Shadow of the Wall

by

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thesis requirement for the degree of
Master of Architecture

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Author’s Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including my required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Abstract

A rapid economic boom in the past decade has completely transformed China’s urban landscape into a theme park of skyscrapers. Architecture has become a means to showcase ambition and desire. Architects are forced to fit into a prescribed way of thinking and assist a powerful government to realize its vision of a utopian order. And as such, many of them are deprived of opportunities to thoroughly investigate the social issues that are affecting China’s urban development. Quite often, architects fall prey to political constraints and economic challenges. Despite China being a testing ground for handsome architecture and experimental urban planning, it is at the same time a graveyard of ethical architectural practices. In response to such pervasive conditions of architectural practice, this thesis investigates social and cultural issues in China that are beyond the control and repertoire of an architect; but ones that directly affect the development of this fast-modernizing nations.

Across the dynasties, a unique walled culture was developed in the Chinese society, characterized by its emphasis on inward orientation and boundary making. The Ming dynasty reached the maturity of this walled culture when political hierarchy, strict morality and the obsession of wall building dominated society in an extreme fashion. It was during the Ming dynasty that the Great Wall was substantially extended in length. Inside the limits of this national boundary, the emperor enclosed each city itself within massive walled networks. In this way, the wall became a physical symbol of Chinese centrality and insularity, where massive walls, strict order and a focus on morality all worked together to create a physically and psychologically suffocating cultural atmosphere. Within this walled culture, a growing fear of a centralized bureaucratic power and a subsequent repression placed upon political criticism were commonplace.

Today, almost five centuries after-the-fact, there remains a ghost of this former walled culture. Although most of these ancient symbols of physical control—the walls themselves—have fallen in ruin after the collapse of dynastical China, an invisible, psychological wall still remains in Chinese society to restrict any politically incorrect thoughts. The collective mind of contemporary China is struggling between the will of rapid modernization and the desire for free expression. The notion of ‘going modern’ and developing an advanced lifestyle now forms a kind of mutual
consent between the government and the citizens. In order to enjoy their ‘modern’ lifestyles, contemporary Chinese must acknowledge and respect certain limits—they must always act and think for the collective good as determined by the government. The government sees suppression of free expression and covering up of social injustice as the best way to ensure social stability and centralization of power. It is for this reason that the ancient walls of China have gradually transformed into a psychological wall that haunts the mind of the citizens. From this perspective, the wall never really collapsed or became ruins—it still resides in the psychology of the collective.

The concept of wall, physical and metaphorical, is the central theme of this thesis. It is not only to be understood as the physical realization of a superficial idea of protection, separation and control, but also as the dominant mechanism of repression, an invisible wall that continues to shape the Chinese national psyche today. This thesis attempts to reveal and confront the unspoken meaning of the wall in Chinese culture which has been buried under the glamour of national pride and glory. It presents a yearning to transform a wall that covers up injustice and inequality into a wall that connects to the underside of the social subconscious.
Acknowledgements

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To my parents
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Just like there are two sides to every wall, in China, walls have a double meaning. They are not only understood physically as a means of protection, separation, and control, but also as a dominant mechanism of repression, a significant psychological barrier that continues to shape the Chinese psyche today. This thesis is a “personal recollection” of thoughts and ideas, using the concept of walls, physical and metaphorical, as the central theme. Every drawing, photo and act of writing represents a personal and alternate view to the struggles of a changing modern Chinese society under the shadow of the Wall.

The motivation behind this thesis is born out of two struggles: (1) my personal quest as a Chinese female who grew up in the West to understand the subconsciousness of the Chinese society; (2) the struggles of China to become modernized.

(1) My struggles

I consider myself a hybrid—a person of mixed cultural identities; I have no fixed identity. I was born in the former British colony of Hong Kong, and have grown up in a generation that cares less about cultural identity and more about material pleasure, individual success, and quality of life. Ever since I can remember, none of my childhood friends considered themselves as Chinese, but Hong Kong citizens; I had never even considered China as my homeland, and had negligible knowledge and concern for China. When I lived in Hong Kong, China was considered a lesser place than Hong Kong. It resembled poverty, backwardness, and a lack of civilization.

My Chinese identity grew stronger after I moved to Canada at the age of twelve, where, I was categorized as Chinese Canadian. Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997 and I could no longer deny my Chinese identity. China’s rapid economic growth in the late twentieth century attracted the attention of Western media. I came across different articles
about China’s urban transformation and new architecture. It was exciting to be an architecture student, to read stories about China’s emergence as an architectural playground. China seemed to provide great opportunities for architects to realize their innovative designs. Therefore, I decided to research China for my thesis. I chose China’s walls as my research topic because China has often been referred to as a “walled culture.” And so I began with the surviving city wall in Nanjing City in the Jiangsu Province.

In the fall of 2005, I set off for Nanjing, the former six-time capital city of China, to photodocument the condition of its ancient city wall. I wanted to find what the wall now meant in contemporary China. Since the early twenty-first century, the municipal government has relocated thousands of local citizens to make way for the city wall’s billion-dollar restoration and reconstruction project. When I was there, most sections of the city wall had been turned into parks. Looking at the masonry workers laying newly-cut bricks onto the wall structure under bamboo scaffolding, and others applying fresh coats of paint onto the timber tower rebuilt at the reconstructed city gate, I wondered about the ultimate value of this fake antique for local citizens.

During my journey, I encountered another wall besides that of the wall of brick and mortar. This wall resided solely in the mind of citizens and it existed because of fear. I encountered a succession of events in Nanjing that confirmed the presence of this psychological wall in the collective mind: I witnessed two vicious authoritative campus patrols in military-green uniform tearing down students’ Halloween party posters at the University of Nanjing; I flipped through a self-censored book of architecture¹; and I was told about the anonymous emails, presumably from the local government, warning Nanjing citizens not to participate in the nationwide protest against the revised Japanese history textbook. These experiences cast shadows in my memory and I gave myself a grand but naïve mission after the trip: to set the citizens free from decades of suppression of free thinking. But how? This issue is complex and cannot be solved simply through architecture.

The Nanjing City Wall has always been a political tool since it was first built in the Ming Dynasty. At first, the wall was a realization of an authoritarian political system which was centralized, insular, and conservative. Today, the city wall represents a cultural heritage and national pride. The idea of reconstructing the wall to glorify the past is anathema to me. I brainstormed possibilities that would transform the Nanjing City Wall from a monument to a culturally stimulating structure—a place that would allow individuals to explore and reinterpret their own meaning of the past. I
wanted to reconnect this urban artefact, which was being mummified, to the
dynamic development of the city. I wanted to let the memory of the city wall
continue to evolve beyond that of the Ming dynasty. I wanted to transform
the city wall from something concrete (a dead monument) into an inspiring
journey that would allow people to see the wall beyond its physical form and
to rethink the relationship between space, memory, and body. I wanted the
people to think beyond the wall. Borrowing from Cedric Price’s concept of
urban magnets, the wall should not be an end, but instead encourage the
continual necessity for change.

I imagined I could break through the city wall and create a
picturesque stroll through the wall like Richard Serra’s “Clara-Clara.” I
imagined the journey to be composed of a succession of views and moments.
People walked into the wall to experience different sculptural spaces through
bodily movement and sensation. The city wall itself became a sculpture.
The experience of walking inside the wall would be personal, variable, and
contingent, reliant on how people experienced the space.

I imagined I could transform the city wall from a solid mass into a
virtual wall of mist. I imagined the city wall as an outdoor public bath house,
a place of social gathering. The idea of transforming architecture from a
political object into a communal, utilitarian space was fascinating to me.

I imagined I could transform the city wall into a “democracy wall” where everyone, including the dissidents, could project their long-repressed
thoughts and opinions about the society onto the surface of the wall. The people could gather to exchange thoughts without worrying about strict
policing. There would be a library to archive the opinions and stories of the people in audio format. There would be temporary exhibitions and forums
held on the city wall. I imagined people singing and dancing through the wall. I imagined freedom of expression re-emerging on the wall.

I kept on imagining.

Those thoughts and imaginings became overwhelming, emotional,
intense, and abstract. I did not have the courage to put all these thoughts
down onto paper and translate them into physical spaces. Architecture
became meaningless. Do the people in China want these spaces? Am I adding
another theme park to the city? Who am I? Do I have the right to represent
their concerns? I was lost and confused; I could not set my mind free. Walls
began to build within me.

I could not convince myself of a proper program and design
intention. I began to question why I wanted to touch upon such a political
issue. I was born into a family in which politics was a taboo. I realized my background knowledge of China was weak. I began to read Chinese history and to read about contemporary issues. The more I understood, the more helpless I felt as an architecture student. I am living in a generation in which history becomes insignificant in the shaping of contemporary Chinese cities; erasure of the past becomes common practice. I felt overwhelmed by the sweeping destruction of decaying traditional neighbourhoods to accommodate new wealth. But I could understand the eagerness of the contemporary Chinese and why they would consider the traditional past as impediments to development. They had had enough of poverty. A rapid economic boom in the past decade has completely transformed China's urban landscape into a theme park of skyscrapers. Architecture has become a means to showcase ambition and desire. Architects are forced to fit into a prescribed way of thinking and assist a powerful government to realize its vision of a utopian order. And as such, many of them are deprived of opportunities to thoroughly investigate the social issues that are affecting China's urban development. Quite often, architects fall prey to political constraints and economic challenges. Despite China being a testing ground for handsome architecture and experimental urban planning, it is at the same time a graveyard of ethical architectural practices.

Therefore I decided to investigate issues that are beyond the control and repertoire of an architect; but ones that directly affect the development of architecture and a city.

(2) Struggles of Modern China

River of Temptation and Wall of Suppression.

In 2006, Chinese officials celebrated the completion of the Three Gorges Dam, a colossal engineering project holding back the Yangtze River. The dam is five times as wide as the Hoover Dam. Its reservoir stretches for about 660 kilometres, and the dam's twenty-six turbines are expected to generate 18,000 megawatts of hydroelectricity a year. The human and environmental costs for the over twenty-five billion dollar project were enormous. Millions of people have been forced to relocate, many of them farmers. Artefacts dating back 2000 years were lost and submerged in water. Drinking water in some areas became contaminated, not to mention other hidden environmental devastation. Nonetheless, all of these losses and opposing voices have been
put aside and blocked by a Great Wall of pride, satisfying China’s insatiable appetite for energy, wealth, and fame.

The struggles of the Three Gorges Dam project are a microcosmic demonstration of modern China’s struggles. If the river represents a kind of ambition that is dangerous and unpredictable, modern China is willing to take the risk to try and control it. Ancient Chinese venerated the mighty Yellow and Yangtze Rivers. The annual great flood destroyed their settlements and threatened their lives, but this still couldn’t stop the Chinese from approaching the rivers. They depended on the rivers to encourage fertile soil for farming—the rivers give them the chance for a better life. Similarly, lightning modernization by all means is risky, yet tempting to contemporary Chinese. The humiliating collapse of the Chinese dynastical empire and the social instabilities of the twentieth century make contemporary Chinese believe in rapid progress and big ambition at all costs. They acknowledge the potential risks, but they choose to ignore them. A strong government with boundless authority put up the Great Wall of national pride and unity to cover up follies, injustice and inequality.

In the past two decades, the notion of “going modern” and developing a materialistic lifestyle has formed a silent, but mutual consent between the Chinese government and its citizens. In order to enjoy their “modern” lifestyle, contemporary Chinese citizens must acknowledge and respect certain rules and limits – they must always act and think for the collective good as determined by the government. However, the government sees suppression of individual expression as the best way to fit society into a prescribed way of thinking and to protect the society from unwanted influence. Confucius had said “The essence of the gentleman is that of wind; the essence of small people is that of grass. And when wind blows over the grass, grass cannot choose but bend.”¹ In the case of China, the authoritarian power is the wind, the citizens are the grass. The essence of the ancient Chinese walls has remained and continues to haunt the mind of modern citizens. From this perspective, the wall of the Chinese psyche has yet to collapse; instead, it is entrenched in the collective mind.

This thesis is a compilation of thoughts and ideas, like a notebook, filled with frustrations and concerns over China’s struggles. It attempts to reveal and confront the unspoken meaning of the wall in Chinese culture which has been buried under the glamour of national pride and glory.

The first section, “Walking around the Wall,” presents a selection of photos documenting the Nanjing City Wall, as well as presenting an
alternate view. My trip to Nanjing inspired me to begin this thesis on the reinterpretation of the meaning of wall in the Chinese culture.

Part II, “Nanjing City Wall and Autocracy,” focuses on the physical and psychological implications of the Nanjing City Wall. The three significant manipulations of the Nanjing city wall—construction, de-construction and re-construction—reflect the political motives behind different autocratic regimes in Chinese history. Centralization of political power has always been the main catalyst behind the three chapters of the Nanjing City Wall. In each case, the collective mind has always been dominated by the will of a single ruler. It is not difficult to discover a collective psychological barrier, an invisible wall created by a mixture of fear, ignorance, desperation, power-worship, blind fervour, social hysteria, and self-censorship.

In Part III, “Nation and Boundary,” the writings concentrate on the ancient Chinese concept of national boundary, looking in particular at the Great Wall of China. This northern frontier has been used to reinforce unity of the Chinese nation ranging from the dynastic periods’ goal of physically protecting the Chinese civilization against their nomadic neighbours to the north to the Communist era’s manipulation of the Wall as a symbol of national pride. Wall building and the concept of unity have intertwined to create the Chinese identity, yet Chinese have a mix of love and hate for the Great Wall. On one hand, the Great Wall unified the nation. On the other hand, the insularity of the Wall also brought the downfall of the nation.

Part IV, “Wall of Pride and Sorrow,” juxtaposes the officially mandated utopia with the gloomy realities of the contemporary Chinese society in two photo collections. As lives of people from different social strata become more complex and divergent in the past two decades, there is hardly any single photo that can depict a complete picture of Chinese society. Wealthy citizens pursuing trendy clothing and driving luxurious cars are real, but so are black-market slaves working in remote coal mines and AIDS victims struggling with local authorities to get their stories told. When we attempt to understand the reality of what modern China is, we are forced to look at both pride and tragedies. A utopia where everyone lives a harmonious and perfect life is indeed a perfect contrast to reality.

In Part V, “the Yearnings,” we first look at the driving force behind China’s walled culture, Confucianism, which is based on ritual and self-control, and how it has been adulterated and manipulated by the authoritarian government to denounce individualism, evolution, and political transparency. The second part of this section analyses the effects of the walled culture on China’s national psychology through the voices of
contemporary social critics and writers in the early twentieth century: Lu Xun in the 1920s; Bo Yang in the 1960s; Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang in the mid-1980s. These intellectuals attempted to voice the problems of national character and all shared one common yearning: emancipation of their fellow citizens from the legacy of the walled culture.

The final section, “Levelling the Wall Within,” is a personal yearning that urges for change. It begins with a classical experiment on learned helplessness that relates to the state of China's collective psychology after cycles of social upheaval and suppression of free thinking, especially during the last century. Creating a picture of utopia by silencing opposing voices, covering up social problems, and sacrificing individual rights may harm future social development. Drawing on discussions of struggles against oppression in modern China, the final section argues that a true modern society comes from its ability to absorb diversity and differences and to acknowledge injustices. Foucault's concept of heterotopia provides a theoretical framework for approaching an open society based on inclusion of differences, contrast and dissent. Opposing voices can be catalysts for changes that better a society when they constantly challenge the existing social crippleness. Dissidents can provide alternatives to the Chinese “utopia” that has been created through strict policing and suppression. Only in a politically free environment can individuals develop their voice and walk away from the legacy of a walled culture.

The three art installations—the River Case, the Land Case and the Consecrated Site—that appear between chapters are projects from the M1 studio. They explore themes such as emotion, identity and commemoration that inspired me to begin my interpretation of the meaning of walls in the Chinese culture.

This thesis made me aware of my hybrid cultural identity which provides me the flexibility and detachment to see this world as a global citizen. My education in a free country gives me the open-mindedness to investigate my cultural roots beyond the limits of national boundaries, and most importantly, to establish my own voice in the quest of making new borders of identity.

To the east lives a Prole, to the west a Fascist, but I don't care of any of this stuff. If I'm forced to state what “ism” I'm for, all I can say is that I want to be an individual.

- Lin Yutang, 1934
I waded, deepening, and the fish
Listened for me. They watched my each move
Through their magical skins. In the stillness
Their eyes waited, furious with gold brightness,
Their gills moved. And in their thick sides
The power waited. And in their torpedo
Concentration, their mouth-aimed intent,
Their savagery waited, and their explosion.
They waited for me. The whole river
Listened to me, and, blind,
Invisibly watched me. And held me deeper
With its blind, invisible hands
“We’ve got him,” it whispered, “We’ve got him.”

-Ted Hughes, “After Moonless Midnight”

The two paintings of the Grand River express the alluring dark forces, calm and potentially dangerous, as depicted in Ted Hughes’s After Moonless Midnight. The explosive desire and anticipation embedded in the poem are liberated and expressed in the paintings of the River. The poem and the river merge on the picture plane.
Tension #2, 2005.
by: angela chan

Painting of the Grand River.
Latex Paint on Canvas, 5'x8'.
I Walking Around the Wall

In 2005, I went to Nanjing and walked around its city wall where accessible. I walked inside and outside the city wall. I climbed on the wall. I walked on the former sites of the wall. Motion connected with emotion. What I saw during my journey constituted a psychological geography in my mind.

Source: Chengdu Mapping Press, Nanjing Aerial Maps.
Map: Nanjing City Wall & Gates

1. Zhonghuamen (Zhubaomen)
2. Zhonghua West Gate - 1931
4. Shuiximen (Sanshanmen)
5. Hanximen (Shichengmen)
6. Qingliangmen
7. Caochangmen - 1908
8. Dinghuaimen
9. Yijiangmen - 1913
10. Yifengmen
11. Zhongningmen
12. Jinchuanmen
13. Xiaobeimen - 1931
14. Zhongyangmen - 1931
15. Hepingmen (Shenbimen)
16. Xuanwumen - 1909
17. Jiefangmen - 1952
18. Taipingmen
19. Zhongshanmen (Chaoyangmen)
20. Guanghumen (Zhenyangmen)
21. Tongjimen
22. Wudingmen - 1929
23. Yuhuamen - 1935
24. Zhonghua East Gate - 1931
Demolished City Wall Gates

4. Shuiximen
5. Hanzhongmen
7. Caochangmen
11. Zhongningmen
12. Jinchuanmen
13. Xiaobeimen
14. Zhongyangmen
18. Taipingmen
20. Guanghumen
21. Tongjimen
22. Wudingmen
23. Yuhuamen

Source: Yang, *Nanjing Ming Qing Jian Zhu*. 
Route A

Source: Chengdu Mapping Press, Nanjing Aerial Maps.
I got lost when I was trying to find the former site of the city wall. The site was hidden behind the shopping mall and residential low-rise apartments. I asked the local people for the exact location but no one could tell me where the former city wall was located. [10.21.2005]

A1

I could not reach the former site of the city wall. The site was occupied by private properties. The low-rise apartments were like a giant habitable wall to me. [10.21.2005]
When I was crossing a bridge, the two long stretches of green fields along the river caught my attention. I thought they were wild vegetation until I saw this old woman bending forward to pick vegetables from the field. I was excited and descended a staircase to the greenfield below street level. This old woman was taking care of her vegetable fields along the river. [10.21.2005]

Demolition of brick houses dating back from the imperial period took place near the former site of the city wall. [10.21.2005]
I reached another section of the city wall. It was part of the tourist attraction on Shizishan, the Lion Hill. The entrance fee into the park was 40 yuan (£8.5 CND) which included the admission to three “historical” buildings, two of which were constructed in early 21st century. [10.21.2005]

The city wall was built around into the Lion Hill. The rampart was rebuilt with a mix of old and new bricks. [10.21.2005]

A traditional Chinese pavilion was built along the moat to create a sense of Chineseness in the park. [10.21.2005]

Yuejiang Lou was the major attraction in this theme park. This tower, 52 metres tall, was located at the peak of the mountain. The design of the building was based on a poem written by Zhu Yuanzhang the first emperor of Ming dynasty (1368-1644) who founded his capital in Nanjing. Emperor Zhu composed a poem to describe his plan to build a tower on the Lion Hill to commemorate a successful battle at this site that led to the rise of his dynasty. Emperor Zhu’s tower project was suspended for 600 years. It was realized in 2001, only for tourism. [10.21.2005]
The Yuejiang Lou was an empty shell. Inside the tower was a souvenir stall and empty space. The tower was just a backdrop for tourists to take pictures. I began to wonder about the value of this building. I left the tower with a feeling of emptiness and descended down the hill. I arrived at the level of the city wall. (Above) I saw these two little houses on the hillside. They were not part of the displays in this park. There were vegetable fields and clothing hanging in front of the house. When will these residents be relocated and their houses dismantled? [10.21.2005]

(Below) Adjacent to the two houses, construction workers were busy reconstructing the Yifengmen, the city wall gate that was demolished in the 1930s. The picture was taken on the city wall. [10.21.2005]
Yifengmen in 1990.
Source: Nanjing Cheng Zhi Hua, 9.

Yifengmen in 1911.
Source: Yang, Nanjing Ming Qing Jian Zhu, 535.
I walked southward from the Yifengmen along this path. This path would lead me to the Xiuqi Park. Temporary shelters for construction workers were placed against the city wall. [10.21.2005]

A memorial stone to commemorate the victims of the Nanjing Massacre. This area was one of the mass burial sites of those who died during the Nanjing Massacre. [10.21.2005]

View of the Xiuqi Park from the top of the city wall. [10.21.2005]

New paving and new landscaping on the city wall. [10.21.2005]
Barbering on the city wall, which was under restoration. [10.21.2005]

The day I visited Yijiangmen, there were also local people gathered at the foot of the gate playing card games. [10.21.2005]
I entered this public park from Yijiangmen. I was walking southward along the path outside of the city wall. [10.21.2005]

The water was calm. This was once to be a continuous moat that wrapped around the city wall. Today, it had been turned into a pond. That late afternoon, people were scattered along the other side of the shore fishing and socializing. [10.21.2005]
This section of the city wall ended at Dinghuaimen. The former site of the city wall was occupied by low-rise apartments. [10.21.2005]

The former site of the city wall from Dinghuaimen to Caochangmen has been transformed into a light commercial strip. [10.21.2005]

Examples of the retail stores on the commercial strip included a camera store, a Taiwanese bento box lunch restaurant and an art store. [10.21.2005]

On the opposite side of the street, construction workers were busy working on a park project. [10.21.2005]
Route B

Source: Chengdu Mapping Press, Nanjing Aerial Maps.
Before I came to Nanjing, I had collected some old photos of the city gate (Bottom) and I was particularly impressed by the simple form of the wooden structure on the Heping Gate. (Top) Heping Gate was located in a public park. When I was there, the Gate was closed for restoration but the security guide let me in to take a few photos.

I walked up the staircase in full anticipation. The staircase led me to the wooden structure I had seen from old photos. When I saw the lines of light fixtures that ran around the edge of the roof like Christmas lighting, my heart sank to the bottom of the sea. This ancient wooden structure had a complete face lift. It looked like a new structure. Its enchanting sense of melancholy was gone forever. I began to imagine one day when the Gate was open to the public, this wooden structure would forever be turned into a souvenir shop. [10.22.2005]
I left the park and continued to walk around the city wall. I did not know where I was going. I followed an old man and entered another complex of low-rise residential apartments. They lined up perpendicular to the city wall. These apartments were located between the moat and the city wall. [10.22.2005]

The colorful clothes always caught my attention, especially when they were bathed under the sun. They were like kites, flying in the air. They made any impoverished areas alive again. The end of the road between the two rows of apartments was the city wall, which was hidden behind the trees. [10.22.2005]

I left the residential neighbourhood and continued to walk along the city wall. I was entering an unexpected region. From afar I saw the city wall was overgrown with vegetation. [10.22.2005]
(Top) I walked along the unpaved path and entered a vast field open to the sky. The city wall on my right was lush green. At the foot of the wall were rows of vegetable fields. Piles of small clay pots and rows of green vegetables formed a beautiful picture. [10.22.2005]

(Middle) A few steps away from the vegetable fields was an open-air dump site. Piles of garbage and building materials scattered around and mingled with the wild vegetation. The city wall behind was hidden behind the lush green vegetation. [10.22.2005]

(Bottom) I turned around and shifted my gaze away from the dump site. I saw a poor lonely house, sitting against the backdrop of the new luxurious condominiums. I could not hear any noise from inside the house but I believed the house was inhabited. [10.22.2005]
There was a gate at the end of the path. I arrived at the north-west bank of the Xuanwu Lake. I felt a sense of relief. It was a scenic spot. The willow trees, the glittering water, the isles in the lake and the skyscrapers in silhouette formed a beautiful picture. This relaxed atmosphere was a contrast to the impoverished area I was just walked pass. [10.22.2005]
(Top) Looking across to the south bank of the Lake, I saw a picture of prosperity. Many new skyscrapers were under construction. They were competing in height. This was a familiar image of China we come across in architectural magazines. [10.22.2005]

(Bottom Left) I made a right turn and continued to walk southward along the city wall. A series of banners hung above the path that said, "Everyone is the host of the New Nanjing."

(Bottom Middle) On my right, there were rows of private vegetable fields that ran against the city wall. (Bottom Right) As I walked along the Lake, I heard a splash. A man had jumped into the Lake and was using the water to rub his body. [10.22.2005]
I walked southward along the Lake. At one point, I paused and looked back to the north and took this picture. A private tennis court was built against the city wall. Behind the wall was a skyscraper. Along the lakeshore, I saw people reading, sketching, doing water-color painting and chatting with their friends. [10.22.2005]

The trail along the Xuanwu Lake was a pleasant walk but I wanted to explore the other side of the city wall. (Bottom) I exited at the Xuanwu Gate and arrived inside the city wall. The Xuanwu Gate was the entrance to the Xuanwu Park on the four isles in the Lake. I wanted to avoid the busy crowd of local tourists so I continued my journey on a local street, south of the city gate. [10.22.2005]
(Top) I was walking along a road called Kunlun Lu. I did not know where would be my next destination. The city wall would lead the way. (10.22.2005)

(Middle) These snap shot photos were taken at a residential neighbourhood, which Kunlun Lu led me to. There were rows of four storey apartments built along the city wall. The neighbourhood was animated by different street activities. (10.22.2005)

(Bottom) Walking further down the road, a blue hoarding wall went up against the city wall. There was a demolition project going on. (10.22.2005)
(Top Left) I arrived at a site with remnants of dismantled houses. (Top Right) At the same site, I turned around and took a picture of the two skyscrapers under construction, which presided high over the city wall in the foreground. Scenes of construction and destruction could be seen everywhere in the city. [10.22.2005]

(Bottom) When I saw this rundown castle-like building facade, I began to imagine this former site as a decaying playground. It was a depressing image. I don’t know what it was exactly. [10.22.2005]
(Top) I left the depressing site and arrived at the Jiefangmen, translated as Gate of Liberation. The Nanjing city wall museum was located here inside the city wall [10.22.2005]

(Bottom) I was standing on Jiefangmen. The enormous staircase, 5 metres wide, was a new addition to the city wall. It was built for the benefit of tourists [10.22.2005]
I was standing on the Jiefang Gate. [10.22.2005]

There was an access to the back-door of a temple on the city wall. [10.22.2005]

Snap shot photos taken from the wall of the buildings besides the city wall inside the city. [10.22.2005]

Descending the city wall. [10.22.2005]
Route C

Source: Chengdu Mapping Press, Nanjing Aerial Maps.
South Elevation of the Zhonghuamen, South Gate. Zhonghuamen Gate served historically as a compound to confine and trap any invaders through the wall. It measured 128 metres long from north to south, 118 metres from east to west and 21.4 metres high (South wall). It sits on a pedestrian island surrounded by busy traffics in and out of the city. Two streams of the Qinhuai River, 24m wide and 120m wide, run along the gate’s north and south side respectively. Two additional gates were made to the east and west of Zhonghuamen in 1931 to make ways for traffics. [10.27.2005]

Inside the Gate. Zhonghuamen has four arched gateways built in stone and brick. Each gateway has a drop-door. Zhonghuumen is a construction of three storeys. The top storey of the Gate is a wooden structure which is no longer in existence. (Bottom Middle) The second storey has seven tunnels where troops were stationed. The one at the centre was the largest—44.92 metres in length and 6.84 metres in width. The small tunnels flanking it was each 38.8 metres long and 3.9 metres width. The height of all the tunnels is about 6 metres. (Bottom Right) The first storey has 6 such tunnels. These tunnels were places where troops were stationed and arms were kept in time of war. Today, these tunnels house exhibitions of ancient city wall brick and souvenir stores. [10.27.2005]
(Top) Looking to the east of Zhonghuamen. The top of the city wall was taken over by nature and was inaccessible to the public. A communal park sat along the north side of the wall inside the city. The wall cast a shadow onto the park most of the day but it was a popular social gathering place. [10.27.2005]

(Middle) Looking to the north of Zhonghuamen. [10.27.2005]

(Bottom) Looking to the south of Zhonghuamen. The Qinhuai River runs along this section of the city wall. The city was expanded beyond this wall. [10.27.2005]
The road cut through the city wall and left an opening at the west side of Zhonghua city wall gate. [10.27.2005]

The old man in grey sweater was waiting for his bicycle fixed. [10.27.2005]

I was told by a resident whose home was built on the former site of the city wall (west of Zhonghuamen) that the government would relocate them in order to reconstruct the city wall.

I took two pictures of the apartments slated for demolitions:

- a bicycle parked in front of the grocery store,
- the clothing hanging from the trees,
- the barbed wire fence,
- and the old woman.

[10.27.2005]
I walked westward into a tunnel underneath a viaduct that cut across the city wall. I walked up a ramp and arrived at a public park.

I ascended a stair and arrived at a sublevel where the city wall was cut. This area was under shade of pine trees. [10.27.2005]

On the city wall, the space was vast and underused. Nature took over this quiet space. [10.27.2005]
On top of the city wall,
I did not walk in a straight line.
I walked in a zigzag across the top,
from one side to another.
The top was about 12 metres wide,
I leaned over the 1 metre high parapet
and took pictures of the space adjacent to the city wall.
Along the wall outside the city was a public park (above)
between the city wall and the moat.
Along the wall inside the city were clusters of buildings (below):
courtyard houses,
low-rise apartments,
and industrial buildings.

[10.27.2005]
C10
Houses adjacent to the wall inside the city. [10.27.2005]

C11
A dump site adjacent to the wall inside the city. [10.27.2005]

C12
A power plant adjacent to the wall inside the city. [10.27.2005]
One end of the city wall on Fengtai Road. [10.30.2005]

Hardware and metal stores occupied former site of the city wall on Fengtai Road. [10.30.2005]
Huju Road was built along the former site of the city wall.

(10.25.2005)
C18

Remnant of the city wall gate in Hanzhong Public Square. [10.20.2005]

The Hanzhong Gate was transformed into a public square called Hanzhong Guangchang as part of the revitalization project of the city wall. The project was completed in 1997. [10.25.2005]
I left Hanzhong Public Square and walked northward along Huju Road. My next destination was Shitoucheng, a popular attraction of the city wall.

On the way to Stone City, I took a few snapshots of the people. These images captured the daily life of the people.

[10.25.2005]

Exit of a highway adjacent to a bicycle lane and retail stores. [10.25.2005]

A simple food store. [10.25.2005]

Recess bell rang from a middle school adjacent to Huju Road. [10.25.2005]
These pictures were taken from the wall looking out of the city on the section called Shitoucheng. This section of the wall was built on the natural reddish brown rock on a hill. [10.26.2005]
A road cut through the city wall. [10.26.2005]

Layering of reddish brown rock and bricks. [10.26.2005]
Three to four storeys low-rise apartments were built adjacent to the city wall. [10.26.2005]
Source: Chengdu Mapping Press, Nanjing Aerial Maps.
(Top) A park space outside the city wall. I walked pass a few people who were playing tai chi, playing chess and doing exercises. That morning, the park was scarcely used. This park was formerly occupied by residential brick houses. The residents were relocated in early 2000 for the restoration of the park. [10.18.2005]

(Middle) This section of the city wall ended at a street called Jiang Yu Lu. In 1936, a new city wall gate called Yuhuamen was opened in this area to make way for a railway which ran from north to south. Today, one can no longer find traces of the railway and the city wall gate in the city. [10.18.2005]

(Bottom) Outside the city wall, I found a landscaped park. Inside the city wall was a different world. I found a quiet laneway with simple stores along both sides. They were all selling black leather shoes. These stores had no signage but handwritten store number. Rows of black leather shoes were lined up in front of each store on the floor. At the end of the laneway was a storage building located right next to a low-rise residential apartment complex. There were roosters and dogs running around. [10.18.2005]
I was over-excited when I found this opening inside the city wall without realizing that I had entered a private property. This opening was located between two gated communities: one of them was a luxurious low-rise residential apartment complex and the other was a run-down mixed-use apartment. I thought the gate was open to the other side but it was blocked. A man from the old apartment opened his window and warned me to leave the property. [10.18.2005]

Behind the city wall where I founded the two gated communities was a public park space outside the city wall. A traditional Chinese pavilion was under construction. [10.18.2005]
This section of the public park ended where the city wall was cut. The rampart was taken over by nature and there was no access to get up to the city wall. [10.18.2005]

The city wall was cut to make way for traffic. The road was called Wuding Men and named after the demolished former city gate. This wall section became a backdrop for a bus stop. There were two laneways along both sides of the wall. I first walked along the east side, outside the city wall, which led me to a garbage station and a few residential neighborhoods. [10.18.2005]

I began the walk along the city wall. A handwritten sign said, "Garbage Collection". [10.18.2005]

The laneway was about 3 metres wide with no exit. It is the only access that linked the different residential neighborhoods and a few mixed-use building complexes. [10.18.2005]

I wondered how many families were living in each building complex. Was the kid in the image already the luckier one who had shelter to live in even it was not in a desirable condition. [10.18.2005]
I walked further down the laneway and reached a residential neighborhood of low-rise apartment. There was a public washroom against the city wall and I wondered why a public washroom was located next to the residential apartments. [10.18.2005]

The end of the laneway I reached a cluster of simple brick houses. They were built by the residents. Since 2000, the government has began to demolish brick houses along the city wall. Today, it is prohibited to build any structures against the wall. [10.18.2005]
I walked along the west side of the city wall from Wu Ding Men. The environment was different from the east side. The path was newly paved and linked to two public parks: Bailuxhou Park and Tongjimen Park. The city wall divided two different communities. [10.18.2005]
(Top) I was standing on one end of the city wall. A section of the city wall ended at the Tongjimen Park, where the former city gate, Tongji Gate, was located. Looking north, upscale condominiums were located along the former site of the city wall. [10.18.2005]

(Middle) West side of the city wall were middle-class low-rise apartments. [10.18.2005]

(Bottom) A view of the Tongjimen Park on the east side of the city wall. Standing on the city wall allowed me to see the diversity of social class living around the city wall. One side of the wall were some impoverished brick houses and run-down apartment buildings. The other side of the city wall were some middle-class low-rise apartments. Along the former site of the city wall were the luxurious condominiums complex. [10.18.2005]
The section of the city wall between the former gates, Tongjimen and Guanghuamen, was replaced by condominiums. This picture shows the layering of old and new buildings along the moat. [10.18.2005]
The Nanjing municipal government made a proposal in 1997 to turn the city wall into a green belt. These are the snapshots of the park space between the city wall and the moat that I walked along. [10.18.2005]
A major boulevard runs through the Zhongshan Gate. The gate at the centre is 10 metres wide, 10.5 metres high and 15 metres deep. The other two gates are 8 metres wide, 9.5 metres high and 15 metres deep. The three gates were made in 1929 when China was run by the Kuomintang as the Republic of China. They symbolizes Sun Yat-sen’s, a significant revolutionary and political leader of the time, political philosophy known as the "Three Principles of the People": nationalism, democracy and the people’s welfare. [10.18.2005]

On the Zhongshan Gate. [10.18.2005]

I was standing on the Zhongshan Gate, looking inside the city wall. The tall tower in the foreground is a hotel. [10.18.2005]

I was standing on the Zhongshan Gate, looking outside the city wall. [10.18.2005]
A house on the Zhongshan Gate. It was difficult to draw a line between the public and private space. When there was no visitors, the entire space became a private paradise. When there were visitors, the house became part of the public display. [10.18.2005]

The two men were flying kite on the Zhongshan Gate. Flying kite is a popular activity. [10.18.2005]

I could not continue walking north on the wall. There was a brick wall that blocked access to the north. There was a hole through the brick wall. I walked through the hole and the path was occupied by the overgrowth of wild vegetation (Bottom Right). I ended the journey of the city wall here. [10.18.2005]
On January 23, 1368, Zhu Yuanzhang (who reigned from 1368 to 1398) offered sacrifices to Heaven and Earth at separate suburban altars, then offered the patents and seals to four generations of his ancestors at the ancestral shrine in the Imperial City, and proceeded to the Fengtian Hall at the newly built Forbidden City of Nanjing. There he received a congratulatory memorial from generals and government officials, concluding his ascension to the throne with an orchestrated ceremony. Zhu officially proclaimed the start of the Ming (translated as Brightness) dynasty, and made 1368 the first year of Hungwu (translated as the Great Martial Power) and himself the Hungwu Emperor. It was also the year that massive expansion of the Nanjing city wall began. The construction extended the existing city walls of Nanjing, formerly known as Yingtianfu that Zhu had recently restored during the 1360s to include the Forbidden City and the Imperial City to the east and a large area between the Xuanwu Lake and the Qinhui River. Construction of the entire 34 kilometres wall took roughly 20 years to complete. Approximately 200,000 workers were summoned for construction. The new wall rose 14-20 metres above ground, and mainly followed the natural terrain of the city. The wall was about 15 metres thick at the base, tapering to 4-10 metres at its top. Within the structure, earth and stone slats were used to fill up the core, followed by an exterior layer of grey bricks.

During the wall construction, many towns and counties across the nation were responsible for manufacturing construction materials, primarily the grey bricks (each roughly 42 x 20 x 10 cm). Emperor Zhu ordered 152 counties to manufacture and transport tens of millions of bricks to the capital. He required all the manufacturing units to stamp the names of the maker and supervisor, and the manufacturing date and location on every brick. This law ensured the emperor had the means to trace the origin of bricks if any of them failed to meet required standards, and impose harsh punishments against the brick maker or the entire
manufacturing unit. Scholar Timothy Brook, in *The Confusion of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China*, traces the origin of Lu Li, a kiln master whose name appears on a brick at Zhonghua Gate (formerly known as Jubao Gate – Gate of Assembled Treasures).  

Since the names of the county and village are stamped on the brick surface that faces inward, it is impossible to tell the exact location of Lu's kiln without removing the brick from the wall. Other than Lu's name, there are two other names on the brick's outer surface: the Tithing Head Fang Chaozhang and tithing unit Guangfu Monastery, both belonging to the *lijia* system of Ming China. The *lijia* or “hundreds-and-tithing” system grouped ten households into a *jia* (tithing) and ten *jiás* into a *li* (hundred). In the system, the duties of the *jia* head rotated among each of the ten households annually, while the post of the *li* heads was given to the wealthiest households in a community. Monasteries and temples were registered as fiscal households in this system; Brook theorizes that Guangfu Monastery served as the meal provider for Lu Li's workers. He tracked Guangfu Monastery in historical accounts and found eight monasteries in the three closest provinces that carried the common name of Guangfu, which means “broad good fortune.” The area serviced by Lu's working unit ranged from 100 kilometres to 1500 kilometres.

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2.2 The map shows the expansion of the city wall under Emperor Zhu of Ming Dynasty. The new serpentine wall wraps around the Imperial Palaces.
kilometres from Nanjing, and Brook soon realized that bricks were too common a local product for the county to record. Nevertheless, Brook’s research on Lu’s bricks reveals the importance of the *lijia* system in shaping Ming’s unique social structure under the absolute power of the emperor. Every brick on the Nanjing city wall is a reflection of the restrictions, both physical and social, placed on the Ming citizens. Zhu determined policy based on a personal desire to extend his control to all corners of his society.

First and foremost, Zhu Yuanzhang’s *lijia* system was used to register people for taxation and state services – a convenient way to exert control and maintain social order. The system divided the entire population into self-sustainable village communities, within which peoples’ movements were further restricted: cultivators were bound to specific farming villages, soldiers to the frontier, artisans to state service units, and merchants to an assigned district established for commerce activity. Zhu Yuanzhang’s aim to immobilize the citizenry is evidenced in the Ming Code: those needing to travel any farther than 100 *li* (about 50 kilometres) required a route certificate and anyone who changed occupations without the government’s permission was severely punished. This occupation restriction extended from father to son. If Lu Li was a kiln master, most likely his son was as well.

In addition to constructing his walled Nanjing and imposing the system of *lijia*, Zhu Yuanzhang set out to realize his goal of building a walled nation. After driving the Mongols off Chinese soil, he sent thousands of soldiers and civilians to the northern frontier to restore and extend the Great Wall of China. The Han Chinese realm was once again enclosed by a structure that separated the “civilized” from the “barbarians.”

Zhu Yuanzhang was perhaps justified in wanting to restructure the Chinese universe after China’s century-long Mongol-ruled Yuan dynasty. The Mongols had little interest in wall building. Their philosophy of openness and continuous expansion contrasted with that of the Han Chinese, who advocated internal harmony and social stability. Walls – the Great Wall, Nanjing city wall and others – were a symbolic return to a harmonic and legitimate China. For Zhu Yuanzhang however, control of his own people appeared to be the primary reason for wall building. The entire nation was subdivided into both large and small walled communities.

During the Ming era, the *Li* Confucianism practiced during the Southern Song dynasty was revived in the hopes of strengthening social
order. But Zhu manipulated the Li Confucianism to restrict people from performing any action not in line with Confucian filial hierarchy, which was established to protect the power of authority. For Zhu Yuanzhang, peoples’ personal freedom was a threat to his rule. Under Zhu, all citizens became servants of the emperor. Within the government, Zhu eliminated the post of prime minister and centralized all power in his hands. Zhu Yuanzhang was also famous for his political persecutions. Specialists estimate that between 1376 and 1396, no less than 100,000 people died from political purges.4 The censorial branch of the government had the emperor’s blessing to closely monitor the bureaucratic bodies as well as the elite class. This reign of terror bound Ming China in fear and prevented anyone, no matter their class or status, from diverging from the status quo. Ming Chinese, wealthy and poor, bureaucrats and peasants, learned to live under these conditions. Zhu Yuanzhang’s rule was the peak of despotic culture in the walled nation. Until the fall of Imperial China in 1911, the Nanjing city wall, one of Zhu’s greatest masterpieces, signified the triumph of despotism and defeat of the people.

2.4 (Left) At a brick kiln, the kilnmaster checks the temperature as an assistant douses the kiln to induce superficial glazing.

2.5 (Right) The brick maker in the foreground fills the wooden mold with clay, then dresses the brick’s surface with a finishing wire strung on a bow.

2.6 (opposite top) The Jubao Gate was a fortified gate which was renowned for its boat-like shape. The entire gate structure was demolished for urban development in the 30’s.

2.7 (opposite bottom) Bird eye view of Nanjing in the 1930s. The South Gate, at the lower left corner of the photo, is a fortified city gate which has three barbicans and four archways.
When it was finally completed, the 34 kilometres long Nanjing city wall seemed impenetrable. It is true that no regime could undo Zhu Yuanzhang’s efforts in defining Nanjing’s boundaries and identity, but the myth of the wall’s supreme defensive powers has been challenged three times. The first time was in 1853 when the Taiping rebels conquered Nanjing from the Qing empire; the second in 1864, when the Qing troops crushed the Taiping and recaptured the city. In both incidents, the mighty city wall provided good defence, but only insofar as it delayed the fall of the city after days of continuous cannon fire. Both times the wall crumbled when the enemies dug deep tunnels into the foundation and used explosives to destroy the structure from below. The city wall showed its insufficiencies in the face of warplanes, tanks and modern weapons. In 1937, the Japanese army broke through the wall at several locations and kept these five to six spots as “displays of military glories” and “convenient passageways” during the years when Nanjing was under Japanese occupancy.5 During the Japanese invasion, a number of the city gates, including the Zhonghua Gate, were damaged beyond repair.

Regardless of the damage done by military invasions, history reveals that the biggest threat to the Nanjing city wall wasn’t the intruders but the Nanjing people themselves. The first attempt at demolishing
parts of the Nanjing city wall began in the 1920s and 1930s, during the Nationalist era. The demolition was mainly in response to the need for road extensions and building materials by the Nationalist government, which was establishing Nanjing as the nationalist capital. Nonetheless, the most devastating blows did not occur until Mao Zedong assumed control and led China toward his utopian goals of socialism and industrialization.

In 1958, massive social movements took place in cities and the countryside under Mao's Great Leap Forward campaign. By this time, China was an industry-heavy powerhouse. The Chinese, especially farmers and factory workers, saw Mao as their nation’s saviour. Their obsession for Mao resembled religious devotion. After a hundred years of suffering humiliation by foreign powers and internal class struggles, the peasants believed Mao would be the one to strike the right balance between the rich and poor, a lead political direction and a fruitful future for the nation. In the first five years of Mao’s Chinese Communist Party, the communists managed to restore social order and put China back on track economically and socially. The success of the Land Reform Policies, which emptied the pockets of landowners and redistributed farmlands to peasants, and the First Five-Year Plan, which followed the Soviet model of state-controlled economic development, helped to solidify blind trust and a passive following for Mao and his Party. This was a welcome change from the combination of warlord rule, Japanese invasion and civil war in the previous years that left little to the nation besides piles of rubble, miles of wastelands, and a collapsed economy.

1958 marked a year of major shifts in Mao's thinking, from the pragmatism of social restructuring to an infatuation with the power of mobilized masses. Mao wanted immediate results in fulfilling his socialist dreams, and launched an aggressive policy plan that bordered on sheer lunacy and unrealistic projections of growth. He thought that three years of collective hard work on industrial production would be sufficient to...
transform China from a farming nation into an industrialized country, and aimed to surpass Britain in industrial production within fifteen years. Under his orders, some 90 million people engaged in local, small-scale steel smelting operations; almost 99% of the rural populace became the members of a People’s Commune, which was regarded as “the basic units of Communist society.” On average a commune was made up of about 5,500 households, which was then divided into production teams. The aim of a commune is to improve production efficiency by forming a large production unit to replace small-scale family-run production. On the commune, everything was shared and private ownership of livestock and garden plots were forbidden. Traditional family practices were replaced by the idealized collective practices. Communal nurseries and kindergartens were established to look after the elderly and the children; everyone dined together in the commune mess hall. Men and women devoted their time and energy entirely to public projects such as water control, irrigation, and steel production. But within a few years, the Great Leap Forward proved to be a disastrous failure. Despite the capability of the authorities to utilize people-power for public projects, the neglect of food production during the Great Leap Forward also lead to a catastrophic famine that spread across China from 1959 to 1962. Also, because of improper manufacturing techniques and professional supervision most of the locally produced steel and iron was so inferior that it was unusable.

The 1950s was also a defining period for the Nanjing city wall, marking its farewell. Up until the 1950s, the Nanjing citizens were free to build homes and private gardens on the wall; many also lived in very close proximity to a deteriorating wall following years of neglect. The authority
began to aware of the danger of the decaying city wall when a part of the wall collapsed, killing three people and wounding another 17 in the winter of 1954. Since then, small-scale demolitions of the wall were common occurrences especially when the officials conceived the idea of “contemporary usage of the past” and advocated wall demolition by offering an incentive to encourage the people to exchange each ancient brick for 10 cents RMB. By 1958, large organizations from the government and citizen groups were all deconstructing the monument. The fever of transforming the nation, catching up with the rest of the world and escaping poverty and the past united every Nanjing citizen in the wall demolition. Their tools ranged from explosives to bare hands. Many of the ancient bricks were used in new construction projects, and in particular, for the many furnaces that were built across the city to support steel production. This was the period when almost all resources were allocated for industrial production. This phenomenon was common in all of China’s walled cities. The few scholars, poets,
painters, and architects who were opposed to razing the wall were ignored, alienated, and even persecuted as enemies of the socialist revolution.

The destruction of the Nanjing city wall subsided after the zealouslyness of the Great Leap Forward. It was not until 1966, at the beginning of another catastrophe – namely the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution – that the wall was finally destroyed. In order to regain absolute control of the Party after the failure of the Great Leap Forward, Mao gambled a third time, triggering a revolution that would quash all of his political opponents and other counter-revolutionists and transform the nation. He ordered Jiang Qing (his wife), Kang Shang, Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao to form the Cultural Revolution Group (CRG). This sole group soon became the Party’s voice. The CRG possessed two crucial weapons: people’s blind trust in Mao and the radical tendencies of students and workers. The slogan, “let us unite and hold high the glorious red banner of Mao Zedong thought… resolutely, thoroughly, totally and completely wipe out all monsters and demons and all counter-revolutionary revisionists of the Khrushchev type and carry the socialist revolution through to the end,” fuelled the movement at Peking University. In the autumn of 1966, over 13 million youth marched to Beijing to participate in eight gigantic parades at Tiananmen Square in front of Mao, who stood high on the Tiananmen Gate like the emperors of Ming and Qing. The crowd wore red armbands, sang songs in praise of Mao’s glory and listened to speeches by the CRG, who had formed a radical group known as the Red Guards whose first mission was to attack teachers, then parents, intellectuals, bourgeoisie, revisionists, and ultimately all designated “counter-revolutionary” enemies of China. By the end of 1966, the working
class was also encouraged to participate. By then, students and workers had become an uncontrollable mob. The revolution swamped society with violence, turbulence, betrayal, censorship, persecution, and prejudice. Many people, especially intellectuals, were continuously interrogated and tortured over the ten-year period. They were often beaten, humiliated, forced to confess to ridiculous charges, and paraded on streets dressed as demons. Many could not withstand the torture and committed suicide.

The following is a recounting of terrible acts that happened every day in almost every family during the destructive Cultural Revolution:

...Yingxia’s father committed suicide, too. He was a country doctor in a commune clinic, famous for his knowledge of traditional medicine, but he was denounced a “reactionary academic authority.” One night, some rebels placed him in front of a coal-burning stove until he was drenched with sweat, then forced him to strip down to his underclothes and sent him outdoors to stand in the snow until he was nearly frozen. The following day he hanged himself.

When Yingxia found out, she burst into tears. But she didn’t have time to grieve. She washed her face and, with her eyes still swollen, reported to the propaganda-team representative at the paper. For the sake of her own future, she couldn’t show any emotion. “My father has betrayed the Cultural Revolution,” she said. “And I want to ‘draw a line’ between him and myself.” Even so, afterward Yingxia – like Peikui – was considered “politically unreliable” and forced to attend study sessions. She had been thought one of the best editors at the paper, but after her father’s suicide she was no longer allowed to work in the editorial department at all.10

One of the fundamental concepts of the Cultural Revolution was the attack on “The Four Olds” – ideas, culture, customs and habits. The Red Guards were told to battle against the reputed bearers of these “evils,” whether they were people or objects. Books, religious items, European
music, art, stamp collections, antiques, and even goldfish were considered manifestations of a bourgeois-style of living or of the “four olds.” Like other ancient Chinese monuments, the Nanjing city wall also fell in victim to the revolution. The wall was used to plant gardens, ponds, electrical poles, and even farm fields; 164 bomb shelters were carved into the structure. Over 10 kilometres of tunnels were dug through the centre of the wall, covering over 30,000 square metres. Bricks from the wall were taken for private construction projects and also for miscellaneous use, like exercise weights. Large sections of the wall crumbled during the Cultural Revolution, damaged by water, plantations and digging. The structure stood as a worthless, wasted wall of earth. Things like heritage, history, architectural design and the poetics of space all belonged to the “counter-revolutionist” culture, and so were vilified.

The Cultural Revolution was responsible for the greatest cultural
and historical losses in Chinese history. Yet, compared to the damage inflicted on humankind, these losses are minimal. As renowned writer Feng Jicai suggests "if the calamity of the fascist regime was its damage to human bodies, the calamity of the Cultural Revolution was its damage to human souls." Commenting on the damage inflicted by the Cultural Revolution, Feng further elaborates:

...more serious was the uncalculated loss to China's traditional cultural heritage. Still the greatest damage was to the Chinese people's simple and honest nature. The Cultural Revolution made us more calculating, shrewd, brutal, practical, hypocritical and vain... The damage may be permanent.  

Official figures from the late 1970s show that 729,000 people were persecuted during the revolution and 34,900 were beaten to death. Many historians and social critics alike believe that the true figures are far in excess of the official numbers and peg the count at 100 million affected and half a million deaths. In addition to the tens of thousands of persecuted, tens of millions more people, mainly the educated, were relocated to the countryside and the school system was closed for five years. An entire generation was nearly illiterate. The climate of terror and pressure from collectivization further segregated people. Family bonds were weakened and mutual trust among neighbours ceased to exist – a wall had been built between people. Life in China would never be simple again.
A dramatic shift from utopian ideology to a pragmatic market economy took place in China after Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978. Under his famous motto, “to get rich is glorious,” Deng ignited China’s economic boom by opening the nation to foreign investors and allowing the Chinese people to enjoy certain degrees of economic freedom. Without losing the merit of communism, Deng defined his capital economic reform as “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” which was a mixed market economy under political authoritarianism. Once China steered away from her insular policy and embraced the world with her powerful labour force and huge market, boundaries around this socialist and ancient nation began to dissolve in favour of the overwhelming international trading and business activities. As the nation capitalized on business opportunities from all over the world, the socialist structure of the Chinese society pushed to the wayside in the race to modernize. Meanwhile, the emergence of Western lifestyles and thinking questioned the legitimacy of the existing authoritarian government. Deng had been aware that, if you unlatch the window, it’s hard to stop the flies and mosquitoes rushing in.16 The Chinese
authorities needed to somehow fill the ideological void left by the decline of Maoism in order to stabilize their power and to counterbalance any challenge from foreign political beliefs. In response to the ideological void, Deng decided to revive nationalism and cultural egocentrism. Deng's response resembles a common phenomenon in western contemporary culture in the age of insecurity when the pace of life speeded up rapidly after the end of the Cold War. Andreas Huyssen, a cultural critic, in the essay “Sculpture, Materiality and Memory in an Age of Amnesia” states his observation of how we negotiate the rapid change in culture:

In the face of speed-up and collapse of stable boundaries, there seem to be two prominent solutions: either embrace and celebrate such deterritorializations as liberating and go surfing on the endless flow of spectacles, distractions and commodities, or seek solace and anchoring in identity politics (cultural, ethnic, sexual, racial) or religious fundamentalism.¹⁷

2.23 The official plan for the revitalization project of the Nanjing city wall. Five sections of the city wall became designated “scenic hot spots.”
In the case of China, having an ideological void is like a collapse of stable boundaries. Deng’s solution was to consolidate the nation through a “pro-traditional cultural policy.” For instance, Deng promoted the Great Wall of China as a long surviving symbol of unity. This cultural icon filled the ideological void left by abandoning Maoist belief. Although the memory of the Great Wall was full of sorrow as thousands of people had sacrificed their lives for the construction, re-inventing the Great Wall as a cultural heritage helped to make the past memory easy to embrace. As David Lowenthal argues in his essay “Fabricating Heritage,”

…it is futile to vilify heritage as biases. Prejudiced pride in the past is not the sorry upshot of heritage but its essential aim. Heritage attests our identity and affirms our worth. When the patriot upholds “my country, right or wrong,” heritage tells him it is always right.

In 1984, Deng launched the national campaign “Love China, Restore Our Great Wall”. Over the next five years or so tens of millions of RMB were poured into the wall’s restoration, especially at the Badaling area where approximately 760 metres of wall were smartened up to showcase the standard. Since then, other major historical monuments such as the Nanjing city wall have regained their significance, at least under official slogans and law.

Under Deng’s campaign, in 1988, the status of the Nanjing city wall was elevated from abandoned ruin to a national cultural relic. Restoring and reconstructing the city wall emerged as a mission of pride for the people in Nanjing. The government immediately made an urgent decision to

Since 2000, the revitalization project of the Nanjing city wall has forced about a thousand of low income families to relocate.

The picture above is a community made up of about 10 households, which have been living on the Nanjing city wall since late 1970s. Some of them grow vegetables on the Wall for sale to make a living. In 2001, the government issued a formal notice forbidding the residents from farming on the city wall.
announcement calling for the return of stolen bricks for proper restoration work. By 2001, 6 million of the original bricks had been gathered through this programme.\(^{22}\) It is not difficult to find news headlines that relate to the Nanjing city wall in domestic newspaper such as “World’s Longest Ancient City Wall to Apply for World Heritage Listing,” “Ancient City Wall Gets Facelift,” or “Nanjing to spend 1.66 billion to link 12 sections of the Ming wall in 3 years,” expressing a sense of collective pride. The entire city seemed equally passionate about the “rebirth” of the “600-year-old man,” a common name used by the locals when describing the city wall. The municipal government successfully put the city wall on the wish list of all Nanjing citizens: that one day the monument would be accepted as an UNESCO world heritage site; that one day the wall and thus the city, would gain worldwide recognition; that one day Nanjing would benefit greatly from tourism; that one day the city would be swamped within glory of the past and modern success. This follows a common phenomenon as suggested in Timothy Mitchell’s essay “Making the Nation,” that reinvigoration of the past became a common political strategy many nations have taken:

One of the odd things about the arrival of the era of the modern nation-state was that for a state to prove it was modern, it helped if it could also prove it was ancient. A nation that wanted to show it was up to date and deserved a place among the company of modern states needed, among other things, to produce a past.\(^{23}\)

Apart from economic and cultural reform, many Chinese speculated that Deng Xiaoping, a victim of the Cultural Revolution, would promise some sort of political reform, steering the nation to a democratic future. In the first year after Deng seized power, the public enjoyed a brief period of political liberalization in which the public had greater freedom to express their criticisms towards the government and the Maoist regime. Their critiques were posted up on a low brick wall in central Beijing, which attracted thousands of political discontents from around the nation to express their political opinions on the wall. Renowned Chinese writer Wang Shan recalls the incident in an interview published in *China Remembers*:

The Democracy Wall Movement began in autumn 1978 with the pasting up of some ‘big-character posters’ (dazibao) on a blank wall in Xidan, about 2 kilometres west of Tiananmen Square. The earliest posters described personal suffering and tragedies:
In April 1978, Deng encouraged writers to outpour their suffering during the Cultural Revolution. In late autumn in the same year, a low brick wall in Beijing, 2 km west of Tiananmen Square, was quickly covered in poems, posters and letters, which often voiced political concerns. This wall was called the Democracy Wall.

Their authors were mainly people who had been wronged during the Cultural Revolution. Many had come from outside Beijing; now they wanted rehabilitation for themselves or their families.

The Wall became so popular it attracted hundreds and thousands of people. Every day after work, people rushed to Xidan to see the new posters. There were quite a number of people like me, from fairly privileged backgrounds, who were drawn to the movement. During the Cultural Revolution, we all ended up at the bottom of the society, where we saw plenty of injustice, caused to a large degree by the undemocratic social system. We were interested in politics and hoped to change that system.

The posters soon progressed from telling personal stories to discussing wider political issues. Young intellectuals, who comprised most of the participants, began to ask what were the causes of these tragedies – some even dared to point fingers directly at Mao – and how to prevent them. Democracy Wall responded very sensitively to the struggle underway in the leadership…

It was a very primitive form of democracy, inherited from the Cultural Revolution era, for the big-character poster was Mao’s creation. Yet it also showed people were seeking modern democracy – to express one’s views freely and independently in public, without approval or censorship by any authority. It was unprecedented in the thirty-year history of the PRC.

After the Party’s Third Plenum in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping’s political position was secured. As he gained more and more power, his popularity soared. Gradually, down at Democracy Wall, the restless youth began to ask questions about him. Firstly, how to prevent Deng from becoming the new Mao Zedong; secondly, though Deng is a wise leader with great political experience, if he does not give the people democracy, is it not inevitable that he will repeat Mao’s mistakes? 24
At the beginning Deng encouraged the people to freely express their political opinions. He even declared to an American journalist at the time, “The people want to speak. Let them!” This immediately fostered Deng as a great reformist, until a young electrician called Wei Jingsheng biked to the wall one morning and put up a poster that demanded a “fifth modernization” – an urge for greater individual freedom. Wei also showed his determination by signing his name on his poster. Since then, as historian Julia Lovell describes,

… visitors to Democracy Wall, as it became known, were no longer reading in silence but making speeches, speaking frankly to foreign journalists, distributing samizdat journals, founding societies and discussion groups, and marching to Tiananmen, where impromptu mass meetings took place. ‘This Wall,’ someone shouted, ‘is the base which supports democracy in China’.25

It did not take long to see the limit of Deng’s tolerance of democracy. After six months of political liberalization, Deng could no longer tolerate the public demand for political transparency and the radical comments on the Democracy Wall. Wei Jingsheng, who became an advocate of Chinese democracy, was arrested in March in 1979 and sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment. Magazines and discussions forums were banned. All of those who took part in the Movement were asked to confess and swear never to be involved in such events again. Meanwhile, the Democracy Wall, was demolished, and later replaced by the Bank of China headquarters.

Deng’s repression on citizens’ freedom of speech resembled a similar incident that happened during Mao Zedong’s regime, twenty-one years before. After founding the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao and his Communist Party made inroads in stabilizing the national economy, redistributing farmland, and perhaps most importantly, boosting the nation’s morale by pursuing a socialist utopia. In 1956, he sponsored the Hundred Flowers Movement that allowed intellectuals, whom he despised in the past, to voice their social and political criticisms. Considering the success of his regime, Mao was confident that the critiques would be gentle, and perhaps non-existent. Mao was probably surprised when the Movement lashed out with a number of severe criticisms against the Party and Mao’s policies. To Mao, these censures were both inconceivable and unbearable. Thus, in 1957 the Party destroyed the Movement with its brutal Anti-Rightist Campaign. So-called “rightists,” or “enemies of socialism” were promptly arrested – the by-now normal course of action in China to quell social critics.
After the Democracy Wall incident, Deng basically put all of his efforts into reshaping China in an economic context. He strongly advocated pragmatism that consolidated a collective will of modernization. Deng attempted to fix the society's sightline on a fruitful and wealthy future. His strategy was successful to a certain extent, most notably in cities where citizens could get a taste of the luxurious benefits of China's rapid modernization. However, social discontent continued to grow throughout the nation in the 1980s as the gap between the rich and the poor widened. Despite the fall of the Democracy Wall, the hope for political reform didn't die down amongst intelligentsia and university students.

Hu Yaobang, the main executor of Deng's open-door policy, the reform-minded Communist Party leader who re-examined the cases of hundreds of thousands of unfairly persecuted individuals during the
Cultural Revolution, was forced to resign in 1987 from his post as the General Secretary in the show of autocratic power by the Party. Three years later, Hu died on April 15, 1989. His death triggered a massive demonstration in cities throughout China; the most large-scale of which happened in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. There, the public commemoration of the death of Hu turned into an ongoing non-violent protest calling for an end to official corruption and reforms on many aspects like political democracy to bureaucratic restructuring. The protestors, mainly university students and intelligentsia, soon gained sympathy abroad and wide support for its agenda. In face of the growing publicity of the protest which threatened the legitimacy of the Party, the authority made an catastrophic decision to crush the movement with military force on June 4, 1989.

The massive outcry over the June Fourth Incident and its bloody ending led the Party to redefine some of its policies, including a stronger emphasis on media control and nationalistic propaganda, along with stable economic
growth, which would bring living improvements that no citizen could refuse. The June Fourth Movement allows the authorities to witness the eruptive force of political dissidents when social discontents unite the mass and gain international support and sympathy. Since then, the authorities restrict the freedom of speech and exercise vigorous censorship and repression of dissidents to avoid large-scale demonstration. Only through censorship and repression can they disconnect the public from political activities and dissidents, thus minimizing the opposing power in the society. While the government is rebuilding the ancient walls as symbols of national unity, they are also reconstructing a wall in people's mind, a barrier that hinders individuals to speak up about social discontents and individual desires. The public becomes cold and helpless towards politics and can only seek for a sense of security in the covetous pursuit of material goods.

2.29 (Above) An anonymous Chinese photographer requested two foreign journalists, David and Peter Turnley, to smuggle this picture out of China.

2.30 (Opposite Top) Support of the demonstration from various professions: (Left) Writers and editors demanded freedom of the press, (Middle) judges expressed support for the student hunger strikes (Right) medical workers held up banner saying “bureaucratic cancer.”

2.31 (Opposite Below) The morning after the massacre, bicycles and the dead bodies of students are scattered everywhere in Tiananmen Square.
The Land Case

I imagined myself as a farmer, who carried a clod of land on my back. This clod of land contained seeds of cultural memory, from which roots grew downwards to the soil, where they belonged. I planted the seeds of cultural memory at each pause on my journey and I carried them with me from place to place, from east to west and vice versa.

My back carries roots that belong to different lands. They entangle and interweave as they grow. I can no longer distinguish which strand of roots belongs to which land. At one point, I thought of pulling my roots out to set free my soul—free from the confusion of my hybrid cultural identity. I tried but I was filled with pain.

The more I struggled to remove my roots, the stronger the force pulled me back to my cultural lands. I can never eradicate my roots. They are buried in my subconscious. They are part of me. I am who I am because of this unique amalgamation of cultural roots. I can only set free from my suffocating struggle if I can accept my hybrid cultural mixture.

Bearing the Roots, 2005.
by: angela chan
Installation, 5’x6’x8’.
Materials: Plaster bandage sculpture, hempen rope, mirror buried in soil, and projection.

Sculpture of a body hangs in the exhibition space with the roots falling vertically to a pile of soil on the ground. The mirror buried in the soil creates a strong vertical relationship between the sky, the body and the land. An image of the entangled roots is projected onto the sculpture and casts shadow onto the white wall behind to create a dual condition: the physical existence and the subconscious mind. The hanging sculpture represents the physical existence with strong attachment to the ground and the shadow represents the subconscious mind which is chaotic and full of confusion.
III Nation and Boundary

Defining Wall

In traditional Chinese buildings, walls were not designed as load bearing components. Walls always served as screening device in between structural elements of the enclosure. The design of the wall varies from foldable partitions to a thick mud wall depending on local climate and social status of inhabitants. In ancient Chinese language, various characters were used referring to a wall, depending on its functionality, from concealment, protection, fortification to climate resistance:

- **牆, 障也, 所以自障蔽也**
- **垣, 援也, 人所倚止以爲援衛也**
- **墉, 容也, 所以隱蔽形容也**
- **壁, 辟也, 所以辟禦風寒也**

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3.1 Pictograph of the Chinese character, **cheng**, translated as city. It also means qiang, translated as wall.

Ying Zao Fa Shi (The Handbook of Architectural Planning and Construction), written by Li Jie in 1103 during the Northern Song Dynasty, is the most significant ancient account of Chinese architecture. In it, Li references 11 different ancient sources for the meaning of “wall.” These 11 sources reference 15 different Chinese characters, each a variation on “man-made barrier.” There are a number of characters to describe the various types of wall such as:

high walls around courtyards were called **qiang**, which connoted what was used to shield oneself; house walls and part walls were called **bi**, which connoted what warded off and resisted the wind and cold; and low walls were called **yuan**, which connoted what one leaned on and thus took as protection. ²
Most of these characters are no longer in use today, but interestingly enough, *qiang*, which connoted the medium used to hide oneself in classical definition, is now the most commonly used Chinese character for all types of wall. This definition of wall embraces an idea of insularity towards wall building: from an external point of view, walls prevent external disruptions to interfere with internal order; from inside, walls shield the domestic disgraceful affairs from the outsider.

The concept of a nation becomes unthinkable without walls. The Chinese character of a nation (pronounced *guo*) is composed of a pictogram of a four-walled enclosure within which is the three components for the formation of a kingdom: land, people and sovereignty with military power. The concept of a nation can only exist if there are boundaries that define military power and a territory for the people. Wall defines the inside and the outside. Beyond the walls lay the wilderness and the barbaric forces of foreign lands, Within the walls lay sacred order of the Mandate of Heaven.

In the following section, we will take a closer look at how the wall plays a fundamental role in the making of the Chinese nation, from the mythical creation of the national boundary to the philosophy behind the making of the Great Wall. This fundamental concept of wall as a representation of egocentrism has deeply influenced the development of the Chinese social psyche as the civilization evolves within the national boundary.
China’s Ethnocentric Worldview

During the Neolithic period, many tribes occupied the regions surrounding the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, where civilization began. While the stronger groups—ancestors of the Han Chinese—merged and became a more agriculturally-advanced settlement, many of the remaining hunter-gatherer tribes were forced out of the fertile river regions, and later even beyond the boundaries of the Chinese world. The non-Han people expelled to the east were named “Yì,” to the south “Mǎn,” to the west “Róng,” and to the north “Dí.” These people were exiled by the Han Chinese to the less fertile lands in inhospitable zones where agriculture was not possible. Hence, they turned to nomadism and became the horse-riding warriors that would threaten and penetrate into the Chinese frontier for millennia to come. The Han Chinese called these horse-riding nomad invaders “barbarians.”

The Han Chinese had a strong concept of division between civilization and barbarism since the prehistoric time. In Shan Hai Jing (the Classic of Mountain and Seas)—a collection of Chinese mythology that is at least 2,000 years old—the ancient China was depicted as a square earth that was surrounded by four seas, North, South, East and West, which separated the wilderness from the “sacred heartland” and defined the inner and the outer. Another historical account Shu Jing also presented the Chinese concentric worldview in this classical scripture of Chinese antiquity. It contains the story of Yu, a public official who rose to the throne after the death of King Shun and founded China’s first dynasty, Xia (2100-1600 BC). According to the legend, Yu traveled the known world to drain the mighty flood waters that “surged towards the heavens, so vast that they embraced the mountains and covered the hills.” He was sent to “open the nine lands, connect the nine roads, embank the nine lakes and survey the nine mountains.” Yu organized the known world and established order by holding a water level and chalk line in his left hand, and a compass and carpenter’s square in his right. In a nod to this legend, the Chinese character for “order” is “guìjū”—guì means compass and jū means carpenter’s square.

The legend also presents the earliest order of the Chinese world:

Yu made the land five-hundred li (one li is about one-third of a mile) outside of the Son of Heaven’s city the supply domain. The farm tax for the first hundred li was paid in sheaves of grain, for the next hundred li in ears of grain, for the next
Neolithic Period
(BC 6,000 - 2,100)

Paleolithic Period
(BC 1,700,000 - 18,000)

West Han Dynasty
(BC 206 - 8 )

Human Settlement

Cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants
Cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants
hundred li in spikes of grain, for the next hundred li in unhulled grain, and for the last hundred li in hulled grain.

He made the land five-hundred li outside of the supply domain the warning domain. The first hundred li were the ranking officers’ fiefs. The next hundred li were the barons’ fiefs, and the last three-hundred li were the feudal lords’ fiefs.

He made the land five-hundred li outside of the warning domain the peace-securing domain. For the first three-hundred li they modified the teachings of the central government according to the situation. For the last two-hundred li, they maintained military garrisons at full strength.

He made the land five-hundred li outside of the peace-securing domain the reinforcing domain. The first three-hundred li held the Yi people (barbarians), the next two-hundred li held exiled men.

He made the five-hundred li outside of the reinforcing domain the wild domain. The first three-hundred li held the Man people (barbarians). The next two-hundred li held banished men.

To the east these domains extended to the ocean, to the west they covered the Liu-sha (desert), and to the limits of both north and south. The government’s advice and instructions encompassed the world.

After this, the King Shun bestowed on Yu a black-jade tablet, announcing to the world his successful accomplishments. The world was then greatly ordered.\textsuperscript{5}
Yu’s order of the Chinese world can be interpreted as five concentric zones with the Chinese royal capital city at its centre. The further away from the centre of Chinese civilization, the more barbaric the people were. It presents the idea that China was the centre of the world. This ethnocentric worldview expanded as the ancient Chinese began treating the sacred “square earth” as China, calling it “The Middle Kingdom.”

To distance themselves from the four barbarian outposts and secure a position in the centre of the world, the Chinese, since mythical times, have defined their national boundaries by the limits of geographic barriers, namely the mountains in the west, forests in the southwest, desert in the northwest and seas in the east and south. Where the north of the nation opens to the vast Mongolian grasslands, the Chinese completed their protective enclosure by building the famous Wall—the Great Wall of a Thousand Miles. Wall, the basic element of space planning, completed the outermost boundaries of the Chinese universe, within which the Hans intended to evolve and flourish forever.

In reality, China’s national boundaries have been fluid since prehistoric times and during the feudal ages (Xia, Shang and Zhou) and dynasties of the centralized state (Qin, Han, Sui, Tang, Song, Ming, Qing, and Nationalist and Communist regimes). This history was interrupted by periods of cultural fusion with the barbarians, and foreign occupancies by the Tartars, Japanese and Western colonial powers. It was often after foreign occupancy that Chinese culture absorbed new ideas and restored a sense of unity, pride and order.
Along with pandas and Mao, the Great Wall is one of China’s most well-known icons. Not only has the Wall become its number one tourist attraction, but it has also served as an ambassador, promoting the grandeur of ancient China to the world. Nixon himself said, “This is a great wall!” when he stepped onto it in 1972. The Great Wall of China was not built as a single structure. It is a network of wall segments that stretch east to west across the northern part of the country. These wall segments were built in various dynasties as physical expressions of an emperor’s desire to protect his empire from the “barbarians” (nomadic non-Chinese tribes) and to centralize his heavenly-mandated power within the walled nation. Nonetheless, history has shown that these defence systems were not sufficient in keeping out the horse-riding nomads from advancing south. Since the earliest wall-building effort in the Qin dynasty (221-206 BC), the Wall, to most citizens, signified the ultimate misfortune of harsh labour and cruel banishment from home. Qin folklore often associated the Wall with death as construction workers usually died on site and were buried below the wall; most workers would never see their families again. Working conditions were harsh; workers often died from exhaustion, starvation and exposure to the bitterly cold winter blizzards. Many others were executed by regional officials simply because of their delayed arrival to the construction site, which according to Qin law, was deserving of the death penalty. Thus the Wall symbolized the Qin government’s tyrannical rule—people lived in fear of severe punishments. After Qin, the Han and the Ming emperors continued to expand, restore and strengthen the Wall as the northern frontier of the Chinese empire, and at the same time, exercised extreme centralization of political power within the walled nation. In the past two decades, the Great Wall has once again gone through massive restorations. The Communist Party proclaimed the Wall

"The Great Wall, replicated in smaller city walls all over China—and within those city walls in even small walls, encircling private family compounds—stands for protection as well as oppression. One implies the other: You are controlled for your own protection; a giant prison is built for the safety of its inmates."

- Ian Buruma, Bad Elements
a feat of national pride and unity, without bothering to tell much about its hostile past. Yet to many who know the history of the Wall, it marked the mass graves of hundreds of thousands of builders lying below the Wall’s shadow. The Great Wall was a witness to China’s perpetual cycles of pride and sorrow.

The history of the Great Wall began when northern China was under constant attack from powerful nomadic tribes in the north and west (today’s Inner Mongolia, Xianjiang region, Mongolia and southern Siberia), whom the Chinese referred as barbarians. In 771 BC, Quan Rong, a powerful nomadic tribe from the northwest seized the Chinese capital of Western Zhou (1025-771 BC) and killed the emperor. The emperor’s successor was forced to abandon the ruined capital and established his throne at the east capital of Loyang, marking the beginning of the Eastern Zhou period (771-256 BC). The Eastern Zhou period was divided into two sub-periods: Spring-Autumn (722-481 BC) and Warring States (403-221 BC). The 1400-year-old feudal system was about to collapse as kingship in Eastern Zhou became no more than a nominal title, and the king lost control of all but a small parcel of land around the capital. A handful of powerful warlords divided up the nation and constantly competed with one another for territories and political influence. Hence the Spring-Autumn period, also known as the Hundred-Blossoms period, provided great opportunities for various political, philosophical and military theorists, such as Lao Tzu, Confucius, and Sun Tzu to develop and promote their theories to the warlords. It was during this period that the long-standing Chinese autocracy, a combination of legalism and Confucianism, began to take shape.

The Warring States period began when one-by-one the Spring-Autumn warlords declared themselves kings and searched for ways to conquer other kingdoms. Massive wall construction first took place during this time; warlords built earthen and stone walls at certain parts of their borders to defend against each other as well as the horse-riding invaders. In 221 BC, Qin conquered all remaining kingdoms and unified China. Ying Zheng, the king of Qin at that time, adopted a new title for himself as—"the First Emperor of Qin"—and formed a centralized government that ruled the nation with thirty-six commanderies. From that moment, autocracy gradually matured as the Chinese bureaucracy developed around the absolute power of the emperor. As time went on, the autocratic system became so deeply rooted in Chinese society that no
matter how many times dynasties fell and emperors were replaced, the autocratic system always remained strong and unchanged.

The First Emperor of Qin used legalism as a tool to generate public fear in order to consolidate his power. He and his chief minister abolished all political theories except their own to enforce a punishing utilitarian philosophy. Historian Julian Lovell gave an example of such ruthless law: “[A]nyone who failed to report a crime committed by another member of his or her group ‘would be chopped in two at the waist.’”

Moreover, to repress subversive thoughts and rebellious aristocrats from the former six kingdoms of the Warring States period, Ying Zheng burned all literary, historical and philosophical texts from previous periods. He also buried Confucian scholars alive. Order and stability were maintained by the full ideological control and the fear of harsh punishments. Ying Zheng’s rulings ultimately ended the Spring-Autumn period, a period during which various political philosophies were allowed to flourish. Besides repressing political thought, he also successfully unified China by standardizing the units of measurement, currency and written language.

Not surprisingly, he was also the first emperor to possess a continuous fortified structure by connecting segments of the defensive walls from previous kingdoms. This structure, known today as the Great Wall, sat at the northern frontier of Qin China.

While many stories and legends on the Qin Great Wall spoke of miracles that aided construction, there were also tales that accounted for the workmen’s and soldiers’ personal sufferings, the actual people that made the miracles happen. The most famous tale is the one of Meng Jiangnu, a young wife, searching for her husband at the Wall’s construction site of the Wall. Unable to find him, she cried until the wall crumbled to reveal the
corpse of her husband buried inside the Wall. The tale begins with the couple's parting during their wedding night:

At the time of taking leave from his wife
he did not speak for long,
For he hoped as it were between morning
and evening to come back to his home.
Who could think that he would suddenly meet
disaster by pestle and hammer,
His soul be dissolved, his life finished—
that he should perish at the frontier wall?
After he had taken leave and reached the
Long Wall
The officials in charge of the work there
treated him with bitter harshness.
When he died his body was at once built into
the Wall,
His wandering soul strayed far amid the
thorns and the brambles…

The tale of Meng Jiangnu was passed down from generation to generation to remind people of the suffering and hardships during the construction. It also reminded people of the tyranny of Emperor Ying Zheng who forced 700,000 workers to build his mausoleum and executed around 460 scholars during his reign.

Despite Emperor Ying Zheng’s attention on border defence and centralization of political power, the Qin empire was short-lived and fell merely four years after the emperor’s death. The Great Wall couldn’t protect the regime from internal rebel forces. After a chaotic power struggle within the walled nation, China was again united and ruled by another centralized government under the Han emperor in 206 BC. The Han adopted many of the Qin’s political systems except its legalist system. The Han emperors believed that the failure of the Qin was caused by the lack of public support, a consequence of the harsh civic laws. Thus they adopted a political concept endorsed by scholars, which was Confucianism, to establish social order and maximize their power. As the Han emperors built their empire, they also renovated and strengthened the Qin Great Wall. They extended the Great Wall thousands of kilometres westward as military successes expanded their territories deep into central Asia. The wall extension reinforced the defence of the Gansu corridor, a natural route that connected Changan, the capital of Han China, to the deserts of central Asia. Merchants and caravans had established a trade route, known as the Silk Road, along this corridor leading into areas in Central Asia and India. Those traveling along the Silk Road were frequently under attack by
the Xiongnu, the powerful nomadic tribe that dominated Mongolia and Southern Siberia, as well as other Mongolian and Tibetan marauders. The Han Emperor had built a thousand kilometres of defence wall to secure the trading route.

After the Han dynasties (202 BC – 220 AD), the Three Kingdoms period (220-280 AD) and the Western Jin (265-316 AD), China experienced 300 years of barbarian invasions and occupations. The fall of the Western Jin dynasty exposed China’s weaknesses: the Great Wall was inadequate protection against the barbarians and the nation was troubled by internal power struggles. Moreover, the Confucian-based autocracy was led by inadequate rulers—the emperor was pathetic, his ministers corrupt. In 581 AD, Yang Jian rose to power, unified China and formed the Sui dynasty. He restored order by renovating the Great Wall and constructed an enormous capital city in Changan, near the site of the former Western Han capital. The Tang dynasty replaced Sui in 618 AD. The Tang emperors believed
These maps show the relationship of the Great Wall and the Chinese national boundary in history. The Great Wall was never very effective in keeping out nomadic invaders.
Ten Kingdom 907-960
Liao 947-1115
Northern Song 960-1127
Southern Song 1127-1279
Yuan 1260-1368
Ming 1368-1644
Ming 1368-1644
Qing 1644-1911
Foreign Influence 1839-1911
Second Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945
Civil War 1927-1949
People’s Republic of China 1949-present

USSR Occupation
British Occupation
Japanese Occupation
French and British Occupation
French Occupation
German Occupation
the Great Wall
in expansion, not sedentary defence, and thus halted any renovation or inspection of the Wall, choosing to concentrate on building a powerful army instead. After much military success and territorial expansion for the Tang, the Great Wall lost its value—it sat too far inland, too far from the expanded border. The Tang rulers allowed it to decay for they saw the Wall as a monument from an inferior age. However some Tang poets saw the partly-ruined Wall as a memorial to the Han battlefields that allayed the grief of people departing Tang China for the barbarian lands beyond. Here is the poem, “Looking Towards an Inner Gate of the Wall” written by Tsu Yung:

My heart sank when I set out from Yen
For the Han camps where bugles and drums sound.
For hundreds of miles a cold light gives
life to packed snow.
Flags fly on three borders like a rising dawn…
The clouds and mountains carry the Great Wall
away from the sea…
I throw aside my writing brush
Challenging destiny like a student who
discards his cap.\(^{13}\)

The Mongolians rode to power and established the Yuan dynasty that governed China from 1279-1368. The Yuan dynasty was one of the most oppressive regimes in China’s history as the Mongol government carried out a national policy of discrimination against the Chinese. The population was classified into four groups: the most privileged were the Mongol ruling class, followed by the Mongol’s allies, inhabitants of northern China and lastly, the Southern Chinese who has the lowest social status.\(^{14}\) Rather
than building defensive walls to enclose the empire, the Mongols favoured continuous territorial expansion and building networks of free trade and communication routes—by the end of the Yuan dynasty, China had 1400 postal stations which used 50,000 delivery horses.\(^1\) Although the Mongols were inarguably excellent warriors, they lacked political sophistication. Yuan China collapsed in 1368 and was replaced by the rebel forces of Zhu Yuan Zhang, founder of the Ming dynasty. To restore order in China after eighty-nine years of Mongolian rule, Zhu and his successors rebuilt almost the entire Great Wall and extended it to its present length. Although the Wall proved ineffective in keeping the Mongols—the Oirat Mongol of the west, the Tartar Mongols to the north and the Uriyangkhads Mongols—off of Han soil, without hesitation, Ming emperors carried out the wall building mission, for the revival of nationalism. Under the Ming emperors, the Wall became a symbol of Chinese culture. The Ming dynasty was the last to undertake any large-scale work on the Wall; construction covered some 7300 kilometres using greatly improved construction techniques. Most of the wall was laid with brick, whereas before many sections were made of nothing more than mud. Historian Jonathan Fryer in *the Great Wall of China*, commented on the psychology of wall building in Ming dynasty: According to historian Jonathan Fryer,

> The Ming rulers were among the most active wall builders in Chinese history, as if anxious to eliminate the possibility of any repetition of the Mongol disaster... The Great Wall seems to have become a way of life, a necessary demonstration of the barrier between China and the world outside, unreachable in spirit if not in fact.\(^6\)
In many ways, Zhu Yuan Zhang resembled the Qin’s Ying Zheng. Like Ying Zheng, Zhu was obsessed with autocratic power. He was a self-centered ruler who enjoyed terrorizing people. For instance, he executed anyone who used the Chinese word *zeng*, which means “monk” because it reminded him of a time in his youth when he was forced to dress as a monk to escape the Mongolians. Emperor Zhu also established a censorship agency as a means to control the public’s thoughts for he was desperate to re-establish order in Chinese society. He brought Confucianism back to life, but manipulated it to become a philosophy that extinguished human desires in exchange for absolute loyalty and servitude to the nation and the emperor.

In the early Ming dynasty, China had looked ambitiously outward mainly to re-establish China’s cultural supremacy. The Yongle Emperor (1360-1424), the third Ming emperor, sent out six separate massive fleets under the command of Moslem eunuch Zheng He (1371-1433), on the mission of cultural diplomacy and glorification. Zheng He’s fleet—each ship measured over sixty metres long—sailed off from the east coast of China and had reached the coasts of southeast Asia, India, Ceylon, Palembang, Aden (South Arabia) and as far as east as the eastern Africa. During each voyage, the fleet carried many Chinese treasures, including porcelain, silk and jade, to impress and entice trade relations with other nations. In return, Zheng He received exotic presents, animals and tributes ranging from jewels, spices and herbal medicines to the most stunning of all—giraffe from Africa.¹⁷

The Yongle emperor’s policy of open expansionism was abandoned shortly after his death in 1424. Zheng He made his seventh maritime expedition under the sponsor of the Xuande emperor (1398-1435) in 1433, but died during his last voyage. The Xuande emperor’s successor, under the influence of their Confucian advisers, took an insular approach and abruptly ended maritime expeditions. The Confucian officials saw interaction with the outside as a threat to the stability of the Chinese society. In order to prevent further expeditions, the emperor destroyed records of Zheng He’s voyages, abandoned the shipyards, closed off the coastline of China and restricted seafaring activities.¹⁸ The emperor’s ethnocentric worldview led him to believe China was self-sufficient, that it was unnecessary to interact with the outside world. In addition, the threat of the Mongols along the northern border and the presence of Japanese pirates along the eastern coastline further encouraged the emperor to shut down expensive sea missions and foreign trading.¹⁹ The Ming emperors
engaged in extensive wall building, but the Great Wall could not prevent the decrepit empire from falling into the hands of corrupted officials. In 1644, the Manchu, a non-Han Chinese ethnic tribe in north-eastern China, conquered the Ming empire and established the Qing Dynasty. China’s ethnocentric worldview remained strong throughout the Qing dynasty. Since the 1430s, China had remained in its self-imposed isolation as the emperors believed in their economic self-sufficiency. Nonetheless, some missionaries and diplomats were able to make connection with this closed nation, such as the Italian Jesuit, Matteo Ricci, who stayed in China from 1582-1610. Ricci succeeded in gaining respect and acceptance by adapting to the Chinese society and learning the language. He immersed himself in Confucian philosophy and attempted to accommodate traditional Chinese beliefs and Confucian philosophy into his Roman
Catholic teachings. By doing that, Ricci eliminated the ethnocentric authorities’ worries of foreign threats to the pre-eminence of the Chinese culture.20

Although trade relations between China and the West remained active from the middle of the 18th century, they were strictly controlled by the imperial government. The Qing government had little interest in expanding their foreign trade even though demand on the Chinese goods, such as tea, silk and porcelain was high in the Western market, especially in the Great Britain. In 1757, the Qing government made trade more difficult for Westerners by restricting foreign trade exclusively to Canton city. The British merchants found it very difficult to maintain fair trade agreements with China especially when the Chinese had no interest to European products until the British introduced them to opium. Opium exports allowed the British access to a larger Chinese market—they could now sell to corrupt officials and poorer commoners. Qing officials soon
realized the negative effects of opium and tried to ban it. The abrupt ban of opium in China angered the British, and it led to the First Opium War (1839-1842). The Qing lost the war to the Anglo-Franco armies who exposed weaknesses in the Chinese military; after so many years of self-enclosure, China’s military technology was significantly inferior to the West. Thereafter, the Qing emperor was forced to open China’s doors by allowing foreign trades at ports in coastal cities such as Tianjin and Shanghai because of foreign domination. Yet, the cultural tensions between the Chinese and the West were still heightened. Westerners saw China as an underdeveloped nation while the Chinese saw the Westerners as “barbarians” who knew nothing but military force. China’s hatred of Westerners climaxed in the late 19th century and led to the Boxer Rebellion Incident (1899-1901). A group of commoners called the Boxers was formed and attacked Western establishments on Chinese soil. The Qing government did little to stop the riots and crack down on the Boxers, thereby giving the foreign powers excuses to launch their armies into China. They entered from Tianjin and eventually marched into the Forbidden City of Beijing. The Eight Nation Alliance, which included Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Japan, United States and Russia, took advantage of the invasion and each gained control of certain regions in northern China. Hostile relations between China and the West continued until the end of World War I when most of the foreign nations, except Japan, agreed to end their colonization of China.
Since the fall of dynastical China, the Great Wall was no longer used for defensive purposes. It was not considered as part of China’s national identity and thus was not maintained. Instead, the image of the Great Wall became metaphorically used by Westerners to describe China’s isolation and insularity like Felix Greene’s *The Wall Has Two Sides* (1963), Alberto Moravia’s *The Red Book and the Great Wall* (1968), Grover Clark’s *The Great Wall Crumbles* (1971), and James H. Williams’ *Bringing Down the Great Wall* (1991), to name just a few. It was not until the 1930s that the Great Wall became a symbol of nation pride to rally around. In 1933, Japanese troops attacked and took the Great Wall region, Shanhaiguan, in the Hebei province. As an important battle site in the Sino-Japanese War, the image of the Great Wall appeared widely in press and propaganda materials. The Great Wall propaganda was further boosted by China’s father of Communism, Mao Zedong (1893-1976). In 1935 he made a rallying announcement to his Communist revolutionaries and said, “You’re not a real man if you’ve not been to the Great Wall”—a statement that now appears on T-shirts, sunhats and other Great Wall souvenirs. Since then, the Great Wall has continued to be a symbol of national unity. In 1984, the Communist party’s new leader, Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997), announced a new slogan for the Great Wall: *Love China, Restore...*
Our Great Wall. From the mid-1980s onward, tens of millions of yuan were poured into the wall’s restoration. Deng promoted the Great Wall to become China’s national symbol and its number one tourist attraction. Deng’s government rebuilt sections of the wall north of Beijing, using it as a showpiece for trade delegations and an emblem of national unity during a time of social change and economic reform.

Despite changing regimes and shifting politics, the Great Wall has always maintained its purpose—national unity, either physically or metaphorically. But a wall always has two sides, and it is important to recall the Great Wall’s contrasting memories and meanings. The rise of the Wall not only parallels the rise of Chinese autocracy but also the downfall of millions of people who sacrificed their lives for the construction, not to mention the tens of millions of people who were persecuted in China’s repressive dynasties. If the Great Wall is to retain its greatness in the future, let it also serve as a memorial to China’s deceased and oppressed.

People pride themselves on the fact that [the Great Wall] is the only feat of human engineering visible to astronauts on the moon. People even wish to use it as a symbol of China’s strength. But if the Great Wall could speak, it would very frankly tell its Chinese grandchildren that it is a great and tragic gravestone forged by historical destiny… it can only represent an isolationist, conservative and incompetent defence and a cowardly lack of aggression… Alas, O Great Wall, why do we still want to praise you?

- Deathsong of the River, 1988
I began to wonder the significance of “Chineseness” in the Chinese culture after my visit to the Yungang Grottoes in 2004. The history of the Grottoes and their statues and architecture shows a sophisticated cultural fusion when the Mongols penetrated through the Great Wall and brought in new ideas to subtly enrich the Chinese culture.

The Yungang Grottoes, stretching 1 kilometre long, are clusters of Buddhist cave-shrines carved in the sandstone cliff of the Wuzhou mountain range in the northern part of Shanxi province, China. They were constructed during the Northern Wei period (386–534) when northern China was taken over by the non-Chinese tribe called the Tuoba Turks, a tribe of Xianbei origin. In order to gain respect and control of the local Han Chinese who considered outsiders as “barbarians,” the early Tuoba Emperors accepted the local Buddhist religious beliefs and assimilated into the Chinese culture successfully by adopting Chinese customs, language and administration. In 460, the third Emperor Xiaowen commissioned a monk to take charge of the construction of Yungang Grottoes in which five of the statues were made to honour the first five emperors in the form and expression of a Buddha.
The House of Memory, is a proposal of a new addition of a secular grotto to the existing 252 Buddhist cave-shrines in the Yungang Grottoes to house the memory of the lost tribe, the Tuoba Turks. After they passed through the Chinese northern frontier, the Tuoba people have been largely sinicized and merged with the Han Chinese populace in a few generations. This Mongol tribe no longer exists today. The proposed design of a secular grotto attempts to commemorate the people and shift the attention from the religious and political figures to the forgotten people. In the past, the ancient emperor manipulated Buddhism to become a testament to the grandeur and austerity of his political power on this sacred site. Today, a secular grotto is proposed to be built right next to the existing religious grottoes as a memorial site to house the memory of the lost tribe and to remember the history of cultural fusion. This proposal is intended to be imaginary and unrealized as inspired by the German artist Horst Hoheisel who once mentioned, “an unfinished memorial process can guarantee the life of memory.”
**IV Wall of Pride and Sorrow**

To build new walls, and to take others down
To dig under one wall, and to jump above another
To lean against one wall, and to sit on another
To walk along one wall, and to run against another
To see shadows through one wall, and see one self in another
To be protected by some walls, and to sense the violence of other ones
To feel the stability of one wall, and to fall with another
To laugh about some walls, and to cry about others
To whisper into one wall, and to hear the screams from others
To believe in one wall, and to hate another
To commemorate some walls, and to forget others
To see names [etched] into one wall, and to be one on another
To live within own walls, and to destroy someone else's
To THINK about one wall, and some of the others.

Eva Schone, “Thinking of Walls”

Every wall has two sides. Eva Schone’s poem _Thinking of Walls_ awakens our conscience to think and see the world from both sides of the wall.

The following chapter presents a two-sided story of contemporary China: the utopian promising land and the harsh reality of a developing nation. Part One consists of “Wall of Pride,” a timeline that shows the utopia envisioned by the authorities, as depicted from cover images of the pro-Party magazine, _Beijing Review_, and from a selection of Beijing’s significant architectural projects in the same period.

In the 80s, the _Beijing Review_ focused primarily on promoting Deng Xiaoping’s modernization principles and the Party’s socialist ideals. Soldiers, civil servants, and teachers were depicted as model citizens. Around the time of the June Fourth Movement in 1989, the magazine shifted its attention onto the nation’s economic reform. Meanwhile, Beijing also saw the realization of many hotel projects, some of which were the first joint venture design projects involving foreign design practices, signifying the country’s willingness to open itself to foreign businessmen and professionals.

In the 90s, as China began to welcome the success of an open market economy, the _Beijing Review_ shifted its emphasis towards national unity, cultural awareness and China’s leading role among third-world countries. In the same period, shopping centres and commercial buildings redrew the skyline of the capital, while local architects struggled to find a modern design aesthetic of the Chinese identity. “Big roof” architecture,
a trend that puts traditional Chinese roofs on top of modern skyscrapers, became the most common design solution for institutional buildings in Beijing.

From the year 2000 onwards, the *Beijing Review* continued to showcase China's growing confidence through writings on its economy, global politics and technological advancement. These images of prosperity reminded readers largely of Deng's famous motto, “To get rich is glorious.” Gigantic architectural projects by world renowned architects dominated Beijing's architectural scene, making the city a showcase of national glory.

Part Two of this section presents an alternate view of the Chinese society through a depiction of social issues that have been all but ignored by official publications: slavery, AIDS, e-waste, pollution, social inequality and poverty. These problems are common knowledge in China despite the lack reporting from official media agencies. Many officials regard such critical social issues as unavoidable phenomenon as a result of the powerful economic growth of the nation. Despite urging from the highest officials in the central government to tackle some of these issues, regional authorities tend to keep their eyes shut as long as their status and wealth are secured. In many cases, social problems in remote areas are intentionally covered up by local authorities, and even Beijing's central government finds them difficult to unearth. If the central government has only one nightmare, it will likely be the social instability erupting from a remote corner in the nation, due to the below-par regional governing.
Pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square violently suppressed by the People’s Liberation Army.

While on his “Southern Tour,” Deng Xiaoping calls for faster market reforms in the Chinese economy.

Broadcast of the Deathsong of the River.

Deng Xiaoping established as Mao’s successor. Start of Democracy Wall movement.

Deng Xiaoping visits US. Cracks down on Democracy Wall protests. Deng launches economic reforms.

China’s first email is sent.

Start of Democracy Wall movement.

China’s economy unaffected by West’s sanction.

China continues to send students abroad.

“Intense Competition Among Fast Food Companies” March, 1992

“China’s Economy Unaffected By West’s Sanction” Oct. 1989

“Why China cannot adopt capitalism” Mar. 1987

The Anti-Spiritual Pollution campaign targets corrupting influences from the West.

Deng Xiaoping launches his “Love Our Country, Restore Our Great Wall” Campaign.

Deng mniezes bourgeois liberalization.

Deng launches economic reforms.

Deng Xiaoping established as Mao’s successor. Start of Democracy Wall movement.

Reportage on slavery broke out in 2007. Migrant workers, children and mentally retarded workers were forced to work in brick kilns without pay in Shanxi province. Some of these people were kidnapped from train and bus stations or lured by a false promise of good pay. Many of them had horrific wounds on their bodies. These workers in remote provinces were found working in brutal conditions.

“In the mid-1990s, the poor peasants in Henan province in eastern China sold their blood for 50 yuan a pint, enough to buy two bags of fertilizer. As a result of unsafe procedures, large numbers were infected with the HIV virus. In some villages up to 40 percent of the inhabitants are seropositive, but for a long time have been isolated from help because the existence of AIDS in China was not officially acknowledged. Today, many villagers are still uncertain whether they are infected and cannot afford a test, which costs 80 yuan. Organized help from local health authorities is getting underway, but many people do not have the money to go to hospital and are cared for by family and friends.”

- Photojournalist Lu Guang, 2006

“Zhou Mao sold his blood three times in order to raise the money to send his five children to school for one semester. He has been ill for three years and his children have now left school to take care of him.”

- Photojournalist Lu Guang, 2006

“Guiyu in the Guangzhou province has been a popular dump site of computers and electronic appliances from the first world countries. Every year, millions of unwanted computer parts, keyboards, television sets and cell phones are smuggled into China by cargo ships. Villagers abandon their farmlands. They shift through piles of broken old computer parts in acid smelling shacks, smelt down parts with basic tools to extract valuable metals such as gold and copper.”

- Photojournalist Natalie Behring, 2005

Beijing municipal authorities have shut down more than 50 schools for children of migrant workers, according to Human Rights Watch. The schools’ closure - part of a campaign to close all unregistered schools for migrants by the end of September, 2007, threatens to leave tens of thousands of children without education.

“In 2006, photographer Peter Parks captured the image of cyclists riding through a cloud of greenhouse gas emitted from a factory in Yutian, China.”

“In the summer of 2007, a man collects dead fish in Donghu Lake in Wuhan, where officials say an estimated of 30,000 kg of fish have been killed by pollution and hot weather.”

“An average of 27 people per day lose a body part in the factories of Shenzhen alone. Nationwide there are 136,000 deaths annually in industrial accidents.”

- Photojournalist: Alessandro Digaetano, 2005

“I discovered the great industrial centres of the north of China. The cities were living through the full impact of the reforms, with apocalyptic effects on the social landscape. Everyone’s eyes were turned toward the coast, so it seemed to me, therefore, that it was crucial to work on an unknown aspect of contemporary China.”

- Photojournalist Bertrand Meunier, 2000-2001


Actually, it [the Great Wall] never did more than kill the many workers who labored on it; nor did it ever stop the northern barbarians…I have always felt there was a Great Wall enclosing me. The material making up this Great Wall consists both of ancient bricks and of newly added ones. These two things have joined together to create the wall which surrounds us. When will we ever stop adding new bricks to the Great Wall?

- Lu Xun, 1925

As previously discussed, the Great Wall represents not only the pride of a unified China, but also sorrow for the dead and the persecuted throughout the Middle Kingdom's history of despotism. Under the combined weight of pride and sorrow, ancient China developed an insular culture, implanted in the Chinese psyche and passed from one generation to another. Within the boundaries of this culture, a mature social hierarchy was established between ruler and citizen, teacher and student, old and young, husband and wife. Filial piety – respect and general dominance of elders – was the principle that governed not only family life, but also political life. This principle, derived from Confucianism, became the art of autocratic ruling, as constant as the northern star. Obedience and submission to power were traits that became part of the glorified national character for maintaining state harmony and deference to tradition. The first part of this essay investigates how Confucianism has been adulterated and manipulated by the authoritarian government to denounce individualism, evolution, and political transparency. The second part of the thesis analyzes the effects of the walled culture on China’s national psychology through the voices of contemporary social critics and writers in the early 20th century: Lu Xun in the 1920s, Bo Yang in the 1960s, and Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang in the mid-1980s. These intellectuals attempt to re-evaluate their culture and voice the problems of national character, and they all share one yearning in their efforts: a hope for change from the heart of each individual.
In man’s original state, Huang [Zongxi] says, there were no rulers. Each man took care of himself and left others alone... The first rulers to appear were men who attempted to remedy this defect, seeking not their own good but the benefit of others. These sage-kings taught men the arts of civilization, saw to it that their people had sufficient land from which to gain sustenance and clothing, established customs and ceremonies which would regulate their social intercourse, maintained schools for their education and moral training, and instituted military service for the common defense…

In ancient times the people had been the hosts, the proprietors of the land, while the ruler was merely a guest on good behavior. Since the rise of the great empires, however, the ruler had become the host and the people the guests, possessing nothing in their own right…

- W.T. De. Bary, 1957

There have been great debates since the late-Qing era over what caused the downfall of Chinese civilization. A number of modern scholars have argued that Confucianism played an integral role in constructing a wall that obstructed China from moving beyond medievalism. A philosophy based on autocratic ruling and moral development, Confucianism emerged as a resolution to end the chaotic Spring-Autumn Period (770–476 BC) and Warring States Period (475–221 BC). Confucius advocated self-control, social harmony, and a recovery of the rituals and order of the Western Zhou – the Golden Age when China was unified. His ideas can be classified into two main parts, ren (仁) and li (礼). Ren has multiple meanings: benevolence, self-refinement, and humanism. These qualities form the basis of Confucian morality. Li, on the other hand, is Confucian order. It emphasizes social hierarchy, societal stability, righteous behaviour, and underscores the use of rituals to express the unreachable status of the ruler.

Confucianism was largely ignored until the Western Han dynasty (206–8 BC), when Emperor Wu, Liu Che, and Confucian master, Dong Zhongshu, aligned with each other. In 140 BC, the seventeen-year old Emperor Wu summoned over a hundred famous scholars to his court to discuss how to reshape state rule so it would resemble Western Zhou, the golden age of the prehistoric sage kings. Dong Zhongshu presented his ideas on the relationship between heaven and humankind. He suggested that the absolute power of the ruler is a divine mandate signified by harmonious relationships between rightful
ruler and loyal public, and human and nature. He also believed that
an improperly-ruled society brought disorder to the universe in the
form of natural disasters. Dong advocated ren, yi, li, le (benevolence,
loyalty, order and rituals) as the mechanisms for ruling. Furthermore,
he emphasized three filial relationships: ruler and ruled, father and son,
and husband and wife, in which the latter parties were to show their
obedience and loyalty to the former. In Dong’s words, “this rule won’t
change as long as the heaven doesn’t.” Under this concept, everything,
including people, were the personal belongings of the ruler, the Son of
the Heaven (天子). Dong’s ideas were strongly supported by Emperor
Wu. Almost immediately, the emperor abandoned all other schools of
thought and made Dong’s Confucianism the national philosophy of
China. Liu’s decision had horrific consequences for the Chinese over
the next two thousand years; from then on, new political thought was
often considered a challenge to the autocratic power and was largely
suppressed. The filial hierarchy in Confucianism became a psychological
wall that bound the entire Chinese population under the power of the
emperor and shadow of the prehistoric sage kings.

It was not until the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279) that
Confucianism had a major paradigm shift, resulting in the School
of Li (理). The School of Li wanted a renaissance of pre-Qin (pre-221
BC) Confucian literature. The Li masters interpreted the classical texts
to construct a philosophy centered on nationalism, conservatism, and
pacifism. They attempted to explain Confucianism purely through
morality and ethics, thus developing a society that would be controlled
largely by the elite scholar class. With the help of Yi, the Book of Changes,
the School of Li merged the laws of nature and morality. Li, the moral
law, came to mean tai chi, the Supreme Ultimate that controlled yin and
yang and the five elements. According to the School of Li, both nature and
humanity was ruled by a single set of virtues – the Confucian morality.
“Heaven is Law,” wrote Zhu Xi, the most significant representative of the
School of Li. Bound by a set of moral rules, a man’s most important duty
was to refrain from any immoral actions and to restrain his inner desires in
order to resemble the virtues of the sage.

Confucianism was politicized to become a philosophy that told
people what not to do in support of authoritarian power. The School of
Li obtained its orthodox status in the late Southern Song era, maintained
its influence during the Yuan (1271–1368 ), and flourished in the Ming
dynasty (1368–1644 ). Under these neo-Confucian decrees, the Ming
dynasty, often referred to as the “walled era”, became the most introverted and self-restrained period in the Chinese history.

After the decline of Ming dynasty, Huang Zongxi (1610–1695), a neo-Confucian political philosopher, gave a profound critique of China’s autocratic walled culture in *A plan for the Prince*. Huang has been likened to John Locke and John Stuart Mill for his belief that “the state is created for man, not man for the state.” In his book, Huang suggested that the interests of people should be the driving force behind governmental actions. He supported the use of constitutional law to limit the power of the ruler, and the restoration of the prime minister as the “servant of the people” to balance the emperor’s power. However, as a Confucian master, Huang remained a supporter of monarchism, and thus, did not advocate democracy. In fact, the exclusive aim of Huang’s ideas was to make the emperor a better ruler. Huang also looked to attain social harmony under the limits of traditional Confucianism. Although Huang did not discourage freedom of expression, he believed that what was right or wrong should be determined by Confucian scholars, rather than by the will of the common people. Huang’s reforms marked the twilight of Confucianism’s self-renewal – in the walled culture, Huang’s ideas had little impact on the relatively stagnant 17th century Chinese society. Huang did little to overcome the barriers set by previous masters other than asserting people’s benevolence. Huang’s failure to reform Confucianism effectively and his society reveals how mature the autocracy and the walled culture already were by the late Ming/early Qing period.

**Madman | Lu Xun**

The first large-scale public protest against Confucianism and China’s walled culture, happened after the last imperial dynasty of China, the Qing dynasty, fell in 1911. During the 1910s and 1920s when China was largely controlled by warlords and foreign imperial powers, many young, patriotic intellectuals, most of them educated abroad, attempted to save their nation from the encroachment of imperialism by promoting a movement to change Chinese culture. These early-20th century academics made radical reforms in literature and education – the most influential of which was the introduction of vernacular Chinese in literature to replace classical Chinese which only highly educated people and officials
could read. This attempt allowed common people with little education to read and understand articles and books. This cultural movement in early modern China was known as the May Fourth Movement. The name was taken from a 1919 protest against the Versailles Peace Treaty in front of the Beijing’s Tiananmen Gate – the treaty had assigned former German territories in Shandong to Japan. In face of foreign imperialism and humiliation, many intellectuals questioned why a nation which possessed four thousand years of history could still be so weak and backward. Lu Xun, along with his contemporaries who had been educated abroad in the West or Japan, condemned the walled culture and blamed it for the country’s downfall. In support of the movement, Lu Xun published a series of short stories and essays urging radical cultural change.

Lu Xun published the satirical story *A Madman’s Diary* in 1918. The story is based on a madman’s diary, reflecting his vision of the society and of the people around him. The madman is actually an enlightened individual who can see the problems of the society with critical eyes. He is labelled “crazy” by society because he refuses to flow with the crowd; because he refuses to conform to power; because he has an independent point of view of society. Through the voice of the madman, Lu Xun condemned traditional Confucianism for trapping people’s mind using the veils of virtue and morality. He described Confucian virtues and morality as cannibalistic, likening them with a practice that gradually eats up people’s souls:

> Everything requires careful consideration if one is to understand it. In ancient times, as I recollect, people often ate human beings, but I am rather hazy about it. I tried to look this up, but my history has no chronology and scrawled all over each page are the words: ‘Virtue and Morality’. Since I could not sleep anyway, I read intently half the night until I began to see words between the lines. The whole book was filled with the two words – ‘Eat people’.

Why consider virtue and morality cannibalistic? Lu Xun’s radical attack on Confucianism is not totally anti-traditional. Similar to Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, Lu Xun’s criticism is based on the psychological effects on people when virtue and morality are adulterated and generalized to become empty formality in a social and political context. Hence, virtue and morality often become political tools to repress basic human instinct and to promote social and political slavery. Lu Xun saw the fundamental problem of the Chinese walled culture residing in the
manipulation of Confucian philosophies by the ruling class to dominate the common psychology of the people. Not only did these manipulated traditional virtues create a society rife with power struggles, suspicion, and mutual censorship, but they also strangled the individual's will to push for change in society. Through the madman's voice, Lu Xun expressed his frustration:

Wanting to eat men, at the same time afraid of being eaten themselves, they all eye each other with the deepest suspicion. How comfortable life would be for them if they could rid themselves of such obsessions and go to work, walk, eat, and sleep at ease. They have only this one step to take. Yet fathers and sons, husbands and wives, brothers, friends, teachers and students, sworn enemies and even strangers, have all joined in this conspiracy, discouraging and preventing each other from taking this step.\(^8\)

Lu Xun believed if one was determined enough to take this very first step to seek change in the society, and if one refused to conform to autocratic power, there would be hope in the society. However, Lu Xun observed that most people did not want to make such a change and develop themselves. Change in Lu Xun's vocabulary embraced qualities such as self-affirmation and self-enlightenment. He believed that social reform must start from change in the individual. True modernity would only arrive when people were no longer bound by cannibal-like traditions and learned to think and speak up for their rights. He asserts,

You should change, change from the bottom of your hearts. You must realize that there will be no place for man-eaters in the world in future.

If you don't change, you may all be eaten by each other. However many of you there are, you will be wiped out by the real men, just as wolves are killed by hunters – just like reptiles!\(^9\)

In 1921, Lu Xun wrote another story, *The True Story of Ah Q*, and created a satirical figure, Ah Q, of a poor rural casual labourer who lived in a small town at around the time of the 1911 Revolution. Although Ah Q lived a miserable life, he could always find ways to make himself feel good. Through this character, Lu Xun condemned the self-deceptive quality of the Chinese national character. Lu Xun describes Ah Q:
There are said to be some victors who take no pleasure in a victory unless their opponents are as fierce as tigers or eagles: in the case of foes as timid as sheep or chickens they find their triumph empty. There are other victors who, having carried all before them, with the enemy slain or surrendered, utterly cowed, realized that now no foe, no rival, no friend is left—none but themselves, supreme, lonely, lost, and forlorn. Then they find their triumph a tragedy. But not so our hero [Ah Q]: he was always exultant. This may be a proof of the moral supremacy of China over the rest of the world.  

Ah Q always felt triumphant because he possessed a mentality called “Spiritual Victory,” which Lu Xun found was common in the Chinese. Many Chinese during Lu Xun’s time still asserted their cultural superiority over the outside “barbarians” after a series of military defeats, and refused to acknowledge that other cultures could actually be stronger and more advanced than theirs. The Chinese coined the term “Spiritual Victories,” which was a little more than unjustified for their victories over outsiders. Similarly, when Ah Q despised someone who was better than himself, he would use a self-defence mechanism and say, “My sons may be much greater” or “He used to be much better off.” Ah Q demonstrated the most outrageous method of rationalization after he had been robbed of all the money he won in gambling. To maintain a positive self-image, he slapped himself as if he had beaten up someone else:

…[Ah Q] changed defeat into victory. Raising his right hand he slapped his own face hard, twice, so that it tingled with pain. After this slapping his heart felt lighter, for it seemed as if the one who had given the slap was himself, the one slapped some other self, and soon it was just as if he had beaten someone else—in spite of the fact that his face was still tingling. He lay down satisfied that he had gained the victory…

Through Ah Q, Lu Xun comments on his countrymen’s passive attitude toward their fate. This attitude results from the two thousand-year legacy of despotism, during which the lives of average citizens were entirely dependent on the will of the ruler. Generations of harsh restraint and compulsory blind obedience made the people give up on their desire for justice and individual rights. This attitude is exemplified in The True Story of Ah Q, when Ah Q is about to be executed for a crime he never committed:
Suddenly it occurred to him [Ah Q] – ‘Can I be going to have my head cut off?’ Panic seized him and everything turned dark before his eyes, while there was a humming in his ears as if he had fainted. But he did not really faint. Although he felt frightened some of the time, the rest of the time he was quite calm. It seemed to him that in this world probably it was the fate of everybody at some time to have his head cut off.  

Lu Xun’s courage to criticize his own culture is indicative of the spirit of the May Fourth Movement and also exposes the psychological barrier that hindered modernization. Cries for political and cultural reform by the May Fourth scholars flew in the face of China’s tyrannical rulers and landowners, marking an era of struggle between the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia. The May Fourth scholars emerged as the first to break through the Chinese wall of authoritarianism and tradition. They were the harbingers of freedom of expression and epitomized determination in cultural advancement – two qualities crucial in reviving a civilization in decline.

Ugly Chinaman | Bo Yang

Fifty years after Lu Xun, Bo Yang, a Chinese writer based in Taiwan, criticized the culture of the Middle Kingdom more harshly and directly. After being imprisoned for nine years in Taiwan because of his critique of Chiang Kaishhek, Bo Yang came to believe that whomever in China told the truth about politics would end up in jail. In the 1980s, Bo Yang compiled a collection of his lectures and essays on his criticism of the Chinese culture in *The Ugly Chinaman and the Crisis of Chinese Culture*. This book caused a furious debate in the Chinese communities when it was first published. Although this book received praises for its honest and critical tone, some Chinese disliked Bo for speaking disdainfully about his fellow citizens. Nonetheless, Bo’s experience as a political prisoner had made him a fearless cultural critic and an advocate of freedom of expression. Indeed, the intention of Bo’s book was to make Chinese readers aware of the problems in the national character that was leading to the degeneration of their culture. He used the metaphor of a soy bean paste (fermented soy bean sauce) to describe the effects of walled culture on people:
Because of their long sojourn in the soy paste vat, Chinese people have developed a strong tendency towards resignation. On the one hand, they like to brag and exaggerate; on the other they're self-indulgent and self-pitying.13

Many Chinese scholars, from the time of Lu Xun to the present, have wondered how despotism could be sustained for so long in China. Bo Yang suggests that the problems of present generations originate from an ideological virus passed down by their ancestors. This virus, according to Bo Yang, was nurtured by both dogmatic Confucianists and a despotic bureaucracy. Bo Yang argues that it was the slave mentality presented in China's national character that encouraged despotism to last for centuries. This mentality is symptomatic of a sense of social inferiority and defeatism in the face of power. It denounces individual creativity, imagination and the will to change society; it forces people to surrender their feelings and desires, prevents alternative social values and ways of living, and defends ancient social structures and the mythological ideals of a golden past that is no longer relevant. Possession of those submissive qualities made people become spineless and selfish:

Confucius had a brilliant philosophy for avoiding calamities. In plain language: 'Avoid dangerous societies. Don't live in dangerous communities. In times of social stability, take an official position. In times of chaos, distance yourself from society. In prosperous times, if you don't take an official position, you should feel shame. In bad times, if you have an official position, you should also feel shame.'14

Slave mentality searches for universal harmony based on moral limits, promotes happiness in accepting fate, praises officialdom and power, and encourages mundanity and self-control. This is the mentality of the many Chinese who, like Ah Q, refuse to modify their “national” behaviour and blindly follow any political regime. Bo Yang asserted that this slave mentality was a huge drawback for social development because it perpetuated paranoia, a sense of resignation and cowardly behaviour:

Chinese are paranoid to the point where they don't even know what their legal rights are, or how to assert them... The psychological environment of neurosis and paranoia I spoke of above is a fertile breeding ground for despots and corrupt bureaucrats, and there is little hope that particular species of human being that flourishes in this climate will soon die out in China. In traditional Chinese culture, 'acting wisely by playing it safe' is praised time and again... This is one reason why the Chinese people continue to degenerate and atrophy.15
The concept of slave mentality is common in modern philosophy and sociology. Nietzsche introduced the idea of slave mentality in the late 19th century to analyze the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Nietzsche thought that those unable to judge for themselves would inevitably be ruled by another entity that would design a set of values for them to believe. Nietzsche proposed this was how despotic systems were established. Therefore, autocracy, according to the theory of slave mentality, has been the official religion of China for over two millennia.

Bo Yang concludes his analysis of slave mentality with a question: Can people raised in a culture that promotes such values think independently? Chinese authorities have used Confucian filial devotion required to maintain social control and to stabilize political power for thousands of years, which has bred a submissive national character of not to directly criticize and challenge their authority in public. The ugliness that Bo Yang saw in his fellow citizens was their slave mentality – their reluctance to change. If a modern state could be comprised of people who could loosen their thinking from the bindings of Confucian filial hierarchy and thus posses the ability to judge their leaders, then China’s modernization would not be limited to only shallow glamour.

The Deathsong of the River

How could China shake its slave mentality, break through its walled culture and develop into a modern society based on individual rights and freedoms? This question has been raised frequently, whether it be during the May Fourth Movement in the early 20th century or during the political crackdown following the June Fourth Movement in the late 20th century. A controversial six-episode documentary series, co-written by Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang, raised this topic for debate. The documentary series titled Heshang, translated as The Deathsong of the River, was broadcasted on television in 1988 during a time when an unusual number of policies of non-interference in literary matters was in effect in China. In the film, the national symbols were revaluated in a critical viewpoint: the Great Wall, which had been the national and cultural identity of unity, was discredited to become the symbol of cultural suffocation that hindered development while the dragon, the symbol of the emperor, was reinterpreted as a symbol of destruction and fear. Like Lu Xun’s Madman Diary and Bo Yang’s Ugly Chinaman,
the *Deathsong of the River* presented a strong desire for change and great eagerness to attack totems of the narrow nationalism.

The Yellow River received the most complex criticism as a metaphor in the *Deathsong of the River*. The Yellow River, the second-longest river in China and fifth longest in the world, is considered the cradle of Chinese civilization. It got its name from its yellow soil, and also because China’s legendary first ruler was named the Yellow Emperor. The Yellow River carries about 1.6 billion tons of silt per year from the loess plains to the sea. As it dissects the plains of Northern China, it deposits silt wherever the current slows, and thus raises the riverbed, which causes cyclic flooding and changes in the river’s course. What nurtured the yellow civilization also proved to be its most destructive force.¹⁷

Dragons, the gods of rivers and seas, are associated with the destructive Yellow River. As dragon worship dominated the Yellow River basin in prehistoric times, fear and respect toward the unpredictable Yellow River was typical. According to written records from 602 BC to AD 1938, the Yellow River broke its embankments 1,590 times – about twice every three years, and has changed its course significantly twenty-six times, about once a century.¹⁸ The cyclic floods of the Yellow River have filled the lakes in the Northern Chinese Plains with silt, submerged cities, farmlands and hills. The mighty Northern Song capital Bianliang, also known as Kaifeng, is now about ten metres below the yellow soil.¹⁹ The once prosperous city of China depicted in Zhang Zeduan’s painting, *Crossing the River During the Qingming Festival*, that had a population of over one million people was lost forever. The Yellow River never tires of changing the Chinese landscape.

Su and Wang, in *Deathsong of the River*, argued that this phenomenon paralleled the chaotic socio-political history of China: every two to three hundred years, a significant and violent upheaval would occur and result in the fall of a dynasty.²⁰ Bo Yang in *The Ugly Chinaman* also pointed out that there was not a single year in the imperial eras that China was not engaged in warfare, large or small.²¹ Societal upheavals have been almost as unavoidable as the flooding of the Yellow River. Since Chinese rulers used to associate themselves with dragons, representations of the fierce Yellow River, then the Yellow River can also be seen as an icon of Chinese despots. Throughout the last two millennia, the Chinese people have been largely subject to the behaviour of their rulers, as threatening as the Yellow River.

In the imperial times, people dreamed for the Yellow River to
run clear. There are legends claiming that if a sage is born, the Yellow River will turn clear, something that had never happened before. In the 20th century, the fate of Chinese people was still largely dependent on the unpredictable ruling class. Su and Wang suggested that what the Yellow River could give the people had already been given to their ancestors. The Yellow River supported China's civilization since ancient times – the sand and mud accumulated by the river flowed through the blood vessels of the Chinese. But, it was time to flush the river deposits away with a great tidal wave, because its mud and sand had choked the vessels of people. The Yellow had become an iconic Confucianist barrier for contemporary Chinese, one which Su and Wang asked contemporary Chinese to turn their backs on:

Confucian culture may indeed possess all sorts of ancient and perfect "gems of wisdom", yet over these past few thousand years it has been able to create neither a national spirit of initiative, nor a legal order for the state, nor a mechanism for cultural renewal; rather on its path of decline it has created a frightening sort of suicidal mechanism, which repeatedly destroys its own best talent, killing off the living elements within itself, and suffocating one generation after another of the finest flowers of our nation. Though it may possess a thousand-year's treasure hoard of gems, in today's world we may be forced to throw out the gems together with the junk.22

The message in the film is direct and clear: Su and Wang take the position that if the Yellow River, which no longer nurtures the people, the Chinese have to give up their long-held fears and respect for the Yellow River and find new ways to accept change and embrace modernity as found in the West. To conclude the documentary, Su and Wang identify “blueness” as the ultimate resolution for China. Here, “blueness” refers to the colour of the ocean, which represents a civilization, “like that of ancient Greece or modern Europe… industrial, seafaring, outward-looking and aggressive” as opposed to China’s “yellow” civilization, which is “characterized by political despotism and by a monistic, ethical creed that forbids diversity.”24 Perhaps, the film presented a naïve desire for westernization. However, the film is so emotionally charged that it becomes a piece of art. The yearning for change and westernization reflects the frustration and anger towards the downfall of a culture. The film shows a strong desire to escape from the mystified national symbols. The episode ends with a hymn of hope for the union of the Yellow River and the blue ocean:
In the Deathsong of the River, Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang indicate a deep despair, a frustration, a feeling of “extreme anger and sorrow, in a sort of self-awareness and self-condemnation.” This sense of frustration is also common in Lu Xun and Bo Yang’s works. Intellectuals in China have always placed themselves at the border of the society. Their border identity allows them to detach themselves from the social norms and develop an independent voice that remains true to themselves. Their border-identity also allows them to understand the two worlds: one within the border and one outside the border. At the borderline, they dream of connecting the two worlds and bringing in the “good elements” that they have never experienced before; but this dream has been suppressed within the border:

Among the professions of mankind, no one has a greater need for a free atmosphere and unlimited space than they [intellectuals] do. If you affixed a black cross to their spirits or weighed them down under a grey Great Wall, then the light of their spirit would never become the sun! May History never again play tracks on Chinese intellectuals. Today, this is our deepest prayer!”

In 1975, Psychologist Martin Seligman established his model of learned helplessness, a theory of depression. Learned helplessness was referred to as a condition in which an individual adopted a belief in his or her own helplessness and ceased to believe in the potential worth of his or her own actions to influence any life-situation positively.

In one of the studies that established the learned helplessness paradigm, Seligman worked with three groups of dogs. In the first phase of the experiment, Group 1 received shocks that would turn off if they responded actively; Group 2 received shocks they could not turn off no matter what action they took; and Group 3 received no shocks at all during Phase 1.

After several Phase 1 trials, Seligman placed each group of dogs in an enclosed box, divided in half by a chest-high fence, from which there was no escape. A shock would then come on, and if the dogs jumped over the barrier to the other side, then the shock would stop. The dogs in Group 1 and Group 3 quickly learned to avoid getting shocked in Phase 2, but the dogs in Group 2, which had prior history of inescapable shock made no attempt to jump. They were passive: they made no attempt to jump to avoid the shock, withdrew to the corner of the box and lay down.1

After reading Seligman’s experiment on learned helplessness, it lead me to wonder, would the same psyche of helplessness become part of the Chinese collective psychology after cycles of social upheaval and repression throughout the history of the last century?

History has taught the Chinese people that no matter how hard they tried, they could never escape from under the hand of an authoritarian government. In the 20th century, many novelists, artists, writers, and students
attempted to loosen the bindings of authority and the resulting historical, cultural, societal, and political restraints. But those moments were like sparks that died off quickly after the government’s repression and harsh punishments in response to the major civil resistance such as Hundred Flower Movement in the 50s, the crackdown of the Democracy Wall in late 70s, and the June Fourth Incident in late 80s.

After the June Fourth Movement in 1989 was curbed, the cry for democracy in China appeared to be silenced, at least on the surface. The bloody and violent military crackdown on the protest added to the psychology of helplessness in the Chinese citizens. Many began to believe that they could not do anything to change the suppressed society in terms of freedom of expression and bringing about democracy; that it was unrealistic to raise further concerns for political liberation and individual freedom.

A popular slogan in the 90s, wan qian kan: look fully toward the future – the future of economic prosperity in place of any desire for political change – best reflects the dominant thinking of the people even in today’s society. Celebrating some parts and forgetting others, the nation turns on her full engine to boost its economy while a new wave of nationalism spreads across the country. Each year, millions of youngsters in the country flock to urban centres for job opportunities. Acres of rural lands are turned into gigantic factory compounds and mines. From the coast to the mountains, new cities emerge like mushrooms after rain. The rocketing economic boom and tremendous growth in GDP keeps the populace contented and satisfied, materially. The people understand that in order to sustain the fruits of economic success, it is in their best interest not to look back to the past with questioning eyes, not to mention the calamitous Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Square massacre. Rising prosperity and improved living standards repress any thoughts that might trigger economic and social instability. In the minds of people they know that,

...a socialist culture has no interest in encouraging people to think critically or creatively about their past, that wants people to fix hopeful eyes on their tomorrows rather than questioning eyes on their yesterdays...

In the last decade, as the Great Wall stood firm and proud on Chinese soil as a tourist attraction and national monument, the government erected a new “great” firewall to censor activities in the cyber world. In 2006, the number of Internet users in China became the second-largest in the world with a population of 132 million users, only the United States had more users. Nonetheless, the degree of censorship and repression in
Chinese cyberspace was like that of other media – magazines, films, books and newspapers; it was not limited to only state-mandated filtering and Web site closure. Many resourceful Web sites such as the BBC News, CNN, and Wikipedia sites were blocked in China. In 2006, the government also proposed forcing her 20 million bloggers to register their real names. By then there was an estimated 30,000-strong Internet police force dedicated to monitor Web sites and emails. Currently, the country’s 110,000 Internet cafés are state-licensed and equipped with surveillance systems. It is not hard to find news about the arrests of Internet users, accused of being subversive and offensive:

Shi Tao, who worked for the Contemporary Business News in China, was jailed for 10 years in 2005 for “divulging state secrets”. He is believed to have posted an internal Communist Party message warning journalists about the dangers of social unrest resulting from the return of dissidents for the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square uprising. Wang Xiaoning was also given a 10 year sentence for “incitement to subvert state power” after publishing pro-democracy material online.

The government continues to play the cat-and-mouse game with dissidents and tightly monitors the activities of her people, repelling any “destabilizing, anti-totalitarian flies and mosquitoes of media freedom and democracy.”

Those who dare to challenge the “border” of censorship risk surveillance, detention, prosecution, and persecution. When dissidents “evaporated,” one after another, the people started to question – where the line was drawn between what could be said and what couldn't. The TV documentary, River Elegy, which reflected the legacy of China's walled culture, was denounced as counter-revolutionary, “tricking and deceiving people’s hearts” and leading public opinion into political turmoil in 1989. In January 2006, the government shut down a newspaper supplement Bingdian, or Freezing Point, for publishing an article written by a professor at Zhongshan University on the way history is taught in China. Are these accusations justified? Does silence equal patriotism? People who honestly questioned the crippled socio-political state of their homeland and culture were thought of as threats to the nation’s stability—in an open society, such voices would be seen as expressions of social conscience. Constant, unreasonable denunciation of such efforts could only lead to a culture of fear. No doubt the majority of the people continue to exercise vigorous self-censorship to repress their thoughts and opinions about their dissatisfaction with society and politics. The punitive political culture in contemporary China is no different from that in Mao’s epoch that saw “honest questioning and honest disagreement
as evidence that questioners and those who disagreed are enemy, traitors” to the nation.\textsuperscript{11} Living in such a culture of political fear, few people would dare to raise honest questions concerning the well-being of their country for fear of denunciation:

Comrade Li asked whether production projections are too high. He is surely a rightist! Mr. Zhang questioned the validity of impossibly high harvest reports. He is surely a weak-kneed rightist! Comrade Shen asked whether water projects carried out so swiftly and constructed with untrained workers would function properly? He dares to question the will and power of the people? He is clearly an elitist, a rightist, and a counterrevolutionary.\textsuperscript{12}

For better or worse, the stability of China is shaped by a group of tamed citizens who have learned to play safe in society, never taking the risk to express opinions on sensitive topics such as criticisms of leadership, Taiwan’s independence, or ethnic minorities in Islamic Xinjiang and Buddhist Tibet. Under long years of political repression, most Chinese have unconsciously bred a habit of “self-discipline” and “self-censorship” to ensure personal safety:

There’s something very potent about Chinese culture; it turns restrictions and taboos into immutable and acceptable rules. If they were just taboos, the Chinese could easily be rid of them. Even today the greatest obstacle to Reform is that the old ways have been turned into sacred Truth, and this clouds people’s judgement, they assume it is right and proper. The moment you liberate them they feel uneasy and oppose their freedom. When feet are unbound people fight against it heart and soul; they can’t walk with unbound feet anymore. It’s not just that the feet have been bound too long; they become their own raison d’être, a self regulation that has also become an esthetic in its own right, a value system. Once this has happened, you can’t do anything to get rid of it…. The reason Reform is making such slow headway is that people don’t dare let go of all those things they once found attractive.\textsuperscript{13}

For the time being, the populace is focusing their full energies on earning and consuming. They are willing to be bound by the one-party government, and to be bewitched by the image of a prosperous nation. The government continues to construct the gleaming façade of a great Chinese nation to legitimize her authoritarian power and for her people to look up upon: the 2008 Olympic games, the first Chinese astronaut in space, membership into World Trade Organization (WTO), the success in conserving the giant panda, the construction of the world’s largest dam and the rocketing economic growth. The Chinese government is attempting to create a Chinese utopia. But this utopian dream exists “nowhere, except in the imagination.”\textsuperscript{14} All
the talk about ideological unity just means everyone has to have the same bound feet; otherwise, you will be branded as a traitor or a rebel.\textsuperscript{15} The opponents of totalitarian utopia are those who ask questions “that [slice] through the stage backdrop and gives us a look at what lies hidden behind it.”\textsuperscript{16} And behind the stage are the social realities: the ugly lies of politicians, corruption, power struggles, social inequality and fatal environmental practices. The suppression of dissidents, the fake milk powder scandal, the e-waste problems, the spread of Avian flu and detention of AIDS doctors are a few examples of China’s current social problems that the government has tried to cover up in the backstage. To create a picture of national unity by silencing opposing voices, covering up social problems, and sacrificing individual rights, the consequences of these actions may haunt future social development and turn into global disaster. Moreover, to achieve ideological unity amongst 1.4 billion people in today’s cyber age and global community is a great challenge. The challenges faced by the Chinese government are enormous and complex and will require more than slogans and kitsch to resolve.

\textbf{Levelling the Wall Within}

Everyone has the spark of individuality; ideological unity is not so easily achieved. Unity means the individual has to be manacled, has to conform to the pattern. This leads people to despise any spark of individuality and individualism. It’s like saying: Get those feet back into bindings, otherwise the nation will collapse. Alas, who would ever think that humanity could come to this? Who would think that people hate natural feet so much?\textsuperscript{17}

- Lin Yutang, 1934

To ensure the minds of her citizens do not become “contaminated” by incoming foreign thoughts, China’s government suppresses free expression, including art. Many international films that deal with politics are banned in China. The German film \textit{Lives of Other}, was among one of them. Although it was banned, the pirated version of the film had been one of the biggest hits among intellectuals when it was first released in China’s underground market. The film resonated profoundly in the heart of repressed individuals who admired the brave transformation of a disciplined party devotee into a human with feelings and thoughts in his own right. The movie portrays a
yearning that has been long repressed in Chinese society – a hope that one day, their nation could face the shadow of the past openly, without being overly sensitive and hysterical to topics and incidents seen as infringing on their national dignity.

In *The Lives of Others*, director Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck presents the blossoming moments of humanity’s liberation through an individual experiencing the process of intimate exchange and becoming exposed to the arts. Set in the suffocating mid-1980s East Berlin, Gerd Wiesler – a Stasi expert in surveillance and interrogation, a devoted Communist party member, and disciplined political machine – is ordered by the state minister to bug the apartment of Georg Dreyman, a famous playwright, on suspicion of treachery. Wiesler sets up a secret station in the attic of Dreyman’s apartment and eavesdrops on the life of Dreyman and his actress lover, Christa, twenty-four hours a day. Wiesler and his assistant record everything they hear on a reel-to-reel recorder and account every detail in daily reports with a typewriter. It does not take long for Wiesler to find out the real motive behind his mission – the minister’s lust for Christa. Wiesler witnesses how the minister threatens to destroy Christa’s career if she refuses to comply with his order. This disgusts Wiesler and he begins to raise questions about the state ideology. At the same time, his sympathy and fondness for Dreyman’s life grows stronger each day as he hears more about the difficulties for artists and intellectuals living within this authoritarian society. His repressed heart is gradually softened and is opened to allow arts to liberate and touch his emotions. He steals a book from Dreyman’s apartment to read a passage of love written by Brecht, a German writer. He sheds a solitary tear while hearing Dreyman played a piano sonata after a friend’s suicide and says, “Can anyone who has heard this music — I mean, truly heard it — really be a bad person?” This significant line from Dreyman echoes the original idea that inspired von Donnersmarck to take on this project. The director himself was inspired by Russian writer Maxime Gorky’s recount of a statement made by Lenin: “I don’t want to listen to Beethoven’s *Impassionata* anymore, even though it’s my favourite piece of music. If I listen to it, I will want to stroke people’s heads and say friendly things to them. I have to smash in those heads to finish my revolution.”

The director succeeded in creating the same effect in his film as the piano sonata did to Wiesler: it awakened the audience’s repressed emotions and facilitated self-awareness. Wiesler’s transformation can be explained by philosopher Emmanuel Levinas’ phenomenological account
of the “face-to-face” encounter. Wiesler’s “face-to-face” encounter with the other announces ethical obligation and disrupts political ideologies that eradicate humanity. Ethics comes from his recognition of the face of the other. Levinas defines the face as that “whose meaning consists in saying: ‘thou shalt not kill.’”\textsuperscript{19} We witness the change of Wielser in his questioning of the authority and challenging the predetermined ideologies. It is not difficult to see the reason behind China’s ban of this movie. The transformation of Wiesler from a state machine to a man who thinks beyond the state’s boundary is definitely what the authoritarian government does not want to see happening to her citizens.

The Lives of Others is precisely what it dramatizes – a picture about change that is meant to promote change. Looking through the Iron Curtain of the past, it shows how a transformed man is an essential part of a transforming society: without that man, and others like him, levelling the walls within themselves, the literal Wall could never have fallen. So, at a time when new walls are rising in the dubious name of security, the film doubles as a vital reminder about the concreteness of hope, and a stern warning about the hopelessness of concrete.\textsuperscript{20}

- Rick Groen, 2007

\textbf{Heterotopia}

In civilizations without boats [heterotopia], dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police take the place of pirates.\textsuperscript{21}

- Michel Foucault, 1986

No matter how hard the government attempts to suppress their existence, the voices of dissidents still arise in every corner of the nation as China progresses to modernity. State-banned books and films remain widely available in black markets. Underground, hidden, anarchic, unpredictable, and uncontrollable, the presence of the black market not only serves to challenge existing rules and regulations of the government, but also reveals a strong need and desire in citizens’ lives for values that conflict with the dominant order. This includes wanting arts like literature and films that promote alternative viewpoints and ideas of social values and bureaucratic culture. This hidden desire of citizens reveals a demand for free thinking and social transformation. The tighter the state control is on banned items, the louder the cry of the repressed will be. The prevalence of the black market parallels the growing demand for new ideas and arousing interest in novelty during China’s rapid modernization.
Today, Chinese citizens are sandwiched between state order and individual desires for liberalization. The government restricts the society from evolving according to the needs of its citizens, and only uses excuses like social stability, state revival and nationalism to maintain its authority.

The authoritarian concept of utopia has not changed since the 60s. This utopia was constructed upon a set of monolithic political and social values, repression of opposing voices, advocacy of blind obedience, and denial of social variances. But political longing for wholeness and homogeneity proved to be disastrous in the 60s when Mao manipulated mass power to eliminate both his real and imaginary enemies in the society during the Cultural Revolution:

In a political culture that specialized in rooting out heterodoxy through hysterically violent public denunciations and forced confessions, where Chinese were pressurized, for their own safety, to inform on their neighbours and colleagues, to report on chance comments overheard out of open windows, merely having – much less expressing – critical thoughts became hazardous.

Hundred of thousands of intellectuals were censored, denounced and humiliated by their friends, neighbours and relatives in Mao’s name. To the authorities, the elimination of intelligentsia was a common practice in the making of their utopia. Czech novelist Milan Kundera points out that a utopia involves creating a gulag alongside for people who don’t fit in: “the gulag is a septic tank used by totalitarian kitsch to dispose of its refused.”

However, eliminating dissidents is equivalent to shutting off all honest suggestions, options for improvement, and public conscience. In the case of Mao, after the vicious suppression of the intelligentsia, what remained in the “utopian” society were corrupted officials who covered up famines and exaggerated industrial success across the country, and billions of confused citizens who “lost touch with reality and could no longer see where their true interest lay.” In the end, the pursuit of utopia became a political haven and a societal nightmare.

The utopian longing for homogeneity deters spontaneous change in a society as perfection is predetermined and is set within strict control of the authority. In a utopian society, authoritarian rules and order become “perfect” standard that governs everyday life, that imprisons human imagination, and that prevents possibilities from flourishing outside the realm of societal norms. To challenge the utopian concept of homogeneity, Michel Foucault employed the term heterotopia, a medical term in Latin originally referring to body parts that are out of place, abnormal, or alien-like tumours, to
reassert new meanings to incongruous places in society. In his lecture in 1967, Foucault sought to give the term heterotopia a material referent by pointing to various places “whose existence sets up unsettling juxtapositions through their strange or ambivalent composition.”25 Foucault included in his list of heterotopia such places as prisons and psychiatric hospitals that accommodate the deviance; cemeteries and theatres that play as mediating space; carnivals and vacation villages that serve as temporal and transitory space; hamams and saunas that give restricted access; and brothels that create a space of illusion. Foucault’s concept of heterotopia enables us to rethink the “multiple forms of deviant and transgressive behaviours that occur in urban space” as an inclusion of difference and diversity.25 Hetherington summarizes the concept of heterotopia:

The main principle of heterotopia is that they bring together a collection of unusual things (or discursive statements), and give them a unity of meaning through the production of a space that acts symbolically as a site for the performance of an alternate mode of social ordering.26

The alternate ordering within these heterotopic spaces allows alternatives to evolve and to challenge the existing dominant practices. For instance, the Palais Royal, a social and commercial hub near the Louvre of late 18th century Paris, is a heterotopia in which opinions on politics and philosophy were generated and exchanged among Parisians of different social classes, who came for entertainment, social debate, pleasure, gossips, food, culture and politics. It was the Palais Royal that modern ideas of the French Revolution gradually took shape, a declaration of liberty, equality and rights of man. As argued in Hetherington’s essay, The Palais Royal as Modernity, the features of the Palais Royal—the coffee-houses, gardens, arcades and theatres—provide a site where people from the highest to lowest social strata mingle together and where intellectual culture and consumer culture flourish simultaneously:

Below the public gardens and promenades were grottoes that housed cafes that were used for more seditious purposes; these were places where Jacobins and freemasons would meet and plot. In the newly built arcades, prostitutes would rent small shops with rooms above, in order to be able to provide sex for their clients. Streetwalkers would mingle with the fashionable crowds... The bookshops sold not only the latest Enlightenment works, political pamphlets, newspapers and journals, but alongside them pornography and seditious writings.28

The Palais Royal reveals the urging need for change in the late 18th century
French society. The desire for change arose from the level of common people, and refined through constant discussion among different social classes. It was the place where modern man was born, a class of new people who acknowledged the importance of social changes and who could voice out the real desires and needs of people.

Another variation of heterotopia can be found in Hannah Hurtzig’s Blackmarket project. Hurtzig’s theatre production *Blackmarket for Useful Knowledge and Non-Knowledge* is the epitome of an apolitical heterotopic place – a site of exchange and enlightenment. Hurtzig took the concept of a black market, a place of anarchic exchange of goods and created a venue for knowledge exchange in areas difficult to acquire in daily life: politics, cultures, arts, economics, and theatre just to name a few. In each event, Hurtzig collaborated with 100-150 experts in different fields such as film directors, lyricists, composers, and human-rights activists. The performance took place in a theatre, which Hurtzig saw as an “original location of public debate.” Participants could choose to have a half-hour conversation with the expert on a particular subject matter, or to listen in on others’ conversation through a headphone in another room. Everyone had access to the conversation regardless of their religious and political affiliation or social status. Within a defined space, the Blackmarket allowed participants to unravel their imagination and curiosity, and engage in a conversation under an open and transparent atmosphere:

The experts are seated on the left; to the right are their clients, who listen intently. Just before the gong sounds, they have to place a euro on a marked area of the table…For thirty minutes, the experts share their extensive knowledge, debate with their clients, give a singing lesson, read an aura, or carry out a thought experiment – and may even learn something in the process. Composer Ulrike Haage talks about “treating music and language with equal rights”. Harald Preissler, a future researcher with car company DaimlerChrysler, ponders “the dilemma” with his clients. Aura-reader Monika Bruns calmly taps into her client’s life energies, unperturbed by the background noise and potential eavesdroppers. Opera singer Burkhardt von Puttkammer expects his clients to play an active role in “singing in the Antarctic”: his table is studded with microphones so that the public can listen in. “Imitate a duck!” he exhorts. “And what sound does a penguin make?” Facing him, his female client has to breathe out heavily while emitting a high-pitched hum. The maestro is keen to teach her that the volume of her voice will increase if she uses her whole head as a resonance chamber – but the gong saves her from the unaccustomed challenge. Surfing the eight different channels on the headphones reveals scraps of conversation about the most diverse topics: liberating the body from the constraint of reproduction, the absence of utopias, why penguins have white stomachs…
Both the Palais Royal and Hurtzig’s Blackmarket sum up the significance of free expression and information exchange in modern society. The ambivalent interplay of control and freedom of heterotopia may seem risky to an authoritarian government who strives for absolute power. Yet, from the citizen’s point of view, heterotopia can be quite positive. Differences and contradictions always generate new ideas and catalyst forces for change and transformation, by which the existing dominant order and social crippleness are constantly being questioned and challenged for bettering the society. Citizens of different social backgrounds are encouraged to gather together to collectively determine how their society are governed. Through the celebration of differences, incongruousness, ambivalence and informality, a more flexible, open-minded, and tolerant society will be formed, which will allow new ideas to mingle, evolve, and become possible alternatives to counterbalance the fallacy of orthodoxy.

The scale of China’s modernization is undoubtedly enormous and happening quickly. Many social issues, such as the corruption of local authorities, social inequality, pollution, health issues, and poverty are hidden within various social strata. Those problems, complex and ever-changing as the society itself, require more than the Party’s devotion and patriotic spirit to resolve; state repression would only worsen the already complicated situation. Only through rational, enlightened debate, open discussion and sincere exchanges of ideas without political intimidation will people be able to imagine and articulate possible solutions that could resolve contemporary social problems. Only in a free society that tolerates differences will allow citizens to get emancipated from their psychological burdens and the dead weights of political repression; so they can develop their own voice and identity in politics, religion, and social affairs. Citizens in a heterotopic society can easily find alternative means to express, redress and exchange their grievances in a rather unrestrained environment. Heterotopia is the first step in taking down the infamous psychological wall, a devitalizing symbol of autocracy that has imprisoned the Chinese culture for centuries and that has enslaved generations of helpless Chinese people under a suffocating system of state censorship, repression, silencing, and blind nationalism.

*If we make awareness of the presence of the wall, we'll realize that the wall is actually not an end but a beginning, a bridge that makes connection.*
Appendix: Chinese Etymology of Principal Terms

The Chinese characters have evolved over time from the earliest known pictographic forms, such as oracle bone script (c. 1400-1200 BC), bronze script (c. 1100-256 BC) and seal script (c. 1100-207 BC), to the simplified script used today. The purpose of etymology is to study the original meaning of words that embrace forgotten ancient wisdom and imagination.

牆壁 [qiáng bì] n. A partition wall

- 墙 [qiáng]: a wall

[Etymology] – a plank (爿) protecting a barn (敏).

爿: a plank
敏: a barn

壁 [bì]: a partition wall / the walls of a room / a cliff

[Etymology] - a partition of earth

辟: to take the laws to criminals / to avoid
土: a pictograph of object rising through the land, meaning earth

城牆 [chéng qiáng] n. A city wall

- 城 [chéng]: an inner city and city wall

[Etymology] – from earth (土) made a city.

土: a pictograph of object rising through the land, meaning earth.
成: a lance with an ingot, meaning to succeed.
- 郭 [guō]: an outer city and city wall

![Oracle script] ![Bronze script] ![Seal script]

[Etymology] – a city (阝 or 郳) with tall watch-tower structures (享)

阝 = 郳: a pictograph of a person kneeling under a boundary.

享: a city wall with two watch-tower structures.

- 里 [lǐ]: a village; a hamlet / a traditional Chinese unit of distance (~1/3 of a mile)

![Bronze script] ![Seal script]

[Etymology] – a measure of human settlement based on land (土) and field (田).

田: a pictograph of a field with irrigation channels.

土: a pictograph of object rising through the earth.

國家 [guó jiā] n. A nation; a country

- 國: a nation / a country / a kingdom

![Oracle script] ![Bronze script] ![Seal script]

[Etymology] – a kingdom surrounded by walls (囗)

囗: a pictograph of enclosure.

或: an original character for kingdom. Land (represented by 一) and people (represented by pictograph of a mouth囗) are protected by a weapon (戈).

- 家: home / house / family

![Oracle script] ![Bronze script] ![Large seal script]

[Etymology] – a pig (豕) lives under a hut (宀) which is on stilts.

宀: a pictograph of a hut or a roof.

豕: a pictograph of a pig.
身份 [shēn fèn] n. Identity

- 身 [shēn]: a body

[Etymology] – a pictograph of the profile of a pregnant body with walking legs.

- 份 [fèn]: a role / a part / a portion

[Etymology] – action of a person (人 or 人) to share (分).

沃尔

- 分: divide (八) with a knife (刀).

藝術 [yì shù] n. Art

- 藝 [yì]: art / skill/ talent

[Etymology] - Cultivating plants. The oracle character shows a person holding plants with both hands.

- 艀: Plants
- 耳: Planting
- 云: Cloud (Mist)

- 術 [shù]: a Skill / a method

[Etymology] – originally an administrative district (术) at an intersection (行).

- 行: a pictograph of a street intersection.
- 术: a pictograph of a top-heavy grain plant.
概念 [gài niàn] n. Concept / Idea

概 [gài]: general / overall / roughly

[Etymology] – a wooden (木) instrument used to sweep off the excess at the top of a measuring tool when already (既) full.

木: a pictograph of wood
既: a man turning (无) from a bowl of rice (Opaque).

念 [niàn]: to think of / to chant / to mumble

[Etymology] – to keep current (今) in the heart (心).

今: mouth (亼) from above speaking, meaning currently.
心: a pictograph of an heart.

禁忌 [jìn jì] n. Taboo

禁 [jīn]: to prohibit / to forbid / to confine

[Etymology] – an omen (示) with a dense growth of trees (林)

示: an altar which reveals the truth of god.
林: a dense growth of trees.

忌 [jì]: jealous / to envy / to fear / a fear / a taboo

[Etymology] – a selfish (己) heart (心).

己: back and forth motion of the warp string in weaving.
心: a pictograph of an heart.
Notes

Introduction
1. Some information was crossed out by a thick black marker in an old picture of Nanjing found in Nanjing Mingguo Architecture. I later found out, what was hidden under the black mark was a banner saying “Chairman Wang is the greatest leader in the revival of China.” Wang was considered as a national traitor who worked for the Japanese government during Japan’s occupation of China. The banner was erected after the Japanese army won victory over Nanjing. The authority was probably offended by the banner which referred Wang as the greatest leader. To the communists, only Chairman Mao is the greater leader.

2. The original passage reads, “Magnets are both pragmatic and polemic in the way they turn space to the public advantage. They are not an end in themselves but encourage the continual necessity for change.” Hardingham, Cedric Price: Opera, 96.

3. There was a “Democracy Wall” in Beijing near Tiananmen Square where the people could pin up their opinions in form of posters. It was demolished in 1979. See Chapter II.


Nanjing City Wall And Autocracy
1. See Brook, The Confusion, of Pleasure, 19.
2. Ibid., 24.
3. Ibid., 19.
4. See Huang, China, 171.
5. See Yang, Nanjing Ming City Wall, 255.
7. See Yang, Nanjing Ming City Wall, 273.
8. Ibid.
10. Li, Red Color News Soldier, 138-139.
11. See Yang, Nanjing Ming City Wall, 276.
12. Ibid., 140.
13. Ibid., 141.
16. Lovell, the Great Wall, 330.

18. Lovell, the Great Wall, 331.
19. Ibid., 331.
21. Lovell, the Great Wall, 331.
22. See Yang, Nanjing Ming City Wall, 283.
24. When, “The Writing on the Wall,” in China Remembers, 180. Wang Shan is well-known Chinese political analyst who participated in the 1978 Democracy Wall Movement and also started a magazine to publish the works that he and his friends put up on the wall. In 1994, under a German pen name, Wang published the controversial best-seller, Viewing Chain through a Third Eye, a critique on the recent reforms. Despite government efforts to ban the book, private sales have exceeded one million copies. Even President Jiang Zemin praised the book before discovering the author’s real identity.
25. Ibid., 179.
26. Lovell, the Great Wall, 328.

Nation and Boundary
1. Cited in Liang, Notes on Ying Zao Fa Shi, 12. Written by Liu Xi of Eastern Han Dynasty at around AD 200, Shi Ming is an ancient dictionary that carries definitions of 1,502 items.
5. Ssu-ma, The Grand Scribe’s Records, 32. Both Shu Jing (Classics of Literature) and Shi Ji (The Grand Scribe’s Records) contain depiction of Yu’s political geography, the earliest order of the Chinese world.
7. The Han Chinese referred to the invaders from the north as barbarians who bore many names during the twenty-five centuries of their threat to China’s agricultural civilization. In general, the non-Han people in the west were called Dongyi, in the west Xirong, in the south Nanman and in the north Beidi.

Wall of Pride and Sorrow

The Yearnings
2. See Bary, “Chinese Despotism and the Confucian Ideal”, 173. Bary’s essay borrowed from the ideas of the late-Ming Confucian scholar, Huang Zong Xi (Huang Tsung-Hsi), and his major work, *A Plan for the Prince*.
6. Lu Xun’s real name is Zhou Shuren. He is considered the father of modern Chinese literature. To avoid political persecution in the 1920s, Lu Xun used more than 100 different pen names; however Lu Xun is most widely used.
8. Ibid., 10.
9. Ibid., 12
11. Ibid., 22.
12. Ibid., 112, 114.
15. Ibid., 20.

Conclusion
3. Ibid., 335.
6. Ibid.
30. Ibid.

**Illustration Credits and Sources**

Walking Around the Wall:
All the photos of Nanjing are taken by Angela Chan; otherwise noted.

2.10. Schoppa, *Twentieth Century China*, 147.
2.15. Yang, *Nanjing Ming Qing Jian Zhu*, 562, 564, 565.
2.22 Photo taken by Angela Chan.
2.23. http://www.labbs.cnarticle_show.asparticleid=1650/
2.27. Zi, *June Four*, 17.
2.29. Turnley, *Beijing Spring*, 175.
3.1. Pictograph drawn by Calvin Chiu.
3.2. Pictograph drawn by Angela Chan.
3.3-3.6. Map of geographic boundaries drawn by Angela Chan.
3.7. Stover, *Imperial China and the State Cult of Confucius*, 79.

The Wall of Pride:
All magazine covers selected from magazine *Beijing Review*, February 1979 to May 2005.
All photos of Beijing architectural projects from *Illustrated Book of Beijing Architecture*, except the following:
National Theatre: Zhou, Xing Lin, A Collection of Design Schemes for the International Architectural Competition of the National Grand Theater P.R. China.

The Wall of Sorrow:
Background: modified from Cai Kuo Qiang's painting.
School Closure: *Zhong Hua Tan Suo*, vol 093, 8-17.


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