Altay COŞKUN and David ENGELS (eds.)

Rome and the Seleukid East
Selected Papers from Seleukid Study Day V,
Brussels, 21–23 August 2015
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Altay Coşkun

Abstract

Suetonius, Claud. 25.3 has preserved the summary of an obscure Roman letter to Seleucus Rex, offering him amicitia et societas in return for exempting the citizens of Ilion, their own ‘relatives’, from taxation. While previous generations of scholars had been inclined to reject this letter as a forgery, more recently, its authenticity has been claimed, and the king been identified with Seleukos II, Seuleukos III or Antiochos III. But neither Seleukos II nor III seems to have exerted effective control over Ilion to qualify. And Antiochos III became an amicus populi Romani probably in 200 BC. Rome was then, however, concerned about the Ptolemaic and the Attalid Kingdoms. Moreover, Antiochos gained the loyalty of Ilion in 198 BC. When the Romans began to advocate the freedom of some Greek cities in 196 BC, the sources repeatedly specify Lampsakos and Smyrna, which defied the king, never Ilion. The later annalistic tradition presents a polished version of the relation between Rome and Ilion: the city figures among the allies in the peace treaty of Phoinike in 205 BC; its citizens went over to Rome in the war with Antiochos, as soon as the first Roman commander C. Livius Salinator set foot on the Ilian coast in 190 BC; Salinator and soon after him L. Scipio chose to sacrifice to Ilian Athena; and Ilion is rewarded at Apameia with immunity and territorial gains. But this tradition is belied by the telling silence of Polybios and Strabon. The latter, in fact, specifies Caesar as the authority that granted tax exemption and a territorial extension. The second half of the 1st century BC thus emerges as the most likely time both for the upgrade of the pro-Ilion annalistic tradition and the fabrication of the Suetonian letter.

1. Introduction: Seleukid-Roman Relations and a Letter from the Julio-Claudian Period

The beginning of friendly relations between the Seleukid court and the Roman Republic is still awaiting a satisfactory reconstruction. It is well-known that the diplomatic contact became intensive on the verge from the 3rd to the 2nd century BC, when Antiochos III Megas prevailed over Ptolemy V Epiphanes in the Fifth

* For critical feedback on previous drafts, I would like to thank David Engels, Germain Payen, Jess Russell, Lothar Willms and Andreas Zack. All remaining shortcomings are of course my own.
Syrian War (202/201–194/193 BC). He occupied Koile Syria (201/198 BC) and successfully campaigned along the Karian (ca. 202 BC), Kilikian (198 BC) and then Aegean coastline of Asia Minor (197 BC). In 196 BC, he began rebuilding Lysimacheia on the Thracian Chersonesos as the first Seleukid royal residence in Europe. His relentless progress inspired awe and respect in many of his contemporaries, but likewise triggered repeated interventions of the Romans. At some point of their negotiations, it seems, he concluded friendship with them.¹

There is only one – isolated – source that points to a much earlier opportunity for establishing amicitia between the two major powers of the Mediterranean World. In his Divus Claudius, the biographer Suetonius writes:

He (Claudius) waived for good the taxes for the citizens of Ilion, as if they were the origin of the Roman tribe, after an old Greek letter by the Senate and Roman people had been recited; this promised King Seleukos friendship and alliance finally under the conditions that he would release their relatives the citizens of Ilion from every burden.²

There is no reason to doubt that such a document was produced in the mid-1st century AD, to the effect that the Ilienses were exempted from taxation.³ This is also confirmed by Tacitus, according to whom prince Nero held a speech in their support while still at a tender age.⁴

¹ For general surveys of Antiochos’ campaigns and diplomacy after his return from his anabasis in 205/204 BC, see, e.g., BADIAN (1959); SCHMITT (1964); WILL (1982); GRUEN (1984); MEHL (1990); MA (1999); DREYER (2007); ECKSTEIN (2008); GRAINGER (2002) and (2015a); ENGELS (2012). For a discussion of his friendship diplomacy with Rome, see below. For the ideological representation of Antiochos’ westward campaigns, also see Visscher and Almagor in this volume.

² SUET., Claud. 25.3 (adapted from the transl. by K.R. BRADLEY, Loeb): Iliensibus quasi Romanae gentis auctoribus tributa in perpetuum remisit recitata uetere epistula Graeca senatus populique R. Seleuco regi amicitiam et societatem ita demum pollicentis, si consanguineos suos Ilienses ab omni onere immunes praestitisset.

³ This is not the place to discuss the nuances between direct and indirect taxation and their relation to formal autonomy or effective independence; see BERNHARDT (1971), p. 209 n. 71 for the case of Ilion under Claudius; and cf. more generally BERNHARDT (1998) and (1999) as well as ENGELS (2017), p. 433–435.

⁴ TAC., Ann. 12.58: Vtque studiis honestis [et] eloquentiae gloria enitesceret, causa Iliensium suscepta Romanum Troia demissum et Iuliae stirpis autorem Aeneam alique haud procul fabulis uetera facunde executus perpetrat, ut Ilienses omni publico munere soluerentur. (adapted from the transl. by J. JACKSON, Loeb: Desirous to shine by his liberal accomplishments and by a character for eloquence, he took up the cause of Ilion, enlarged with grace on the Trojan descent of the Roman nation; on Aeneas, the progenitor of the Julian line; on other traditions not too far removed from fable; and secured the release of the community from all public obligations.) Cf. SUET., Nero 7.2: Apud eundem consulem pro Bononiensis Latine, pro Rhodiis atque Iliensibus Graece vexa fecit. The exact date is uncertain: see ERSKINE (2001), p. 172 n. 41; BATTISTONI (2010), p. 86 n. 27. For more context, see JONES (2001), p. 180f. and ELWYN (1993), p.
2. ‘King Seleukos’, Ilion and Rome

It is more problematic to accept that the Romans might ever have addressed such a request to a Seleukid king, specifically to Seleukos II Kallinikos, who is regarded most widely as the recipient of the letter. As far as I see, Bernhard Niese was the first to question the authenticity of the document in the 19th century, charging the Romans with fabricating it for ideological purposes.5

The most detailed criticism has been unfolded by Maurice Holleaux.6 He emphasizes that evidence for any renewal of amicitia with the successors of Seleukos II is lacking: only the ambassadors of Antiochus III are said to have aimed for concluding a treaty of friendship and alliance in 193 BC. Holleaux rejects all friendship terminology applied to the king’s earlier interactions with the Romans as ‘des relations d’amicale courtoise, qualifiées par abus d’amicitia’. Otherwise, the ‘langage si sévère’ used by the Roman ambassadors in their negotiations at Lysimachia appears to him incompatible with a pre-existing friendship. Moreover, he shows that it is unlikely that Ilion began to be protected by Rome as of 237 BC, since the Lampsakenoi, when looking for support from Rome in 197 BC, took the detour to Massalia, rather than trusting the value of their syngeneia with reference to Ilion. Next, Rome intervened only for Alexandria Troas, Lampsakos and Smyrna,7 but Antiochus found even that demand outrageous, given that he was neither interfering in Italy; how much more strongly would Seleukos II have reacted to a much weaker Rome in 237 BC?

Following the authority of Niese or Holleaux, generations of scholars have either endorsed their verdict or passed over Suetonius’ testimony in silence altogether when discussing early Roman-Seleukid relations.8 A minor nuance

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6 HOLLEAUX (1921), p. 46–58, esp. 49f. (on friendship diplomacy in 193 BC); 50f. (quotation on friendship terminology used for 197 BC); p. 51–53 (on negotiations in Lysimachia: wording of POLYB. 18.50.5–9 too severe; and DIOD. SIC. 28.15.2 incompatible with the intention to renew friendship; cf. LIV. 34.57.7–9, on which see below, section 3); p. 53–57 (on relations with Ilion and Lampsakos, on which also see p. 47 and see my discussion below, including the next note); p. 56f. (comparison with the situation in 237 BC). Also see below, esp. ns. 6, 24f., 44f on Holleaux.
7 For Lampsakos, see esp. Syll.3 591 = I.Lampsakos 4 = AUSTIN2 197 = CANALI DE ROSSI (1997), p. 194–198, no. 237 c). For Lampsakos and Smyrna (also: TAC., Ann. 4.56.1), see the references to Polybios, Diodoros, Livy and Appian as below, and cf. MA (1999), p. 95–97. The case of Alexandria is more problematic, see the appendix below.
8 E.g., BEVAN (1902); BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ (1913/14); WALBANK (1979), p. 182; MA (1999); JONES (2001); ENGELS (2017). Cf. BERNHARDT (1998), p. 91f., who does not even
was added only by David Magie, who put the blame for forging the letter not on the Romans, but on the Ilienses.9

But the pendulum swung back a few decades ago, not least because some of Holleaux’ assumptions on diplomatic friendship were regarded as outdated.10 Some of the most distinguished Hellenistic and Roman Historians of our times are now willing to accept the above-quoted letter as a reliable document. A recurring argument in favour of the Suetonian tradition is the well-known example of the friendship with Ptolemy II Philadelphos that the Romans embarked on in 273 BC.11 It is widely believed that Seleucus Rex can only be Seleukos II Kallinikos: Seleukos I Soter barely ruled in western Asia Minor, since he was killed only a few months after his victory at Koroupedion in 281 BC; Seleukos III Keraunos died in 225 BC before reconquering the Aegean parts of Asia Minor, and when Seleukos IV Eupator succeeded his father in 187 BC, Asia Minor had largely been forfeited in the Peace of Apameia.12

The identification with Kallinikos has not remained uncontested. Andrew Erskine, for instance, observes that he barely had an opportunity to deal with

address the topic when discussing the rivalry between Ilion and Skepsis; Errington (2008), p. 209, who seems to be avoiding deliberately any commitment regarding the beginning of Roman-Seleukid friendship.

10 Holleaux (1921), p. 47 n. 1 and p. 49f. insists on a formal foedus for societas et amicitia, – the main argument of Gruev (1984), vol. 1, p. 65 n. 57 for rejecting Holleaux’s argument; Rizzo (1974), p. 84f.; 87. The current discussion is, however, much more complex than any of them foresaw: see, e.g., on the one hand, the contributions by Zack, esp. (2015a) and (2017), and, on the other hand, by Coşkun, esp. (2008) and (2018), all with further references.
11 Besides the next n., also see Pfeiffer / Thes (2007), § 2 for Philadelphos and Rome (with references).
12 See, e.g., Schmitt (1964), p. 291, emphasizing the old age of the Roman version of the Trojan descent; Gruev (1984), vol. 1, p. 64f. and 612, calling the rejection of the letter as a falsification ‘understandable but unnecessary’: the Romans did not invest anything, and were happy to grant informal friendship, as in the case of Ptolemy II Philadelphos. For a defense of the authenticity, also see Rizzo (1974), p. 83–88, esp. p. 86f. (depicting a vague historical context between the Third Syrian War and War of Brothers, avoiding years, sources and most scholarship); Briscoe (1981), p. 343f.; Battistoni (2010), p. 86f.: ‘Sarebbe davvero ironico se proprio il più “antiquario” degli imperatori fosse stato ingannato con un falso. Al contrario questo contatto con Ilio costituisce un precedente importante per giustificare l’inclusione della polis nella pace di Fenice (205 a.C.)’; Dmitriev (2011), p. 105; 128f. Cf. Burton (2011), p. 107; Zollschan (2017), p. 171. Undecided remain Elwyn (1993), p. 280–283; Dreyer (2007), p. 283 n. 221 (only a passing reference); Eckstein (2008), p. 31: ‘It is also possible that sometime in the 240s or 230s Seleukos II initiated an informal amicitia with Rome; but the historicity of this interchange has been challenged as well, and in any case it clearly had no international repercussions.’ Also see his qualification of Rome’s request in n. 6: ‘an impossibly arrogant Roman response’. For the exclusion of some Seleukoi, also see the discussion of Erskine (2001), p. 173.
Rome: he came to power in 246 BC, but lost control of Asia Minor around 240 BC, not as late as about 237 BC, as previous generations of historians had believed; at the same time, the Romans were absorbed by the First Punic War until 241 BC. In fact, the chronological problem is even more pressing, if my new chronology for the War of Brothers is accepted.

As I have recently suggested (in a different context), Kallinikos’ control of Anatolia collapsed long before 240 BC: within days after the death of his father Antiochos II Theos in ca. July 246 BC, Ptolemaios Andromachos, the admiral of Ptolemy III Euergetes in the Aegean, stretched out his hands for Ephesos; by August of the same year, Laodike I, Kallinikos’ mother, had been killed in her resistance to Ptolemaic encroachment; when Kallinikos finally arrived in Ionia in September, his brother Antiochos Hierax and his uncle Alexander had already changed sides, they took possession of Sardeis and Magnesia-on-the-Sipylos. About the same time, Mithradates II of Pontos invaded central Phrygia, another fleet from Egypt captured Kilikia in storm, and Euergetes landed in Seleukis. The famous Battle of Ankyra, which Seleukos II barely survived, can now be dated firmly to September or October 246 BC (with Porphyry), rather than around 240 BC (with Justin). The king escaped to his eastern satrapies, whence he returned to Syria in 244 BC after his ‘Beautiful Victory’ won at the Euphrates. There were, admittedly, a few Anatolian powers that changed sides to him in 244 BC, most prominently Olympichos in Karia, the city of Smyrna and the aforementioned king of Pontos, but their success against the combined forces of Andromachos and Hierax was limited. In about 242 BC, Kallinikos made a concession to his brother, offering him Asia Minor (except for Kilikia) in return for betraying Euergetes. There is no hint in our sources that he ever regained the control of Ionia or Aeolia during his lifetime. Accordingly, there is not even a theoretical chance that Seleukos II Kallinikos might have negotiated with Rome over Ilion.

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13 Thus ERSKINE (2001), p. 172–176, 173: ‘Even before his defeat de facto control of Ilion and Asia Minor as a whole was in the hands of his brother Antiochos.’ Cf. Grainger (2002), p. 11: ‘In the 240s Rome was fully occupied in the First Punic War, and Ilion was not endangered.’ Also see below on their conclusions.

14 The main source is PORPHYR., FGHist 260 F 32.8, which is to be preferred over JUST. 27.1–3. Also see APP., Syr. 65.346 (cf. PORPHYR. / HIERON., FGHist 260 F 43); P.Gourob = FGHist 160 = AUSTIN² 266; I.Kildara = SEG 42, 1992, no. 994 AUSTIN² 267 (with the new interpretation that the dynastic ideology expressed here reflects the aggressive take-over of Seleukid possessions by Ptolemy III Euergetes, not the protection of his sister’s or nephew’s interests). For the chronology of 253–246 BC, see COSKUN (2016a); for 246–225 BC, see COSKUN (2018b); for local events in Western Asia Minor, 246–241 BC, also see COSKUN (2016b). The relevance of this new chronology for SUET., Claud. 25.3 has been expressed for the first time in COSKUN (2015), p. 731.

15 That he had not done so explains why the Romans did not at least intercede diplomatically for their socius et amicus, requesting Euergetes to leave the Seleukid territory alone, as they later did in the Fifth Syrian War in support of Ptolemy V.
For partly different reasons, John Grainger prefers Seleukos III Keraunos (225–223 BC) as the letter’s addressee. On the one hand, he questions that Rome had any concerns with the Eastern Mediterranean during the First Punic War (264–241 BC); on the other hand, he views Rome’s interest in the Greek World initiated through the Illyrian Wars (229–219 BC). Grainger, however, does not make a case for Keraunos ever having controlled Ilion in his short rule. One may in fact seriously doubt the beginning of friendly relations between Rome and the Seleukids prior to Antiochos III’s return from his anabasis in 205/204 BC. There is no plausible reason why any previous Seleukid ‘Great King’ should have made such a concession for a far-away power such as Rome.

As far as I see, only Sue Elwyn has yet proposed an at least hypothetical identification of the mysterious Seleucus Rex with Seleukos IV Eupator. At least in theory, he could have negotiated with Rome as a representative of the Seleucid court, especially after the death of his brother Antiochos, the co-ruling son of Antiochos III (193 BC), and before the outbreak of the war with Rome (192 BC) or possibly even somewhat later, namely until the Seleukid defeat at the Battle of Magnesia (190 BC). But, ultimately, this would not be a credible solution: his royal title is not attested before 188 BC, and even if it should be

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16 Grainger (2002), p. 10–13, 12: ‘inventing it either by the Emperor Claudius or the historian Suetonius – is such an unlikely idea that the easiest course is to accept it’. For Seleukos III, also see Engels (2008); cf. Rizzo (1974), p. 85. The letter is not yet mentioned in Grainger (1997), nor has it been reconsidered in his more recent publications: Grainger (2010); (2014); (2015a); (2017).

17 Elwyn (1993), p. 281 does not refer to Antiochos, the Son of Antiochos III, and only considers a time between 189 and 175 BC: ‘This was a period in which Rome acknowledged her kinship with Ilium several times, and was closely involved with affairs in Asia Minor. It seems unlikely, however, that there would be any need for Rome to intercede with a Seleucid monarch on behalf of Ilium after 188.’ This leaves open if Elwyn regards 189/188 as a possibility for the letter or not. The next section (p. 281f.) is inclined towards accepting a forgery, but likewise remains undecided.

18 Admittedly, it is often assumed that he was elevated to kingship immediately after his brother’s death in 193/92 BC; see Grainger (1997), p. 63f.; (2015a), p. 143; 145; 148; (2015b), p. 2; Coşkun (2016), p. 857; Elvidge (2017), p. 10. An indication of this might be Livy’s mention of Lysimacheia as his residence, although it had been assigned to him even prior to his brother’s death (Liv. 31.15). However, the (negative) evidence of the Babylonian King list, in combination with the (positive) attestation for the co-rule of Antiochos the Son (Sachs / Wiseman 1954, esp. p. 207f.), is sufficient reason to hesitate conceding any co-rule of Seleukos IV with his father. And yet, the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries mention Seleukos as co-ruler in 188 and 187 BC (Sachs / Wiseman 1954, esp. p. 324f. and 326f.). Accordingly, it is most often understood that he was given the diadem by his father in 189 BC, that is soon after the defeat at Magnesia and thus during a time of challenges, in which it was important to herald dynastic stability; see Habicht (1989), p. 338; cf. Errington (2008), p. 223; Miletta (2014), p. 173; Elvidge (2017), p. 16f. One might also think that Seleukos’ role as chief negotiator with Cn. Manlius Vulso in 189/188 BC would be strengthened this way, although he lacks the royal title in Livy’s account (Liv. 38.13: Seleucus, Antiochi filius; otherwise, he
conceded to him as of 193/192 BC, it would be unusual to find him negotiating with the Romans in his own name, without his father even being mentioned. Would the Senate not rather have offered amicitia to Antiochos III or at least to both reges? However, in case one is willing to grant this peculiarity, immunity of Ilion would have been a ridiculously low price for friendship with Rome anytime since the Romans had begun negotiating the fate of the Greek cities in the Aegean world in 196 BC: the status of Pergamon and Smyrna were of much higher concern than that of Ilion.19 So, indeed, Seleukos IV cannot be the king mentioned by Suetonius.

3. Antiochos III and the Beginning of Seleukid-Roman Friendship

For somewhat different reasons, but at least in part following the argument of Holleaux, Erskine proposes 195 BC as a terminus a quo for the first conclusion of friendship between the mysterious Seleukid king with the Roman Republic. Instead of rejecting the Suetonian letter as a forgery, Erskine suggests that merely the king’s name was confused, so that it is Antiochos III to whom the Romans specified the conditions for the grant of their friendship:

‘Perhaps a Seleukos was much the same as an Antiochos. It would not after all have mattered in the first-century AD Roman Senate which long-dead king of a defunct dynasty received the letter.’20

Erskine identifies the mission of Menippos and Hegesianax to Rome in 193 BC as the most suitable context for the (conditional) Roman offer of friendship; these ambassadors were handed a letter for their king, who had been asking for amicitia since about 195 BC.

This reconstruction overstrains credibility. First, the assumed confusion may well be possible, but I would claim: only in a fictitious letter written centuries later, not in a document by which the Senate and the Roman people were addressing the most powerful king on Earth. Other difficulties relate to the Roman demands: Erskine is of course aware that much more was at stake in the 190s than taxation of a relatively insignificant polis; so he suggests that only the

is simply called Seleucus in Liv. 38.13 and 38.15). While the evidence remains inconclusive on the one hand, it appears safe to say that Seleukos (IV) does not seem to have figured as co-ruling king in his interactions with Rome.

19 Differently, however, ERSKINE (2001), p. 205: ‘In Suetonius’ letter there is only one demand, but that is the only demand which is relevant to Claudius’ decision on Ilion. No doubt there were others.’

20 ERSKINE (2001), p. 172–176 (with no reference to Liv. 29.10), esp. p. 174: ‘Various possibilities can be imagined. Perhaps the letter was addressed to King Antiochos, son of Seleukos, and at some stage, either in translation or later transmission Antiochos disappeared.’ And see below on the diplomacy.
one condition that mattered to the Ilienses under Claudius is mentioned by Suetonius. While this is a possibility, it is not an intuitive reading of amicitiam et societatem tua demum pollicentis. Most importantly, Erskine fails to address the evidence that seems to indicate the existence of a friendship relation between Rome and Antiochos as early as 200 (or 198 BC).\textsuperscript{21}

More attractive is therefore the argument of Paul Burton, who proposes a context of around 198 BC for the Suetonian letter.\textsuperscript{22} This was the year when King Attalos I of Pergamon begged the Romans to intercede against Antiochos (Liv. 32.8.9–12). They responded, however, that they could not simply go against the king, who was a socius et amicus populi Romani (Liv. 32.8.13); instead, they would send an embassy to mediate on the basis aequum esse socios et amicos populi Romani reges inter se quoque ipso pacem seruare (Liv. 32.8.16). The ‘friendly’ king apparently complied with the request (Liv. 32.27.1). There is, admittedly, barely any detail in Livy’s account of Seleukid-Roman relations that has not yet come under suspicion,\textsuperscript{23} but Livy’s causation is so complex that strong evidence would be needed to reject it. While Livy may have distorted the representation of Antiochos one way or another, there seems

\textsuperscript{21} ERSKINE (2001), p. 174–176, with n. 51, with reference to LIV. 34.25.2 for 195 BC, and see below on 193 BC. Also cf. DMITRIEV (2011), p. 127, according to whom Antiochos wanted to reassert his friendship with Rome when seeing their amicitia with Nabis breaking down in 195 BC. – Traditionally, the beginning of Roman diplomacy with Antiochos III is dated to 200 BC, following the king’s victory at the Paneion in the north of Koile Syria and the subsequent conquest of Gaza. This line of events was based on the reconstruction by HOLLEAUX (1908); cf., e.g., GRÜEN (1984), vol. 1, p. 65. But there has been occasional criticism of Holleaux’ chronology, and a systematic study of the numismatic evidence now compels us to date the Battle of Paneion to ca. spring 198 BC; see LORBER (forthcoming), with a full bibliographical survey. She therefore believes that diplomacy with Rome started only in the course of 198 BC. This is possible, but would require that Livy’s account on 200 is partly fictitious. But in combination with the evidence of Sallust (discussed below), I would like to suggest that Roman diplomatic intervention followed sometime upon the first occupation of Koile Syria by Antiochos III in 202/201 BC, and might have granted his territorial gains, which where then taken back by the Ptolemaic general Skopas in ca. 200 BC. This said, I foresee that Lorber’s argument will solicit further discussion, which may help us better understand the complex events around 200 BC.

\textsuperscript{22} BURTON (2011), p. 105–107 in fact wavers between Seleukos II and Antiochos III for the king mentioned by Suetonius, but he seems to be inclined towards the latter. He has confirmed this in an email to me, in which he further calls himself ‘agnostic’ regarding the authenticity of the Suetonian letter (8 Feb. 2017).

\textsuperscript{23} Ever since NIESE (1899), p. 607 n. 4 (quoted after SCHMITT 1964, p. 269 n. 5) scholars have denied that Antiochos invaded Pergamene territory in 198 BC; cf. MA (1999), p. 279–281 and DREYER (2007), p. 283–290 (with further literature in n. 221). This does not, however, mean that there was no urgent threat against which Attalos was seeking Roman protection; probably, Zeuxis was already operating from Sardeis in 198 BC; see, e.g., SCHMITT (1964), p. 267–276; WILL (1982), p. 179; ENGELS (2012), § 2.
to be nothing wrong with the king’s characterization as a Roman *amicus*. Additional evidence can be adduced from Livy’s narrative for the year 197 BC: in his dealings with a Rhodian embassy that was concerned about Antiochos’ naval campaign along the Kilikian coast, the king ensured them that his actions would not infringe on his friendship with the Romans, whom he was in close contact, and by whom he was held in the greatest respect. Such a plausible context notwithstanding, previous scholars have put more emphasis on the fact that Antiochos seems to have been seeking Roman friendship. Most prominent is the mission of Menippus and Hegesianax to the Senate in 193 BC:

> Menippus and Hegesianax were the leaders of the king’s embassy. On their behalf, Menippus said that he did not see what there was in their embassy that was so difficult, since they had come merely to ask for friendship and conclude an alliance. There were three kinds of treaties, he said, by which states and kings concluded friendships: one, when in time of war terms were imposed upon the conquered; for when everything was surrendered to him who was the more powerful in arms, it is the victor’s right and privilege to decide what of the conquered’s property he wishes to confiscate; the second, when states that are equally matched in war conclude peace and friendship on terms of equality; under these conditions demands for restitution are made and

24 The evidence of Livy is fully accepted by BRISCOE (1973), p. 183, and more recently by DMITRIEV (2011), p. 104 and 126: ‘The senators’ appeal to Antiochus III in 198 reflected one of the basic principles of Roman foreign policy, and there is no reason to join Holleaux in doubting Livy’s information.’ Livy probably drew on an old source to be convinced of the existence of a friendship relation; cf. COSKUN (2008), p. 222f. GRÜEN (1984), vol. 2, p. 538f. and 617 defends the transmission, though without specifying the conditions under which friendship had been concluded, pointing out that both Rome (for her intercessions) and Antiochos (for his concessions) had good reasons of her/his own to invest in an amicable relation. Differently, HOLLEAUX (1921), p. 49–51 regards earlier friendship terminology as contradicted by the later negotiations; likewise, MA (1999), p. 279. DREYER (2007), p. 285 suspects the reference to *amicitia* to be part of an apologetic construction, designed to excuse Rome’s failure to intercede for one *socius*, because the opposing side was pretended to be a *socius*, too; this, in turn, contradicts Dreyer’s view that Antiochos only tried to become a Roman *socius* as of 197 BC. But see below against this view.

25 *LIV.* 33.20.8: *Nam Romanorum amicitiam se non violaturum argumento et suam recentem ad eos legationem esse et senatus honorifica in se decreta responsaque*. BRISCOE (1973), p. 183; 287. This is among the passages rashly dismissed by HOLLEAUX (1921), p. 50f., see above, n. 5.

26 ESP. HOLLEAUX (1921), p. 50f., referring to *LIV.* 34.57.6–11; 58.1–3; 59.2; DIOD. SIC. 28.15.2; APP., SYR. 6. CF. LIV. 34.59.1–2a: *Cum haesitaret Hegesianax nec inftiri posset honestorem causam libertatis quam seruituti praetexi titulo, ‘quin mittimus ambages?’ inquit P. Sulpicius, qui maximus natu ex decem legatis erat, ‘alteram ex duabus condicionibus quae modo diserte a Quinctio latae sunt legite aut supersedete de amicitia agere.’* (adapted from the translation by J.C. YARDLEY, Loeb: *At this Hegesianax hesitated, and could not deny that it was more honourable to go out under the banner of liberty than of slavery, and Publius Sulpicius, the eldest of the ten commissioners, said: ‘Why not stop beating around the bush? Choose one of the two conditions so clearly stated by Quinctius a while ago, or cease to talk of friendship.’*)
granted by mutual agreement, and if the ownership of any property has been rendered uncertain by the war, these questions are settled according to the rules of traditional law or the convenience of each party; the third exists when states that have never been at war come together to pledge mutual friendship in a treaty of alliance; neither party gives or accepts conditions; for that happens when a conquering and a conquered party meet. Since Antiochos was in this last class, he wondered on what account the Romans deemed it right to impose terms upon him, prescribing what cities of Asia he was to leave free and independent and what he was to make tributary to him, and what cities they forbade the king’s armies and the king to enter. For in that way it was proper to make peace with Philip, an enemy, but not a treaty of alliance with Antiochos, a friend.27

These passages have induced Holleaux and others to reject the idea of a previous friendship between Antiochos and Rome. But this conclusion is in no way necessary, for it is largely agreed that Livy was very vague in applying diplomatic friendship terminology: he often uses socius et amicus to denote either a socius in the narrow sense or an amicus with no other obligation than maintaining a friendly neutrality. His wording rarely allows us to see whether the mentioned relation was based on a foedus or a less formal ritual, or whether it involved a military alliance, be it binding or effective.28 Such uncertainties notwithstanding, a close reading of the context normally reveals the nature of the friendship relation. Accordingly, against the background of the above-quoted sources for the year 198 BC, the evidence for 193 BC clearly conveys the impression that Antiochos already was an amicus of the Romans. He had stayed neutral in the Second Macedonian War, so that he was obviously not what we would call an ‘ally’, whether bound to deliver military assistance (as was the duty of the Italian socii) or through effective military aid (which Attalos gave).

Two passages of the Menippos speech make it pretty clear that Antiochos, being a friend, also wanted to be a socius, that is: he coveted a treaty that would spell out the specific conditions of his relation with Rome. First, he was asking for

27 Liv. 34.57.6–11 (adapted from the transl. by J.C. Yardley, Loeb): Menippus et Hegesianax principes regiae legationis erant. ex iis Menippus ignorare se dixit quidnam perplexum sua legatio haberet, cum simpliciter ad amicitiam petendam iungendamque societatem unissent. Esse autem tria genera foederum quibus inter se paciscerentur amicitias ciuitates regesque: unum, cum bello uictis dicerentur leges; ubi enim omnia ei qui armis plus posset dedita essent, quae ex iis habere uictos, quibus multari eos velit, ipsius ius atque arbitrium esse; alterum, cum pares bello aequo foedere in pacem atque amicitiam uenirent; tunc enim repeti reddique per conuentionem res et, si quarum turbata bello possessio sit, eas aut ex formula iuris antiqui aut ex partis utriusque commodo componit; tertium esse genus cum qui nunquam hostes fuerint ad amicitiam sociali foedere inter se iungendam coeant: eos neque dicere nec accipere leges; id enim uictorius et uicti esse. Ex eo genere cum Antiochus esset, mirari se quod Romani aequum censeant leges ei dicere quas Asiae urbs liberas et immunes, quas stipendias esse uelint, quas intrare praesidia regia regemque uentent; cum Philippo enim hoste pacem, non cum Antiocho amico societatis foedus ita sanciendum esse.

amicitia sociali foedere inter se iungenda (Liv. 34.57.9); and second, he was requesting this while already enjoying the status of a friend: cum Antiocho amico societatis foedus ita sanciendum esse (Liv. 34.57.11). It seems obvious to me that Antiochos wanted to formalize his relation with Rome through a foedus, less so for the need of military assistance than with the intention of firmly and unambiguously defining each other’s spheres of interest. This territorial implication is made explicit in the response that T. Quinctius Flamininus, the chief negotiator of the Senate, gave Menippos:

Quinctius replied thus: ‘Since it is your pleasure to discuss the matter systematically and to enumerate the different ways of establishing friendships, I shall set forth two conditions without which you may report to the king that there is no way to form a friendship with the Roman people: first, that if he wishes us to have no interest in what concerns the cities of Asia, he too must himself keep entirely out of Europe; second, that if he does not keep himself within the limits of Asia, but crosses into Europe, the Romans, too, shall have the right both to defend their existing friendships with the cities of Asia and to add new treaties of alliance.'

Diodoros’ shorter version echoes the same altercation. Although its tone is somewhat sharper, Polybios must have been the common source for both later historiographers. Antiochos’ desire of a firm territorial arrangement with the Romans is confirmed further by Appian’s brief report at the conference of Ephesos, which immediately preceded the outbreak of the war: in this, Appian lets the king specify precisely which cities he was willing to grant autonomy and which cities he was not.

Livy’s work, complemented by those of Polybios, Diodoros and Appian, thus clearly implies that the negotiations about Egypt provided an opportunity for Antiochos and Rome to embark on a friendship in 200 BC. There is yet another

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30 On the context of geopolitics and rhetoric of the 190s BC, see Ma (1999), p. 97–102, though without a connection to the debate on amicitia et societas.
31 Liv. 34.58.1–3 (adapted from the transl. by J.C. Yardley, Loeb): Ad ea Quinctius: ‘quoniam uobis distincte agere libet et genera iungendarum amicitiarum enumerare, ego quoque duas condiciones ponam, extra quas nullam esse regi nuntietis amicitiae cum populo Romano iungendarum amicitiarum enumerare, ego quoque duas condiciones ponam, extra quas nullam esse regi nuntietis amicitiae cum populo Romano iungendarum amicitiarum enumerare, ut et ipse omni Europa abstineat; alteram, si se ille Asiae finibus non contineat et in Europam transcendat, ut et Romanis ius sit Asiae ciuitatium amicitias et tueri quas habeant et nouas complecti.’
32 Diod. Sic. 28.15. Note, however, that Diodorus puts the Roman response into the mouth of the more famous T. Quinctius Flamininus, a typical literary device. – Also cf. Zack (2015a), p. 38f. for Polybios as the common source.
33 App., Syr. 12 (45). Somewhat more ambiguous is App., Syr. 6 (24f.) on the previous embassy to Rome: part of the report seems to imply that friendship pre-existed, part of it that it was yet to be obtained, with or without an additional foedus; Appian was obviously not interested in terminology, but the importance of territorial boundaries is also prevalent in this report.
piece of evidence to be adduced. In the *Letter of Mithradates*, a composition with which Sallust spices his account of the Third Mithradatic War (73–63 BC), the king of Pontos addresses the Parthian king Arsakes, blaming Roman infidelity as follows:

*In fact, the Romans have one inveterate motive for making war upon all nations, peoples and kings; namely, a deep-seated desire for dominion and for riches. For this (desire) they at first began the war with Philip, king of Macedon. While they were hard pressed by the Carthaginians, they craftily diverted Antiochos, when he was coming to his aid, from this purpose by the surrender of Asia, by pretending friendship (amicitia simulantes), and then, after Philip’s power had been broken, Antiochos was robbed of all the territory this side of the Taurus, and of ten thousand talents.*

Modern scholars understand this text section differently: by relating *amicitia simulantes* to the previous sentence, they regard Philip as the (first) victim of dishonest Roman friendship. But such a reading raises a number of grammatical and historical problems that have not found satisfactory explanations. My translation implies that Sallust’s tendentious historical construction collapses the Second Illyrian War (219–217 BC) with the First (214–205 BC) and Second Macedonian Wars (200–197 BCE) into one war against Philip, so that the war against the Carthaginians (i.e. Second Punic War, 218–201 BC) was fought during that ‘Macedonian War’. This is what I would call an intuitive reading that is largely in line with the established historical facts, with the mild exception that the Peace of Phoinike is ignored here. Such a

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34 Sall., *Hist.* 4.67.5f. = 4.69.5f. (ed. Maurenbrecher 1891/1966): *Namque Romanis cum nationibus, populis, regibus cunctis una et ea etsa causa bellandi est, cupidio profunda imperi et diuitiarum; qua primo cum rege Macedonum Philippo Bellum sumpseret; dum a Carthaginensiibus premebantur; amicitiam simulantes; Ei subuentern Antiochum concessione Asiae per dolum auortere; ac mox facto Philippo Antiochus omni cis Taurum agro et decem milibus talentorum spoliatus est.*

35 The brackets in my previous note allow the reader to compare my interpretation with that which seems to be agreed on among generations of scholars, as reflected in the *editiones Teubnerianae* (Maurenbrecher 1891/1966; Ahlberg 1919; Kurfess 1972), *Oxoniensis* (Reynolds 1991) and *Loeb* (Rolfe 1921), as well as in *thelatinlibrary.com* and the *Perseus Database*. According to them, the Romans pretended friendship with Philip during the Hannibalic War, thus explicitly Rolfe (1921), p. 435: ‘Therefore they first began a war with Philip, king of Macedonia, having pretended to be his friends as long as they were hard pressed by the Carthaginians.’ Likewise, e.g., Lambert / Howaldt 1978/1991; McGushin, P. (1994), p. 48; cf. 180f.

36 It may seem that Zuck (2015b), p. 156f. deviates from this tradition: his quotation is ambiguous in that, on the one hand, the full stop after *simulantes* is missing, but, on the other hand, the subsequent *Ei* remains capitalized; more importantly, he is – as far as I see – the only one to adduce this source as evidence for Roman friendship diplomacy with Antiochos around 200 BC. This notwithstanding, in an email (8 Feb. 2017) he explains to me that his argument was not based on *amicitia simulantes*, which he continues to relate to the Roman relation with Philip, understanding that the Peace of Phoinike necessarily resulted in *amicitia*. But see below, n. 38.
choice, however, can be seen as common practice (not only) in (ancient) historiography. One may only think of the Archidamian (431–421 BC) and Dekeleian Wars (413–404 BC), which Thukydides conceives as the one ‘Peloponnesian War’.

In contrast, the traditional reading subordinates amicitiam simulantes to bellum sumpsere. A grammatically precise reading which requires the action of simulare to be ongoing at the time of sumere would render the whole sentence absurd. There might seem to be two ways around this problem: either one assumes that the Macedonian War had started before the Carthaginian, and that the Romans paused their hostilities with Philip to concentrate on Hannibal first; or one surmises that, after fighting two wars simultaneously, the Romans interrupted hostilities with Philip through the Peace of Phoinike in 205 BC, thus ‘feigning friendship’ with him for a while, before resuming the war after the defeat of Carthage. We can safely ignore the first option, given that no one has advocated this – grossly a-historical – scenario. The second variant, however, seems to be the common opinion.37 I am willing to grant this reconstruction some historical plausibility, although it implies more difficulties than anyone has so far admitted: there is at least an odd tension with primo (‘initially, first’), given that everyone knows that the Romans had been at war with Philip before the end of the Hannibalic War. Moreover, referring amicitiam simulantes to Philip implies yet another problem: we have no reason to assume that the Treaty of Phoinike stipulated amicitia besides pax, two concepts that the Romans were quite able to distinguish.

Even so, there is another, more serious, grammatical challenge. The mainstream interpretation silently accepts that simulantes does not express an action simultaneous to bellum sumpsere, as would be the norm (‘waged war, while feigning friendship’), but rather that the Romans first deceived Philip and then went to war with him. Such a loose employment of the tenses is not covered by archaic and classical grammar, and upon closer inspection, even the examples that might be adduced for a laxer post-classical usage are sufficiently distinct.38

37 See above, n. 34.
38 In his report of the peace negotiations at Phoinike, Liv 29.12 speaks about a dozen times of pax, not a single time of amicitia. There was no friendship relation between Philip and the Romans prior to the end of the Second Macedonian War. Pace A. Zack (see above, n. 36), there was no automatism between pax and amicitia; although the Romans were later inclined to grant amicitia to most of its defeated opponents, the situation in 205 BC was different, since Philip had not been defeated and accepted all Roman demands, a condition for the imperial practice of granting amicitia. Also see my discussion of 1Macc 8.17–32 for the same terminological distinction (Coşkun 2018b).
Last, but not least, the traditional interpretation results in an (even extended) version of the most-resented epic clausula: amícitiám simulántes. While in itself not an impossible choice, it does all but support the communis opinio. 40

I thus doubt that the traditional interpretation matches the meaning intended by Sallust. We should rather accept that the first sentence ends after sumpsere, and that amícitiám simulántes specifies the condition under which the Romans managed to induce Antiochos to abort his campaign in support of Philip. Sallust thus only chooses slightly arbitrary interpretations of Antiochos’ motivation for campaigning in Asia Minor in 197 BC and of the Roman offer of friendship, but he avoids any serious conflict with classical grammar or canonical historiography. 41 This new reading shifts the whole emphasis on the relation between Rome and Antiochos. Such a stress is in fact what we may expect from the Letter of Mithradates: in this, the king of Pontos is represented as addressing the king of the Parthians, who was not only the successor of the Seleukids in the Middle East, but also enjoying amicitia with the Romans. In his despair to gain new allies, Mithradates was trying to convince him that friendship with the Romans would not protect him against their greed in the future, with their lack of honesty expressed twice (amicitiam simulantes ... per dolum). Hence, the Parthians should act as long as Mithradates (represented by Philip in the historical comparison) was available as an ally.

Accordingly, in Sallust’s historiographic construction, Antiochos quite clearly emerges as an amicus populi Romani before the outbreak or perhaps during the Second Macedonian War. Sallust therefore provides the oldest

40 Be it admitted that Sallust did not fancy the Ciceronian clausulae, and that even Cicero rarely admits the heroic cadence: KÜHNER / STEGMANN (1962/1971), Part II, vol. 2, p. 622–625, § 248. And yet, some “Ciceronian” instances have been rejected as interpolations (based also on historical and grammatical considerations: BARTLETT 2016, esp. p. 49 and 72–76), while others have been identified as deliberate choice to mark a distinguished historical event (KLOSS 2009).

41 Two (asyndetic) participle constructions (amicitiam simulantes ei subuenientem Antiochum) at the beginning of a period are nothing unusual, see, e.g., KÜHNER / STEGMANN (1976/1992), Part II, vol. 1, p. 782f., § 140.4, with reference to CAES., Bell. Gall. 1.24.5 etc.
explicit testimony to the conclusion of friendship in ca. 200 BC. He, too, must have drawn on Polybios’ *Histories*.

Burton’s consideration has thus found sufficient corroboration, and I agree with his interpretation that the Roman requests for the sake of Attalos and Ptolemy were granted ‘because his obligations arising from *amicitia* compelled him to do so’. The only problem I see with Burton’s argument is that he regards 200/198 BC as the potential historical context for the letter attested by Suetonius. On this reckoning, the Romans’ request for Ilion’s tax exemption

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42 There is a broad scholarly discussion as to whether Sallust drew on documentary or at least historiographical evidence from the court of Mithradates, but none of the arguments produced in favour of such a view has much weight: neither do they require any knowledge that Sallust could not have drawn from, say, Poseidonios of Rhodes (or Polybios), nor do they make it believable that he made an effort to include material from the opponents of Rome. Differently, e.g., *Ballesteros Pastor* (2018), 291–294, with ample bibliography. At any rate, the problem of Sallust’s direct source(s) is of limited relevance to our present problem, for even if he should have based his version of the letter on an original composed by Mithradates or his court, or else on a now-lost pro-Pontic historiographical account, it is likely that, ultimately, even those would have been informed by Polybios, as far as the hard facts of the Punic, Macedonian and Syrian Wars are concerned.

43 Burton (2011), p. 106f. with n. 61, referencing *Polyb*. 16.27.5 and further scholarship on those negotiations; for the latter, also see above, n. 1. For the same conclusion, see already Dahlheim (1968), p. 258 n. 72; Biscoe (1973), p. 183; cf. Badian (1959), 82; Zack (2015b), p. 156f. – Skeptical remains Gruen (1984), vol. 1, p. 65: ‘It is of course possible that the *amicitia* dates only to 200 when Roman envoys were allegedly sent to Syria and Egypt […]. But what they accomplished there (if anything) is quite uncertain, and no evidence that they concluded an *amicitia* with Antiochus.’ Yet differently, Dmitriev (2011), p. 128, who suggests that Rome established a network of friendships in the East following the succession of Ptolemy V in 204 BC (including Antiochus III, Attalos I and perhaps Rhodes): ‘Since Egypt was a Roman friend, Antiochus received the same status. This would have been logical from the Roman view that friends of Rome were obliged to keep peace with each other and settle their conflicts with the help of Roman mediation. Establishing friendships thus offered the Romans their only justifiable grounds for interfering in Hellenistic politics at the turn of the second century.’ I remain unconvinced, but Dmitriev’s further observation carries some weight: ‘Antiochus was not honored with the status of a Roman friend for changing his policies: he still controlled Ptolemaic cities in the mid-190s.’ But Rome may have valued partial concessions more highly before than after the Second Macedonian War and following the declaration of the freedom for the Greek cities by T. Quinctius Flaminninus in 196 BC. Further problematic is the following assumption (p. 129, cf. 130): ‘The Romans simply granted him their “friendship”, for which he had not necessarily asked: the only way he could have received it from the Romans without making a formal treaty with them was in the form of a gift. His status then obliged him, in Roman eyes, to abide by the rules of Roman politics and to have the same friends and enemies as Rome.’ Such conclusions from an arbitrary definition of Roman diplomatic practices are without any force.

44 See above, n. 21, for Burton.
would have been the smallest favour they asked for. Remains to wonder what, if all of this were accepted, would have been in for Antiochos.

Moreover, the wording of the letter (amicitiam et societatem ita demum pollicentis) clearly seems to imply some hesitation on the side of the Romans in granting friendship. True enough, they had just overcome Hannibal, but the war in Cisalpine Gaul continued and the confrontation with Philip was about to reignite. Antiochos, in turn, had not only united the Upper Satrapies and several vassal kingdoms behind himself, but also achieved more against Ptolemaic Egypt in Koile Syria than any of his predecessors. What is more, the Romans were the ones who approached him, asking him for leniency with Attalos and Ptolemy V. Considering this, the years 200/198 BC do not provide a fitting context for the Suetonian letter, even if we should allow for the slip with the addressee’s name.

The proposals of Erskine and Burton involve yet another difficulty: they seem to be taking for granted that Ilion was among the protégés of Rome around 193 or 200/198 BC respectively. As we shall see in the next section, this assumption – though widespread – implies further problems, since the city is not mentioned in the detailed accounts of Livy for the Roman-Seleukid negotiations, and likewise missing in the fragmentary testimonies of Polybios and Diodoros.

4. The Shared Trojan Ancestry of Rome, Ilion, and Lampsakos, and the Agency of Pergamon

In his attempt to refute the Suetonian tradition, Holleaux elaborated on a ramification that comes with an early acknowledgment of the syngeneia between Rome and Ilion. If Ilion had been able to instrumentalize this anytime under Seleukos II or III, one should truly wonder about the course of action that the Lampsakenoi took, when rallying support against the emerging Seleukid threat in 197 BC. Their ambassador Hegesias made a detour to Massalia, to enlist

45 Likewise, Holleaux (1921), p. 48 n. 3 concluded that Seleukos is represented as having taken the initiative; he is followed by Gruen 1984, vol. 1, 65 n. 56; that much is also conceded by Rizzo (1974), p. 84. I add that the formulation further seems to imply a higher status of the Romans. When the letter was composed, it was apparently a remote idea that the conclusion of amicitia with Rome should have been initiated without addressing a humble request to the Senate. Differently, Dmitriev (2011), p. 105 with n. 8: ‘There is no reason to accept Suetonius’ view that the king petitioned the Romans for friendship [...] The Romans typically presented foreign powers as having asked to be acknowledged as Roman friends.’

46 Holleaux (1921), p. 53–57 rejects as unlikely the idea that Ilion began to be protected by Rome as of 237 BC, the assumed date for the treaty of friendship (p. 47), since the Lampsakenoi, when looking for support for their request to Rome in 197 BC, took the detour to Massalia, rather than trusting the value of their syngeneia, with
support for his mission to the Senate, which he beseeched to intercede against Antiochos. For a member of the Ilian League, if the league was existing at all and functioning at the time, this is surprising. Had Ilion indeed been enjoying a special relation with Rome, one would have expected it to endorse the Lampsakene request. Otherwise, in case Ilion was ill-disposed to Lampsakos, Hegesias would nevertheless have wanted to mention the favourable treatment of the Ilienses thanks to their *syngeneia* with the Romans – the same blood relation that the Lampsakenoi were about to draw on.

Holleaux’ argument has been questioned, in most detail, by Hatto Schmitt: on the one hand, he says that Ilion was occupied by Antiochos III in the course of 197 BC, before Hegesias had left Lampsakos; on the other hand, he suggests much more plausibly that Ilion had submitted to Antiochos without any immediate violence, responding to the diplomacy that Zeuxis started to deploy from Sardeis in 198 BC. The latter is indeed a very plausible assumption,

reference to Ilion (p. 53–56); and Rome intervened only for Lampsakos and Smyrna (Liv. 35.16.10), but even that demand Antiochos found outrages, given that he would neither interfere in Italy: Polib. 18.52. Differently, Schmitt (1964), p. 291 n. 8: ‘Bezeichnend ist übrigens, daß in der lampsakenischen Inschrift die Art der Verwandtschaft mit den Römern nicht eigens erklärt wird. Sie war also offenbar eine längst bekannte Größe’; even weaker is the counter-argument by Rizzo (1974), p. 88. For a traditional argument that simply ignores the concerns of Holleaux, see, e.g., Magie (1950), vol. 2, p. 943: ‘In 197 B.C. the envoys of Lampsacus based their plea for Roman protection […] on the ground of their *syngeneia* with Rome, a “kinship” evidently founded on the theory that Lampsacus, as a member of the Ilian Federation […]], was “akin” to Ilium and so to Rome.’

48 For the dispersed evidence for the Ilian League, Magie (1950), vol. 2, p. 869–871; Frisch (1975), p. XII; 1–55. The number of its member poleis was unstable, and it is uncertain when exactly Lampsakos belonged to the league.
especially when we see that Lampsakos and Smyrna were still free to send embassies to Rome in 197/196 BC. Schmitt further underlines that there is no firm evidence that either of the cities had gotten under the Seleukid sway in the ensuing years. At least the detailed narrative of Livy for 190 BC does not convey the impression that Smyrna or Ilion hosted a garrison of Antiochos. But it begs the question why Ilion should have preferred Antiochos over the Romans in 198 or 197 BC, since they were then actively fighting Philip in Greece, the most imminent threat to the freedom of the cities in Western Asia Minor. Choosing Antiochos would have been astonishing, if Ilion had developed close bonds with Rome or Attalos beforehand. Only one source attests to a previous relation between Ilion and Rome: the Livian account of the peace treaty of Phoinike dating to 205 BC – a tradition that involves yet further problems.

Before dealing with the immediate context of 205 BC, we should explore one further implication of the doubtful letter to Seleucus Rex. If indeed the Senate had supported Ilion due to consanguinitas under either Seleukos II or III, the Romans would not only have embraced the idea of their own Trojan descent, but also have used it, and – what is more – allowed it to be used in diplomatic affairs by others. Positive evidence for any such practice is, however, quite late, and clearly points to the time of the Hannibalic War. The earliest attested case

ENGELS (2012), § 2 includes Ilion among the opposition to Antiochos that turned to Rome in 197/196 BC.

51 SCHMITT (1964), p. 283 (Smyrna) and 293: ‘Lampsakos war vor 197 v. Chr. frei [...] und sträubte sich auch in den folgenden Jahren gegen die syrischen Eroberungsgelüste [...]. Daß die Stadt erobert worden wäre, läßt sich ebensowenig beweisen wie im Fall Smyras.’ Cf. p. 290, where he downplays any military threat to Lampsakos in 197 BC. Yet, in contradiction to his previous claim, he states on p. 295: ‘Smyrna und Lampsakos wurden, nachdem die Verhandlungen ergebnislos verlaufen waren, noch vor Beginn der Feldzugszeit 196 zermüht’. The latter is not attested for 197/196 BC (Liv. 33.38, cf. MA 1999, p. 173). According to BADIAN (1959), p. 84f., Antiochos passed on laying siege to Lampsakos and Smyrna, lest to halt his march into Thrace and gain further ground before the Romans would interfere once more. The two cities continued to resist at least until early in 192 BC (Liv. 35.42.2, quoted below in the appendix on Alexandria Troas). And yet, it may well be that Lampsakos gave in to the pressure in 192 or 191 BC; see below, with n. 68.

52 More on the events of 190 BC below.


54 Pace SCHMITT (1964), p. 291: ‘Die römische Propaganda hat wohl schon damals (sc. around 240 BC) eifrig für die Idee geworben, daß die Römer Abkömmlinge des Aeneas und somit ein altes, in den griechischen Kulturkreis gehörendes Volk seien. In den folgenden Jahrzehnten mehren sich die Nachrichten, die hierfür sprechen’. BRISCOE (1981), p. 343 goes as far back as Pyrrhos (PAUS. 1.12.1), but apart from the fact that the evidence is late, it does not prove that the Romans had embraced their Trojan past. More to the point is ELWYN 1993, p. 267–271, who discusses kinship terminology (homophylia, consanguinitas) that later literary sources occasionally adduce for the Roman negotiations with the Mamertines, Saguntines and Capuani. She not only points to doubts concerning the historicity of the evidence, but also argues convincingly that none of the
in which the Trojan connection played a role in Roman politics dates to 212 BC, when the *Carmina Marciana* were recited from the Sibylline Oracles. More famous is, of course, the quest for the ‘forgotten’ *Magna Idaea Mater*, which was undertaken in 205/204 BC, also at the behest of the Sibylline Oracles. This time, Attalos I of Pergamon got involved. He did not take the Roman ambassadors to Ilion, as one might have expected, but to Pessinus, a remote and yet barely-known place in eastern Phrygia. Intriguingly, our main source Livy specifies that, when the oracle was discussed in the Senate, the Romans did not yet have any city in Asia Minor among their ‘(friends and) allies’ (Livy. 29.10): *nullasdam in Asia socias ciuitates habebat populus Romanus*. We cannot ultimately decide whether Livy is drawing on a reliable tradition for this negative statement or presenting his own conclusion based on the uncertainty that the Romans apparently felt: they chose to consult the oracle of Delphi twice before approaching Attalos in Pergamon – bypassing Ilion, which remains unmentioned in the account.

It deserves emphasis that the search for the forgotten Mother took place in 205/204 BC, and thus at least in part simultaneously with the peace negotiations at Phoinike. Remarkably, Livy lists Ilion among the allies of the Romans that were included in the peace treaty with Philip. If this annalistic tradition is accepted, we would have to do with a last-minute addition, just as in the potential case of Athens. It is, however, not too bold to follow the majority of scholars who reject the authenticity of that list: neither Ilion nor Athens had fought on the Roman side in the First Macedonian War. The inclusion of Athens in the Roman historiographical tradition is immediately obvious, when considering the

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55 *Livy*. 25.10; see *Erskine* (2001), p. 39: ‘Since prophecies and oracles are usually cryptic and enigmatic, one could equally maintain that the occurrence of the term *Troiugena* is evidence for the lack of familiarity with the myth in Rome’; *Russo* (2005) and (2014), p. 596. Note that *Walbank* (1979), p. 185 has pointed out, has only ‘indifference polie et bonnes paroles’ for this kindred state; the claim of kinship has little effect on Rome’s policies and actions in the Greek East.’ Also cf. *Coşkun* (2008), p. 20–23; *Vischer* in this volume with ns. 25f.

56 See *Russo* (2014); (2015), p. 139–154, mainly arguing for P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus promoting the notion of Trojan ancestry in Rome and pushing for the acquisition of the Magna Mater prior to his African campaign; also see p. 142–144 on the involvement of Attalos.

city’s part in the justification of the Second Macedonian War: Philip’s impinging on Athens offered one of the reasons to reopen the war in 200 BC.\(^{58}\) Much less clear is the case of Ilion: if indeed it played a role during the negotiations in Phoinike, it would have owed its privileged status as a Roman ally to the patronage of Attalos.\(^{59}\) But an alternative seems much more likely: in the quest for the *Magna Idaea Mater*, Attalos instigated the detour to Pessinus in order to bind Roman loyalty to him and his kingdom, rather than to the Ilian League, which does not seem to have been under his control.

5. Ilion, Antiochos and Rome

The events of 205 BC also shed a different light on the behaviour of the Lampsakenoi in 197 BC: asking for Roman protection effectively meant distancing oneself from Ilion and its league, which must have been siding with Antiochos. Perhaps the Ilienses felt they had better reason to fear Attalos than the Seleukids, who were certainly offering good terms until 198/197 BC. Against this background, one can understand much better why, in their negotiations with Antiochos in 196 BC, the Roman ambassadors made claims for Lampsakos, Smyrna and Pergamon, but not for Ilion.

Antiochos was, in fact, an apparent choice for Ilion, especially at a time when the outcome of the war between Rome and Philip was yet uncertain. It is easy to imagine that the Seleukid king was wooing the Greek cities long before his ships would reach their harbours in 197 BC, and it is neither an abject speculation that Ilion could expect a privileged status under his rule. No one could foretell how much weight the Romans would give to a shared Trojan ancestry. In contrast, the prestige that Ilion had enjoyed under previous Hellenistic kings is well documented. Our main source, Strabon, attests Alexander the Great’s fascination with that place, the immunity he granted and the several promises he added. But it was Lysimachos who effectively took care of the city walls and also of the temple of Athena.\(^{60}\) An inscription from ca. 275 BC allows us to add Antiochos I Soter to the list of the city’s benefactors.\(^{61}\) Another small epigraphic

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\(^{58}\) Liv. 29.12.14 on Phoinike. Against the inclusion of Ilion and Athens, see, e.g., Walbank (1967), p. 552 (with reference to the case of Lampsakos in 197 BC, see below); Eckstein (2008), p. 113f. with bibliography in n. 147.

\(^{59}\) Thus, e.g., Erskine (2001), p. 174f.; ‘Ilion had been included among the *adscripti* to the Peace of Phoinike in 205, most probably because of its kinship with Rome, though whether the initiative came from Rome, Attalos, or Ilion is uncertain.’ Cf. Schmitt (1964), p. 291.

\(^{60}\) Strab., Geogr. 13.1.26f. (594C).

\(^{61}\) The honorary inscription capitalizes repeatedly on the cult for Athena, and further attests Antiochos’ role as saviour and benefactor, which may, however, simply relate to overcoming the Galatian crisis by 275 BC, see esp. OGIS 219 (Sigeion) = Frisch (1975),
fragment confirming previous privileges and promising goodwill and honour has convincingly been ascribed to Antiochos III, it should be dated to 198 or 197 (if not around 202) BC. The latter king’s awareness of the ideological potential is revealed by his sacrifice to Ilian Athena just before he set sail to Greece in 192 BC.

We may add a reference to Hegesianax of Alexandria Troas here: he has been mentioned before as the king’s ambassador to Rome in 193 BC, but he also had been his delegate to Korinth in 196 BC and participated at the conference of Lysimacheia in the same year. His hometown Alexandria was one of the cities of the Troas that smoothly accepted Seleukid suzerainty in 197, if not 198 BC, together with Ilion. It is of some bearing that he quickly became a most-trusted philos of the king. He is recognized to be behind the pseudonym Kephalon of Gergis, to whom a History of Troy is generally ascribed. Although only fragments of this work have been preserved, their subtle nuances to the narratives that were then gaining currency in the Mediterranean World are apparently designed to strengthen the ideological link between the Seleukid dynasty and Troy at the cost of Pergamon and Rome. Such an intention is revealed by having Aineias die in Thrace, so that he never reached Latium; in addition, Rhomos (Remus?), not Romulus is named as the founder of Rome. Ilion and its league members were faring well in the first year of renewed Seleukid presence in Western Asia Minor. When only Lampsakos felt the need to resist, one may speculate either about tensions within the league or machinations of the Attalids, who were trying to build a pro-Roman network in the area headed by themselves. Conditions changed quickly in 191 BC. Both

I. Iliön no. 32 = MA (1999), p. 254–259 = Austin 2 162, Il. 36–38: Ο δήμος ὁ Ταλείων βασιλέα Αντίοχου βασιλέως Σελεύκου εὐσέβειας ἔνεκεν τής εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν, εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτήρα γεγονότα τοῦ δήμου. ‘The people of [Ilium (honours) King Antiochus] son of King Seleucus for his piety towards the sanctuary (and) for being [the benefactor and] saviour of the people.’ For the date, see Coskun (2012), p. 61 n. 14. Note that I. Iliön 31 seems to be attesting a cult for Seleukos I late in 281 BC.


63 For Seleukid military operations in Karia around the time, which also resulted in diplomacy with Ionian cities, see Dreyer (2007), p. 272–282. If so, diplomacy with Aiolian cities would be a similar possibility, especially when those were under threat from Philip (or Attalos). And see above, with n. 49 for 198 BC.

64 Liv. 35.43.3: pristquam solueret naues, Ilium a mari escendit ut Minerva sacrificaret. See Visscher in this volume, section 2, for more details.


66 See Dion. Hal., Rom. Ant. 1.44.3–71 and 1.72.1f., with Visscher in this volume, section 1, also referring to BNJ 45 = FGrHist 45. Note, however, that Visscher hesitates to accept an openly hostile attitude towards Rome.

the speed and the efficiency of Rome’s response to Antiochos’ expansion into Greece probably exceeded everyone’s expectations. The defeats that Antiochos suffered at the Thermopylai and in the Aegean shook his reputation. It also became clear that he had not thought about a second defense line at his back: no one was there to prevent the Romans from landing in the Troad in winter 190 BC. In fact, Pergamon had even operated against Antiochos throughout the war, and quickly joined the first Roman general in the ‘Harbour of the Achaians’:

Already Livius\(^68\) from Kanai, with his own thirty ships and seven quadriremes which King Eumenes had brought with him was on his way to the Hellespont, that he might make everything ready for the crossing of the army, which, he thought, would come by land. He first brought the ships into what they called the ‘harbour of the Achaians’, thence he went up to Ilium, and after sacrificing to Minerva gave a gracious audience to embassies from Elaios and Dardanos and Rhoiteion offering to entrust their cities to his good faith.\(^69\)

While it is hard to establish what precisely the conditions were under which the Ilian League had been held by Antiochos, we can be sure that he had not garrisoned them, trusting that his charisma would suffice to hold his new subjects in awe. A possible exception might be Lampasakos, whose traces are lost for the years 196–188 BC: a Seleukid garrison would at least explain why the city did not send a delegation to welcome Livius Salinator, or soon thereafter the consul L. Cornelius Scipio (Asiaticus).\(^70\) With the latter’s arrival in the Troad a few months later, the Ilian spectacle was repeated according to Livy:

When everything was ready for the execution of his designs and when he had moved from his base, the consul first advanced to Dardanos and then to Rhoiteion, and both peoples thronged to meet him. Then he went on to Ilium, and encamping on the level ground which lies below the walls, he went up to the city and the citadel and offered sacrifice to Minerva, the guardian of the citadel; the people of Ilium, on their part;

\(^68\) C. Livius Salinator (MRR I, p. 357).

\(^69\) Liv. 37.9.7–8 (adapted from the transl. by J.C. Yardley, Loeb): *Iam Liuius a Canis cum triginta naubus *<s>suis</s>* et septem quadriremibus, quas secum Eumenes rex adduxerat, Hellespontum petebat, ut ad transitum exercitus, quem terra venturum opinabatur, praepararet, quae opes essent. In portum, quem uocant Achaearum, classem primum aduertit: inde Ilium escendit, sacrificioque Mineruae facto legationes finitimas ab Elaeunte et Dardano et Rhoeteo, tradentes in fidem ciuitatis suas, benignae audiuit.

\(^70\) Add to this that Lampasakos is not singled out in the list that Livy provides for the post-war regulations (Liv. 38.39, in part quoted below); it is likewise missing in Polybios’ account (Polyb. 21.46). Should we blame both authors for incompleteness, as Walbank (1979), p. 164 does? There is the alternative that Lampasakos then seen among the cities partisan or even tax-paying to Antiochos. At least, we do not read of any support for the Roman campaign in 190 BC. Antiochos’ offer to forsake his claims to Smyrna and Lampasakos in 190 BC (Polyb. 21.13.3) does not reveal its current status. For uncertainty during these years, but without this explanation, see Will (1982), p. 185. Inconsistent are the positions of Schmitt (1964), p. 290–295, see above, n. 50. Gruen (1984), vol. 2, p. 619 supposes its successful resistance. Dreyer (2007), p. 357 n. 172 only addresses the (likewise uncertain) post-war regulations.
Ilion and the other league members seem to have been lucky: if we can trust Livy (whose account has been further expanded by Justin), the Roman leaders were as fond of the Homeric traditions as the Hellenistic kings from Alexander to Antiochos III. The same is implied in the preferred treatment which Ilion received in the peace negotiations of Apameia in 189/88 BC. It is worthwhile to read what the historiographer has to say more broadly on the treatment of the Aiolian and Ionian cities:

Those which had been tributaries to King Antiochos but had sided with the Roman people were granted freedom from taxation; those which had been partisans of Antiochos or tributaries to King Attalos were all ordered to pay tribute to Eumenes. In addition, they granted freedom from taxation expressly to the Kolophonians who live in Notion, to the Kymaians and the Mylasenians; to the Klazomenians, in addition to immunity, they gave the island of Drymussa as a gift, and to the Milesians they restored what they call the ‘sacred land’, and to the people of Ilion they added Rhoiteion and Gergis, less as a reward for recent services than in recognition of their descent. This was also the reason for liberating Dardanos. The Chians, Smyrnaeans and Erythraeans, because of the extraordinary loyalty they had displayed in the war, were rewarded with lands and in addition were treated with every mark of honour. To the Phocaians they both gave back the lands which they had held before the war and permitted them to live under their ancient laws.

The preferential treatment of Ilion was not only substantial, but the additional comment is quite noteworthy, especially in contrast with the merits of the other beneficiaries: non tam ob recentia ulla merita quam originum memoria. This seems to imply that the Ilienses had not made the least effort to support Rome; they did nothing but opportunistically changing sides as late as 190 BC, but not
even then providing any military assistance. This said, there is no reproach of Ilion’s disloyalty either, something the Romans notoriously responded to with harshness. As a result, we should understand this last Livian passage as further support for the view that the Romans had neither requested tax exemptions for the Ilienses from any Seleukid king nor extended the protection of the Peace of Phoinike to them.

One serious problem remains, however. In his Histories, at least in their fragmentary state, Polybios fails to mention that C. Livius Salinator or L. Cornelius Scipio jumped on the opportunity to sacrifice to Athena of Ilion. What is more, he does not even note any preferential treatment the city might have received in Apameia.74 Most scholars nevertheless find the Livian tradition credible.75 One might think to find further confirmation in a marginal note in Polybios’ account of the complex negotiations at Apameia: he tells us that the Ilienses interceded in support of the Lykians ‘because of the syngeneia with themselves’. The wording is somewhat ambiguous, but I am willing to grant that this relation was meant to involve all three: the Ilienses, the Romans and the Lykians. There is no reason to question Polybios’ statement that the ambassadors received a friendly reply’, and were given hope that the Lykian confederation might escape punishment. And yet, the Romans passed on their territory to Rhodes as a gift.76 Against this background, I suggest we take Polybios’ previous silence on Ilion seriously.

In fact, there is further reason to mistrust Livy’s testimony, since we can also enlist Strabon as a witness against the annalistic tradition. In his very detailed account of the benefactions granted to Ilion, he ignores any advantage that the city might have enjoyed in the aftermath of the Roman War against Antiochos. This argumentum e silentio is of some weight: while the Geographer is addressing the Roman take-over, his emphasis is on the insignificance of the little town at the time. Next, he says that, some unspecified time later, Ilion ‘enjoyed great improvements’, only to be annihilated by Fimbria in the First Mithradatic War. Sulla tried to make good for the damage, but the real benefactor, so Strabon goes on, was Julius Caesar, a descendant of Aineias

75 Thus, e.g., Magie (1950), vol. 2, p. 950f. n. 50 (rejecting the suspicion of a later annalistic insertion as put forward by Mommsen and Niëse 1899, p. 760 with n. 2); Schmitt (1964), p. 292 (cf. p. 284); Walbank (1979), p. 165 and 182; Canali de Rossi (1997), p. 208. Also Erskine (2001), p. 175f., who, however, downplays the significance of the Trojan connection for the Romans, but regards it as an opportunity for Ilion and Dardanos in times of turmoil. Erskine adds in n. 57: ‘Either Livy introduced material from another source or the Byzantine excerptor of Polybios omitted this section’. Briscoe (1981), p. 305; 343 does not even comment on the sacrifices offered by Salinator and Scipio.
through Ilos. It was he who granted freedom and immunity, besides increasing their territory.\(^{77}\)

Preferring the versions of Polybios and Strabon does not result in denying any Ilian claims of kinship voiced to the Roman conquerors in 190 BC. Neither do we have to regard the Romans as entirely deaf towards the ideological potential that the control of Trojan locations might bring with it. Yet their zeal to do good to all their fellow descendents would have been limited by the fact that the Ilenses had willingly offered their ideological advantage to Antiochos, and we should perhaps add that his pompous sacrifice to ‘their’ Athena had not helped him much, but ended in disaster. Various conclusions could possibly be drawn: instead of abandoning the idea of Trojan descent altogether,\(^{78}\) the most pragmatic reaction would have been simply to distrust Ilios’s claim. After all, that is what a few years later a neighbour of the city did: Demetrios of Skepsis, the author of the *Troikos diakosmos*. This was the main source for Strabon’s lengthy digression dedicated to the rejection of the lofty claim of Ilios.\(^{79}\)

5. Conclusions

After setting out the different responses to Suetonius’ testimony for the beginning of Roman friendship with *Seleucus Rex* in the introduction, we first explored (and rejected) Seleukos II, III and IV as potential addressees of the letter. Next, we examined the evidence for Antiochos III, confirming his status as the first *amicus populi Romani* among the Seleukids and dating the beginning of this relationship to 200 BC. This year, however, is incompatible with the conditions implied in the Suetonian letter: namely, that the king took the initiative and begged for friendship, and that the Romans granted it after some hesitation and only (or mainly) under the condition that he would grant tax exemption to Ilios. The year 200 BC rather saw the Romans concerned about the survival of the Ptolemaic and Attalid kingdoms, besides the upcoming Second Macedonian War, whereas their attention for individual cities (Smyrna and Lampsakos) was aroused only in 197/196 BC. The letter summarized by Suetonius is thus no fit for a situation in which the Romans were keen on

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\(^{77}\) Strab., Geogr. 13.1.27 (594f.C).

\(^{78}\) And thus offending the powerful *Magna Idaea Mater* once more.

\(^{79}\) Strab., Geogr. 13.1.27–45 (595–604C); cf. RA (2008), vol. 7, p. 480; cf. 481f.; 487f.; 495f. The problem is certainly worth further exploration. Some ideas deserving consideration are the following: 1) it is a possibility that the freedom of Dardanos might have come at the cost of Ilios in 189/188 BC. 2) Livy names no patron of Ilios, which would have given more credibility to his claim; the sections quoted above attest plenty of opportunities to have done so.
ensuring the king’s friendly neutrality on the eve of the Second Macedonian War.

In another step, the relation between Rome and Iliön came under scrutiny. It has some bearing that the Romans did not even consider contacting Iliön during their quest for the ‘forgotten Mother’ in 205 BC. Instead, they entrusted their concern to Attalos I, and saw their needs served well with the meteorite from Phrygian Pessinus rather than with any cult statue from the Troad. Even Livy confesses that the Romans did not have any other friends in Asia Minor at the time, which once more excludes the possibility that they had previously interceded on behalf of Iliön. The city’s inclusion in the Treaty of Phoinike as an ally of the Romans is questionable on the ground that it had not been involved in the conflict with Philip V at all. Further suspicion is aroused by its absence from the literary source for nearly the next fifteen years. Nothing indicates that the Ilienses were close to Attalos. On the contrary, they rather chose to join the Seleukid side in 198 BC.

This affiliation yields an obvious reason for why the Romans were not concerned with Iliön, but instead with Smyrna and Lampsakos during the negotiations with Antiochos between 196 and 193 BC. Iliön was treated well by the king and neither needed nor wanted Roman patronage. After he had suffered defeat in Europe and the first Romans showed up on their shores, Iliön and its league members were, however, quick to change sides, at least if we can trust Livy’s account in this regard (Alexandria Troas abandoned the king a bit earlier). For this reconstruction, we do not have to accept that C. Livius Salinator or L. Cornelius Scipio sacrificed to Iliön Athena (whether to imitate Alexander or Antiochos). While such actions cannot be excluded entirely, the silence of Polybios and Strabon combined render them unlikely. Perhaps Salinator or Scipio showed signs of interest, which were later embellished into offering a sacrifice, and the narration of a Roman sacrifice at Iliön was later duplicated in the literary tradition. Either way, not even Livy reports that those rituals came with privileges or promises thereof. And yet, the Ilienses may well have taken any friendly gesture as a hint that their glorious ancestry might gain them a particular esteem among the Romans. Iliön ambassadors put this to a test in 189/188 BC, but failed miserably: although they interceded to deflect punishment from Lykia in Apameia, the Romans ‘gifted’ that territory to Rhodes. While a fragment from Polybios has preserved much of the story, Livy or the intermediate source got rid of the embarrassing incident.

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80 See above, n. 6, on Alexandria.
81 Liv. 37.55.4f. seems to be subsuming their delegation under ‘other delegations’: auditae deinde et aliae legationes ex Asia sunt. Quibus omnibus datum responsum decem legatos more maiorum senatum missurum ad res Asiae disceptandas componendasque; summam tamen hanc fore, ut cis Taurum montem, quae intra regni Antiochi fines fuissent, Eumeni attribuerentur praeter Lyciam Cariamque usque ad Maeandrum
This omission requires us once more to acknowledge that the tradition preserved in Livy is not only inconsistent, but also underwent a pro-IIion revision. We should perhaps even hesitate to accept that Ilion changed sides before the Battle of Magnesia, since the city and its league were conspicuously absent from among the Roman allies in the decisive battle. Neither should we believe Livy’s allegation that Ilion was richly rewarded for its glorious ancestry in Apameia: according to Strabon’s quite detailed account, tax exemption and territorial expansion were granted only by Caesar. With the latter’s control over Asia Minor as of 48 BC, we also gain a terminus a quo for the aforementioned major ‘upgrade’ of Ilion’s history in the later annalistic tradition. Sometime in the second half of the 1st century BC, the partisanship of the Ilienses for Antiochos against the Romans was felt to be embarrassing, and someone undertook to obliterete that inglorious political choice. Livy himself is not a likely candidate for this manipulation, for if so, he would at least have omitted some comments that caused inconsistency. As so often, he is a largely reliable but not overly critical preserver of a pluriform tradition.

We may next ask the question if Caesar’s dictatorship does not also yield a plausible terminus a quo for the composition of Suetonius’ uetus epistula Graeca? If this should date to the 40s BC, the letter would be about a full century old when later produced in the Senate under Claudius: it could rightly be seen as ‘ancient’. Accepting that the letter is a fabrication, we may finally consider the king’s identity once more: whom would the forger have had in mind? He chose to avoid Antiochos III, the most powerful king the Romans ever encountered, given that he had broken friendship with Rome and started a major war – at least, from the Roman perspective. This requires us to look once more around among his predecessors called Seleukos. Understanding that the author did not draw on positive evidence for diplomatic relations with any of them, he probably thought of the most prestigious bearer of that name, the founder of the dynasty: Seleukos I Nikator.

This said, he who phrased the Suetonian letter is likely to have been at least in part inspired by the reports of Roman-Seleukid diplomacy of the years 196 to 192 BC, where the treatment of some Greek cities by the king was a condition for the Romans to offer a foedus of amicitia et societas – a condition that was, however, not met. Nearly one and a half centuries later, the Ilienses were not

annem; ea ut ciuitatis Rhiodiorum essent. (Adapted from the transl. by J.C. YARDLEY, Loeb: Then other embassies also from Asia were heard. To all these the same reply was given that the Senate, in the fashion of their forefathers, would send ten commissioners to adjudge cases arising in Asia and to settle the differences; yet the general principle would be this, that on this side of the Taurus mountains the districts which had been within the boundaries of the kingdom of Antiochos should be assigned to Eumenes, with the exception of Lykia and Karia as far as the Maeander river; that these should be given to the Rhodian state.) Contrast this brevity with the detail of POLYB. 22.5.1–4, on which see above, with n. 75. Also cf. LIV. 38.39.10.
concerned with such historical detail, nor were Claudius or Nero, who fully supported their request for tax exemption a quarter-millennium after the Roman-Seleukid War.\footnote{Holleaux (1921), p. 58: ‘Elle a pour objet d’établir, d’une part, que les Romains, toujours fidèles au souvenir de leurs ancêtres troyens, ont, sitôt qu’ils l’ont pu, entouré de soins pieux la ville d’Ilion, leur metropole; et, d’autre part, que, dès les temps les plus anciens, les plus grands rois de la terre se sont fait honneur de rechercher et d’obtenir leur “amitié” publique. […] Pour le faussaire érudit, auteur de la vetus epistula Graeca, ce “Seleucus” était impersonnel et son règne flottait dans le lointain des âges: c’était simplement le “roi d’Asie”.'}

6. Appendix: The Role of Alexandria Troas during the Run-Up to the Roman-Syrian War

There is a nearly ‘canonical’ list of three Greek cities in Western Asia Minor which enjoyed Roman diplomatic support between 197/196 BC in Korinth or Lysimacheia and Ephesos on the eve of the Roman-Syrian War in 193/192 BC: Smyrna, Lampsakos and Alexandria Troas. To many scholars, this seems to be a well-established ‘fact’, for which source references are superfluous.\footnote{E.g., Schmitt (1964), p. 284 and Dreyer (2007), p. 289 (cf. 357 n. 172); also Walbank (1979), p. 164f.} Holleaux (1921), p. 56f. presents references, but none of them mentions Alexandria. They do cover Rome’s intervention for Lampsakos and Smyrna at the conference of Lysimacheia, 196 BC (Polyb. 18.52), the conference in Rome, spring 193 BC, with Menippos and Hesegianax representing the Antiochos III (Liv. 34.57–59), and the conference in Ephesos, fall 193 BC, with Minnio as the king’s negotiator (Liv. 35.15f.). Add to this Liv. 35.17.7, where Smyrna and Lampsakos are mentioned as defying Antiochos.\footnote{More evidence for Smyrna and Lampsakos is collected above, in n. 6. Dmitriev (2011), p. 126f. is either following Holleaux or Canali de Rossi.}

Likewise, Canali de Rossi (1997), p. 197 and 199 includes Alexandria into the list of cities appealing for Roman support in 196 BC, although, under the lemma \textit{Alexandria Troas} (p. 199f., no. 239), he dates the beginning of the city’s diplomacy with Rome to 193 BC. Note that not even our sources for the negotiations in Korinth in 196 BC mention Alexandria, while they do attest to the embassies of ‘Smyrna, Lampsakos and others’ (App., Syr. 2.5); the same two cities are further mentioned as raising the court’s concern: their attitude, if unchecked, might arouse further defiance in Aiolis and Ionia as well as the Hellespontic region (Liv. 33.38 on 197/96 BC).

But Canali de Rossi (1997), p. 194 and 199 adds two additional pieces of evidence: Polyb. 21.13.3 and the corresponding section in Diod. Sic. 29.7. Both of them mention Alexandria among the three cities hostile to Antiochos, claims

\footnote{82 Holleaux (1921), p. 58: ‘Elle a pour objet d’établir, d’une part, que les Romains, toujours fidèles au souvenir de leurs ancêtres troyens, ont, sitôt qu’ils l’ont pu, entouré de soins pieux la ville d’Ilion, leur metropole; et, d’autre part, que, dès les temps les plus anciens, les plus grands rois de la terre se sont fait honneur de rechercher et d’obtenir leur “amitié” publique. […] Pour le faussaire érudit, auteur de la vetus epistula Graeca, ce “Seleucus” était impersonnel et son règne flottait dans le lointain des âges: c’était simplement le “roi d’Asie”.’
\footnote{84 More evidence for Smyrna and Lampsakos is collected above, in n. 6. Dmitriev (2011), p. 126f. is either following Holleaux or Canali de Rossi.}
to which he was ready to give in for peace with Rome. But this report refers to early 190 BC. The first mention of Alexandria dates to the eve of Antiochos’ European campaign in 192 B:

Three cities were detaining him, Smyrna and Alexandria Troas and Lampsakos, which he had up to that time been able neither to take by assault nor to win over to friendship by negotiations, nor was he willing to leave them in his rear when he crossed to Greece.85

Ma (1999), p. 90 n. 235 (cf. p. 96) comments: ‘Alexandria Troas only appears alongside Smyrna and Lampsakos in 192 (Liv. 35.42.2), but may have resisted Antiochos from the start: Liv. 33.38.1–7 does not say that Smyrna and Lampsakos were the only non-Seleukid cities in 197, but the most important ones.’ While this may be correct, it does not have to be so, or at least Livy’s testimony does not require Alexandria to have entertained diplomatic relations with Rome. This is what may also be implied in Polybios’ wording (Polyb. 21.13.3 on 190 BC): ‘instructions to offer to surrender the territories of Lampsacus and Smyrna as well as Alexandria (Troas), which were the original cause of the war’.86 Antiochos apparently hesitated more regarding Alexandria, it presented a different case than the other two cities, which – I assume – had persistently enjoyed Roman advocacy since 197/196 BC.

Alexandria, in contrast, may have managed to maintain its independence through a friendly diplomacy with Antiochos, without ever recognizing his sovereignty. This success may have been owed to Hegesianax of Alexandria Troas, the king’s philos, on whom see above, section 5. Antiochos may have tolerated this splendid isolation of the Alexandrians as long as they did not turn to Rome, or perhaps as long as he felt to have the loyalty of his Alexandrian friend. But his patience ended in 192 BC.87

Bibliography

Sources

Greek texts have been adapted from the Perseus Database, Latin texts from the latinlibrary.com, English translations from the Loeb editions. Significant deviations from

85 LIV. 35.42.2 (adapted from the transl. by J.C. Yardley, Loeb): Tres eum ciuitates tenebant, Smyrna et Alexandria Troas et Lampsacus, quas neque ui expugnare ad eam diem poterat neque condicionibus in amicitiam perlicere, neque ab terto relinquere traiciens ipse in Europam uolebat.

86 POLYB. 21.13.3: ὅτι περισσευεῖ τῆς τῶν Λαμψακιών καὶ Σμύρνης, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρεως πόλεως, ἕξ ὄν ὁ πόλεμος ἔλαβε τὰς ἀρχάς.

87 Also see Canali De Rossi (1997), p. 200 for older scholarship according to which Rome began to support Alexandria only in 192 BC (cf. Will 1982, p. 200).
those versions have been accounted for in the notes. The following are the printed editions, besides the commentaries, that have been consulted:

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