The Indigenous Ainu of Japan and the “Northern Territories” Dispute

by

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A thesis
presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfillment of the
thesis requirement for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
History

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2007

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Author’s Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Abstract

This thesis re-examines the territorial dispute between Japan and Russia, the so-called “Northern Territories” issue, through a reinterpretation of the role of the indigenous Ainu of Japan. An exploration of Ainu history and historiography reveals that the long-standing emphasis on Wajin-based legitimacy of rule and annexation of northern areas was replaced by historical amnesia concerning the role and status of the Ainu.

Discussion focuses on an interpretation of Ainu understandings of local, regional/national and international historical events. This approach underscores the importance of de-nationalising History by integrating the important perspectives of Indigeneity. It asserts, further, that the understanding of these events and processes require a broader disciplinary prism than that provided by the study of history. The preponderance of nation-based studies, and not only in the field of History, has seriously inhibited the analysis of historical phenomena involving Indigenous peoples, in this case the Ainu. The study of the Northern Territories issue offers, then, both a new perspective on the history of this important dispute and an illustration of the importance of broadening traditional academic studies in disciplines such as History, Anthropology, Ecology, Political Science, International Relations and Law to incorporate Indigenous perspectives and experience.
Acknowledgements

We look into the past and inevitably write something about ourselves.1

Although I began to learn of Ainu issues in 2000, this project is rooted in a study I commenced four years ago on Ainu-Wajin relations. Keira Mitsunori, a representative from the Foundation for Research and Promotion of Ainu Culture, introduced me to Ainu issues in a seminar at Hokkaido University of Education Sapporo (HUES), Japan. The Ainu instructor of an Ainu culture and history course I later took at HUES provided more detailed information on their contemporary issues. For this project, I am deeply indebted to the Kawamura Kaneto Ainu Memorial and the Hokkaido Utari Association for providing support and resources concerning Ainu perspectives. My Canadian citizenship, having Japanese as a second language, and currently residing outside of Japan have influenced my own views as well as how people have perceived and responded to me while performing research on this topic.

Thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for funding through a Canadian Graduate Scholarship. A University of Waterloo President’s Graduate Scholarship also provided invaluable funding after finishing my course work. The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) in Waterloo generously supported my studies with a Balsillie Fellowship. I am also grateful for a University of Waterloo’s Graduate Scholarship and the Hugh MacKinnon Graduate Scholarship.

My supervisor, Kimie Hara, has been inspiring for looking at the Northern Territories issue through various lenses, introduced me to comparative studies with Nordic conflict resolution, and provided constructive feedback on this thesis. In addition, Blaine Chiasson, Ken Coates, Whitney Lackenbauer and James Walker provided feedback and recommendations for improving this thesis. Geoffrey Jukes commented on an earlier draft of Chapter Four for which I am appreciative. Ted Harms at the Inter-Library Loan assisted in obtaining many resources on my behalf.

The owner of the Sapporo-do book store in Japan, Ishihara Makoto, provided me with invaluable information on current research in Japanese and contemporary issues concerning the Ainu and recommended numerous resources. I am grateful to Kodama Yoko at the Northern Studies Resource Collection for her assistance. I would like to thank those Japanese, Russian and other resident friends who provided me with places to stay, and supported me while performing research in Japan. Thank you also to Mark Watson, Chris Frey, Jean Becker, Scotty Moore, and Ben Fitzhugh.

Finally, I am would like to sincerely thank my family, especially Saki Murotani, for their underlying support.

Any errors within are my own.

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# Abbreviations

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCPR</td>
<td>Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERD</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Cultural Promotion Act (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRPAC</td>
<td>Foundation for Research and Promotion of Ainu Culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>HFAPA</td>
<td>Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act (1899)</td>
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<td>HUES</td>
<td>Hokkaido University of Education Sapporo</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFII</td>
<td>Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>WGIP</td>
<td>Working Group on Indigenous Populations</td>
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## NOTES

I have capitalised the word “Indigenous” to conform to growing trends in publications on the topic.

Japanese names are written family name first.
Figure 1: Ainu Territories

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INTRODUCTION

…as long as someone else
controls your history
the truth shall remain just a mystery…
Ben Harper, 1995

Rational and Significance of This Study

This thesis simultaneously addresses two politically sensitive issues: the so-called “Northern Territories” dispute and the Indigenous Ainu of Japan. There has yet to be a comprehensive historical interpretation of the Northern Territories dispute that focuses on the Ainu which incorporates other international examples, such as the Åland Islands settlement in northern Europe. The majority of studies on the Russo-Japanese Northern Territories/Southern Kurils problem ignore the historical, present and future connection of the Indigenous Ainu. For a group of people that has been literally written out of the history of this dispute, many politically sensitive issues will continue to rise to the surface unless we seriously and critically question the status quo. It follows that any incorporation of multilateral frameworks or international examples related to this dispute will continue to avoid the Ainu, unless they are first addressed in domestic and regional arenas in relation to this dispute.

This thesis highlights some historical blind spots of Northeast Asian history, challenges the foundation on which past and present research is based, and moves towards explaining why scholars have avoided the topic of the Ainu in relation to this Russo-Japanese dispute. Investigating and examining the Ainu in relation to this issue is an important means to expand the current research framework and place a larger portion of relevant material on the discussion table. Looking into this particular group of Indigenous peoples further complicates the issue at hand, but also challenges past and present ways of thinking and viewing this issue.

This project deals mainly with the Ainu from a historical standpoint, but has general and broad connections to areas of study involving Indigenous peoples, and is by its nature intertwined with a wide variety of academic disciplines at local, regional and international levels. Studying Indigenous peoples inevitably leads to topics that are connected and associated with Anthropology, Geology, History, International Relations, Law, and Political Science.1 Examination of the non-inclusion of the Ainu in relation to the Northern Territories dispute encourages an interdisciplinary approach. This research area offers a unique and original addition to studies related to the Ainu and this dispute, which have all but ignored the Ainu in what they have coined as a “dispute between two thieves.”

1 The capitalised History is used in reference to the discipline, while history denotes its study.
Theoretical Framework and Statement of Problem Investigated for This Study

It is sometimes said that the aim of the historian is to explain the past by “finding,” “identifying,” or “uncovering” the “stories” that lie buried in chronicles; and that the difference between “history” and “fiction” resides in the fact that the historian “finds” his stories, whereas the fiction writer “invents” his. This conception of the historian’s task, however, obscures the extent to which “invention” also plays a part in the historian’s operations… The historian arranges the events in the chronicle into a hierarchy of significance by assigning events different functions as story elements in such a way as to disclose the formal coherence of a whole set of events considered as a comprehensible process with a discernible beginning, middle and end.2

The objective of this thesis is not only to work towards inclusion of the Ainu in the Northern Territories problem, but also to address and explain why scholars have not seriously included the Ainu in past and present research on this issue. This is done through a historical examination of the Ainu at three levels: the local, regional and international. Centering on the Okhotsk region, rather than the traditional view of centering Japan on the Kansai or Kanto regions moves the focus away from a centrifugal and largely unilateral historical dialogue of the Ainu at a local level. De-centering (or re-centering) the area of focus also helps to open arenas for a coherent, important and living voice that is both worthy to be heard and responded to. The regional level works to include other Indigenous peoples of the area, as well as Russian and Japanese interaction within East Asia during their pursuit of nation-building and colonialism. The third level of interaction, the international, moves research away from the potential of falling into the trap of creating a nationalistic historical interpretation that is easier to become a part of, if the sole focus is more local in nature. These three historical levels do not operate in an isolated vacuum, but are mutually and simultaneously interactive, and encourage movement away from nationalistic and state-centered histories that plague many historical accounts, and in the case of Hokkaido have often resulted in histories or interpretations that focus on development and “progress” in terms of the modernisation of Japan. Examining the Ainu and the Northern Territories issue from these three perspectives enables the inclusion of the Ainu in this issue and works towards answering why the Ainu are not included in this issue.

This thesis analyses history that, according to the current official Japanese government view, does not exist or is at minimum not fully recognised. In turn, it challenges this state-sponsored view, which much of the local and international academic community appears to support. The issue of the Ainu and Northern Territories shows that there are numerous ways to interpret history and that it does not operate in a vacuum, or in isolation from other fields of academia, and that the political world, which very much influences academia and vice-versa, utilises History to its advantage. History of this

northern region cannot be properly understood unless we include the Ainu and their relationship to both the lands and the varying peoples with whom they were and are in contact.

Similar to Marshall Beier’s thinking in regards to International Relations and Indigenous peoples, this work has “three conflicting propositions: that it possibly cannot, perhaps should not, and yet must be written.” It should not be written because it is a topic that has potential to negatively affect future employment and research in Japan since it challenges views that tend to fluctuate between the far left and the far right. Some academics in Japan refused to study about the Ainu and their relation to the Northern Territories because they felt that it could affect their employment. However, it must be written because, if it is not, then it would imply agreement with the current arguments by both the majority of Russian/Soviet, Japanese and third party scholars that have ignored the Ainu issue in the past and present.

Since the Northern Territories issue is one of border demarcation, bringing the Ainu into discussion is difficult because they are a people included in the Japanese state and did not have a state of their own. Scholars should openly include the Ainu in their research, as well as negotiations on the Northern Territories, as a means to move away from past and present hegemonic ways of thinking on this issue. Since this issue is extremely political, it is unlikely that the status quo will change in the near future, but challenging deeply entrenched ways of thinking needs to start somewhere.

Definitions of Terms

The term “Indigenous peoples” needs clarification as it describes one such group of people that are the focus of this thesis. The post World War II trend of decolonisation was accompanied with the creation of international organisations such as the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP). This body has acted as a forum enabling Indigenous people worldwide to assert themselves as Indigenous. In effect, this is giving them the legitimate political voice which allows them to participate as full or complete actors. In 1984, Jose Martinez Cobo finished a study for the United Nations on discrimination of such peoples, which led to the now widely accepted definition of “Indigenous peoples.” Similarly to the global community not supporting a definition for the term “peoples” as used by the United Nations Charter, I do not propose or support a universal definition of “Indigenous peoples.” To do so would work against the spirit of inclusion and deny many peoples which I do not feel I have the qualifications, authority, or knowledge to judge. However, for the sake of some clarity on the matter Cobo’s rather loose definition proves useful. According to his definition the four main characteristics of “Indigenous peoples” are their:

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4 Some academics in Japan refused to study about the Ainu and their relation to the Northern Territories because they felt that it could affect their future employment (Mr. A. et al., personal communication with author, August 2006 [Japan]).

(1) having historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial society; (2) considering themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies; (3) forming at present non-dominant sectors of the society; and (4) being determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories and their ethnic identities.6

Forums like the WGIP and inclusive definition have allowed many of the world’s three-hundred seventy million Indigenous peoples to reclaim or create their identity and announce it to the world. In 2000, the UN took an unprecedented step when it established the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues which, unlike the WGIP, is a direct branch of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).7 In a global system which respects and pays particular attention to the “state,” this is a formidable movement. This thesis follows the definition as stated by the Cobo report, but since the focus of this thesis is not on defining who is, and who is not belonging to “Indigenous peoples,” I will also make use of the terms Indian, Aborigine and Native interchangeably as to best fit the literature and time periods in question.

The word Ainu, similar to many other self-recognising terms of Indigenous peoples throughout the world, means “human being” in the Ainu language. Another word that the Ainu have used to call themselves is Utari or comrade. This term began to replace the word Ainu in some situations where many had felt “Ainu” had too many negative connotations connected to it. One of the best examples of this transformation was the change in name of the Hokkaido Ainu Association to the Hokkaido Utari Association in 1960. According to the Association’s own writings, this was a positive to lessen discrimination. However, the Ainu were not a homogeneous group in earlier times. There existed both linguistic and cultural differences among the Ainu in Sakhalin the Kuril Islands and even those within Hokkaido. Only after the Japanese government amalgamated the Ainu into their Imperial subject system were they seen as a single entity, as authorities ignored their language and cultural distinctions, entering the Ainu into registries under the heading of “former native.”8

Determining who is Ainu, and how many Ainu there are today, depends largely on the method one adopts. According to the Japanese government, the only modern Ainu homeland is Hokkaido. This conveniently deflects attention away from the numerous historical contacts with Ainu in the north and mainland Japan, Okinawa and abroad. As well, it works towards non-recognition of the some 2,700 to 5,000 Ainu who live in the


Kanto region, other areas of Japan, Sakhalin and those Ainu who live abroad. In official surveys carried out by the Hokkaido Utari Association every seven years since 1972, only those who openly admit that they are Ainu, in areas that are recognised to be home of Ainu people, are counted. For various reasons, some Ainu chose not to participate in the Utari Association’s survey, or live outside of recognised areas of residence, and thus the official number is lower than it probably is. According to a 1999 survey the Ainu population was 23,767 in seventy-three areas of Hokkaido, but estimates go as high as 300,000 for the whole country.9

The “Northern Territories” issue is the Japanese title given to the border dispute between Japan and Russia over four islands to the northeast of Hokkaido. This specific title is a Japanese government-fabricated term that gained significant use and attention during the 1960s, after a Diet resolution first adopted it in 1962, and then in 1964 when the use of “Southern Kurils” was practically, although not entirely, forbidden to refer to the islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu.10 Before the widespread use of this term, the islands of dispute were called either by name, or addressed as the southern Kuril Islands. For a period in the late 1940s and into the 1950s, the Japanese government recognised the two islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu as being part of the Kurils while those of Shikotan and the Habomai islets (often addressed as a single island) were not. With the spread of the term “Northern Territories,” all four islands became part of the same group, and ideologically and politically separate from the remaining Kuril Islands. This term is rather new, and has not been imagined and supported enough either domestically or internationally to the point of recognising it as a coherent region or property, or territory, hence the use of quotation marks around the term. However, as Howell noted, adding quotation marks around words used under duress does little more than evade the recognition of the force of politics in constituting identity as social reality. Although Howell wrote this in relation to the changing and fluid constructs of Japan and Japanese, this same idea is applicable to the term Northern Territories because, to apply Howell’s argument, no matter how new or fluid this political geographical identity is, it is real in the minds of many people and the Japanese state. Even though the state and institutions are constructs, they exercise real power. “Real power over life, property and livelihood is reality enough.”11 When I use the term in this thesis, I refer to a real, new, largely unaccepted (especially in Russia), unfounded, and dynamically created and imagined conception of a territory that nonetheless has power of mobilisation.

Wajin refers to the people that make up the dominant group of Japanese people, the so-called descendents of the Yayoi culture. To be Wajin is to be Japanese and to be

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11 Howell, Geographies, 18-19.
Japanese is to be Wajin. However, today being Ainu means being Japanese according to citizenship but does not imply that they are Wajin, and being Japanese certainly does not imply one is Ainu.\footnote{Howell argues that the Ainu were very much included within the term “Japanese” in the Tokugawa era, but in Meiji they “had to contend with the reality that being Japanese in the eyes of the state was not the same as being Japanese in the eyes of society” (Howell, Geographies of Identity [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005], 151,171, 193).} The same holds true for those of naturalised Korean or Chinese, and Okinawan decent. The Ainu often refer to the Wajin as Shisam or Shamo: the first meaning “neighbour,” and the second “coloniser” with somewhat negative connotations. I use the well accepted term of Wajin to distinguish between Ainu and non-Ainu Japanese of the dominant group.

Concepts of colonialism are important as they are deeply rooted in, and connected to, nation-building and modernity, which are themselves connected to indigeneity and thus to the Ainu.\footnote{For nation-building and indigeneity see Bain Attwood, Making of the Aborigines (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989).} The time frame of Japanese colonialism could vary greatly depending on perspective and what we consider as a Japanese colony. We could start in Tokugawa times with expansion into Ezo (Hokkaido) in the north, and the Ryukyu Kingdom (Okinawa) to the south, with the acquisition of Taiwan in 1895, or even with the annexation of Korea in 1910. A large amount of literature has taken 1895 and the attainment of Taiwan as the start date for Japanese imperialist activity.\footnote{For example see, W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks,1991), 6; Mark Peattie, “Introduction,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon Meyers and Mark Peattie (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), 15-16; Takakura Shinichiro, (trans. John Harrison) “The Ainu of Northern Japan: A Study of Conquest and Acculturation,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 50.4 (1960): 7.} However, as a means to further include Indigenous peoples in discussion, this thesis follows a more fluid and less binary definition of colonialism by avoiding a specific start date and states broadly that colonial activity was present with expansion into Ezo (Hokkaido) in the north, and the Ryukyu Kingdom (Okinawa) to the south, even though neither are officially recognised as a colony.\footnote{This inclusion is important even in the case of Taiwan, because Wajin used an incident where Taiwan aborigines killed shipwrecked Okinawans to further their claim to the Ryukyu kingdom.} One such definition that is fitting was put forward by Beckett in 1989:

A colonial order arises when the state that has annexed a territory formally and systematically discriminates between the conquering invaders and the subject indigenes in such a way as to entrench the differences between them and to foster their economic, political, and cultural inequality. This discrimination is sustained by some form of ideology that justifies the domination of the indigenous population in terms of differences of race, mentality, moral qualities, cultural advancement, religion or historic destiny.\footnote{J. Beckett, “Aboriginality in a Nation-State: The Australian Case,” in Ethnicity and Nation-building in the Pacific, ed. M.C. Howard (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1989), 120; quoted in Richard Siddle, Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan (London: Routledge, 1996), 8.}
Within this colonial order, as well, lie inherent contradictions that make the concept of colonialism much more dynamic and expansive, allowing it to continue in various forms to the present day.

**Methodology and Scope of This Study**

While performing research in this area it is important to pay attention to a few Ainu preconceptions of scholars that are noticeable in the literature. Some examples of these include that scholars: only study about the Ainu for personal gain; treat the Ainu as research specimens that have long since passed away; create nothing but problems for the Ainu people and that in general they do not respect the Ainu. The perception that non-academics are not interested in the Ainu appears to be another fixed idea. Not falling into the trap of objectifying or romanticising them, where objectifying them would deny their own subjectivity and thus their voice(s), is also important. Romanticising the Ainu would do little more than praise a past Eden-like utopian period that historically would be difficult to accept, or would support the Ainu as being a curious Other yet to become a part of the present. These views were kept in mind while performing research to encourage both critical analysis of the material and original research. In this pursuit the concept of academic responsibility is directly related to both research and analysis, especially while dealing with Indigenous peoples. In other words, academic freedom (as guaranteed in Article 23 of the Japanese Constitution that reads “Academic freedom is guaranteed”) and academic responsibility are not mutually exclusive as some traditional Wajin Ainu scholars tend to think. Every right is in conflict with another, and in this case choosing responsibility to the group over a potentially discriminating and harmful form of “freedom” is appropriate.

Research for this project was highly qualitative in nature through concentration on the use of primary and secondary sources written in English and Japanese. Authors of such work include Ainu, Wajin, westerners, institutions and governmental bodies. While performing and critiquing these sources it was critical to consider who has studied and written about the Ainu, and for what purpose(s). Research for this project relied to some extent on resources acquired in Hokkaido, Japan during three separate trips in the winter

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of 2004, spring of 2005 and summer of 2006, from (in no particular order) the Kawamura Kaneto Ainu Memorial, Hokkaido University Library and the Resource Collection for Northern Studies at Hokkaido University, Hokkaido University of Education (Sapporo [HUES] and Asahikawa campus libraries) and Asahikawa Public Library’s Recourse Centre, the Foundation for Research and Promotion of Ainu Culture (FRPAC), the Hokkaido Utari Association and the Shiraoi Ainu Museum. I have also made use of some resources obtained at HUES while studying there from 2000-2002. Although Russian views are not a focus of this thesis, where possible I relied on English and Japanese resources for Russian perspectives, and this reveals some biases in my approach and focus. I included some historical comparisons while understanding that theoretically historical occurrences are too complex and unique in themselves to make any direct comparison meaningful, so I have opted for integrating historical events rather than necessarily comparing them. I hope that this study will contribute, albeit modestly, to rethinking subjects related to the Ainu, the Northern Territories, Japan, and Indigenous peoples in general.

I have relied heavily on Aboriginal perspectives in this thesis. Writing from this angle does not presuppose it is the Aboriginal perspective, nor does it intend to give the impression of speaking as an Indigenous person (of which I am not) as there are numerous views and opinions within each community. Furthermore, by utilising these voices my intention is neither to appropriate them as my own, nor to represent or speak on behalf of the Ainu or any other Aboriginal group. Rather, I hope this approach allows for a different outlook to both western and Wajin points of view on the topic.

Focusing on local Ainu perspectives, however, does have potential to take on “nationalistic” nuances, but by sacrificing governmental or state-centered positions it allows largely silenced or downplayed voices to be heard and told, which should be given authority to speak in their own right, with the expectation that they deserve some sort of serious response. However, not including government positions would eliminate the relational aspect of history that has been important in shaping Native and non-Native views and actions. Bain Attwood has also recognised the need to include the narrative of the Europeans while studying the Aborigines of Australia. He wrote that a lot of work starts from the assumption that we “already know about whites,” and that they were homogeneous or that it is unnecessary to learn who they were; for the study of Aboriginal people we need to know who they were. In the case of the Ainu, we need to know who the Wajin were, and how they both fit into global perspectives throughout history, which is not a static but elastic and changing set(s) of actions in a matrix of relational constructs. It follows that without governmental or state positions being told, the modern/recent Native position would not be entirely comprehensible, as well as vice versa. In other words, these two groups of people, the Native and newcomer, have been and are mutually influencing. Attwood suggests, just as one should view the history of Aboriginals as in the “becoming” instead of in a state of “being,” so too should we view the history of the nation-state. The history of a state was of the becoming and not of the being, despite the tendency of the nation-state to create its own antiquity and timeless origins.  

18 Attwood, Making of the Aborigines, 147.
19 Attwood, Making of the Aborigines, 149.
context of Indigenous peoples’ history it is also important to keep in mind that the act of “nation-building…is an act of colonization.”

Historical analyses have been, and are, important components in the development of social policy, land rights claims and laws regarding Indigenous peoples throughout the world. For better or worse, the Ainu are no exception, as many laws and policies, including the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act of 1899, and the 1997 Cultural Promotion Act, were largely the outcomes attributed to state-sponsored scholastic research. Beyond the scope of policy making, research on Ainu history and the Northern Territories also benefits academic and non-academic audiences wishing to learn more about Japan, its minorities, and how human rights issues and Indigenous land rights have been developing in Japan. For the purpose of broadening the framework of this project, investigating international examples in Canada and Åland (Finland) through international organisations, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, alongside Ainu issues in Japan, contributes to a better understanding of past endeavors and future solutions dealing with Indigenous peoples.

Chapters One and Two assess the historiography, first that of the Northern Territories issue in relation to the Ainu, and second of Indigenous peoples and Japanese colonialism. These chapters establish where my research fits, or does not fit, in relation to previously written material, and works towards showing some of the consequences of non-inclusion of the Ainu in discussion on the Northern Territories and Japanese colonialism, of which these northern islands were a part. Chapters Three through Six include the Ainu in historical issues that concern the Northern Territories. Chapter Three provides a brief historical overview of Ainu-Wajin relations to set the stage for further discussion. A view of the Ainu in relation to the Åland Island settlement in northern Europe is the focus of the Chapter Four, which addresses the Ainu, Japan and the League of Nations. The remaining chapters focus on post-World War II events: connecting the Ainu and early Return Movement discourse through Japanese government initiatives in Chapter Five, then through Ainu internationalisation in Chapter Six.

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CHAPTER 1

The Northern Territories/Southern Kurils/Ainu Moshir Problem

The historiography of the Northern Territories problem in Japanese and English has for the most part focused on events in the geopolitical realm between Japan, the Soviet Union/Russian and the United States in predominantly bilateral or trilateral state relations. Within this framework scholars have addressed various aspects of state diplomacy, treaties and the Cold War in East Asia. Taking the state to be the centre of study, and giving the state sole agency and authority, has been a typical way to view power relations or disputes. With few exceptions, scholarship that specifically deals with the Ainu has also neglected this issue.

During the early 1990s, a rapidly changing Soviet Union and its eventual collapse, along with the waning of the Cold War, brought optimism for finding a solution of the Northern Territories problem, which contributed to two collaborative trilateral projects on the topic.1 Around this time, there was an increase in international activities within Indigenous circles that were connected with the United Nations movement towards the International Year for the World’s Indigenous People that began in 1993. The director of the Hokkaido Utari Association, Nomura Giichi, was invited to be one of eleven Indigenous representatives to address the General Assembly in New York on 11 December 1992. Nomura closed his speech with words reflecting the theme of the event by encouraging governments to take on new partnerships with Indigenous people around the world. The Utari Association’s movement called for a new law concerning the Ainu that would recognise the Indigenous status of the Ainu and certain rights to land, allow the Ainu to have representation in the government, and work towards rejuvenating the Ainu culture and language. Just before Nomura’s speech and during the UN International Year there was an increase in publications on and by the Ainu in general, a small number of which addressed the Northern Territories. Throughout the early to mid-1990s there was a lot of activity both locally and internationally in political and academic circles related to the Northern Territories that coincided with increased indigenous activity.

This was not the first writing on Ainu involvement in the Northern Territories. Since the 1970s, some Ainu and various Wajin have stated their views that the lands in question are inherently Ainu territory, and they have requested that both the Russian and Japanese governments listen to their arguments from their perspective. Nonetheless, the Ainu were not included in the more popular and widely distributed published works on the Northern Territories. Historically, windows of opportunity for a resolution have cycled every sixteen or seventeen years. The first window was in 1956 with the Joint Declaration, the second in 1973 with talks between Brezhnev and Prime Minister Tanaka, 

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with the last in the early 1990s. According to this trend, 2006-07 represents the start of another potential window, so even though resolution is politically unlikely, we may see more publications on the topic in the coming year. We can hope that it shows initiative to challenge the status quo.

**Literature on the Northern Territories**

An exception to the norm and a quite notable article that strove to include the Ainu was Noel Ludwig’s 1994 article, “An Ainu Homeland: An Alternative Solution for the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles Imbroglio.” This article, a product of the literature boom on the topic in the early 1990s, was ahead of its time. Even though Ludwig wrote this before the Japanese government implemented the Cultural Promotion Act (1997), he shows us how the “Ainu solution” may be an important factor in helping to resolve the dispute by making comparison to other territorial disputes in Australia and Hawaii. His thesis does not appear to have influenced further writing, however, and taking the Ainu seriously in English language literature started and stopped with him.

Another product of this same period is the book “Northern Territories” and Beyond, a compilation of twenty-nine articles written by thirty two contributors of Russian, Japanese and American backgrounds who are for the most part well-known academics or ambassadors. While the focus of this edited volume was on bilateral relations between Russia and Japan, it was written as an international collaborative project. Peter Poole, a doctoral candidate at the time, was the only author to make mention of the Ainu in his short essay “Environment and History.” Poole recognised that historically the Ainu lived on the islands, but his goal was not to get the Ainu involved. Rather he used the Ainu and even an Ainu epic poem, yukar, as an example of poor Japanese handling of the northern environments of Hokkaido and the Kuril Islands. If Poole was constructing the Ainu as a part of a recent past, having nothing to do with the present or future, while at the same time using them as an instrument to prove a selected point, he reproduced all the elements of the unequal relationship and absence of a recognised Ainu voice.

In 1998, Hasegawa Tsuyoshi, a well known historian at the University of California, wrote a two volume edition entitled The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations, which covers the years 1697 to 1998. He tried to take the middle ground between Japanese left and right wing scholarship as represented by Wada Haruki and Kimura Hiroshi, but he tended to lean closer to Wada’s leftism. This book is the definitive English book on the subject. He dealt with the Ainu in a sensitive, but at the same time, minimalist manner: he showed Russian “brutality” against the Ainu as they pushed from Kamchatka southward down the island chain. This sensitivity has its limits,

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as his portrayal of the Ainu as docile victims of Russian expansion ignores similar treatment to which the Ainu were subject under Japanese expansion from the south and ultimately denied the Ainu as actors of their own history. He argued that historical debate cannot solve this problem because, if it could, then the Ainu would be the rightful owners of the land. This implies that he thinks that the study of history should be selective in order to show that the Ainu are not the rightful owners. His argument on this issue was not entirely clear or logical. What this argument allowed him to do, however, was to limit the mention of the Ainu to less than twenty pages of over seven-hundred pages of text. If he meant that history is not the answer, then it would also be difficult for Japan to claim rights to the islands as Hasegawa favours.

Hara Kimie wrote the intriguing book *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace* in which she made use of new materials unearthed from Australian archives. The core of this book, which focused on events since the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, dealt with governmental relations on domestic, bilateral and international levels. This was a provocative work on the matter, but since localities or local movements were not the focus she offered the reader only one paragraph of the Ainu connection.

Two years after the publication of Hasegawa’s two volumes, Kimura Hiroshi, a prolific writer on the topic of Japanese-Russian relations, wrote his own two volume edition which overlaps and follows Hasegawa’s book. He finds no room in either volume for the Ainu in his discussion which focused largely on Russia. The closest Kimura has come to the Ainu in his writing was an earlier book he edited in Japanese in which Togawa Tsuguo, who wrote the introductory chapter, brought up the fact that the names of all the islands in the Kuril chain are based on the original Ainu names and that they had trade networks from Nemuro, on eastern Ezo, expanding throughout the whole Kuril chain. Togawa went on to explain that the Ainu were the original inhabitants of the area, and that they provided Matsumae-han with enough information to draw a 1644 map of the Kurils. It is rather intriguing, then, that Kimura has come so close in association to others that wrote on the Ainu yet none of his own work mentions or attempts to build on such information. Reasons for this will be expanded on later in this thesis.

As Kimura’s contemporary, Wada Haruki has a very radical opinion about the Ainu. In his 1999 book *Hoppo ryodo mondai: rekishi to mirai*, Wada adopted an intriguing and unusual stance towards the Ainu. While many authors only mentioned the

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8 Kimura Hiroshi,

Ainu in passing or not at all, he designated the whole first chapter to the history of the Ainu in the Kurils and the movement of both Russians and Japanese into the island chain. Wada is even bolder in his concluding remarks when he suggested a solution to the issue which involves entrusting one of the islands in the Habomai Islets to the Ainu, allowing them to participate in its management. This conclusion largely stems from the ratification of the Cultural Promotion Act and the 1997 termination of the 1899 Protection Act (that he mistakes as taking place in 1995), which has worked to promote a resurgence of Ainu culture and language. By allowing the Ainu to take an active role in the management and upkeep of one of the islands, he argued, the Ainu would be able to further their cultural revival, and at the same time this would be in the best interest for both the Japanese and Russians. Mutually aiding the Ainu would give such a program a positive, global humanitarian message.10 This interesting and provocative idea was built on “morality,” a concept often used in Indigenous or non-government petition processes.11 Providing the Ainu with land rights to bolster national morality in an international context would not be an act performed for the Ainu, but would be done to the Ainu for their own benefit, and ultimately misses the main issue at stake: it would undermine Ainu and other Indigenous voices. Nonetheless, many Ainu would be sure to support this idea. However, such an action would require more scrutiny and analysis than Wada offered. Would such an act continue to hold “moral” features knowing that, although rich in konbu and other natural resources, Stephan described the Habomai Islands as lying “so low that they could be mistaken for reefs?”12 It seems unreasonable to think it could serve as a redemptive new home of Ainu cultural rebirth without extensive Japanese and Russian support. At the moment the Japanese government’s reluctance to identify the Ainu as being Indigenous to any area within their national boundaries, or beyond, fails to show the large amount of commitment needed for Wada’s solution.

These few mentioned works represent the dominant approach of literature on this specific topic. Focus has been mainly on bilateral (state-level) negotiations with a fleeting short term focus on trilateral scholarship (Japan, Russia, and United States), where states were (and are) taken as the only authoritative actors and viewed from a top-down perspective. When scholars mentioned the Ainu, they were given scant attention or used to derive conclusions that usually did not involve the Ainu themselves. This trend was not limited to discourse that takes the state as the centre-point. Literature on the Ainu revealed that the issue was one that was not of immanent concern as it appears to be bogged down by states themselves and international laws and declarations.

Those that have written more specifically about the Ainu have given minimal attention to the Northern Territories dispute. Focusing on events from the twentieth century onwards Richard Siddle is one of the most well-known Western scholars in modern Ainu studies. Between 1993 and 2004 he has written over a dozen articles and an “authoritative” book regarding the Ainu entitled Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan.

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In this book he made occasional mention of the Ainu reaction to the “movement for the return of the Northern Territories.” For example, Siddle acknowledges this issue’s importance as one seed that encouraged Kaizawa Tadashi and the Hokkaido Utari Association in the 1970s to produce a “correct” version of Ainu history that would challenge the official narratives of the “opening up” of Hokkaido and that of the Northern Territories. However, his direct discussion of the topic goes no further than this. Arasaki Moritetsu, professor at Ryukyu University dedicated a chapter in his book *Yawarakai shakai o motomete* to the Ainu and the Northern Territories, suggesting that inclusion of the Ainu is important to resolving the matter, and that the discussion should be broadened to historical events before the signing of treaties in 1855 and 1875. This argument is contrary to views presented by many scholars that have come to see the San Francisco Treaty of 1951 as central to the issue, and challenges the field of research.

Kikkawa Hitoshi’s “Land Rights of the Ainu People and Japanese Legal Culture” focuses on general land claims within Hokkaido. By comparing the 1992 Mabo decision in Australia with the Ainu situation in Hokkaido, he questions whether the Ainu have lost their rights to the land. While he does not draw any conclusions, he proposes that using an Australian example may help resolve land issues with the Ainu. This article, written in 2000, shows that movements working to internationalise understanding of Ainu land disputes are relatively new, are still in the process of development and require more attention. A more recent addition is Higashimura Takeshi’s 2006 book on Ainu-Wajin relations from the 1940s to 1960s. In one chapter he examined newspapers’ portrayal of Kuril Ainu and the Northern Territories from the late 1950s to late 1960s. This offers a valuable critique on Ainu involvement in the area but the breadth of scope is quite limited. While all the above research and publications were those of westerners or Wajin, many Ainu have also published on the issue of land.

**Ainu Authors and the Northern Territories**

The few accounts written by Ainu people include the article in *AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review* entitled “Getting Back Our Lands: An Interview with Akibe Tokuhei on the ‘Northern Territories,’” and Nomura Giichi’s article in the book *Ainu no hon*, “Hoppo ryodo wa dare no mono?” Both of these were published in 1993, the first UN International Year for the World’s Indigenous People. The first of these articles called for other people to stand up and press both the Russian and Japanese governments to listen to the Ainu. This article notes that the Ainu that are involved see the land issue well beyond the Northern Territories and affecting another Ainu homeland, Sakhalin. They argued that they are not concerned with which country is in possession of the land as long as

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they have access to their traditional lands. In the second, Nomura, former executive-director of the Hokkaido Utari Association, called on the government to act responsibly and to acknowledge historical events of the area that the Ainu were very much a part.  

Both articles are important as they represent Ainu views, yet they amount to less than ten pages of text. This is negligible compared to the edited book put out by the Association to Restore the Autonomous Ainu Homeland in 1993. This book includes work by both Ainu and what many scholars call “sympathetic Wajin” detailing Ainu discussion with the Russian government, as well as other activities that have moved to raise awareness of the issue, such as that done through the non-governmental organisation called the Peace Boat, wherein Chikappu Mieko traveled to Kunashiri, Etorofu and Shikotan in September 1991. This book contains the most written Ainu perspectives on their involvement with the Northern Territories, yet it appears unknown or at least not worthy of attention by scholars on the Northern Territories issue, some of whom dismissed it as “activism.”

With this in mind, there is a counter discourse as Escobar pointed out in 1984. He said that subjugated knowledge trying to speak out usually demonstrates a local, “autonomous, non-centralized and non-hierarchical character and … that their validity has ceased to depend on the approval of the established regimes of thought.” While the Ainu based counter discourse is largely local, it has also begun to internationalise. An issue of hierarchy, or regionalism, may also come into play within the Ainu community. For example, governments and scholars give the Hokkaido Utari Association more attention than other Ainu organisations because it has the largest base of Ainu membership and was connected to the Docho at the time of its conception. As for validity, it appears the voice of the Ainu depends on an opening in the “established regimes of thought” that do not appear to want to share their position.

**Changing the Focus of Study**

Traditional scholarship that focuses on state negotiations is not a hindrance to this issue, for it is an exceptionally important aspect in order to understand the international geopolitical situation. As well, in order to understand contemporary rights in international law and regulations set forth by the United Nations, broad studies that focus on state and international institutions have significant merit. In doing so, however, scholars have meekly addressed history before World War II and the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Gregory Clark, former Australian diplomat, clearly illustrates this when in 2005 he wrote: “The story begins with Japan’s 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with the Allied

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18 AM, Ainu Moshiri.
20 Etter quoted Basil Hall Chamberlain as having written “As a way to others who might be inclined to accept statements of facts made by the Ainu with regard to their own history, the present writer would remark that his own impression is that such statements made by an uncultured people are quite untrustworthy, unless supported by extraneous evidence” (Carl Etter, Ainu Folklore [Chicago: Wilcox & Follett, 1949], 29; original in Basil Hall Chamberlain, Memoirs.)
Powers.”

It was the ambiguity in the Treaty that led to the dispute. Scholars have also largely ignored those peoples that fall outside of the state, or who have only recently been incorporated into the state. In other words, by focusing on state to state relations, whether bilateral or multilateral, scholars have taken the Ainu, whom traditionally lived on these lands, out of the debate. This gives an impression that the Ainu have no particular place in such discussion because they are Japanese citizens that are represented by the Diet. Other inferences could be that the Ainu no longer exist, or that Ainu do not care about this issue, or simply that what they have said and done was and is of no importance to the matter. The views presented herein do not propose to completely counter previous scholarship: instead they add one more dimension of the issue to further complicate and enrich this area of historical negligence: non-state centered voices. This, however, indirectly conflicts with the foundation on which previous scholarship is based.

The concepts of modernity, progress, development, colonialism/imperialism, nation-state, and Cold War, are interconnected with scholarship on the Ainu and Indigenous peoples. In the case of the Ainu, these violent processes along with ecological changes such as disease and decline in resources led to placing the Ainu within local history in an isolated area of the Japanese nation. Ainu historical writing and histories of the Okhotsk region are abundant. However, placing Ainu within localised history along with the difficulties associated with publishing in English for international markets, versus publishing in Japanese in Japan, has helped to keep work on the Ainu and the Okhotsk within a relatively small community of writers and audiences. For this reason, any publication in English has potential to have larger (though likely still very small) impact in the sense that it would have a broader audience. Therefore, a publication on the Ainu has greater potential to disrupt or enhance the status quo of understanding about this part of Northeast Asia, making any publication on the Ainu a very sensitive subject matter with inherent academic responsibilities. Looking back at the historiography of the Northern Territories, the English sources to date have enhanced the official Japanese view that the Ainu are negligible, and that they can be conveniently and easily sidestepped to spend more time on the “important” or authoritative issues and perspectives.

Richard Siddle recognised the highly politicized nature of Ainu history and wrote that since most of the sources are written in Japanese, many of which are biased, it makes it difficult to view Ainu history through such distorted lenses. If I were talking strictly in terms of the Ainu, rather than pointing to the Ainu as an example of greater international trends relating to Indigenous peoples in general, I would be highly exaggerative in the importance I give to the Ainu. Although each group of Indigenous peoples has its own unique set of historical interactions and experiences, making cross-cultural comparisons rather incoherent in some respects, the international community is moving to further accept a body of peoples that includes some three-hundred and seventy million individuals worldwide, thus creating greater unity among different groups. Since


there appears to be a sort of international blanket of scholarship that covers and obscures topics related to Indigenous peoples there are definite trends that require attention in each discipline.

**Consequences of Ainu Non-Inclusion**

When land disputes began to arise after the end of World War II between the Soviet Union and Japan, which involved third parties such as the USA, the common trend of ignoring the Indigenous inhabitants continued and was unquestioned. However, this issue has ramifications beyond that of state conduct; third parties are also influenced and affected by the return movement. For example, in 1988 the National Museum of Natural History held a celebration of peoples and cultures from the west coast of Canada to the Amur River Region and Sakhalin in the eastern Soviet Union in the form of a special exhibition. The three-hundred and sixty page book that accompanied this exhibit, *Crossroads of Continents*, is a magnificent compilation of colour pictures and maps with a wide assortment of articles on each of the peoples from this region. Upon closer inspection, it is odd that a large two-page map that illustrates the native groups in the area does not mention the Ainu. Hokkaido, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands are all drawn and labeled on the map, but this rather comprehensive collection did not recognise the Ainu.23 In addition, none of the thirty-six articles addressed the Ainu. Eleven years later, William Fitzhugh, one of the main organisers, revealed the reason for this when he helped the National Museum to host an exhibition dedicated to the Ainu. He explained in this exhibition’s book that the reason for not including the Ainu in the previous exhibition was because of “political reasons: *Crossroads* was organised under a bilateral arrangement with the Soviet Union, which did not want its political history involving the seizure of the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin and the expulsion of Ainu peoples aired broadly to the public.” The exhibition book used a much smaller version on the same 1988 map but superimposed “Ainu” with arrows pointing to Hokkaido, southern Sakhalin and the Kurils.24

Another example, in the international realm, is that of the International Kuril Islands Project (IKIP). This project was an international collaboration project between American, Japanese and Russian scientists which performed an extensive biological survey of the Kuril Islands. Although this project had its roots in 1991, it did not take shape until 1995, and Archaeology was only added in 2000, the last year of the project. Scotty Moore, a member of the Archaeology section of the project, explained that “no Ainu or other Indigenous personnel were involved in the project” for several reasons. First, since Archaeology was added late in the expedition, it adopted prior IKIP structures, and more importantly the logistics were organised by the Russian funding agencies, even though the majority of funding came from the United States. He also mentioned that after World War II the Soviets removed the Ainu living on the Kurils to Hokkaido and that the lands upon which they worked were in Russian hands.25 Although Moore did not mention

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it, the Ainu could have been included in the archaeological aspects of the project but the political sensitivity of their study on the Kurils encouraged Russian, and possibly even Japanese, sides to keep the Ainu out of the picture. Even though IKIP personnel recognised prior Ainu inhabitation, it was easily discredited as having potential to enrich their scientific studies because of the “fact” that the expedition took place on Russian lands.

The research of IKIP also gives us an example of discussion and research concerning bio-geographical boundaries in the Kurils. Most important is the Miyabe Line, or De Vries Strait, between Etorofu and Uruppu, which has been a standardised geographic boundary of vegetation and flora in the Kurils. The Miyabe line, first established in the late 1890s by Miyabe Kingo from his 1890 publication, represents the most significant Japanese research on the biodiversity of the Kurils before World War II. “Tatewaki (1947, 1957) presented evidence for a floral break between Irurup and Urup. He named this boundary the ‘Miyabe Line’ after the famous Japanese botanist Miyabe Kingo (1860-1951), who was one of the very first scientists to study the Kuril Island plants. Tatewaki’s conclusion was quickly accepted and is now almost universally recognised among Japanese botanists.” The creation and support of the idea of the ecological border at the De Vries Strait supports the government’s claim over the southern Kurils. This is also a reflection of prior Wajin limited bio-geographical studies, showing a greater knowledge of the southern Kurils than the central or northern part of the archipelago. The supported ecological border became a split between the known and the unknown, or in other words the claimed and the unclaimed.

Perhaps it is accurate to say that the Ainu who lived on Etorofu and Kunashiri were “Hokkaido Ainu” and not “Kuril Ainu,” following the thinking first proposed by those Ainu scholars like Takakura Shinichiro, who became the return movement’s first institutional supporters, who also followed the idea that Japan had rightful sovereignty over all lands that the Ainu inhabited since they were “Japanese.” However, arguing that it was Hokkaido Ainu that lived on the two larger southern islands and turning the Kuril Ainu into “Shikotan Ainu” should not imply that all four islands are not a part of the Kuril Chain for geographical and historical study tells us otherwise. Even though Nemuro prefecture had jurisdiction over this part of the chain (political and economic), it does not necessarily mean that it is not a part of the Kurils, because Nemuro also had jurisdiction over the rest of the archipelago as well. The use of the label “Shikotan Ainu” distorted their forced dislocation from their lands and livelihood that were largely influenced by Russians at the time. The Ainu that call for inclusion in negotiations do not see the distinction of Hokkaido Ainu and Kuril Ainu, or the “extinction” of the Kuril Ainu as important, since they stress communal Ainu history. Emphasising the death of the last “pure” Kuril Ainu implied that the Ainu were an isolated people and denied the fluid contacts the Ainu in the north had with Russians, Kamchadals, Aleuts and other peoples of the area. The Japanese government and its supporting activists’ politically charged argument that the Northern Territories are separate from the Kurils has shaped their thinking of geography and the Ainu.

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IKIP’s Takahashi Hideki’s findings led him to doubt the foundation of the prominence of the divide at the De Vries Strait, because of the large number of plants that are found in all the Kurils, with no clear cut distinction as the Miyabe Line suggested. When the members of IKIP debated the Miyabe Line they did so in terms of scientific bio-geographical findings and did not address the coincidental issue that the Miyabe Line’s northern extent is identical to that of the claimed political boundary of the Northern Territories. To keep their research “safe” they avoided political comments that are connected to supporters of the Miyabe Line. Pietsch et al. found that while the De Vries Strait and the fourth Kuril strait between Onokotan and Paramushir do represent minor transitional zones, they are not as important as the distinction at the Bussol Strait between Uruppu and Simushu (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). The coincidence that Tatewaki’s boundary is the same as Takakura’s boundary of cultural, economic and political influence should not go unnoticed. Neither should the virtual acceptance of both theories during the same time period as the Japanese government and local scholars began the return movement.

Building on research initiated by the International Kuril Islands Project, The Kuril Biocomplexity Project formed in 2005. They have support from the FRPAC to include one or two Ainu students/teachers in their 2006-2008 expedition, but for 2006 they were unable to recruit any Ainu due to the inability of FRPAC to pay salary and most likely other political issues that would make Ainu participation difficult. Ainu representatives are also supposed to be involved in any exhibitions created in the Kurils that make use of research from the project. While the project members try to stay as politically neutral as possible, they did gain attention and criticism from the Japanese government after American project members went to Kunashiri and Etorofu on Russian visas for research in summer 2006. They felt they could not promise to not go to the southern Kurils, as it would set a precedent for future American scientists and felt they were in no position to take part in state negotiations. However, by using Russian visas to go to the islands it seems that they did set a precedent for future US scholars by showing support of Russian sovereignty for the purpose of research. The visit to the southern Kurils, and subsequent government protests, will likely make it increasingly difficult for the project to work with Japanese and Ainu organisations in their future research in the Kurils.

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30 Benjamin Fitzhugh, email with author, 8 September 2006 and 18 October 2006. Also see the organization Friends of the Kurilsky Reserve (“Become a Friend of the Kurilsky Reserve,” Japan Times, 17 March 1999) which formed in 1998 and changed its name to Kuril Islands Network (KIN)
This dispute also affects the Ainu indirectly through third party organisations. The denial of the Ainu’s connection to the lands in question has potential to also deny the existence of the Ainu in other discursive realms and reveals the close relationship between politics and academia. These examples illustrate how the term Northern Territories is no longer simply a term of imagination and propaganda. This term (which is often used in quotation marks), no matter how fluid or controversial it may be, has real power that effects more than dogma, but real peoples, real places, and real things (research).

**Reasons for Non-Inclusion of the Ainu in the Literature**

The Northern Territories is an example of an international hegemonic scholastic blanket that covers issues of Indigenous peoples. Despite the abundant literature written on the Northern Territories, the Ainu have received little attention in terms of this territorial dispute. Why is it that writing about the Ainu and Northern Territories has been so scarce? Possible answers are numerous and may include: the Ainu had no state of their own; the Japanese government and/or scholars feel that attention paid to Ainu land rights would weaken their claim to the Northern Territories; the Ainu population is marginal and “pure” Ainu no longer exist; the Ainu reduced their demands as they pushed for the ratification of the proposed Ainu New Law; recent Japanese scholars consider studying the Ainu as a sensitive area that makes it difficult to be objective, dissuading academics to study topics likely to encounter protest and funding issues; possible international movements became less inviting for their arguments; officials and academics view Ainu movements as a “trend that will blow over” and that the Ainu are assimilated so their interests should be in line with national interests, so the Ainu will not produce counter-arguments and thus there is no need to mention them (which implies expectations and responsibilities as a citizen); and/or the Ainu are giving up the fight for land rights. This in 2001. They are working to preserve the natural habitat amidst the political debate over the islands’ ownership (Kuril Islands Network <http://www.kurilnature.org> (20 January 2007). 

31 Kelly Dietz, “Ainu in the International Arena,” in *Ainu: Sprit*, 364. Kimura Hiroshi is also an advocate of this position.

32 “Getting Back Our Islands,” 8.


34 Katrina Sjoberg writes this point not applied to the Northern Territories, but to general positions of officials in the 1990s to give little heed to the Ainu. On the subject of Ainu occupational sectors a government official she interviewed said that “choice’ is a luxury few of us enjoy.” This stance has consequences beyond job markets and to me appears to be an extension of Tokugawa images of the Ainu supported by social Darwinist thinking (Katrina Sjoberg, *The Return of the Ainu: Cultural Mobilisation and the Practice of Ethnicity in Japan* [Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1993], 150-151, 154). However, Kimura Hiroshi has been cited as saying that “When the Ainu claim indigenous rights, the background of the governments demand to Russia for the return becomes complicated. Because the Ainu enjoy the rights and obligations as Japanese citizens, it is preferable that they claim their special rights (in case of a quick return) at the time when the islands are returned” (“Utari kyokai / hoppo ryodo / ketsugi e / rainendo nimo / Akita rijicho ga iko,” *Hokkaido Shinbun, evening edition*, 17 May 2002).
last explanation, however, is not convincing since many Ainu have been involved in protests against the annual 7 February “Northern Territories Day,” as well as involvement in land disputes in 1997 in relation to the Nibutani Dam35 in Hokkaido and the Ainu demand for participation in the Shiretoko National Park, now a UNESCO World Heritage site. The reasons listed contribute to understanding why government views and scholars alike have written out the Ainu as insignificant. While these views and practices appear highly domestic in nature, they are not limited to Japan. These reasons could be generalised to fit reasons of non-inclusion or discrediting the importance of indigenous claims elsewhere as well, where most of the reasons tend to originate from the first mentioned above – their lack of a prior nation or state.

Indigenous writers and their supporters are often labeled as “activists” because of the lack of a universal arena at the same level of current academic discourse in which they are permitted to contribute to our scholastic understanding. The only way to have Indigenous voices heard in the past was through Anthropological appropriation, as a product of participant observation or through travelogues. As Beier suggested, academic disciplines need to reform to the point where a space exists where Indigenous peoples, including the Ainu and their supporters, can be heard on the same plane as other disciplines.36 The problem with this and other claims is that their voices take the tone of petitions to a higher moral order than realistically exists either within the state system or academia. Opening up a “space” that Beier sees as necessary also implies the need for the re-conceptualisation of the supremacy of the state, an ideal theoretically vital but practically implausible at this time. The Ainu voice is now working to be heard on equal terms, but through a hegemonic lens are reinterpreted as little more than petitions, petitions with no power or legitimacy.

Borrowing a Canadian example posited by Ken Coates, we could look at the Japanese government’s (and that of the Russian government’s as well) fear of losing battles to Indigenous or minority peoples. For example, Coates says that the Canadian government is slow to act on Indigenous claims because of the challenge of their scale and complexity. If the Canadian federal government lost all claims currently before the courts, the sum would surmount “many billions of [Canadian] dollars.” With potential for such substantial liability, the federal government has decided it more practical to spread such claims, and therefore costs, over a longer period of time.37 While the Japanese government likely views accepting the Ainu as Indigenous peoples as directly related to rising costs and potential territorial loss, it sees Ainu claims hindering the status of their nation or country, and view the Ainu as a challenge to the further strengthening of the state. Supporting the Ainu in this case is considered a “loss” and un-enriching for Japan, so the Ainu are seen as existing outside of the nation for their perceived inability to contribute to it. In the case of Russia, openly reflecting and responding to Ainu claims


36 Beier, Uncommon Places.

37 Ken Coates, “It’s Time for Canada to Do better,” The Record, 30 October 2006.
could trigger other claims by Indigenous people within their borders. The failure to view the resolution of Indigenous claims as beneficial to the state justifies slow governmental response and signifies the perceived state benefit by ignoring them.

Many problems exist when dealing with issues of indigeneity and how to deal with associated rights and claims. For example, in situations where first peoples replaced first peoples, who were then replaced by today’s first peoples, we see a possible continuum of dislocation and relocation from one group to the next (which is a possible pattern that took place in the Kurils). In this somewhat Social Darwinist way of thinking, why should we now start treating dislocated peoples with an equal voice? It appears that issues involving the Ainu and other Indigenous groups today are products of colonialism/advanced colonialism and the creation of nation-states, or in Coate’s argument of the interaction between surplus and non-surplus societies, and not necessarily that of an open ended history or historical plane.

The potential explanations provided above work towards an answer, but individually fail to provide a comprehensive reason why History, Political Science, Museumology, and many other disciplines that are connected to this imbroglio, portray the Ainu as unimportant. They only touch the surface of the issue. This thesis builds on answering this question by further connecting it to themes of nation-building, globalization and autonomy, and colonialism/advanced colonialism. These forces resulted in what Marshall Beier has termed the “hegemonologue.” To rid ourselves of further jargon, this word refers to “that decidedly Western voice that speaks to the exclusion of all others, heard by all and yet, paradoxically, seldom noticed, the knowledges it bears having been widely disseminated as ‘common sense’ rather than as politicized claims about the world and our way of being in it.” We have been taught to view knowledge as defined by a Western universalistic sheet of understanding the world which has spread a thin cover over the globe, silencing or manipulating Indigenous voices (knowledge) in attempt to add credibility and thickness to the same fabricated cover. While Beier wrote his book specifically with International Relations in mind, this idea is transferable to the field of History, and applicable when analysing Ainu-Wajin relations. As Johannes Fabian wrote “Writing need not have the Other as its subject matter in order to oppress the Other.” This study views the issue in a broader historical context, one that works to give agency and coherence to Ainu history, and arguments presented by the Ainu, and reveals how a discourse based on the state denies agency of Indigenous peoples.

The next chapter looks at a more expansive historiography of Indigenous peoples in the Japanese colonial empire, which is deeply connected to the emergence of the

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38 Coates, *Global History*.
40 A question that rises from this that this paper is too limited to answer is: Are Indigenous peoples (including the Ainu) becoming increasingly more audible because they now have institutions such as the United Nations to speak through that is breaking through the guise of traditional hegemonic ways of understanding? Or perhaps their voices are taking audible shape under the guidance of an international system in terms of our current form of knowing, and presenting arguments that work to further appropriating them.
modern Japanese state. This is necessary to promote further understanding of the background of perceptions of the Ainu and Indigenous peoples in Japan and how the Ainu fail to be a part of the Northern Territories issue.
Figure 1. The sea of Okhotsk region in the Late Würm, c. 18,000-15,000 yr BP (after Bezverkhniy et al., 2002). 1, recent coastline; 2, the Late Würm coastline; 3, sea regions [(a) shallow, (b) deepwater]; 4, pathways of biotic immigration from southern and northern source areas.

Figure 2: The Bussol Strait (Pietsch, "Biodiversity and Biogeography," 1298)

Figure 2. The Kuril Archipelago showing (in parentheses) the number of species of vascular plants on each island.

Figure 3: The Kuril Islands (Pietsch, "Biodiversity and Biogeography," 1308)
CHAPTER 2

Rethinking Indigenous Peoples in the Japanese Colonial Empire

This chapter focuses on approaches authors have used and how they addressed Indigenous peoples in writing on colonial history of East Asia. This survey represents a start to better understanding Indigenous peoples in colonial Japan, to draw connections between indigenous peoples and policies in other colonies, and more importantly, to broaden the scope and ways of understanding the Northern Territories issue through Japanese colonial experience.

The history of Indigenous people in the Japanese empire as portrayed by writers of East Asian history in English is, to say the least, inadequate. There are similarities with conclusions drawn by human rights scholar James Walker in 1971 while addressing the Indian in Canadian history: “The picture of the Indian as a human being that is presented by writers of Canadian history is confusing, contradictory and incomplete. Certainly he is not often considered to be deserving of attention, or his society of scholarly analysis.”

While this was an explicit conclusion about Canadian historical writing to that time, this idea also applies to Indigenous people in historical writing on Japan to the present. In a similar historiographical note, more specific to the Ainu, “descriptions of colonization in academic and official history represent the dominant political interests of post war Japanese elites. The descriptions are romanticized and nostalgic and ignore the violence of colonization. The history of the Ainu and Hokkaido was made to coincide with the interests of those with power.”

Broadening this statement to include wider ranging geographical contexts within the colonial empire outside of Hokkaido is non-exaggerative.

Examining influences contact with the Ainu or other Indigenous peoples had for later colonial enterprises is important for revealing other aspects from which to scrutinize and contemplate colonialism and for further understanding processes of discourse around the Ainu and the Northern Territories dispute. It adds a characteristic of colonialism as an organic set of interactions that were mutually influencing activities between the colonised, specifically aboriginal peoples, the metropolitan coloniser and other international third parties. Therefore, discussion on this point of “influences” involves presentation of few ideas and trends found in the literature. The historical story herein is one of how literature has slowly moved toward inclusion of the ever increasingly audible colonised voice. Nevertheless, it is possible that these audible voices are appropriated recreations through the hegemonic academic disciplines as pointed out by Beier. This characteristic of the

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3 Beier, Uncommon Places.
literature continues in the present time when it appears that Native Studies is becoming a recognised area of global studies.

Stating that there was significant borrowing from policies in the two poles of Japan, Hokkaido and Okinawa, this chapter acts to encourage further understanding of the Ainu within discourses on the Northern Territories problem. There is a connection with the silencing of Indigenous peoples in the Japanese colonial empire to the silencing of the colonial history of integrating the Northern Territories into Japan in both the past and present. Therefore, a brief look into literature that addresses Japanese colonialism is informative to provide a broader context of the use of History in the Northern Territories issue in relation to the Ainu, colonialism and nation-building.

**Approaches of Literature: Local or Regional; Top-Down or Bottom-Up; Savage or Noble Savage?**

When authors brought up discussion on Indigenous groups in the reviewed literature, focus was largely localised to a particular area, such as Sakhalin (or Karafuto as the Japanese called it), or Taiwan (or Formosa as Europeans commonly dubbed it). John Harrison’s 1954 article, for example, explains Sakhalin trade between the Ainu and surrounding peoples to show the reader that the Ainu were far from an isolated people and that trade influenced change in the Ainu social system, such as their concept of leadership. Such a narrow focus has limitations on introducing the Ainu as inhabiting various lands. To Harrison’s defense, this must have been a modest scholarly contribution to broadening recognition of the Ainu over fifty years ago, and he recognised his own study as “fragmentary.” Some authors, like anthropologist Kodama Sakuzaemon (1895-1970) and more recently historian Brett Walker, have been more inclusive than Harrison and regionalised their study to include Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands and Hokkaido. Still, this expanded scope pays little attention to connections between Indigenous groups and Japan’s expansion as a whole.

Historians in general have given the topic of Japanese colonialism more attention over the last decade, particularly in Manchukuo, yet they have muted the roles of Indigenous people in their writing. Recent work by Rana Mitter, Louise Young,

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This reflects how, until recently, there were few institutions in which so-called Indigenous peoples were able to speak. This point will receive attention later on. While not addressing Indigenous issues in depth, it appears that scholars concern themselves with battling out theoretical approaches to how the historian should approach colonialism. Should they approach Japanese colonialism through a top-down or bottom-up approach? In other words, should diplomatic state affairs and large institutions, or individuals, press and minor institutions, be the focus of study? If scholars mention aboriginals in regional areas of the empire, they tend to associate them with issues of identity, legitimacy of conquest or expansion and labour, which could be viewed in either of these two approaches. However, literature has tended to portray them as inactive recipients (victims) of Japanese (or Russian) subjugation, hinting at the dominant top-down perspective. On the surface, this is a problem of sources used, but deeper down it is the sources and their interpretation that is reflective of ideology as well, where the state holds all authenticity.

In more recent work, there have been some small gestures to portray these peoples as active participants in history by showing their resistance to the “invaders.” Sympathetic, or possibly even empathetic, non-indigenes have written most of the better known work that includes and gives a “voice” to Indigenous people on their behalf. While a smaller selection of work written by Indigenous people themselves does exist, it appears that it is less well known and distributed. One reason for this is that very little of what they have published has been translated into English, thus narrowing the international audience. A few examples of Ainu who have written rather extensively in


7 However, it should be noted that this institution enables for a more audible voice of these peoples on an international scale, and simultaneously ensures that these voices become audible within the bounds of westernized means of recognition and authenticating voices. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations formed the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples in 1982 as the lowest possible level in the hierarchy of any UN human rights bodies. In late 2000, the General Assembly approved ECOSOC’s plan to form a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (PFII) as a direct branch. The first session of the PFII was held in New York in May 2002. Theoretically, the PFII puts indigenous peoples on equal footing as states within the UN. See, United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/index.html> (6 April 2006) and United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples, <http://www.unhchr.ch/indigenous/groups-01.htm> (6 April 2006).


11 See Siddle, Race, Resistance. The majority or literature written by the Ainu could also fit into this category, for example, Nomura Giichi, Ainu minzoku o ikiru (Tokyo: Sofukan, 1996); Kayano Shigeru, Ore no Nibutani (Tokyo: Suzusawa shoten, 1975).
Japanese include Kayano Shigeru, Chikappu Mieko, Keira Keiko, Nomura Giichi and Kawamura Kenichi. It is even more interesting to note that often when a person of Indigenous background writes about their own people, the general public, and academia, often label them as “activists,” which has potential to lead us to not taking them as seriously or as formally as academics or scholars.

In some cases the literature has taken on the global trend of moving from a view of the Native as “savage” to one as a “noble savage.” That is, they have moved from being “backward” and in need of civilisation to survive to a position that has romanticised them and suggests that they possess something valuable to offer “modern” peoples spiritually, medically, environmentally and/or theoretically. “Modern,” according to many authors, was something that aboriginals were not. The idea of “modern” was a dynamic and evolving term similar to that of the developing and somewhat overlapping terms of “race” (jinshu) and “ethnic” (minzoku). To simplify the matter, many Wajin associated modernity with westernisation, which partly consisted of industry and European and North American “high” culture and furniture, along with subjugation over others in the form of colonies.

Although this is a general trend in changing perceptions of aboriginal peoples both inside and outside of the Japanese empire, it would be misleading to say that the terms and ideas of “savageness” and “noble savage” were directly linked to “backwardness” and romanticism. For example, as Faye Yuan Kleeman indirectly pointed out, Wajin were able to perceive a “Native” as being “backward” and lacking “modernity,” and at the same time be an object of romantic ideals, which did not encourage pressuring them to become “civilised.” Kleeman’s account of Yanagi Muneyoshi (1889-1961) in her book Under an Imperial Sun demonstrates this. Yanagi was a creator of the arts and crafts movement (mingei undo) and a promoter of Japanese culture outside of naichi, mainland Japan. According to Yanagi, Ainu and other aboriginal folk arts were “pure,” since they had an ability to “resist Western modernity” and for this he praised them. This implies that to be pure was to be non-western. But at the same time he said that “they [aboriginal people] cannot tell good art from the bad. It will take a Japanese to discern the beauty [for them].” This is a good example of contradictions in the perceptions of Indigenous people that existed under the umbrella of Japanese influence and rule that grew out of stereotypes of concepts and ideas of the

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Other that worked to reinforce Japan’s own identity. Part of this identity is the attachment to national lands, or “inherent territory” including that of the four islands in dispute between Japan and Russia.

**Slow to Recognise Colonial Encounters, Trends Moving Against State-Centered, Nationalistic History and the Silencing Effect of the Frontier Thesis**

In his article published in 2000, Andre Schmid pointed out that Western histories of Japan have isolated Japan to “island history” and have been slow to recognise its colonial encounters. When they did, they separated colonial history from national history. Literature on Meiji Japan has been largely from a top-down orientation and in some cases developed similarities to Japanese colonial literature where authors centre on the nation. Without literature on Japanese colonies, many characteristics of Japan’s sense of self and national identity that developed because of them would be absent. Louise Young, in her book *Japan’s Total Empire*, addressed this issue by making use of a bottom-up, or grass roots view of Japan. In doing so she debunked several myths regarding Japanese imperialism. For example, she noted that there was widespread public support for Japanese expansion and colonial enterprises especially in Manchukuo. However, she also recognised that there was some resistance, and not all Japanese people were cooperative or supportive of expansion in Manchukuo. In *The Manchurian Myth*, Mitter also took a grass roots approach by focusing on individuals and deflated the myth that there was widespread and strong resistance in Manchukuo to the Japanese between 1931 and 1933. These two scholars tried to offer a unique approach to scholarship on the area by avoiding the common top-down approach. Both authors would acknowledge there is an absence when it comes to the colonised voice, but neither addressed that of Indigenous peoples.

The oft-used top-down approach in the rich body of literature on modern Northeast Asian historical study has traditionally focused on the history of, and relations between, four states: China, Japan, Korea and Russia/Soviet Union. Whether the studies focus on the Sino-Japanese war, the Russo-Japanese war, the Manchurian Incident, the Korean War, the Asia-Pacific War, or even the Northern Territories dispute, the centre of discussion has been on these four countries. This is reflective of a historiography that has taken the nation-state as the focal subject and that from such a perspective these four states have dominated the region for centuries. Much of the foreign policy literature of Japan focuses on relations with the United States, thus scholars have added a fifth state. Ian Nish, known for his writing on Anglo-Japanese alliance, moved beyond this and

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added other European countries to his study on Japanese foreign policy. However, by viewing History of Northeast Asia in terms of these four, plus several American-European dominating states, historians have tended to overlook much smaller and less formal communities that existed in between the states and that these communities were not given agency as state actors. It follows that since they did not have agency as a nation or state, scholars did not necessarily consider them worthy of study. The top-down approach mutes communities that include Indigenous peoples of Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, Hokkaido, Manchukuo, Taiwan and the Pacific Islands.

Before returning to the topic of approaches of historical study I will briefly address possible forces pushing against this trend. A professor at Keisen University in Japan, Uemura Hideaki, concluded one of his articles on Okinawa by asserting

...for 150 years, due to the absence of a perspective on indigenous peoples’ rights Japanese history and social sciences in general has been deceived by the sophistry of the Great Japanese Empire. Hokkaido and Okinawa have been left out of the field of colonial problems. As a result, the idea of facing up to the fact that colonial policies and assimilation policies are continuing as before has been forgotten.

This idea of the nonexistence of “rights” dating back to “one hundred fifty years” could be extended because such an idea of “Indigenous rights” itself is rather new and did not begin significant international development until after World War II following the emergence and expansion of ideas and discourse on “human rights.” Connected with this discourse on human rights is the even more recent and slow development of the idea of “Indigenous peoples’ rights” that before World War II was not a pressing issue. The elaborate use of terra nullius when referring to lands inhabited by aboriginal peoples gives clear evidence that international law did not apply to such people. While the last sentence in the quote by Uemura refers to current situations on the two land areas on opposite poles of Japan, it would also be beneficial to think of this in terms of scholarship on the subject of Indigenous and colonial studies in general. The forgotten colonial and assimilation policies to which Uemura refers are particularly relevant to the Northern Territories. Writing the Indigenous habitants out of important roles and mutually influencing occurrences throughout Japan’s colonial experience is in itself also a type of colonialism of scholarship, which Beier would surely call advanced-colonialism.

Prasenjit Duara, a History professor at the University of Chicago, would argue that Young and Mitter fit into typical scholarship that tends to take either one of two nationalistic perspectives in relation to Manchukuo. That is, one of victimisation/false Manchukuo or a puppet state. While it appears neither Young nor Mitter fully conform to either stance, Duara indirectly puts them in this category:

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When writing of the experiences of people, whether ordinary or elite, the expectation is that they cannot but be reduced to symbols of victimization, collaboration, or resistance. My objection to this position is not that we should not denounce a brutal regime, but that this narrative itself is shaped by a nationalist politics that channels history into very narrow passages. This is true not only of contemporary Chinese writings, but also of much Western and postwar Japanese historiography.

He also recognises that there has been a focus on negative affects on peoples’ lives and, as a result, historians have not done as much work on wider and potentially positive outcomes. Schmid illuminated that a top-town approach can fall prey to nationalistic history, now Duara has come to a similar conclusion for history written from a local perspective. This shows the importance of addressing the Ainu and the Northern Territories within three levels of interaction.

Duara does not appear to answer the question of whether the approach of focusing on individuals or grass root movements is a necessary evil or something that historians should avoid. Leaving the reader unclear on this question, he attempted to create a history that did not depend on nationalistic perspectives by utilising a global-systems approach towards Manchukuo. In doing so he made use of a geographical approach by taking on a Manchukuo-centered approach, which moved his scholarship one step away from becoming nationalistic in nature. This is also characteristic of how Brett Walker recently wrote about Yezo, the area now known as Hokkaido, in his book *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*. Instead of looking at the island strictly as a frontier leading to inevitable conquest by the Japanese, he centered the land. This makes it difficult to see the island in terms of a unilateral northward movement of the Japanese. Both Duara and Walker make use of this “new Western” history that works to avoid turning places into frontiers that ultimately silence the local populations and view expansion as inevitable.

One possible disadvantage of this method, as is evident in Walker’s book, is that inconsistencies may surface in the writing. For example Walker claims to write from the perspective of an ecological centre where disease and changing connection to the land is supposedly the focus of his arguments for change in Ainu society. Yet at the same time he shows indirectly and without explicitly admitting it that commercialisation and economics, which increased with Wajin encroachment, were two factors to changing relations and declining autonomy of the Ainu. This, therefore, indirectly implies that the Ainu could not be modern. If commerce disrupted the fragile pre-modern world of the Ainu it is further proof that they were incapable of surviving in a world of modernity, further supporting, albeit indirectly, concepts of Social Darwinism. Another example of such inconsistency is that it is unclear if he thinks Ainu “ethnicity” emerged around or

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22 Walker, *Conquest of Ainu*.

before the sixteenth century following the Shakushain war in the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{24} Lastly, by adopting a geographical focal point he moves away from a teleological and deterministic history on one hand but this also makes it appear, to some extent, as though the Ainu were accidentally colonised and that neither the Wajin nor Russians had historical agency. Nonetheless, the approach he utilised worked towards moving away from nationalistic historical interpretations for which both Duara and Schmid have shown distaste.

For the purpose of identifying the role of smaller and less formal communities in so-called border lands, Duara and Walker open up more possibilities for egalitarian discourse. Older historical writing has not necessarily ignored writing on these communities, but the authors have traditionally approached them as frontier people, who were written off as pawns to their civilising and parental-like conquerors. Writers have used various words to describe these people including ignorant,\textsuperscript{25} barbarian, hairy\textsuperscript{26}, savage, lazy, beggars\textsuperscript{27} who were on the verge of extinction.\textsuperscript{28} In the case of the Ainu it almost seemed obligatory for writers to place the words “dying” or “vanishing race” either in the title or text.\textsuperscript{29} These perceptions, at least in part, justified the expansionists’ parental roles to “protect” and “civilise” them, where civilising them gave connotations of aboriginals learning the colonisers’ language, religion, and culture, while giving up their own. The global spread of ideas like Social Darwinism in the late nineteenth century nuanced earlier literature. While ideas of “survival of the fittest” and portrayals of “primitive” and “savagery” that were used in earlier writing has apparently died out in more recent literature, arguably these ideas have not ceased. Rather, they have taken a different form that exists in personal opinion, pop-culture and a tendency of non-recognition or publication of aboriginal issues, unless they cause problems or inconveniences for majority societies.\textsuperscript{30}

Histories that dealt directly with colonialism tended to overlook the Indigenous populations as a result of utilising the frontier thesis. In other words, they put frontier or border lands in the scope of national interest or expansion. For example, John Stephan

\textsuperscript{24} See his introductory chapter and epilogue (Walker, \textit{Conquest of Ainu}).

\textsuperscript{25} Harry Emerson Wildes, \textit{Aliens in the East: A New History of Japan’s Foreign Intercourse} (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1973), 113.

\textsuperscript{26} Henry Savage Landor, \textit{Alone with the Hairy Ainu} (London: John Murray, 1893 [London: Johnson Reprint Company, 1970]).


\textsuperscript{30} A Canadian example of this is a highly critical book by political scientist Tom Flanagan (Tom Flanagan, \textit{First Nations?, Second Thoughts} [McGill-Queen’s Press, 2000]). This is also likely to be deeply intertwined with concepts of colonialism or colonial activity that have transformed and continued to the present age in such areas as our “common sense” and even academic study, which often go unquestioned.
dealt with Russian expansion into the “far east,” sensitively met the Indigenous person, but only mentioned them in passing and largely in relation to yasak, Russian fur tax.\textsuperscript{31} Young did little more than confirm that the Ainu had existed in the early Japanese colony of Hokkaido while she addressed Japanese expansion before Manchukuo. Aboriginal populations of Manchukuo were not even referenced. Japanese scholar Takakura Shinichiro (1902-1990) also utilised this approach for his colonial history of Hokkaido. Although Takakura was (and still is) highly criticised by many in the Ainu community, he differs from others in his acknowledgement that most colonised lands were previously populated with aboriginal peoples. This in turn brought forth a “native problem” which itself was of key concern to colonial policy.\textsuperscript{32} It is curious that other “frontier” colonial scholars did not seem to pick up on this idea of challenging the notion of the “empty frontier,” which he presented in 1942. Perhaps this idea was too radical for the time. As is shown in Chapter Five, Takakura later used his concepts on the development of the native policy to support his claims that the Ainu were Japanese, and by default, so was the territory they inhabited.

Faye Yuan Kleeman’s recent study on colonialism in Taiwan made a similar acknowledgment as Takakura. She stated that one of Japan’s first priorities on Taiwan was to tame and civilise the “barbaric people” which involved a “meticulous study of the aborigines.” However, Kleeman’s statement was less bold and even appeared slightly contradictory. While she recognised the importance of a “Native policy” in early stages of colonial efforts, she limited this idea to the case of Taiwan by stating that Taiwan was “Japan’s first colony.” This is somewhat odd, in that on the prior page she mentioned that the Japanese first moved to control Ainu and Okinawan lands before 1895. Apparently this did not fit Kleeman’s undefined definition of colonialism.\textsuperscript{33}

Similar to work on Manchukuo and Japanese colonial history in general, Indigenous studies have also had a phase of concentrating on resistance and victimisation (oppression). Two examples illustrate this trend. Richard Siddle, at the University of Sheffield, concentrated on modern resistance of the Hokkaido Ainu against the encroaching Japanese in his 1996 book.\textsuperscript{34} His book traces Ainu oppression and resistance from the late Tokugawa era to the early 1990s. The focus on resistance and oppression was perhaps what led him to see Ainu and Japanese histories as competing in nature.\textsuperscript{35} Katrina Sjoberg’s account is a telling narrative of Ainu cultural mobilisation in the 1980s


\textsuperscript{32} Takakura Shinichiro, “A Study of Conquest,” 6-7. The Japanese version under the title \textit{Ainu Seisaku Shi} was published in 1942 (Takakura Shinichiro, \textit{Ainu seisakushi} (Tokyo: Nihon hyoronsha, 1942). Despite the ethnocentric vantage point his work still represents a major breakthrough in studies on Ainu history for his time. It should not be forgotten however, that Takakura also denied Ainu existence in his time and was closely associated with the Japanese government and institutions.

\textsuperscript{33} Kleeman, \textit{Imperial Sun}, 20, 228-229.

\textsuperscript{34} Siddle, \textit{Race, Resistance}. An example of such victimisation literature in Japanese is Miyajima Toshimitsu, \textit{Chikisani no daichi} (Tokyo: Nihon Kiritsu kyodan shuppankyoku, 1994).

\textsuperscript{35} Siddle, \textit{Race, Resistance}, 19-25.
as a means to resist complete assimilation. Here, the word “mobilisation,” if defined, could easily mean resistance against the dominant Wajin culture. At least in the case of the Ainu, the literature dealing with resistance to dominant cultures has faded with the ratification of the Ainu New Law in 1997. This also coincided with an increase in global interaction between Indigenous groups supported by the United Nations in such fora as the first International Year for the World’s Indigenous People in 1993, and the first and second International Decade for the World’s Indigenous People from 1995-2004 and 2005-2014.

Making Connections among Japanese Colonies

Other areas of Japanese colonies into which aboriginal people are incorporated include Taiwan, Manchukuo and Sakhalin. Nevertheless, many authors more often than not set these groups of people aside just as quickly as they introduce them. Huang Chih-huei, a researcher interested in Taiwan ethnology, did little more than acknowledge that Aborigines existed in Taiwan. Almost immediately after she mentioned that they were there during Japanese rule, she moved on. The 1977 work by Patricia Tsurumi went a little further, and in addition to seven pages of brief mention she included a five page appendix on aboriginal colonial education. Interestingly enough, she put the “concentrated” five pages at the end of the book instead of incorporating them into the main text, almost as if they were afterthought. Much of the writing on aboriginal groups in East Asia gives the sense that they were nothing more than objects; objects easily discarded after initial discussion of “first contacts,” historicising and eliminating them from the present and future, where they then fade into the region itself as if part of the flora and fauna. Much of the literature has not denied their historical existence, but neither has it purposefully given them attention.


40 Tsurumi, *Colonial Education*, 2-6, 9, 45, 231-235.
Duara, in his dense chapter on the Oroqen of Manchukuo, delves even deeper into the issue. He challenged the centrifugal vantage point and showed how ideas of the aboriginal affected ideology of nationalism and identity. This was done by moving away from the frontier thesis and taking on Manchukuo as a centre area. He draws our attention to the idea that the Japanese had an “urge to see the Self in the primitive Other.” This is a highly provocative and suggestive statement. Duara argues that the Japanese encouraged the perception of Manchukuo to be similar to the Wild West, a land where agriculture was not the focus, and to portray the image of “aboriginals in the forests.” This is similar to the treatment of the Ainu in Wajin arguments legitimising conquest by stating that all lands where the Ainu lived are “inherent territory,” such as the Northern Territories. It is worth mentioning that he borrowed these ideas from Faye Yuan Kleeman. Indirectly through Duara, it is apparent that Kleeman also considered that a “romanticised” aboriginal view was important to not only Taiwan but also Manchukuo. Unfortunately, Duara in his own book did not further connect this idea to other “primitive” peoples within Japanese colonial rule, such as the Ainu and Okinawans. He borrowed this idea from Kleeman who viewed Taiwan as Japan’s first colony, and this was outside of the scope of his volume. Nonetheless, two years before the publication of Duara’s book, independent writing showed a similar situation on Karafuto (Sakhalin).

In 2001, Tessa Morris-Suzuki wrote about how the Aboriginal peoples on the island of Karafuto were used to form an identity of that island. Not only is the use of identity similar to Duara’s description, but so is the accompanied denial or covering up of the existence of Chinese and Korean inhabitants through the use of romanticising the Native and building an image of a common ancestry. Duara, Kleeman and Morris-Suzuki have similarly recognised the roles of Indigenous groups in relation to Japanese colonial efforts yet connections have not explicitly been made.

Other authors have acknowledged a similar connection between Okinawa and Hokkaido with later colonies. Most tend to either agree with or write similar ideas in their own work. Mark Peattie, in *Nanyo: the Rise and Fall of Micronesia*, draws our attention to similar Japanese administration policies between the Japanese mandated islands of Micronesia and Korean and Taiwan, but failed to elaborate. We need to trace Korean and Taiwanese polices back further through suggestions of other scholars.

Siddle exposed some interesting documents, unearthed by then graduate student Inoue Kaoru in 1989, that reveal official contact by the Governor General of Korea with both Hokkaido and Karafuto governments seeking recommendations for Japanizing

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41 Duara, *Sovereignty*, 186.
42 Duara, *Sovereignty*, 174, notes 11, 12 on page 177.
45 Inoue, a graduate student at Hokkaido University’s Department of Education, accidentally found these documents at National Diet Library. Sapporo Ainu Cultural Association’s Toyokawa Shigeo also says that the colonial policy in Korea relied extensively on Ainu assimilation policy (“Karafuto Ainu kosekiho ga shijiki – ‘Nominka’ shokuminchi keiei no shichu,” *Asahi Shinbun*, 21 October 1989).
names since such a policy had already been implemented in regard to the Ainu. He does not inform the reader if the responses given were used or influenced Korean policies. Nor does he inform us if they contacted Okinawan authorities on a similar matter. Siddle concludes this intriguing fact with: “The assimilation policies applied to Japan’s first colonial subjects were now informing policies of forced assimilation in the more recent parts of the empire.” An article by Steve Rabson provides an answer for the later question about if the same authorities contacted Okinawa. He wrote renaming to Japanese names was voluntary in Okinawa, unlike in Korea later on. Rabson did not mention that even before Korea, government officials gave Japanese names to the Ainu. From this, a possible reason why they wrote to Hokkaido and Karafuto authorities and were not likely to have written to those in Okinawa is because there was no such need for a forced policy of renaming the local populace in the later area. This is one example of how similarities existed between aboriginal colonies, yet they each had their own peculiarities.

Uemura Hideaki also suggested how the strategy of first denying diplomatic rights of the people in the Ryukyu Kingdom, then having the central government declare diplomatic rights on their behalf, was a strategy the Japanese later used in Korea with the establishment of the Residency-General Agency in Seoul. Michael Weiner tells us that “The Meiji period also witnessed the establishment of a colonial order in Hokkaido. Employing institutional and administrative mechanisms very similar to those which would later be deployed in Korea and Taiwan…” Shortly after this passage he continued by stating that “in a process which would be repeated elsewhere in the empire, the Ainu were gradually constructed as a primitive and ‘racially’ immature ‘Other’ in a discourse which justified and rendered the colonial project inevitable.” It is unfortunate he stated this so matter-of-factly; he did not elaborate on this and give the reader details of what, where and how such processes were copied. The Indigenous contribution, direct or indirect, seemed to be quite important to the Japanese colonial order.

Brett Walker, building on an idea presented by Peter Duus’ book Abacus and the Sword, also agreed that there are important connections between Ezo and Korean colonisation. The areas of resemblance are in the close connection between political and economic ties that occurred first in Ezo and later in Korea. Walker also mentioned that there are also “important distinctions” between the two. Regrettably, he fails to expand on explaining exact similarities or differences of such links.

Connection between policies in Ezo, Ryukyu and Manchukuo are also evident. For example, Duara wrote of how the Oroqen were segregated and banned from taking part in agriculture and from integrating with other people as a means to “preserve” them during the 1930s. This sounds familiar to Japanese policies towards aboriginal people in Taiwan and even prior to this towards the Ainu in the nineteenth century under Matsumae

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46 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 145, note 94 on 229.
rule. Some Ainu were even severely punished for learning Japanese during these times.\(^{51}\) This was still the period in which the reaction to modernisation had not yet set in so the noble savage discourse should not have been well established.

Another example is the connection between the Japanese Imperial line and the Ryukyuan King Shotai and that of Emperor Pu Yi in Manchukuo. In order to give Japan symbolic rule they connected the Imperial family to that of the Ryukyu Kingdom. Later on they used a similar strategy in Manchukuo, when they connected the newly enthroned Pu Yi (whom the Japanese forced back into rule) to the Japanese emperor as an official half brother in 1940.\(^{52}\) The question here remains to what extent did the experience and decision to “adopt” King Shotai to the Imperial line influence the decision making in the latter. This requires further investigation.

It is also significant that many of the upcoming anthropologists were connected first to the Ainu and Okinawans and then branched off to various other areas where colonial institutions permitted them to operate. For example, after studying the Ainu in Hokkaido, Yoshida Iwao went to Taiwan; in the late 1920s Fujii Tanotsu went to Micronesia; and in the 1930s scholars joined research organisations like the East Asia Research Institute.\(^{53}\) Although European and American anthropological debates and ideas greatly influenced these anthropologists, they were able to apply them and blend them with prior ideas and stereotypes developed during the Tokugawa times. It would be interesting to investigate details of the spread of Anthropology that was largely initiated through contact with the Ainu. The newly developing academia in Japan during Japanese expansion produced many scholars who later became associated with the Northern Territories.

To say that Japan’s colonies were completely similar would be to deny each area and people their own agency, experience and history. Yet we will find commonalities in ideas and policies that had roots in dealing with aboriginal peoples. These commonalities do not suggest that the policies had equal effectiveness in each of these areas during different times. To quote the Canadian Métis architect Douglas Cardinal, “A balance does not exist at this time as there is no input by Native people into this world.”\(^{54}\) In other words, the input they have made, either directly or indirectly, through relational discourse and experience, is often either not acknowledged or downplayed by academic writing.

**Summary**

Andre Schmid noted a lack of work on Japanese colonial history, and in particular the dearth of published materials on Korea in colonial affairs.\(^{55}\) If he considers Korean history to be understudied within this genre, then Indigenous Studies in relation to Japanese colonial history lags even more. A large body of writing separates Aboriginal studies and colonial history, and, when they are connected, the literature tends to have

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\(^{52}\) Duara, *Sovereignty*, 65-66.

\(^{53}\) Siddle, *Race, Resistance*, 85.


\(^{55}\) Schmid, “Korean Problem.”
centrifugal, local or regional characteristics. In other words, many authors have viewed Indigenous peoples as inactive reactors to outward and expanding influence from metropolitan centers in Japan and in isolated areas such as Okinawa, Taiwan, Sakhalin or Hokkaido. Scholars viewed these peoples as savages in need of civilisation and modernisation, and that paternalism was an important method for achieving these goals. As well, paternalistic acts have helped to ensure the muting of Indigenous perspectives. Since these people were “childlike” it allowed the fatherly nation-state to speak on the behalf of these people. A centering of geography and a movement away from nationalistic approaches have fostered a sense of potential worth, although the nation-state still shows reluctance in releasing its prior control and portrayal of these peoples.

International trends, at least partially supported by international bodies, have also supported theoretical centering of areas where aboriginal people live. This development, however, has been slow to catch on in Asia perhaps because the concept of state is increasingly questioned in the west and is for very specific reasons left unquestioned in Asia.

Regional historical studies alone are unsuccessful in bridging connections between Indigenous peoples through colonial experiences. With the build up of regional studies on Indigenous peoples within colonial Japanese history, scholars do not appear to have made a serious attempt to make connections between the areas, despite the active debates on approaches historians should use (top-down, bottom-up, centering geography or people) to move away from state-centered interpretations. While more literature brings Indigenous peoples into the picture of Japanese colonialism, on a grander scale it is stuck in an era of perceived irrelevance. While the distinction is perhaps superficial, it appears there is a separation between Native Studies and colonial studies. This is rather ironic because they are intricately connected as the latter helped create the former and vice versa. Native Studies is often seen as an extension of Anthropology, thus denying Indigenous people a history. However, growing efforts by international non-governmental organisations (both aboriginal and non-aboriginal) and international bodies such as the United Nations WIGIP and PFII have been encouraging general comparative Indigenous studies to both include and move past the study of their traditional culture, bringing them into the present. Colonial studies scholars, on the other hand, are still having difficulty in seeing that colonial experiences were and are mutually influencing, especially in regards to Native peoples. When a writer combines these two areas of research a hybrid of Anthropological-History emerges. It is possible that this merger between two (artificially) separated areas of study presents a problem for dealing with Indigenous peoples within the context of Japanese colonial history. The case of the Northern Territories fits into this area, because the lands in question were previously Ainu lands that were absorbed by Japan as a result of long periods of contact between Ainu and Wajin and external forces from Russia, and later other Western colonial nations, which directly and indirectly encouraged Japan to “develop” the lands during their nation-building endeavors. Connecting this dispute with Indigenous colonial studies also requires the addition of Political Science and International Law, to which the dispute is academically associated.

Unlike other empires which were forced into a slow, painful and protracted decolonisation, such as France and England, the Japanese empire disappeared overnight from the official record. The trauma of war surrender has allowed Japan to forget the
empire and the imperial courses of war.\textsuperscript{56} And in the post-World War II period, the Japanese have not been forced to confront domestic and international effects of their colonies. As well, there are common elements to the colonial experience that would shed light on Japan’s experience. One such experience is that of their involvement with the Okhotsk region and its peoples in which the Northern Territories are a part. Such ideas encourage working towards further connecting Indigenous peoples with colonial history in the Asia-Pacific region from a non-centrifugal, non-nationalistic approach starting with the case of the Northern Territories in a broader context, including colonialism and nation-building, than scholars have traditionally used.

Many of the ideas presented by Japanese colonial scholars may strike a parallel with recent Canadian history on First Nations. The now popular usage of “Native-newcomer relations” implies a movement away from the idea of frontier, and a push towards “centering” geography or even centering aboriginal peoples themselves.\textsuperscript{57} This shows an emerging overlap between Indigenous (Native) and historical studies. In 1996, Siddle called Indigenous history and other histories to be “competing histories.”\textsuperscript{58} It is possible with such an emergence of studies based on Native-newcomer relations that these histories may begin to be less competing and more complimentary in nature. Perhaps this is still a little too optimistic for the majority of current research, but we need to start somewhere, and this thesis is starting with the Ainu and their relation to the Northern Territories dispute.


\textsuperscript{57} Two such examples are J.R. Miller, \textit{Reflections of Native-Newcomer Relations} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) and Alan Cairns, \textit{Citizens Plus} (Vancouver: University of B.C. Press, 2000). By “centering Indigenous peoples” I imply taking them as legitimate actors and limiting them to subjects or participants of history.

\textsuperscript{58} See note 35.
CHAPTER 3

Historical Overview of Ainu-Wajin Relations

If little is generally known either in Japan or in Europe concerning the Natives of Yezo, the reason must be sought in the remoteness of the subject from topics of general interest.1

Although Basil-Hall Chamberlain wrote the above quote in 1887 while teaching at the Tokyo Imperial University, the nuance of this excerpt still applies to a large extent today.2 Chamberlain foreshadowed later treatment of Indigenous peoples in general through prisms of academic and government-centered interests. Literature involving the Ainu is ever increasing in both journalistic and scholastic writing by both Ainu and non-Ainu peoples.3 However, as Chamberlain bluntly pointed out, this large body of literature goes fundamentally unnoticed – and if read, as the Ainu cultural-political leader Kayano Shigeru (1926–2006) noted, not taken seriously – due to its “remoteness.”4 This sense of remoteness underlies current scholarship on the Northern Territories when the issue of the Ainu is brought to the discussion table.

This chapter introduces Ainu history as a means to provide important and necessary historical background to the region and to the modern day territorial dispute. Without better understanding the local and regional history of the Ainu and Hokkaido, the territory in question loses much of its significance. This chapter brings the topic of the Ainu closer to an important debate by outlining a local and regional Ainu history that is not only important but necessary to further understanding the Northern Territories today. Although directly tied to Japanese history, this chapter does not see the history of the Ainu as being underneath the hegemony of it despite its inherent interconnectedness. Due to the relational aspects of the Ainu and Wajin, informing a history based strictly on the Ainu experience fails to tell a larger portion of the whole and Wajin historical analysis without inclusion of the Ainu is itself incomplete and supportive of the status quo that works to mute Indigenous peoples in Japan and abroad. The incorporation of Ainu history deserves attention in its own right and works to build a better understanding of the Ainu and their relations to the land, time and peoples associated with the Northern Territories dispute. The history of Ainu as documented during Tokugawa and Meiji eras is well

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1 Basil-Hall Chamberlain, “The Language, Mythology and Geographical Nomenclature of Japan viewed in Light of Aino Studies,” Memoirs of the Literature College, Imperial University of Japan No. 1 (Tokyo: The Imperial University, 1887), 1.
2 According to Beier’s argument we could consider this connected to what he labeled the “hegemonologue.”
3 For a look at articles concerning the Ainu in Japanese newspapers see, Table 1: Ainu in the Press.
established; this chapter highlights relevant background information on the Ainu, putting the issue of the Northern Territories into context in terms of Ainu history.

Only since 1869 has Hokkaido referred to the large island north of Honshu. Discussion on the Northern Territories focuses for the most part on events subsequent to the name change and official incorporation of Hokkaido lands into the national. The notion of discovery used when discussing areas such as the Kurils, Mamiya Strait, and Sakhalin completely ignores one very important facet, that is, the Indigenous people of these areas. Strategically planned or not, using the Northern Territories as a debate which primarily utilises documents associated with World War II and the Cold War takes the focus away from Hokkaido and its absorption into Japan. This dispute reinforces Japan’s claim to Hokkaido and other islands that were inhabited by the Ainu. As stipulated by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan had to renounce all lands that they had taken by force or greed. If too much attention was placed on Hokkaido perhaps their claim and recognition of sovereignty would have been or could be questioned. A strategic way to avoid such attention was to remove it by redirecting it to lands that lay outside of their current sphere of control, in this case the southern portion of the Kuril Islands. In such an interpretation, the Northern Territories dispute acts as a mechanism by which to strengthen national borders and ultimately the state – a continuation of state-building in the present.

Before Meiji’s renaming and incorporation of Hokkaido, the Japanese called these northern lands, minus the southern extremity of Hokkaido, including Sakhalin (Karafuto) and the Kurils (Chishima), Ezo or Ezochi and considered them largely foreign lands and not an “inherent” part of Japan. To the Ainu their lands were not a frontier or a middle ground, but their home, where they lived off the land and traded with their neighbours for means of sustenance and cultural growth, where traditions and customs were in flux, far from the static image portrayed in many museums in Hokkaido. They later came to work as labourers in Wajin semi-capitalistic fisheries in the Tokugawa era and act as guides for Wajin explorers and surveyors. Their relationship with the land and trade were intertwined and interconnected with their culture and beliefs, they were far from an isolated people.

Ainu Cultural Formation and Life-Ways
The Ainu relied heavily on hunting and gathering and small scale plot farming for their livelihood. Trade was also an important part of Ainu culture, as they were in contact with the surrounding peoples such as the Chinese, Koreans, Russians, and Wajin. The Nivkhi, Uilta, Aleut and Kamchadals are other Indigenous groups that also lived near the areas

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5 The Uilta and Nivkhi are also indigenous to Sakhalin.
6 For example, there were talks of Hokkaido separation at the end of World War II (Kono Hiromichi Hokkaido jiyu kokuron [Sapporo: 1946]).
the Ainu occupied, making for a rich and complex set of interactions among many different peoples. Having once lived throughout northeast Honshu, Hokkaido, Sakhalin, the Kurils, and probably around the Amur River in Siberia, the Ainu of today live for the most part in Hokkaido, numbering around 25,000 people, with smaller, yet important populations in Sakhalin and throughout the rest of Japan – most notably in the Kanto region.

The word Ainu, which holds the meaning of human being, refers to a people that were physically, culturally and linguistically distinct from the Wajin. Archeology has worked to further define the birth of Ainu culture, taking attention away from internal creation myths. Accordingly, around 250 BCE when the agricultural society of the Yayoi emerged in Honshu, the cultures of Japan began to grow in different directions. Those in the north continued in the Jomon until the emergence of the Satsumon/Okhotsk culture around 700 CE, when the two cultures went through a merging period. Ultimately those that were part of the Satsumon culture predominated in northern Hokkaido and Sakhalin, resulting in the emergence of a new-Satsumon culture around the twelfth century, congruent with recognisable Ainu culture.

Ainu creation myths on the other hand are numerous and focus not on cultural creation but on the world of kamui or spirits. One example of such a myth is that the creator spirit, kotan-kor-kamuy, and his sister descended upon Mount Daisetsu, the largest mountain in Hokkaido, as it was emerging from the ocean and they created Ainu Moshir, the land of the humans, from the clouds. Some of the clouds became rivers and

9 Estimates for the Kanto region range from 2,700 to 10,000 Ainu depending on the definition of Kanto. Sakhalin Ainu however small in number are bound to exist. See, Ogasawara Nobuyuki, Ainu sabetsu mondai dokuhon (Tokyo: Rokufu shuppan, 1997), 109-116 and AM, Ainu Moshiri.
10 David Howell aptly points out that “ethnicity” is not an applicable term to nineteenth century period of Ainu-Wajin relations as differences were seen in terms of customs and not ethnicity (Howell, Geographies).
11 Mark Hudson, Ruins of Identity (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 208. For more discussion about the formation of the Ainu and archeology see pages 206-232. See also, Mark Hudson, “The Perverse Realities of Chang: World System Incorporation and the Okhotsk Culture of Hokkaido,” Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 23.3 (2004): 290-308. In early European writings on the Ainu, when classification of “race” was deemed important, it was often noted that the Ainu were a type of Caucasoid. Since then, this thesis has been proven incorrect. See, S.A. Arutjunov, “Ainu Origin Theories,” 29-31 and W. Fitzhugh, “Ainu Ethnicity: A History,” in Ainu: Spirit, 13-14, and Omoto K., “Ethnicity survived: the Ainu of Hokkaido,” Human Evolution, 12-13.1-2 (1997): 69-70. It is interesting when archaeologists talk of Ainu creation they tend to do so in terms of culture, which differs greatly from concepts of ethnicity, race and status, which the Ainu were subjected to in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Howell talks of the Ainu in terms of status and customs in the nineteenth century, while Siddle, who focuses on the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, tends to focus on issues of ethnicity and race (Howell, Geographies and Siddle, Race, Resistance).
12 Ainu Moshir means “the land where the Ainu live” or “quiet land where humans live.” Kayano has also translated it as “the peaceful land of the Ainu.”
others became rocks, soil and islands. John Batchelor, a British missionary who lived and worked close to many Ainu for over half a century, recorded several creation stories involving *Aeoina kamui* (also called *Ainu rak-guru*) or “the divine tradition holder” where it was said that humans were created from willow and earth.

No matter the specific date of the arrival of Ainu culture, it is unquestioned that they inhabited the islands of Hokkaido, southern Sakhalin and the Kurils before the influx of Wajin and Russians into the area. Ainu livelihood has often been referred to as a hunter-gatherer people, but as Tessa Morris-Suzuki notes, many Ainu had similar agricultural practices not so different to many Wajin. The aspect of the Ainu being strictly a hunter-gatherer society has led many scholars to overlook the agricultural aspect as raised by Morris-Suzuki. Trade was also important for Ainu livelihood. Many Wajin trade goods gradually became a part of their customs by the mid-eighteenth century in the Kuril chain (even earlier in other parts of Ezo). It is this trade network that initially encouraged both Russians and Wajin to move further and further into the traditional Ainu lands. During early contacts between the Ainu and Wajin both parties gained from trade. With Wajin expansion into northeastern Honshu from late eighth century well into the tenth century and southern Ezo from the fifteenth century to the late nineteenth century, the trade gradually became a means by which Ainu were disadvantaged and in many communities Wajin forced Ainu to work for their interests, which included, fishing, hunting, and farming, which along with the disastrous effect of disease, displaced much of the Ainu way of life and religion.

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15 It is debated how far south into Honshu the Ainu lived, as there are Ainu derived names all over Japan. See, Suzuko Tamura, “Ainu Language: Features and Relationships,” *Ainu: Spirit*, 60-62.
19 During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Ezo was used for exiling Wajin criminals, but this does not constitute conquest of the lands. For discussion on establishment of Wajin controls in southern Ezo see, Friday, “Pushing Beyond,” 17-24. See also, Siddle, *Race, Resistance*, 32-38.
The Tokugawa shogunate granted the Kakizaki family in southern Ezoichi the name of Matsumae and in 1604 Tokugawa Ieyasu’s black-seal order accorded the Matsumae clan exclusive trading rights with the Ainu. The order had three points, outlining first, that nobody was to enter or exit Matsumae for the purpose of trade with the Ainu unless they had been authorised by Matsumae. Second, Japanese people should not “cross freely into Ezo for the purpose of trade, [but] Ainu should be considered free to go where they please.” The last point stated: “[i]t is strictly prohibited for [Japanese] people to inflict injustices or crimes upon the Ainu.” It ended by stating anybody who did not follow these edicts would be severely punished. The shogunate continuously renewed this policy with only minor changes, until 1799, twenty-one years after a battle in eastern Ezo.

The result of the spatial and political distance between Edo and Matsumae and those living in the area not considering Matsumae, and to a greater extent Ezoichi, as a part of Japan provides one example of why this black-seal order did not appear to be strictly adhered to. When dealing with Christian missionaries moving to the area, Matsumae claimed in 1618 that “Matsumae is not Japan.” This attitude affected actual conditions of trade that occurred. Unlike many other areas in Japan, wet rice cultivation was not as profitable in the area Matsumae occupied. This combined with effects of receiving daimyo status in 1716 made those Wajin in the area incredibly dependent on trade with both Ainu in Ezoichi and also Wajin domains in Tohoku. As David Howell explains, without the Ainu, the Matsumae could not justify their presence in Ezoichi.

The Japanese in Hokkaido could allow neither the assimilation nor the extermination of the Ainu population because, quite simply, if there were no Ainu, the Matsumae house would have no formal reason to exist. The Ainu’s barbaric identity was consequently a cornerstone of the feudal institutional structure of the Matsumae domain. They had no intention of interfering in internal Ainu world orders and stuck to outwardly visible symbols as stressed in the Wajin order of customs, not ethnicity. The Ainu suffered the brunt of providing Matsumae with legitimacy of rule and badly needed income as the Matsumae gradually fell into financial despair in the eighteenth century; a similar situation in many domains in naichi, mainland Japan, during this

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Howell calls the early modern Japanese state (1600-1868) the mark of a new relationship between Ainu and Wajin, not because contact was new, but for its scale and political and diplomatic significance.\(^{27}\)

### The Kunashiri-Menashi Battle of 1789

The Kunashiri-Menashi battle of 1789 resulted from unequal trade networks based on short term goals (both Japanese and Russian), which exploited both human and natural resources in eastern Ezo and the Kuril Islands.\(^{28}\) The forfeit by the Kunashiri Ainu chief Tsukinoe, Akkeshi chief Ikitoi and Nokamappu chief Shonko shows that there was intricate trade reliance and influences of Wajin over Ainu chiefs and Ainu power structures in eastern Ezo. Ogawa understood this battle in terms of historical irony in that the outbreak of the French revolution occurred the same year that led to further Bakufu interest in lands that were largely outside of Edo’s political sphere, resulting in further Ainu dislocation from their lands in the Kuril Islands.\(^{29}\)

The Ainu living in the northern Kurils had been subjected to Russian assimilation policies since at least the mid-eighteenth century when Russians began to penetrate the Kurils from Kamchatka in search of “soft gold” or seal pelts.\(^{30}\) However, this was not comparable to the severity of direct assimilation policies the Bakufu implemented towards the Ainu of eastern Ezo and southern Kurils ten years after the 1789 battle.

Wajin movement into these lands had a drastic effect on the Indigenous people’s lifestyle. Hidaya Kyubei, a prominent lumber merchant from Honshu, moved to Ezo in 1702 to exploit Ezo pine. By the third generation his family was able to take advantage of Matsumae’s weak financial situation to expand their own trading territories. Hidaya’s

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\(^{26}\) Partially due to the Tokugawa shogunate’s requirement to have daimyo or domain leaders spend alternate years in the capital, Edo (Walker, *Conquest of Ainu*, 159-160).

\(^{27}\) Howell, “The Ainu and the Early Modern State, 1600-1868,” in *Ainu Spirit*, 96. Walker wrote that between 1624 and1862 there were about nineteen recorded epidemics in Ezo, including syphilis, which cripples peoples’ ability to reproduce. “This epidemiological history reveals that Ainu society underwent widespread upheaval and dislocation as a result of foreign contagions, compelling scholars to reexamine the early contact between Ainu and Japanese to understand how Ainu lands were conquered by the Japanese.” Disease limited ability to resist the Japanese. Ainu culture was dynamic and could change for the times but it was not enough to curb the effects of disease. In the long run this led to loss of faith in their cosmological world view (107). In his book on page 178 he writes, “By about 1800, however, following two centuries of trade, war, economic development, and cultural exchange, Ezo lay firmly within the realm of Japan’s disease ecology.” Before this Ezo’s disease ecology was distinct (Walker, “Foreign Contagions, Ainu Medical Culture, and Conquest,” in *Ainu: Spirit*, 102, 107 and Walker, *Conquest of Ainu*, 178).

\(^{28}\) Other major battles between involving Ainu and Wajin were the Koshamain War of 1457-57 and the Shakushain War of 1669. According to Okuyama battles between Ainu and Wajin were continuous between 1456 and 1525 (Okuyama Ryo, *Ainu suiboshi* [Sapporo: Miyama shoten, 1966], 44).

\(^{29}\) Ogawa, *Ainu sabetsu*, 102.

\(^{30}\) Miyajima, *Land of the Elms*, 41.
lucrative lumber trade with Edo and Osaka enabled him to send large sums of funds to Matsumae. Instead of paying back these loans, Matsumae granted Hidaya five additional trading posts in 1774-75, and secured a thirty year contract for trading rights to four of the areas including the Menashi area and Kunashiri, establishing the first non-permanent posts there. At this time eight to ten year contracts were generous, so this exceptionally long contract gave the Hidaya family an abundance of time to expand their interests beyond lumber. Their family was able to further exploit the land and people in lands considered unknown and independent of Matsumae.  

In 1774, the Kunashiri Ainu leader, Tsukinoe, refused Hidaya’s request to open a trading post on the island. The boat and crew that Hidaya sent to make the request was sent away after the local Ainu removed all the goods on his boat. The Wajin responded by cutting off trade between the Ainu of the Menashi area and Kunashiri. During this trade sanction, Tsukinoe continued trade relations with the Russians in the north.

The first Russian movement into the Kurils took place in the form of an unorganised excursion to Shumshu, the island closest to Kamchatka, in 1711. After this time, they moved further south along the island chain collecting prized sea otter pelts from the Ainu as forced tribute called yasak. Russians employed a similar pattern in Ainu homelands (Kurils and Sakhalin) as they had in central and eastern Siberia with Mongols and China of first implementing economic trade and then gradually annexing lands under the guise of friendship. In response to Russian traders demanding ever increasing amounts of yasak, many Ainu moved southwards down the archipelago while the Ainu around Shumshu continued trading and were subjected to Russian assimilation, adopting Orthodox Christianity and Russian style clothing.

Before Russian movement into the area, the Ainu were in contact with the Itelmens, an Indigenous group from Kamchatka. Russians came to replace these aboriginal peoples as their main northern traders, and both the Kuril Ainu and Itelmens came to rely on the trade from yasak for sustenance. In 1770, the yasak system led to disputes as the Ainu on Uruppu refused to pay tribute, whereupon Russians killed several Ainu. The following year, when a group of Russians returned to the island the Ainu retaliated in an organised attack showing how Ainu in this part of the Kurils thought of themselves as benefactors of trade mediators, rather than subjects of the yasak system.

As Bakufu officials began to probe the area for suspected Russian trade, forbidden under Bakufu regulations, Wajin in Menashi gradually became more reluctant to accept Russian goods the Ainu had been bringing to eastern Ezo, ignoring the Hidaya

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31 Ezochi ikkenn (1766), np, in Ogasawara, Ainu sabetsu mondai, 102-4.
32 Miyajima, Land of Elms, 65; Ogasawara, Ainu sabetsu mondai, 104.
35 Walker, Conquest of Ainu, 161-3; Stephan, Kurile Islands, 48-50.
In 1782, the Ainu of southern Kurils, reacting to the pressure of the trade restrictions and increasing cost of goods, especially rice, due to famine in the Tohoku region, agreed to let Hidaya open a trading port on Kunashiri, the first permanent Wajin trading post in the Kurils. The Ainu in Kunashiri, Etorofu, Akkeshi and Kiritappu had been out of the reach of Matsumae control and largely independent until this time. This resulted in the Ainu fishing and trading lifestyle to quickly wane as many became labourers of the post, a scenario that had already occurred in many other parts of Ezochi. Hidaya, adapting to changing times and depleting reserves of lumber and animal resources that were common items of wealth, began producing fish fertilizer for export to Honshu. In 1788, under the direction of Hidaya, Kunashiri became a fish fertilizer production factory run by forced Ainu labour under severe working conditions. Pay was poor by eighteenth century standards, and by forcing both men and women to work, the Ainu became unable to supplement their diet by hunting, fishing or trading. The rape of women and poisoning or murdering of old or weak Ainu, who were unable to work, became increasingly common. Those who tried to resist were beaten, fined, killed or threatened. Such threats included the shaving off the men’s valued beards, being poisoned or being boiled to death in large pots that had been prepared. A similar situation was also occurring in the Menashi region, across the strait from Kunashiri.

After the poisoning of several Ainu, a few young Ainu men, who decided to fight against Hidaya’s authoritative control, organised around two-hundred people in both Kunashiri and Menashi to take action. While the Kunashiri and Menashi Ainu chiefs were away in the northern Kurils, their sons planned and carried out the attacks. First, on 7 May 1789, five Japanese posts on Kunashiri were attacked. Six days later Wajin in Menashi were assaulted. In total, seventy-one Wajin were killed in well organised incursions. News of the attack reached Matsumae twenty six days later, and by July, they sent two-hundred and sixty Wajin warriors to the Nemuro Peninsula.

On 21 July, thirty-seven of thirty-eight Ainu directly responsible for the Wajin deaths were given the death sentence of decapitation (one Ainu was killed while trying to run away). All other Ainu involved had to pay an Ainu form of compensation, tsugunai. The first five were executed one by one in succession. Before the sixth could be put to death a few Ainu in the cell started to scream “Pewtanke!” The cry spread throughout the cell and soon the thousand or so Ainu spectators joined in on the cry. Pewtanke was a cry the Ainu used to signal the spirit world for help in times of distress. This startled the Ainu to signal the spirit world for help in times of distress. This startled the

36 Walker, *Conquest of Ainu*, 165-172. Okuyama wrote that the first official Bakufu investigation in Ezochi was around 1785 or 86, where the focus was on the coasts of the Kurils and Karafuto. The Bakufu had more official knowledge of the Kurils and Karafuto than it did of the interior of Ezochi (Okuyama, *Ainu suiboshi*, 124).


Wajin, and in panic, they approached the cell, where the remaining thirty-one Ainu were, and either shot them at close range or bayoneted them to death. After the battle, Chief Ikitoi went to complain of Matsumae actions to the Russians on Etorofu. News of this fight attracted the attention of the capital Edo, and with rumors of Russian involvement on the Ainu side, officials were sent to survey all of the resources, population and trade occurring in Sakhalin, Ezo and most importantly the Kurils. This represented the fall and end to exclusive Matsumae and Hidaya control in Ezochi. The Bakufu saw Matsumae as being unfit and under resourced to quell disputes, or defend themselves against any potential Russian movement into the area. This became the start of the Bakufu’s direct involvement in Ezochi. In 1799 they took direct control over eastern Ezochi, marking the beginning of official assimilation policies, and by 1808 all of Ezochi was under Bakufu rule. This was done to ensure no such battle would occur again, to prevent Russian penetration into the region and to add Ezochi resources to the Japanese economy. The most energy in enforcing the new policies was in areas closest to Russian contact, the Kuril Islands. Takakura argued that it was during this first stage of Bakufu rule in the area when “Japanese sovereignty in Ezo was confirmed…” Even though their initial direct control in this northern region only lasted until 1821 neither Matsumae nor Hidaya were able to receive the same amount of autonomy it had in the past.46

The Kunashiri-Menashi battle represented a dynamic turning point of official Japanese government involvement with the Ainu and their lands, especially in the Kurils. The Wajin living in Ezochi and Bakufu officials had separate views of the Ainu as being “barbarian.” While locals viewed them from the situations of slavery, which had become common throughout the north, the Bakufu saw the Ainu in the light of legitimising Japanese expansion into the area, in attempt to keep the Russians at distance. These

42 There were surveys that were carried out by the Bakufu in 1785, but they came to a quick end.
45 For more detail on Japanese policies and events from 1799-1821, see, Stephan, *Kurile Islands*, 67-85.
46 The effect of disease is also important in understanding their relations. Walker stated disease limited ability to resist the Japanese. Ainu culture was dynamic and could change for the times but it was not enough to curb the effects of disease. In the long run this led to their loss of faith in their cosmological world view and “By about 1800 … following two centuries of trade, war, economic development, and cultural exchange, Ezo lay firmly within the realm of Japan’s disease ecology” (Walker, *Conquest of Ainu*, 107, 178). For more in-depth analysis of this battle see, Nemuro shimpojiumu jikko inkai, ed. *Sanjunana hon no inau: Nemuro shimpojiumu: Kunashiri Menashi no tatakai* (Sapporo: Hokkaido shuppan kikaku senta, 1990).
views, not entirely exclusive of each other, justified both the local and Bakufu officials’ treatment of the Ainu to be used for their own political and economic needs. These included both to exploit the resources of the north and to quell any foreign (European) movement into the area. Implemented policies further dislocated the Ainu from their lands as their movement was continuously restricted.

Today, this battle can be looked back upon as the Russo-Japanese disputes in the Kuril region that started in the eighteenth century continues today. There is one difference however. The Ainu history in this area has been greatly marginalised by both governments and academics. This battle is an important part of modern Ainu recognition of their Indigenous rights in the Kurils, and is important for understanding Ainu movements for inclusion.48

**Bakufu Control of Ezochi**

The year 1799 marked the end of the black-seal order and the beginning of direct Bakufu administration of Ezochi, with a specific emphasis on eastern Ezo and the southern Kurils. The ten year delay between the battle and the beginning of Bakufu control can at least partially be understood through examination of Honda Toshiaki (1744-1821) in which we see that expansion and developing Ezochi was not a widely accepted idea before this time, nor was Russian threat a major concern until the late eighteenth century. Honda, the teacher of the famous Wajin explorer Mogami Tokunai, interested in British models of expansion, proposed assimilation of the Ainu, since he feared their Russification, expansion of navigation to survey the northern islands and increase trade. While he called for colonisation, most wanted nothing more than trade they could easily retreat from.49

After the Kunashiri-Menashi battle some Bakufu officials, such as Kondo Juzo, sought to define previously obscure northern boundaries. In a solo trip to the island of Etorofu in 1798, his sixth trip to the island and seven years after the establishment of the first permanent trading post on Kunashiri, Kondo knocked down Russian Christian crosses and erected a stone pillar with the words “Etorofu of Greater Japan” inscribed on it.50 When the Bakufu took control over eastern Ezo, they worked to implement law there. Takakura, signifying the difference between Ainu and Wajin noted, however, that “It is a very difficult thing to enact legislation for people of a different race, language, customs,

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48 It was such military conflict with the Wajin that, according to Howell, encouraged Ainu to close cultural and linguistic gaps with each other, resulting in greater uniformity of Ainu culture (Howell, *Geographies*, 117-118). At Cape Nosapu there is stone inscribed with the words, “Here in 1789, the barbaric Ainu banded together and carried out their criminal act. Their evil brought about the death of seventy-one samurai and commoners. This stone is erected in their memory,” and is dated 1812, although it was not put up until 1922, because it was apparently lost at sea and not recovered until that time. Beside this stone is a memorial put up by the Nemuro board of education also for the dead Wajin (Miyajima, *Land of Elms*, 68; Matsuura Takeshiro *Shiretoko Diary* [Todasha, 1983] and Kawakami, “Doto Ainu,” 148. Ainu hold annual *icharupa*, or memorial services in Nokkamappu for both the Ainu and Wajin who died there.

49 Taken from Donald Keene, *The Japanese Discovery of Europe: Honda Toshiaki and Other Discoveries 1720-1798* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952),

and cultural standards, for if the law is not brought into line with their habits, it can exist only nominally and, if the law is forced on these people, they will rebel and the result will be contrary to the original purpose of the laws.”\(^{51}\) Ainu movement to Uruppu, where many traded with Russians, was prohibited in 1802\(^{52}\) after Russians had set up a camp there, rendering them even more dependent on the Wajin for food, goods and clothing. Shortly afterwards, policies of Ainu assimilation and pacification were implemented often involving force. Many Ainu were given Wajin names and encouraged to use the Wajin language and wear their clothing, stressing the need to change external characteristics of the Ainu.\(^{53}\) However, upon their return to their villages they continued using the Ainu language and wore their own clothing.\(^{54}\)

The Ainu standard of living had been in continual decline since Wajin influence increased in eastern Ezochi. Near the end of the nineteenth century, Ainu ways of life were undermined, as foreign contagions spread and policies limited Ainu trade routes.\(^{55}\) In an attempt to win support of the Ainu, and have them further rely on Wajin influence rather than their own means of sustenance, the Bakufu tried to improve their living conditions. Improvements thought beneficial to the Ainu, more often than not, involved encouraged adoption of Wajin culture, which had previously been forbidden to them. However, under the new assimilation initiatives and Bakufu legislation, treatment towards the Ainu continued on par with the previous severity. Interests in surveying and creating more efficient communication networks throughout the north contributed to the turmoil of the Ainu role as traders. The construction of roads and other communication/transportation networks and continued work in fisheries were main areas of forced Ainu labour.\(^{56}\) It was mainly due to these policies that the Kuril Ainu moved closer to Ezo, ceased their contacts with other traders in the north, and became unable to sustain their previous means of livelihood.\(^{57}\)

When the Russian threat in the Okhotsk subsided with the rise of the Napoleon War, the Bakufu reinstated the Matsumae clan in southern Ezochi in 1821, whereupon assimilation policies and trade habits returned largely to pre-1802 standards. Takakura noted that after an 1808 Russian invasion on Etorofu most Ainu there reverted back to

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\(^{51}\) Takakura, “Ainu of Northern Japan,” 76.


\(^{53}\) Ohnuki-Tierney wrote that Ainu were forbidden to speak Japanese until 1871, (*Ainu of Northwest Sakhalin*, 8-9) the same year that the Meiji government abolished the outcaste status.


\(^{55}\) Walker argued that foreign contagions greatly contributed to the decline of the Ainu after 1800.

\(^{56}\) Siddle, *Race, Resistance*, 22-23.

\(^{57}\) Before the first period of Bakufu rule, Ainu in Karafuto refocused their trade from China to Japan as they began providing Matsumae with silks from China which led them into debt. Between 1808 and 1812 the Bakufu paid off their debt to Santan traders (Sasaki Shiro, “Trading Brokers and Partners with China, Russia, and Japan,” in *Ainu: Spirit*, 86, 88).
their own ways and by 1856 only one elderly Ainu remained wearing Japanese clothes as a means to obtain a government subsidy.58

During the second period of direct Bakufu control (1855-1868) officials stopped using the word Ezo (a compound which uses the Chinese character “för” or other) to refer to the Ainu and began to call them dojin, or natives, as a means of gaining acceptance of their inclusion within the cultural core of Japan.59 The ka-i world view, which Japan adopted from the Chinese world-view in which a cultural core was civilised and lands and people farther away from the core were barbarian and uncivilised, was used to interpret its boundaries. This world view focused not on concepts of race or culture but on fuzoku or outward appearance. Fuzoku was easily manipulated and changed in 1850s-60s as Ainu were “assimilated,” in order to provide a barrier between Wajin and Russians. Russian invasion threatened Japan’s security and they responded by trying to absorb the northern regions into their ka-i world order through assimilation of the Ainu. Taking a similar stance as Takakura, Howell argued that this showed “unequivocally” that the northern boundary of Ezochi in the Kurils and Sakhalin was a part of Japan even though until 1869 most Wajin lived along the coasts and worked in herring fisheries with limited knowledge of interior lands.60

Meiji Japan and the Ainu

As Howell, Siddle and Walker show, by the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 the traditional Ainu way of life by hunting, gathering and trading had been seriously compromised, the Ainu relied to some extent on capitalist structures of trade and wage labour, and Japanese goods, which had for centuries under the Matsumae, gradually become a part of changing and adapting Ainu life-ways.61 Howell wrote,

Ironically, by defining the Ainu’s barbaric identity vis-à-vis the status system, Matsumae paved the way for the shogunate and later the Meiji regime to negate the validity of Ainu identity entirely. In 1855 the shogunate assumed direct administration of Hokkaido in response to the threat posed to Japanese sovereignty over the island by Russia.

58 Takakura, “Ainu of Northern Japan,” 80. Raids by off-duty Lieutenants Nicholas Alexander Chvostov and Gavrilo Ivanovich Davidov between 1806 and 1808 in the Kurils were planned to threaten Japan to increase its trade with Russia. In 1806 they pillaged Kushunkotan and took eight Ainu and one Wajin captive after torching the town. They threatened to attack every Wajin settlement in Sakhalin as well, if Nagasaki did not open its doors to Russians. Their notice also informed their opinion that the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu were Russian. The following year they attacked Naiho on Etorofu, where one-thousand Ainu and three-hundred Wajin lived, followed by the town of Shana, where they eventually retreated after panicking and killing six men during peace talks, only to return and loot the town. Ainu and Wajin eventually found many of the men involved and beheaded them. This led to further Bakufu interest in the area to protect it from reported twelve foot tall “Red Hairs” (Wildes, Aliens in the East, 145-150).
59 Howell, Geographies, 139.
60 Howell, Geographies, 133.
61 Howell, Capitalism from Within; Siddle, Race, Resistance; Walker, Conquest of Ainu.
Magistrates dispatched to Hokkaido oversaw an assimilation program designed to win international recognition of the Ainu’s Japanese nationality and hence secure Japan’s territorial rights to areas inhabited by the Ainu, including the Kuril Islands and southern Sakhalin, as well as Hokkaido. The Meiji state continued this policy after it succeeded to power in 1868.62

The newly modernising Meiji state differed from the Tokugawa system in that the latter did not try to impose itself on every aspect of “the individuals’ lives and minds as to efface any distinction between individual and national identity.”63 In 1869 Ezochi was renamed Hokkaido for reasons the former Utari Association director, Nomura Giichi, was unclear on,64 but it is sufficient to say it aided Japan’s claims to the island, expanding their influence to areas north of their northern gateway, and to quell European influence in the area. The name “Ezochi,” using the Chinese character for “other” or “foreign,” meaning “foreign land” or the “land of the barbarians,” was an inappropriate name for an island the government considered “inherently Japanese.” Ainu customs, such as wearing earrings and tattooing, were banned in 1871 as an outcome of Kuroda Kiyotaka’s policy to treat the natives with affection, protect them and educate them.65

Four years after the Meiji Restoration the Land Regulation Ordinance (jisho kisoku) declared Ainu lands as terra nullius and officially transferred all Hokkaido lands to crown ownership. In the same year there were ninety-two households and four-hundred and forty-six Ainu in the Kurils recorded under the jurisdiction of Nemuro.66 Between 1882 and 1886, Hokkaido was divided into three prefectures: Hakodate, Sapporo, and Nemuro. Nemuro prefecture consisted of three kuni: Nemuro, Kushiro and the Kurils (Chishima), along with Kitami these made up four counties. Even ten months after the creation of Nemuro prefecture the population of Ainu outnumbered that of temporary and seasonal Wajin worker-residents.67 The official history of Nemuro prefecture rarely recorded accounts of the Ainu in the area. When it did, it called them dojin or kyudojin, indigenes/former indigenes, and recorded them in relation to Wajin sympathetic benevolence or population census, foreshadowing early post-World War II positions on the “return movement.”

62 The collapse of the status system of Tokugawa “marked the onset of modernity” (Howell, Geographies, 45, 144).
63 Howell, Geographies, 44.
64 Nomura, Ainu minzoku, 25.
65 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 61; note 32; Harrison, Japan’s Northern, 67.
66 Okuyama, Ainu suiboshi, 19.
Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act, 1899

Even before the 1899 law, the Ainu had already experienced assimilation policies. What makes the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act (HFAPA)\(^{68}\) significant is that it dictated and represented Wajin official Ainu policy that the government kept on the statues until 1997.

The HFAPA is important to mention when discussing Ainu-Wajin relations, because it was one of the tools used to help further secure Wajin claim and legitimacy to the northern lands by encouraging Ainu to become more Japanized and further fit into the argument that Ainu were Japanese, a mechanism for both domestic and international recognition. This Act worked to further change both external and internal structures of Ainu lifestyle. The official reason for the introduction of the Act was written as follows:

Since the beginning of the Meiji era, measures have been taken as to the protection of the indigenous people of Hokkaido in accordance with the Emperor’s notion to love every one of his subjects equally, without discrimination. However, they have not been completely fruitful as yet. It is because the benevolent influence of the Emperor’s fine government has not spread itself widely enough and also because the indigenous people were unenlightened. The natural blessings on which they had been living were taken away from them by the immigrants from the mainland little by little. As a result, they gradually lost their sources of livelihood and they were left in extreme poverty. It is an irresistible course of nature that the superior gets the better of the inferior. Nevertheless, the indigenous people are the subjects of the Emperor also, and so they should not be ignored and abandoned in their suffering. It is the duty of the nation to cure their misfortune through remedial measures and secure their livelihood by means of the appropriate industries, which is believed to meet the Emperor’s wishes also. This is the reason this bill shall be submitted.\(^{69}\)

The three main pillars of the Act were land grants to promote Wajin style agriculture, welfare, and establishment of schools and hospitals in Ainu communities. This Act was applicable to Ainu in Hokkaido and the Kurils, but not those of Sakhalin. Similar to the Dawes Act in the United States (see Chapter Four), the overriding purpose of the Protection Act was to have the Ainu move to a position within the Japanese as “commoners” despite their continued status as “former natives.” Provisional land granted to the Ainu up to 5 cho per household (15,000 tsubo or 12.25 acres) for the purpose of agriculture was often not surveyed, resulting in often less than this amount on wasteland unfit for farming. Traditionally, many Ainu in Hokkaido did have small plots where they

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\(^{68}\) For a copy of the HFNPA see Appendix 1: The Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act (Law No. 27, March 1899).

grew grains, but it differed from Ainu practices: in the Japanese system, the Ainu man was expected to raise crops, traditionally work of Ainu women, and no longer work as wage labourers or hunt which often paid better than farming. Any lands uncultivated after a period of fifteen years reverted back to crown lands. Innately flawed and under the guise of moral duty to save them, a direct influence of Social Darwinism, the Act did little to help the majority of Ainu for whom it was enacted. It was rather an Act to the Ainu for the benefit of Wajin.\textsuperscript{70} The HFAPA is addressed again in the next chapter.

The concepts of civilisation, progress and nation, which Siddle argued had become self-evident by the end of the Meiji in 1912,\textsuperscript{71} are connected to the foundation of the Northern Territories return movement. Tracing the movement of Wajin and Russians into Ainu lands during the Tokugawa era alongside the development of these concepts in the Meiji era helps broaden the narrow historical interpretations and concepts that current return movements have built on. The return movement stresses the progress Wajin initiatives led to, in other words, development and civilising missions of the Ainu led to the incorporation of these lands into first, a part of the Japanese cultural core, and then the nation, which acted to solidify fluid cultural borders. The Ainu were integral to this process.


\textsuperscript{71} Siddle, \textit{Race, resistance}, 107.
Table 1: Ainu in the Press

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<td>1882</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>1902</td>
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<td>1912</td>
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<td>1922</td>
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<td>500</td>
</tr>
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*Although the source used in the above graph is far from comprehensive for the time period in question, it does give a general trend of attention to Ainu in the press.*
CHAPTER 4

The Ainu at the Time of the Åland Islands Settlement

Understanding of history can have a real impact on current perceptions of the “other,” especially as the nation-states involved in past conflicts have not wilted away.

There is potential that to learn lessons applicable for resolving the Northern Territories issue through examination of the Åland Island settlement in northern Europe. This chapter works to utilise this idea while including issues relevant to the Ainu by addressing connections between the Åland settlement, the Ainu and the Northern Territories dispute. Involving the Ainu in this issue challenges many of the current perspectives on this territorial/border demarcation dispute, but doing so is necessary to help break past the stale foundation of dominating discourses. In this respect examining the Åland settlement and the international setting of the time are paramount for understanding why Ainu are not included in negotiations today. This chapter briefly deals with issues of Åland’s connection to Japan, Ainu and Russo-Japanese Treaties, Japanese colonialism, and the League of Nations.

The Åland Islands Settlement

Situated between Sweden and Finland in the Baltic Sea, Åland has about 6,500 islands with a Swedish-speaking population of approximately 27,000. During the eighteenth century when the Swedish empire extended eastward engulfing present day Finland, the islands had little strategic significance because they were in the middle of that empire. This changed as the islands moved to the border of that empire and Russia after 1809. After the Crimean War, the islands, still a part of the Grand Duchy of Finland, were demilitarised and 2006 marked the one-hundred and fiftieth anniversary of its initial demilitarisation.

Following the independence of Finland in 1917, Ålanders began to seek reunification with Sweden. Leaders of the reunification movement were regarded as traitors and a few of the leaders were imprisoned. This prompted the League of Nations to deal with the Ålanders’ minority issue. The League wanted to reward Finland for services during the war and saw it as a country that could accommodate a Swedish-speaking minority. The 1921 Autonomy Act (Act on the Autonomy of Åland), although initially against the wishes of the residents, became the League’s first successful

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“minority solution,” which confirmed the 1856 demilitarisation and added neutralisation of the islands. As the Act became outdated, it was replaced by newer versions, first in 1951 and most recently in 1993. The Åland settlement has continued to prove successful for Sweden, Finland and the Ålanders, and continues to grant the residents a high degree of autonomy allowing for their cultural and linguistic preservation. Today, Åland is the only place in the world that has autonomy, demilitarisation and neutralisation.3

Connecting Åland to Japan
From a Japanese perspective, a common way of connecting the Åland settlement to Japan is through the twentieth century agriculturist and scholastic figure of Nitobe Inazo (1862-1933). Nitobe, the former face on the Japanese 5000-yen bill note for a twenty year period staring in 1984, is commonly known for his international prowess and involvement with the League of Nations from its birth in 1920 to his retirement six years later at the age of sixty-five. It was during this time in Geneva as Under-Secretary General that he is thought to have taken part in the Åland settlement in 1921. It is his possible involvement in this successful dispute resolution involving a minority group that brings us to unite Japan to Åland. Perhaps if we continue from this point and learn from Nitobe and his self-proclaimed position as a “bridge across the Pacific” then we would better be equipped to deal with the current half century old dispute between Russia and Japan.

Logic and reason are both able to support and justify such an argument, but before being too supportive of this stance it should also be noted that Nitobe was and is a highly controversial figure. Although this questioning of Nitobe is less common, it should not be overlooked, as it will better enable us to understand Japan during the early twentieth century. More importantly, questioning Nitobe and those around him illustrates major flaws in the current dispute that academics need to challenge if any sort of serious effort is to be made for a solution. If we are to adapt the spirit of Nitobe, then we should be sure to be selective, and not adopt “Nitobe as was.” To do so would reinforce some current scholastic perspectives that we should confront, as they are interlinked and present in the background of this issue. And if we do not wish to become too involved in policy recommendation as academics, at minimum it can be a clear indication that ideas from the Åland example are applicable for addressing the Indigenous Ainu peoples involvement and the politically and nationalistic manipulative use of History in this issue. Before examining one of Nitobe’s controversial areas of being involved in colonial enterprises, and his support for perpetuating hardship for Ainu through scholastic work and policy recommendation and creation, let me first address the Ainu.

The Ainu and Russo-Japanese Treaties
The Ainu, living on numerous islands in the Okhotsk region had early contact with other Indigenous groups in the Amur region as well as north of the Kuril Archipelago in Kamchatka. These cultural and trading contacts also involved overlapping expansions of

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larger communities of China, Japan and Russia. By the mid-nineteenth century the Ainu had become the centerpiece people between the emerging nation-states of Russia in the north and Japan in the south in the Okhotsk region. The conquest of Hokkaido and other Ainu homelands was not as abrupt as, say, those invasions by the Spanish and other European groups into the Americas but the Ainu did become to rely on the Wajin for trade goods. Likewise, the Matsumae clan, in the southern tip of Ezochi (currently Hokkaido) relied on the Ainu for justifying their existence on the island, as well as for obtaining daimyo status. Nonetheless, the consequences of their interaction included cultural and ecological destruction of the area. As well it had a marginalising effect on Ainu voices as the surrounding society demoted them to one of the lowest levels of subject status within the Meiji world view.  

Caught between two expanding powers, many Ainu, especially in eastern Ezo, managed to maintain their own language and culture by adapting to the changing times and circumstances with their neighbours. Yet, there were also Russo-Japanese treaties signed, that had devastating consequences for some Ainu groups, especially those Ainu living in south-eastern Sakhalin and the Kuril islands. The first of these, the Treaty of Shimoda (1855), impeded the Kuril Ainu’s use of their normal trade routes, extending from Nemuro peninsula to Kamchatka. These trade relations, on which they relied for exchanges of both food and goods, not only helped sustain a balanced lifestyle for the Ainu, but also provided them with foreign goods that they reinterpreted as treasures, greatly valued as signs of prestige, that had become an important dimension of their society.  

The Shimoda Treaty split the Kurils between Russia and Japan at the Etorofu Strait, thus forcing the Ainu to adapt to the new situation and theoretical limitations of their trade. They most probably continued to both trade with each other and act as middlemen between Russia and Japan.

Precisely twenty years later after much dispute over joint control over Sakhalin, Russia and Japan decided to sign another treaty to further clarify the rather fluid boundaries in the Okhotsk region. The result was the Treaty of St. Petersburg, or the Sakhalin-Kuril Exchange Treaty of 1875, to which a Supplementary Treaty was added in 1876. The supplementary treaty added specific details, especially to Article Five of the original treaty that addressed aboriginal issues. However, very little of what the treaty specified concerning Indigenous rights were carried out in practice.

There are several examples of this, but perhaps the most drastic, which is directly relevant to the area the southern Kurils, was the forced relocation of the Ainu living on Shumshu and Paramushir, the northernmost islands on the Kuril chain. According to Article 5 section “d” of the treaty, the Indigenous peoples residing in Sakhalin and the Kurils were to be given three years to decide their country of residence. If the Ainu on Shumshu wished to stay under the influence of the Russians, they would have to move to

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4 For discussion on changing status of the Ainu within the Tokugawa era and Meiji nation building see, Howell, Geographies.
6 For a copy of the treaty see, John Harrison, Japan’s Northern Frontier (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1953), 171-175.
Kamchatka, a short distance away; if they stayed they would become Japanese subjects. The Ainu of the northern Kurils had by this time learnt to speak Russian, and had accepted partial Russification to the extent of adopting Orthodox Christianity. The right to preserve their religion was stipulated by the treaty. Most of them chose to stay where accustomed to live, but did not want to become Japanese subjects. In 1884, after three unsuccessful attempts to persuade them to move closer to Hokkaido, the Japanese government forced ninety-seven Ainu living in the north (nine Ainu chose to go to Russia) to move to the island of Shikotan, burning their homes, boats and other belongings, and killing their hunting dogs, representing the Japanese government’s first political decision involving the Ainu in the north.

The most common justification given for this action was that the Wajin saw Russian-speaking, Orthodox Christian Ainu as a potential security threat in their “northern gateway.” Leaving part-Russified Ainu as they were conflicted with both of two major opposed academic discourses on the Ainu and Japanese colonial discourse in general, that taking over Ainu lands was justified because (1) they were a mirror of the Japanese people’s ancient past, leftover ancestors of the Yamato race, whom Japan should protect, or because (2) they were completely different from the Japanese, a primitive relic that had not progressed as quickly as the Yamato race, and were therefore inferior and would die out if not for Wajin benevolence and civilisation. The second point was influenced by Social Darwinism which grew in popularity in Japan through the work of Edward Morse at Tokyo University in 1877, but did not reach a reading public until 1879 with the translation of Thomas Huxley’s Lectures on the Origin of Species, and “became widely known after the publication in 1881 of Morse’s lectures,” the same year Darwin’s own The Descent of Man became available in Japanese.

This dislocation psychologically damaged the Ainu, and combined with geographical and ecological issues contributed to a rapid decline in Shikotan’s population. For example, in the north their diet consisted mostly of seal meat and fish, which they hunted with the help of their dogs, and were free to gather and trade. In

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8 Most of the Sakhalin Ainu were forced to move to Hokkaido prior to the three year period. For discussion on the physical dislocation on both the Karafuto and Kuril Ainu see, Miyajima Toshimitsu, Chikisani no daichi (Tokyo: Nihon kitokudan shuppansha, 1994): 158-173. On the Karafuto Ainu relocation see, Karafuto Ainushi kenkyukai, Tuishikari no ishibumi: Karafuto Ainu kyosei iju no rekishi (Sapporo: Hokkaido shuppan kikaku senta, 1992). The Portsmouth Treaty of 1905 affected the return of Sakhalin Ainu from Hokkaido.
9 Yuchi Sadamoto, Governor of Nemuro, was directly responsible for the relocation of the Kuril Ainu (Yuchi Sadamoto to Yamagata Arimoto, “Uruppu-to ito keibi no gi ni tsuki joshin” [July 15, 1884], in “Nemuro ken kyudojin,” in Howell, Geographies, 190).
10 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 11.
11 Within a year of signing the 1875 treaty the Meiji government forced 841 of the 2, 378 Ainu in southern Sakhalin move to Hokkaido. These Ainu were used as labourers, and in an eleven year period forty-six percent of the relocated Ainu died, mainly from starvation and disease. “It sends shivers up one’s spine to imagine more than ten funerals a day in a population of only eight hundred” (Karafuto Ainushi Kenkyukai, Tuishikari no ishibumi, quoted in Miyajima, Land of Elms, 98).
Shikotan seals were few, and they were forced to take up farming on unsuitable land, resulting in a drastic change for the worse in their diet. By 1888, a total of forty-nine Ainu died on Shikotan, or *Nu-Pemoshir*, the island of tears. The difficulties they encountered reinforced Social Darwinist influenced scientific notions that the Ainu were a lesser race which was naturally “dying out.”

This example shows Ainu connection to the area in question through Russo-Japanese Treaties. Aside from the newly-transplanted northern Kuril Ainu on Shikotan, Ainu had lived on other islands, including Kunashiri and Etorofu, and frequently moving between Hokkaido and Uruppu for trade and sustenance. By the end of the eighteenth century work in fisheries established through the Matsumae-han in the Menashi area rivaled traditional ways of sustenance in the area and as a corollary increased the transfer of disease. The long Ainu history in the region is proven by the Ainu place names in the Kurils, still in use today.

**Nitobe Inazo, the Colonial Agency and the Sapporo Agricultural College**

Nitobe was not a stand-alone figure, but was deeply connected to other newly-developed colonial institutions and scholars of the day. At the age of nine he moved from his upper-class home in Morioka, to Tokyo to study. Given his love of English and things of a western nature he opted to continue his studies at the newly established development-minded Sapporo Agricultural College that supplied him with an English and American style of education. From its conception this institution was closely linked to the Ainu. The College was first established in Tokyo as the *Tokyo Kaitakushi Gakko* (Tokyo

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12 Despite recognition of Indigenous populations’ right to hunt seals to sustain traditional lifestyles in the North Pacific in Articles 11 and 12 in the 1911 Convention Respecting Measures for the Preservation and Protection of the Fur Seals in the North Pacific Ocean this right was domestically inhibited for the Ainu (Convention Respecting Measures for the Preservation and Protection of the Fur Seals in the North Pacific Ocean <http://www.intfish.net/treaties/furseals11.htm> [24 November 2006]).

13 Miyajima, *Land of Elms*, 100-104. It is possible that there are further unidentified decedents of these lands.


15 Howell, *Capitalism From Within*, 40.

16 Sakakibara Masafumi, *Hoppo yonto: Ainu go chimei noto* (Sapporo: Hokkaido shuppan kikaku senta, 1994). Five maps drawn between 1700 and the 1830s are on display at Hokkaido University’s Northern Studies Resource Centre. Place names, on these maps, are for the most part all in the Ainu language; many of which names are still in use today. Another map, said to be on display at the Northern Territories Resource Centre on Nemuro Peninsula, drawn by the Edo Bakufu scholar Hayashi Shihei titled “Sangoku Tsuranzu” colours Hokkaido, the Kuriles and Sakhalin different than that of Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku (Nomura, “Hoppo ryodo,” 151). Since Soviet occupation of Sakhalin and the Kurils many Ainu place names have been Russified, an action the Association to Restore the Ainu Autonomous Homeland sees as cultural destruction by the state (eg. Kushunnai → Irinsuki, Shirutoru → Makarofu, Ushoro → Oruroo, Maoka → Horumosku, Shana → Kiririsuku) [AH, *Ainu Moshiri*, 167].
Colonial/Development Agency School) in 1872. The same year, Kuroda Kiyotaka, the secretary of the Colonial Agency (*kaitakushi*), sent thirty-six Ainu to the School as a test to see if they could be “civilised.” The result was a complete failure. In 1875, after four of the Ainu had died, the authorities transferred the school to Sapporo and renamed it. This College in Sapporo opened a mere seven years after the Meiji government changed the name of this large northern island from Ezochi to Hokkaido.

In return for Nitobe’s free education, in which he specialised in agricultural development, he was required to stay in Hokkaido after his graduation to undertake development work. Nitobe took this colonial framework with him and returned to it later in his life, with grave consequences for the Ainu. He took up similar views towards Native people as the Americans that were hired to help with the development of Hokkaido, such as William Clark, Horace Capron and his many companions. Like Capron, Nitobe did not write or talk about the Ainu on a regular basis. Capron was more interested in moving the Japanese on Hokkaido away from manual labour and supplementing it with “all known forms of mechanical science and ingenuity.” Exploiting nature was far more important than seriously dealing with the Indigenous inhabitants. Since until then Wajin saw the Ainu only as a source of manual labour they further lost out in the dialogue of “progress.”

Capron’s associates tended to take more interest in the Ainu, since they spent more time on Hokkaido than he did. The Chief Geologist and Mining Engineer took the liberty of weighing and measuring the twenty-six Ainu he had hired before the Ainu left for home. William Blake, a geologist and mining engineer on the American team, reported that both Japanese and American developers used Ainu as guides and to gain knowledge of the interior. Unlike Capron he saw a use for the Ainu as labourers, when he wrote, “Physically they are well formed, muscular, and active. Under the proper guidance they would, undoubtedly, be of great use as labourers. Their habituation extends even to Sagalin and the Kuril islands, and all names of rivers, mountains north of Volcano Bay are Ainu.” The Ainu were only mentioned and used when it suited Japanese or American needs; otherwise they were not worth mentioning. Though the Meiji government included the Ainu as one of its subjects around this time, the Ainu were seen as very different and separate from the Japanese.

Nitobe’s views on the Ainu came out when he later took a teaching position at the College. He occasionally told his students that Ainu “are ‘barbaric’ and have no notion of making a living from working; their capacity for work is very poor. They may spend

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18 Although Wajin had been in the area for hundreds of years and the 1855 treaty recognised Wajin authority over the area, lands of Hokkaido were not taxable and distributed similarly to those of Honshu until under the 1872 Land Ordinance Hokkaido land became crown lands.
19 For comments on the Ainu by Horace Capron and his associates see, Horace Capron and his Foreign Associates, *Reports and Official Letters to the Kaitakushi* (Tokei: Kaitakushi, 1875), 46.
three or more days without sleep when they go hunting bears, but if they are made to
work with the plough, they will not stand even a couple of hours of labour.” 21 In his
1912 publication *The Japanese Nation* he wrote: “as they are now found, they have not
yet emerged from the Stone Age, possessing no art beyond a primitive form of
horticulture, being ignorant even of the rudest pottery. Their fate resembles the fate
of your American Indians, though they are much more docile in character.”22 Since Nitobe
was apt to follow his teachings to create a Japanese civilisation based on agriculture,
there was little room for the Ainu in his daily work. The College and the Colonial
Agency connected to it viewed the Ainu lands as *terra nullius*. To them the Ainu did not
exist, except where suited to their needs to aid “progress” and development.23

Many Ainu today see Nitobe as a figure who wanted nothing more than to turn
them into farmers, and a key contributor to the creation of the 1899 Hokkaido Former
Aborigines Protection Act (HFAPA).24 One Ainu has said, rather accurately, that
“scholars always do things in line with what the Japanese government wants. Every time
rules are made [regarding the Ainu]; it is the scholars that make them. The rules are made
for the Japanese government and not for the Ainu people.”25 In fact one of the three main
issues this Act addressed was setting the Ainu up to be farmers. The other two issues of
the HFAPA focused on were Social Darwinist education and welfare policies towards the
Ainu. So what exactly was Nitobe’s connection to this act?

Nitobe had knowledge of native policies from New Zealand and the United States
which the British Missionary John Bachelor introduced to the Docho in the 1890s. He
translated and published a speech presented by an American in 1894 on the 1877 Dawes
Act, which attempted to turn American Natives into good farming citizens.26 By this time

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21 Yanaihara Tadao, ed., *Nitobe Inazo hakushi shokumin seisaku kogi oyobi rombunshu* vol.6: 143

Putmans’ Sons, 1912), 86-87. Nitobe’s view of Koreans was similar to that of the Ainu in that it was
not the fault of the land that they were in decline, but that of the people whose “habits of life are the
habits of death. They are closing the lease of their ethnic life” (Nitobe Inazo, *Thoughts and Essays*
[Tokyo: Teibi Publishing Company, 1909], 216). Continuous labeling of Ainu as “docile” worked to
decrease any perceived threat from the Ainu, similarly to how many tribal peoples in South America
were labelled as inherently viscous and violent to justify their “pacification.”

23 Many museums in Hokkaido are clear indicators that “progress” was a prominent word and way of
thinking during the Meiji and Taisho eras.

24 For a copy of the HFAPA in English see Appendix 1: The Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act
(Law No. 27, March 1899)

25 Mr. A. et al., personal communication with author, 3 January 2004 (Japan).

Administration* <www.ourdocuments.gov> (19 October 2006). The United States repealed the Act in
1934. Nitobe was not a fan of assimilation since he thought the process would take five-hundred years.
Despite speaking several languages himself, he said bilingualism was “harmful to intellectual
development,” so the movement of getting the colonized to speak Japanese, if perused, should be full
and complete. He also noticed that the government frowned upon mixed marriages (see, Caprio,
*Koreans into Japanese*, 148-151). Although he first argued against assimilation and interfering with
Nitobe had been working for the College for three years and further entwined himself with the Colonial Agency’s successor, the Docho (Hokkaido Agency). He had first hand knowledge of both the Ainu and international native policies.

The issue of the HFAPA was brought up for the third time and passed in the form of a Docho-sponsored law in the 13th Diet in 1898. It took effect in 1899 and although it remained in force until 1997, it was by that time a dead letter. Two years before the League’s decision on the Åland Settlement, the Act was first amended to include medical coverage and construction of native medical clinics, that Japanese also took the liberty of using. Like the 1872 experiment of “civilising” the Ainu in Tokyo, the HFAPA failed to turn Ainu into farmers. It further devastated their traditional ways, culture and language by forcing them to adopt unsuitable Japanese ways of sustenance on marginal land.

Nitobe and those peoples and institutions linked to him were significant actors in encouraging and perpetuating the notion of Ainu inferiority, through both their actions and the consequences of their ideas. His scholastic and international approach, of opting for Western ways of progress and development gave legitimacy and justification for his actions that internationally went largely unchallenged in his own time.27

The League of Nations, Minority Rights, Indigenous Rights and Japan

Through the example of the League during the time of the Åland settlement we can better understand the situation regarding the status of the Ainu during the twentieth century and beyond. A brief analysis of early twentieth century League of Nations movements and their applicability to the Ainu and Japan are important to gauge the spirit of the times. While perhaps less so today, there was then an important historical distinction between minority rights and Indigenous rights; the latter did not yet exist as a concept. Japan was active in the League as a promoter of rights, as it sought a restricted form of equality to suit its own needs.

League of Nations, Minority Rights and Indigenous Rights

After 1919, colonised people around the world began to speak out with anger towards their colonisers. These outbreaks of newly emerging nationalism from within encouraged the League of Nations to take particular interest in minority issues after its conception in 1920. This post-Great War conglomerate of winning states founded itself on the idea that the “state” was both desirable and universally applicable, but that not all peoples were necessarily ready for statehood. Therefore, the League ranked people according to their

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27 For the St. Louis Exposition in 1904 Fredrick Starr went to Hokkaido to recruit some Ainu to put on a human display along with other “primitive” people from around the globe (Frederick Starr, The Ainu Group at the St.Louis Exposition [Open Court Publishing Company, 1904] and James W. Vanstone, “The Ainu Group at the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, 1904,” Arctic Anthropology 30.2 [1993]: 77-91).
closeness to, and likelihood of, becoming a state. This approach, seeing varying degrees or levels of “state-ness,” was important and of international concern to the League. Likewise there were peoples seen as not ready for statehood, and as being in need of paternalistic assistance until they could learn to be a state. Their tutelage would continue until they could “stand on their own,” as indicated by five standards. These included a settled government, ability to keep public peace and have political independence, adequate financial recourses, and ability to make law and have equal justice. The last requirement that resulted from their taking the state as core was for “effective protection of racial, linguistic and religious minorities.” Consequently, the League-supported highly political minority framework presumed that new nations would have minorities within their borders, and should be expected to accord them special group rights.

This stance was rather ironic, since member states (the United Kingdom in particular) saw the League’s protection of minorities as a hindrance to their assimilation. Mark Mowazer has agued that the League’s willingness to listen to and attempt to protect minorities encouraged the formation of such groups. The idea of “minorities” came from dealing with nation-state formation after the war, and thus was applicable only to certain states as designated in peace treaties. Finland was one such state, while Sweden was not. Many minorities did not, or could not, apply or demand support to create their own states. The League required the state in which they belonged to speak on their behalf, to help create special minority group rights. This is perhaps one reason why the Åland Islanders were not consulted in the settlement process. The League supported giving special rights to groups of people who did not previously have a state, and the Ålanders did not qualify under that heading.

Dorothy Jones offers another way of looking at the minority issue. She argues that the League was not protecting minorities but borders. Her reasoning was that the League thought that peace relied on the stability of borders, so if they protected minorities, they would stop unrest at the borders, and therefore prevent conflict. This explains why minority protocols only applied to certain “trouble” areas. The League did not want to interfere in states other than those designated as potentially problematic, because it feared disrupting borders which its members wanted to remain intact. However, within the boundaries of already established and newly formed or forming nation-states, many linguistic and religious minority groups existed that did not fit their interpretation of minorities. Even though the number of minorities in East and Central Europe far outnumbered those in Western Europe the lack of a universal minority system was an embarrassment to the Powers that made up the League. A universal plan had been proposed in 1919 only to be rejected for fear that it would challenge the basis for state

30 This may also provide reason why the League granted the Åland Islands to Finland. Other states were Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania with Poland and Germany included at a later date.
sovereignty and fear for having to address their internal, peripheral and external colonial subjects in a much less profitable manner.32

The people now called “Indigenous peoples” are included in this group, but in the early twentieth century they were usually termed native, Indian or aborigine. The South Pacific was one region where the numerous groups of Indigenous islanders qualified for tutelage under the League’s mandate system,33 but these peoples were not accorded minority status because there could not be a minority without a state. Those of Indigenous descent within established states such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, were not given attention in the same manner as European minorities in the designated states, even though many of these groups had signed treaties with the British Crown that recognised their status as nations.

The first opportunity for the League to actively treat Indigenous peoples as fitting into their minority clauses came in the early 1920s. Travelling on a Six Nations, not Canadian, passport, Haudenosaunee Chief Deskaheh (Levi General) was the first aboriginal to visit Geneva with grievances.34 He approached the League as representing not a minority but a nation to be treated equally with other nations. He and his supporters gained much attention, traveling on Six Nations passports and wearing their traditional regalia. They even received some sympathy from the Council: “Mr. Branting [President of the Council] thinks it would be on the one hand rather inopportune for the Swedish government to ask for the case to be examined; on the other hand he thinks it rather hard if the poor Indian cannot even be heard.”35 During the delegation’s one-year stay in Geneva, it also received support from several countries, and, ironically, Japan was one of them. Meanwhile the Canadian government under Mackenzie King was worried about scarring Canada’s “excellent reputation.” Britain eventually used its influence to protect Canada from the potential embarrassment of permitting Deskaheh to be heard, and he and his entourage returned to Canada empty handed.36

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33 Micronesia was at the time a strategic area for obtaining supplies and coal during this time, making the South Pacific Islands strategically important. Not until the late 1930s did the Japanese population on the islands outnumber the natives.
35 Niezen, “Recognizing Indigenism,” 125.
36 T.W. Rawana, a Maori who petitioned in both Britain and Geneva, also went home with out a formal hearing after Deskaheh.
Since an organisation or institution can only be a sum of its participants, this interpretation is not surprising. Knowing that the League was formed by dominant colonial powers on the winning side of the Great War, that minorities were limited to specified states, and that Nitobe was the first Under-Secretary upon the League’s conception, it is not difficult to see why they largely ignored the Indigenous issue, despite opportunities to do otherwise. While we can say that Britain was the centre for discrediting Indians of the day, as it feared border issues in its dominions, Japan supported Deskaheh for its own purpose of gaining equality with the West. Japan and its search for equality is the next topic of discussion.

League of Nations and Japan
Mark Caprio noted that “the events following the end of World War I and the initiation of the League of Nations did not factor heavily in the administration of their colonies.”37 Whether defined as an internal or peripheral colony or a mix between the two, Hokkaido was nonetheless a Japanese colony. Within this colony existed the Ainu people, who had been registered as subjects of the emperor in 1872, yet were classified in the registries as “former natives” (kyudojin) and subjected to a policy of assimilation. Before the Meiji Restoration the Matsumae clan forbade them to adopt the Japanese language or customs except for two periods (1802-23 [eastern Ezochi from 1799] and 1855-67) when the Bakufu took direct control over Ezochi (Hokkaido and the southern Kurils). So how can we explain the difference in Japanese behaviour towards the aborigines within its borders and those from Canada, who internationally stood up to the League?

For starters, the Ainu had not signed any treaties with any other Crown, as had Native peoples in parts of Canada; the Ainu were unilaterally acquired as subjects. More importantly, while the League was building its minority framework, Japan was seeking its own racial equality with the West while maintaining superiority over the rest of Asia. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 Baron Makino proposed an addition to Article 21, to ensure that there would be no discrimination between League members on grounds of race or nationality.38 Japan tried to enthusiastically adopt Western methods of development and ways of thinking show the international world it could continue to compete and stand with Western nations. This movement differed from the way equality is understood today, because it envisioned equality between only Japan and other League members, one of the criteria for equality with the West being that Japan was mature and civilised enough to have its own colonies and operate internationally as an imperial nation.

Japan justified this limited equality through the framework of colonialism during the late 1910s. During this time Japan “had a two-tiered conception of ‘race.’” On one hand Japanese saw themselves as part of Asia as being “yellow” as opposed to “black” or

“white,” but on the other hand they saw “race” in terms of the concept of “nation,” where they differentiated themselves from the Koreans and Chinese. Shimazu argues that Japan sought to include a racial equality clause within the League’s covenant in order to raise its own position and gain equality with the West, since it was the only non-white member of the League. But in order to convince the West it was equal, Japan tried to use international pressure to have the League accept it, so sought and gained support by many in the Afro-Asian world. 39 Essentially Japan sought to impress those that had been oppressed in the international arena, including Deskaheh.

Nitobe represented this spirit of gaining global acceptance of Japan, as demonstrated by his internationalised education and staunch work to turn Hokkaido, among other colonies, into an agriculturally based colony on land the Japanese considered terra nullius. His goal of being a “bridge across the Pacific” had little to do with universal equality, or rethinking the ideas of race and Social Darwinism of the time. It had everything to do with being a part of this dialogue, and manipulating it to raise Japan’s status to that of the Powers that dominated the League of Nations.

Although the Japanese proposition of equality found support, it was ultimately discouraged and thrown out by Britain. In October 1921, about three months after the League settled the Åland issue, the British Foreign Office wrote:

The white and the coloured races cannot and will not amalgamate. One or the other must be the ruling caste; and countries where the white population is in power have determined from a sure instinct for self-preservation that they will never open their doors to the influx of the coloured race, which might eventually become dominant. … Japan is the only non-white first-class Power. In every respect, except the racial one, Japan stands on par with the great governing nations of the world. But, however powerful Japan may eventually become, the white races will never be able to admit her equality. If she can enforce her claim she will become our superior; if she cannot enforce it she remains our inferior; but equal she can never be.40

Since the Japanese proposal was eventually thrown out, Japan needed to continue to impress the Western Powers by further adopting Western practices within its emerging empire. This included using those they designated “former aborigines” as they saw fit,

either ignoring them or using them to submit claims over colonised areas. The Ainu served as a yardstick to judge Wajin modernity.41

Åland itself was a historical part of the League’s minority protection system. As the League tried to create a Europe comprised of homogeneous nation-states, it encountered the problem of minorities which had different ethnicities and languages than the majority within them. The League realised that it could not create all nations based on such a narrow definition. For this reason, as a multinational organisation, it took particular interest in protecting minority peoples within designated new nation-states as a means of ensuring border stability. The minority rights program it supported was based on ethnic or language-centered group rights as a means to ensure security in the region.

Another way of thinking about this is that, during the time of the Åland settlement, minorities were considered part of the civilised or modern world, while those considered to be indigenes or Indians were not. Europeans who dominated the League’s Council denied such people civilisation and modernity, because in their minds the natives represented a past that was long forgotten. This theoretically and psychologically aided the preservation of the status quo in their colonies, upon which they relied to justify their own modernity and civilisations.

As the only non-white founding member nation of the League, Japan strove for acceptance, which meant challenging the status quo. However, this was confined to the framework of the League. Challenging the status system within its own colonies would have removed them from being classified as modern and civilised in the eyes of the Western powers.

New Initiatives for Solving the “Northern Territories” Dispute: Inspiration from the Åland Experience

The situation during the times of the Åland settlement reveals a striking continuity of views from the past through to the present, the most important of which is taking the state as the centre of all arguments. However, if we are to take any sort of lesson away from the Åland process as a whole (i.e. 1921 to the present) that can be applied to current and future study of the Northern Territories issue, it is the need for flexibility, adaptability and compromise. The Åland settlement, seen as a package, appears more like a fluid and changing process than clear-cut decisions from a particular point and place in time. All three potential lessons directly conflict with the majority of literature surrounding the issue. For example, if we discuss the situation of the Ainu in relation to this dispute, we directly challenge some of the most embedded and stale arguments on the market (yes it is a marketable dispute as it is profitable) that perpetuate non-resolution. One such dispute occurs with the facts upon which the “movement for the return of the northern territories” premises itself, namely that the islands are inherent Japanese lands.

Further examination is necessary to provide and detailed answer on why the Ainu, current residents and former Japanese residents where not included in contemporary research. As a minimum, the Ainu treatment (or non-treatment) in the matter extends

41 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 77.
beyond the scope of the Northern Territories dispute extending into the academic fields of History, Anthropology, Geography, Political Science, International Relations and Law. So the argument that the Ainu are not included because the Northern Territories issue is a border dispute between two states is not convincing. The Ainu in the discourse of the Northern Territories challenges the surrounding academic hegemony. In Marshal Beier’s words the *hegemonologue*, or domination of solidly fixed Western ways of thinking, prevents academics from seriously looking into issues with Indigenous peoples.  

Rather than continue to ignore or suppress such Indigenous issues, it would be best to address them and move towards new ways of understanding not only the Northern Territories dispute but the many academic fields that are intrinsically connected to it. Bringing the Ainu to the table is one step towards putting all relevant material on the table, which many scholars believe is a necessary condition for any sort of satisfactory resolution of this Russo-Japanese issue. Examining the situation of the Ainu and Japan’s connection to the Åland settlement of 1921 is one such way to broaden the current framework.

Studying the Åland settlement and rights pertaining to the Ainu and how rights of the current and former inhabitants relate to the Northern Territories issue would enable additional critique on this issue. Further examination of Ainu history around the time of the Åland settlement is both appropriate and valuable.

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42 Beier, *Uncommon Places*.  

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Figure 4: “Exchange” The Japan Punch 1875

CHAPTER 5

The Japanese Government’s and Supporting Academic Views on the Northern Territories

According to Prasenjit Duara, “First, as a modern state, the colonial state was built upon the imperative that all global resources be controlled by territorially sovereign polities, whether nations or empires.”¹ This quote is reinforced by International Law thinkers of the nineteenth century, such as Henry Wheaton (1785-1848):

The right of every independent state to increase its national dominions, wealth, population, and power, by all innocent and lawful means, such as the pacific acquisition of new territory, the discovery of and settlement of new countries, the extension of its navigation and fisheries, the improvement of its revenues, arts, agriculture and commerce, the increase of its military and naval force, is an incontrovertible right of sovereignty, generally recognized by the usage and opinion of nations.²

The pre-World War II era of Japan was one of colonialism, where within the nation-state, nationalism and imperialism became blurred as the state tried to incorporate alien territories (resources) and people (bio-power) wherever possible, creating a multi-ethnic greater-Japan, while simultaneously supporting a dogma of homogeneity of the nation. Development, progress and civilisation ideologies dominated the pre-War era. An example of this in relation to the Ainu was in the first official history of Hokkaido written in 1918, where editor Kono Tsunekichi, a well known Ainu scholar, wrote that “responsibility for colonisation of Hokkaido had fallen to the Japanese as ‘no other superior race’ (yuto jinshu) was in contact with the Ainu.”³ These ideologies and power structures of the nation-state were refined and redefined, while ideas of progress and development continued in the post-War era. The ideas of progress and development became an advanced form of colonialism, where historical violence was muted, buried and then largely “forgotten.”

Ainu and Wajin activities regarding to the Northern Territories are relational and in constant flux, and the Ainu were/have hardly the static, dead, and obsolete people that writing since World War II on the Northern Territories has portrayed them as. This chapter presents a historical account within local, regional/national and international

³ Kaiho Mineo, Shinryo to kataru Hokkaido no rekishi (Sapporo: Shuppan kikaku senta, 1985), 13; quoted in Siddle Race, Resistance, 85.
levels of first, how, why and when, the Ainu went from being an intricate part of the territorial debate, to outside of it from academic and government movements.

Literature from the nineteenth century and earlier that addressed territorial claims or border demarcation in the Okhotsk region for the most part acknowledged that the Ainu lived on these lands and that the lands were Ainu territory. However, as Russo-Japanese negotiations concerning these northern islands proceeded, the less the Wajin recognised the Ainu’s historical existence in these areas. Following Wajin claims to these islands during post-War negotiations illustrates how Wajin moved from recognising Ainu in the area, using them as a positive card in which they saw no negative side effects, to a point of complete oblivion and denial while adamantly insisting that the islands were their “inherent territory.”

The End of World War II to 1981

Soviets troops began their invasion of the northern Kuril Islands on 24 August 1945 proceeding southward, and stopped at Uruppu ensuring American troops were not present further south. When they confirmed that American troops had yet to establish themselves in the area, a separate fleet from Sakhhalin invaded Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai, successfully gaining control by 5 September. Approximately seventeen thousand “Japanese” people on the islands were “repatriated” to Hokkaido. Included in these “repatriated Japanese” were those Kuril Ainu descendents living on Shikotan, along with the Ainu from other islands south of Uruppu. Those Ainu that were hastily relocated from Shikotan were dispersed throughout eastern Hokkaido; reports on these Ainu were few in number after their second forced relocation. One year later, three Ainu still living in the Kurils were found by the Soviets and moved to Hokkaido, they were the last of the identified Ainu living on the island chains. During the 1950s and 60s these Kuril Ainu were an integral part of territorial “return” movements, ignoring those Ainu from the other Kuril islands.

After the Japanese defeat in World War II, the government signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty on 8 September 1951, in which Article 2 stipulated that they were to renounce all claims to the Kuril Islands, where the “Kurils” were left undefined and a recipient unmentioned. Hara pointed out that post-War conflict over these islands began as a result of the ambiguity surrounding the definition of the “Kuril Islands.” Drafts of the treaty included exact measurements of the boundaries of the Kuril Islands and other lands the Allies planned to force the Japanese to renounce. Drafts also included recipient countries of Japanese-renounced territory, and the Soviet Union was at one time listed as the recipient of both Sakhaln and the Kurils. However, on the final treaty version the

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longitude and latitude of these territories along with mention of the Soviet Union were deleted, creating territorial ambiguity, purposefully creating various post-War conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region, which the Northern Territories is a part.\(^7\)

Before the signing of the Peace Treaty, the *Gaimusho* (Japanese foreign ministry) drafted a pamphlet in 1946 that somewhat contradicts the more current claim for a four islands return. Here, the government treated the two islands of Etorofu and Kunashir as the “Southern Kurils” and it said that Shikotan and Habomai were separate from the Kuril Islands “geographically” as well as “topographically,” so Japan did not renounce them in the Peace Treaty.\(^8\) The *Gaimusho*’s 1946 “two islands claim” is also reflective in local and national newspapers.

The first mention of Kuril Ainu in the press after the war was in 1950, when a journalist made a brief outline of their relocation to Shikotan Island, Wajin benevolence towards the Ainu, and Kuril Ainu Koizumi Shukichi’s movement to search for the Kuril Ainu Mutual Aid Fund that totalled just over seventeen thousand yen in 1923, a value of approximately two to three million yen in 1950.\(^9\) Since this article was printed before the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Kuril Ainu were not yet a designated symbol for the return movement or territorial negotiations. This changed, however, in 1953, when *Hokkai Taimusu* published an article that mentioned Koizumi Shukichi and his movement to find the Mutual Aid Fund, but rather than building on such details, it moved towards connecting the Kuril Ainu’s existence to a surfacing movement for territorial returns. Kuril Ainu even accompanied the League for Appealing the Return of the Chishima and Habomai (established in 1950) as “living witnesses” to meetings in Nemuro and Tokyo in 1953. The press reported Koizumi stating that he accompanied them as a “living witness” to support their cause because “Chishima was not greedily taken by Japan.” The appeals of Koizumi and other Kuril Ainu from Shikotan to hold memorial services for their ancestors and retrieve lost assets were meant to please their ancestors, and gain sympathy from the Soviets and the rest of the world.\(^10\)

The reported aim for using the Kuril Ainu in the movement was to insist upon the return of Shikotan, and not claim rights to their traditional lands in the northern Kurils. For this reason, the press often labelled the Kuril Ainu as “Shikotan Ainu.” This aided Wajin movements’ cause by converting their second homeland of Shikotan into their ancestor’s home, while at the same time it encouraged amnesia over their forced

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\(^9\) “Horobiyuku chizoku kurirushimajin/Hogo to kyusai o seifu ni undo/Shikotan (furusato) ni kaeshite!” *Hokkai Taimusu*, 4 February 1953.

\(^10\) “Chishima wa rekishi tekinimo watashitachi no tochi/seishojin kattederu” *Hokkaido Shinbun*, 16 July 1953.
relocation. One article alleged that even though the fate of these Ainu as a “dying race” was pitiful, they had “a stronger feeling than anyone else to return to their second homeland of Shikotan.”

Fascinated with the “dying race” concept, newspapers worked like a countdown every time a known “pure-blood” Kuril Ainu died: “five people left in Hokkaido” (1956), “now only four people” (1958), “only one person in Japan” (1964), and “the Kuril race about to die out” (1964). The decedents of the repatriated “Shikotan Ainu” received only scant attention as it would have taken away from the dramatic headlines. During this countdown of human lives, the famous Ainu grave-plundering anthropologist at Hokkaido University, Kodama Sakuzaemon (1895-1970), continued to insist that their existence was also important for Anthropology.

During the late 1950s, a notebook on pre-War paternalistic actions towards the Kuril Ainu was “rediscovered” and reported to have been held in a village administration office before Soviet occupation. It became an important plea to have the Soviets return this valuable resource that supposedly recorded the detailed process of taking the Shikotan Ainu out of their primitive state and civilising them, looking after them and treating them as “new countrymen.” This was the Wajin proof of their single-handed development of the region. Some years after the discovery, newspapers again mentioned this book when they supported the idea that “this is an important history of ‘civilising another race and is an important book for the management of Hokkaido during this time.” Insistence to have this resource returned continued until 1967, when news on the matter suddenly stopped.

Again in 1961 Koizumi Shukichi made another appearance in the news. The press showed sympathy and worry over the Kuril Ainu, and the “return” movement’s loss of contact with them. Koizumi reportedly continued his movement for reclaiming the lost Mutual Aid Fund and offered a warm hand in helping those around Nemuro, who felt the issue of the Kuril Ainu should be addressed first when dealing with this territorial issue.

Three years later, with only one known “repatriated” Kuril Ainu alive, the press reminded its readers of the “Shikotan natives or ‘Kuril race,’ and stressed that ‘the Kuril Islands, Shikotan and the Habomai Islands are inherent Japanese territory.’” The press regretted the soon loss of these valuable “living witnesses” to their territorial claims. These few

12 “Horobiyuku Kuriru zoku,” Asahi Shinbun, Hokkaido shuppan, 27 January 1956, 197; “Hirobiyuku Kuriru zoku (Chishima Ainu),” Asahi Shinbun, Hokkaido shuppan, 30 January 1958; and “Shikotan to bosandan,” Mainichi Shinbun, Hokkaido shuppan, 11 September 1964. At this time, identifying Ainu was based more on Wajin perceptions than self-recognition.
14 “Shikotan to Kuriru zoku buikushi hakken – ryodo kankei ni koshiryo,” Yomiuri Shinbun, Hokkaido Shuppan, 12 September 1951.
articles from the 1950s and 60s show that the Ainu were valuable “living witnesses” connected to the Wajin foundation of claims to these territories, especially those of Shikotan and Habomai. The historical existence of the Shikotan natives was symbolic of the “return,” and provided the Wajin a base from which to launch claims aimed at gaining sympathy from locals, Soviets, and the international community.

Researchers also played important roles during the 1950s and 60s for making connections between the Ainu and territorial claims. Of these, perhaps the most important were Hokkaido University Professor Takakura Shinichiro (1902-1990), who had in 1942 completed the most comprehensive history of Ainu policy through a Wajin colonial lens, Kindaichi Kyosuke (1882-1971), known for his extensive work on Ainu folklore, and Kodama Sakuzaemon. Academics expanded on connections between the Ainu and Shikotan and Habomai to include Kunashir and Etorofu in what was then known as “southern Chishima.” In 1956, Takakura reported that he had completed extensive research on the discovery, lifestyle, culture, and economics of the area and that from these angles Kunashir and Etorofu were definitely “inherent Japanese Territory.” Examples he gave included that archaeologically the lands were within the cultural sphere of Hokkaido, a large portion of place names were in the Ainu language, the southern Kuril Ainu had a very similar disposition and culture to those Ainu on Hokkaido, the few northern Kuril Ainu had minor differences but were nonetheless similar to the Hokkaido Ainu as well, and that all these Ainu were under the influence of Wajin trade supplies. Higashimura Takeshi wrote that he has not seen the systematic research which Takakura claimed he had done at the time, but perhaps Takakura was referring to his 1955 article “The Development of the Kurils and Karafuto and its affect on the Aborigines,” then six years later he wrote his Chishima gaishi or general Kuril history, which was directly connected to the return movement.

Shortly after the Japanese were defeated, Takakura found out about the Yalta agreement, and the Gaimusho asked him for his opinion and to provide pertinent

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18 Between 1950 and 1955 the Hokkaido government sent nine position papers to MacArthur regarding their position on the Kurils, particularly the southern four (reproduced in Hokkaido Utari Kyokai, ed., Chishima retto no Ainu minzoku senju ni kansuru shiryo (Sapporo: Hokkaido Utari Kyokai, 1983), 48-64.

19 “There was in World War II an intensified Japanese ideology that all people in the country were the Emperor’s subjects, so that the study of the Ainu as a race distinct from the Japanese was frowned upon by the government” (Takakura Shinishiro, “Vanishing Ainu,” 24). This quote hints at state expectations of the subject, that would later become expectations of the Japanese citizen within the nation, homogeneity.

20 Chiri Mashiho, the only Ainu to receive a PhD during his time, often quarrelled with Kodama Sakuzaemon and most other “Ainu Scholars,” who continued to operate from within the protection of their institutions after the War (Siddle, “From Assimilation to Indigenous Rights,” in Ainu: Spirit, 111).


information. He “happily responded as a fellow countryman,” and with his own “meagre efforts started the return movement.”

Subsequently, soon after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Takakura argued that Japan had not acquired the Kuril Islands by force or greed from another country. In the south the “primitive peoples,” who occupied the lands, had no nation or state, this allowed the Japanese to “peacefully” advance into the area, and from joint cooperation they were able to develop the lands leading him to see the islands as “inherent Japanese territory.”

Takakura continued these claims by making use of a history that interpreted the Ainu as belonging to the Wajin even prior to the formation of the Japanese nation-state, and more importantly through the Wajin “development” the lands became inherently theirs.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, the “return” movement was rather slow. When the movement gained followers in 1969, after the “return” of Okinawa was formally decided to take place in 1972, newspapers still reported a lack of interest in the Northern Territories, even though a LDP general election slogan in 1969 was “Okinawa has come back! Now for the north!”

The difference in this post Okinawa return movement was that the Ainu were no longer used as “living witnesses,” and Higashimura explained that the mobilisation of paternalistic civilising of the Ainu and their historical importance were “driven into the depths of oblivion.”

The Northern Territories Issue Countermeasures Association, established in 1969, (hoppo ryodo mondai taisaku kyokai) started producing books on the matter from the early 1970s in both English and Japanese. The logic and reasoning behind their arguments followed Higashimura’s suggestion that movements after the late 1960s adhered to those of Takakura and Kindaichi. These groups openly viewed the territorial issue in dramatically different ways than in the 1950s and early 60s; politicians also took part while this movement fit nicely in line with the growing popularity of nihonjinron or theories of Japanese uniqueness.

In 1973, one year after the last known “repatriated”

25 In a 1966 article, Takakura completely denied the existence of contemporary Ainu identity, and strictly thought of them as relics of the past. He, interestingly enough, wrote that, “In the sixteenth century the Ainu were distributed more broadly than on Hokkaido alone – throughout all the Kurile Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin, and the northern edge of Honshu, the largest of the Japanese islands” (emphasis added, Takakura Shinichiro, “Vanishing Ainu,” 17), thus further pushing the Ainu back to a time in history some four centuries earlier signifying their irrelevance to the situation during the 1960s. Takakura was also the representative of the Committee for the International Appeal for the Return of the Northern Territories (three-hundred members), which went to the UN in New York to appeal in 1979. Some Ainu tried unsuccessfully to join the Committee in order to voice their own opinions (Dokusha no koe, “Senju minzoku o wasureru na,” Hokkaido Shinbun, 20 May 1979).
26 Stephan, Kurile Islands, 197.
27 Higashimura, Zenkoki, 203.
28 On Nihonjinron see, Harumi Befu, Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of Nihonjinron (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001) and Harumi Befu, “Nationalism and
Kuril Ainu, Tanaka Kinu, died, 29 Welfare Minister Saito Kuniyoshi openly stated in the Diet that “we strictly adhere to the view that they [the Ainu] are equal Japanese citizens under the law.” 30 Then in 1975 during his short two year period as Prime Minister, Takeo Miki said that Japan does not have racial problems as other countries do, because Japan is a “homogeneous nation.” 31 Another government official in 1976 said that “we sincerely hope that they [the Ainu] will be conscious of themselves as Japanese the same as everybody else,” which oddly enough implied that many Ainu did not see themselves as Japanese. 32 These domestic citations fall directly in line with international claims that Japan sent to the United Nations in their initial report on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) in 1980. In relation to Article 21 the report alleged, “The right of any person to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practice his own religion or to use his own language is ensured under Japanese law. However, minorities of the kind mentioned in the Covenant do not exist in Japan.” 33 These consistent and adamant denials of the Ainu after government policy changed towards the disputed islands are contradictory in many ways. They viewed the Ainu as being equal to the Wajin and already fully and completely assimilated, yet ignored the relevant issues that the Protection Act still existed, and that the same government had supported the adoption of programs designated specifically for Ainu welfare since 1974 (Utari Welfare Measures), signifying an unspecified difference between Wajin and Ainu, despite Prime Minister Miki, in 1975 stating that “Japan has no racial problems.” 34

As the next section on the “Northern Territories Day” shows, the Ainu were no longer used as “proof” in Wajin claims after the 1970s, and the “Ainu card” moved from Nihonjinron,” in Cultural Nationalism in East Asia, ed. Harumi Befu (Berkeley: University of California, 1993), 107-135.

29 Miyajima, Land of Elms, 104. Kodama listed “the last survivor as the pure Kurile Ainu” as Suyama Nisaku who died in 1956 (Kodama Sakuzaemon, Ainu Historical and Anthropological Studies [Sapporo: Hokkaido University School of Medicine, 1970], 61). It is possible that there are further unidentified decedents of these lands. See, “Getting Back Our Islands,” 8.


31 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 178-79.

32 Head of Prime Minister’s Office and Head of Okinawa Development Agency Ueki Mitsunori, 77th Diet, House of Representatives Accounts Committee, 20 May 1976, in Ainu shi shiryo hen 3; quoted in Siddle, Race, Resistance, 170.


34 At the 71st Diet in 1973, in response to why three in ten Ainu lived in destitution and why Ainu had difficulty in obtaining stable jobs due to discrimination, Minister Saito said “Our basic attitude towards the Ainu people, or the Utari, is that they are equal Japanese citizens of the law. We never treat them as a different ethnic group living among us Japanese people” (The 71st Diet – the Third Subcommittee of Lower House Budget Committee Session, Material 2, reproduced in AAH, “statement submitted to the Fifth Session of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations,” AKS, 1167-1166. “The 76th Diet – Upper House Budget Committee Session,” AKS, 1151-1150.
a definite plus to a non-issue. The government and its supporting “activists” stopped using the Kuril Ainu because they modified claims to stress specifically a four islands return, and not only a return of Shikotan and the Habomai Islets as in the immediate post-War era. In addition, the Kuril Ainu could only complicate their selective claims as they in turn supported an interpretation of the Peace Treaty where Japan renounced the northern Kuril Islands, the original homelands of the so-called “Shikotan natives.” This, however, does not fully address the non-inclusion of those Ainu on other parts of the Kurils who mostly lived on Kunashiri and Etorofu, they were simply not discussed. In the background of the growing movement, people like Nakasone Yasuhiro, involved with the LDP at the time, became a member and approved of the movement. Nakasone, after becoming Prime Minister (1983-87), is well known for reviving Japanese nationalism. With such supporters there is little surprise in the direction that the movement took.

The Northern Territories Day, 7 February

Starting in 1981, the Japanese government designated 7 February as the “Northern Territories Day” to “commemorate the day in 1855, when Russia and Japan set their border north of Etorofu,”35 by the Treaty of Shimoda. It is now a day for the right wing and other activists to spread propaganda concerning Japan’s claims. The date chosen is intriguing because many scholars do not want to include the Ainu in negotiations or even historical literature on the matter, because they were a decentralised people without a modern style nation or state. But in 1855, Japan was still under the Bakufu system, which was a feudal system very different in nature and structure than the Meiji government which followed it from 1868. And Japan did not begin to emerge as a modern nation until during Meji times. By historically calling back to a time prior to the nation, while at the same time imaging that the current Japanese nation has a timeless beginning, the argument of not allowing Ainu participation because of their prior lack of a modern nation tends to lose its durability.

The first official document compiled for the history of the disputed Northern Territories in relation to this “Day” under the title “Our Northern Territories” (wareware no hoppo ryodo) in 1981 failed to mention the Ainu. Every year since then the government has published similar PR booklets under the same name. An English edition is also available entitled “Japan’s Northern Territories.” The covers of these booklets have geographical pictures or maps of the islands in question which vary in scale and detail depending on the year. The contents tend to start with the 1855 Shimoda Treaty, proceed to briefly explain each major treaty affecting the islands, and then finish with more current developments between Soviet/Russian negotiations and exchanges. As in

35 “A Voice of Reason Campaigns for the Return of Japan’s Northern Territories,” Japan Times, 3 February 2000. Also in 1981, the Japan Travel Bureau placed a discriminatory advertisement in a national newspaper encouraging tourists to visit “famed hairy Ainu.” The Travel Bureau officially apologized for the advertisement one year later.
the first publication, the Ainu fail to receive recognition while stress is put on Japan’s sole “discovery” and peaceful “development” of the islands.\textsuperscript{36}

Most booklets contain maps that simply show the quintessential changes in boundaries that resulted from the various treaties, further demonstrating how the islands were inherently Japanese territory, using the “power of maps” to best suite their needs (Figure 5). In the words of Denis Wood, “the very point of the map [is] to present us not with the world we can see but to point toward a world we might know.”\textsuperscript{37} This shows knowing as being abstract and conceptual. These maps tell a story or narration about ownership and location of the Northern Territories. There are few who would argue over the story of the location presented in these maps; the crux occurs with the story of ownership over which the battle is fought.\textsuperscript{38} This use of maps to disguise the government’s reproduction of these islands brings a very selective past to the present, resulting in a “scientific abstraction of reality”\textsuperscript{39} that works to simplify the matter and ensure that the position of the Ainu is irrelevant. The use of maps in these PR booklets fail to make the complex historical background understandable, rather they narrow our perspective by simplifying the complex.

To further support this special “Day” the Hokkaido Government set up a display on the first floor of their government building, a mere one minute walk away from the Hokkaido Utari Association office. This display commemorates August as the month to strengthen the “return” movement. Before entering the government building, a large permanent sign overhead the front doors of the building that reads “Return the Four Islands for Peace and Trust” greets the visitor, but does not specify for whom the peace and trust will be, certainly it is not the Ainu. Annually produced posters line the entrance to the display besides a booth, where one can sign a petition for the return of the islands (over seventy eight million people have signed as of August 2006). The display is full of colourful maps, displays and pictures. There are even stamps and colouring sheets and simple quizzes for kids, and take home application forms for high school students and older for the annual poster contest, where one can win between approximately one-hundred and five-hundred dollars.\textsuperscript{40} While it almost feels like there is something for everyone at the display, it mentions nothing of the Ainu or their prior residence on the islands before the Japanese and Russians.

At the annual 7 February rallies, where Prime Ministers have also been key figures to speak at the event, it appears that mentioning the Ainu is taboo. In 2004, former Prime Minister Koizumi attended the rally and spoke to the extent that it would be beneficial to both Russia and Japan to conclude a peace treaty. He remarked on positive

\textsuperscript{36} Wareware no hoppo ryodo, Warera no hoppo ryodo, and Japan’s Northern Territories, produced annually by the Gaimusho (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 1981 to 2004.


\textsuperscript{39} Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, 173.

\textsuperscript{40} The stamp reads “Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, Habomai, 150 yeas of history, 60 years of longing.” Since 1987, there have also been annual High School Students’ speech contests on the Northern Territories.
actions that Japanese people had done during times of war in Matsuyama towards Russian POWs, yet failed to remark on past actions of the Japanese military against the Soviets during World War II. While this statement appeared out of general context of the subject at hand, his mere appearance showed that the rally had official backing, and gave a sense of authenticity to the cause. Perhaps this is why he was later criticised for not attending the rally in 2005 or 2006, even though he showed his support in writing.

At the 2007 rally, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo vowed to follow in his father’s (Abe Shintaro) performance as Minister of Foreign Affairs, who reopened negotiations, and continue to pursue the issue in line with the established government position.

Since 1981, this day has grown to a large extent along with accompanying literature for its promotion. However, the Russian interpretation on this day is far from supportive. Alexander Yakovenko said that Russians consider the very fact of the existence of such a “day” a regrettable survival of the Cold War era, when stereotypes of ideological contention, distrust and alienation prevailed in relations between our countries…a settlement of the differences that exist ought to be sought by the development of ties across the board and the deepening of trust and mutual sympathies between the peoples, and not by methods of propaganda pressure and political pressing.

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41 “Prime Minister Attends 2004 National Rally to Demand the Return of the Northern Territories,” Prime Minister and his Cabinet, 10 February 2004 <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2004/02/07hoppou_e.html> (17 November 2006).
43 In order to promote “accurate” historical understanding, Minister of State of Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs Sanae Takahaichi proposal for schools to actively address this issue in their classrooms.
44 One book that is representative of the main ideas of the movement that is directed at a lay and student audience is, Fukasajiwa Kenji, *Irasuto hoppo ryodo 100 mon 100 kotae: dare demo sugu wakatteshimau* (Tokyo: Ningen no kagakusha, 1991), originally published in 1985, it was reprinted in 1991 to coincide with Gorbachev’s visit. Yamagata Taizo, principle of a school on Kunashiri from 1937 to 1942 wrote a book which he addressed a school curriculum for teaching on the Northern Territories that incorporated the Ainu, however he introduced little more than the three major Ainu-Wajin battles and conformed to earlier thinking that the Ainu are “docile, loyal and honest” and said that we “cannot deny the fact that the Ainu are the same as the Japanese” (Yamagata Taizo, *Naze “hoppo ryodo” ka* [Tokyo: Sanseido, 1983], 110-127, 298-300).
However displeased the Russians have been about this day, Takakura Shinichiro would surely beam at the success and boom of this “day,” and the movement’s continued neglect of the Ainu.

**National Trends in the Japanese Government and Its “Activists”**

The government focused on Hokkaido resource exploitation before World War II and after the War ended the focus moved towards the goal of industrialisation of the island. Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato’s 1960 proposal to double the GDP in a decade is an example of this. Later, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei proposed the theory of reconstruction of the Japanese islands, which spurred infrastructure and industrialisation in 1972. Before this, the Liberal Party merged with the Democratic Party in 1955 to form the Liberal Democratic Party, which has been supportive of right wing ideology. Komori argues that the LDP functioned as the apparatus to erase the problem and responsibility of colonisation from the educational field and from memories of post-War generations. Foreign Affairs Minister Takasugi Shinichi echoed this, when in 1964 he said “Japan did a good thing” in relation to imperial colonisation. With the merging of two CIA supported conservative ruling parties and their planned industrialisation came economic progress and nationalism, which played a significant role in changing views and activities in relation to Japan’s claim over the two, and then four, islands return.

The Hokkaido Development Agency (Hokkaido kaihatsucho) was established in 1950, superseding the Hokkaido Agency (Hokkaido cho, 1886-1947), which was, until 2000, a part of the central government and had quasi-colonial structures. The Development Agency was the next step in a long line of colonial bodies that started with the Colonisation Commission (kaitakushi) in 1869, a year after the Meiji Restoration. The goals of the Agency were, as expected from extending former Prime Minister Ikeda’s views, to develop Hokkaido’s abundant resources and increase food production to serve national shortages.

Japanese claims to the Northern Territories, indirectly aimed at Hokkaido as well, were (are) based on their assertion that they acquired the islands in question through peaceful means and sole development. This way, the government ensures consistency with the Cairo Declaration and the post-War Peace Treaty. To say they claimed the islands without violence also indiscreetly implies that they were terra nullius, ignoring the Ainu whom they displaced through often violent measures. When they said they obtained the islands peacefully, they implied that they did not obtain them through violence with another people that were globally recognised as having a state of their own. This again reinforces the dialogue between nation-states and the importance of

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“development” and “progress” to territorial claims within international law. Visual aids throughout Hokkaido act as constant reminders of peaceful Wajin and American-assisted development of these northern islands.48

Ainu and Wajin activities in regard to the Northern Territories were relational and in constant flux. The Ainu were/are hardly the static, dead, and obsolete people many authors on this dispute have portrayed them as since the end of World War II. This chapter began by noting how the Kuril Ainu went from a positive card in the early stages of the return movement to a position in the “depths of oblivion,” which the government further advanced after it began to take a more active role in the return movement. Irony shows that the Ainu lie forgotten at the foundation of the return movement.

The next chapter covers various Ainu responses to the official arguments of the Northern Territories, and historically ties their movement to the international rise of human rights and Indigenous rights since World War II.

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48 In Odori park, a thirteen block-long park situated in central Sapporo, for example, is home to the Sapporo City Resource Building, formerly the Sapporo Court built in 1926, situated at the west end (housing an abundance of surveys and writing on Hokkaido’s development), statues of Horace Capron and Kuroda Kiyotaka first erected in 1903 (and rebuilt after the war because they were used for materials in 1943) now stand on Nishi 10 chome, the development memorial monument on Nishi 6 chome, and the Statue of Development Mother is on Nishi 2 chome. There are William Clark statues at Hokkaido University and Histujiga Observation Hill. The Hokkaido Historical Museum (literally the Hokkaido Development Memorial) was built to commemorate the hundredth year history of Hokkaido development since the Meiji era. In 1983, a Historical Village was built on the site, mainly consisting of buildings from the Meiji and Taisho era from all over Hokkaido. The Hokkaido development monument statue “Winds and Snow Group” stands in Asahikawa Tokiwa Park, which contains one elderly Ainu sitting on a stump pointing the way forward to three Wajin men and one woman. While the young Wajin colonizers are given dramatic names, that of the Ainu man is kotan, or village, signifying his stationary status while the Wajin move forward (ie, progress). In addition to statues, it is almost impossible to entre a museum (besides those organised by Ainu) in Hokkaido without repeatedly seeing the words “development” and “progress” in reference to Wajin, while Ainu traditional artifacts are for the most part left in the static state of seemingly “pre-contact” in nature.
September 1951

Figure 5: Maps from Japan’s Northern Territories (MOFA, 2006)
CHAPTER 6

Post-War Internationalisation of the Ainu and Ainu Indigenous Diplomacy

According to Susan Boyd et al.’s interpretation, Foucault conceives of

power as a relational, reflexive, dynamic, capillary phenomenon that is intimately tied to the flow of knowledge relations and inherently embodies resistance as much as it does authority… [P]ower is not a static instrument of oppression, but rather a set of contention where every display of power ignites its own oppositions, and where even the most seemingly “marginal” people and groups are far from impotent.¹

Foucault’s perception of power is applicable to further understand the Ainu in relation to the Northern Territories. Ainu resistance was not a separate reaction to the hegemonic Japanese government and leading academic discourses on the issue, but their movements grew together with, and a part of, the very hegemony that had (has) relentlessly tried to silence them. In other words, Ainu-Wajin relations were (are) relational at all three levels of interaction: local, regional/national and international. The Ainu were integral to changing relations, claims and methods used by the government and its supporting activists. This chapter outlines Ainu approaches to dealing with the mutation of their history and implications this had on their approaches to dealing with their own history.

As Wajin supporters of the Ainu (a great number being of the political left and socialist groups) grew in number in the late 1970s, some Ainu and Wajin questioned the movement’s non-inclusion of Ainu history. This led to larger, but far from total, cohesion among different Ainu groups and organisations, as they took a new step in internationalising themselves as a part of the global movement of Indigenous rights. However, roots of Ainu internationalisation started before this post-War phenomenon.

From the late nineteenth century, peoples outside of Japan had opportunity to learn about the Ainu through a few international events. Ainu goods and artifacts spread throughout the world as curious European visitors sought “authentic” goods of the pre-modern era. The Japanese government sent Ainu artefacts to Philadelphia’s Centennial Exposition of 1876, the World’s Columbian Exposition of Chicago in 1883 and the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, and in 1890 the Smithsonian museum organised an Ainu Exhibit. The cumulative result of government and individual interest in the Ainu was the overseas accumulation of Ainu goods and artefacts, many of which are now on display

throughout the world. For the 1904 Louisiana Purchase Exposition in St. Louis, Frederick Starr made a special trip to Hokkaido to secure live Ainu “specimens” for a human display of what the organisers believed to be primitive peoples. Starr, in collaboration with John Bachelor and the Governor of Hokkaido, acquired a total of nine Ainu men, women and children volunteers to make the trip to the United States to take part in the anthropological reserve. It was here in Saint Louis where four Ainu became the first Japanese to participate in Olympic Games. While the exact length of their stay is unknown, one or more Ainu may have stayed in the US for more than a six-month period before returning to Hokkaido.

When the Akita Prefecture resident Shirase Nobu (1861-1946) led an expedition to the Antarctica in 1910, he was accompanied by two Sakhalin Ainu; Yamabe Yasunosuke (1867-1923) and Hanamori Shinkichi. Yamabe, as a result of the 1875 Kuril-Sakhalin Exchange Treaty, was forced to move to Hokkaido at the age of nine, but nonetheless managed to return home at the age of twenty. Before the expedition both men were calling for Ainu independence, and ultimately joined Shirase’s team in hope to create more Ainu attention and brought sixty Karafuto dogs for sleds. Internationalising the Ainu to the West, in the modern era, began before the global movement for human rights or Indigenous movements, the major difference of more recent movements is the audibility of their Indigenous voice. Pre-World War II travels to Japan’s capital and abroad also differ from migration towards the capital and other urban areas outside of Hokkaido in post-War years. More importantly, many post-War travels became associated with petitions to governmental bodies, which were also different than their pre-War petitioning. Changing petition methods, from the local and national to the

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4 Starr, *Ainu Group at the St. Louis;* Vanstone, “Ainu Group at the Louisiana Purchase.”  


6 For Ainu movements to the capital see, Mark Watson, “Kanto Resident Ainu and the Urban Indigenous Experience” (PhD dissertation, University of Alberta, 2006).
international level were interconnected with calls for a New Ainu Law and proper historical recognition, where Ainu organisations used the example of the Northern Territories issue to show historical negligence.

**The UN, Human Rights and Indigenous Diplomacy since World War II**

Beier signified the international context of Indigenous movements in the post-World War II era as a move from Indigenous globalism (vertical) to global indigenism (horizontal). Outlining this movement is important for clarifying the relation between the Ainu, their claims and demands for inclusion, the Japanese state’s views on both the Ainu and the Northern Territories, and the connection between historical discourses, and how the Ainu fit into the international.

Indigenous diplomacies throughout the world occurred before encroachment on Indigenous societies, and have taken place among Indigenous peoples in differing forms for centuries. Increased interactions with encroaching societies (called “colonialism”) resulted in a continuation and modification of such diplomacies. In the early twentieth century people like Deskaheh (Chapter Four) began to petition, albeit unsuccessfully, to higher Western international authorities. Indigenous issues and “rights” however, did not internationally gain enough force to have their voices internationally heard until well after the formation of the UN and the International Bill of Rights amidst further processes of limited decolonisation, under a the guise of Western hegemony. Beier would call this a step towards advanced-colonialism.

The international development of human rights is important for understanding Ainu-Wajin relations in respect to the Northern Territories, since they are referred to by the state in procrastinating dealing with Ainu claims, and are a forum where Ainu representatives are seriously listened to, and this works to authenticate their indigeneity. Once we know how human rights came about, we can better utilise and apply them to specific cases involving Indigenous peoples. Briefly following the development of issues relevant to Indigenous peoples shows how policies are created as solutions to perceived problems, and importantly how every right is in conflict/contradiction with another right.

The League of Nations was not motivated by concepts of human rights, the mandate and minority system worked to strengthen leading powers’ status quo based on their political interests. The UN, like the League, was founded and made up of recognised states, where states were the only entities with valid, coherent and authoritative voices. However, the UN, utilising concepts of the individual, while also operating through highly political processes, provided a more flexible international system than the League to which Indigenous peoples could petition and gain international attention.

It was the developing world, especially countries in south America, and NGOs that worked to get human rights issues on the UN’s agenda, and not that of the ruling or

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8 In relation to this Cairns noted that “Indianness and Aboriginality are now capacious concepts no longer confined to historical ways of life. Aboriginality now incorporate non-traditional beliefs, practices, and values from outside without ceasing to be Aboriginal” (Alan Cairns, *Citizens Plus* [Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000], 105).
winning powers. For example, during the 1940s, Canada distrusted the UN and the concept of universal human rights, throughout the 1950s it did not actively participate in the dialogue due to domestic issues between federal and provincial jurisdiction, and in the 1960s Canada supported human rights as a tool to help keep the UN together in post-War years and to promote its own identity as a middle power. However, the Canadian government knew that, if it did not support them, they would be in minority alongside the Soviet Union during the Cold War. So, they agreed with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), but said they could not implement them. The development of human rights was also, to some extent, connected to the advance of the Cold War, showing how the concept of human rights was also politically motivated state interests.

In Canada, it was initially the political right, businessmen and legal associates that opposed the UDHR, because they had the least to benefit. Here, we can see similarities with Japan, with the ruling LDP, Japanese law – which has difficulty dealing with international law, and private interest groups that profit from the Northern Territories issue, which likely involves many Ainu for gaining political support. However, states are no longer the sole voice in the UN system since there has been a change in the perception and role of NGOs, from consultative to power positions. International instruments give NGOs power by providing a global forum to project their mandates.

This is important to consider because Indigenous peoples and supporters often make use of NGOs and refer to UN treaties, especially CERD and Article 27 of CCPR. These treaties, however, are targets and not a reality, similar to the UDHR. These international agreements require individual states that make up the UN, to take on more responsibilities, but the same states do not commit comparable resources needed to carry them out. Human rights issues need to be voluntarily accepted, they need to be an active choice as exemplified by former UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar in 1984: “I urge every government to dedicate itself to not only in law, but in practice, to respecting the inherent dignity of every human being.” In such a discourse, it may take longer to implement than with use of force. However, if states domestically change it will be a conscious decision for a conscious goal, representing values of that particular society, without choice there is no meaning behind the actions. Issues of human rights and Indigenous rights are relatively new, and will take time to further develop and implement, but will likely increase in global importance as concepts of the nation-state continue to

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change and since issues involving resource extraction often involve Indigenous land (claimed, or operated). Resource issues are most prominent in former British colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United states, but, as Stuart Henry argues, are gradually spreading further internationally.\textsuperscript{14}

Rights specific to Indigenous peoples have significantly developed since the late 1970s. The United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1971, in response to human rights complaints, appointed Jose Martinez Cobo to begin work investigating the situation of the world’s Indigenous people. This was the first action any organisation in the UN, besides the ILO, took towards Indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{15} Between 1981 and 1984 Cobo submitted five comprehensive volumes based on his findings. In response to his initial recommendations, ECOSOC authorised the creation of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in 1982 as a subsidiary to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.\textsuperscript{16} The position of this working group is located at the lowest level of the hierarchy of the UN’s human rights bodies (WGIP $\rightarrow$ Sub-Commission $\rightarrow$ Human Rights Commission $\rightarrow$ ECOSOC $\rightarrow$ General Assembly). The rules of the WGIP are flexible enough to accommodate those interested in participating, especially Indigenous groups. This flexibility and openness were crucial for addressing Indigenous issues. The first session took place with about fifty participants and more recently numbers have risen to more than eight-hundred, making it one of the UN’s largest forums on human rights.\textsuperscript{17} A draft Declaration on Indigenous Rights, based largely on Cobo’s reports, was adopted by the WGIP in 1993 and by the Sub-Commission in 1994. The Commission on Human Rights began considering it in 1995 and created the “working group on the draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples” with the goal to draw a draft that the General Assembly would approve by 2004. By 2003 the Commission had only accepted Articles 5 and 43,\textsuperscript{18} and a deadlock arose between governments and Indigenous peoples over the remaining forty-three Articles. The largest problem was with defining “Indigenous peoples” and Article 3 on self-determination,\textsuperscript{19} which states interpreted as complete independence, while it had varying meanings and degrees for Indigenous groups.


\textsuperscript{15} For ILO programs from 1950s to 1972 see, Lee Swepston, “Indigenous and Tribal Populations: A Return to Centre Stage,” International Labour Review 126.4 (July-August 1987), 447-454.


\textsuperscript{17} See, Lola Garcia-Alex, The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issue (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2003), 49-50.

\textsuperscript{18} Article 5 reads, “Every Indigenous person hs the right to belong to a nationality” and Article 43 reads, “All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male and female indigenous individuals.”

The United Nations began to show more support for Indigenous issues, and after seven years in the making, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, a direct subsidiary body of ECOSOC, held its first meeting in May 2002, with more than six-hundred participants. In June 2006, ECOSOC, in a 30 to 2 vote, passed the draft Declaration, with only Canada and Russia in opposition. Although Canada changed its position after the Conservative party replaced the Liberals in early 2006, it is unlikely, given past Canadian perspectives at the WGIP that other political parties would have behaved differently. Japan, despite not recognising Indigenous peoples within its borders, voted in its favour. At the present moment the draft Declaration is waiting for approval by the General Assembly, which in December 2006 deferred it. Stuart Henry advised that governments and peoples should become more open and willing to seriously discuss Indigenous rights issues, because they are not localised or insignificant issues, but will continue to grow in importance and consequence in the future.

The Hokkaido Utari Association

The Hokkaido Utari Association became active in the international realm as a means to secure domestic rights. The Japanese government, by refusing to act on Ainu claims, because there is no international definition of “Indigenous peoples,” has encouraged this organisation to take a more active role in the international, furthering their international recognition and Indigenous status. Many Ainu and Ainu organisations have increasingly moved from domestic audiences to international ones.

The Hokkaido Utari Association is the largest Ainu organisation in Japan with around 16,000 members (as of 2007). The Association has drastically modified its goals from promoting Ainu conformity with Wajin, to promoting pride in their Indigenous history and culture. It is a public interest corporation sanctioned by the Governor of Hokkaido, and for this reason it receives a fair amount of criticism and suspicion from within the Ainu community as being an arm of the very government that traditionally worked to assimilate the Ainu, and that it ultimately works for the government and not for the Ainu. The Utari Association views their institutional history, since the early 80s, as a history of the movement towards having their draft Ainu New Law approved. It was from within this movement that issues relating to the Northern Territories were extracted, as pursuance of rights in the Northern Territories officially began in connection to their push towards enactment of a New Law. The two issues were not independent of each other; both were necessary and worked to justify the other. This section deals with the Association broadly as an institution, which informed “official” Ainu positions and policy, and individual members who took part in issues overlapping between the

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23 Many Ainu think that Suzuki Muneo dominates affairs at the Utari Association (Mr. A. et al., personal communication with author, 3 January 2004 [Japan]). I use “Utari Association” to refer to the largest Ainu organisation and should not be confused with the “Kanto Utari Association” which I do not address.
Association’s and other non-sanctioned positions outside of it, tracing their movement to becoming ever more supportive of international agendas.

In 1946, the incorporated Hokkaido Ainu Association was established, a revival from the original 1930 organisation, and soon began a movement to secure rights to their provisional lands from post-War land reforms. Following Japan’s surrender the HFAPA was at the mercy of the Allied forces and sweeping changes in Japan. It is rumoured that in 1945 American SCAP Officer Joseph Swing asked the Ainu if they wanted independence, and the Ainu declined saying that they were good Japanese citizens, showing the effect of Ainu education that strove to turn Ainu into the Emperor’s subjects, only to regret it later.24 But, as Siddle noted, even if they had asked for independence, the extent of which would not likely have resulted in more than a “glorified reservation,” given the American treatment to its own Indian population.25

The Hokkaido Ainu Association did, however, petition the Hokkaido Governor and General MacArthur to ensure the Land Reform Ordinance did not apply to Ainu provisional lands administered through the HFAPA. Post-War petitions often involved gift giving to Japan’s new American Emperor. During the American occupation, General MacArthur received a great number of gifts from the Japanese, which he willingly accepted. Included in the long list of gifts over the years, Takahashi Makoto sent him, in autumn 1947, a deer pelt and antlers “as token of our grateful appreciation for what he has done to secure land for our people and give to Japan a democratic society, based on law and order.”26 After the war, Takahashi, an Ainu from Obihiro (Hokkaido), was one person, who called for the creation of an independent Ainu state. By 1948, over two years of petitioning by the Ainu Association yielded few results. Although the HFAPA was revised in 1946, eliminating Articles 4, 5 and 6, which dealt with free agricultural equipment, medical treatment and welfare, in 1948, the Land Ordinance Reform was applied to Ainu provisional lands, resulting in 1,271 Ainu farmers losing their land, 34 percent of total arable lands.27 The Ainu Association, in shock, fell apart and had only about one-hundred and eighty members between 1948 and 1960,28 whereupon individual members revived it. Upon its revival, members voted to change the name to the Hokkaido

25 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 148.
27 Siddle, Race, Resistance, 151. For copies of the Association’s petitions see, ASS3, 859-924.
28 AKS, 241-242.
Utari Kyokai due to discriminatory use of the word “Ainu.”

The late 1970s represented a time when the Ainu, including Nomura Giichi, formally a conservative Ainu and supporter of assimilation, then the Executive Director, began to look abroad, rather than strictly domestically for inspiration for dealing with Ainu issues. The first official visits by Ainu through the Association to another country were to China. Nomura led the third delegation to China in 1978 and Kaizawa Tadashi, ...
then Assistant-Director of the Association and author of a historical column in the Association’s newsletter Senjuku no Tsudoi since 1976, led the fourth in 1983, on invitation from the China-Japan Friendship Association to study China’s minorities.36

As the Ainu became more informed about other Indigenous peoples in Australia and North America, they adapted their approaches in securing rights. For example, the term Ainu Moshir, first used by Chiri Mashiho in the 1930s, became a common term, referring to the Ainu homelands of Hokkaido, the Kurils and Sakhalin. Somewhat similar to the term Northern Territories, it called on a pure and isolated past that did not involve the Other, in this case the Wajin. Yuki himself used the term, in relation to “Mother Earth,” a possible borrowing from North American Plains Indians’ spirituality.37 In this atmosphere Yuki first began to write about the Ainu and the Northern Territories in 1979, as a contributor to Seidan, the same year that Japan ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESRC) and the CCPR.38

Yuki derived many of his ideas on the Northern Territories issue from Sato Goji (1906-?), an elderly Wajin who, in 1967, ran for Hokkaido Governor using the slogan “Ainu Peoples’ Independence.” Sato managed his own paper in Obihiro and stressed that he wanted a return of the islands from an Ainu perspective and to create an independent country on them.39 Since the end of the war, Goji had taken such a stance, travelling throughout the country by foot often handing out pamphlets that read “Japanese government charged with breaching the constitution.” The pamphlet contained a song showing his thoughts on Japan’s contradictory stance between its peace constitution and military arrangements with the United States, how this was connected to Japan’s claims over the islands and how the Ainu should complain to the UN. Yuki thought that Sato was the first Wajin to inform such an opinion so bluntly.40 In his own arguments, Yuki often referred back to Sato’s “correct historical recognition,” and he too saw connection between the government’s involvement in the Northern Territories and militarism, kindling anti-Soviet sentiment and not being representative of public intentions.41

He rebutted the return movement’s three most right wing opinions in relation to the Ainu in the 1970s that (1) Ainu had no sense of “territory,” or ownership, so the concept of annexation is not applicable; (2) through Wajin penetration into Hokkaido and the Northern Territories, Ainu ethnicity formed, so if it were not for the Wajin the Ainu would have remained in small tribal fashion and would not have formed a group; and (3) without Wajin penetration into the area, there would have been no Ainu ethnic

37 Yuki, Ainu sengen, 43.
40 Yuki, Charanke, 58-60.
41 Yuki, Charanke, 73-74.
formation 42 and, therefore, no current issue of an independence movement. He said such opinions indirectly admitted invasion into Ainu lands and that their movement was full of impudent and ignorant slogans. 43

In his pursuit to encourage the creation of an Ainu homeland on the Northern Territories, he questioned his own arguments, yet always ended in hope. He noted that specific projects would be difficult to set up, especially those of long term scope, but such challenges should become a main focus of Ainu liberation. Since the Japanese government incorporated the Ainu unilaterally, it would be unlikely that the government would ever support Ainu separation from the nation. The government never returned any of the rights that it deprived them, including land rights, so this is why the Ainu must stand up. Since the development of an Ainu perspective for an independent nation was in its infancy, he called on more Ainu to wake up and assert their rights as being Ainu. He pointed out the area of the four islands (5,036 square kilometres) is larger than Okinawa (2,271 square kilometres) and about the same size as Aichi prefecture (5,119 square kilometres), that they could build their economy on the abundant marine resources, and that it would “be good to make this small independent state both a demilitarised zone and neutral country.” 44

He said the Japanese version of history is “as if anything the Japanese claim is just, while Ainu claims are anti-societal.” He called Wajin “cunning Shamo” in their pursuit to wipe out Ainu history in relation to the issue while they paid attention to the Soviet’s illegal occupation, but not admitting their own. As noted with the example of Sato Goji, not all Wajin agreed with the government’s view. In 1980, Kishida Hide at Wako University wrote in the Asahi Shinbun that the use of “inherent territory” is inappropriate, and if we follow this way of thinking then the Europeans would have to head back to Europe, because the Americas belong to the Indians. 45 Mention of the Northern Territories by Ainu was not limited to Yuki, prominent Ainu cultural leader Kayano Shigeru (1926-2006) in the 1970s said “if it comes to the point that the islands are returned to the Shamo, it is better the way it is now.” 46 In other words, they opposed Japanese rule over the disputed islands. Such views on the Northern Territories gained in popularity within the Ainu community and to a degree transferred over to Utari Association policy.

The first PR booklet the government published on the Northern Territories, which made no mention of the Ainu, encouraged the Utari Association to take up new measures, when they decided to articulate Ainu history, including their ancestral rights to the Northern Territories. Although this was not a direct response to the Association’s move to address the Northern Territories, it conveniently fit into their new framework and goals

42 Takakura’s interpretations would have us believe that “acculturation has helped to solve some of their problems as a minority group” (Takakura, “Vanishing Ainu,” 24).
43 Yuki, Charanke, 64-65, 67.
44 Yuki, Charanke, 66-68.
45 Kishida, “Matamo daiteikoku no genso,” Asahi Shinbun, 14 August 1980; quoted in Yuki, Charanke, 87, see also pages 85-86.
46 Quoted in Yuki, Charanke, 89.
that were in the process of rather drastic changes around the same time as the government endorsed the Northern Territories Day in 1981. In the early 1980s the return movement was limited to direction by the Docho and return movement organisers, the Japanese government had yet to play a significant role in the movement. Nomura Giichi questioned a Docho representative in 1982 about the movement’s slogan of “inherent territory” and since when have the islands been inherent. The reply was that this claim stems from Kondo Juzo’s erection of a stake on Etorofu in 1798 that read “Etorofu of Greater Japan.” Nomura then asked who was living in Etorofu and the Northern Territories when the stake was erected in 1798. “Ainu were living there” was the response. Since the Ainu lived there before 1798, why have they not been included in any part of the discussions? The representative kept silent. Nomura thought it nonsense that if one plants a stake on someone else’s land then they can claim “this is mine.” It should also be noted that at the time of Kondo’s trip to Etorofu, the Bakufu had not yet taken direct control over eastern Ezochi and Matsumae’s official position was that Ainu should not learn the Japanese language or adopt Wajin styles of dress, as a means of authenticating their trade monopoly in the area and their own rule over the Other, it was not until 1808 when the Bakufu first implemented a short term policy of assimilation (Chapter Three).

In 1982, the same year the UN established the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, the Utari Association, at their annual general assembly, after one year of investigation by a Special Committee, formally confirmed former occupants’ rights in Sakhalin, the Kurils and Hokkaido for the first time, and adopted a resolution that called for the repeal of the Hokkaido Former Aborigines Protection Act. There was a close connection between asserting recognition of their history and land claims, and riding discriminatory legislation towards the Ainu. One year later, the Association published and distributed a sixty-five page booklet on the Association’s official position on the Northern Territories, *Materials concerning the Prior Habitation of the Kuril Islands by the Ainu People* (*Chishima retto no Ainu minzoku senju ni kan suru shiryo*). Through the use of historical documents, they countered the government’s claims to the islands including that Wajin peacefully developed the islands with relations to the Ainu based on concepts of benevolence.

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47 For the Association’s general movements at the time see Siddle, *Race, Resistance*, 182. It seems that many Ainu paid attention to the fact that the Okinawans fought with the Japanese government to “return” Okinawa to Japan because they thought it would be better than being under American occupation. But when Okinawa was returned, the Okinawans were not happy with continued US bases and a tourist economy that takes the money back to the mainland (like a colony supporting the mother land) and leaves only waste and crowded beaches behind. The Ainu have found it better not to work alongside the government.


50 I am grateful to the Utari Association for providing me with a copy of this booklet.
The Association adopted the “Law Concerning Ainu People (draft)” in 1984, in which one of the objectives was “to recognise the existence of the Ainu people with their own distinct culture in the state of Japan.” Included in the reasons for instituting the legislation, the draft pointed out that they have a distinct language and culture and managed their own common existence in Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurils. It also prompted the government to recognise that under the Sakhalin-Kuril Exchange Treaty Wajin forced Ainu in Sakhalin and the northern Kurils to give up their traditional livelihood and that all Ainu were “bereft of their land, forest, and sea” which worked to humiliate “the Ainu’s ethnic pride.” Yet importantly, they were not seeking separation, but special rights from within the Japanese state of which they were a part. Publications by the association after this period focused on historical interpretations to support the repeal of the HFAPA and enactment of the Ainu New Law. It is a wonder then why Ainu movements in regards to the Northern Territories issue often fail to be mentioned while authors examine the process of enacting the Ainu New Law.

Another important figure in internationalising Ainu issues was Narita Tokuhei (Akibe Tokuhei as of 25 May 1990), an outspoken member of the Utari Association, who was born on Uruppu and whose parents lived and worked throughout the Kurils. His parents were asked to take part in the Reversion Movement in the mid 1960s but never participated. During the 1970s he unsuccessfully proposed for the passive Utari Association to take an active stance on the Northern Territories. Since the late 1970s he has promoted contact between the Ainu and minority peoples outside of Japan. In 1984 he showed the Ainu movement’s previous reliance on the domestic Buraku initiatives along with their newer inspiration from international models when he wrote,

Article 27 of Convention B in the International Covenant on Human Rights is a very important text for us. Representatives of the Japanese government have insisted that there is no such minority as indicated by that text. However, the government handles the Hokkaido Utari (or Ainu) policies under the Hokkaido Development Agency, dealing with issues including discrimination. The Ainu certainly exist for the Agency.

Surprisingly, also, the Japanese government leads movements to regain the Northern Territories. They say, “In the Northern Islands have lived no other race than Japanese. Our ancestors developed those islands, therefore they are our territories.” Of course, “our own ancestors” means

51 For a copy of the draft see Appendix 2: New Law Concerning the Ainu People (Draft) Adopted at the General Assembly of the Utari Kyokai, 27 May 1984
52 I am grateful to the Hokkaido Utari Association for kindly presenting me with resources regarding the Association’s views on the Northern Territories as well as their written submissions to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations from 1987 to 2000.
the Yamato race. The government tells such a white lie saying no race has ever lived there except the Yamato.55

... What we, the Ainu, must do first in our situation is to identify ourselves correctly, because our identity was twisted by the compulsory policies in the Meiji era. We have to advance ways by which we can understand what we are. Here is one such manifestation. The general assembly of Hokkaido Utari Society this May appealed to the Movement to Regain the Northern Territories that they must recognize the fact that the Ainu is the historic occupant not only on Chishima but also in Hokkaido.

Thus the Ainu have made an assertion. Until now all we could do was to run away from our identity.

We have begun to edit our history as well and we have made a decision to work for the abolishment of the Law on the Protection of the Old Natives in Hokkaido.

... The Ainu are now editing our history, claiming our identity, beginning to walk for ourselves.56

Narita’s article demonstrated connections between domestic and growing international influence in their thinking of their place within Japan, renewal of Ainu pride, and desire to be relocated within domestic and international historical discourse as a means to legitimise their present situation and future endeavours. No longer could Wajin exclusively use History to justify state positions and undermine the Ainu without an Ainu reaction. For example, in 1986, Prime Minister Nakasone said that Japan enjoys a higher level of education than the United States, because it lacks the many blacks and other non-white peoples that are a part of their populace, otherwise a result of Japan’s homogeneity, a comment that Ainu and international critics reacted to very seriously.57

The Utari Association and the United Nations

Ainu voices, while taken seriously in the international realm, have been constantly reinterpreted and downplayed within Japan. The first time for Ainu representatives to participate in any UN function was at the fifth UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva, where they spoke on their own affairs. Ainu continued to participate in these meetings thereafter through continued support by the Shimin Gaiko Centre (Citizen’s Diplomatic Centre). Since their initial participation in 1987, the UN has recognised the Ainu as being Indigenous. In the same year, Japan’s second report to the CCPR acknowledged the uniqueness of Ainu religion, language and culture, but said that the Ainu are guaranteed equality under the Japanese constitution. This standpoint is representative of International Law scholar Iwasawa Yuji’s argument that Japan is slow and passive in adopting international law standards domestically, as it reinterprets international law within the framework of their constitution.

After Ainu participation in the UN minority rights group in Geneva in 1989, Nomura Giichi expressed his optimism for pursuing support from the international community for pressuring the government to officially recognise the Ainu. He said “Our demands coincide with world trends towards respect for minority peoples. If the Japanese government does nothing, even while saying they are internationalising, we will confront them at the UN. Pressure from the outside world has the strongest potential.” It is interesting that Indigenous peoples, including the Ainu, use concepts of, and the realm of International Law to work towards decolonising their lands and life-ways, because International Law had been the very discipline used by the Japanese and other colonial nations to declare and justify incorporation of Indigenous lands into their own system or rule, often calling their lands terra nullius.


58 The UN acknowledged Okinawans as being Indigenous since 1996. For details on how Utari Association members first went to the WGIP see, Takeuchi, Nomura Giichi, 24-27.


60 Iwasawa, International Law.


62 See, Uemura Hideaki, “Colonial Annexation of Okinawa,” 110-112. Japan also sought to classify Formosa as terra nullius when it asserted its claim on the island in the late nineteenth century. In 1988, at an International Labour Organization conference in Geneva the international treaty No. 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries was revised to disavow past encouragement of assimilation. This resulted in the creation of No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries to promote ethnic people’s enjoyment of legitimate rights to their uniqueness and social, economic and cultural development. The Utari Association was also an active participating organisation in its revision despite the Japanese government’s complete neglect of Ainu positions (AHH, “Statement Submitted to The International Labor Conference 75th Session, 1988: Sixth item on the Agenda –
The Association continued to stress the importance of the international arena for their struggle. In their report to the seventh session of the WGIP, they made a direct connection between recognition of their traditionally inhabited lands, their movement for a national law guaranteeing Ainu rights, and the international movement for “the rights of the world’s indigenous peoples,” so therefore “we would like to secure our self-reliance in cooperation with the efforts of the international society.”63 Linked to seeking such cooperation, the Association encouraged both governments to re-acknowledge the Ainu’s Indigenous status to the area when President Gorbachev visited Japan from 16-19 April 1991.64 No reply came from either side.65 Shortly afterwards, Chairperson of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Erica Irene Daes went to Japan upon the request of the Association to survey discrimination against them and the government’s policy toward the Ainu,66 and a symposium was held in Tokyo.

Their 1991 report to the WGIP informed the international community that unauthorised excavations of Ainu remains, for the purpose of “medical research,” took place in all of their homelands, where over one-thousand individuals were dug up and transported to Hokkaido University’s Medical Department.67 Although the report said that the remains were returned and a memorial hall constructed, this is only a partial truth as there still remains unresolved issues between Ainu and other peoples, whose bones were collected, and this university.68 Of the bones collected fifty-one were from the Kuril Islands. These excavations were done mainly by Haruo Yamazaki and Kodama Sakuzanemon of Hokkaido University, during excavation trips from 1934 to 1938, then again in 1956.69 The stealing of bodies from graves by Hokkaido University professors, and having them on display, is an example showing that, although the Ainu are officially considered Japanese and equal under the constitution, they are, in the eyes of many Wajin,
considered distinct and different (see Figure 6). The same researchers did not dig up and steal half decomposed Wajin bodies and put them on display claiming them as their own property, neither did Wajin anthropologists go to Wajin cities and villages to take their measurements to the extent that was done to the Ainu. This kind of treatment is contrary to arguments made by scholars like Okuyama Ryo, who have written that there was no difference in treatment between the Ainu and Japanese as commoners. But, this was (is) a problem because ignorance of the difference between the Ainu and Wajin led the government to treat them the same under law, under the guise of homogeneity, without paying attention to local level activity, representing a continuation from differences we saw between government and local views of the Ainu, when the Bakufu took direct control over Ezochi. Okuyama himself, like the majority of government officials and Wajin scholars who claimed that there were no difference of treatment, and therefore no issues to be dealt with, concentrated on recordings of law and paper documents. This is interesting because Okuyama himself noted the need to be sceptical and critical of his resources. This issue of Ainu grave theft by Wajin scholars received a lot of attention in the WGIP. In a disturbing way, the grave robberies from the 1930s onward helped the Ainu gain audiences in the international arena and authenticate their claims.

In December 1991 Takemura Yasuko submitted four questions to be clarified by the government regarding the legal status of the Ainu. The answers given by a Member of the House of Councillors illustrates underlying official rhetoric that appears not to seriously address the situation at hand. In response to asking when Hokkaido was incorporated into Japan and what the legal basis for the incorporation was, the answer was that “The island of Hokkaido has been a territory of Japan from the beginning, and it is not clear when the land became actual Japanese territory. When Russia and Japan settled the border between the two countries at the end of the Edo era and the beginning of the Meiji era, the island of Hokkaido was not taken up as a question at all, and it was regarded as a natural premise that the land was Japanese territory.” When asked to define the procedures taken to assimilate the Ainu at this time he said “The island of Hokkaido has been a territory of Japan from the beginning, and the Ainu have been Japanese from the beginning.” In response to the last question of what was the position of Hokkaido and the Ainu before the incorporation of the island it was recorded that “I have read the documents and acquired other information regarding Hokkaido, and I acknowledge that it is a common belief that the Ainu have been living on the island of Hokkaido for centuries.” This type of unclear, unspecific, and non-comprehensive answers are the norm that Ainu encounter when questioning the foundation of the return movement. Ten days later the Japanese government’s third report to the CCPR recognised the Ainu for the first time as an ethnic minority of Article 27, but that they were not denied any of the

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71 Okuyama, *Ainu suiboshi*, forward.
rights stipulated by the same Article. While this showed a change of government position toward the Ainu within Japan, the foundation of their position that there are no problems in relation to the Ainu persisted.

This lack of serious reply is also seen in June of 1992, when the Governor of Sakhalin invited Ainu to attend a meeting between them and the Hokkaido Government regarding the Northern Territories issue in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. Akibe Tokuhei, dressed in Ainu regalia, showed a map of traditional Ainu lands and said that the Ainu were the original inhabitants even before a territorial issue arose, and that both governments should remember this when they negotiate. While the Association later wrote that at the meeting the “Russian side made it clear that it considered the Ainu people to be the indigenous inhabitants of the islands,” the press had a different view stating “Some Russians laughed nervously while Japanese listeners studied their shoelaces.” Once again the Ainu were not taken seriously, this time in regional debates.

At the inauguration of the International Year of the World’s Indigenous People in December 1992, which Japan voted in favour of in 1990, Nomura had the rare honour of addressing the General Assembly. His speech informed the listeners on the three main areas of Ainu life. He talked of how the areas of Hokkaido, the Kurils and southern Sakhalin have been the homeland of the distinct Ainu society and culture since “time immemorial.” He then described how the Japanese government unilaterally claimed their lands and how many of them were relocated in the process as the Japanese and Russians negotiated borders in the nineteenth century. The Ainu were the target of government assimilation policies that resulted in discrimination and marginalisation within Japanese society. Nomura did not dwell on negative aspects of Ainu history and exhibited acceptance that Indigenous people throughout the globe have a history of similar colonial encounters. He ended his speech by expressing desire for governments around the world to begin “a new partnership” and to have the Japanese government open meaningful dialogue with the Ainu, certainly not a new request.

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74 In a meeting in May 1992 with the government and the ad hoc Committee for Consideration of the New Ainu Law at the Prime Minister’s Office in Kasumigaseki in Tokyo, less than one month after Toyooka Masanori circulated letters of Ainu petition to government and press, Nomura Giichi’s second point of discussion was that of the Ainu and the northern Territories (AAH, “Statement to the Tenth Session,” in AKS, 922).


The International Year was a busy year for the Ainu with various events throughout Japan. For example, the Utari Association invited Ms. Rigoberta Menchu Tum, a Guatemalan Indigenous person, the 1992 Nobel Peace Prize Winner and a UN Goodwill Ambassador for the International Year of the World’s Indigenous People, to Hokkaido. The Nibutani Forum, a four day event organised by the Association, included Indigenous representatives from thirteen countries and had over four-thousand participants. The Association said that through these events the people of Japan acquired a better understanding of the Ainu. During the same year the UN resolved to make the ten years from 10 December 1994 the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples. In their 1993 report to WGIP they briefly mentioned the connection between their Indigeneity and the Northern Territories issue. It also remarked how “the ‘Collection of Data Concerning the History of Territorial Issues between Japan and Russia – Joint Compilation,’ was prepared based on the mutual agreement of the two countries in 1992, was produced on the assumption that the Ainu people are an indigenous people.” The Ainu Association, echoing the theme of the International Year, did not look to blame the government for the past, but demanded a “new partnership” and encouraged the Japanese Government to pay closer attention to the effect Japanese companies have on Indigenous peoples throughout the globe. They understood that the concept of self-determination in the UN draft Declaration is troublesome for many governments, but stressed that they only want a “high degree of autonomy” and are willing to act in consideration of “the unity of the nations” and “preservation of the nation’s territorial integrity.” They are willing to act as part of the nation, as full participants, and not outsiders as the government and academics seem to fear if they recognise the Ainu as Indigenous. They reiterated their traditional lands as consisting of Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurils, and that “the Ainu people have never given up nor handed over any land, including Hokkaido, on which they have lived. Therefore, the land originally belonged to the Ainu people, and they have the rights to the land, which no one can infringe.” The point here is that the Wajin did infringe and have justified it in terms of the nation-state, progress and development, concepts all supported by International Law.

Nomura, showing how national opinions can differ greatly from local ones, later wrote that Russians on Sakhalin were in the opinion that the Northern Territories belong neither to Russian or Japanese governments and, if they are returned, they should be returned to the Ainu. The Association also inquired, unsuccessfully, to have Ainu included in the three groups of “concerned people” (mass communication, return

79 In 1994 the UN resolved for 9 August to be a day to celebrate the International day of the world’s indigenous people to be held every year of the International decade
81 AAH, “Eleventh Session,” in AKS, 878, 874, 872.
movement members, and returnees [returnee here, does not include the “repatriated” Ainu or their descendents]), who became eligible for visa free trips to the Northern Territories to pay respects to their ancestors. This brings up issues of an internally developed communal history of the Ainu despite regional variations in language and culture.

In May 1997, one year after the government ratified CERD, partially in response to over ten years of protest by the Ainu, the destruction of Ainu lands by a damming project near Nibutani and international pressure, the Japanese government ratified the Cultural Promotion Act (CPA), based on only one principle presented in the proposed Ainu New Law – education and culture. This was often labelled an “Epoch making event,” for two main reasons: first it nullified the outdated 1899 HFAPA; second, it recognised the Ainu people as having a distinct cultural identity within Japanese national borders. The CPA, however, has been a mixed blessing for the Ainu. It recognised a separate ethnic group in Japan and supported the promotion of their culture and language. On the other hand, it completely omitted any mention of: the Ainu being Indigenous, Ainu land rights, or other political and economic rights demanded by the Hokkaido Utari Association in their 1984 proposed law. Nonetheless, many Ainu saw it as an improvement compared to comments made by the former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone eleven years prior.

In the Association’s 1998 report to the WGIP, recognising the shortfall of the CPA, they reflected on major decisions regarding the acknowledgement as being Indigenous. For example, the March 1997 judgment in the Nibutani Dam Case recognised that “the Ainu people are the original inhabitants of Hokkaido and its adjacent areas (including the Kuril islands and Sakhalin Island). They constituted a distinct culture and identity before Japan extended jurisdiction over their land. Their land was incorporated by the Japanese government and they suffered economic and social disposition under the governmental policies imposed by the majority Japanese. Even under these circumstances the Ainu still maintain their distinct culture and identity as a

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84 The full title of the law is “Law for the Promotion of the Ainu Culture and for the Dissemination and Advocacy for the Traditions of the Ainu and the Ainu Culture” (Ainu bunka no shinko narabi ni Ainu no dentoto ni kansuru chishiki no fukyu oyobi keihatsu ni kansuru horitsu no gaiyo). For a copy of the law see Appendix 3: Law for the Promotion of the Ainu Culture and for the Dissemination and Advocacy for the Traditions of the Ainu and the Ainu Culture

Law No. 52, May 14, 1997
Amendment: Law No. 160, Dec. 22, 1999


86 See Appendix 2: New Law Concerning the Ainu People (Draft) Adopted at the General Assembly of the Utari Kyokai, 27 May 1984It was reported that a Canadian member of the Human Rights Committee was disappointed with the Government of Japan when they learnt about details regarding the 1997 law (AAH, “Statement Submitted to the Sixth Session the Working Group on Right of the Indigenous People,” reprinted in KKS, 320).
social group.” 87 While Kayano Shigeru was in political office (1994-1998) it was recorded that Prime Ministers and other cabinet members felt that the “indigenousness of the Ainu is a historical fact.” 88 Repetitious in nature, the report reminded the WGIP that since 1982 they have officially asked for reconfirmation of their Indigenous status to the entire Kuril chain and want the government to clarify the Ainu’s Indigenous status of Hokkaido. 89 In Japan’s 1999 CERD report to the UN, they recognised that the Ainu had been in Hokkaido before Wajin expansion, but the downfall was that in the same sentence they called Hokkaido Japan’s inherent territory, thus undermining the Indigenousness of Ainu. 90

Akibe Tokuhei has recently said that he does not “understand why the Japanese government claims sovereignty only over the four islands.” 91 Implying that since Ainu lived throughout all the Kurils, and since Japan claimed Ainu lands as inherently Japanese, by extension they should not limit their claim to four islands. While this seems like a drastic statement for an Assistant Director of the Utari Association to make, it shows independence of thought between the Docho and the Utari Association and possible acceptance that their petitioning method has been unsuccessful. Although highly unlikely, this may lead to new or more assertive approaches by the Association in the future both domestically and internationally.

The Utari Association has said that they are in a deadlock, because they feel that they cannot proceed unless they are recognised as being “Indigenous,” and the only way for the government to recognise them as such is to have an international definition available. 92 This is one reason why they take great interest in the activities at the United Nations. Applying thoughts of Iwasawa to this issue, however, even if there were such a definition available, courts in Japan would continue to ignore, devalue and move around such international human rights issues and focus on their constitutional rights instead, therefore, greatly limiting the value of having such an international definition, which, if ever created, would greatly limit who could be called “Indigenous.” This is because Japanese courts, which are closely linked to the ruling LDP, would rather deal with their own familiar ground of the Constitution and that they are “strict in recognizing a certain rule to be customary international law, or in regarding it to be directly applicable in Japan.” 93

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87 See chapter one, note 35.
88 From August 1993 to January 1996, a coalition of opposition parties, not the LDP, was in power.
90 CERD, Japan, CERD/C/350/Add.2, 6.
91 Hirano Keiji, “Residents Still Dream of Return to Russian-held Isles,” Japan Times, 8 October 2006.
92 If we put the UDHR up to the criticism of the draft Declaration where there is much insistence to have an international definition of “indigenous peoples” then we would also have to define the word “peoples” in the UDHR, because it gives a significant amount of rights without ever defining what exactly “peoples” is. Under international law “peoples” are groups that are authorized to have self-determination such as is manifested in a nation or state.
93 Iwasawa, International Law, 289.
Domestic Failure to Take the Hokkaido Utari Association Seriously

Lack of Ainu participation on issues related to them is not limited to the Northern Territories. Even in issues directly involving the Ainu, excluding them from being active participants in decision making processes is the norm. For example, in a meeting in May 1992 with the government and the ad hoc Committee for Consideration of the New Ainu Law at the Prime Minister’s Office in Kasumigaseki in Tokyo, less than one month after Toyooka Masanori, leader of Kurils and Sakhalin Ainu conference, circulated letters of Ainu petition to the government and press, Nomura Giichi strongly criticised the Committee for asking childish questions even after three years of investigation of Ainu matters. The Committee asked: “Now in Hokkaido how many Ainu are there? Is there anyone who can speak the Ainu language?” This showed their lack of serious study.94

Four years later at the “The Conference of the Well-Informed on the Measures for the Ainu People,” which formed to discuss the draft Ainu New Law in 1996, was made up of seven members, not one was Ainu. The members included four professors (one was an ex-judge on the Supreme Court), the president of the National Ethnology Museum, the Governor of Hokkaido and a novelist, who past away almost two months before they finished their report. The report itself was highly descriptive in nature and lacked any sort of in-depth analyses. The group had various meetings over a one year period, with only one brief trip to Hokkaido. The report referred to the assimilation policy as the “Adjusting policy” in the English translation, and that despite “being treated equally as a part of the Japanese nation under the law,” “many Ainu people suffered from poverty and discrimination.” This statement reinforces the idea that the Ainu were incapable of succeeding under situations of “equality” due to their inferior nature, justifying the HFAPA, and not including Ainu in present discussion since they are descendents of the very people that needed “protecting.”

The Conference members’ opinion on the UN was that its outcomes are unpredictable, and that the definition of “Indigenous peoples” is still under heated debate, so it would be impossible to yet call the Ainu “Indigenous.” They completely opposed any ideas of self-determination, and/or compensation for lost lands into any newly implemented measures for the Ainu. To do so would undermine the concept of Japanese homogeneity. Outlining only a few of their positions gives a good sense of Committee’s underlying position. A supreme court judge, who like most judges in Japan, was likely not familiar or entirely comfortable dealing with international law, a museumologist and the historical novelist Shiba Ryotaro, who represent putting the Ainu in the past and not the present or future, and the Hokkaido Governor, whose position is symbolic of manipulating Ainu for the benefit of progress and development of the north.95 Knowing

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that active Ainu participation in domestic issues directly related to them does not occur even in recent times, it is unsurprising that they are not taken as active participants in the larger issue of the Northern Territories domestically.\footnote{For more examples of recent events that show a lack of seriousness or awkwardness in Ainu issues that involve international law and concepts of human rights look into the issue of the court case involving scholar Kono Motomichi and discriminatory reprint texts (Tsubute henshu iinkai, ed., Ainu neno an charanke:ningen rashi hanashii o; Kono Motomichi no sabetsu tosho o dangai suru [Hyogo: Rokuzaisha, 2001]; Kawamura Shinritsu Eoripakku Ainu, “Hochi dekinai sabetsu tosho,” Tsubute 35 [Summer 2002]: 7-10; Hideshima Yukari, “Kohan na koe de saibansho no ninshiki o kaeyo,” Tsubute 35 [Summer 2002]: 13-17 and Fujino Yutaka, “Ainu minzoku e no iryo isei chosa no sabetsusei,” Tsubute 35 [Summer 2002]: 21-32). From 8-9 October 1979 the three-hundred members Committee for Return of the Northern Territory to Japan (Hoppo ryodo henkan yokyu kokusai apiru iinkai) went to New York and appealed directly to the United Nations and individual country representatives for the UN and posted an advertisement in the New York Times entitled “Japan is Still Occupied.” Before their departure Arai Genjiro and other Ainu asked the Committee to include Ainu representatives. Seeing that the representative was Takakura Shinichiro and understanding the position of late 1970s return movement mentality there is little surprise that the Committee did not allow any Ainu to participate (“Japan is Still Occupied,” New York Times, 8 October 1979 and Arai Genjiro, “Senju minzoku o wasureruna,” Hokkaido Shinbun, 20 May 1979).}

International versus domestic/regional treatment of Ainu issues differ greatly, while local areas of debate fluctuate between support and ignorance, the UN views the Ainu as Indigenous Peoples and supports their claims to traditional lands. Domestically, the Japanese government recognises them as an ethnic minority with no problems besides those of welfare issues. The United Nations provides a platform and space for including Ainu voices, where they can be heard and responded to. The government has difficulty in giving clear answers related to Ainu and the Northern Territories. Nonetheless, it expects a clear definition by the UN on “Indigenous Peoples” before it is willing to debate this issue domestically, yet has shown support for the Draft Declaration on Indigenous Peoples. Once again, this shows a difference between domestic circumstances and international actions, based on political motives, as we also saw in Chapter Four with the 1919 racial clause. The Ainu pursuit of rights in the Northern Territories was closely associated with their push for the Ainu New Law. One purpose of the New Law, according to Nomura, was to avoid the kind of amnesia of Ainu history represented by the Northern Territories issue.\footnote{Nomura, “Hoppo ryodo,” 155.}

Other Ainu Organisations and Issues: the Return for the Autonomous Ainu Homeland and the Pirika Zenkoku Kai

Many Ainu have found actions of the Hokkaido Utari Association, especially since the enactment of the CPA, to be too conservative domestically. These Ainu have, therefore, initiated a number of their own organisations to assert their often unheard and seemingly powerless voices. One example, is the Ainu Moshiri no Jijiku o Torimodosu Kai or the Association to Restore the Autonomous Ainu Homeland.\footnote{Siddle, “Limits to Citizenship,” 454.} The first president was Araya
Kokichi, who later died in 1992 at the age of 59, followed by Yamamoto Kazuaki. Several Ainu created this organisation on 24 October 1991 to seek the return of the four islands to the Ainu. The following day many Japanese newspapers printed articles on it. Their assertion for territorial rights exhibited an Ainu need to further movements beyond the Utari Association’s eight year demand for Indigenous rights.

Simultaneously following arguments and activities presented by this organisation with information provided by Brad Williams on the “Sakhalin Factor” proves informative for better understanding the development of Ainu arguments and their position on currently Russian occupied lands. Reading Ainu arguments alone, without understanding the political influence Sakhalin governors, especially Governor Valentin Fedorov (1990-1993), had on territorial discourse leaves the story incomplete, since this organisation formed and matured during this same period. Williams argued that governors had a large degree of influence over negotiations with Japan in the early to mid-1990s. As the Soviet system broke down, regional leaders gained more power both locally and nationally as Moscow relied more on them for cohesion and preservation of their own national political power positions. Amidst such regional influence, the Peace Boat, a Japanese NGO, visited Sakhalin and the southern Kurils. Local authorities and peoples in Sakhalin and the Kurils told Chikappu Mieko, the only Ainu on board, that if the islands were returned to anyone they would be returned to the Ainu and not the Japanese, because the lands previously belonged to the Ainu. Such a response is understandable because, at the time Fedorov used nationalism and his regional authority to obtain more support from Moscow for local development, which gave him an even stronger hold and claim to keeping all the Kurils under Sakhalin jurisdiction and as a part of Russia. To support the relinquishment of any of the Kurils would have undermined regional development of Sakhalin, and his own power. Obtaining Ainu support for his actions further legitimised his rule and persuasion to ensure Moscow would make no concessions. The Ainu also gained regional Russian support in the early 1990s to have access to Sakhalin and the Kurils, which enhanced their own arguments as having historical claim to the region, as well as a stronger foundation for asserting their indigeneity.

After the Japanese government finished a survey of left-behind Wajin in Sakhalin, Chikappu demanded the Ministry of Health and Welfare to perform a similar survey of Ainu on the island, but the Ministry denied her request. This led her to propose to

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Even when the Governor of Hokkaido, Yokomichi, went to Moscow in the early 1990s, he did not actively take lead in talking about the Ainu. Although he received some votes from Ainu people, he did not represent them (AH, Ainu Moshiri, 27).
perform an Ainu-led survey the following month.\textsuperscript{102} When she went to Sakhalin with five other Ainu in 1990, she found out that in the same year the Nivkhi regained a degree of autonomy with some lands returned to their control and that the Nivkhi Association welcomed the Ainu to join and work together for common goals. In December 1989, the Nivkhi of Sakhalin formed the Northern Minority Peoples Association (hoppo shosuminzoku kyokai) and called for self-determination rights and started reviving their ceremonies, and within the year they secured fishing and hunting rights. Chikappu and other Ainu wanted to work with the Sakhalin Indigenous peoples to hold a symposium on the Northern Territories there to have both the Soviet Union and Japan think seriously about basic Indigenous rights.\textsuperscript{103} According to Hokkaido University of Education Lecturer Tanaka Ryo, who specialises in Sakhalin Indigenous peoples and Ainu history, the Nivkhi signed an agreement with the Sakhalin provincial council on 29 September 1990 resulting in the return to them an area of about one-hundred and thirty square kilometres in northern Sakhalin.\textsuperscript{104} Ten days before the return, Kaizawa Teruichi sent a message to the governor of Sakhalin calling for closer ties between Sakhalin and Ainu.\textsuperscript{105} In 1991 five new areas were returned to Indigenous minorities in the island. Tanaka said that, even though the system is different in Sakhalin than in Japan, it is worthwhile to evaluate the positive way of looking at Indigenous rights on the island.\textsuperscript{106} These changes in Sakhalin likely stimulated the Ainu to take further action and develop ties with Sakhalin and its people. Inspired by the Uilta and Nivkhi successes Chikappu called upon other Ainu to work hard to have land returned to them.\textsuperscript{107}

Also around this time an Ainu fishing company, Utari Kyodo, created ties with Aniwa, a Japanese-Soviet venture in and around the disputed waters, in order to help develop fisheries and contacts with other peoples, and fish. The director of the Foreign Ministry, Togo Kazuhiko, expressed concern of this joint venture to Hokkaido Governor Yokomichi stating that it could be interpreted as recognising Soviet sovereignty in the area.\textsuperscript{108} Less than two years after the joint venture began, the Ainu company was charged with illegal fishing of crab in waters off of Shikotan. The president, Shiiku Tadaichi, denied the accusation and justified their actions as being in contract with Aniwa. The government said that any fishing in the area, regardless of the company, is a crime


\textsuperscript{104}“Shosuminzoku ni tochi henkan,” \textit{Asahi Shinbun}, 16 November 1990. See, “5th Minutes of the 120th Diet – Upper House Cabinet Committee Session,” in \textit{AKS}, 900.


\textsuperscript{106}“Saharinshu shosuminzoku ni toshi henkan,” \textit{Asahi Shinbun}, 15 November 1991.

\textsuperscript{107} AM, \textit{Ainu Moshiri}, 125.

without permission of the government. Shiiku’s argument failed to please the court and in early 1991 the Kushiro district court found him guilty of illegal fishing and sentenced him to five months in prison and suspended his fishing for three years. The Sapporo High Court upheld the ruling in April 1992. Ota Masakuni later wrote that “…the hidden meaning behind their actions was that people had the right to communicate and coexist with people who lived close to each other. This stands in opposition to the consistent course of the modern state, for which borders and territories are the most important thing…”

The visits to Sakhalin, along with the Utari Association’s lack of success in the matter of securing Indigenous rights, led several Ainu to create the Autonomous Homeland Association. The president Yamamoto Kazuaki did not see this organisation as a sudden formation or activity, but a continuation of work that the Ainu Liberation League began under direction of Yuki Shoji. Ideas presented by the Association were not new, Ainu and Wajin have made such claims in the past; it is simply that the government and many scholars have not noticed. Their mandate included nine articles, which similar to the 1983 Utari publication, included their goal to declare to the world their rights in their former lands and for the formation of an autonomous Ainu homeland in the disputed islands. Most of the thoughts presented by this Association directly oppose the return of Northern Territories and address Indigenous rights to the same lands. While through inference, their claims extend to all of the Kurils, they stress rights on the southern portion where the majority of political attention lies.

Chikappu Mieko became the first Ainu since the end of World War II to visit Sakhalin, Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan, when she participated in a Peace Boat voyage. The Peace Boat took its first voyage in 1983 as a Japanese university student-led initiative and “creative response to government censorship regarding Japan’s past military aggression in the Asia-Pacific…with the aim of learning first-hand about the war from those who experienced it and initiating people-to-people exchange.” The eleventh voyage of Peace Boat left Niigata with about one-hundred and twenty people on board and visited the Northern Territories visa-free and Sakhalin from 17 to 27 September 1991. Another Peace Boat voyage in 2002 visited Kunashiri, an action which MOFA criticized.

112 AM, Ainu Moshiri, 12, 328.
113 AM, Ainu Moshiri, 151.
departure the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seriously opposed them from going to the Kurils. They warned going to the Kurils is for specialists, so the government should be responsible for taking amateurs there. The Ministry of Transportation also became involved and said that there was the obstacle of getting a license from a travel agency before they could go. But those from the Peace Boat persisted and made the trip possible. When they arrived in Sakhalin, Governor Fedorov and other government officials attended the welcome party, but soon returned to their office. Many locals in the islands visited told Chikappu that the Ainu are the rightful owners to the islands and Ainu were invited to live there. She was fascinated that in addition to Russians, there were Koreans from Sakhalin on the Northern Territories, children in Shikotan were learning English and Japanese, and the Russian museum curator on Shikotan had an interest in Ainu ruins. Her impression of the Indigenous inhabitants of Sakhalin was favourable, and she saw the Soviet Union as embracing multiculturalism, a view different than official Japanese views as represented by Nakasone’s 1986 remarks and the large body of Nihonjinron literature, interpreted as an extension of the Meiji assimilation policy. She expressed a need to change the consciousness of each citizen towards the false idea of Japan’s homogeneity. She said that Japan was ignoring the Ainu and the current inhabitants of the islands, and this was an historical error that is repeating – a criminal act. She wrote it would be possible to work with local governments to create an autonomous region, but in Japan they are not even acknowledged as peoples.

For this reason their Association was looking into the possibility of creating an autonomous region and wanted the Japanese government to give straight answers on why they are unable to acknowledge them as an Indigenous people. Yamamoto said they formed an Ainu-Soviet Association (AS Association) and the Soviet side recognised the Northern Territories as Ainu lands, so they should be free to fish and live with the current inhabitants, just like how the Koreans, who the Japanese brought there, live alongside Russians. He did not mention that such a move, while potentially positive for the Ainu, would not work to resolve other issues, nor would it be plausible since the Ainu are Japanese citizens, this would create a multitude of new problems. The state would not support such an Ainu or Russian initiative. Ainu encouragement of such a move would have further supported the Sakhalin Governors’ control over the islands and pressured those in Moscow to oppose a return.

Locals wanted to support the Ainu, because similar to the Ainu, most local Russians did not want the islands returned to Japan. Supporting the Ainu also supported their cause. Just as it would be impossible to tell the Wajin to get out of Hokkaido, it is

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116 AM, Ainu Moshiri, 7, 111, 135. See also, “Mitsu no mei motsu Karafuto Ainu: ‘kokyo’ tte ittai nani?” Hokkaido Shinbun, 11 October 1991. Yamamoto said that they had been talking with the Soviets since the 1980s and they have said if they return it to anyone it would be to the Ainu (AM, Ainu Moshiri, 11).
117 AM, Ainu Moshiri, 113, 115.
118 AM, Ainu Moshiri, 8.
119 AM, Ainu Moshiri, 9, 150, 151.
120 AM, Ainu Moshiri, 12, 119-120.
similarly impracticable to tell the current residents to leave. The Ainu are insisting upon their Indigenous rights and desire the establishment of an autonomous region where they can live according to their own ways. While the Utari Association sought to be included in “concerned peoples” who could visit the islands visa-free, they would prefer to not to be included in the group of “former residents,” because it would imply that Ainu are not the original inhabitants. Members argued that they will need to fight to change public opinion; however public opinion on historical matters is difficult to change, because it is at the mercy of nationalism. They believe that, even if the government does know of the Ainu and Ainu rights to lands within the Northern Territories, they purposefully hide this with the use of mass communication and media so the public has not learnt the actual history of the area.\textsuperscript{121} Even today most inhabitants of Hokkaido know very little of Wajin occupation of Hokkaido and the northern regions.

This Association also built ties with Okinawans. The twentieth anniversary of the return of Okinawa took place in 1992, but numerous locals argued that the return only helped them gain economic sufficiency, but they still have no power to choose their own path and Japan has destroyed Okinawan nature through the promotion of tourism. From their experience numerous Okinawans think Ainu deserve to have a choice in making their future based on their own ways.\textsuperscript{122} Many Okinawans fight for the removal of US military bases, but they also oppose the resorts, which destroy the local environment and economy. Most of the money from tourism goes back to Honshu with the locals receiving little benefit. Okinawan support helps the Ainu to build national contacts and further disseminate their claims throughout Japan.

Like the Utari Association, they also recognised the importance of internationalising their cause. Chikappu believed that internationalising the problem would help their cause and that is why she took part in the Peace Boat. In 1992, Yamamoto handed over a position paper addressed to President Yeltsin and Sakhalin Governor Fedorov at the Sapporo Russian Consulate General which stressed the rights of Ainu in the Northern Territories.\textsuperscript{123} And a month later representatives of this organisation participated in the Global Forum in Indigenous Peoples in Rio de Janeiro.\textsuperscript{124} They believed that such international initiatives and movements around the draft Declaration on Indigenous peoples give enough power to the Ainu, so they no longer need the Japanese government to speak on their behalf.

Their solution to the Northern Territories issue would not be a “return” to Japan, because, if they were, the Wajin would develop them as they did Hokkaido and ruin the environment. They would rather leave the islands as they are and continue to work for inclusion of the Ainu and other Indigenous peoples in the region and set the area up as a place or park, where the Ainu would have access. This would encourage a reduction of

\textsuperscript{121} AM, \textit{Ainu Moshiri}, 25, 26, 132, 133.  
\textsuperscript{122} AM, \textit{Ainu Moshiri}, 10.  
concepts of sovereignty and territory and encourage academics and governments to pay more attention to the human aspect of the issue and less to the nation. This is one step towards breaking the idea of a “sovereign nation” as we begin to think of people above that of the state.125 In other words, this organisation called for a softening of concepts of sovereignty and territorial national borders.

**Pirika Zenkoku**

Associated with the Autonomous Homeland Association, the *Pirika Zenkoku Jikkoinkai* (full name is “*Hoppo Ryodo no Hi*” Hantai! “Ainu Shinpo” Jitsugen! Zenkoku Jikkoinkai) has continued to network with empathetic Okinawans and Wajin regarding many issues around the Ainu, the Northern Territories being one of them. Tadashi Shirakawa, a member of *Pirika Zenkoku*, made a similar request to the Utari Association by insisting both governments recognise Ainu rights in the Kurils, Sakhalin and Hokkaido. One of eight articles in the mandate of this organisation, which first took shape in 1999, is to oppose the Northern Territories Day and the status quo of Russo-Japanese negotiations. One of the four themes of the activities of *Pirika Moshiri Sha*, a newsletter associated with Pirika Zenkoku, is to fight against the “Northern Territories Day.” The newsletter’s second theme is the pursuit of the enactment of a real Ainu Law, because the CPA fell short of the draft Ainu Law and fails to recognise the indigeneity of the Ainu, or provide political or land rights. Once again the pursuit of a new law and opposition to the Northern Territories return movement are intricately connected.126

Another member of Pirika Moshiri Sha stressed that they are continuing to pursue rights to travel to and from the Kurils visa-free and have hunting and fishing privileges, which would enable them to live with the current Russian residents. They are not asking for a complete unconditional return as the Japanese government is. Members openly oppose and wish to stop bilateral Russo-Japanese negotiations that ignore the Ainu and try to work towards a realistic and true history that includes the Ainu in the Okhotsk region. They also support Ainu and other northern Indigenous peoples’ Indigenous rights and movements towards self-determination.127 Pro nation-centered academics and politicians appear uneasy when dealing with the concept of self-determination. Self-determination, however, is not a black or white concept, but has a large grey area that is much more complicated in nature than a binary division.

While this association is interested in pursuing Ainu rights in the international realm, some Ainu think that the United Nations and the draft Declaration for Indigenous

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126 The other two aims are to (1) Investigate the Hokkaido University’s human skeletons incident and (2) fight against the cultural anthropologist Kono Motomichi and his reproductions of discriminatory sources from the early twentieth century (*Pirika Moshiri sha* <www.geocities.jp/pirika_kanto/> [21 November 2006]).

127 A member of *Pirika Moshiri sha* gratefully supplied me with information regarding their movements towards the “Northern Territories,” the Kono Motomichi case, and issues regarding skeletal remains at Hokkaido University (Mr. A. et al., personal communication with Author, 5 August 2006 [Japan]).
Peoples will not help their situation, because Japan will not recognise it since Japan only copies the United States’ actions, and they are unlikely to support it. And if Japan does adopt it after its acceptance by the General Assembly, then it will argue that they are unable to implement it, because there is no international definition of “Indigenous peoples.” This organisation, therefore, tends to focus on domestic and regional issues. Their annual February protest is one such example. On 7 February 2004, Pirika Zenkoku organised, mainly through Ainu efforts, the tenth annual demonstration against the “Northern Territories Day” in Sapporo. The main objective of this protest was to ensure that the Japanese government does not forget about the Ainu and other Indigenous peoples, when addressing issues north of Hokkaido. In November 2005, Shirakawa Tadashi submitted a joint statement to the Japanese Foreign Minister and the Russian embassy in Tokyo which stated that neither Japan nor Russia have rights to Northern Territories and that both governments need to recognise Ainu human rights as Indigenous peoples, including the right to move to and from the islands. An official at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that “we will report the request to the foreign minister but we cannot accord special treatment only to the Ainu.” However, “This will not have an effect on the talks because it has never been an issue between the two governments.” Likewise, a spokesperson of the Russian embassy said it was “not to be taken seriously” and added that it had been a pointless exercise because it had generated no reaction in either Japanese or Russian media. State dialogue silences Indigenous voices, and media and external pressure in the petition process is important.

Summary
The Ainu, who do press the government to get back land and pursue issues of Ainu Indigenous rights, are in the minority. This is partially due to most Ainu being satisfied with receiving money from the government. “Since we get some money from the government it makes it difficult to complain about anything.” The “cheque-book”

128 Mr. A. et al., personal communication with author, 21 July 2006 (Japan).
129 Several web sites created by the Ainu that include information on this demonstration include: Ainu Puyara, <http://alles.or.jp/~tarrq/> (6 April 2004); No Title, <http://geocities.co.jp/SilkRoad-Ocean/8242/prika/gogo-nothandominon2003.html> (6 April 2006); “Nanboku no shiro de icharu to ‘Hoppo ryodo no hi no hantai! Okinawa kodo,” <http://naha.cool.ne.jp/mayonakashinya/020310.html> (6 April 2004).
130 At a meeting in Hakodate on 15 February 2003 concerning the Ainu and the Northern Territories, Uemura Hideaki, a well know Wajin scholar who deals with indigenous issues, expressed his disappointment of the Northern Territories Day and called for recognition of Ainu rights in Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurils. He pointed out that since the enactment of the CPA discrimination and claims that Japan is a homogeneous country have continued in the cabinet and from Diet members (“Ainu minzoku no senjuken kangaeru/Hoppo yonto koenki,” Hokkaido Shinbun, 18 February 2003).
133 Mr. A. et al., personal communication with author, 3 January 2004 (Japan).
policy, that has become a noted part of many aspects of Japanese policies, is being used in a similar manner towards the Ainu.

Discontented Ainu and empathetic Wajin and Okinawans and other Indigenous groups in the region (Nivkhi and Uilta) called for the government to become more conscious of human rights, Indigenous rights and hope the government will return land to the Ainu, or at minimum allow them access to the islands. While their numbers are small, groups outside of the Utari Association have contributed to furthering domestic Wajin understanding of Ainu claims through their domestic and regional contacts. They have gained little with their struggle so many Ainu and Wajin will continue to fight. Continual protest through various organisations illuminates Ainu regionalism and lack of cohesion of opinion and what they see as appropriate measures to pursue their rights. While the Utari Association has stepped forward in the United Nations, their actions remain conservative at home. Other Ainu see this conservatism of their domestic strategies as harmful and they exhibit a need to openly confront academia and government on issues related to Ainu Indigenous rights at home. This variable and changing relationship between the Utari Association and other groups shows both a healthy and active Ainu community, one that is adaptive and flexible, yet fragmented and indecisive. While some critics note the need for Ainu to become more uniform in action and opinion, often citing Canadian First Nations examples for direction of cohesion, current Ainu regionalism, as Mark Watson recently demonstrated, extends to Ainu migration into metropolitan areas in the Kanto region. There is a continuation of the realities of territorial regionalism and inter-Ainu politics from the past in the present.

This chapter followed the internationalisation of the Ainu through several Ainu organisations. A major obstacle for the Ainu in gaining recognition in this issue is the government’s refusal to acknowledgment them as Indigenous peoples. Without governmental recognition it is doubtful that the Ainu can break through barriers of various forms of discrimination and have the government and academics take them seriously in this issue. The government is hesitant to domestically accept the “Indigenous” status of the Ainu, because it could encourage other minority peoples to further assert themselves and weaken their claims to the disputed Northern Territories, and confuse the concept of homogeneity in Japan. These points have yet to be either conceded or denied by the government. The relationship between the Japanese government and the Ainu is becoming increasingly complex, as their relationship breaches domestic boundaries and extends into the international realm. Japan’s policy toward the Ainu is reflected in the domestic realm, where the established ideas of Nihonjinron or “Japaneseness” are clenching on to the idea of a mono-cultural and mono-ethnic society, and in the international realm to limit Ainu influence in government actions.

134 AM, Ainu Moshiri, 14-15.

The failure to recognise the Ainu’s collective ownership of land is not a new phenomenon applicable only to the Northern Territories, but it has a long continuation since the Kaitakushi, when the Wajin reported the land to be virgin and untouched under Meiji’s 1872 Land Ordinance, which declared Hokkaido lands Crown lands. And later during Allied occupation land reforms removed a large percentage of lands from Ainu ownership. The Ainu pursuit to edit their history originated alongside the decision to work towards the abolishment of the HFAPA and establish the Ainu New Law, so it is a wonder why the issue of the Northern Territories has been left out or minimalised when authors traced the drafting process of the Ainu New Law. The Northern Territories issue has encouraged further Ainu movements to reclaim their history and identity by relocating them in the past, present and future.

Ainu arguments and goals on the Northern Territories issue differ greatly from the Japanese government and arguments presented by the majority of publications on the topic. This issue has traditionally been scrutinised in terms of specific wording in treaties between states. From this angle it is easy to disqualify Ainu arguments, because they were not signatories of the treaties that recognised their status as separate from either the Russians or Japanese, but were unilaterally claimed and absorbed (both people and resources) first into the Wajin cultural sphere and later by the Meiji state as “former natives.” From this nation-state perspective, the Ainu do not have an important existence. In order to include the Ainu there is need to address issues of Indigenous rights, or human rights arguments, which themselves only emerged in a coherent context after World War II. The Ainu are not arguing for an unconditional return, but for rights as the traditional inhabitants of those lands and thus access to live, travel, hunt, fish and gather without a visa, together with the current Russian inhabitants, and even past Japanese decedents who lived there. This argument indirectly shows that what is, and who is, Indigenous is difficult to define.136

136 Similar to the case of the Inuit in Greenland, the Ainu living in the Kurils may have been the most recent in a series of peoples to move into the area.
The late professor Sakuzaemon Kodama (died in 1970) of the department of medical science at Hokkaido University, holds Ainu skulls, emushi (swords), tamasai (necklaces), and nimkari (earrings) carried away from the grave site which he excavated without permission of Ainu people.

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CONCLUSION

Expanding Frameworks: Solutions that Consider the Ainu

Consistently ignoring Ainu history in relation to the Northern Territories issue erases the Ainu from present and future discourses in a government and academic-perceived, top-down, one-way centrifugal relationship based on conceptions of the nation and progress. The government ignored the Ainu when renaming Hokkaido, making treaties with Russia, when “opening” Hokkaido, in post-War land reforms, in school texts, during celebration of the centennial of Hokkaido history, and in the state’s writings to the UN. Prime Ministers, government officials and scholars have ignored the Ainu in claims of national homogeneity, and in the Northern Territories dispute, therefore precluding a more accurate history of the Okhotsk region. Collectively, Wajin have taken from the Ainu for the purpose of land, resources, knowledge of land and navigations in maps, as subjects for the creation of institutions and academic disciplines like Anthropology, policy relating to other Japanese colonies before World War II, and for museums. Even today academics are still clinging onto Ainu bones and taking Ainu blood and urine samples. These are not activities limited to Japan alone, as Western academics have also been and are involved in degradation of the Ainu that has persisted to this day.¹

Since the arrival of both Russians and Wajin into Ainu Moshir, they have worked around and above the Ainu when land or power disputes have arisen. Besides the obvious loss of Hokkaido, the Ainu have also lost say in events occurring in other parts of their homelands, including Sakhalin and the Kurils. This dislocation encompasses disputes in land ownership, use of resources, even the rights of Ainu livelihood, cultural and political revival and freedom to live or even visit their collective homelands.² As in the case of Hokkaido in 1872, these Northern Territories were declared terra nullius, and discussion revolved (and still does) around Wajin and Soviet/Russian representatives and governments. Neither party has consulted with, invited, or permitted Ainu people to take part in discussion relating to these lands.³

With the end of World War II, the stabilising of the Japanese economy, and the international push of human rights, the Ainu proved that they were not the dying race that many academics and journalists had labelled them within the bounds of Social Darwinist rhetoric, and strove to relocate themselves. Ever increasing contact with international Indigenous groups, and the United Nations, led the Ainu to become politically more united and organised than in the past. This led to renewed sense of identity (although this

¹ Mr. A. et al., personal communication with author, August 2006 (Japan).
was not and is not for all the Ainu even today) and they are slowly taking back their history.\footnote{According to one Ainu man only about one percent of the Ainu populace is what may be coined as \textit{activists} (Mr. A. et al., personal communication with Author, 3 January 2004 [Japan]).}

Evaluation of how literature on the Northern Territories and Indigenous peoples in East Asia have developed while focusing on Japan brought further depth and understanding to the Northern Territories and the Ainu. The predominant scholarship on the Northern Territories is state-centered which works to eliminate the Ainu from participation in the dialogue. Ainu history was pushed into a local history in Hokkaido which, although rich in nature, tends not to move beyond local dialogue, into a national or colonial history, a similar situation to Native Studies in general. This issue has potential to affect third party initiatives in local, national and international arenas as the Smithsonian Institute demonstrated. Historiography of Indigenous peoples in the Japanese colonial empire is relevant to the Ainu and the Northern Territories and illustrates how approaches in History on the topic have changed, slowly working towards ever increasing inclusion of Indigenous peoples. This broadened the framework of the Northern Territories by placing it in colonial literature, which has lagged behind in addressing subjects of indigeneity especially in the case of Japan.

A brief history of the Ainu explained their historical connection to the lands in question. The Kunashiri-Menashi battle was an important event in the history of the Kuril Islands, Hokkaido and for Ainu-Wajin relations in the Okhotsk region and deserves more attention in historical analysis of the disputed islands and Indigenous rights. Extending examination of the Ainu into historical lessons of the Åland settlement and of government and Ainu actions since World War II initiated historical inclusion of the Ainu in the Northern Territories issue. The Åland settlement provided opportunity to demonstrate that while historical events such as the Åland settlement may provide inspiration for resolution of contemporary issues, we need to critically evaluate such events to be sure that we do not adopt prior ideas without understanding their historical situation. The double standards of international versus domestic issues, as in the example of the pursuit of Japanese equality in 1919, are a phenomenon limited to neither history nor specifically Japan. Such double standards are a mechanism that the nation-state uses to ensure its own survival domestically and recognition as being legitimate and authentic internationally. Instead of looking at Åland as a successful solution by the League in 1921, it is more valuable to look at it in terms of an eighty-five year process that has been ever evolving and adapting to new situations based on concepts of flexibility and compromise.

Ainu and Wajin activities in regards to the Northern Territories are relational and in constant flux, and the Ainu were and are hardly a static, dead, or obsolete people. Globalisation, which some Indigenous peoples have denounced for its harmful effect to their people, culture, and way of life (environmental destruction), is now a mechanism which they use to preserve and strengthen their own way of life and relocate themselves within present and future discourse. According to Beier, the cause of their silence is part of a process that is rooted in the very discourse of an advanced form of colonialism,
whose hegemonic voice excludes all others. If we objectify the Ainu or other Indigenous groups, we deny their subjectivity in pursuance of academic freedom and objectivity. However, on the other hand, if we only recognise their subjective voice it is easy to treat them trivially and disqualify their voices. This seems to be an issue when we look at the difference in treatment the Ainu receive in international institutions like the UN versus how they are treated domestically by the government. It follows that there is need to reevaluate the foundation in which dialogue has been occurring between Indigenous peoples and states, and Indigenous peoples and academia, and work towards real conversation and dialogue. This requires flexibility, compromise and willingness of both sides to change. The Ainu have begun to study themselves, as well as those who study them, but yet they are not replied to. Mark Mowazer fittingly wrote that “Internationally as well as domestically, it seems as though history is more about forgetting the past than about learning from it.”

It is necessary to think that the Ainu and other Indigenous peoples’ voices and history have something important to say, for example in the case of the Northern Territories, that is worthy of a response.

Ainu, who are trying to involve themselves in this affair, want it to be clear to both Russian and Japanese governments that, no matter whose boundaries the four islands are in, three issues must be taken into account. Governments should not allow commercial fishing in the Okhotsk Sea, to ensure ocean resources are not depleted. Overfishing through commercial fishing, would hurt not only local fishermen in the area but also those of Hokkaido. Tourist activities, such as golfing and resort hotels would destroy the nature that is still in abundance in many parts of the islands. The islands should be left in their natural state. Ainu fishermen must be allowed to fish in the area.

Tanaka Nobunao was under the impression that the direction in which the European Community and the UN have been moving symbolises an era where national sovereignty is becoming less important; a promising outlook for Ainu demands. He, along with organisations like Pirika Zenkoku, requests a return of even a part of the Northern Territories to the Ainu so they can create an Ainu Autonomous homeland.

Arasaki Moritetsu, a former Chancellor of Ryukyu University, emphasises that the dispute must not be resolved in a similar manner as Okinawa after World War II, because it left behind an aggravated local population. Important questions he raised are: for what purpose is the return sought, and who is the return to benefit? For the case of Okinawa, it was a further intertwining of US-Japanese military, rather than sovereignty for the Okinawan people. A resolution to this issue must be first for the future development of friendship and cooperation between the two nations of Japan and Russia contributing to world peace. At the same time, the interests and welfare of both the original Ainu inhabitants and the old and new residents must be considered. He also warns that if the existence and claims of these people are ignored in the resolution, it will be a cause for considerable trouble in the future.

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5 Mowazar, “Minorities and the League of Nations,” 60.
7 AM, Ainu Moshiri, 103
8 Arasaki, Yawarakai shakai, 159-161.
Noel Ludwig has proposed ten possible solutions for this dispute, based on Russian, Wajin, international, and importantly, Ainu interests in the area. He compared the Torres Strait Treaty of Australia and the Kaho’olawe and Moloka’i islands of Hawaii to the situation of Japan’s northern claims. Of the scenarios discussed, he discarded seven due to “obvious reasons” where interests of Japan, Russian or the Ainu are completely omitted. The options left include:

1. The return of all four islands to Japan, with a commitment by Japan to either transfer administration or outright ownership to the Ainu once an organised governing body is in place.
2. The same as (1), but encompassing only Shikotan and Habomai, while Etorofu and Kunashiri become UN trust zones or areas for joint development.
3. The same as (2), but only Etorofu and possibly Kunashir are set aside for Ainu ownership and/or administration.

Of these, the first would be most idealistic for the Ainu, but either (2) or (3) would be plausible, as they would also include the Ainu and other relevant peoples. Ludwig concluded by stating that if a solution such as these were agreed upon, it “would not only repair historical wrongs at little cost to these governments, but it would also provide a lasting legacy for the Japanese, Russian and Ainu leaders who accomplish it.” This is similar to the argument Wada Haruki made when he suggested turning one of the islands in the Habomai group to the Ainu. However, besides providing a “lasting legacy” for Russia, there seems to be little benefit for Russia without which no concession would be likely, especially since Russia is in a much different position now than in the early to mid-1990s due to its growing oil-based economy.

Arasaki and Ludwig echo calls for flexibility in negotiations that Elisabeth Naucler of the Åland government stressed, which were also important in other land disputes, such as the Torres Strait Treaty and ever changing situations in the Åland Islands. In the case of the Torres Strait Treaty, “It was only after the adoption of an imaginative, broadly focused approach that a solution acceptable to all the parties

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11 Ludwig, “An Ainu Homeland,” 17. These are numbers 7, 9 and 10 in the original. Akibe Tokuhei shares the same view as (2), see, “Getting Back Our Islands,” 8-9.
concerned – not just governments but the people themselves – was achieved.”14 In the case of the Ainu and the Northern Territories, however, the issue is more complex, because the Ainu have had little scholastic or politically recognised legitimacy or worth in the debate. Before seriously considering an “Ainu solution,” it is necessary to begin to work the Ainu into the discourse as participants and not merely an area of academic inquiry. I agree with Nobuo Arai, at Hokkaido University and Noel Ludwig that neither the Japanese nor Russian governments are, at the present moment, ready to take any moral action toward the Ainu and the Northern Territories.15 Without political motivation concepts of morality are not likely to play any major role in decision making processes, nor does morality imply actions would be done for the Ainu with the Ainu, but to the Ainu for the nation-state, a continuation of dislocating the Ainu from any meaningful discourse.

Despite both Japanese and Russian governments stating their wish to find a mutually acceptable solution, both sides continue to insist that their view on the matter will not change: Japan demands full return of the four islands, and Russia insists that control of the islands is not up for negotiation. Scholars and governments need to seriously analyse, and reconsider, potential solutions provided by Ainu and other academics such as Ludwig. Encouraging Ainu input into the matter acts to further bring all relevant material regarding the Northern Territories to the discussion table and works to enrich history and understanding of the Ainu, concepts of Indigenous peoples and Japan.

Although the return movement and government sponsored state-centered rhetoric mainly uses arguments that embrace concepts of continuity and definitions, which work to provide stability, or at least a false sense of security, the perspective of focusing on the Ainu has brought forth a high degree of instability, conflict, and dislocation. There exists wide-ranging contradictions within the recorded history of Northeast Asia, as represented by the Northern Territories issue, and rather than dismiss one side of these contradictions and conflict to avoid such complexities, this thesis strove to address them. The history of Ainu in conflict resolution has been masked as a non-issue, in other words the Ainu do not exist, and if they do, certainly not as beneficial to the state, as Indigenous peoples or a people with anything meaningful to say or to be responded to. However, embracing the conflicts that bringing issues of the Ainu lead to challenges previous ways of thinking of disputes between governments and nations, and between peoples themselves.

The Northern Territories issue is a dispute between two states, but this discourse moves beyond the state and state discourse, and nonetheless maintains a focal point in discussion either openly or pervades in the background of third party discourse as well. The nation-state becomes insecure when dealing with issues of indigeneity. Instead of addressing this insecurity, the nation-state and those who advocate it (either consciously


15 Nobuo Arai, personal communication with author, 26 December 2004 (Japan). Ludwig thinks that Russia is unlikely to make compromises on the Northern Territories, even to the Ainu, because of the strength of their oil economy (Noel Ludwig, email with author, 31 May 2006).
or unconsciously) such as academics and politicians, move to down play or disqualify the Indigenous voice, perspective and experience.\(^{16}\) In order to bring the Ainu into this topic we need to expand both time and space/place. Perhaps this is a problem, as it has been a trend to narrow both time and space/place by focusing on treaties, especially that of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and even individual articles within the treaty limiting the time, and by focusing on one, two, three or four islands instead of viewing the area as a whole, we have limited the space. The bilateral nature that this issue developed into limits the place, giving it the impression of a localised issue between only Russia and Japan. In contracting or limiting these planes where legitimate and valuable discourse is currently able to take place, we lose the human component of history to differing degrees in local, regional/national and international levels, encouraging a history that reverts to state-created and centered nationalistic arguments that disqualify non-state actors. There is a need to move beyond state-centered diplomatic history and be more inclusive of those Indigenous to the lands and current residents. The Northern Territories dispute is one example that brings out problems of dealing with identity and conflict resolution. Whether it is an issue of border demarcation, or a territorial dispute this issue has consequences beyond bilateral political negotiations.

\(^{16}\) In relation to this Ackermann wrote, “Love of one’s nation is meant to be unquestioned so if you criticize your nation you have to do it, or at least have others think you do it, to make it stronger and improve it” (Robert Ackermann, *Heterogeneities: Race, Gender, Class, Nation and State* [Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996], 116).
Appendix 1: The Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act
(Law No. 27, March 1899)

Article 1
Those Former Natives of Hokkaido who are engaged, or wish to engage, in agriculture shall be granted free of charge no more than 15,000 tsubo (3,954 sq. yards) of land per household.

Article 2
The land granted under the preceding Article is subject to the following conditions on rights of ownership.
1. It may not be transferred except by inheritance.
2. No rights of pledge, mortgage, lease or perpetual lease can be established.
3. No easement (servitude) can be established without the permission of the Governor of Hokkaido.
4. It cannot become the object of a lien or preferential right. The land granted in the preceding Article shall not be subject to land tax or local taxes until 30 years from the date of grant. Land already owned by Former Natives shall not be transferred except by inheritance, nor shall any of the real rights (jus in rem) referred to in paragraphs 1 to 3 be established upon it without the permission of the Governor of Hokkaido.

Article 3
Any part of the land granted under Article 1 shall be confiscated if it has not been cultivated after 15 years from the date of grant.

Article 4
Hokkaido Former Natives who are destitute will be provided with agricultural equipment and seeds.

Article 5
Hokkaido Former Natives who are injured or ill but cannot afford medical treatment shall be provided with medical treatment or expenses of medicine.

Article 6
Hokkaido Former Natives who are too injured, ill, disabled, senile or young to provide for themselves shall be granted welfare under existing legislation and if they should die at or during the period of assistance funeral expenses will be provided.
Article 7
Children of destitute Hokkaido Former Natives who are attending school will be provided with tuition fees.

Article 8
Expenses incurred under Article 4 to 7 shall be appropriated from the proceeds of the communal funds of Hokkaido Former Natives, or if these are insufficient, form the National Treasury.

Article 9
An elementary school will be constructed with funds form the National Treasury in areas where there is a Former Native village.

Article 10
The Governor of Hokkaido will manage the communal funds of the Hokkaido Former Natives.

   The Governor of Hokkaido, subject to the approval of the Home Minister, may dispose of the communal funds for the interests of the owners of the communal funds or may refuse to expend it if he deems necessary.

   The communal funds managed by the Governor of Hokkaido shall be designated by the Governor of Hokkaido.

Article 11
The Governor of Hokkaido may issue police orders with regard to the protection of the Hokkaido Former Natives and may impose a fine of over 2 yen but no more than 25 yen or a period of imprisonment over 11 days but no more than 25 days.

By-laws

Article 12
This Act will become effective from 1 April 1899.

Article 13
Regulations relevant to the implementation of this Act shall be set by the Home Minister.

Note: five revisions of the HFAPA have taken place, deleting Articles 9 and 11 in 1937 and Articles 4, 5 and 6 in 1946.

Appendix 2: New Law Concerning the Ainu People (Draft)
Adopted at the General Assembly of the Utari Kyokai, 27 May 1984

Preamble

The objectives of this legislation are to recognise the existence of the Ainu people with their own distinct culture in the state of Japan; for their ethnic pride to be respected under the Constitution of Japan; and for their ethnic rights to be guaranteed.

Reasons for this legislation

The Ainu people are a group with a unique history, possessing a distinct language and culture and maintaining a common economic lifestyle in Ainu Moshir (the land where Ainu live) – Hokkaido, Karafuto, and the Kurile Islands. The Ainu have held fast to their ethnic independence while struggling against the inhumane invasion and oppression of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the Matsumae Domain.

The Japanese government, having taken its first step to becoming a modern state with the Meiji Restoration, unilaterally incorporated Ainu Moshir into state territory as ownerless land without any negotiations with the indigenous Ainu. Furthermore, the government concluded the Sakhalin - Kurile Exchange Treaty with Imperial Russia and forced the Ainu in Karafuto and the Northern Kuriles to leave their homeland where they lived in peace.

The Ainu were robbed of their land, forests and seas. Taking deer or salmon became poaching and collecting firewood was deemed theft. On the other hand, Wajin immigrants flooded into the land, destructive developing began, and the very survival of the Ainu people was threatened.

The dignity of the Ainu people was trampled underfoot by a policy of assimilation based on discrimination and prejudice. The Ainu were confined to granted lands, and their freedom to move or pursue an occupation other than agriculture was restricted, while their distinct language was stolen from them through education.

The postwar agrarian reform extended to the so-called Former Native allotments, and the trend in agricultural modernisation scattered the poor small-scale Ainu farmers, destroying the Kotan [villages] one by one.

Several tens of thousand Ainu are now said to live in Hokkaido, with several thousand more outside Hokkaido. Most of them are not guaranteed equal opportunities for employment due to unfair racial prejudice and discrimination. Excluded from the
modern corporate sector, the Ainu form a group of the disguised unemployed and their lifestyle is usually insecure. Discrimination increases poverty, while poverty endangers further discrimination. The present sees widening gaps in such areas as living conditions and educational advancements for children.

The so-called Hokkaido Utari Welfare Countermeasures that are presently being implemented are no more than a random collection of legislation and regulations. Not only do they lack coordination, but, above all, they obscure the responsibility of the state towards the Ainu people.

What is demanded here is the establishment of a thorough and comprehensive system predicated on the restoration of the ethnic rights of the Ainu, to eliminate racial discrimination, promote ethnic education and culture, and provide a policy for economic independence.

The issue of the Ainu people is a shameful historical legacy that arose during the process of establishing Japan as a modern state. It is also an important issue with implications for the guarantee of basic human rights under the Constitution. It is the responsibility of the government to resolve the situation. Recognising the problem as one concerning all citizens of Japan, the government must abolish the humiliating and discriminatory Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act and enact new legislation for the Ainu people. This legislation must apply to all Ainu living in Japan.

**Section 1: Basic human rights**
The basic human rights of the Ainu have been clearly violated over the years in the educational, social and economic spheres by both concrete and intangible racial prejudice.

With regard to this, the new legislation for the Ainu people is based on the fundamental concept of elimination of discrimination against the Ainu people.

**Section 2: The right to political participation**
Since the Meiji Restoration, under the official designations of ‘Native’ or ‘Former Native’, the Ainu people have received discriminatory treatment different from that accorded to other Japanese. There is no need to discuss the pre-Meiji period here. To overcome this humiliating situation and correctly reflect the demands of the Ainu people in national and local politics, the government should immediately put in place a policy to guarantee seats for Ainu representation in the National Diet and local assemblies.

**Section 3: Education and culture**
Institutional discrimination against the Ainu under the Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act not only clearly violates the human rights of the Ainu but also encourages discrimination against the Ainu among the public. This has hindered the normal development of the Ainu people in education and culture and contributed to their inferior situation socially and economically.
The government must take the position that breaking through this current situation is one of the most important issues in a policy for the Ainu people and implement the following policies.

1. The implementation of a general education policy for Ainu children.
2. The planned introduction of Ainu language lessons for Ainu children.
3. The implementation of a policy to completely eliminate discrimination against the Ainu, both within the school system and in education in society.
4. The initiation of courses in Ainu language, culture and history in university education. Moreover, the employment of Ainu with ability to conduct such courses in various fields as professors, associate professors, or lecturers, regardless of existing legislation. The establishment of a special admissions system for Ainu children to enter university and take such courses.
5. The establishment of a national research facility specialising in the study and maintenance of Ainu language and culture. Ainu should actively participate as researchers. Previous research has been fundamentally flawed since it was unilaterally conducted without respect to the wishes of the Ainu and turned the Ainu into so-called objects of research. This must be corrected.
6. The reinvestigation of the existence of the problems surrounding the contemporary transmission and preservation of Ainu culture, with a view to perfecting methods.

Section 4: Agriculture, fishing, forestry, commercial and manufacturing activity

The Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act stipulates a grant of up to 15,000 tsubo (about 5 hectares) per household for those engaged in agriculture. However, it must be recognised that Ainu difficulties in agriculture clearly result from the presence of discriminatory regulations not applied to other Japanese. The Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Act must be abolished and a policy appropriate for the modern age established.

The present situation with regard to fishing, forestry, commercial and manufacturing activity is that because the same lack of understanding of the conditions of Ainu life exists, they have been ignored and no appropriate policy implemented.

To promote the economic independence of the Ainu, the following necessary conditions should therefore be put in place.

Agriculture

1. The guarantee of and appropriate acreage

Since Hokkaido agriculture can be broadly classified into wet-rice cultivation, arable cropping, and dairy farming, a fair and appropriate acreage must be guaranteed according to the local agricultural situation.

2. Provisions and modernisation of the productive base
Projects to improve the productive base for Ainu-managed agricultural enterprises should be implemented without regard to existing legislation.

3 Miscellaneous

**Fishing**

1 The granting of fishing rights

For those managing fishing enterprises or engaged in fishing, such rights should be granted to those who fish them regardless of the presence of existing fishing rights.

2 Provision and modernisation of the productive base

Projects to improve the productive base for Ainu-managed fishing enterprises should be implemented without regard for existing legislation.

3 Miscellaneous

**Forestry**

1 The promotion of forestry

Necessary measures should be implemented for the promotion of forestry for those who manage or are engaged in forestry enterprises.

**Manufacturing and Commercial**

1 The promotion of manufacturing and commerce

Necessary measures should be implemented for the promotion of commercial or manufacturing enterprises managed by Ainu.

**Labour Policy**

1 The enlargement of employment opportunities

Historical circumstances have clearly chronically lowered the economic position of the Ainu people. One manifestation of this is the large number of seasonal workers who can be regarded as disguised unemployed. The government should actively promote a labour policy to widen opportunities for employment for the Ainu people.

**Section 5: Fund for Ainu self-reliance**

The so-called Hokkaido Utari Welfare Countermeasures are supported from the budgets of the Hokkaido and national governments, but these protective measures should be
abolished and a fundamental policy must be implemented to make the Ainu people self-reliant. The rights to guaranteed political participation, the promotion of education and culture, and the improvement in the productive base in agriculture, fishing and other enterprises should be considered part of this. Of these policies, some should be undertaken on the responsibility of national, prefecture, or municipal authorities, while others should be undertaken under the responsibility of the Ainu people. In the later case in particular, a fund called the Self Reliance Fund of the Ainu People should be established. This fund should be under independent Ainu management.

The government should be responsible for providing resources for the Fund.

The Fund should be established at the latest by 1987, when the second seven year stage of the welfare policy is completed.

Section 6: Consultative bodies

To justify and continually reflect Ainu policies in national and local politics, the following consultative bodies should be established.

1 A Central Consultative Council for Ainu Policy (provisional title) should be established, directly attached to the Prime Minister’s Office or associated with it. Members should consist of relevant State Ministers, representatives of the Ainu people, Diet members representing all parties from both Upper and Lower Houses, experienced scholars, business leaders and others.

2 Along with this consultative body at the national level, a Hokkaido Consultative Council for Ainu Policy (provisional title) should be established. Composition should follow the same lines as the Central Consultative Council.


Appendix 3: Law for the Promotion of the Ainu Culture and for the Dissemination and Advocacy for the Traditions of the Ainu and the Ainu Culture

Law No. 52, May 14, 1997
Amendment: Law No. 160, Dec. 22, 1999

Article 1 (purpose)

This law aims to realize the society in which the ethnic pride of the Ainu people is respected and to contribute to the development of diverse cultures in our country,
by the implementation of the measures for the promotion of Ainu culture (hereafter called “Ainu Traditions”), the spread of knowledge related to Ainu Traditions, and the education of the nation, referring to the situation of Ainu traditions and culture from which the Ainu people find their ethnic pride.

**Article 2 (definition)**

“The Ainu Culture” in this law means the Ainu language and cultural properties such as music, dance, crafts, and other cultural properties which have been inherited by the Ainu people, and other cultural properties developed from these.

**Article 3 (duties of the national and local governments)**

The national government should make efforts to promote measures for the nurture of those who will inherit Ainu culture, the fruitfulness of educational activities concerning Ainu Traditions, the promotion of the monitor and study of the Ainu culture, which will contribute to its promotion and other measures to promote Ainu culture, as well as providing advice and support to the local governments necessary for measures to promote Ainu culture.

2. The local governments should make an effort to implement measures to promote the Ainu culture in accordance with the social situations of their areas.

**Article 4 (respect to be taken into account in the implementation of this law)**

The national and local governments should respect the autonomous spirit and ethnic pride of the Ainu people in the implementation of the measures to promote Ainu culture.

**Article 5 (fundamental policy)**

The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to establish the fundamental policy for the measures to promote Ainu culture (hereafter called “the Fundamental Policy”).

2. The following should be established in the Fundamental Policy.

(1) The fundamental matters for the promotion of Ainu culture
(2) Matters related to measures for the promotion of Ainu culture
(3) Matters related to measures for the spread of knowledge relevant to Ainu Traditions, and the education campaign for the nation
(4) Matters related to the monitor and study of Ainu culture which contribute to its promotion
(5) Important matters related to the respect which should be put into account in the implementation of the measures for the promotion of Ainu culture

3. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to consult with the heads of relevant administrative bodies and to listen to the comments of the
local administrative bodies concerned provided in the 1st provision of the following article.

4. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to announce the Fundamental Policy and/or the amendment with no delay when established/amended, as well as dispatch them to the local administrative bodies provided in the 1st provision of the following article.

Article 6 (fundamental program)
The local administrative bodies, appointed by national government ordinance, are recognized as responsible for the comprehensive implementation of measures to promote Ainu culture referring to the local social situations in the regions (hereafter called “the Prefectures Concerned”) and should establish the fundamental program for measures to promote Ainu culture in the Prefectures Concerned.

2. In the fundamental program, the following should be determined:
   (1) Fundamental Policy for the promotion of Ainu culture
   (2) Matters on the content of the measures to promote Ainu culture
   (3) Matters on the content of the measures to spread the knowledge relevant to Ainu Tradition to residents
   (4) Significant matters which should be taken into account in the implementation of the measures to promote Ainu culture

3. The Prefectures Concerned are required to publicly announce and submit their fundamental program to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology immediately when established/amended.

4. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology should make effort to provide necessary advice, recommendations, and information to the Prefectures Concerned in order to facilitate the establishment of the fundamental programs and the smooth implementation of the programs.

Article 7 (appointment)
Following the acceptance of applications from corporations which had been previously established to promote Ainu culture under the civil law (act #89/1896) Article #34, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology will appoint only one corporation in the country, and recognize this corporation as proper to carry out fairly and surely the duties provided in the following article.

2. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to announce the
name, address of the office of the corporation (hereafter called “Appointed Corporation”), after the appointment according to previous provisions.

3. The Appointed Corporation is required to notify any plan to change its name and address to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.

4. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to announce the changed matter provided by the previous provision when they receive notice.

**Article 8 (duties)**
The Appointed Corporation is required to implement the following duties:

1. Duties for the nurture of those who will inherit Ainu culture and other duties relevant to the promotion of Ainu culture

2. Publishing activities related to Ainu Traditions and other campaigns

3. Research and monitoring activities which contribute to the promotion of Ainu culture

4. Providing support such as advice, subsidies, and other support to those who conduct the promotion of Ainu culture, the campaign activities related to Ainu Tradition, and research and monitoring activities.

5. Other duties which are necessary for the promotion of Ainu Culture not listed in the previous provisions.

**Article 9 (implementation plan)**
The Appointed Corporation is required to make an implementation plan and a budget, and submit them to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology every year, according to the statutes of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. In case of amendments, the same procedure should be taken.

2. The implementation plan should be made in accordance with the content of the Fundamental Policy.

3. The Appointed Corporation is required to make a report on the measures and a settlement of accounts, and submit them to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology every year, according to the statutes of the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transport and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.

**Article 10 (the requisition of reports and inspection)**
The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology may require a report of the duties of the Person-in-law Appointed, dispatch their officials to the office of the Person-in-law Appointed to inspect the conduct of duties under the act, notes of account and documents, and question persons concerned, as far as necessary to implement this law.

2. The officials who inspect the office under the previous provision have to carry official identification, and show this identification when requested by persons concerned.

3. The implementation of the inspection shall not be interpreted as a criminal investigation.

**Article 11 (the order to improve)**
The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology may order to the Person-in-law Appointed to implement measures necessary for improvement, when recognized as necessary to improve the conduct of duties provided in Article 8.

**Article 12 (dismissal of the appointed body)**
The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology may dismiss the appointment when the Person-in-law Appointed violates the order provided by the previous provisions.

2. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport and the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology are required to publicly announce the dismissal of the appointed body.

**Article 13 (the penalty)**
Any person who refuses to make a report or makes a false report as required by the first provision of Article 10, or who refuses or interrupts the inspection provided by the same provision, or who does not answer or gives false answers to questions, may be imposed a penalty of less than 200,000 (two hundred thousand yen).

2. Not only the person who commits a violation under the previous provision, but also the same penalty may be imposed upon the Person-in-Law, when its representative, deputy, or employee commits a violation under the previous provision related to the duties of the Person-in-Law.
Supplementary Rules (excerpt)

**Article 1 (date of validity)**
This law will be enforced from a date which shall be provided by government ordinance within 3 months from its promulgation.

**Article 2 (abolishment of the Hokkaido Ex-Aborigines Protection Act)**
The following acts will be abolished:

1. The Hokkaido Ex-Aborigines Protection Act (#27/1899)

2. The Asahikawa Ex-Aborigines Protection Land Disposition Act (#9/1934)

**Article 3 (temporary measures for the abolishment of the Hokkaido Ex-Aborigines Protection Act)**
The Governor of Hokkaido should put it under its control the Hokkaido Ex-Aborigines Common Properties (called “the Common Property” in the next provision) which have been controlled under the 1st provision of Article 10 of the Hokkaido Ex-Aborigines Protection Act (hereafter called “the Ex-Protection Act”) until the return of the properties to the owners as provided by from the following to the 4th provision, or the reversion to the Person-in-law Appointed or the Government of Hokkaido as provided in the 5th provision.

2. The Governor of Hokkaido has to publicly announce matters in the official gazette provided by the ordinance of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare for each property appointed by the 3rd provision of the Article 10 of the Ex-Protection Act.

3. The owners of the common properties may request the return of the properties from the Governor of Hokkaido within 1 year from the announcement as provided by the ordinance of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.

4. The Governor of Hokkaido may not return the properties to the owners after the term, except a case in which all of the owners make a request as required by the provision.

5. In the case that the owners of the common properties do not request the return within the term provided in the 3rd provision, the common properties will revert to the Person-in-law Appointed (in case that the appointment provided by the 1st provision of the Article 7 has not been carried out at the time of passage of the term, to Hokkaido).

6. In the case that the common properties revert to the Person-in-law Appointed, the Person-in-Law should apply the properties to expenses related to the duties for the promotion of Ainu culture.
The supplementary resolution to the legislative bill for the promotion of the Ainu Culture and for the dissemination and advocacy for Ainu traditions and culture
(Cabinet Committee of the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives)

- Referring to the historical and social circumstance into which the Ainu have been put, the Government should take appropriate measures for the following matters, in order to find further national understanding regarding the promotion of Ainu culture.
- To make efforts to respect the autonomous spirit and reflect the will of the Ainu sufficiently in measures to promote Ainu culture, in order to contribute to the realization of a society in which the ethnic pride of the Ainu is well respected
- To provide further support for the promotion of Ainu culture, for the respect of the ethnic pride of the Ainu and for the development of diverse cultures in our country
- To make efforts, regarding advocacy of human rights of the Ainu and awareness raising of this people, to take necessary measures by respecting the ratification of the “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination” and the spirit of the “U.N. Decade for Human Rights Education” etc.
- To make efforts to disseminate the knowledge about Ainu traditions, including the indigenous nature of the Ainu, which is a historical fact
- To continue to expand support for the existing Hokkaido Utari Welfare Measures

(Source: Foundation for Research and Promotion of Ainu Culture,
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