MBSs were created no longer exists (CWS7).
Protecting Habitat: A Strategic Management plan for the CWS Protected Areas

Network

Protecting wildlife and habitat provides benefits to all Canadians by conserving our natural heritage and contributing to the maintenance of healthy ecosystems for present and future generations. The federal government is responsible for species at risk and for migratory birds. The Canadian Wildlife Service works with its stakeholders and partners toward the conservation of Canada’s biodiversity. In order to protect the biodiversity that benefits us all, we acquire land that is important to the species in our mandate, such as bird nesting colonies. Accordingly, we work with scientists, conservationists, the public, and other government departments to identify those important sites. We negotiate with willing sellers to acquire or manage those important sites. Science forms the basis of our decisions, but it is the Canadian people, through their elected representatives, that have the final decision about conservation.

The Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS) works with all stakeholders to ensure that the process is fair and equitable to all parties including wildlife, which cannot speak for itself. The CWS is accountable to the people of Canada, through Parliament, for all decisions that it makes. As a science-based organisation, we continually identify ways by which we can learn from experience. One recent advance has been our development of ecosystem approaches to management. We work with national and international partners to publicise the effects of human impacts and to educate the Canadian public about actions that they can take in order to reduce their impact on biodiversity. This plan identifies actions over the next five years. It is a hybrid of strategy and operations that will help us to achieve our long-term goal of protecting native species of wildlife for Canadians.
Who We Are

The Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS) is a component of Environment Canada that manages the department’s wildlife programs. The name is well-recognized worldwide to denote Canada’s wildlife conservation agency and has enormous value both within and beyond the department for its connotation of a long history of scientific expertise, commitment, leadership, and partnerships. It is used here in an inclusive way that builds on these associations to describe all staff and programs of Environment Canada that are involved in and support the department’s wildlife conservation activities.

The CWS protected areas network is distinctive in many ways. Our first site was established in 1887, and the network has grown to become the second largest network of protected areas in Canada. Covering almost 12 million hectares of wildlife habitat, CWS properties include federally-owned sites, provincially-owned lands, and even privately-owned land. The legislative tools we use are some of the most flexible in the country, which means we can adapt their use to many different situations, according to the need.

Our staff is made up of professionals: scientists, land managers, policy analysts, and law enforcement officials. We work with professionals from outside the CWS who have expertise in disciplines as varied as law, communications, and education. Across the country, we working together to protect Canada’s unique biodiversity. CWS staffers are recognised nationally and internationally for their expertise and dedication to the protection of wildlife and habitat.

What We Do

The CWS protects Canadian biodiversity, our wildlife and the ecosystems of which they are a part. Because of our legislative mandate, we have a special focus on migratory birds and species at risk. A key tool for the CWS, and one of our most prominent programs, is the establishment of protected areas. These protected areas are called National Wildlife Areas, Migratory Bird Sanctuaries, and Marine Wildlife Areas. As a science-based organisation, we recognise the need to protect wildlife, habitat, and ecosystem functions.
Who We Work For
The CWS works to protect wildlife, habitat, and ecosystem functions for the benefit of present and future generations of Canadians.

Why Plan?
Creating a strategic plan and long-term goals is important for identifying resources, providing certainty to industry, and providing a long-term goal toward which we can work toward with our partners.

Our Stakeholders
We protect biodiversity for the benefit of present and future generations of Canadians. We create our protected areas for wildlife first, but we also recognise the important role that Canadians play. In fulfilling our task to protect wildlife, we work closely with other federal organisations, Provincial and Territorial natural resource organisations, First Nations, non-governmental organisations, and the Canadian public.

What Do We Value?
The CWS values ecosystems, and the people that live in them. Human health and the economy both are two aspects of life that depend on healthy ecosystems. We believe in conservation using an ecosystem approach; one site is part of several different systems. We protect nationally important wildlife habitat in a way that ensures consistency across the country. The contributions of all Canadians are important for the future of our protected areas; we protect our rich biological heritage on their behalf. We also value the special knowledge that Canada’s Aboriginal Peoples can provide.

Vision
Our vision is a Canadian landscape where wildlife, habitat and ecosystem functions are protected by a comprehensive protected areas network.
Mission
The mission of the CWS Protected Areas Network is to create, manage and safeguard a national network of lands and waters sufficient in size, diversity and location to make available, now and in the future, public benefits that are associated with wildlife over which the Federal Government has responsibility, particularly migratory birds and endangered species.xiv

Situational Assessmentxv
Our purpose is to protect habitat, as we recognise its importance to preserving biodiversity. Our Protected Areas Network will be complete when all significant migratory bird sites and all critical habitats of species at risk in Canada are protected. We recognise that habitat is not static, and that we will need to adapt our sites as the wildlife and ecosystems change. This will mean a dynamic network - acquiring land only when the current sites no longer protect the species that the sites were designated for. A variety of tools exist to help us achieve this goal, including direct acquisition with land, partnership with other federal departments, and formal stewardship agreements, such as the Ecological Gifts Program.

Wildlife conservation was, for a long time, aimed at providing game for hunting. However, demographics are changing and the number of hunters in Canada has declined significantly. We have a long history of collaboration with hunters, but we need to enhance our already strong partnerships, into new areas, particularly by reaching out to the Canadian public, in order to maintain our important conservation role.xvii Specific groups to target would include naturalists, conservationists and academics, with the eventual goal of sponsoring a national organisation to support our Protected Areas Network.xviii

The CWS has significant issues of capacity. The biggest threat to the CWS Network is the current - and chronic - lack of resources.xix We are responding to critiques by modernising our planning and site management.xx Canadians have repeatedly expressed the value they assign to environmental protection. The federal government must allocate resources according to this need, or many of our protected areas will fail to maintain the values that they were created to protect.
As a Service, the CWS maintains excellence in science and research related to wildlife. However, as people are able to travel to increasingly remote places, and as resource development expands, the CWS needs to develop excellence in research related to land management, human-wildlife interactions (including public wildlife education), and in minimizing the impact of resource development.

The CWS prides itself on maintaining good relationships: with our fellow staffers, demonstrated through factors like a very high retention rate, and with our partners. Like many other government departments, we are facing the possibility of many retirements over the next five years and staff recruitment requires new resources.

Our legislative tools (the *Migratory Birds Convention Act* and the *Canada Wildlife Act*) are strong, and provide flexible protected areas that allow us to meet conservation targets without completely limiting the possibility of using the sites. As long as activities in our sites take place in a manner that does not impact on wildlife protection, we believe that conservation and carefully planned human activities can co-exist in a model of sustainable development.

Migratory Bird Sanctuaries and National Wildlife Areas, which are created by regulation rather than by statute, can change relatively fast, as the needs of the wildlife they are created to protect change. The strength and flexibility of our legislative tools makes them ideal for partnerships with other federal departments. The flexible nature of NWAs can help to reduce the costs of creating a protected area. Most provinces and territories are in the process of preparing or implementing environmental strategies. These efforts provide an opportunity for CWS protected areas to contribute to provincial biodiversity goals. Municipalities also offer opportunities for advancing the protection of wildlife.

The *Species at Risk Act* (SARA) provides us with another tool for conserving species at risk in Canada. Critical habitat, which will be identified for all endangered or threatened species, is the most important habitat to protect. The CWS Protected Areas Network provides a key
opportunity to work with landowners to conserve these areas of critical habitat. However, in order to properly respond to the SARA, we require further resources.xxiii

Because we have concentrated on science and wildlife health, many Canadians are not familiar with the CWS. Improving our public profile will be an important step forward for the CWS.xxxiv It will also give us the opportunity to interact with the public about protection of wildlife and wildlife habitat. Partnerships with non-governmental organisations may be a way to begin to accomplish this.xxxv We plan to begin establishing NWAs for the purpose of public educationxxxvi in order to educate Canadians about our biological heritage, to provide opportunities for cooperation with provinces and territories, and to increase the public profile of conservation. Establishing these sites will create opportunities for Canadians to interact with wildlife and its habitat in easy reach of urban centres. It will also offer the potential to generate revenue to offset the costs of managing sites that are less accessible for visitation.xxxvii Our focus on wildlife has resulted in some highly effective projects, but we have neglected to remember that wildlife does not vote.xxxviii

Opportunities for the CWS will be built on the passion of our employees.xxxix The CWS has always been a small organisation, but we have been able to achieve much more than would appear possible given our size.xl Our size has the potential to become more of a weakness as our administrative burden increases.xli Emerging threats, such as climate change, will require us to adapt and change our management.xlii

Strategic Issue Agenda

In expanding the CWS Network, we must take all aspects of sustainability into account.xliii

Health and Safety

Our first priority will be to meet basic standards for human health and safety at all sites. This will require capital investment for things such as signs, fences, and vehicles. It will also
require some new educational programming for staff, but we can do this quickly with sufficient resources.xliii

Renewing the Network

The CWS Protected Areas Network needs sufficient resources for effective management: financial resources, human resources, and political resources. We know of many sites that could become candidates for protection, but we lack the resources to investigate them more fully. Once sites become protected areas, we lack the resources to manage them in the way that they deserve. In order to obtain these resources, we need to explain the benefits that Canada receives from these protected areas.xlv We also need to reach out to Canadians. In order to be successful in our mission in the future, we need to include more people in our activities, including people of diverse backgrounds.xlvi

We will be to hire professional planners and financial analysts who can manage the network land acquisition and communicate with central agencies on their own terms. A more thorough management training program for protected areas staff is also part of our long-term plan.xlvii We also require new planning approaches to unify the varying programs within the CWS. We will begin to identify national goals for our Network.xlviii We will improve and integrate monitoring and enforcement.xlix

In order to be successful with this network renewal, Protected Areas will require an additional $25 million per year in operational funds, and approximately 40 new employees.1

Landscape-level planning/partnerships

The CWS will have to work with an increasing number of jurisdictions as conservation planning expands to an increasingly large scale.li While conservation efforts at this scale are now more common, recognition of the need is long standing.lii As a federal organisation, the CWS will expand its role as a facilitator for inter-provincial and international discussions on wildlife management.liii The CWS participates in a number of international fora that could serve as models
for such planning efforts. Involvement with broader planning efforts is the only way that conservation will be successful over the long term. Landscape-level planning will also provide the opportunity to account for some of the changes that take place over time. It is not necessary to make every site a protected area, and involvement in landscape-level planning is one way to identify those sites that should become protected areas. However, we believe that it is better to err on the side of caution and create more protected areas.

The CWS will learn from the DFO’s integrated management approach to planning. Marine reserves, generally, take a more integrated approach to conservation, and tend to focus on ecosystem function rather than single-species issues. Because the CWS has a specific mission to conserve species at risk, single-species approaches may be required on occasion, but we will prefer to use ecosystem-level approaches.

Network Planning and Expansion

The long-term plan for the CWS Network is to protect all critical habitats for federal species and the important habitats for migratory birds. Where possible, we will also seek to acquire important habitat for vulnerable species (“special concern” under the SARA) to mitigate the risk of those species becoming endangered. We will target sites according to their importance for federal species and according to our available resources, but it is important that we retain the ability to work opportunistically because we have committed to working with willing sellers, including provincial, territorial, and First Nations governments. At times, a slightly less important site may be more affordable or have a willing seller.

Across the federal family of protected area management organisations, we will work to create a network that will be able to maintain the biodiversity of Canada. To do so, we will adopt four ecological goals, recognising that they will be difficult to fulfil:

- Represent, in a system of protected areas, all native ecosystem types and seral stages across their natural range of variation;
• Maintain viable populations of all native species in natural patterns of abundance and distribution;
• Maintain ecological and evolutionary processes, such as disturbance regimes, hydrological processes, nutrient cycles, and biotic interactions;
• Manage landscapes and communities to be responsive to short-term and long-term environmental change and to maintain the evolutionary potential of the biota.\textsuperscript{lxiv}

We recognise that we must include Canadians in our protected areas. Without the interest of Canadians, we will fail to steward the land we have been entrusted with. In the first year, we will realise the following objectives:

• Finalise the process of updating the ecological framework of Canada, which we will use to identify the ecosystem types and seral stages that will be represented in the next generation of our Network;
• Survey experts to identify the state of knowledge about the status of native species, and what viable populations would be;
• Convene a series of workshops to identify best practices for maintaining ecological and evolutionary processes;
• Meet with all relevant organisations involved in the management of landscape in order to develop protocols for maintaining the evolutionary potential of our native biota.

After the first year, we will re-evaluate them, identifying the logical next phase of work.

Many of the easy opportunities for creating new protected areas are in Canada’s North. The ongoing relationship the Aboriginal peoples in the North have with their environment means that protected areas must be adapted for local needs. We have embraced this new type of protected area in the North, and we will expand it to Aboriginal lands in southern Canada.\textsuperscript{lxv} We can maintain both conservation and eco-cultural values with hard work and equitable partnerships. Creating protected areas on Aboriginal lands also provides opportunities for Aboriginal peoples to be employed as enforcement officers or as interpreters.\textsuperscript{lxvi}
Site selection

Biologists and network managers may have little or no training in planning, and could thus fail to achieve optimal results. In order to improve our chances of success, we should make each of our sites as large as possible. Not all sites need to be managed by the CWS, nor would that be desirable. However, as a Canadian leader in biodiversity conservation, we will take a leadership role as the Canadian government develops a national strategy for protected areas. The first step will be the creation of a Federal Protected Areas Strategy, building on the success of the Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy.

We will continue to expand our selection of sites for species at risk, and other non-exploited species. There are many approaches to site selection, but CWS will concentrate on protecting the most in need. By protecting habitat of species at risk (many of which are at risk because of habitat loss) the CWS will also protect other wildlife species. We will plan our sites to represent habitat that is important to wildlife of national interest. We must also begin to account for ecosystem variability in our sites, especially with the expected variability resulting from climate change.

We recognise the need to be more systematic and transparent in our approach to conservation. While it is better to provide a choice of sites to protect, the nature of critical habitat and migratory routes may mean that only a single site is suitable for achieving our conservation goals. However, we will consult with local communities about preferred sites prior to acquisition. We will also improve the clarity of our site selection criteria so Canadians will understand why we are establishing protected areas. While site establishment will be limited in cases where there are no willing sellers, we will nonetheless maintain a long-term goal for the ultimate size of the protected area.

Ecological Integrity

Ecological integrity of our existing protected areas is under threat. In order to deal with the threats to our protected areas, we will carry out a series of actions aimed at improving
public understanding of the issues impinging on our protected areas. This would include working with neighbouring landowners to discuss pesticide use, modernising our programs to improve facilities and education for visitors, and improving public education to indicate sites where visitation should not occur.\textsuperscript{lxix}

We will pursue land acquisition to improve the ecological integrity of sites through infilling and buffering. We will target our stewardship programs to improve the ecological status of our protected areas. For example, the Ecological Gifts Program and the Nature Conservancy of Canada partnership will specifically target areas around National Wildlife Areas to provide buffer zones for the sites.\textsuperscript{lxxx} By enlarging each protected area as much as possible, through acquisition or in cooperation with neighbouring landowners, we will also protect our sites against major catastrophes such as storms and climate change.\textsuperscript{lxxxi}

Another important area for improving ecological integrity will be to cooperate with provinces, territories and municipalities in developing improved land-use standards.\textsuperscript{lxxxii} Because we identify pesticides and herbicides as one of the top three threats to CWS protected areas,\textsuperscript{lxxxiii} we need cooperative approaches with our neighbours to protect our sites.

\textit{Interpretation, Communications and Outreach}

The CWS needs to improve its public outreach. As Canada’s federal voice for wildlife, we need to reach out to policy makers, decision makers, and the Canadian public in order to help fulfil our mandate to conserve Canadian wildlife. We believe that in order to achieve the desired level of cooperation, people must know what their actions are protecting.\textsuperscript{lxxxiv} Hinterland Who’s Who, with its iconic theme music, educated the public about wildlife in the 1960s, 1970s and into the early 1980s. Recently, the CWS partnered with the Canadian Wildlife Federation to re-launch Hinterland Who’s Who, mainly using the internet.\textsuperscript{lxxxv} The CWS will enhance the revived project, creating new educational materials that can be provided to schools along with opportunities to visit our protected areas. The vast majority of our sites were created to protect specific wildlife
populations, which have varying degrees of sensitivity to human impacts. Accordingly, we need a mechanism to exchange information with the public about our sites and about wildlife in general. Through our power to create sites for education, we will pursue partnerships with provinces, territories, and NGOs to begin to create a culture of conservation in Canada. Within ten years, we will have an educational program, with a NWA within an hour’s drive of each major Canadian city. In order to achieve this, we will identify, in collaboration with other wildlife and conservation organisations, sites in close proximity to urban centres that will allow for easy access to high quality natural areas.

The CWS will also develop a comprehensive policy to address visitors to our protected areas. Initially, the policy will serve to manage visitors to our protected areas. Over time, as we develop our interpretive protected areas, the policy will be expanded to include more elaborate educational opportunities. Our eventual goal is that all Canadians will visit a National Wildlife Area by the time they complete high school. Part of the educational output will be to inform the public about sites where visitation is inappropriate. What experiences are Canadians seeking when they visit our sites, and how well are we meeting those desires? A new thrust for the CWS will be to survey visitors to our protected areas in order to better understand Canadian recreation goals and to improve our services.

Because we protect wildlife habitat, and most threats to habitat are caused by people, public education is our most important tool for long-term protection of wildlife. The CWS needs to re-engage with public outreach in order to meet our goals. Balancing preservation and interpretation is not easy. This is why the option to create NWAs for interpretation is such an attractive one. Science, while very important to our conservation mandate, will not be enough to preserve the wildlife habitat we value so highly. Accordingly, we will also work towards the following education and interpretation objectives, in order to support our conservation mandate.
Research and Monitoring

We can also create NWAs is for research. We recognise that there are some commercial activities that can take place within protected areas at low intensity levels, without causing any harm to the conservation value of a the site. However, it is unclear at what point the activities will begin to cause harm to the protected area. Creating protected areas that allow us to research such key issues will be an important step forward for the CWS.\(^{xcii}\) We will create a small number of NWAs for pure research purposes,\(^{xciii}\) in order to reduce the pressure on fragile wildlife sites. Collaborations with university researchers have long been a source of important management information for CWS scientists, and we have also made a significant contribution to the scientific literature about Canadian biology.\(^{xciv}\) Promoting new ties with researchers will help to promote research partnerships that investigate issues of concern to the CWS, such as ecological integrity of our protected areas.

Monitoring various impacts on our protected areas is another important area of business. Because of chronically low levels of staffing, many of our sites are visited by CWS staff only every few years.\(^{xcv}\) Having good quality data about human on activities in the protected areas is important for future management decisions.\(^{xcvi}\) A challenge for monitoring will be to obtain broad agreement about the indicators that will be monitored.\(^{xcvii}\) In order to survive, we must be able to demonstrate that we are providing value for money. We need to be involved in setting the tasks we are evaluated on, and in determining the indicators of success.\(^{xcviii}\) In order to do so, we need to have monitoring data to demonstrate the impact of our activities.\(^{xcix}\)

Cooperation with other landowners

To achieve our goal of using the ecosystem approach to planning, we must cooperate with our neighbours and other organisations around our protected areas. The CWS can learn from Parks Canada’s efforts at working with local interests when creating and managing a national park.\(^{c}\) Working with landowners is a long-term solution to landscape protection that is socially
and politically feasible. Effective working relationships are also important in marine protection, although there are no direct parallels to landowners. Community involvement is key.

Agency Status

The establishment of the CWS as an operational agency, much like PCA, is our long-term goal. In order to create the conditions for our own agency act, we must enhance our revenue generation. Creating sources of revenue is something we have already done, but we will continue to develop new sources in order to establish the conditions for enabling legislation as an agency. Status as an agency would allow us significantly more freedom in operations; as operations are our primary reason for existence, this would be a significant benefit.

Feasibility Assessment

The elements included in this plan have varying degrees of feasibility. Some of the easily achievable items, such as improving our communications, will also assist in creating the conditions for making our more ambitious elements possible. In the current political climate, the government is giving environmental issues high priority. In future, we need to have a plan that will capitalise on such circumstances.

Some of the more immediate objectives will be our top priorities, such as improving communication and outreach. Important external initiatives, such as leading a national protected areas planning exercise, will require negotiation and efforts to create the circumstances under which the plan will be acceptable. A more feasible approach may be to develop bilateral plans with each province and territory, modelled more closely after the NWT Protected Areas Strategy. We believe that all of the items proposed are feasible over the long term. Achieving some of our objectives may require careful assessment of the political environment before we propose them. Timing will be very important.
Footnotes

i Some of this habitat may be found on private land. In cases where the landowner is unwilling to sell the land to the CWS, there are other potential options for protecting the habitat. The CWS administers a variety of programs designed to encourage land conservation by the private sector, such as the Ecological Gifts Program and the Habitat Stewardship Program. This alternative option fits with the policy intentions of government initiatives such as the $225 million contribution to the Nature Conservancy of Canada.


iii Brechin et al. (2002) identify six key elements of social and political processes that are required for conservation. They suggest that unless interventions meet their criteria (especially #1-4) interventions will likely fail because of increasing resistance. These criteria are (p. 43-44):

- Human dignity [who benefits?]
- Legitimacy
- Governance
- Accountability
- Adaptation and Learning
- Non-local forces

iv In this case, willing sellers includes provincial governments and other federal land owners. The CWS is reluctant to take on any new sites for which it does not have control over the land (the exception is when management of the NWA is delegated to another Minister, as in CFB Suffield NWA).

v “Effective ecosystem policy intervention is the art of the possible and is rarely the strict application of leading-edge natural science or best available technology” (Bissix & Rees, 2001, p. 578).
Porter suggests that a major contributor to the perceived failure of strategic planning is an inability of organisations to differentiate strategy and operational effectiveness (Porter, 1996).

Bryson (1995, p. 76-77) identifies six questions that should be answered during the strategic planning process:

1. Who are we? (need to distinguish between what it is and what it does)
2. In general, what are the basic social or political needs we exist to meet, or what are the basic social or political problems we exist to address?
3. In general, what do we recognize, anticipate, and respond to those needs or problems?
4. How should we respond to our key stakeholders?
5. What are our philosophy, values, and culture?
6. What makes us distinctive or unique?

This is the way the CWS defines itself in its Strategic Plan (2000, p. 3)

Protecting sites is increasingly being recognised as the important step in maintaining wildlife populations, for example Sarkar & Margules, who write “places are what matter for conservation” (2002, p. 302). Noss, one of the most prominent scholars in conservation biology, writes that “many biologists now acknowledge that, despite notable successes, single-species management has caused many problems” (Noss & Cooperrider, 1994, p. 25).

“Creating a plan and getting an idea of where our interests lie while we look for funding would create more certainty for industry” (DFO1).

The CWS used to promote standards and strategies at a regional scale: “in developing our strategy, and despite our federal role, it is essential to apply regional criteria in selecting between alternative proposals. Any attempt to adhere to absolute criteria nationwide would only tend further to widen the disparity between “have” and “have-not” regions” (Boyd, 1969, p. 18).
However, as a federal organisation, it is important for the CWS to maintain a single set of national standards to promote accountability and transparency in decision-making.

xiii Adapted from vision statement in CWS Protected Areas Strategic Plan (2005, p. 2-5). “A comprehensive protected areas network that contributes to the conservation and protection of Canada’s wildlife and the ecosystems of which they are a part.”

xiv Adapted from the following: “The special mission of the National Wildlife Refuge System is to provide, manage and safeguard a national network of lands and waters sufficient in size, diversity and location to make available, now and in the future, public benefits that are associated with wildlife over which the Federal Government has responsibility, particularly migratory birds and endangered species” (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1976, p. I-4).

xv Bowman (2003) indicates that the first thing to do in preparing a strategic plan is to develop an understanding of the firm’s strategic assets. These assets include capabilities and/or resources that can either win new business or help to lower costs” (Bowman, 2003).

xvi Agee (1996), among others, emphasises that ecosystems are dynamic. Noss writes that, “a glaring deficiency of many conservation plans is their failure to recognize and to accommodate change in Nature” (1994, p.12).

xvii The close collaboration between the CWS and hunters is long-standing: “from the time wildlife conservation became a matter of public policy in Canada, it was closely allied to the recreational pursuit of fish and game” (Burnett, 1999, p. 83). Hunters, who have been traditional supporters of CWS activities, are declining in number. Sales of hunting permits have been declining since they peaked in 1978. Over the next twenty years, the total number of permits declined by 61% and not all permit holders actually hunted in any one year (Boyd, et al., 2002). The number of active hunters declined by 46% between 1985 and 1998; between 1981 and 1996, the rate of Canadians’ hunting participation decreased from 9.8 percent to 5.1 percent, a decline of 33 percent (Boyd et al., 2002). The authors suggest that the total number of hunters will remain
substantially lower than at the peak. CWS interviewees are aware of the potential threat posed by
the decline in the number of Canadians who hunt, although it poses less of a risk to the CWS than
it does to provincial wildlife organisations (CWS9). For the CWS, hunting is as “a valuable tool
in managing migratory birds ... But it does not have a role in recruiting or retaining hunters”
unlike the Fish and Wildlife Service in the United States (CWS5). The solution for the CWS is to
educate people, so that “the public continues to support us in our mission and our mandate”
(CWS6). If that is the case, the decline in the number of hunters will not be a threat.

The change could be a challenge for the CWS because of its history, but the important
thing will be to “not really tie the existence of its system so cleanly in peoples’ minds to that
community. It’s a difficult thing to do, because they [hunters] were the impetus behind the
network” (CWS7). This dilemma illustrates some of the CWS’ “mixed philosophy” when it
comes to hunting (CWS9). CWS interviewees did indicate that there has been a strong history of
partnerships with other outside organisations (CWS8).

xviii For example, the US has a very active national NGO, the National Wildlife Refuge
Association (http://www.refugenet.org/).

xix CWS7, CWS8

xx CWS4

xxi CWS8

xxii CWS8

xxiii CWS6

xxiv CWS6

xxv CWS7, CWS9

xxvi CWS7

xxvii CWS7
CWS7. The examples of administrative partnerships with other federal departments are currently limited to the CFB Suffield NWA, although other such partnerships are possible. The amendment of the CWA to allow this type of partnership was the result of a “sort of strategic plan” (CWS9).

Dixon & Sherman (1990, p. 18) identify various costs of protected areas:

- direct costs (budget)
- indirect costs (damages indirectly caused by existence of protected area, e.g. crop damage)
- opportunity costs (benefits lost by society when area is protected)

Because they allow some other activities to take place, NWAs minimize the opportunity costs of protected areas.

CWS8. Examples discussed included the New Brunswick biodiversity strategy and the Northwest Territories Protected Areas Strategy.

CWS9. The CWS already has one protected area that is partially owned by the Ottawa Public School Board - Beckett Creek MBS (http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showdoc/cr/C.R.C.-c.1036/sc:_S//en#anchorsc:_S)

CWS Protected Areas Network includes all National Wildlife Areas and Migratory Bird Sanctuaries (and eventually, Marine Wildlife Areas). Having more than one type of protected area has provided increased flexibility for protected area managers in the past. For example, it allows the CWS to establish MBSs on private land, something that is not currently possible on National Wildlife Areas. At this point in time, there is no support for ceasing the dual designations, although the CWS is not making any specific efforts to create new MBSs (personal observation).

CWS8

CWS6

For example, working with Friends Groups or with the Green Budget Coalition (CWS9).
The *Canada Wildlife Act* allows the CWS to create NWAs specifically for the purpose of interpretation. Because NWAs are often located at a distance from urban centres, and the sites do not have the iconic appeal of the National Parks, creating these NWAs will provide new opportunities for conservation and education. Because there are specific biological criteria for creating wildlife conservation NWAs, identifying these new sites for interpretation will allow the CWS to create these new publicly-accessible NWAs. Some regions will not require new sites (e.g. Cap Tourmente, with extensive visitor infrastructure, is located within a 30-minute drive of Quebec City).

Howard Douglas, appointed Superintendent of Rocky Mountains Park (now Banff National Park) in 1897, was an early advocate for wildlife preservation, and he believed that it was a duty of the state to protect wildlife. He felt that, in order to win government support, he would have to show that the provision of parks and wildlife could become commercially viable (Foster, 1978). While many of the National Parks have become commercially viable, the PCA has had problems with too much visitation, creating its own set of problems. The CWS will have to plan visitation policies carefully.

This echoes a comment from PCA4 who reported on a presentation with the then Minister responsible for Parks (Jean Chrétien) who pointed out that birds don’t vote and thus a National Park was unlikely to be created in the Belcher Islands.

The CWS is known for “punch[ing] above its weight” (CWS8).

For example, the SARA is heavily focused on planning, and documenting of activity. It is “very administrative” (CWS8).

"It is important that management strategies integrate biological, physical, and socio-economic components and interests in a holistic manner” (Barrett & Peles, 1994, p. 103).
All CWS respondents indicate that health and safety is an issue for protected areas. In some cases, sites cannot be visited because the CWS lacks the proper equipment (e.g. boats with sufficient horsepower) (CWS7).

“Even where adequate amounts of land are given protected status, these areas often receive only limited funds for management – essentially because many of their benefits go unnoticed or are quite dispersed over time and space. Furthermore, since the government receives no compensation for many of these benefits, there may be little motivation to allocate the funds needed to ensure proper management and continued provision of these benefits” (Dixon & Sherman, 1990, p. 3).

“Though ethnic minorities constitute more than one-fourth of the population, a very low percentage are currently employed or have any input in the federal land management agencies that oversee public lands” (Taylor, 2000, p. 175). Although the discussion is American, observation indicates that a very similar pattern occurs in Canada.

In terms of organizational structure, Rogers (1981) finds that the most significant of these is the way management posts are filled. In the public sector, professionals tend to be promoted into positions of management, whereas in the private sector, professionals act as advisors to professional managers. Accordingly, there is the potential for management problems as practitioners learn to be managers, to varying degrees of success. This is a problem for the CWS, where professionals tend to be biologists, without any training in management. While some individuals are naturally able to overcome the lack of training through instinct or intellect, and some seek training of their own initiative, others seem to flounder in their new position. As overheard, describing the federal government system of promotions, “you keep getting promoted until you can’t handle your job, and then you stay there.” [The Peter Principle]

More systematic planning is necessary, because:
You can’t just go spending millions of dollars willy nilly. There is an element of cowboy science that’s always pervaded, although the whole reputation of the organization is built upon the quality of our science, planning is not our forte as an organization. It’s absolutely appropriate for TBS to be asking “what’s your system plan?” And if we never came up with it, then it explains why we never get any money to do it. I’m a believer in strategic planning, we don’t have it, ergo, I agree, they should not give us money. They should give us money to maintain the ones we have, but again I think that’s probably in part because we have just not done a good job of asking for it, although there is politics involved. A system plan would be a great idea. (CWS3)

“...When placed within the context of adaptive management … unification of planning, assessment, monitoring, and research is possible. Without such a unification, forest biodiversity is unlikely to be conserved, except by accident” (Noss, 1999, p. 137).

Figures identified in the Management Review (Canadian Wildlife Service, 2006). The CWS is in the process of identifying management standards for its protected areas (e.g., the number of protected areas practitioners required for each site). These figures represent the first estimate of these standards.

Planning across borders “may further accentuate the difficult nature of managing land across complicated boundaries of ownership and jurisdiction” (Hatch, Uriarte, Fink, Aldrich-Wolfe, Allen, et al., 2002, p. 690)

Early conservationists noted that political boundaries were not a limit on resources; in the early 20th Century, US President Teddy Roosevelt wrote to Prime Minister Laurier to say that the need to conserve resources “is as wide as the area upon which they exist” (cited in Foster, 1978, p. 36).

For example, the Canadian Forestry Service has proposed a similar role for itself in the forestry sector:
As the rallying force behind the various factions making up the Canadian forest community, the CFS has a vital and exciting role to play in seeing that the policy and decision makers—both within our own government and forest community and amongst governments, stakeholders and product buyers worldwide—recognize our organization as a global leader in the realm of sustainable forest management. (Hardy, 2003, p. 739)

Examples include the Trilateral Committee for Wildlife and Ecosystem Conservation and Management between Canada, US, Mexico; Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance; Convention on Biological Diversity; CITES.

Protecting ecologically important sites is an accepted part of conservation, but “protecting every acre in nature reserves is neither feasible nor necessary to conserve biodiversity” (Noss & Cooperrider, 1994, p. 100). Entering into land use planning processes will help to identify the key areas for protection. As I learned during my employment with the CWS, the federal government used to be involved in land use planning, to some degree. In recent years, Environment Canada has pulled back from involvement in land use planning because it is not directly relevant to its mandate. However, there has been a history of involvement in broader planning.

By 1979, CWS habitat biologists “were becoming increasingly convinced that tightly focused species/population management projects would prove to be not only ruinously expensive, but also a wholly inadequate response to the need.” This was complicated by the awareness that “intensive management of small protected areas would never be enough to generate the quantity of waterfowl that the North American hunting fraternity desired” (Burnett, 1999, p. 98). Staff became convinced of the need to seek ways to protect more than individual sites. This led to the increasing promotion of landowner stewardship, through such ventures as the formation of Wildlife Habitat Canada, and the North American Waterfowl Management Plan (Burnett, 1999).

Environment Canada used to have an organisation called the Lands Directorate that was involved in broader landscape-level planning. When the organisation was “dismantled” in 1988,
many staff members were reassigned to the CWS, which “brought new expertise to CWS in the
field of land use planning and strategy. Such skills were needed” because of the increase in CWS
protected areas, along with other programs such as the Western Hemisphere Shorebird Reserves,
Ramsar Sites, and North American Waterfowl Management Plan stewardship agreements”
(Burnett, 1999, p. 102). The arrival of the Lands staff was key, because the CWS was “in need of
a framework to coordinate its involvement in land management” (Burnett, 1999, p. 102).

There is a need to coordinate “the planning and management of protected areas” with “the
use and management of other areas rather than treated in isolation. The long term success of
protected areas must be seen in the light of the search for more sustainable patterns of
development in general” (Davey, 1998, p. 2). We must being to create protected areas that “work
in concert with surrounding working landscapes to maintain biodiversity” (Beazley, 1997, p. 60).
The most important task in land protection will be “selecting sites that warrant the highest degree
of protection … because these sites are the core areas around which a compatible land use system
can be built” (Noss & Cooperrider, 1994, p. 100).

\* vi “Surprisingly little attention has been given to many temporal phenomena in conservation
planning” (Cowling, Pressey, Rouget, & Lombard, 2003, p. 191). We must pay more attention to
temporal phenomena, because “effective conservation planning must also include consideration
of the heterogeneity and dynamic nature of ecosystems” (Sanderson, et al., 2002, p. 42).

\* vii The Canadian Environmental Advisory Council, an arms-length advisory body, recommended
that protected areas be managed in the context of their regions. Creating protected areas “in
isolation from regional planning and decision-making processes is not an effective way to ensure
the maintenance of their long-term ecological integrity” (Canadian Environmental Advisory
While not every site requires protection from development, “it is better to err on the side of over-protection – because more options will remain – than over-exploitation” (Noss, 1999, p. 145).

While boundaries are somewhat arbitrarily created, the DFO is attempting to develop large-scale, systematic, plans for Canada’s oceans. The LOMA process is described in Chapter 4.3. Because of the variety of tools at their disposal, the DFO can take several tacks when protecting a site (DFO2). The current “MPAs are a panacea approach” needs to be thought about because statutory MPAs cost money and may not be the best tool (DFO2). For example, recently DFO put in place protections for coral by closing an area to groundfish trawling, something that was done under the *Fisheries Act*. Another example is protection for Right Whales that was put in place in cooperation with Transport Canada by changing shipping lanes. Successes will demonstrate the role that MPAs have, but policy and science people “need awareness of other tools” (DFO2).

The Parks Canada Agency has also realized the importance of this issue. In *Sea to Sea to Sea*, the PCA states that NMCAs “cannot be managed in isolation from the surrounding region” (p. 8). Indeed, the whole federal approach to marine conservation revolves around the concept of integrated management. This fits well with the thoughts in the literature:

Effective biodiversity conservation must therefore integrate use and protection across the landscape … For landscape scale conservation to be socially as well as ecologically sustainable, those strategies must succeed in a mosaic of different land uses that not only conserves biodiversity, but also allows people to make a living …” (Sanderson, et al., 2002, p. 41)

Marine reserves are “an emerging tool for marine conservation and management” (Lubchenco, Palumbi, Gaines, & Andelman, 2003, p. S3) that take the approach of ecosystem-based conservation as opposed to species-oriented site selection. “The design and implementation of comprehensive, representative, and adequate reserve networks is the next great challenge for
marine policy and resource management” (Lubchenco, et al., 2003, p. S6). Internal government discussion is exploring the potential of using an integrated ecosystem approach for an increasing number of species (e.g. the PCA-led Garry Oak Recovery Plan).

For example, the Garry Oak ecosystem in B.C., with over 100 species at risk is being used as a test case for the ecosystem approach to species recovery. Although the effort is being led by the PCA, all three SARA departments are involved to some degree.

This would create a National Wildlife Area system that aims to represent the most important habitats for species at risk and migratory birds. This would fulfil the federal portion of a true reserve system, as defined by Davey. In the IUCN Best Practice series, Davey (1998, p. ix) defined a system plan as “the design of a total reserve system covering the full range of ecosystems and communities found in a particular country.”

CWS9 discusses the acquisition of an important parcel of land on Prince Edward Island that came about because of the settlement of an estate. In cooperation with other levels of government and ENGOs, the CWS was able to preserve one of the last remaining areas of a certain habitat type on the Island (the site is now managed by the Nature Conservancy of Canada). By acting on an opportunity, the CWS was able to preserve an important habitat from development, which is something that the PCA’s representivity model could not accommodate.

The Wildlands Project, founded by a prominent group of conservation biologists, has identified four “fundamental objectives” that are needed for “maintaining the native biodiversity of a region in perpetuity” (Noss & Cooperrider, 1994, p. 89). These four are:

- Represent, in a system of protected areas, all native ecosystem types and seral stages across their natural range of variation;
- Maintain viable populations of all native species in natural patterns of abundance and distribution;
• Maintain ecological and evolutionary processes, such as disturbance regimes, hydrological processes, nutrient cycles, and biotic interactions;
• Manage landscapes and communities to be responsive to short-term and long-term environmental change and to maintain the evolutionary potential of the biota.

Noss & Cooperrider refer to the Wildlands Project’s “bold” vision for wide-scale preservation; they maintain that the vision will provide motivation and direction, and that the details can be worked out later (1994, p. 157).

lxv For example, the CWS has provided Habitat Stewardship Program (HSP) funding to the Walpole Island First Nation in Southwestern Ontario. The HSP funding has supported a variety of programs including a survey of species at risk, outreach to landowners, an English/Anishnaabe book that describes local species at risk and their habitat (http://www.cws-scf.ec.gc.ca/hsp-pih/default.asp?lang=En&n=6DB0A599-1)

lxvi The potential for employment has been discussed in negotiations for various co-managed protected areas, such as those proposed for Nunavut (personal observation).

lxvii A major challenge will be the fact that “there is a paucity of information on which resource managers can base reserve design” (Botsford, Micheli, & Hastings, 2003, p. S25).

lxviii “Nature reserves should be as large as possible, and there should be many of them. The question then becomes how large and how many. There is no general answer” (Soulé & Simberloff, 1986, p. 32). Because there is no general answer, “it would be wise to design refuges to conserve large fractions of a functioning community whenever possible” (p. 35).

lxix The Federal Marine Protected Areas Strategy provides a mechanism for cooperation in the creation of new protected areas. It allows each of the federal organisations to create protected areas under their individual mandates while providing some coherence to the overall creation of federal marine protected areas.
Historically, the strategies developed for managing wildlife have tended to be directed at a small number of game species rather than biodiversity generally (Barrett & Peles, 1994, p. 99).

There are many contrasting strategies that can be used for selecting protected areas. Epifanio et al. (2003, p. 16) identify several:

- evolutionary uniqueness;
- most in need;
- save the most common;
- save the easiest to access;
- save the most isolated.

Bonn, Rodrigues & Gaston (2002) specifically evaluate the use of threatened and endemic species as surrogates for biodiversity conservation. While the lack of national-scale studies on the “wider effectiveness of networks chosen on the basis of threatened or endemic species” (p. 734) is problematic, their study of South African birds found that the use of threatened or endemic species may be a good first step because there is often more data available for those species. Accordingly, the CWS, with its mandate for conserving SARA-listed species may be able to leverage further conservation gains from following its core mandate. Indeed, the Bonn et al. study finds that threatened species’ ranges capture more species diversity than do endemic species.

“Reserves are most likely to fulfil their critical role in conserving biodiversity if reserve systems become as representative as possible” (Pressey, Humphries, Margules, Vane-Wright, & Williams, 1993, p. 124). In addition, the “application of the principles requires an explicit statement of the representation target of a reserve network” (p. 124).

“If the aim of protected areas is to preserve the processes of evolution in perpetuity rather than the present diversity of species per se, then the forces that affect species extinction and evolution must be considered” (Beazley, 1997, p. 64).
A major impediment to the acceptance of reserve proposals is that often only a single candidate site is under consideration. The process of reserve establishment would be made much easier if there were biologically suitable alternative candidate sites, identified by scientists together with other stakeholders, that could be fed into the socioeconomic stages of selection” (Roberts, Branch, Bustamante, Castilla, Dugan, et al., 2003, p. S218).

“More systematic and explicit approaches to selecting reserves are necessary if the goal of conserving biodiversity is to be realized” (Pressey, Bedward, & Keith et al., 1994).

Selection criteria for NWAs include the following (Canada Wildlife Act):

**migratory birds**

1a) The area supports a population of a species or subspecies or a group of species which is concentrated, for any portion of the year.

OR b) Where data on populations are available, the area supports at least 1% of the Canadian population of a species or subspecies or a group of species, for any portion of the year.

OR c) The area possesses a high research potential for restoration or enhancement, such that migratory bird populations could be increased to meet national population targets.

**wild flora and fauna**

2a) The area supports an appreciable assemblage of rare, vulnerable, threatened or endangered species or subspecies of plants or animals, or an appreciable number of individuals of any one or more of these species or subspecies (e.g. COSEWIC list).

OR b) The area has special value for maintaining the genetic and ecological diversity of a region because of the quality and uniqueness of its flora and fauna.

**unique wildlife habitats**

3. The area is a rare or unusual wildlife habitat, of a specific type in a biogeographic region.

Theberge (1989) lists 15 criteria for creating national parks and nature reserves with ecologically sound boundaries (e.g. “Boundaries should not sever communities with a high
The reality of contemporary land ownership means that the only place that these criteria can be applied with ease is to Crown lands (which are, admittedly, vast). However, these criteria could be used to guide parcel assembly for any new protected areas.

This is established in reports such as the *State of Federal Protected Areas for Wildlife* (Canadian Wildlife Service, 2002). Similar conditions are documented in other protected areas. For example, the 2005 *Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development*, Chapter 2, reports on ecological integrity in National Parks (Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, 2005)

Visitation remains inappropriate on some protected areas. Wellers Bay NWA, in Prince Edward County, Ontario, is a former bombing range. The Department of National Defense warns against visiting the site because of unexploded munitions that remain on the site. However, because the area is an attractive beach, owned by Environment Canada, local residents feel that they should be able to use the site. See [http://www.uxocanada.forces.gc.ca/UXOLocations/WellersBay_e.asp](http://www.uxocanada.forces.gc.ca/UXOLocations/WellersBay_e.asp) and [http://www.indynews.ca/archives/news/news2005/July/050713paradise.html](http://www.indynews.ca/archives/news/news2005/July/050713paradise.html) for more details.

Protected areas practitioners have become increasingly aware of the fact that “existing protected areas are insufficient for the long-term maintenance of ecological integrity” (Snaith & Beazley, 2002, p. 235). One approach for improving the ability of protected areas to preserve biodiversity is establishing buffer zones, “but there is as yet little agreement as to how this should be achieved” (Kozlowski & Vass-Bowen, 1997, p. 248). Indeed, “what happens outside the boundaries of a given park is often as important - perhaps more important - as what happens inside the boundaries, particularly in terms of habitat protection” (Hart, 1966, p. 3). Accordingly, cooperation with other landowners will play an increasingly important role in protected areas management.
There is a need to account for major catastrophes when planning reserves (Allison, Gaines, Lubchenco, & Possingham, 2003). While major catastrophes, such as hurricanes, ice storms or droughts are important, reserve planning will increasingly need to include considerations for climate change.

In 1972, EC prepared an Action Plan for the year. After describing the overall function of EC, the document goes on to list many specific actions, including:

38) develop at an early date, preferably within three years, jointly with the provinces (and possibly with municipalities as well) and in collaboration with other departments, national land use guidelines suitable for all three levels of government in reaching a pattern of land use more beneficial to Canadians, with particular attention to problems of… preservation of wilderness areas” (Environment Canada, 1972b)

Canadian Wildlife Service, 2002. The top two threats are tourism/recreation and human disturbance (identified in the report as being closely related to tourism).

For example, Hardy, 2003, p. 738 (cited above)

Some television broadcasts have also happened, including a series on the boreal forest which was sponsored by the Forest Products Association of Canada (Environment Canada, 2005b).

Sites where visitation is inappropriate are small in number, but include sites such as the Wellers Bay NWA, described above. Some landscapes within protected areas may be more sensitive to human impacts than others, so a zoning approach may be appropriate in these cases.

Competitive advantage is important for organisations to achieve success. An organisation will achieve competitive advantage when it “maintains unparalleled excellence in not just one, but several core business processes. The only way for this to happen, though, is through repeated, deliberate efforts to continually improve core processes from the customer’s point of view, make ongoing investments to enhance their capabilities and properly measure and evaluate process performance on a regular basis” (Cascella, 2002, p. 64).
“The proximal threats to most species are related to habitat, but the ultimate threats are human population, behaviours, and attitudes” (Carroll, Noss & Paquet, 2001, p. 978).

Accordingly, to respond to the factors negatively influencing biodiversity, the CWS will have to engage Canadians. For example, Erwin (2002, p. 10) wrote that, “under all circumstances, however, additional public education is needed to demonstrate the ecological and aesthetic roles of waterbirds in their wetland environments.” In fact, “protected areas will not survive unless they enjoy broad public support and this will not exist unless people’s fundamental needs are met” (Davey, 1998, p. 2).

In 1972, EC prepared an Action Plan for the year. After describing the overall function of EC, the document goes on to list many specific actions, including:

45) provide educational materials and interpretive centres to increase the public knowledge and enjoyment of wildlife (Environment Canada, 1972). By the early 1980s, there were several CWS interpretation centres across Canada. Direct provision of interpretation virtually ceased in 1984.

“Protected area institutions can do much to strengthen their constituencies and build support” (Milne & Waugh, 1994, p. 281). Direct interaction and education is an important way to build support. It is possible to balance conservation and use, but Llewellyn & Tappin warn that “the key strategic problematic in managing the national parks in both countries is balancing the preservation of land with facilitating enjoyment of the public space” (2003, p. 966).

“Scientific reasoning and solutions alone will not be enough to safeguard biodiversity. We must also apply political analyses and responses” (Wilshusen, Brechin, Fortwangler, & West, 2002, p. 35).

“Many uses are no problem at low levels but will constitute a threat if use increases beyond a certain point” (Dixon & Sherman, 1990, p. 65). Several CWS protected areas are currently under
threat from industrial activity (e.g. Kendall Island MBS and CFB Suffield NWA). How do you
determine the threshold? The CWS has not yet answered this question.

xciii The Canada Wildlife Act authorises the creation of National Wildlife Areas for purposes of
conservation, interpretation and research.

xciv For example, the top award of the Canadian Society of Ornithologists has been awarded to a
CWS researcher for 5 of the 21 years it has been presented (http://www.sco-
soc.ca/speirs_award.htm). Other examples include long-term studies of Arctic bird populations,
coordination of the Canadian Breeding Bird Surveys, and extensive work on wildlife toxicology.
See the National Wildlife Research Centre website for more details (http://www.cws-

xcv For example, a farmer on the Prairies was able to build a barn on a NWA and was grazing
cattle within the NWA for some time before the CWS became aware of the problem (CWS1).

xcvi “Monitoring public use is a fundamental responsibility for managers” (Hornback & Eagles,
1999, p. 6).

xcvii While from one perspective public and private sectors are more alike than they are different,
Rogers (1981) points out that there remain some fundamental differences between the two types
of organizations. These include the fact politicians are reluctant to accept measures that can hold
them accountable.

xcviii Organisations should remember that, “over the entire lifecycle, organizations that survive
and grow are the ones that respond to the ultimate value demand: the demand for task
performance” (Summer, 1980, p. 12). If an organisation is able to define performance criteria for
itself, it will have a significant advantage.

xcix “If MPAs are to meet the world’s future needs … performance indicators for their
establishment and management must be identified and new approaches to managing these factors
must be explored on an international or regional scale” (Alder, 1996, p. 99).
Public engagement is important, but it is not without risk. The PCA has had problems establishing parks in some areas because of local opposition. For example, in Cape Breton Highlands NP, “to achieve the ecosystem protection goal for the park it was necessary to involve a wide set of agencies.” However, “park managers understood the pitfalls of outsider participation when many local interests were sceptical of, and even hostile to, national park objectives” (Bissix & Rees, 2001, p. 580).

Brechin et al. “argue that establishing a legitimate process by constructively working with people is the most feasible and morally just way to achieve long-term nature protection” (2002, p. 51).

“A common factor in effective management of MPAs is stakeholder involvement facilitated by community education and awareness programs” (Alder, 1996, p. 101).

In response to this conclusion, two respondents indicate that the central agencies of the government would not want to create a CWS agency at this time. CWS 5 and CWS8 indicate that the CWS would be unable to meet the financial criteria for being an agency. However, the Canadian International Development Agency does not collect revenue as part of its programs.

For example, organising public geese hunting instead of having staff cull the flocks, hosting movie shoots, and providing land for cell phone towers have all been carried out by CWS (personal observation). Exact totals are not publicly available, but the total is on the order of $200,000 per year, nationally.

PCA1 and PCA2 both identify increased latitude in contracting, a budget separate from other departments, revenue retention, year over year budgets (rather than participating in the departmental budgeting process each year) and the potential for flexibility in human resources as the most important benefits of status as an agency.

Berry (1994) studies the conditions under which strategic planning is adopted in various state governments and agencies. Berry suggests that “career public managers should be ready early in
new agency appointees’ tenures” to implement a strategic planning process (p. 327). Charih & Paquin (1993) find a similar rise in planning early in new managers’ tenure in a study of Quebec and federal government departments, although they concluded that the planning exercises were nothing more than a re-labelling of existing procedures. Those involved in the protected areas program should be ready to present a new strategic planning process as soon as a new Director General is named.