Gesta Principium: A Study of the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian Field Armies at the Battle of Dorylaeum, 1097 AD

by

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Author’s Declaration

I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public.
Abstract

The purpose of this study is to showcase the Battle of Dorylaeum, fought between the Frankish invading forces of the First Crusade and the defending Turkic-Syrian armies of late eleventh-century Anatolia, as a military engagement between these two factions which outlines the unfamiliar nature of their styles of combat. After providing a brief history of the First Crusade in Chapter One, as well as outlining several key military engagements leading up to Dorylaeum itself, Chapter Two delves into a military-analytical study of Dorylaeum, outlining the favoured battle tactics of both Frankish and Turkic-Syrian field armies at maximal strengths and using examples from the Battle of Dorylaeum itself. A secondary study, the observation and survey of troop numbers present at the engagement as put forward by both primary and secondary sources, is conducted in an attached Appendix.
Acknowledgements

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Maalouf, Crusades


Morton, Turks


Oldenbourg, The Crusades


Philips, Holy Warriors


Philips, Knights and Crusades


Prawer, Les croisades


RC

*Sancti aurelii Augustini Hipponensis episcopi opera omnia: post lovaniensium theologorum recensionem castigata denuo ad manusciptos codices gallicanos, vaticanos, belgicos etc. necnon ad editiones antiquiores et castigatores*. Parisiis, apud Gaume fratres, 1836.

Richards, The Chronicle of Ibn Al-Athir


Riley-Smith, Motives


Runciman, HoC


Setton, ed. HotC., 1


Introduction

The First Crusade stands out among its peers of religiously motivated European conflict birthed from the consolidation of papal power in western Europe during the first few centuries of the second millennium, best characterized by a largely aggressive militaristic attitude towards the Islamic world by the late eleventh century. Spurred on by promises of rewards both temporal and spiritual, a myriad of separate western armed groups composed of soldiers, knights, and pilgrims marched as the Milites Christi in an aggressive attempt to deliver military aid to the waning Byzantine Empire and reclaim ancient lands which had been under Christian jurisdiction in Late Antiquity.

While certainly building and relying upon the works of various scholars of the twentieth and twenty-first century regarding crusading warfare, the particular contribution of this study is its focus on an in-depth analysis of the study of imported western tactics against an Oriental opponent, as at the Battle of Dorylaeum (1097). While using the Battle of Dorylaeum as a case

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1 When referring to the campaign itself, the term “First Crusade” will be capitalized. When referring to the ideologies of, or those forces taking part in, the crusade, it will remain lowercase.

2 One of the larger catalysts was the Turkic wresting of Asia Minor from the Byzantine empire following the disastrous campaign of Emperor Diogenes IV and the subsequent defeat of Byzantine forces at Manzikert in 1071. Hodgson, *Expansion of Islam*, 264.

3 “[N]unc aeterna praemia nanciscantur, qui dudum pro solidis paucis mercennarii fuerunt”. Hagenmeyer, ed. *HH*, 136. “Let those who have been hirelings for a few pieces of silver now attain an eternal reward.” Fulcher, *HH*, trans. Ryan, 67. Urban certainly pitched the idea of his crusade in terms of spiritual rewards, regarding indulgences, yet also included the possibility of amassing wealth and territories beyond the scope of Christendom. See Riley-Smith, *Motives*, 722-3. All translations are provided by the author unless indicated otherwise. “What distinguished the Crusades was that they were a mass movement, in which men of all ranks and classes were caught and swept forward by a wave of emotion.” Gibb, *Arabic Materials*, 741.

4 “Soldiers of Christ”.

5 “From the view of the Byzantine empire, the first Crusading expedition was a contribution to its standing goal: to regain all the territories once held by the Christian Roman Empire…”. Hodgson, *Expansion of Islam*, 264. Philip Jenkins excellently summarizes the history of Christianity in the East, where, in Chapter Two of his work, he outlines the churches in the east as being arguably stronger and more stable in terms of their social standing and popular support than those in the Western Roman Empire. See Jenkins, *LHoC*, 45-70.
study representative of Frankish and Turkic-Syrian field army engagements, this study will strive to outline the several military adaptations enacted by both factions, due to the unfamiliar nature of their styles of combat to each other, and certain military truths, such as army composition and deployment, made apparent through the engagement. A secondary aim of this paper, which will be conducted in an attached Appendix, pertains to a survey of the numerical figures of troops involved for both the Turkic-Syrian and Frankish armies engaged. This addition to the paper intends to outline the views and opinions of the most relevant primary sources, as well as those authoritative secondary ones, in relation to the number of troops engaged at what has become known as the Battle of Dorylaeum, as well as their extensive commentary on the logistics entailed regarding troop formations and movements.

The Battle of Dorylaeum took place on July 1st, 1097, between the multi-ethnic field army of Kilij Arslan and the coalition force of the western princes following the fall of Nicæa in June 1097, resulting in a victory for the Frankish forces, albeit a costly one as a result of their ignorance of Turkic-Syrian warfare. Dorylaeum manifests as the ideal case study for a military-analytical survey of Frankish and Turkic-Syrian field armies for three primary reasons. Firstly, it ought to be noted that both the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian field armies were comprised of coalition forces, a fact which becomes apparent through the accounts provided by the primary sources; although this phenomenon is characteristic to the campaign as a whole, and not solely

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6 Tyerman, *Chronicles*, 178.
7 For a complete definition of the specific terminology used throughout this paper, refer to the Glossary of Terms.
8 See below in the Glossary of Terms, 75-6.
9 Ibid.
10 The engagement is estimated by scholars to have been fought near Eskisehir, some 50 km north of Dorylaeum proper. Tyerman, *Chronicles*, 178.
11 It is essential to note here the effect which this has on a study of the numerical figures of combatants at Dorylaeum; the available primary sources often outline the specific followings of both the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian princes at the outset of many of the engagements of the First Crusade, thus, a more developed number of combatants for both armies is able to be discerned.
of this engagement, the scale of operations represented at Dorylaeum is not matched until perhaps the Siege of Antioch (October 1097 – June 1098). Secondly, the abundant availability of western primary sources regarding the engagement at Dorylaeum demonstrates the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian military strengths in terms of troop numbers. Since various contingents from both fragmented armies were each under the command of their own regional leader, Dorylaeum becomes the most important instance in the campaign pre-Antioch where the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian field armies present themselves as maximally gathered, where the numbers of troops present represent the total amount of combatants from the time of the Siege of Nicaea until the departure of Baldwin of Boulogne before the Siege of Antioch. Thirdly, and most importantly, Dorylaeum ultimately outlines several characteristics of eastern and western warfare tactics which portray the unfamiliarity to each other of their respective modes of battle.

Eventually successful by 1099, Frankish forces faced an opponent with radically different modes of warfare, in terms of troop composition and military tactics; the western tactics brought to the Orient ultimately proved sufficient to contest the fractured Muslim world in the late eleventh century, yet were only used with the greatest of difficulty.

This aim of this paper is the use of Dorylaeum as a case study representative of the styles of eastern and western warfare in engagements of maximal army size, including the military adaptations both sides deemed necessary to enact in order to engage effectively on the

12 Other instances of this, where the entirety of both forces is present, was the siege of Nicaea (1097), and the siege of Antioch (1098). Following the fall of Antioch to the crusading princes and the defeat of Kerbogha of Mosul at the Battle of Antioch, the Frankish forces seem to have divided due to internal rivalries between Bohemond of Taranto and Raymond of Toulouse. Raymond led the majority of the Frankish army on to Jerusalem, while Bohemond remained at Antioch and decided not to join the rest of the Frankish forces at either Jerusalem or the Battle of Ascalon.

13 The siege of Nicaea lasted from May 14th until June 19th, 1097.

14 The siege of Antioch lasted from October 21st 1097 until June 2nd 1098. These dates only correspond to the siege of the city by the Frankish forces, and do not include the three-week long siege as imposed by Kerbogha of Mosul beginning on June 5th 1098.
battlefield. A second objective of this study is to complete a comprehensive survey of the available data regarding the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian field armies vis-à-vis the numerical figures of troops involved in the engagement, in which the relevant primary sources will be examined that discuss the time from the Frankish arrival at Constantinople to the Battle of Dorylaeum.\textsuperscript{15} Chapter One begins with a brief examination of the histories of the conflicts between Christendom and the Islamic world, including a brief summary of the First Crusade itself, that highlights some of the generally accepted harbingers of the conflict and shed light on the scale and scope of the First Crusade in terms of both troop statistics field army composition. Chapter Two offers a study of the tactics employed on the battlefield by both the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian forces, using the evidence from the primary sources as well as leaning upon those modern scholars, such as Raymond Smail and Steve Tibble, who outline several characteristics of eleventh-century medieval warfare. The second half of Chapter Two provides a sequential summary of the Battle of Dorylaeum itself, with a special emphasis on troop deployment, leading to the data presented in the Appendix. The Appendix itself will include an extensive listing of both eastern and western primary sources regarding the figures of troops present at the engagement, offering the reader a complete survey of the data available; here, the size of forces will be surveyed in light of the consulted sources, both primary sources and crusading scholars of the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} century, to propose a “less than” or “greater than” figure for both the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian field armies of 1097 as they presented themselves for supremacy for Asia Minor.

\textsuperscript{15} Refer to Appendix, where this study takes place. It is important to note here, however, that the work completed in this paper on numbers must be restricted to a summary of the figures proposed by the primary sources of the First Crusade, both Turkic-Syrian and Frankish.
Here, it is important to note that there has been no study specifically focused on troop numbers in recent scholarship; while some authors such as Raymond Smail, Steve Tibble, Christopher Tyerman offer some details on the study of military tactics of the medieval era, strictly military studies of the First Crusade, especially those pertaining to the logistics of troop figures present at specific engagements, and even more nuanced, a critical examination of the Oriental sources,\(^{16}\) are excessively rare.\(^{17}\)

A few words on the sources consulted during the composition of this entire work ought to be included before a history of conflict between east and west is summarized in Chapter One below. As mentioned above, this paper will lean upon those academics who deal specifically with the nuances of western medieval military deployment and engagement in times of campaign, especially with regard to the crusades. Steve Tibble’s *The Crusader Armies*, Raymond Smail’s *Crusading Warfare*, and John France’s *Victory in the East* have been constant guides on the military operations of the Frankish forces in the Orient, from the time of the First Crusade until the fall of Acre in 1291. The first volume of Kenneth Setton’s (ed.) *History of the Crusades*,\(^{18}\) offering a masterly summary of the entire crusading period from 1095 until 1099, is heavily relied upon for chronology and has been a continual reference point for the analyzing of


\(^{17}\) Hamilton Gibb suggests that while the study of both Greek and Latin sources of the First Crusade is fairly complete in terms of translations and multiple editions being available for interested parties, and they tend to corroborate each other’s information, the same cannot be said of the Oriental primary sources due to a considerable lack of study, leading to a gap between the prominence of western and Oriental sources in western crusading scholarship. For more on this, see Gibb, *Arabic Materials*, 739.

\(^{18}\) This source is a 6-volume set which deals with the idea of crusading, its origins, ramifications, events, and consequences, all while giving a detailed chronological timeline of events. It is not, however, simply restricted to the crusading ideals, mentalities and events in Anatolia and the Syrian coast, but also includes the events in Spain, the Balkans and intra-European conflict throughout the Middle Ages. The first volume, *A History of the Crusades: The First Hundred Years* is what shall be consulted most regularly throughout this paper.
specific engagements discussed throughout this paper, as have Christopher Tyerman’s *God’s War* and Jonathan Philips’ *Holy War.*

It is now appropriate to discuss the primary sources that form the basis of this paper. By use of both western and eastern primary sources, this paper will attempt to avoid the “euro-centric” mentality so common among previous generations’ discussions of the crusades, instead aiming to provide a complete image of the military situation as represented by the engagement at Dorylaeum, following the methodology of René Grousset. This paper has been formulated strictly on the premise of surveying and analyzing the military situation surrounding the Battle of Dorylaeum, leaving to others the task of summarizing the religious, social, and political implications of the campaign in its totality. It is essential to recognize that the primary Turkic-Syrian chroniclers seem to downplay the importance of Dorylaeum in their writings. By contrast with the eloquently written, and often fantastical-seeming accounts of the Frankish authors, both by eyewitnesses and later writers, the eastern accounts of the engagement instead opt to remain vague in terms of the causes, implications of, and events happening within this specific engagement. There appears to be three possible reasons for these lacunae. Firstly, it might be that the Muslim chroniclers wished to avoid the mention of a defeat so detrimental to a unified

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19 Only those sources which have formed the backbone of the research entailed for this paper have been included in this list. There are multiple other sources which have been cited throughout this paper to support claims made throughout, especially in terms of troop numbers, yet those listed in this paragraph have been the constant reference point in terms of details military and chronological.

20 As will be discussed in more detail in the coming paragraphs, it is essential to note the unequal attention which the western and eastern primary sources pay to the engagement at Dorylaeum. The Frankish sources cover the event in much detail, with exceptional summaries of troop movements and tactics, if not on numbers and troop figures, while the eastern sources simply gloss over the engagement as though it were not consequential.


22 While the religious implications of the First Crusade can hardly be separated from the events, especially in terms of several military engagements of high intensity, the focus of this paper lies in the military situation, as the “divine” attributes of the campaign were little more than rallying points for both the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian forces. For more on this, see Gibb, *Arabic Materials*, 740.
Oriental²³ front against the western invaders;²⁴ secondly, yet perhaps less probably, the battle was smaller in scale than the western primary sources indicate, and thus was not seen to have been important enough to record with much enthusiasm. Thirdly, the gaps in academic knowledge of 11th-century Syria present a substantial obstacle in the discovery and analyzing of Turkic-Syrian contemporary texts, leaving crusading scholars with a “missing piece” of the history of the First Crusade.²⁵ The main Byzantine source of the First Crusade, Anna Comnena’s Alexiad, glosses over the battle at Dorylaeum in like manner, despite the fact that a Byzantine force of some proportions was present in the vanguard where the fighting is reported to have been most concentrated. Therefore, in a study of this nature, one must inevitably consider the differences in emphasis, indeed even in quantity, between eastern and western primary sources.

Politically and socially fractured in the late eleventh century, Syria and Anatolia had become a battleground for Byzantine, Frankish, Sunni and Shi’ite armies for decades. The arrival of the crusading hosts in Anatolia presented to the local Muslim lords yet another foreign incursion,²⁶ which did not receive significant attention from the world of Islam until the revival of the Jihad under Zengi (1085 – 1146), Nur al-Din (1118 – 1174), and Saladin (1137 – 1193).

²³ The term “Oriental” is suggested in this context by Gibb in his work Notes on the Arabic Materials for the History of the Early Crusades and has been adopted as legitimate terminology throughout this paper.

²⁴ It is essential to notice the difference of opinions between the Christian and Islamicate worlds, in regard to the causes, events, and ramifications of the First Crusade. The Muslim world, it would seem from the lack of eyewitness accounts, was largely unperturbed by the presence of an invading Frankish force, even though it threatened their holdings on the Palestinian coast which they had wrested from the Byzantine world in centuries prior. For more on this, see Niall Christie, “Reviewed Work: The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the Crusading Period from "Al-Kāmil fī l-ta’rikh," 2: The Years 541-589/1146-1193, the Age of Nur al-Din and Salad by Ibn al-Athīr, D. S. Richards” Speculum 84, no. 2, 2009, 454.

²⁵ “[W]e know next to nothing of the composition of the population in the various regions of Syria, their relations with one another and with Iraq and Egypt, or of the significance of the Shi’ite, and more especially the Batini, movements in Syria; the criticism of the Oriental sources, Arabic, Syriac, and Armenian has not even begun. Failing these, the Muslim princes and peoples remain, even in M. Grousset’s work, so many lay figures, a kind of vague patchwork backcloth against which the Western Knights make a brave enough show, until it presently falls down and envelopes them, still valiantly struggling, in its folds.” Gibb, Arabic Materials, 739-40.

²⁶ “The half-dozen or so Muslim governments controlling various parts of the Mediterranean coast between Ascalon and Constantinople often did not co-operate with each other and sometimes were in open armed conflict.” Bachrach, Crusader Logistics, 53.
The anonymous *Gesta Francorum* provides a firsthand, yet religion-saturated, account of the battle with a special focus on the happenings of the vanguard, product of being a pro-Norman account created by an individual in the service of Bohemond of Taranto. Although the actual author of the *Gesta Francorum* is unknown, it is likely he took part in the crusade under the banner of Bohemond, shedding light upon his propagandistic anti-Provençal sentiments. It is also noteworthy that the *Gesta Francorum* is one of the three eye-witness accounts of the campaign in the east, and is examined accordingly.

Fulcher of Chartres was chapelain to Baldwin I and was therefore also one of the participants of the First Crusade. He subsequently lived in Jerusalem and thus is a prominent source for the happenings of the later Kingdom of Jerusalem until 1127, at which point he

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27 “To judge from his use of the first person and from the vividness of his descriptions of particular incidents, he took the cross at Amalfi in the summer of 1096, and crossed over to the Balkan Peninsula with the South Italian division later that same year…went through the siege of Nicaea and the Battle of Dorylaeum, and before the end of October 1097 had settled down to the siege of Antioch, in Bohemund’s camp, to the east of the city…” Lees, ed., *GF*, xiv-xv. For the term “Anonymous”, see the Glossary of Terms.

28 “En maint passage L’Anonyme exprime l’ardeur de ses sentiments religieux et de son enthousiasme pour la croisade, mais aussi de sa haine pour les infidèles, qu’il confond sous le nom de “paiens” et qu’il prend naïvement pour les idolâtres.” Bréhier, *Histoire*, IV.

29 “[E]nfin il est très au courant des faits et gestes de Bohémond, et il manque rarement, lorsqu’il le cite, de lui appliquer quelque épithète que marque la vénération qu’il a pour sa personne; c’est à lui qu’il réserve le titre de dominus, “seigneur”, qu’il ne donne pas aux autres chefs.” Bréhier, *Histoire*, II.

30 It is known that the “Anonymous” was from Southern Italy, which can be discerned by his terminology such as “longobards” to describe the crusading forces, instead of the more common “Franks” or “Normans”. See Bréhier, *Histoire*, II. It is likely that the “Anonymous” was not a cleric, “car en plusieurs actions, à la bataille contre Kerboga, à la procession autour de Jérusalem, il oppose toujours les clercs et les évêques, priant pour le succès des croisés, aux groupes de combattants dont il fait partie.” Bréhier, *Histoire*, II.

31 The *Gesta Francorum* deals with the happenings of the First Crusade following the crossing of the Bosphorus and the Siege of Nicaea where the Anonymous author was present for the siege, serving under Tancred of Hauteville, and the battles of Dorylaeum and Antioch. The Anonymous, when Bohemond refused to venture further south following the fall of Antioch to the Frankish forces by mid-1098, travelled in a Norman company under the command of the Count of Toulouse, and thus witnessed the exploits of the Franks in South Palestine, the capture of Jerusalem, and the Battle of Ascalon. See Bréhier, *Histoire*, II. Certain exploits of the “Anonymous” are known, such as his being one of the very first to step foot inside Antioch on the night of June 3rd 1098, his involvement in the Battle of Antioch, and his relative position within the army. See Bréhier, *Histoire*, III.

32 As this account was created by a follower of the crusade, there is a twofold nature to it; the “Anonymous” certainly attributes divine aspects and characteristics to the exploits of the Franks, particularly the successful events, yet also does not refrain from retelling the horrific massacres inflicted on the Turkic-Syrian prisoners and populations of captured towns. For more on this, see Bréhier, *Histoire*, IV.
disappears from the historical record. His journey began by marching alongside the force of Robert of Normandy and Stephen of Blois, then by accompanying Baldwin to Edessa while the main army remained at Antioch;33 his Historia Hierosolymitana is the second of three eyewitness accounts of the events at Dorylaeum.

Raymond of Aguiliers’ (b. ~1050) text, the Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem is the third of three eyewitness accounts. It is known that he marched alongside Raymond of Toulouse for the duration of the crusade; although very little is known about the author, he was certainly a first-hand witness of the crusade, potentially even having served under Adhemar of le Puy before the household of Toulouse. He thus provides readers with a biased pro-Provençal interpretation of events through his account’s Dorylaeum narrative.34

Ralph of Caen (~1080 – 1120), not an eyewitness to the military happenings of the First Crusade, created his prose account of the campaign with the intention of highlighting the contributions of Tancred and his flowering military career.35 He writes with a visibly favourable inclination towards the Norman contingent, while taking a recognizably derogatory tone towards the Provençal contingent under Raymond of Toulouse.36 His Gesta Tancredi proves to be a valuable asset in regards to observations of troop movements37 and tactics for both the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian field armies at Dorylaeum.

33 Fulcher, HH, trans. Ryan, 3.
34 John France, in a critical edition of the works of Raymond of Aguiliers, notes that the author was elevated to priesthood during the siege of Antioch, suggesting he was a deacon beforehand. France, HF, ix-xvi.
35 Bachrach, RC, 90. See also 92.
36 An excellent summary of the life of Ralph of Caen in provided by the translators of the Gesta Tancredi; see Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., Gesta Tancredi, 1-5.
37 “Ralph of Caen’s Gesta Tancredi has a very strong claim to be given serious consideration in regard to providing accurate information concerning military operations undertaken during the course of the First Crusade.” Bachrach, RC, 89.
Albert of Aachen\textsuperscript{38} (b.~1080), a canon of the church of Aachen, was not a participant of the First Crusade, despite his willingness: records of his life suggest he was forbidden by his superior from going. His account of the crusade was composed in the first half of the twelfth century, sharing a remarkable number of details with the later William of Tyre;\textsuperscript{39} his \textit{Historia Ierosolimitana} offers sums of troops regarding casualties for the Frankish vanguard prior to the arrival of the second army, as well as details regarding the logistical\textsuperscript{40} movements of the forces involved.

Little is known definitively of Robert the Monk (1055 – ~1122) yet it is likely that he was an eyewitness of the events at Claremont 1095 and was commissioned by his abbot to compose a history of the First Crusade, that which has become known as the \textit{Historia Iherosolimitana}.\textsuperscript{41}

Anna Comnena (~1083 – 1153), a princess and politician in the court of her father, Alexius I Comnenus (1056 – 1118), was well positioned to make firsthand observations of the Byzantine court. Her account mainly deals with her father’s rise, achievements, and life but is particularly interested in the sudden and unprecedented appearance of the armies of the crusading princes prior to their crossing into Asia minor. As is seen vividly through her writings, Anna Comnena held a strong bias against Bohemond of Taranto as a direct result of the conflict which he and his father, Robert Guiscard, imposed upon the Byzantines in years prior.\textsuperscript{42} Her

\textsuperscript{38} Also known as Albert of Aix.
\textsuperscript{39} Edgington, \textit{Albert of Aachen}, xxv.
\textsuperscript{40} See Glossary of Terms for the definition of the term used here.
\textsuperscript{41} For more on the life of Robert the Monk, which is speculative at best for lack of historical records, see Sweetenham, \textit{RtM Historia}, 1-4. The \textit{Historia} is divided into nine books, ending with the eventual capture of Jerusalem by the Frankish forces.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{The Alexiad}, trans. Dawes. It is curious to note that not all of the primary sources agree on this topic: the \textit{Historia Iherosolimitana} depicts Bohemond as having no ill will towards the emperor, only seeking to pass through Byzantine lands to join with the forces of the other Princes: “You fools. Why do you want to kill soldiers who belong to me and to God? We are companions and servants and pilgrim soldiers of the Holy Sepulchre. We have no intention of harming any of you, and no plans to wrest anything from your Emperor.” Sweetenham, \textit{RtM Historia}, 96.
Alexiad is considered only in relation to troop numbers prior to Dorylaeum, since her writing does not deal with the battle directly in any great detail; it does, however, provide arguably exaggerated estimates of the princes and their respective armies as they arrive at Constantinople.

The Muslim chronicler Ibn al-Athir (1160 – 1233) was a scholar of both philology and religious studies,\(^{43}\) though he stemmed from a military lineage.\(^{44}\) His accounts of the Frankish incursions of 1097 remain one of the most fundamental avenues through which to view the early crusading period from the Oriental perspective;\(^ {45}\) he vaguely suggests the carnage caused by the Turkic-Syrian defeat at Dorylaeum but refrains from offering any numerical figures. Ibn al-Qalānisī (1071 – 1160) remains vague in the same manner but was included in this summary due to his explanation of the composition of Kilij Arslan’s forces gathered for Dorylaeum.

Before demonstrating the mutual unfamiliarity of Oriental and western styles of combat, which can best be assessed through an in-depth study of the favoured tactics of the two armies (the subject of Chapter Two), the histories of prior conflicts between Frankish and Turkic-Syrian forces ought to be outlined within the confines of Chapter One.

\(^{43}\) Imtiaz Ahmad, "Ibn Al-Athir Al-Muhaddith — Life and Works" (Islamic Studies 23, no. 1, 1984), 33.
\(^{45}\) Commonly accepted as the most authoritative of the Oriental sources regarding the history of 11th century Syria and Mesopotamia, Ibn Al-Athir is only seconded by Ibn al-Qalānisī’s “Damascus Chronicle”. See Gibb, Arabic Materials, 745.
Chapter One

The First Crusade: An Extension of the Age-Old Conflict between East and West

Before delving into a military-analytical survey of the western tactics used in the engagement at Dorylaeum when confronted by the forces of Sultan Kilij Arslan, as well as an in-depth study of the numerical figures regarding the number of combatants involved in the Battle of Dorylaeum, it is necessary to provide a brief history of the conflict in its totality.

What has become known as the First Crusade was a military encounter in Anatolia and the Syrian coast between the Latin, Christian west and the Islamic, largely Sunni Muslim east, taking place between November 1095 and August 1099. Proclaimed by Pope Urban II (1042 – 1099) at the Council of Clermont on November 27, 1095, he described a crusade as an “urgent task” to spur the forces of Christendom into military action against the Seljuk Turks who had seized Anatolia and Syria from Byzantine control by 1073/4. This is recounted with verve by Fulcher of Chartres:

[T]here still remains for you, newly aroused by God's correction, an urgent task which belongs to both you and God, in which you can show the strength of your goodwill. For you must hasten to

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46 See Glossary of Terms for the definition of this term.
47 Military encounters between the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian forces did not take place until late 1096, when the following of Peter the Hermit was defeated soundly, and then not again until May 1097, when the forces of the crusading princes assembled at Nicaea.
48 Setton, ed. HotC., 1, 220. See also Philips, Knights and Crusades, 118.
49 Fulcher, HHI, trans. Ryan, 65. “There is no doubt that the extraordinary response to the preaching of the Crusade was a product of the desire of large numbers to participate in the recapture of Jerusalem by a pilgrimage under arms. Providing assistance to the Byzantines and relieving the plight of Christians under Muslim rule, two other motifs that emerge from accounts of Pope Urban’s views, were secondary or even lesser goals.” Bachrach, Crusader Logistics, 51.
50 “He [Alexius Comnenus] was now ready to undertake the offensive which he hoped would enable him to recover Asia Minor from the Turks. This task was difficult indeed, but he hoped to accomplish it with the aid of the west. It was for this reason that in 1095 he appealed to Urban II for help. And to succeed in obtaining this help he used the argument that it was necessary to liberate the Holy Land from the Turks. The result was the First Crusade.” See Setton, ed. HotC., 1, 219.
carry aid to your brethren dwelling in the East, who need your help for which they have often entreated. For the Turks, a Persian people, have attacked them, as many of you already know, and have advanced as far into Roman territory as that part of the Mediterranean which is called the Arm of St. George. They have seized more and more of the lands of the Christians, have already defeated them in seven times as many battles, killed or captured many people, have destroyed churches, and have devastated the kingdom of God. If you allow them to continue much longer they will conquer God’s faithful people much more extensively. Wherefore with earnest prayer I, not I, but God exhorts you as heralds of Christ to repeatedly urge men of all ranks whatsoever, knights as well as foot-soldiers, rich or poor, to hasten to exterminate this vile race from our lands and to aid the Christian inhabitants in time.”

The military urgency seen in Fulcher’s account of Urban II’s speech depicts an intentionally distorted image of the crumbling Byzantine military infrastructure following the Battle of Manzikert on August 26, 1071, where control over Asia Minor was lost to a Turkic-Syrian enemy unknown to the massing Frankish armies.

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51 “[E]xstat operae pretium ut insuper ad quoddam alid Dei negotium et vestrum, emendatione deifica nuper vegetati, probitatis vestrae valetudinem versetis. Necesse est enim, quatinus confratribus vestris in Orientali plaga conversantibus, auxilio vestram iam saepe acclamato indigis, accelerato itinere succurratis. Inaserunt enim eos, sicuti plerisque vestrum iam dictum est, usque, mare Mediterraneum, ad illud scilicet quod dicunt Brachium S. Georgii, Turci, gens Persica, qui apud Romaniae fines terras Christianorum magis magisque occupando, lите bellica iam septuplicata victos superaverunt, multos occidendo vel captivando, ecclesias subvertendo, regnum Dei vastando. Quos quidem si sic andiu in quiete siveritis, multo latius fideles Dei supergredientur. Qua de re supplici prece hortor, non ego, sed Dominus, ut cunctis cuiuslibet ordinis tam equitibus quam peditibus, tam divitibus quam pauperibus, edicto frequenti vos, Christi praeces, suadeatis, ut ad id genus nequam de regionibus nostrorum exterminandum tempeste Christicolis opitulari satagant.” Latin text is provided by Hagenmeyer, ed. HH, 132-5. The English translation is provided in Fulcher, HH, trans. Ryan, 65-6. A similarly distorted image of the Turkic-Syrians is presented in Robert the Monk’s edition of Urban II’s speech at Claremont, which he specifically states was the Pontiffs attempt to make a rhetorical appeal to those present. Sweetenham, RtM Historia, 79-80.

52 Fulcher of Chartres’ accounts depict the Turkic-Syrian conquest as a type of punishment against Christendom for their internecine wars; Urban is reported by Fulcher to have suggested the Turkic-Syrians were “a race so despicable, degenerate, and enslaved by demons” to garner enough support to launch an offensive into Anatolia. For the English translation, see Fulcher, HH, trans. Ryan, 66. “[S]i gens tam spretta, degener et daemonum ancilla.” Hagenmeyer, ed. HH, 135.

53 This battle was part and parcel of Emperor Romanus Diogenes’ third and final attempt to curb Seljukid expansion into Asia Minor, where a large but multi-national force led by the emperor was defeated by Alp Arslan. This ushered in a period of civil unrest in Byzantium due to the military disaster, the imprisonment of Diogenes, the large ransoms paid by the empire, the establishment of an annual tribute, and the outbreak of civil war. For more on this, see Setton, ed. HotC., 1, 192-3.

54 The Byzantine Empire was fraught with civil war following the disaster at Manzikert until 1081, when Alexius Comnenus took power and attempted to re-conquer those territories which were lost to the Serbs, Pechnegs, Kumans, Normans, and Turks. See Setton, ed. HotC., 1, 213. See also page 223.

55 “Thus, the argument could be made that the Franks marched to the East knowing only that a non-Christian enemy of some kind awaited them, but with no clear knowledge of the Turks.” Morton, Turks, 53.
It would be erroneous to suggest, however, that this Byzantine defeat, most widely accepted as the official harbinger of the First Crusade, stands as the sole catalyst for Pope Urban’s appeal. In like manner, it would be inaccurate to also portray the First Crusade as the earliest large-scale military confrontation between east and west.\(^{56}\) Isolated Arabo-Byzantine military encounters had begun as early as 636, when Caliph Umar decisively defeated Byzantine Emperor Heraclius at River Yarmuk, wresting Syria and Egypt from Greek control and influence.\(^{57}\) Large swaths of North Africa were lost to Islamic forces as early as 647,\(^{58}\) and Anatolia was largely overrun by 678. Further Islamic conquests included raids up to the very walls of the Byzantine capital itself, which resulted in a Greek victory in 678,\(^{59}\) setting the stage for centuries of conflict in Asia Minor, ultimately culminating in the loss of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks by 1453.\(^{60}\) Byzantine campaigns against the Seljuk Turks litter the history of the 10\(^{th}\) century, suggesting military engagements between east and west were not as unique nor rare as one may initially expect.\(^{61}\) Sicily experienced raids from 704 onwards, drawing the Holy Roman Empire into open conflict with the Muslim world by 806, with Muslim forces appearing.

\(^{56}\) Paul Crawford refutes the claim that places the First Crusade at the beginning of military tensions between the Islamic and Christian worlds. See Andrea and Holt, eds., \textit{SMoC}, 1-4.
\(^{57}\) For the intricacies of the campaign, which immediately followed the Byzantine-Persian wars of 602 – 628, which left both Persia and Byzantium militarily exhausted, see Andrea and Holt, eds., \textit{SMoC}, 9-10.
\(^{58}\) Despite an overwhelming sweep over North Africa by Islamic forces, resistance was made, and was partially successful, by both Byzantine and native Berber rulers. It is critical to note that these dates denote the military successes of the Islamic forces, but do not discount those figures such as “the Kahina” who curbed the Arab expansion in North Africa for a time. For more on this, see Andrea and Holt, eds., \textit{SMoC}, 12-3.
\(^{59}\) These Arabo-Byzantine conflicts also included naval encounters, which allowed the Islamic forces to attempt to conquer Constantinople itself. It is curious to note that the Byzantine victory of 678 shielded, and seemingly postponed, western Europe from contact with the Muslim forces, as stated by Byzantine historians. See Andrea and Holt, eds., \textit{SMoC}, 13-4.
\(^{60}\) For a brief, but very well outlined history of the military clashes in Anatolia between the Byzantines and Arab/Persian/Turkic forces up until 1091, see Andrea and Holt, eds., \textit{SMoC}, 13-20. For the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Turks, see Steven Runciman, \textit{The Fall of Constantinople 1453} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965).
\(^{61}\) “It is one of the principal services rendered by M. Grousset that, for the first time in any general history of the Crusades, he brings out the importance of the Byzantine “Crusades” of the tenth century as the forerunners of the Latin Crusades, and as establishing a certain juridical claim by the Eastern Empire to the restoration of its former Syrian territories, the last of which it had lost only in 1084.” Gibb, \textit{Arabic Materials}, 740.
on Italian soil as early as 837. The Visigoth king of Spain was defeated by Tariq bin Ziyad in 711, marking the beginning of Christian-Muslim military hostilities in the Iberian Peninsula which would eventually prod the remaining Christian kingdoms of the peninsula to begin the Reconquista, completed by Isabelle and Ferdinand of Castile and Aragon in 1492. Islamic expansion was curbed by the emerging Frankish kingdom under the Merovingian dynasty at the Battle of Tours in 732 by the maior domus, Charles Martel (688 – 741), inducing a series of conflicts along the Merovingian border only concluded by 769. African colonists were driven to Sicily in 1005, causing the island to be an area of conflict between the native Christians and the newly arrived Muslim population, sparking nearly one hundred years of conflict between the two factions until the Norman conquest of Palermo, effectively ending the Sicilian Wars between Christians and Muslims. Thus, rather than being an isolated incident which sparked more than two centuries of military tension between East and West, Manzikert was merely one of the many instances of conflict between Christianity, whether Western or Greek Orthodox, and Islam since the mid-seventh century.

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62 Andrea and Holt, eds., SMoC, 20-1. It is important to note that one of the first appearances of Muslim forces in Italy was requested by the Duke of Naples, resulting in a Sack of Rome in 846.
63 Andrea and Holt, eds., SMoC, 24-5.
64 “Reconquest”. A campaign waged by the newly founded Spanish kingdoms following the rapid conquest of the Umayyad dynasty to re-claim the peninsula for Christendom. Largely spearheaded by the major Spanish kingdom of Castile, the “Reconquista” of the Iberian Peninsula was waged on-and-off between 711 and 1492, culminating in the fall of Granada to Isabelle and Ferdinand of Castile.
65 An excellent summary of Islamic expansion of the seventh century is provided by Brian Carey; see Carey, Warfare, 48.
66 “Mayor of the Palace”. This office was primarily tasked with the military defense of the kingdom, often being seen as the true power behind the Merovingian throne.
67 See Andrea and Holt, eds., SMoC, 25.
68 For the entire history of the Sicilian campaign, which involved remarkably few battles yet numerous raids and military adaptations, see Setton, ed. HotC., 1, 61-5.
69 The victory of the Seljuk Turks over the Byzantine forces at Manzikert drastically altered the power balance in Syria post 1071; prior to that defeat, the Byzantine infrastructure was “the most stable and best-governed state in the world and the army was a highly organized department of that state. It was permanent, professional, paid by the state, and organized into regular units.” Smail, Crusading Warfare, 122.
70 It is suggested that the expansion of Islam began to face increasing pressure from Western Europe during the eleventh century, when the defensive mentality of the European kingdoms was transformed into one of expansion and re-conquest; in like manner, the expansionist ideologies of Islam, unable to be sustained during the periods of
The First Crusade, therefore, becomes a military engagement between east and west on an ancient stage, structured on religious ideologies from centuries prior, but manifested in a proto-colonial manner, conceivably on a larger scale that the aforementioned military confrontations. The “Occidental” movement of the late eleventh century presented to the Islamicate world a threat to its ideologies, sea dominance, and territorial holdings which would only be overcome with an Islamic resurgence in the thirteenth century.

To return to the brief summary of the First Crusade, it is essential to note the distinction between the People’s Crusade, and that which has become termed the Princes’ Crusade. The former was a mass movement of pilgrims, and remarkably few knights, led by the influential preacher Peter the Hermit (c. 1050 – 1115/31) and Walter Sans-Avoir (d. 1096), arriving in Constantinople by August 1096. These bands were poorly organized and fraught with internal rivalries between the French and Germano-Italian factions, who chose to engage the Turks

civil war, decentralization, and political insecurity, naturally reverted to a defensive posture against a growing militaristic aggressor coming from Western Europe. Marshal Hodgson states it best when he writes: “[T]he Muslims were driven out of Italy and even of Sicily and Northern Spain, and the Maghrib coast was itself harassed and even some ports at last occupied.” See Hodgson, Expansion of Islam, 264.

The threat which the massive migration of Western European forces to the Middle East posed to the Turkic-Syrian infrastructure extended far beyond the immediate military crisis which it entailed, as it was accompanied by large ideological implications which threatened to disturb the balance of power struck between the Greek Orthodox Byzantine Empire and the rising Sultanate of Rum. Both the Byzantines and the Sultanate saw themselves as legitimate heirs of the Roman Empire, thus had to contend with one another for its ancient territorial holdings. For more on this, see Hodgson, Expansion of Islam, 264.

Naval superiority became usurped from the Muslim world by the Italian commune systems by the eleventh century, while Frankish forces conquered the Middle East and set up the “crusader states” which lasted for less than two centuries, much of which had already been lost by the end of the twelfth century. See Hodgson, Expansion of Islam, 264.

It is worth noting that the “counter-crusade”, or Jihad, had begun in Syria long before the suggested date in the text. On the Syrian stage, Turkic-Syrian mobilization against the Frankish territorial holdings began as early as the mid-twelfth century, perhaps best depicted by the conquest of Edessa by Zengi in 1144. Setton, ed. HotC., 1, 461.

Christopher Tyerman places the number of Peter the Hermit’s force at perhaps 20,000, though that figure certainly contains non-combatants. See Tyerman, God’s War, 97.

According to Albert of Aix (d. 1120), there were “only eight knights in this band, which clearly consisted largely of pilgrims.” See Setton, ed. HotC., 1, 258.

For more on the backstory of Peter the Hermit, including his supposed instigation of the Crusade which prompted Urban II to declare a holy war at Clermont, see Setton, ed. HotC., 1, 258.

Sans-Avoir, meaning “the penniless” was one of the few knights in Peter the Hermit’s entourage. He arrived in Constantinople in July 1096 leading the vanguard. See Setton, ed. HotC., 1, 281.

Tyerman, God’s War, 98.
before the mobilizations of the more adequately supplied and trained armies of the princes were complete. The host led by Peter the Hermit was recounted by Anna Comnena as having been of massive proportions:

Meanwhile Peter, after he had delivered his message, crossed the straits of Lombardy before anybody else with eighty thousand men on foot, and one hundred thousand on horse back, and reached the capital by way of Hungary. For the Frankish race, as one may conjecture, is always very hot-headed and eager, but when once it has espoused a cause, it is uncontrollable.  

This movement obtained moderate success immediately after crossing into Asia Minor, yet these disorganized groups were soon soundly defeated and virtually annihilated by Sultan Kilij Arslan in the vicinity of Nicaea by October 1096. The German faction (led by a certain Rainaldo) was destroyed at Xerigordo, while the French suffered the same fate days later at Kibotos under Godfrey Burel.  

Regarding the size of Peter the Hermit’s following, Anna Comnena paints a bleak picture for the number of casualties sustained:

And such a large number of Franks and Normans were the victims of the Ishmaelite sword, that when they piled up the corpses of the slaughtered men which were lying on either side they formed, I say, not a very large hill or mound or a peak, but a high mountain as it were, of very considerable depth and breadth – so great was the pyramid of bones.

Lacking sufficient numbers of knights, suffering from incompetent leadership and inadequate supplies, burdened by a large following of non-combatants, and ignorant of Turkic-Syrian tactics of warfare, the People’s Crusade dissolved after no more than two months in

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80 Certain fragments of the army, specifically the French contingents, conducted successful raids up to the very walls of Nicaea. See Tyerman, God’s War, 98.
81 These events are outlined by Raymond of Aguilers: “Moreover, when the Turks from Nicaea saw that unwarlike multitude, they cut them down without effort and delay to the number of sixty thousand.” Krey, First Crusade, 105.
82 The force is estimated to have been ~6,000, defeated after a siege of eight days without a water supply. See Philips, Knights and Crusades, 128.
83 The French contingent marched out towards Nicaea to avenge the destruction of the German forces at Xerigordo, despite being warned by Walter Sans-Avoir to refrain from further combat against the Seljuks. The force was defeated on October 21, where the few knights were targeted and defeated by the Sultan’s force before the complete route of the foot soldiers. See Tyerman, God’s War, 99. The force is estimated to have been about 20,000, with only ~3,000 surviving. Philips, Knights and Crusades, 129.
This movement of armed bands between April and October of 1096 did little to alter the balance of power between the Byzantine-Frankish and Turkic-Syrian forces in Asia Minor prior to the arrival of the more organized armies of the princes, and thus can be excluded from the remainder of this analysis.

The main focus of this military-analytical study pertains to those forces of the western princes, arriving at Constantinople one-by-one with their respective armies throughout late 1096 and early 1097. Lacking the participation of western kings and emperors, indeed being titulary commanded by a leading church figure, these main forces estimated to have been approximately 60,000, with around 7,000 knights, crossed the Bosporus and laid siege to

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85 The sentiment is best phrased by Fredric Duncalf: “Too many eager pilgrims, inspired by religious enthusiasm, and too few fighting men, had marched away in these early bands.” See Setton, ed., *HotC*, 1, 266. See also France, *Victory in the East*, 159.
86 These dates correspond solely to the movement under Peter the Hermit and Walter Sans-Avoir. Other groups of armed pilgrims travelling under the pretext of a “holy war” included those of Gottschalk and Volkmar, which were defeated before leaving Hungary after pogroms against the Jewish populations in 1096. See Tyerman, *God's War*, 100. Another crusading host had departed for the Holy Land under Count Emicho of Leisingen numbering 10,000 armed combatants but was crushed by the Holy Roman Emperor’s forces upon their massacring of Jewish communities at Worms, Mainz, Cologne, and Trier. See Philips, *Knights and Crusades*, 125.
88 Hugh of Vermandois’ brother, Philip I of France, had been excommunicated by the Pope and thus took no part in the expedition. See Tyerman, *God's War*, 107. The Spanish kings were in no position to offer military support to this campaign after Alfonso VI of Castile suffered a military defeat in 1086. See Setton, ed., *HotC*, 1, 232. King William II of England was in conflict with the papacy, as was Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV; for more on this, see Philips, *Holy Warriors*, 11. An excellent summary of all the leaders of the crusade, with an obvious special focus on Tancred and Bohemond, is provided by Ralph of Caen in his 15th chapter of *Gesta Tancredi*; see Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., *Gesta Tancredi*, 37.
89 “Urban then commanded all who were going, to obey Adhemar as their leader (dux).” Setton, ed., *HotC*, 1, 239. The Adhemar outlined here is Adhemar of Le Puy (d. 1098), titular commander of the crusade as well as papal legate. “[T]he First Crusade was led by a committee of princes, and it was only in extreme circumstances that the leaders agreed to the appointment of a single commander – and then only for a limited period.” France, *Western Warfare*, 208. Adhemar was not seen to be the overall leader of the crusade in terms of military matters, only having the authority over the armed forces in more spiritual terms. See Kostick, *Social Structure*, 244. “[Die quibus fuit unus episcopus Podiensis, nomine Ademarus, qui postea vice fungen [sic] apostolica cunctum Dei exercitum.” Hagenmeyer, ed. *HH*, 138-9. “All unanimously chose the Bishop of Le Puy acclaiming him as the ideal choice for both spiritual and temporal reasons, highly capable in both fields and shrewd in his actions. He agreed, albeit unwillingly, to lead and organise the people of God like a second Moses, with the blessing of the Pope and the whole Council.” Sweetenham, *RtM Historia*, 83.
90 France, *Western Warfare*, 204.
Nicaea on May 6th, 1097. Much like the contemporary Turkic-Syrian forces, the Frankish forces were composed of several independent armies coordinating their efforts on a single objective; Raymond’s force did not join the siege until 10 days later, and Robert of Flanders’ force was not in position until June 3rd. A figure of over 300,000 for the crusading force is put forward by Robert the Monk:

The news of that revered Council spread throughout every country, and the story of its important decision reached the ears of kings and princes. It touched a chord, and more than 300,000 decided to go on pilgrimage and took action to carry out their vow insofar as God had given them the ability. And now the huge might of the Frankish race began to strain at its bounds and in spirit they were already ferociously attacking the Turks.

Although certainly exaggerated by the enthusiastic account of Robert, the size of the crusader force must have been quite large, since Raymond of Toulouse’s force alone fended off two separate attacks from relief forces. The city fell on June 19th to the now fully-mustered forces of the western princes, although the formal surrender was to the Byzantine general Butumites. Due to successful Byzantine negotiations, the way was clear for the crusading hosts to move across Anatolia. Kilij Arslan, the defeated Sultan who had been taken unawares at Nicaea and suffered the disastrous loss of his capital, had massed his troops in the vicinity of the valley of the river Tembris to exact revenge on the Frankish forces while they were on the march from his former capital. On July 1st, the crusading force decisively defeated the field army of

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92 Robert of Flanders had been on a pilgrimage between 1087 and 1090, having promised Emperor Alexius Comnenus military aid upon his arrival back to Flanders. Morton, *Turks*, 62.
94 Two field battles occurred during the siege; it is here that the Turkic-Syrian leaders realized the formidability of western knights and would act accordingly during the encounter at Dorylaeum. See Setton, ed. *HotC.*, 1, 289-91.
95 Setton, ed. *HotC.*, 1, 293
Sultan Kilij Arslan at Dorylaeum by use of the “fighting march”, despite being heavily outnumbered according to all the primary accounts of the engagement. This episode is recounted in the *Gesta Francorum*, which emphasizes the sheer number of the forces of Kilij Arslan during the encounter:

> Our men were, therefore, wondering where a multitude of Turks and Arabs and Saracens and others whom I am unable to name, had come from; because every mountain, hill, valley and every flat place inside and outside from all directions was overwhelmed with these excommunicated peoples.

By October 20th, the crusading forces had reached Antioch, having to contend with no more than one Turkish field army at Heraclea on their march through Anatolia. The city, defended by Yaghi-Siyan, presented a formidable obstacle to the crusader forces, who could no longer count on Byzantine naval support or diplomacy skills; a stalemate ensued where the Turkic relief forces could not dislodge the Frankish positions around the city, and the Frankish troops could not force their way into Antioch for lack of siege engines. Treachery succeeded where brute force could not; the city fell on June 3rd to the Frankish forces as a result of a plan conceived between Bohemond of Taranto and an Armenian resident, allowing the crusaders to

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96 Perfected by Alexius Comnenus, the fighting march allowed larger, more heavily armoured European forces to negate the effects of the more mobile Turkic light cavalry. See Tibble, *Crusader Armies*, 139–49.
98 Tancred separated from the main army with “a company of a hundred knights and two hundred infantrymen” and Baldwin of Boulogne with “five hundred knights and two thousand infantrymen” on or about September 10th, to found principalities in the East, namely, the territory surrounding the town of Edessa. The remainder of the princes marched on towards Antioch. See Setton, *HotC*, 1, 295.
99 The Turkish army, led by the Danishmend emir, chose not to offer a pitched battle to the crusader armies in light of the events at Dorylaeum two months earlier, and dispersed without a fight. See Setton, *HotC*, 1, 295.
100 Tyerman places a large emphasis on Byzantine intervention at the siege of Nicaea which, he submits, played an enormous role in the crusader victory. See Tyerman, *God’s War*, 135.
101 February 1098 saw the defeat of Ridwan of Aleppo and his relief force by Bohemond of Taranto, as well as a Frankish victory against a large sortie made by Yaghi-Siyan against the crusader camp. In early March, another relief force was defeated by the forces of Bohemond and Raymond. Setton, *HotC*, 1, 314-5.
102 Tyerman, *God’s War*, 135. The despair caused a mass wave of desertions across the crusading forces, including the Byzantine representative Taticius and his contingent, paving the way for anti-Byzantine sentiments to fester.
breach the city walls and bypass the defenses via a tower handed to them. After defeating a relief army of Kerbogha of Mosul on June 28th, with Bohemond of Taranto solidifying his hold on the city, the crusading forces spent the next several months deciding which route to take to Jerusalem. After a brief siege of Ma’arrat-an-Nu’man, Raymond of Toulouse led the Frankish forces on the final march to Jerusalem beginning in January 1099, joined by the forces of Godfrey of Bouillon and Robert of Flanders by late February.

The crusading force reached Jerusalem on June 7th, its number having been reduced to a fraction of the massive host that had taken Nicaea two years earlier. Filled with religious fervour at the sight of the Holy City, the crusading host attempted a general assault on June 13, only to be driven back with heavy losses. Siege equipment would prove to be a necessity if the

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103 An Armenian guard, Firuz, was Bohemond’s key accomplice in being able to enter the city. See Tyerman, *God’s War*, 142. The city was taken in short order aside from the citadel, where the remnants of the garrison under Shams-ad-Daulah fended off the Frankish assaults against it. See Setton, ed. *HotC*, 1, 318. Bohemond’s hand in this victory assured him possession of the city once taken, in violation to the oath sworn to Alexius Comnenus, much to the annoyance of his rival Raymond of Toulouse.

104 For details on the siege by Kerbogha, see Setton, ed. *HotC*, 1, 319-22. Hamilton Gibb suggests that the relief army led by Kerbogha of Mosul was not supplemented by any troops aside from those of his immediate vassals, thus may have been of smaller proportions then the Frankish sources have conveyed. See Gibb, *Arabic Materials*, 742.

105 The situation became more complicated for Raymond when Adhemar of Le Puy supervised the swearing of oaths of the princes, regarding Bohemond’s hold of the city if he could find a way to take it. See Kostick, *Social Structure*, 247. The tensions between Bohemond and Raymond of Toulouse increased with the death of Adhemar of Le Puy, the titular leader of the crusade, in August 1098. Raymond garrisoned sections of the city but was soon forced to relinquish his position. For the crusaders’ internal rivalries, see Setton, ed. *HotC*, 1, 324. The tension between Raymond and Bohemond reaches strenuous levels following the victory of the crusading forces over Kerbogha of Mosul, where Raymond refused to accept Bohemond’s rule over Antioch. This impacted his ability to take control of the direction of the crusade as a whole, as Raymond was a popular figure. See Kostick, *Social Structure*, 255. See also Riley-Smith, *Motives*, 733.

106 This was accompanied by the outbreak of a typhoid epidemic, where the princes thought it best to postpone further major conquests in light of the newly developing rivalries between them.

107 The siege lasted from November 27 to December 11, 1098, yet the crusading host did not depart for Jerusalem until January 13, 1099. See Setton, ed. *HotC*, 1, 326-7.

108 The force led by Raymond initially numbered some 7,000 infantry. See Tyerman, *God’s War*, 150.

109 Steven Runciman notes the absence of Bohemond’s forces from this last stage of the crusade; fearing an attack from Constantinople on Antioch, Bohemond refrained from moving south with the rest of the Frankish forces, choosing instead to solidify his own position further north.

110The figure of 12,500 infantrymen and 1,300 knights is suggested in Philips, *Holy Warriors*, 22. One must recognize the extensive garrisoning of towns taken during the march through northern Palestine. The figure of 12,000 infantry and 1200-1300 knights is suggested by Jonathan Riley-Smith; see Jonathan Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders: 1095 - 1131* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 14.

111 The assault, Runciman submits, was hindered by lack of siege equipment; the plan of attack was poorly formulated due to the overwhelming religious fervour which seems to have peaked when the crusade reached
city was to be taken, thus efforts were made to construct “two mighty siege towers, several catapults and a ram.” On July 15th, a second general assault was attempted by Godfrey and the lesser nobles directed at the northern section of the walls, while Raymond of Toulouse’s forces assaulted the southern and western portions of the city. After a struggle which lasted half the day, the city fell to the Frankish forces, heralding the commencing of a slaughter of the inhabitants which, as Christopher Tyerman phrases it, “spared few”.

Jerusalem was in Christian hands after a campaign of over three years, but a relief force from Egypt threatened to wrest the city from their control. After resolving the issues of governance, where Godfrey had been elected *Advocatus Sancti Sepulchri*, the remaining Frankish forces were mobilized to meet the Egyptian field army advancing towards Ascalon. The Franks mustered at Ibelin on August 11, and the next day engaged the Egyptian army in nine units. The result was an overwhelming, if not surprising victory for the Frankish forces from the Fatimid point of view; Fulcher of Chartres emphasizes the role of the Christian knights in the engagement:

As a result Duke Godfrey went back with a heavy body of mailed knights and rescued the rear line. … Soon the lance took the place of the arrow as our knights, as if mutually agreed under

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112 See Philips, *Holy Warriors*, 23. The construction of these engines was made possible by the arrival of a Genoese supply ship, as well as the discovery of large hoards of timber near the camp of the crusaders.

113 Raymond’s forces seem to have made little impression on the defenders, yet news of Godfrey’s breach in the northern section caused the garrison to abandon the southern defences. See Philips, *Holy Warriors*, 25.


115 Refusing to adopt a royal title, Godfrey simply took the role of a military protector of the holy sites, namely, the “Defender of the Holy Sepulcher”. See Setton, ed. *HotC.*, 1, 339.

116 The Egyptian army was led by vizier al-Afdal. Mobilized against him were the forces of Godfrey, Tancred, and Robert of Flanders; Raymond of Toulouse and Robert of Normandy did not commit their forces initially. See Setton, ed. *HotC.*, 1, 340. For the Battle of Ascalon, see Tibble, *Crusader Armies*, 222-4.

117 This force would have contained the entire military strength remaining in the princes’ power, as Godfrey mobilized all resources available. Al-Afdal likely foresaw a siege of Jerusalem as the end result, thus did not seem to take the Frankish force at Ibelin seriously. See Tibble, *Crusader Armies*, 226.

118 Steve Tibble suggests that the small size of the Frankish army was key in their victory against the Fatimids, as the Fatimids expected more Franks to arrive and thus did not expect an attack on August 12th.
oath, made a violent onslaught. In the slaughter the slower of the horses of the enemy were thrown over on their riders. In the short space of an hour many bodies became pale and lifeless.\textsuperscript{119}

Palestine had been secured, the Egyptian threat neutralized, and a vital link to Europe via Jaffa established for the Frankish forces. While Frankish military tactics and the deployment of western styles of warfare on an eastern stage certainly played a large role in the eventual capture of Jerusalem, the success of the First Crusade for the crusading princes was aided by the fractured infrastructure of the Turkic-Syrian political system, where in-fighting among the various warlords hindered a much-needed unified front,\textsuperscript{120} as Hamilton Gibb suggests:

What distinguished the Crusades was that they were a mass movement, in which men of all ranks and classes were caught and swept forward by a wave of emotion. There was nothing corresponding to this amongst the Muslims until the time of Nur ad-Din at the earliest, perhaps not until the time of Saladin. Some faint hint of it may doubtfully be detected in the undertakings of Mawdūfīd, but even these were conducted as routine expeditions, differing in no respect from any others.\textsuperscript{121}

The First Crusade contains remarkably few field battles, effectively constituting of large masses of soldiers surrounding key geographic towns or cities, often with the Frankish forces as the besiegers. Yet this does not characterize the campaign in its entirety; the few field battles present, of which Dorylaeum is the first to occur and largest until perhaps June of 1098,\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{119} “[U]bi dux Godefridus subsequenter cum amnyme denso militum armatorum remigrando postremam aciem sollicitabat… Congruentissime mox secutae sunt sagittas lanceae, dum equites nostri, tamquam iureiurando omnes invicem confirmassent, impetu vehementi inruerunt in eos, et quorum quadru- pedes tunc non fuerunt cursui celeres, continuo neci subversi sunt supra sessores, ubi parvae horae spatio multa corpora palluerunt exanimata.” Hagenmeyer, ed. \textit{HH}, 31-4. The English translation is provided by Fulcher, \textit{HH}, trans. Ryan, 126.

\textsuperscript{120} “[I]n the last decade of the eleventh century almost every important town had come to have its own independent Amir, only nominally under the primacy of a Seleucid prince whose effective power was limited to Aleppo… When there swept in upon them the troops of the Western allies of the Byzantine Empire, they could plan almost no united defense; each amir held out in his town in the hope that sooner or later the storm would blow over and the unexpected show of initiative from the Christian power would burn itself out.” Hodgson, \textit{Expansion of Islam}, 264. It is important to note here the eagerness in which the Fatimid Empire sought to create an alliance with the Byzantine-Frankish forces at Antioch, further showcasing the discord between the Muslim factions. “For a century and a half, Syria and Mesopotamia had been left to fight their own battles, with some intervention from Egypt, and for the most part Syria and Mesopotamia were left to fight them now.” Gibb, \textit{Arabic Materials}, 741.

\textsuperscript{121} Gibb, \textit{Arabic Materials}, 741.

\textsuperscript{122} The battle referred to here is the “Battle for Antioch”, waged against the Frankish forces under Bohemond and the Turkic-Syrian coalition army under Kerbogha of Mosul on June 28, 1098, outside the walls of the city. While a battle of large proportions, it is likely to have been of smaller proportions than Dorylaeum in terms of Frankish combatants. Firstly, one must recall the fractured state of the Frankish command, resulting in a wave of desertions including Stephen of Blois and his following. Months of inadequate food supplies, constant skirmishing with the
represent the several key moments between 1097 and 1099 where eastern and western tactics of warfare would be pitted against one another in a desperate contest for supremacy over Asia minor, northern Syria and Palestine. The ability to seize towns and cities from the locally independent Muslim emirs would do the Frankish princes little good, if they could not learn to confront the fully massed Turkic-Syrian forces barring their way on the open fields of Asia Minor, with the skills of war which had led to their dominance in Oriental warfare for decades.

garrison, desertions, and abandonment by the Byzantine field army all suggest a lower troop count for the Frankish forces at Antioch, when compared to the Dorylaeum.
Chapter Two

A History of Military Engagements: The Contrasting Warfare Tactics of Frankish and Turkic-Syrian Field Armies

“It is impossible to find a more powerful, more courageous, or more skilled people in the art of war. By the grace of God, however, we defeated them.” – Anonymous, Gesta Francorum

The quote above was authored by the anonymous creator of the Gesta Francorum following a substantial-scale military encounter between the crusading princes and the local Turkish Sultan, Kilij Arslan (r. 1092 – 1107). What has become known today as the Battle of Dorylaeum took place on July 1st, 1097, and acted as the first instance of a large-scale open field battle between the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian forces, where the very opposite styles of eastern and western warfare became pitted against one another. The Battle of Dorylaeum ultimately resulted in a costly victory for the invading forces of the First Crusade yet introduced the crusading princes to Turkic-Syrian tactics which had until that point been largely unknown to them. A brief study of the history of contact between eastern and western field armies prior to Dorylaeum will be conducted, followed by an analysis of Turkic-Syrian and Frankish battlefield tactics, in order to showcase the incompatibility of the respective modes of warfare between the two opposing factions. Examples provided from the primary sources will be from the Battle of

123 “[I]t would have been impossible to find a people more powerful, more courageous, or more skilled in the art of war. By the grace of God, however, we defeated them.” Lees, ed., GF, 20.
124 Setton, ed. HotC., 1, 340.
125 “The Crusaders' first full-scale battle took place on 1 July 1097 and, although it was a close-run thing, it ended in total victory for the Christians.” David Nicolle, The Crusades (Osprey Publishing Limited, 2001), 25.
Dorylaeum, upon which a study of the numerical figures of combatants present at the engagement will be pursued in the Appendix.

It would be erroneous to suggest that both sides were completely ignorant of their opponent’s fighting techniques. The Byzantine empire, during its military reforms under Alexius I Comnenus, had certainly been exposed to Turkic-Syrian styles of warfare long before the arrival of the crusading princes. Indeed, the very “Fighting March” used by the Frankish forces during the Battle of Dorylaeum in the face of what the primary sources describe as overwhelming odds is reported to have been developed by the Byzantines to counter the dreaded Turkish light cavalry archers.¹²⁶ The Battle of Manzikert in 1071 acted as proof of the efficiency of Turkic-Syrian warfare, where a feigned retreat and counter-offensive annihilated the Byzantine force under Diogenes IV.¹²⁷ One must also recall the failed expedition of the People’s Crusade, where Turkic-Syrian modes of warfare decimated the forces of Walter ‘Sans-Avoir’ and Peter the Hermit shortly after their crossing the Bosporus.¹²⁸ Upon the arrival of the crusading princes at Constantinople, the Byzantine emperor himself offered nuanced military advice as to the efficacy of Turkic-Syrian warfare, based on his own military encounters with these masters of Oriental warfare.¹²⁹

The crusading princes themselves, and their respective forces, had already clashed with the field army of Kilij Arslan outside the walls of Nicaea by May 1097 in a pitched open

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¹²⁷ Setton, ed. *HotC.*, 1, 148-9. “In 1071 the Byzantines suffered their major defeat at Manzikert and, in the following years as the empire descended into civil war and Turcoman tribes invaded in the east, much of Anatolia was lost. Thus, the Turks fundamentally redrew the map of the Near East, breaching long-established frontiers and plunging many regions into confusion.” Morton, *Turks*, 48.
¹²⁸ See Chapter One, where a summary of the causes, achievements, and consequences of the People’s Crusade is examined.
¹²⁹ “Once the armies arrived at Constantinople, and after the business with oaths and gifts, Anna Komnene presents an impressive picture of Alexios sending for the crusade leaders and giving them ‘profitable advice. They were instructed in the methods normally used by the Turks in battle; told how they should draw up a battle line, how to lay ambushes; advised not to pursue far when the enemy ran away in flight.’ Edgington, *First Crusade*, 76.
battle. In a desperate attempt to dislodge the besieging armies of the Franks and save the capital of his Sultanate, Kilij Arslan launched an impressive offensive against the forces of Raymond of Toulouse from outside the city walls. The brunt of the attack was suffered by Raymond’s forces, as no other prince was able to leave his section of the walls unguarded to come to the aid of the Provençals. This entire episode is recounted by Anna Comnena:

And the Sultan detached and sent on a part of his army to spy out Isangeles’ way of approach and bade them not refuse battle, if they met any Franks. Isangeles’ soldiers saw them from a distance and joined battle with them. Directly the other Counts and Bohemund got ear of the barbarians’ attack, they selected two hundred soldiers from each Count’s army and thus dispatched an army of imposing size to aid Isangeles’ men; they succeeded in routing the Turks and pursued them till the evening.

It was here that both the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian armies first came to blows in an open field battle, highlighting the unfamiliar nature of their respective modes of warfare; the more mobile Turkic forces were unable to make way against their more heavily armoured opponents in a pitched battle; the Historia Iherosolimitana places emphasis on the armour used by the western forces as a fundamental characteristic of their forces:

The army moreover was marching in such a disciplined and pious way that none could be found who had suffered from its passing. The arms of the knights were just such as befitted an army of

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130 Setton, ed. *HotC.*, 1, 290. “In addition, the besiegers made several efforts to storm the walls and they won a victory in pitched battle over the relieving army of Qilij Arslan, a force of some 10,000 troops, mostly mounted archers.” Bachrach, *Crusader Logistics*, 49-50.

131 See Setton, ed. *HotC.*, 1, 290. The episode struck the chronicler Raymond of Aguiliers as particularly important and is narrated with verve in the *Historia Francorum qui ceperint Jerusalem*; see Krey, *First Crusade*, 103-5. Ralph of Caen places emphasis on the valour of Tancred during the engagement once the princes were finally able to send reinforcements to fend off the Turkish attack, saying that his presence in battle counted for a multitude. See Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., *Gesta Tancredi*, 39. The engagement resulted in an eventual victory for the crusading forces by the end of the day on May 21st. Kilij Arslan chose to retreat his forces into the heart of Asia Minor, setting the stage for the eventual Battle of Dorylaeum.

132 The Alexiad, trans. Dawes, 191. This is the first of two separate attacks by Kilij Arslan on the forces of Raymond of Toulouse; “When the Franks became aware of the Sultan’s presence, they armed themselves fully and rushed upon the Turks like lions. And then a severe and terrible battle began. Throughout the whole day the fate of the balance swayed equally for both sides, but when the sun set the Turks were routed and night decided the battle. Many fell on either side and yet a greater number were wounded.” The Alexiad, trans. Dawes, 192.

133 Smail, Crusading Warfare, 3, 77. Christopher Tyerman places emphasis on this victory outside Nicaea, as it is a stunning achievement for “such a novice and fragmented army”. Tyerman, *God's War*, 124. The valour of the Frankish forces is likewise outlined in the Historia Iherosolimitana in the lamentful speech of Soliman following his defeat at Dorylaeum: “You have never come up against Frankish valour or experienced their courage. Their strength is not human: it comes from heaven - or the Devil. They trust not in their own powers but in the power of God.” Sweetenham, *RTM Historia*, 114.
God engaged on such a venture - what human eye could bear the glitter of their breastplates, helmets, shields or lances in brilliant sunshine? The foot soldiers likewise were armed with all kinds of weapons sufficient to terrify the whole of the Orient if it approached them. Yet despite being protected by all those weapons and armour, they still bought their provisions like unarmed pilgrims.  

All other races are terrified by our bows and fear our weapons; but these, once armoured, fear an arrow about as much as a straw; a missile frightens them as much as a wooden stick.

The Franks, on the other hand, were unable to organize or deliver their dreaded cavalry charge due to the rapid movements of Turkic-Syrian troops. Although these instances, save perhaps Manzikert in 1071, cannot be said to have been on the same scale as the engagement at Dorylaeum, they represent the unfamiliar nature of the others’ tactics which both the crusading princes and the Turkic-Syrian forces were forced to recognize when facing each other on the battlefield, stemming from very different modes of warfare.

By analyzing the account of the battle provided by the primary sources, one comes to realize the differences in warfare tactics between East and West, with both factions fielding very different forces to very different effects. The Frankish forces adhered to three main tactics...
which can be seen consistently throughout crusading warfare, not only to attain victory out of any given engagement, but to ensure the survival of a western army in hostile territory.\footnote{This sentiment is put forward by Steve Tibble, who suggests that the above-mentioned tactics were a direct response to Turkish light cavalry, which had wreaked havoc on more heavily armed, slower western forces. See Tibble, \textit{Crusader Armies}, 132.}

\textbf{Knightly Charge}

The Frankish forces characteristically adopted the cavalry charge to turn the tide of battle or to bring it to a premature close, dispatching their most élite troops, the mounted and heavily armoured knight, in an often-desperate yet well-coordinated attempt to break the enemy’s lines and formations.\footnote{Steve Tibble compares those cavalry charges as done in the East by the Frankish forces to those as practiced in mainland Europe; crusader cavalry charges often were designed to deliver a much more stunning blow to their opponents and took much more time and skill to execute successfully due to the rapid movements of the Turkic-Syrian forces as opposed to those practiced in the West, where slow-moving, heavily armored armies would be easy targets for a knightly charge. Tibble, \textit{Crusader Armies}, 133. For the importance of the knightly charge in Syria during the First Crusade and beyond, see Smail, \textit{Crusading Warfare}, 3, 115.} Knights, due to the armour they wore and the steeds they rode into battle, were costly to supply, resulting in the substantial lack of mounted knights in the closing years of the crusade.\footnote{Smail, \textit{Crusading Warfare}, 3, 91. For their status as almost being synonymous with nobility, see Smail, \textit{Crusading Warfare}, 3, 106. John France suggests the presence of some 5,000 mounted warriors, knights or otherwise, in the opening years of the campaign. See Bachrach, \textit{Crusader Logistics}, 55.} In her \textit{Alexiad}, Anna Comnena several times emphasizes the effective nature of an organized Frankish cavalry charge, such as in her description of Alexius’ hesitance to engage the forces of Bohemond directly in 1081,\footnote{“The two armies were burning with impatience to attack each other. But the Emperor dreading the irresistible first shock of the Latin cavalry hit upon a new device”. \textit{The Alexiad}, trans. Dawes, 87.} or the clash between the forces of the Emperor and Godfrey of Bouillon outside the walls of Constantinople in January 1097.\footnote{“And as soon as they [Byzantines] saw only a narrow space left between the armies, they were to give the order to the archers accompanying them to direct a shower of arrows at the horses, not the riders, and to dash at full speed against the Latins, partly to break the violence of the Franks’ onrush by wounding the horses so that they could not ride against the Romans, and secondly, which was more important, to prevent any Christians being killed.” \textit{The Alexiad}, trans. Dawes, 184.} Even on the most fundamental of levels, the heavily armoured knight posed a significant threat to the more lightly armed, mobile Turkic warriors in close quarter combat, as narrated by the \textit{Gesta Tancredi}:

\begin{quote}
The battle line of the [Turkish] archers was scattered and the bows were cast to the ground. The quivers were smashed and the bowstrings were trampled. Their small shields and the breastplates
\end{quote}
were as linen threads to the swords [of the Flemings]. They proved to be burdens rather than protection for the Turks bearing them.144

That the knightly core was of utmost importance for a Frankish army in the field,145 both due to the social status of the knights146 as well as the force they could bring to bear in battle, is evident from the beginning of Book Three of the *Gesta Francorum*, where Bohemond first instructs the knights to engage the Turkish forces, leaving the foot soldiers behind:

The wise man Bohemond was seeing the innumerable Turks in the distance shrieking and shouting in a demonic voice, immediately he commands all the soldiers to dismount and to pitch the tents without delay. Before the tents were pitched, he says again to all the soldiers: “Lords and most strong soldiers of Christ, behold the way this confined war is completely surrounding us. Therefore, all the knights advance with vigor against them (the Turks), and the foot soldiers wisely and speedily make the tents.147

The deployment of the troops under Bohemond during the Battle of Dorylaeum is as follows: foot soldiers made camp while the knights held the line against the forces of Kilij Arslan, and the baggage trains and non-combatants were placed at the center of the vanguard. A defensive posture was maintained throughout, until the arrival of the main army under Godfrey of Bouillon, Raymond of Toulouse, Hugh of Vermandois, and Adhemar of Le Puy.148 Such a tactic served only one purpose on the battlefield and had to be executed at the perfect moment

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145 The *Historia Iherosolimitana* makes direct mention to the impact which the Frankish armour had at the engagement at Dorylaeum: “Who could bear to look at the terrifying splendour [sic] of their arms? Their lances glittered like shining stars; their helmets and breastplates were like the brilliant light of growing dawn; the sound of their arms was more terrible than the roar of thunder.” Sweetenham, *RtM Historia*, 114.
146 Philips, *Knights and Crusades*, 38.
147 “Sapiens vir Bohemundus videns innumerables Turcos, procul stridentes et clamantes daemonica voce, protinus iussit omnes milites descendere et tentoria celeriter extendere. Priusquam tentoria fuissent extensa, rursus dixit omnibus militibus: ‘Seniores et fortissimo milites Christi, ecce modo bellum angustum est vndique circa nos. Igitur omnes milites eant viriliter obuiam illis, et pedites prudenter et citius extendant tentoria.’” Lees, ed., *GF*, 17. Raymond Smail debunks the derogatory attitude of some modern scholars towards the Frankish foot soldiers during the battle of Dorylaeum, outlining their importance as a vital defense in the shield wall; see Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 3, 117.
148 Setton, ed. *HotC.*, 1, 293.
for maximum effect: to have the cavalry, or knightly core, charge the opposing forces, with the infantry remaining in a primarily defensive posture, a common characteristic of contemporary western medieval warfare.\textsuperscript{149} Should the attack succeed in breaking the opponent’s front lines, infantry would then advance to support the knights.\textsuperscript{150} The knights became incredibly vulnerable after the charge had been delivered, as their formation would be dissolved and the need to reform amid enemy lines would manifest,\textsuperscript{151} justifying the presence of the foot soldiers following a cavalry charge, and signifying a symbiotic relationship between the upper and lower classes of the Frankish forces.\textsuperscript{152} The role of the knightly charge in an armed engagement was best worded by Robert the Monk in his description of Soliman’s speech to his Arab allies following the defeat at Dorylaeum:

> When they get ready to attack they come forward in disciplined ranks, lances erect towards the sky, silent as if they were dumb. But when they reach their enemies, then they rush forward to attack, slackening the reins, as if they were lions raging with the hunger of starvation and thirsting for the blood of animals. Then they shout and grind their teeth and fill the air with their shouts, and, strangers to all pity, take no prisoners but kill everyone.\textsuperscript{153}

This knightly core was not, however, without its weaknesses; should the charge be less effective than hoped for, knights became extremely vulnerable targets for large masses of foot soldiers due to their loss of momentum and heavy armour.\textsuperscript{154} While outlining Godfrey of Bouillon’s offensive against Kilij Arslan’s troops at Dorylaeum, Ralph of Caen describes the disadvantage which the Frankish forces suffered due to their heavy armour:

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{149} “The Franks became famous for the irresistible charge of their heavy cavalry, and their tactics spread from France to all of western Europe.” Carey, \textit{Warfare}, 72.
\textsuperscript{151} Smail, \textit{Crusading Warfare}, 3, 114.
\textsuperscript{152} Tibble, \textit{Crusader Armies}, 149.
\textsuperscript{154} Philips, \textit{Knights and Crusades}, 95.
\end{flushleft}
Once the cohort [of the enemy] reached the mountain, those who were not burdened with armor easily evaded the men who rushed after them who were so burdened. They shot with their easily bent bows, contemptuous of the spears being brandished in the distance.155

Effective when perfectly deployed against a solid body of enemy troops on the battlefield,156 yet slow to mobilize and even more difficult to direct effectively, the knightly core had to be protected from envelopment by the rapid-moving forces of the Turkic-Syrians157 until the crucial time when the charge was delivered. The strength of the Frankish forces of the First Crusade, and long thereafter, lay in its cavalry,158 and thus its preservation was prioritized by the development of two additional formations discussed below.

Combined Infantry Shield Wall

A need to protect the Frankish knights from Turkic-Syrian light cavalry units until the opportune time to deliver a cavalry strike manifested prompted the development of the “Combined Arms Infantry Shield Wall”, behind which the knights could safely mass.159 As will be seen in the subsequent description of the Battle of Dorylaeum, the shield wall proved to be essential for the survival of the Frankish vanguard in this first large-scale encounter with the forces of Kilij Arslan. Meant to keep the opposing forces, mainly the light cavalry so effective in Turkic-Syrian tactics of warfare, from the knights and more mobile units of the Frankish army, the shield wall quickly became a normality for crusading warfare and placed all the more

156 Smail, Crusading Warfare, 3, 78.
157 The knight was vulnerable on foot due to the restrictive, yet protective, armor which was designed for a mounted warrior, and not one on the ground. As plate armor developed along with chain mail in the 14th century, knights became weighed down further, restricting their movement if they became unhorsed. See Philips, Knights and Crusades, 94-95. Tibble, Crusader Armies, 138. “This tactical use made of archery was to destroy the cohesion of the enemy, and this could be achieved by inflicting upon him the loss not only of men, but of horses.” Smail, Crusading Warfare, 3, 81 and 139.
158 John France suggests that had the second army not come at the sixth hour, the Turkish forces in the Frankish camp would have likely destroyed the Frankish cavalry from behind and ended any chance of victory for the crusaders. See France, Victory in the East, 182.
159 Tibble, Crusader Armies, 149.
emphasis on the lower-class factions of the Frankish army. Turkic-Syrian tactics were based on the premise of disrupting Frankish formations with their mobile archers and potentially drawing out their more heavily armoured units to be overwhelmed based on superior numbers. Frankish survival, therefore, lay in the retaining of a tight defensive position to dissuade the enemy from bringing their full force to bear in a close-quarters encounter. Although not a product of the crusades, the shield wall was augmented by using large numbers of crossbowmen behind heavily armed spearmen at the front of the defensive position, to ward off Turkic light cavalry while the knightly core prepared for the decisive charge. Indeed, even within offensive maneuvers of Frankish cavalry units, a “tightly packed phalanx of foot soldiers armed with spears” advanced to the rear of their mounted comrades, to offer their support in the event of an unsuccessful charge. This defensive posture adopted by the crusading princes at Dorylaeum was suggested by Emperor Alexius Comnenus, he who had perfected this technique in response to Turkic light cavalry. Densely packed with spearmen and bowmen to the front while retaining a primarily defensive posture, the shield wall presented a formidable obstacle, if not a direct threat once completely encircled, for both Turkic cavalry and infantry alike. The sheer number of infantry that was needed to protect the cavalry while it massed had no offensive

160 Tibble, *Crusader Armies*, 149.
161 Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 3, 125.
162 This manifests at Dorylaeum during the two-pronged attack led by Bohemond and Robert of Normandy on the Turkic positions, in an attempt to dislodge Kilij Arslans army before the initial engaging of battle. Bachrach, *RC*, 96.
163 Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 3, 123.
164 The natural advantage which the shield-wall brought was density of firepower, where the more compact Frankish archers could “bring a higher volume of fire to bear on individual Muslim cavalry units as the approached.” Tibble, *Crusader Armies*, 150.
165 The usual tactics of Turkic warfare were found wanting at the Battle of Dorylaeum, so long as the Frankish army retained its defensive posture. See Maalouf, *Crusades*, 16.
166 Tibble, *Crusader Armies*, 150 makes direct reference to the use of the shield wall against light cavalry units, as the horses of the opposing forces would “naturally tend to shy away from an unbroken formation of heavily armed infantry, particularly spearmen.”
value, its nature lay in maintaining a defensive position to endure the enemy’s onslaught until the time to release the knights arrived. At the engagement at Dorylaeum, the Frankish forces adopted this formation in the face of complete encirclement as recounted by the anonymous

_Gesta Francorum:_

After this was all done, the Turks had now completely surrounded us, fighting, shooting, and stabbing and shooting arrows in an extraordinary way far and wide. We, accordingly, although unable to resist them neither to endure the burden of so great a force, nevertheless held that position harmoniously to that point. Our women, also, were a great refuge to us that day, for they carried water to drink to our fighters, and always bravely comforted those fighting and defending.

The _Chanson d’Antioche_ also shares the same information with that suggested by the _Gesta Francorum_, both the emphasis of the knightly core being the first to engage the forces of Kilij Arslan, as well as the importance of the participation of the women in the vanguard:

The baronage was thirsty, it was greatly oppressed; the knights of Tancred strongly desired water. They were greatly served by them who were with them. The ladies and maidens of whom there were numerous in the army; because they readied themselves, they threw off their cloaks, and carried water to the exhausted knights in pots, bowls and in golden chalices. When the barons had drunk they were reinvigorated.

_Fighting March_

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167 Foot soldiers were seen to have little value in an open battle against mounted opponents, as shows by Bohemond’s instructions to send the knights into battle and retain the footsoldiers into defensive postures. See Carey, _Warfare_, 94-5.

168 Smail, _Crusading Warfare_, 3, 119. “Following this retreat, these heavily armed mounted troops deployed in a solid formation and held the attacking force at bay until relief arrived from the main body of the army.” Bachrach, _RC_, 94.

169 “Postquam vero hoc totum factum est Turci undique iam erant circumcigentes nos, dimicando, iaculando ac spiculando et mirabiliter longe lateque sagittando. Nos itaque, quanquam nequiuimus resistere illis neque sufferre pondus tantorum hostium, tamen pertulimus illuc unanimiter gradum. Foeminae quoque nostrae in illa die fuerunt nobis in magno refugio, quae afferebant ad bibendum aquam nostris praeliatoribus, et fortiter semper comfortabant illos pugnantes et defendentes.” Lees, ed., _GF_, 17-8. “The soldiers and those who could fight, fought; the priests and clergy wept and prayed; and the women, lamenting, dragged the bodies of the dead back to the tents.” Sweetenham, _RtM Historia_, 109.

170 “Li bornages ot soi, si est molt esgorés, Molt desiroit de l’aigue li chevaliers Tangrés. Mestier lor ont eü celes de lor regnés, Les dames, les puceles dont il i ot assés. Quar eles se rebracent, s’ont lor dras jus jetés, s’aportent de l’aigue les chevaliers membrés As pos, as escueiles et as vaisiaus dorés. Quant ot but li bornages, si est resvigorés.” Kostick, _Social Structure_, 275.
A final tactic employed by the Frankish army in the field was the “a battle order inspired by angels”, namely, the “Fighting March”,\(^{171}\) said to have been developed and perfected by Alexius I Comnenus during his military reforms in early 1080.\(^ {172}\) Deep in hostile territory, the Frankish army made use of an already developed Byzantine tactical system in order to press forward while keeping non-combatants and baggage trains safe from enemy skirmishers. Divided into a vanguard, center, and rear guard,\(^ {173}\) the outer ranks of the formation consisted of spearmen and archers, behind which the cavalry was kept in reserve. Much like the combined infantry shield wall, the Fighting March did not pose a direct threat towards the mobile Turkic-Syrian cavalry during an armed encounter.\(^ {174}\) On the most fundamental of levels, the primary function of the Fighting March was to enable a western army to continue its march despite being surrounded and engaged from all sides; Dorylaeum served as a prime example of the efficacy of such a construction, where the Frankish princes learned all too quickly the need for tight formations in the face of envelopment.\(^ {175}\)

If the strength of the Frankish forces lay in their heavily armoured knights and dreaded cavalry charge and the tactics adopted by western forces in Syria were rooted in that knowledge, quite the opposite was the case for the effectiveness of Turkic-Syrian warfare. Fractured

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\(^{171}\) Tibble, *Crusader Armies*, 138.
\(^ {172}\) Alexius Comnenus developed the Fighting March to counter the problem posed by nomadic light cavalry of the Turkic-Syrians; his forces had gathered at Dorylaeum to examine the usefulness of such a formation. Tibble, *Crusader Armies*, 140.
\(^ {173}\) The formation adopted by the crusading host prior to the Battle of Dorylaeum only consisted of two bodies of soldiers, instead of three that became customary thereafter.
\(^ {174}\) See Tibble, *Crusader Armies*, 139.
\(^ {175}\) Tyerman, *Chronicles*, 178. “There were skirmishes, and both the baggage train to the rear and the vanguard charged with reconnoitring the route forward probably were in danger from time to time.” Bachrach, *Crusader March*, 232-3.
politically in the late eleventh century, Syrian field armies manifest as incredibly diverse and thus potentially unreliable; the sultan’s army at Dorylaeum was drawn from the various amirs under his control, tribal auxiliaries, leading to a complex military hierarchy with different factions of the army being loyal to certain amirs to whom they owed military service. Turkic-Syrian warfare consisted of light offensives and raids in the Syrian countryside, namely “low-intensity warfare”, conducted by smaller groups of horsemen to destroy the crops and towns upon which the revenue of the Frankish army depended, designed to strike fast at an enemy and withdraw causing maximum damage before a counterattack or defense could be planned or executed. Heavy incursions required a massive concentration of foreign troops, which involved the drawing up of the Sultan’s full forces, including the independent forces of the local amirs who owed him allegiance only nominally. It is essential to note here, however, that with a diverse field army comes several different modes of warfare, each regional regiment fighting in

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176 “[T]hey were running it as a series of personal fiefs, with each warlord worrying as much about his Turkic competitors as about the new entrants to the region.” Tibble, Crusader Armies, 253. The socio-political situation of modern-day Syria, Lebanon and Israel in the late eleventh century is described exceptionally well by Marshall Hodgson, where he submits that the weakness of the region came from “the continuous, internecine warfare among the various sultans and atabegs and amirs, with its intermittent ravages.” Hodgson, Expansion of Islam, 2, 263. “Favoured by the unusual disunion of the Syrian amirs and supported by the navies of the Italian trading cities, they [the Frankish forces] were enabled to murder and plunder straight down the Syrian coast.” Hodgson, Expansion of Islam, 2, 265. See also Smail, Crusading Warfare, 3, 64 and 99.


178 See Smail, Crusading Warfare, 3, 66.

179 Steve Tibble does an outstanding job in his classification of early crusading warfare, where he determines the difference between “High-intensity” and “Low-Intensity” warfare on the Oriental stage. “High-Intensity” entails the massing of large bodies of usually foreign troops for a substantial incursion, usually indicating a large-scale campaign. “Low-Intensity” revolves around light raids, mainly to destroy the crops on which both sides depended on to field their armies. For more on this, see Tibble, Crusader Armies, 53.

180 It is curious to note the wide variety of army compositions which the Turkic-Syrian forces could field, depending on the nature of the campaign; Turkic-Syrian armies characteristically involved high numbers of cavalry, or mounted archers, for excursion-based raids, and more foot soldiers for campaigns of conquest in hostile territory. See Carey, Warfare, 48.

181 Smail, Crusading Warfare, 3, 104.

182 “That amirs, as a class, could never successfully co-operate, and, if not strictly controlled, were always rivals to each other, was clearly recognized by at least one Saljuq statesman, and it was abundantly proved by events.” See Smail, Crusading Warfare, 3, 67-8.
their own style, the *Gesta Tancredi* makes precisely this observation, differentiating between the Turkish and Arab contingents: “But soon, as Raymond’s front ranks turned toward them, and came against them, and his sword drew close, then the Arab no longer trusted in his javelin and the Turk no longer trusted in his bow.”

**Archery**

With only a limited number of Turkish soldiers remaining under arms at any given moment, the tactics used by the Turkic-Syrians remained effective, if not entirely successful, throughout the First Crusade. Turkic mobile archers had the potential to cripple severely the more heavily armed, slower western armies, yet could do little in close-quarter fighting against their better-armed opponents, as seen in Ralph of Caen’s description of the Battle of Dorylaeum:

> At this point, the sharp cry of ‘behold the enemy, behold the enemy’ was raised repeatedly [among the Christians] and they charged. The force of [Muslim] archers was engaged, now pierced by spears, now killed by swords, it was engaged, I say, so that the lead group was carried to the middle and the group in the middle was forced to seek its own safety.

The account provided by Fulcher of Chartres describes more fully the nature of the Turkic-Syrian forces:

> [T]here were the Turks, those pagan Persians whose amir and prince was that Soliman who had held the city of Nicaea and the country of Romania in his power. They had at Soliman’s

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184 “Primo stant dubii mox ut Raimundica cuspis Obvia pueequo rotat, colliditur, ot subit ensis: Tunc nec Arabs jaculo, nec fidit Turcus in arcu.” *RC*, 515. Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., *Gesta Tancredi*, 56. This exact observation is noted by Robert the Monk; see Sweetenham, *RtM Historia*, 108.
185 Raymond Smail notes the separation of high intensity warfare, requiring the mobilization of all the Sultan’s forces for a major campaign, and low intensity, where a small number of soldiers would suffice to hold borders against potential aggressors. See Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 3, 72 and France, *Western Warfare*, 211.
186 “Infantry were expected to practice archery, avoid and harass enemy cavalry, and know the skills of siege warfare.” David Nicolle, *The Crusades* (Osprey Publishing Limited, 2001), 22.
command collected about him, having come to his aid for a distance of more than thirty days. There were present with him many amirs or princes, viz., Amircaradigum, Miriathos, and many others. Altogether they numbered 360,000 fighters, that is to say, bowmen, for it was their custom to be armed in that manner. All were mounted.\textsuperscript{188}

The multi-ethnic composition of the Turkic-Syrian force is confirmed by Robert the Monk:

The battle lasted from the third hour until dusk that day; and it was a source of wonder as to where such a large force could have been assembled from. Those recognised as being in the know said that Persians, Publicani, Medes, Syrians, Candei, Saracens, Agulani, Arabs and Turks were all there and covered the face of the earth like locusts and grasshoppers, and that without number.\textsuperscript{189}

Leaving room for the exaggeration of figures by the primary author, the composite nature of the Turkic-Syrian army present at Dorylaeum becomes apparent, as does its heavy reliance on mounted archers, as stated by Fulcher of Chartres: “Meanwhile the Turks were howling like wolves and furiously shooting a cloud of arrows.”\textsuperscript{190} This same sentiment is shared by Ralph of Caen: “And so, after shooting their bows, the [Muslims] charged so that they could ravage the [Christians] more boldly with drawn swords.”\textsuperscript{191} The mobile archers of the Turkic-Syrian army caused the Frankish army the most grief from the beginning hours of the engagement; having been caught on the march and in the open, Bohemond’s entire force fell prey to a mobile enemy who could shower the Frankish columns, both armed and otherwise, with projectiles.\textsuperscript{192} The threat posed by these mounted archers was significant enough for Alexius to attempt to reform


\textsuperscript{190} Fulcher, \textit{HH}, trans. Ryan, 85. The dependence on mounted archers was not shared by the Fatimids in Egypt; Raymond Smail does an excellent comparative analysis of the difference in tactics between the Turkic-Syrians and Fatimids. See Smail, \textit{Crusading Warfare}, 3, 85. See also France, \textit{Western Warfare}, 212.


\textsuperscript{192} Bachrach, \textit{RC}, 94.
his own military and create the Fighting March, used by the crusading forces at Dorylaeum in a
defensive posture. The *Historia Iherosolimitana* describing also places emphasis in passing on
the Turkic-Syrian reliance on the bow while describing the arrival of Godfrey of Bouillon and
Hugh of Vermandois on the field: “Whilst our men were beleaguered in this way, covered by the
shadow of a cloud of flying arrows, Duke Godfrey flew to the rescue with Hugh.” Turkic-
Syrian archery is outlined by Robert the Monk as having had deadly effect during the
engagement from beginning to end: “Many of ours died at that point, shot down by Turkish
arrows… It is a bad day for those they [Franks] meet first: living men become mere corpses
whom neither breastplate nor shield can protect and whom neither arrow nor taut bow can
help.”

Having asserted their dominance in Oriental warfare for decades, Turkic field armies
consisted almost exclusively of mounted archers, barring military support from regional
allies. These mounted arches combined maneuverability with their skills of archery to deadly
effect; although the armour worn by the Franks often protected them from the enemies’ arrows,
the volume of fire persistently maintained by the Turkic mounted warriors was sufficiently
impressive to receive comment in almost all the western primary sources of the crusade.

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193 Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 3, 76.
197 It is important to note the importance which these mounted archers played, which had not been the case until the late 11th century. See David Nicolle, *The Armies of Islam, 7th-11th Century* (Reed International Books, Ltd, 1982), 23. See also pg. 24.
198 Maalouf, *Crusades*, 16. Robert the Monk, even in his description of the battlefield after the Frankish victory, is impressed with the sheer number of projectiles used by the Turkic-Syrian forces: “Missiles and arrows are picked up and empty quivers filled.” Sweetenham, *RtM Historia*, 112.
199 “The rate of shooting achieved by these nomads was also very high.” David Nicolle, *The Armies of Islam, 7th-11th Century* (Reed International Books, Ltd, 1982), 24.
suggesting that Fulcher was correct in asserting that the form of warfare which they encountered at Dorylaeum was indeed unknown until that point. 200 Failing to dislodge Frankish soldiers in hand-to-hand combat, as was the case in Tancred’s successful defense of a hilltop preventing a complete Turkic-Syrian envelopment of Frankish positions, archery became the preferred mode of combat of Kilij Arslan’s force. 201 Curiously enough, the Gesta and Fulcher agree that archers represented a significant portion of the Sultan’s army, whereas Ralph of Caen submits that the battle was fought in a very western manner, with archery playing only a small part of the engagement:

The Turks were holding their position and the Christians were advancing against them. There was no scope for the use of bows and little for spears. Swords were being used everywhere. The Turks were defended by their countless multitude while our forces were defended by hauberks, shields and helmets. Much blood was shed on both sides, but more on the side of the barbarians. The carnage among them did not cease but just like the returning heads of the Hydra, where a few fell, countless others took their place. 202

The Historia Iherosolimitana refers to the Turkic-Syrian use of archery as a fundamental aspect of their modes of warfare throughout the description of the engagement at Dorylaeum:

Before the tents were erected, 150 Turks rode up to our men on swifter horses, and bending their bows shot poisoned arrows towards them. Our men spurred forward, met them and attacked and killed them all. That was because the Turkish tactic is to turn and flee after shooting their arrows and whilst fleeing to inflict serious wounds on those following them. 203

200 See Smail, Crusading Warfare, 3, 81. “[N]ec hoc mirandum, quia nobis omnibus tale bellum erat incognitum.” Hagenmeyer, ed. HH, 195 and note 122.
201 “In accord with Kilij Arslan’s orders, Turkish forces rushed up the side of the hillock in large numbers, but the superiority of the arms and armour of the Norman troops caused immense casualties in hand to hand combat, and the enemy was driven back. After several such failed sorties which were intended to retake the hillock rapidly, the Muslim commander decided to change tactics, to have his forces stand off at a distance and shower the Normans with barrages of arrows...having held the hillock for the greater part of the night, the barrages of arrows drove Tancred and his men from their position.” Bachrach, RC, 98.
The *Gesta Tancredi*, which provides one of the most detailed accounts of the Battle of Dorylaeum, outlines the Turkic reliance on the bow as a way to avoid close-quarter combat with the Frankish shield wall:

After the Turkish attack was broken on the bold battle lines, the Turks realized that audacity offered no safety and decided that they would no longer send strength against strength. Instead, they relied on their bows that they had set aside. If they had continued, as they had begun, to set foot against foot, hand against hand, and shield against shield, the death gathered unto this scene would still have struck this magnanimous man [William].

Maneuverability

In addition to their skill at archery, the strength of the Turkic forces lay in their maneuverability, as suggested by Raymond Smail: “[B]ut it is clear from all contemporary accounts that that the Turks were quicker and more flexible in manoeuvre [sic] than the Franks. This was ascribed to the pace and agility of their horses and to the lightness of their weapons.” Said maneuverability allowed these masters of Oriental warfare to strike from afar against their Frankish opponents while providing no target for the dreaded Frankish cavalry charge; this tactic proved to be effective against the Frankish armies at Dorylaeum, as Bohemond ordered a defensive position against the Turkish onslaught, implying that the speed with which the Turks attacked provided no clear target.

Feigned retreats were also used to trap unsuspecting and over-enthusiastic Frankish bodies of troops; this tactic became a fundamental aspect of Turkic-Syrian warfare to the point of

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204 “However, the Turks retreated rapidly and scattered as it was their tactical imperative to avoid hand-to-hand combat with heavily armed mounted troops. Once out of reach of the slower-moving Norman cavalry, the archers reformed and launched intensive barrages of arrows, which forced the crusaders to return to their own lines.” Bachrach, *RC*, 96.


206 Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 3, 77.

207 See Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 3, 78. “the crusaders were alert and their foot soldiers prepared to pitch camp while an element of the knights confronted the enemy and were put to flight.” Bachrach, *RC*, 94.
Emperor Alexius warning the crusading princes of the danger they posed. Ralph of Caen precisely makes this observation when outlining the Dorylaeum Narrative:

The force of [Muslim] archers was engaged, now pierced by spears, now killed by swords, it was engaged, I say, so that the lead group was carried to the middle and the group in the middle was forced to seek its own safety. When the Normans came on driving the enemy in flight before them, the Muslims took renewed strength from their own dense ranks so that those who recently had been the pursuers were now forced to take flight.

The use of archery to provoke a disorganized Frankish charge, and thus for the latter to abandon their combined infantry shield wall or fighting march, was a common Turkic-Syrian tactic when facing a slow-moving Frankish force, as stated by Amin Maalouf: “They [Turkic light cavalry units] would draw near, unleash a flood of deadly arrows on their enemy, and then retreat briskly, giving way to a new row of attackers.” This stream of projectiles became yet another tactic used by the Turkic-Syrian Sultan to great effect, as seen in Anna Comnena’s description of the opening of the Battle of Dorylaeum:

Then that swollen-headed Latin, who had dared to sit on the imperial throne, was forgetful of the Emperor’s advice, and fought in the front of Bohemund’s army and in his stupidity ran ahead of the others. About forty of his men were killed in consequence, and he himself, seriously wounded, turned his back to the foe and made his way back to the middle of the army, thus proclaiming in deed, though he would not in words, the wisdom of the Emperor’s advice.

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208 Edgington, *First Crusade*, 76.
210 “The lessons taken from this alarming and, as the accounts suggest, frightening encounter included the understanding of the need for closer formation on the march; recognition of the outstanding ability of Bohemund as a field commander; and awareness of the Turkish tactics of harrying, ambush and the feint by their lightly armed cavalry.” Tyerman, *Chronicles*, 178.
211 Maalouf, *Crusades*, 16.
212 *The Alexiad*, trans. Dawes, 196. Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 3, 82. Ignoring Bohemond of Taranto’s explicit order to remain on the defensive, a group of French knights was provoked to attack their aggressors, only to be routed with heavy casualties; see Setton, ed. *HotC.*, 1, 293. For this episode, which also includes Tancred, see Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 3, 128. Ralph of Caen once again places emphasis on the Turkic reliance on the bow, as seen with the arrival of Robert of Flanders on the battlefield at Dorylaeum: “From this vantage point he saw the dense lines [of the enemy] bristling with bows. The threats were whizzing and bristling there.” Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., *Gesta Tancredi*, 52.
The maneuverability and speed of Turkic forces threatened Frankish lines and columns, as narrated by Fulcher of Chartres: “What shall I say next? We were all indeed huddled together like sheep in a fold, trembling and frightened, surrounded on all sides by enemies so that we could not turn in any direction.”

The maneuverability mastered by the Turkic-Syrian forces on certain levels outmatched the western knightly charge; their rapid maneuvers often easily evaded their Frankish counterparts, threatening to envelope them should they stray too far from the supporting infantry. The grim situation arising from Turkic envelopment during the Battle of Dorylaeum is recounted with verve by the Gesta Tancredi, providing insight into Turkic offensive maneuvers as well as the sheer size of Kilij Arslan’s force:

The [Turks] shoot rapidly from all sides. Bold Gaul is surrounded on all sides by enemy forces. The [Franks] cannot face any unless they face them all. Unwittingly, the [Franks] turn sometimes toward these enemies and sometimes toward others. They were like a boar that has been surrounded by a huge pack of dogs, first threatening one group with its tusks and then eviscerating others, now gnashing its teeth at those at the back, and now threatening those in front. Thus, the great leader and the young men under his command were eager and turned themselves about innumerable times.

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214 “After a while, some of the Frankish lancers grew restless and attempted mounted sorties against the Seljuk light cavalry. But the Latin heavy cavalry could not reach the faster Turkish horse archers, who rode off only to rapidly cut back and swarm the pursuing knights, separating the hapless European heavy cavalry from their infantry support.” Carey, Warfare, 95.

215 “Undique septa armis audacia Gallica et hoste, Ad quos se vertat, nisi se convertat ad omnes, Ignorans: modo ad hos, mode se convertit ad illos, Qualis apri, quem turba canum circumvenit ingens, Fulmineus nunc hos dens, nunc eviscerat illos; Nunc retro mordaces, et nunc a fronte minaces. Sic vir magnanimus, et eo duce freta juvenus Innumeratos ardens se circumflectit in orbes.” Bachrach, RC, 512. Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., Gesta Tancredi, 51. This episode corresponds to the arrival of Hugh of Vermandois with his forces, which become encircled as soon as he enters the battle to relieve the plagued vanguard of Bohemond of Taranto. The same threat of encirclement is recognized by the Historia Iherosolimitana: “They [Turkic-Syrians] surrounded our men [Franks] so effectively that they could find no empty space except around the tents.” Sweetenham, RtM Historia, 109.
The possibility of the annihilation of a Frankish field army by way of encirclement was quite real; the crusading princes knew this well, having to restrain their men from abandoning the defensive posture provided by the combined infantry shield wall, as detailed by Ralph of Caen:

Bohemond wanted to keep the enemy army, which had spread around, from encircling ours as if in some kind of circus spectacle, and thus, having enclosed our force, threaten death on all sides. In this manner, the foresight of the Christian leaders denied permission to the burning spirits of the young men to go forth into battle lest the rashness of a few undermine the order of the whole force.\(^{216}\)

Forcing of Battle

The final tactic so characteristic of Turkic-Syrian warfare was that which prompted the Byzantine creation of the Fighting March, namely, the forcing of battle upon Frankish forces on the move: as Turkic armies often forced western armies to fight on the march, a defensive position that ensured a slow and safe move forward became essential.\(^{217}\) That Turkic-Syrian armies forced battles on Frankish troops on the march further outlines the unfamiliar nature of eastern and western modes of warfare to each other, where the Franks preferred to marshal their entire force for open combat, where they would hold the initial advantage.\(^{218}\) This maneuver was not restricted to field battles against the Frankish forces; surviving Turkic-Syrian units from Dorylaeum plagued the Frankish force on its way from Dorylaeum to Antioch, striking quickly before withdrawing, all the while remaining in the field.\(^{219}\) This forcing of battle upon an opponent on the move,\(^{220}\) coupled with the specific targeting of Frankish horses by the use of

\(^{216}\) "Boamundo enim invito quin prohibente, res coepta vix comites aliquot elicere impetravit; ideo autem prohibente, quod exercitus hostilis diffusus nostrum quadam theatrali specie circumsepserat, ex omni parte necem significans inclusit. Quamobrem Christianorum providentia, aestuantibus juvenum animis ad congressum egressum negabat, ne forte paucorum terneritas rei ordinem turbaret universum." Bachrach, RC, 510. English provided by Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., *Gesta Tancredi*, 48.

\(^{217}\) The Battle of Dorylaeum highlights this specific aspect of Eastern warfare; forced to fight on the march and unable to make use of the knights under his command in the vanguard, Bohemond immediately adopts a defensive posture to protect his camp and await the arrival of the second force of crusaders.

\(^{218}\) Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, 3, 80.

\(^{219}\) Bachrach, *Crusader March*, 239.

\(^{220}\) "It was Turkish strategy to take the crusaders of the vanguard by surprise and win a victory in a ‘mobile battle’ over this force of heavily armed mounted troops which was outnumbered.” Bachrach, RC, 94.
mobile mounted archers so characteristic of Turkic-Syrian tactics, came to be known by the crusading princes for the first time at Dorylaeum, which threatened disaster for the Frankish forces, as described by Ralph of Caen:

But when they took up their bows again, the great flight of arrows did not spare those whom the swords had spared. It struck those whom the swords had not reached. Where the swords had not ascended, the arrows descended. What before had been such a heavy burden, armor, shields and helmets, now formed a most appreciated barrier which determined the boundaries of life and death. It is often the case that those who take off the burden of armor suffer as a result. The drawn bowstrings of the Turks inflicted wounds and hailed arrows.

As has been discussed above, then, the unfamiliar nature of battle tactics between European and Oriental armies can be observed vividly through an analysis of the Battle of Dorylaeum via the available primary sources. The Frankish forces strongly relied on their more heavily armoured contingents, making use of slow-moving marches and pre-developed Byzantine infantry postures to make safe excursions into hostile territory. In the event of a large-scale field battle, such as that at Dorylaeum, the crusading princes would organize their forces into defensive battle lines where infantry would initially play a very secondary role, as well as exercise extremely limited offensive manoeuvres. All of the above becomes augmented by the Frankish emphasis on the knightly core of their army, with cavalry charges employed to break the lines of their opponents, followed by the long-anticipated offensive movement by supporting infantry and archers to exploit the resulting gaps. Having been tested by the Byzantines, and used to great effect by the crusading princes, these tactics posed a significant threat and difficult obstacle for Kilij Arslan following the fall of Nicaea in 1097.

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221 “Sed resumptis arcubus, grando volans quibus enses pepercerant, non parcit; quos non attigerant, perfodit; ubi nec ascenderant, descendit. Hactenus ergo sarcina tantum gravis, loricae, scuta et galeae: nunc gratissimus obex, vitae mortisque fines disternat. Eatusen tamen, si quatenus molesta, quod levitas captata ad limen saepius artifices manus retrorserit. Pluentibus itaque vulnera Turcorum nervis.” Bachrach, RC, 511. English provided by Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., Gesta Tancredi, 49.
The Turkic-Syrian forces likewise presented the crusading princes with an unforeseen challenge. The very composition of their field armies, with various ethnic and regional contingents specializing in different tactics of warfare, and their mode of warfare on the field became known to the Franks as a fundamental aspect of contemporary local Sunni armies. The importance of the mounted archer is of particular interest, especially when investigating the engagement at Dorylaeum, as the hail of arrows on the Frankish vanguard was an approach unknown to them prior. Making use of their speed and mobility, the Turkic-Syrian forces regularly assailed their enemies while the latter were on the march, thereby forcing them to engage at a time when they were neither willing nor prepared to do so. Envelopment was a favoured technique, where the mobility of the eastern forces allowed their mounted archers to encircle their opponents while discharging a continuous stream or projectiles so as to sever communication and supply lines. Finally, the very nature of these Turkic-Syrian armies did not provide a clear target for counterattack, suggesting that their opponents would be limited to a very defensive posture.222

Thus, with a clear understanding of both factions’ military tactics, with the Battle of Dorylaeum serving as a key example of these observations, the task remains to examine the logistics of the engagement regarding troop numbers at the engagement, which will shed light on the physical challenges the western armies faced during the First Crusade.

222 It is important to realize the debt owed to Dorylaeum regarding Turkic-Syrian military adaptation after the battle, as stated by Brian Carey: “For the Turks, the shock of losing so many of their light cavalry to these strange medieval juggernauts would delay a fully organized military response on their part, but reorganize they would.” Carey, Warfare, 95-6. “Moreover, there were many observed similarities between Turkish and Hungarian societies. Regino of Prüm (d.915), for example, described the Hungarians’ nomadic pastoral way of life; their reliance in war upon mounted archers; their construction of bows made from bone and horn; their strength and military prowess; and their utilization of ‘feigned flight’ tactics. These same qualities were observed in the Turks, both in Byzantine and later crusading sources.” Morton, Turks, 58.
Conclusion

The primary aim of this paper has been to study the imported western tactics on an eastern stage as apparent at the Battle of Dorylaeum. As the reader may recall, Dorylaeum shows itself to be representative of the military context of the First Crusade in multiple aspects; the coalition nature of both forces as presented by the relevant primary sources, the instance of fully massed Frankish and Turkic-Syrian field armies, and an example of the unfamiliarity of eastern and western tactics of engagement, all arise as standard characteristics of the campaign between 1097 and 1099 yet embodied by Dorylaeum better than any prior or subsequent battle. Dorylaeum becomes the prime example by which to examine the opening stages of the First Crusade through a military-analytical lens, giving a complete snapshot of the military situation between the fall of Nicaea until the Frankish forces’ arrival before the walls of Antioch in 1097.

Those primary sources consulted which provide the fundamental baseline for a study of this nature, be they Frankish, Turkic-Syrian or Byzantine, certainly seem to exaggerate upward the numbers of combatants on the field, as demonstrated in the Appendix below. Turkic-Syrian chroniclers who have mentioned the Battle of Dorylaeum in their writings, however, have been analyzed in respect to the detail which they provide, that is, vague suggestions of troop numbers present, main commanders of the Turkic-Syrian field army, and the disastrous effects which Dorylaeum caused for the Oriental unified front. The most relevant primary sources have been

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223 One may recall John France’s statement that the final counter-offensive launched by the Frankish forces at Dorylaeum was quite exceptional, in that they abandoned their combined infantry shieldwall in the final stages of the battle. This does not, however, imply that the totality of military tactics used by either the Frankish or Turkic-Syrian field armies were uncharacteristically unique; Dorylaeum represents the formations and techniques used by both forces, with a slight variation enacted by the Franks as a product of adaptation to a mobile enemy.
studied in terms of the military tactics of both the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian field armies at Dorylaeum.

A fundamental aspect of this analysis lay in understanding the history of prior conflicts between the Latin, largely Roman-Catholic west and the Islamicate, largely Sunni east. The early pages of Chapter One highlight the record of intense military tensions present between these two worlds since the very foundation of Islam in the mid-seventh century. The purpose of understanding prior conflicts is twofold: firstly, it sets the stage for assessing the scale and scope of the military situation as represented by Dorylaeum, bringing to the forefront the religious, political, and socio-economic harbingers of the campaign launched by the western world; secondly, it authoritatively debunks the common myth surrounding the First Crusade regarding its lack of precedent in terms of eastern and western military tensions.\textsuperscript{224} The River Yarmuk, Northern Africa, raids to Constantinople, Sicily, the Iberian Peninsula, the battle of Tours, and countless others all accompany Manzikert as instances of aggressive military attitudes between Islam and Christianity, thus depicting the First Crusade as distinct yet instigated by the age-old tensions of centuries prior. After providing a succinct summary of the People’s Crusade, this paper gives a complete survey of the First Crusade from Clermont (1095) to Ascalon (1099) with an emphasis on the size of both the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian coalition forces from the arrival of the Frankish forces before Constantinople until immediately after Dorylaeum. The purpose of this Chapter is to familiarize the reader with the campaign while striving to avoid becoming distracted by religious and/or political details, instead taking an approach more specifically interested in the military context of the campaign; with the foundation of knowledge regarding the military events between 1097 and 1099 having been lain in the latter pages of Chapter One,

\textsuperscript{224} See Andrea and Holt, eds., \textit{SMoC}. 
this paper moves to a more military-analytical approach when speaking of characteristic military
techniques used by both the eastern and western forces.

In Chapter Two, the differences in tactics between east and west, more specifically, the
tactics of open battle used by both contesting armies, are analyzed. Specific examples of military
engagements between Frankish and Turkic-Syrian field armies are used\textsuperscript{225} to showcase the mutual unfamiliarity of heavily armored western knights facing mobile Turkic-Syrian mounted archers. The Frankish forces of the First Crusade adopted and adhered to several techniques to cope with a mobile and numerous enemy; the first and most characteristic tactic of western armies on the eastern stage was the “knightly charge”, in which the momentum of a heavy cavalry charge would break the lines of their opponents enough to allow their infantry to exploit the resulting gaps. To protect the knightly core until the time to deliver the strike manifested, the “combined infantry shield wall” was enacted to form and retain a primarily defensive posture in the face of complete encirclement, which, although holding no inherent offensive value, proved to be crucial at the Battle of Dorylaeum. Finally, the reader becomes aware of the execution of the “Fighting March” in the opening hours of Dorylaeum, where the Byzantine system of maintaining a march while under duress, keeping the safety of non-combatants and horses a priority, was used to great effect to maintain the integrity of the Frankish lines prior to the arrival of the second crusading force.

Chapter Two also examines the strength and execution of Turkic-Syrian tactics of warfare as manifest during the encounter at Dorylaeum. As opposed to the Frankish mode of fully massed forces and heavy incursions into hostile territory, often with long lines of supplies

\textsuperscript{225} The examples used in Chapter Two to this effect are Manzikert, the People’s Crusade, and the Siege of Nicaea in 1097. This Chapter also uses Dorylaeum as a case study for Franko-Turkic-Syrian military encounters due to its representative characteristics.
and communications, as well as a substantial following of non-combatants, Turkic-Syrian tactics revolved around “low-intensity” warfare of light offensives and raids, with open battles fought only with the highest concentration of foreign troops. This Chapter outlines the common characteristics of Turkic-Syrian warfare as manifest at Dorylaeum as a prime example of “high-intensity” warfare, which entails a high concentration of mobile archers meant to cripple severely the slow, more heavily armored western armies. As the authors of the Gesta Francorum, Gesta Tancredi, Historia Hierosolymnitana, and others all vividly recount, the presence of such large numbers of mounted archers among the ranks of the Turkic-Syrian force at Dorylaeum presented the Frankish force with a new mode of warfare they had not yet encountered, which became known from 1097 onwards as a fundamental avenue of Turkic-Syrian military aggression. The maneuverability of eastern troops was not shared by their western opponents, whereby rapid strikes were launched against the Frankish defensive lines while providing no clear target for a counter-offensive, for the twofold purpose of provoking a disorganized Frankish charge as well as executing a complete envelopment to engage from all sides. The final tactic examined in Chapter Two revolves around the Turkic-Syrian preference of forcing battle upon a moving, and often unready, opponent to incite panic, making full use of their mobility and archery to decimate their slower opponents or prompt either a disorganized charge or a panicked retreat.

The Appendix attached to this work is dedicated to a survey of the primary sources regarding the numbers of troops engaged at the encounter at Dorylaeum; modern scholarship exhibits notable hesitation in relying upon the figures provided by the eye-witness accounts. The study focuses on the actual figures proposed by some of the primary authors, as well as their descriptions of the casualties suffered by both sides.
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Appendix

The First Step of the Crusade: Troop Numbers from the Battle of Dorylaeum

The purpose of this addition is to discuss the numerical figures of combatants present at the engagement at Dorylaeum between the Frankish crusading force following the fall of Nicaea in 1097 and the field army of Sultan Kilij Arslan. To begin, a brief summary of the engagement will be offered, followed by an in-depth listing of the troop numbers for both forces, beginning with the maximal strength of the involved armies followed by the estimations of their losses, based on the views and statements of the relevant primary authors. Although the available primary sources almost certainly exaggerate the numbers of troops involved at Dorylaeum, it nonetheless remains a critical avenue to further understand the scope of the engagement through the eyes of those who took part, as well as those who recounted the battle at a later date. A review of the authoritative scholarship will be conducted following that of the primary sources, showcasing the tendency of modern scholarship to only partially rely upon the numbers and figures provided by the primary authors; by a compilation of both primary and secondary regarding numerical figures of troops present at Dorylaeum, this Chapter tackles the last aim of this work, that is, the suggestion of a “less than” or “greater than” number for the total forces which engaged on July 1st, 1097.

Ralph of Caen submits that the army was divided into two groups by way of Norman design, in order that Bohemond of Taranto and Tancred might solely gain glory for their

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item[226] Those sources which were authored by those who witnessed the battle, namely the \textit{Gesta Francorum}, the \textit{Historia Hierosolymitana}, and the \textit{Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Jerusalem} are given special emphasis in this study. For more on the primary sources, see Introduction, 10-4.
\item[227] Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., \textit{Gesta Tancredi}, 44-5.
\end{itemize}}
fatherland. Ralph later suggests that the crusading princes chose to deny this fact, saying that the separation of the two forces occurred by accident rather than by purpose. Another possible explanation for the separation of the army lay in its route, where “the road divided in two and the army of Christ was likewise divided into two sections.” The division of the forces went in the following manner: the vanguard consisted of “the Normans from southern Italy and northern France, the troops of the count of Flanders and Blois, and the Byzantines.” The vanguard was accompanied by “a token force of Greek soldiers and guides”, supplied by the Byzantine emperor to act as guides through Asia Minor, as well as to protect Byzantine interests in the campaign. The second contingent consisted of “southern French and the Lorrainers and the troops of Hugh of Vermandois.” The Alexiad submits the crusading force divided into two parts due to scarcity of provisions, as they were a “countless multitude”, and Bohemond specifically requested command of the vanguard. Albert of Aachen states that the force marched for two days as one unit, until a need for food prodded the princes into separating their forces. The Historia Iherosolimitana states that the Frankish force marched as one body for two days following the fall of Nicaea, rested for a further two days, afterwards dividing into two divisions as they prepared to cross a desert region which could not support “so many men, horses

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228 “Secta est in bivium via, et exercitus Christi factus est biviator.” Bachrach, RC, 508. English provided by Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., Gesta Tancredi, 44.
229 Riley-Smith, First Crusaders, 13. “[A]nd once Nicaea had been duly surrendered to him and the crusaders set off across Asia Minor, he despatched his trusted general Tatikios to safeguard his interests.” Edgington, First Crusade, 76.
230 Setton, ed. HotC., 1, 292. The Historia Iherosolimitana suggests that the vanguard under Bohemond was of smaller proportions than the main army, which had been entrusted to the leadership of Hugh of Vermandois. Sweetenham, RtM Historia, 107.
232 “And so for two days they were marching as a single armed column through the heights of the mountains and the narrow passes of the way, and then they decided that the army was so big that it should be divided, so that the people could live more freely and spaciously in the camp, and if a division was thus made there would be a lot more food and fodder for the horses.” Edgington, Albert of Aachen, 38.
or animals.” Fulcher of Chartres, in the Historia Hierosolymnitana, admits to not knowing why the force divided into two, but points to that fact as the cause of the substantial losses for the Frankish vanguard sustained at Dorylaeum.

Given the proportions suggested by the primary sources, from Byzantine to Latin, regarding the overall size of the Frankish contingents, it seems most plausible that the army divided into two due to a lack of immediately accessible provisions. However, based on the timely arrival of the second Frankish army on July 1st, it can be deduced that both forces travelled on the same road, roughly one day apart, which would certainly not have solved the problem of immediately available supplies. Regardless of the cause for the split of the crusading host, the vanguard under the command of Bohemond became isolated from the main army by June 30th, 1097 on the march from Nicaea to Dorylaeum; Fulcher states that Bohemond’s force had been separated from the main army for a period of two days. The vulnerable position of the Frankish vanguard became known to Kilij Arslan, who had his own armies encamped nearby, now supplemented by troops provided by the Danishmend emir, the product of a hasty treaty concluded between the two factions to counter the Frankish incursion. After using the cover of night to position his own forces in a favourable position to engage with the seemingly unsuspecting Franks, the Sultan launched his forces into battle on the morning of July 1st,

233 “As they were about to enter a deserted land without water, they agreed amongst themselves that they should divide and split the army into two parts: there was no way that one land or region would support so many men, horses or animals.” Sweetenham, RtM Historia, 107. “Quia vero ingressuri errant terram desertam et inaquosam, consilium inierunt inter se, ut divideretur et in duo agmina partirentur. Non enim una terra, una regio sufficiebat tot hominibus, tot equis, tot animalibus.” Kempf, Historia, 25.
234 Fulcher, HH, trans. Ryan, 85.
235 Some 95 km. See Bachrach, Crusader Logistics, 44.
236 Fulcher, HH, trans. Ryan, 85.
237 France, Victory in the East, 175.
238 Fulcher of Chartres seems to suggest that the presence of a Turkic field army was known to the crusading host by way of scouts, who warned Bohemond when they saw Turkic soldiers “a long distance away.” Fulcher also suggests that Bohemond set up his camp the night before the battle with extra care, as he was aware of the presence of Kilij Arslan; the morning of the battle, Fulcher submits that the vanguard set out on the march in “battle wings with the
Anna Comnena describes how Kilij Arslan risked a battle with the Frankish forces because he believed he had encircled the entire army of the crusading princes, and that, based on the size of the force he saw surrounded at Dorylaeum, the Frankish army was too insignificant to pose any major threat to him. The event is narrated vividly by Robert the Monk:

They rode through Anatolia with no trouble, starting to feel almost safe. Then after the third day, at the third hour of the fourth day, those with Bohemond saw 300,000 Turks coming towards them and shrieking heaven knows what barbarisms in loud voices. Their numbers were so large that some of our men began to be unsure whether they should put up a fight or flee to a safe distance.

According to the account provided by the Gesta Francorum, Bohemond immediately ordered the knights into combat; the Historia Ierosolimitana suggests a large amount of close-quarter fighting, in which heavy casualties were sustained by both sides. The foot soldiers were instructed to set up camp, in order that a defensive perimeter might be established, organizing two separate lines of defense. Ralph of Caen states that Robert of Normandy played an active role at Dorylaeum, being given command of one of the defensive lines, while the other was commanded by Bohemond. Following several hours of combat, during which the Franks could organize no charge to break the Turkic forces, while the Sultan’s troops

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239 The Alexiad, trans. Dawes, 196.
240 “Itaque prospero successu per Romaniam iam quasi securi equitabant; sed evoluto trium dierum curriculo, quarto iam die, hora tercia, hi qui erant cum Boamundo viderunt CCC Turcorum milia sibi occurrere, et clamosis vocibus nescio quid barbarum perstridere. Pro quorum inmensa multitudine quidam ex nostris hesitare ceperunt, utrum resisterent, aut fuge divortia quererent.” Kempf, Historia, 25. English provided by Sweetenham, RtM Historia, 107.
241 See Edgington, Albert of Aachen, 40.
242 Lees, ed., GF, 17. See also Setton, ed. HotC., 1, 293. The Historia Iherosolimitana states that Bohemond ordered the mounted knights to pitch camp before beginning the engagement, making no mention of the footsoldiers. Sweetenham, RtM Historia, 107.
243 This course of action was preceded by an unsuccessful heavy cavalry charge conducted by both Bohemond and Robert of Normandy, where “Once Robert’s and Bohemond’s forces had returned to the encampment, Ralph credits the Norman duke with suggesting to his colleague that they should not think any further in terms of retreat but should stand their ground and protect the camp.” Bachrach, RC, 97.
244 See Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., Gesta Tancredi, 45.
245 The Historia Iherosolimitana does seem to suggest that Bohemond ordered a knightly charge at the outset of the engagement, before the tents had been erected, in an effort to dissuade the Turkic-Syrian host from sully engaging,
could not penetrate the mass of soldiers guarding the pilgrims, casualties on both sides continued to mount:\(^{246}\)

Our leader, Count Robert of Normandy and Stephen, Count of Blois, and Robert, Count of Flanders, and Bohemond also, resisted the Turks as far as they were able and often tried to attack them. They were also strongly assailed by the Turks.\(^{247}\)

Ralph of Caen depicts the catastrophic state of the Frankish army as it began to retreat, caught by surprise at the Turkic reliance on the bow:

There was a terrible slaughter at the hands of the enemy since they shot arrows at the backs of the Christians. The latter also were struck by spears and skewered just as if on a spit over a fire. Neither side now took any care, those who were driving the enemy with their bows and those who were being driven on by their spurs. The latter sought refuge in their camp which was not of much solace, but the only one available.\(^{248}\)

This information is also put forward by Fulcher of Chartres, who outlines the retreat of the vanguard to their camp in the face of overwhelming odds and substantial losses:

And now from the other side of the marsh a dense mass of the enemy fiercely forced its way as far as our tents. The Turks entered some of these tents and were snatching our belongings and killing some of our people when by the will of God the advance guard of Hugh the Great, Count Raymond, and Duke Godfrey came upon this disaster from the rear. Because our men had retreated to our tents those of the enemy who had entered fled at once thinking we had suddenly returned to attack them. What they took for boldness and courage was, if they could have known, really great fear.\(^{249}\)

which was largely unsuccessful: “After awhile the Franks, having broken their lances against the bodies of the infidels, started in with their swords.” Sweetenham, *RtM Historia*, 108.

\(^{246}\) “But the legion of the faithful suffered the same losses without having the same reinforcements. Thus, wounded while it struck, shaken while it resisted, and weakened while its ranks were thinned, the [legion] retreated.” Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., *Gesta Tancredi*, 46. Fulcher states “For that reason we suffered [in the ensuing battle] an irreparable loss because as many of our men were slain as there were Turks who escaped death or capture. Because those who were separated from us received our messengers late, they were tardy in coming to our aid.” Fulcher, *HH*, trans. Ryan, 85.


\(^{248}\) “[F]itque vel hosti miseranda clades, cum terga sagittis horrent, illa lanceis velut torrendorum verubus affinguntur. Dum itaque non parcut, aut qui fugant arcubus, aut qui fugantur calcaribus, refugitur in castra, minimum tamen solatium, sed unum.” Bachrach, *RC*, 509. English provided by Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., *Gesta Tancredi*, 46. Ralph of Caen describes Robert of Normandy’s special role in the battle, as he manages to rally the knights holding the front line against the Turkic-Syrian forces and renew their vigor for battle.

Ralph of Caen depicts the Turkish incursion into the Frankish camp,\textsuperscript{250} which seems to have been protected by a wooden palisade erected behind the mounted knights; Kilij Arslan dispatched a separate unit of spearmen, to bypass the knights and lay waste to the Frankish tents:

This body of spearmen bypassed our mounted troops and attacked the lesser folk who were present in great numbers but lacked military ability. The latter, who had planted stakes behind the screen of the heavily armed mounted troops, thought that their walls would protect them from danger. But then, suddenly, the savage Turks rushed in on them first shooting with their bows and then attacking with swords.\textsuperscript{251}

The damage inflicted on the non-combatants by this contingent of Turkic spearmen is also outlined in detail by Ralph of Caen, where the old were slain, the young were carried off, while others “suffered the fate of those whom they most closely resembled in appearance”. The same carnage in the Frankish camp is recounted by the \textit{Historia Iherosolimitana}, where Bohemond briefly gives command of the main engagement to the Count of Normandy while he retreated to save the tents.\textsuperscript{252} Kilij Arslan seems to have chosen Dorylaeum as the ground for his attack due to its size; it was here that his mobile forces could engage with maximum effect. John France suggests that the tactics used by the Turkic Sultan at Dorylaeum were the same used against the Franks at Nicaea, yet more effective due to the open ground provided at Dorylaeum.\textsuperscript{253} As the

\textsuperscript{250} “Ralph highlights the success of this Muslim attack as he reports that the crusaders suffered large numbers of casualties, their part of the encampment was looted, and numerous prisoners were carried off to be sold as slaves.” Bachrach, \textit{RC}, 97.


\textsuperscript{252} Sweetenham, \textit{RtM Historia}, 108

Christian lines began to falter, the vanguard of the second crusading host appeared.254 The *Gesta Francorum* describes the battle formations adopted by the crusading host once they had re-established contact with the enveloped vanguard under Bohemond:

The battle formation of ours was arranged in a continuous line. On the left side there was the wise man Bohemond and Robert of Normandy and prudent Tancred and the most revered soldier Robert of Ansa and the renowned Richard of Principatu. The Bishop of Le Puy came through another mountain, completely surrounding the incredulous Turks. On the left side also rode the bravest soldier Raymond count of St. Giles. On the right side, however, there was the honourable Duke Godfrey and the most keen knight, the count of Flanders, and Hugh the Great, and many others whose names I do not know.255

Godfrey of Bouillon broke through to the Frankish camp while the united crusader force prepared for an offensive,256 begun by Hugh of Vermandois who entered the battle with “300 helms”.257 Robert the Monk has a slightly different variation of these events, claiming that Bohemond had been the one to save the Frankish camp before the arrival of Godfrey.258 Bishop Adhemar of le Puy led a smaller force to surround the opposition which caught Kilij Arslan by surprise;259 unable to cope with an offensive manoeuvre so uncharacteristic of western armies following the arrival of the second Frankish force,260 the Sultan abandoned the field, leaving his

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254 Setton, ed. *HotC.*, 1, 293. Fulcher suggests that the arrival of the second army took place around the sixth hour of the day, roughly midday, and that the vanguard had been under attack from the first hour of the day, just after dawn. See Fulcher, *HH*, trans. Ryan, 85.


256 The feats of Godfrey of Bouillon, who is compared by Ralph of Caen to Hector of the Trojans, are reported from the time he enters the battlefield and rescues the Frankish camp, to his final charge which breaks the forces of Kilij Arslan. See Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., *Gesta Tancredi*, 54.

257 Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., *Gesta Tancredi*, 51.


259 Amin Maalouf suggests this was a “third army” which, in reality, was likely a very small following, or the vanguard of Raymonds own forces, that had taken an important position to the rear of the Turkic-Syrian force. See Maalouf, *Crusades*, 16. Adhemar is suggested to have had a large role in military affairs at Dorylaeum; See Kostick, *Social Structure*, 249.

260 John France suggests that the tactics used by the Frankish forces during the second half of the battle of Dorylaeum, that is, the fully deployed counterattack against a mobile enemy instead of holding a defensive position while under duress, were quite extraordinary, paving the way for new tactics to be used in the east against more mobile opponents. See France, *Victory in the East*, 184.
camp undefended and intact. Setton also places emphasis on the lack of ammunition for the Turkic mounted archers as the cause for the defeat of the Sultan’s field army; the primary western sources all agree on the destruction which the Turkic-Syrian archers brought on the Frankish lines, therefore it seems likely that mobile archers formed one of the largest contingents of Turkic-Syrian force at Dorylaeum. As defeat for Kilij Arslan seems to have been caused largely by a lack of ammunition, one can deduce that the main strength of his field army lay in archery, thus suggesting that mounted archers formed a large contingent.\(^\text{261}\)

The force led by Adhemar to the rear of the Turkic lines was likely small\(^\text{262}\) yet caught the Turkic-Syrian forces in a three-pronged counter-offensive launched by the re-grouped forces of the vanguard under Bohemond, and reinforced by the relief army of Godfrey of Bouillon and Raymond of Toulouse.\(^\text{263}\) Robert the Monk places the turning point of the battle upon the arrival of Raymond of Toulouse and Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy with a third force.\(^\text{264}\) The disastrous result for the Sultan’s field army is best described by Ibn al-Qalānisī who, despite offering exact figures for neither the Frankish nor Turkic-Syrian forces involved, reported the mass amount of casualties and prisoners taken by the Franks at Dorylaeum:

> When he [Kilij Arslan] had thus killed a great number, they [the Franks] turned their forces against him, defeated him, and scattered his army, killing many and taking many captive, and plundered and enslaved. The Turkmens, having lost most of their horses, took to flight. The King of the Greeks bought a great many of those whom they had enslaved, and had them transported to Constantinople. When the news was received of this shameful calamity to the cause of Islām, the

\(^{261}\) For more on this, see France, *Victory in the East*, 181. Fulcher of Chartres provides a vivid description of the sacking of Kilij Arslan’s camp, in which camels and horses were taken by the Frankish forces to replace those slain in the battle. See Fulcher, *HH*, trans. Ryan, 87. The *Historia Iherosolimitana* also states the vast treasures and livestock which the Frankish armies collected in the aftermath of the battle; See Sweetenham, *RtM Historia*, 112.\(^\text{262}\) The speculation that the force led by Adhemar of Le Puy is quite opposed to the opinion of Robert the Monk, who states he rode into battle with the “remainder of the knights and footsoldiers in the army”, stressing the fear which the Turks experienced upon seeing this third force. This would suggest that the second army was quite large, given that Godfrey had already led 40,000 soldiers of the second Frankish army into battle before this point. See Sweetenham, *RtM Historia*, 110.\(^\text{263}\) See Setton, ed. *HotC.*, 1, 293-4.\(^\text{264}\) See Sweetenham, *RtM Historia*, 110
anxiety of the people became acute and their fear and alarm increased. The date of this battle was the 20th of Rajab (4th July, 1097).\textsuperscript{265}

Turning now to the troop numbers, the data available from the eyewitness accounts all stress the magnitude of the engagement and the concentration of armed soldiers on the field. This is perhaps best worded by Robert the Monk, who states “[N]ever before was there a battle of such great forces.”\textsuperscript{266} Anna Comnena’s \textit{Alexiad} comments on the magnitude of the Frankish forces upon their approach to Constantinople;\textsuperscript{267} although certainly exaggerated, the Greek princess numbers the force of Godfrey of Bouillon alone at 70,000 foot and 10,000 mounted knights.\textsuperscript{268} Robert the Monk in the \textit{Historia Iherosolimitata} claims Bohemond was “shrewd and immensely wealthy” and that “so many surged forward to take crosses [at the camp of Bohemond] that there were not enough for all those wanting them.”\textsuperscript{269} A number for the following of Godfrey is not given by the \textit{Historia Iherosolimitana}, but he is suggested to have been at Constantinople “with a large army”.\textsuperscript{270} Instances of exaggerated figures are augmented with her description of Hugh of Vermandois, whom she claims “lost the greater number of his vessels, crews, soldiers and all, and only the one skiff on which he was, was spat out” in a severe

\textsuperscript{265} Gibb, \textit{Damascus Chronicle}, 42.
\textsuperscript{267} “Before he [Alexius Comnenus I] had enjoyed even a short rest, he heard a report of the approach of innumerable Frankish armies.” \textit{The Alexiad}, trans. Dawes, 176. The \textit{Alexiad} presents Bohemond in a very degoragortory light and underplays the force which he had brought to Constantinople; this is debunked by Riley-Smith, who states Bohemond certainly had the wealth to mass a large following for the crusade, lacking only in the ability to achieve his political desires in Italy for lack of support. See Riley-Smith, \textit{Motives}, 733.
\textsuperscript{268} \textit{The Alexiad}, trans. Dawes, 183. Likely stemming from her anti-Norman bias, Anna Comnena states that Bohemond’s following was rather small “owing to his poverty… and for this reason not even many troops, but only a very limited number of Frankish retainers.” \textit{The Alexiad}, trans. Dawes, 188-9.
\textsuperscript{270} Sweetenham, \textit{RtM Historia}, 93. “As he saw the camp of the Lord grow and increase from one day to the next, the crafty Emperor - lacking in courage, devoid of sense and short on wisdom - began to get extremely angry. He had no idea what to do or where to turn, or where he should flee if it became necessary. He was terrified in case such a large army with so many soldiers might turn upon him.” Sweetenham, \textit{RtM Historia}, 99. “Subdolus itaque imperator videns castra Dei crescere, et de die in diem augmentari, inops animi, expers sensus, pauper consilii, ira vehementi cepit inflammari. Nesciebat enim quid ageter, quo se verteret, quorsum si eum urgeret necessitas fugeret; timebat namque ne tuntu et tantorum exercitus in se insurgeret.” Kempf, \textit{Historia}, 19.
storm near Epirus in late 1096. When describing the encounter of the Frankish forces with those of Kilij Arslan at Dorylaeum, she mentions the presence of a Byzantine army marching with the princes, likely smaller than the force of “two thousand brave peltasts” that had been commanded by Taticius and Tzitas at Nicaea. Immediately following Dorylaeum, the Alexiad describes another battle between the princes and “the Sultan Tanisman and Asan, who alone commanded eighty thousand armed men” at Hebraica where both forces were of similar size. A figure of 60,000 cavalry of the second Frankish army, not counting the infantry, is further proposed by Albert of Aachen, as is 3,000 perished Turkic-Syrian soldiers. Ralph of Caen seems to suggest the presence of a Byzantine force marching with the Frankish princes at Dorylaeum, in his effort to portray the separation of the vanguard from the main army as accidental rather than voluntary. The Gesta Tancredi gives surprisingly few details on specific numbers, yet mentions the arrival of Hugh the Great at Dorylaeum with “300 helms” as a

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271 The Alexiad, trans. Dawes, 180. No figure for the force of “Ubus” is provided by Anna Comnena, but she does mention he was the supposed “leader of the whole Frankish army,” thus his following was likely to have been substantial. The story of his whole force being lost in a storm seems likely to an exaggeration that serves the purpose of humiliating the Frankish commander after his arrogant attitude towards the emperor prior to his catastrophe on the sea.

272 “And Taticius with his army and all the Counts and the innumerable Frankish hosts under their command, reached Leucæ in two days... And the Roman and Frankish armies carried off the victory.” The Alexiad, trans. Dawes, 196. The fact that a “small force of Rum” was present with the Frankish forces is agreed on by Amin Maalouf; see Maalouf, Crusades, 15. The “Rum” which Maalouf mentions here clearly refers to a Byzantine force, not to be mistaken for troops from the Sultanate of Rum.

273 The Alexiad, trans. Dawes, 193. “It may be suggested that the crusaders were influenced in their decision to use this [cavalry-foot soldier] tactic by Tatikios, the Byzantine military adviser to the crusaders who is thought to have accompanied the vanguard. The tactics also possibly could have been suggested by one of the Byzantine officers among the ‘foreign troops’ whom, Ralph notes, were accompanying Bohemond’s forces at this time.” Bachrach, RC, 96.

274 The Alexiad, trans. Dawes, 196.

275 “Tamquam si ad convivium omnium deliciarum vocarentur, festinant armas capere, loricas induere, gladius recingere, equis frena inferre, sellas tergis reponere, clipeos resumere, et ad sexaginta milia equitum e castris procedunt cum cetera manu pedestri.” Edgington, Albert of Aachen, 132.

276 “In hoc conflictu belli et Turcorum diffugio nonnulli Christianorum militem sagittis vulnerati perierunt, Turcorum autem tria milia cecidisse referuntur.” Edgington, Albert of Aachen, 40.

277 “[T]hat they [Frankish leaders] were pleased by the presence of foreign military forces alongside them”. Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., Gesta Tancredi, 45. Much like in the Alexiad, figures for this Byzantine force are not provided by the author.

decisive turning point for the Frankish cause, as it heralded the arrival of the second Frankish army on the field.\textsuperscript{279} Albert of Aachen, who concerns himself greatly with the meticulous recounting of troop numbers and movements during the battle at Dorylaeum, describes Godfrey of Bouillon coming to the relief of the vanguard with only fifty companions.\textsuperscript{280} When describing the Turkic-Syrian force, the \textit{Gesta Tancredi} states that “at first, they had been without number, so that they could not be counted,”\textsuperscript{281} stressing the magnitude of the engagement;\textsuperscript{282} in like manner, when describing the counterattack of Raymond of Toulouse in collaboration with Godfrey and Hugh of Vermandois, Ralph of Caen is impressed by the size of the Provençal following: “His forces, the foot soldiers, horsemen and household troops provided this war leader and deployer of legions with such a large force, with such strength and with such a great number of banners that no one could believe that anyone was absent.”\textsuperscript{283}

Although a figure for the Turkic-Syrian force at Dorylaeum is not explicitly suggested by Albert of Aachen, he submits that Kilij Arslan gathered an army of “five hundred thousand fighting men and knights in armour from the whole of Rum”, to contest the Franks at Nicaea who, Kilij Arslan was told, numbered 400,000.\textsuperscript{284} The \textit{Historia Iherosolimitana} gives the figure

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\textsuperscript{279} The secondary army did not appear at Dorylaeum in its full strength – upon hearing the request of Bohemond, the princes took their most mobile units and rushed to his aid, leaving the infantry to defend their camp in the event it should come under attack in their absence. Carey, \textit{Warfare}, 95.
\textsuperscript{280} “Dux autem Godefridus qui solum cum quinquaginta sodalibus in equi uelocitate precesserat.” Edgington, \textit{Albert of Aachen}, 135.
\textsuperscript{281} “Agmina sub numerum sternendo necando reducit.” Bachrach, \textit{RC}, 513. English provided by Bachrach and Bachrach, trans., \textit{Gesta Tancredi}, 52.
\textsuperscript{282} Even after beginning the retreat, Kilij Arslan is noted by Albert of Aachen to have retained a considerable following, taking up a position on the mountain top “with quite a large company and quite close formations of troops.” Edgington, \textit{Albert of Aachen}, 135.
\textsuperscript{284} “Quousque quingenta milia uiorum pugnatorum et ferratorum equitum ex omni Romania contraxit.” Edgington, \textit{Albert of Aachen}, 102. The figure of 400,000 is not necessarily representative of Albert of Aachen’s opinion; he simply states that it is the figure which Kilij Arslan was expecting to contend with at Nicaea.
\end{flushleft}
of 40,000 “chosen soldiers” of the main Frankish army coming to the aid of the besieged vanguard and places the Turkic-Syrian host at 360,000, emphasizing the sheer size of Kilij Arslan’s force throughout his description: “[B]ut this time there was no room to flee because the mass of the enemy was so great that even the summits of the mountains were covered with them.” Robert the Monk also outlines the sheer size of Kilij Arslan’s force while describing the final stages of the engagement with the coming of night: “Night brought an end and that was what saved them; for, if darkness had not concealed them, few indeed would have survived from such a great multitude.”

A number for the second Frankish army is not suggested by any of the above-mentioned sources, yet is suggested to have been of massive proportions as indicated by Robert the Monk:

Meanwhile, when the Turks who were busy fighting our men looked up at the mountains, they saw the Bishop of Le Puy and Count Raymond with the remainder of the knights and footsoldiers in the army riding down to attack them. They were struck rigid with terror by the numbers of soldiers, thinking that either soldiers were raining down on them from heaven or that they had come out of the mountains themselves.

This same source also repeats this sentiment in Soliman’s speech to his Arab reinforcements, indicating the massive proportions of the second Frankish army: “We had crushed them to the point where we were already getting bonds of rope and reeds ready to put round their necks when suddenly innumerable forces with no fear of death and unconcerned by

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286 “Alas! Alas! There were 360,000 of us, and yet we were all killed by them or fled in disorder” Sweetenham, RtM Historia, 114. “Heu! Heu! CCC et IX millia fuimus, et omnes vel occisi sumus ab istic, vel dispersi fugimus.” Kempf, Historia, 30.
288 “Nox quippe litem diremit, magnoque fuit illis presidio; quoniam nisi tenebre eos occultuissent, pauci ex tanta multitudine superfuissent.” Kempf, Historia, 27. Sweetenham, RtM Historia, 111.
289 “Interea dum Turci qui nostros impugnabant ad montana respiciunt, conspiciunt Podeisem episcopum et comitem Raimundum cum reliquo exercitu militum et pedition de montibus descendere suosque invadere; obriuerunt timore magno pre multitudine bellatorum, putantes quod aut supernis de sedibus bellatores compluissent, aut de ipsis montibus emersissent.” Kempf, Historia, 27. English provided by Sweetenham, RtM Historia, 110.
enemies burst out of the mountains.” Fulcher of Chartres submits the figure of 360,000 Turkic warriors, all of whom “were mounted”. The figure proposed for the Turkish forces, that is, above 300,000 combatants, almost certainly suggest some augmentation by the several sources in which it appears. The *Gesta Francorum* also makes use of this number:

Immediately, however, when those knights of ours arrived, the Turks and Arabs and Saracens and Angulans, and all of the barbaric peoples rapidly took flight, through short-cuts in the mountains and through the flat locations. There were, however, numbers of Turks, Persians, Paulicians, Saracens, and Angulars and other pagans, three hundred and sixty thousand aside from Arabs, whose number no man knows, only God.

The *Gesta Francorum* consistently refers to the Turkic-Syrian host as *innumerabiles, tanta multitudo*, outlining the sheer size of Kilij Arslan’s force during the encounter. Ibn al-Qalānisī states that Kilij Arslan summoned both the armies of his brother and large bodies of “Turkmens” to his cause, as well as raised his own forces while the Franks besieged Nicaea. This information is confirmed by Albert of Aachen, who gives a detailed list of the forces under Kilij Arslan’s control at Dorylaeum:

Since the time he was put to flight from the city of Nicaea he had brought together assistance and forces from Antioch, Tarsus, Aleppo and the other cities of Rum which were occupied here and there by Turks, and now he appeared, charging violently and with a large attacking force.

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291 “[E]quites erant omnes.” Hagenmeyer, ed. *HH*, 193. English provided by Fulcher, *HH*, trans. Ryan, 84. Fulcher clearly states that this force was not solely composed of the troops of Kilij Arslan, but also included forces provided by several leading Turkic-Syrian amirs and viziers, each contingent having their own leaders.


294 “The king, D ā’ud b. Sulaimān b. Qutulmish, whose dominions lay nearest to them, having received confirmation of these statements, set about collecting forces, raising levies, and carrying out the obligation of Holy War. He also summoned as many of the Turkmen as he could to give him assistance and support against them, and a large number of them joined him along with the ‘askar of his brother.’ Gibb, *Damascus Chronicle*, 41.

During a recounting of the attack on the Turkish soldiers on the mountaintop, following the arrival of the second Frankish army, the Historia Ierosolimitana still emphasises the size of the Turkic force: “The Turks, meanwhile, having recovered their strength, were fighting back courageously, relying on the force of their own great numbers … were diminishing and destroying masses of them.”

Even less detailed logistical statements are made by Ibn al-Athir, who simply recounts the crossing of the Frankish hosts from Constantinople. In addition, he mentions the battle at Dorylaeum only in passing, where Kilij Arslan “barred their way with his troops.” Following the chronological order of events, Ibn al-Athir states, while describing the siege of Antioch, that “if all the Franks who died had survived they would have overrun all the lands of Islam.” In like manner, the Historia Iherosolimitana mentions the presence of 10,000 Arabs coming to the aid of Kilij Arslan on the fourth day of retreat, while also lamenting at the large loss of life suffered by the Turkic-Syrian field army. The princes’ forces immediately after Dorylaeum must still have been relatively large; this comment also implies a large number of casualties sustained by the Franks during their march through Asia Minor and Northern Syria.

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297 “They [the Frankish armies] reached the lands of Qilij Arslân ibn Sulaymân ibn Qutlumish, namely Konya and other cities. Having arrived there, they were met by Qilij Arslân with his hosts, who resisted them. They put him to flight in Rajab 490 [July 1097] after a battle and then traversed his lands into those of the son of the Armenian which they marched through before emerging at Antioch and putting it under siege.” Richards, trans., The Chronicle of Ibn Al-Athir, 14.
298 Gabrieli, AH, 5.
299 Gabrieli, AH, 5.
300 “After four days of dodging in retreat hither and thither, their leader Soliman happened across 10,000 Arabs coming to their rescue… After he had fled from Nicaea, he had brought his forces together into one and led it towards the Christians to avenge his injuries. When he saw them and the Arabs saw him, he collapsed from his horse to the ground overwhelmed by grief and began to howl loudly, proclaiming himself miserable and unfortunate.” Sweetenham, RtM Historia, 113. “Igitur per IIII dies huc illucque sic fugientes, contigit ut Solimannus dux illorum inveniret X milia Arabum venientia sibi in auxilium. Erat autem Solimannus filius Solimanni veteris, qui totam Romanian abstulit imperatori. Hic quippe postquam de Nicea fugerat, gentem hanc in unum congregaverat, et quasi pro ulciscenda sua iniuria super Christianos adduxerat. Hic cum eos vidisset et Arabes illum, pre nimo dolore equo lapsus in terram, cepit magnis vocibus heiuare, seque miserum et infelicem proclamare.” Kempf, Historia, 29.
Ibn al-Qalānisī stresses the size of the Frankish forces upon their arrival from Constantinople as “not to be reckoned for multitude”;301 his assessment of the following of Kilij Arslan prior to the battle at Dorylaeum is rather optimistic, saying “his offensive power [was] rendered formidable.” No exact numbers are given by Ibn al-Qalānisī, yet his use of vocabulary entails a large force gathered by the Turkic Sultan.302 While Fulcher gives no count of the Frankish troops, he laments the large losses which the vanguard had suffered as a result of its separation from the main force:

For the reason we suffered [in the ensuing battle] an irreparable loss because as many of our men were slain as there were Turks who escaped death or capture. Because those who were separated from us received our messengers late, they were tardy in coming to our aid… Oh how many of our men straggling behind us on the road did the Turks kill that day! From the very first hour of the day until the sixth, as I have said, difficulties hampered us.303

The account provided by Ralph of Caen also places emphasis on the loss of life in the Frankish camp, where mounting casualties becomes apparent: “There was a terrible slaughter at the hands of the enemy since they shot arrows at the backs of the Christians.” Albert of Aachen likewise depicts the massacres which took place during the battle of Dorylaeum, although he seems to be describing the pilgrims as opposed to the infantry and knights:

There was no pause, no respite from slaughtering and subduing the army, and as they ran through the camp some were pierced by arrows, others beheaded by the sword, several taken prisoner by the excessively cruel enemy. At these things, a great shouting and shaking arose among the people, women both married and unmarried were beheaded, along with men and little children. And Robert of Paris, wishing to come to the aid of the wretched victims, was shot by a flying arrow and killed.305

301 Gibb, Damascus Chronicle, 41.
302 Gibb, Damascus Chronicle, 42.
305 “Nec mora, nec requires cedendi et expugnandi exercitum, ac discurerndi per castra fuit, alius sagittis transfixis, alius gladio detruncates, nonnullis a tam crudeli hoste capiuitis. Ad hec undique clamor magnus et tremor in populo exoritur, mulieres nupite et innupe una cum uiris et infantulis detruncatur. Robertus vero Parisiensis miseris ulens succurrere, sagitta uolatili confixus et extinctus est.” Edgington, Albert of Aachen, 40.
The *Historia Ierosolimitana* gives the figure of some 4,000 Frankish casualties as the second army entered the fray,\(^{306}\) corroborating the information given by Fulcher, Ralph of Caen, and the *Gesta* regarding massive casualties. Robert the Monk laments more at the death of the non-combatants in the camp during the battle, emphasizing the large number of lives that had been lost: “Seeing many lying there dead he [Bohemond] began to lament, and implored God to be a refuge for the living and the dead.”\(^{307}\)

In like manner, when speaking of Turkic casualties following the battle of Dorylaeum, the *Gesta Tancredi* does not provide exact figures, yet suggests that “there was no way of establishing how large the innumerable host had been, but it was certainly more than the enemy [Turkic-Syrians] had lost.”\(^{308}\) Ralph of Caen suggests that Hugh suffered heavy casualties in this encounter, being ultimately unable to break through the Turkic lines, and being forced to signal a retreat to await the main army under Raymond of Toulouse and Godfrey of Bouillon. Robert the Monk does not offer figures for the Turkic-Syrian casualties but is content to recount that “several thousand Turks [were] killed with fresh impetus.”\(^{309}\)

Modern military analytical studies of the First Crusade remain largely undecided the question of troop numbers at Dorylaeum, a product of the almost certainly augmented figures provided by the primary sources. Charles Philips submits the figure of some 20,000-30,000 Turkic-Syrian warriors under Kilij Arslan, as well as the figure of 50,000 for the Frankish

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\(^{306}\) “[D]um sic afficentur fidelium greges et Boamundi iam uirtus minus resistere ualeret, eo quod ex inprouiso in se suosque armis exutos irruissent, et iam ad quattuor milia de exercitu Christianorum in manu hostile cecidissent.” Edgington, *Alber of Aachen*, 132.


forces. The author submits the vanguard of the Frankish force under Bohemond numbered around 20,000, with the main army numbering some 30,000. Turkic losses are said to have been “very heavy”, while Frankish losses are said to have been some 4,000 altogether. The vast size of the Sultan’s army is stressed by Zoé Oldenbourg, who, while refraining from providing estimates, mentions that the Frankish force was “much weaker numerically” and that Kilij Arslan had “gathered together all the forces at his disposal in Anatolia… [and] appealed to help to Ghazi ibn Danishmend.” Joshua Prawer places the number of the Frankish forces anywhere between 60,000 and 100,000 at Nicaea, which, he suggests, included non-combatants; while he provides no figure for the Turkic-Syrian force at Dorylaeum, the author recognizes the presence of Danishmend contingents. Authors such as Raymond Smail and Steve Tibble, regarding Dorylaeum, content themselves with outlining the military tactic and principle commanders involved in the engagement, while providing priceless insight into the tactics of medieval warfare for both the Frankish and Turkic forces involved in the conflict. Steven Runciman meticulously outlines the main protagonists in the conflict; through his outlining of the chain of command of the Turkic-Syrian forces at Dorylaeum, he suggests a large force coming from Sultan Kilij Arslan himself, the Emir of Cappadocia, Turkish mercenaries, and the Danishmend army. While no figures are specified, he gives a bleak picture of the Frankish casualties: “Many Christian lives had been lost”. Christopher Tyerman gives the estimate of 20,000 for the vanguard under Bohemond of Taranto, and around 30,000 for the main army under Raymond

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310 Philips, *Knights and Crusades*, 95.
312 Prawer, *Les croisades*, 1, 204-5.
313 Regarding Dorylaeum, these two authors content themselves with outlining the military tactics and principle commanders involved in the engagement.
314 Runciman, *HoC*, 1, 153.
315 Runciman, *HoC*, 1, 153. He provides no estimate of the Turkic-Syrian casualties.
of Toulouse and Godfrey of Bouillon; the author also counts Tatikos [sic] as one of the leaders, implying that a Byzantine force of some proportions was present at Dorylaeum. The author further suggests the vanguard was outnumbered by Kilij Arslan for the first half of the engagement, which places the figure for the Turkic-Syrian force likely around 30,000 combatants: “The Turkish force was mounted and probably outnumbered the western knights in the vanguard.” René Grousset acknowledges the presence of Anatolian Turks, Seljuk, and Danishmend contingents marching with Kilij Arslan, stating the Turkic army was “a considerable force.” Amin Maalouf notes the size of the combined Byzantine-Frankish army at Dorylaeum coming to relieve the vanguard to be “as numerous as the first”; if this estimate is to be taken seriously, it places the total combined Frankish forces, once the two armies connected, at between 40,000-60,000 combatants. No exact figures are provided, but Frankish casualties are said to have been particularly heavy, mainly sustained by the vanguard: “On that day, after several hours of battle, the Turkish archers had inflicted many casualties, especially among the foot-soldiers.” Jonathan Philips does not give any details in terms of figures for the engaged forces, yet the task has been attempted by John France, who estimates that the vanguard was significantly smaller than the main army of the Frankish forces, numbering some 20,000 men, while the main force under Godfrey and Raymond was likely over 30,000 men. Furthermore, the author estimates that the Turkic-Syrian force was likely smaller than both the

316 Tyerman, God's War, 130.
317 Tyerman, God's War, 130.
319 Maalouf, Crusades, 15
320 Maalouf, Crusades, 16.
321 The author simply outlines the main princes of the crusade, and the relative movements of their forces; see Philips, Holy Warriors, 16.
322 France, Victory in the East, 179-81.
Frankish forces once a connection between the main army and the vanguard was formed, and that most of the 4,000 casualties were stragglers between the vanguard and the main army. John France suggests that around 4,000 Frankish soldiers had perished in the engagement at Dorylaeum, and around 3,000 of the Turkic-Syrians by the end of the battle.\textsuperscript{323} Bernard Bachrach suggests the presence of some 50,000 fighting men at Dorylaeum, along with a probable figure of 7,000 mounted fighting men, with some additional 10,000 non-combatants for the Frankish faction, but refrains from suggesting a sum for the Turkic-Syrian force.\textsuperscript{324}

This study of the troop numbers for both the Frankish and Turkic-Syrian forces at the Battle of Dorylaeum, when conducted in light of both western and eastern tactics of combat, highlights several nuances of medieval warfare distinctive to the crusades. By understanding the history prior to 1097 in terms of past military engagements between eastern and western armies, and by extension the incompatibility between their respective modes of warfare, the origin of battle formations, and numerical figures of involved troops at Dorylaeum presents a unique opportunity to examine a rare, pitched battle between the very different Frankish and Turkic-Syrian field armies.

Statistics of troop numbers remain a difficult topic to assess, based on the opinions of the primary sources consulted in the making of this study. The anonymous author of the \textit{Gesta Francorum}, Fulcher of Chartres, and Robert the Monk all suggest the figure of between 300,000 – 360,000 Turkic-Syrians on the field, many of which were mounted archers. Indeed, that Kilij Arslan commanded a very large following, consisting largely of mounted archers, and enjoyed

\textsuperscript{323} France, \textit{Victory in the East}, 179-81.
\textsuperscript{324} Bachrach, \textit{Crusader March}, 234. “In the context of much recent writing on medieval military demography, scholars generally have been reasonable with regard to the size of First Crusade forces and figures in the 60-70,000 range are supported in some quarters; although, there are minimalists who look to half that figure.” Bachrach, \textit{Crusader Logistics}, 49.
numerical supremacy for the first phase of the Battle of Dorylaeum is to be accepted based on the accounts provided by both eye-witnes accounts as well as those writing at a later date. Albert of Aachen proposes the sum of 400,000 for Kilij Arslan’s field army; a lower sum of 150,000 is proposed for the field army of Kilij Arslan by Raymond of Aguilers. That the authors of these primary shared information regarding the event is most certain, perhaps shedding light on the seemingly common figure of 360,000 Turkic-Syrians present on the field. Turkic-Syrian casualties are likewise difficult to address given the inherent bias of the primary Christian authors, yet the sum of 3,000 appears as a probable figure. Having examined the Battle of Dorylaeum in regard to the logistical movements of bodies of troops, both from a Turkic-Syrian and Frankish point of view, several key points arise across all the accounts which aid in the discerning of a number for the Turkic-Syrian force. The field army of Kilij Arslan certainly outnumbered the Frankish vanguard which, if we assume Christopher Tyerman is correct in his estimation of 20,000 troops, places the Turkic-Syrian force between 25,000 – 30,000 combatants, which becomes a plausible figure when taking into account the ease with which the Sultan’s force enveloped the vanguard and attacked both its front line as well as its camp.

Figures for the Frankish force are even more obscure than that of their mounted adversaries; the primary sources only seem to concern themselves with a partial numbering of the secondary army under Godfrey of Bouillon and Raymond of Toulouse which, they seem to suggest, was well over 40,000 combatants, although it is likely to have been closer to between 25,000 – 30,000 combatants. Of the vanguard, no figure is proposed by any of the aforementioned authors; we know only for certain that it contained the troops under the

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325 Bachrach, *RC*, 94.
326 The account of Robert the Monk also suggests the presence of some 10,000 Arab units in close proximity to Dorylaeum, whom Kilij Arslan encounters on his 4th day of retreat. See Sweetenham, *RtM Historia*, 113.
command of Bohemond and Robert of Normandy, and that it was certainly heavily outnumbered by the initial attack of Kilij Arslan while being unable to defend both the camp and the front lines simultaneously, which suggests the sum of some 20,000 fighting men. There also seems to have been, according to several of the sources, a large body of knights present, who held the front line of the attack while the foot soldiers prepared the camp. The *Alexiad* mentions the presence of a Byzantine contingent which, if it was of the same proportions as it had been at Nicaea, is likely to have numbered some 2,000 troops. Based on the available evidence and taking into consideration the split of the Frankish force due to lack of immediate provisions en route from Nicaea by June 1097, it becomes probable that the Frankish force numbered anywhere from 50,000 to 60,000 combatants fully united, which certainly included a Byzantine contingent of some proportions. The *Alexiad* likewise suggests large proportions for the Frankish army post-Dorylaeum, stating the crusader force was equal in size to the Turkic Syrian army of 80,000 stationed at Hebraica in late 1097.327 The common figure for Frankish casualties, 4,000, reappears in several of the consulted primary sources; taking this into account, therefore, the combined Frankish force seems to have been some 55,000 to 65,000 combatants once fully mustered.

**Glossary**

- **[C]rusade** - the specific campaign being examined, namely, the armed conflict taking place in Anatolia and the Syrian coast from 1096 to 1099.

- **The “Anonymous”** – Reference to the author of the *Gesta Francorum*, who is unknown by name yet is known to have travelled under the command of Bohemond of Taranto, before moving to the service of the Count of Toulouse following the Siege of Marra in 1098.

- **Military-Analytical** - As this paper focuses on the military aspects of this campaign, touching only tangentially upon its related religious and socio-political ramifications and characteristics, the term “military-analytical” will be used to represent the methodology engaged throughout. This term refers to the way in which this entire paper will be structured, where the engagement at Dorylaeum will be looked at only in terms of troop numbers, and military tactics employed by both sides.

- **Logistics** - To be used strictly when referring to troop movements and positioning on the battlefield when speaking of any given engagement unless otherwise indicated, nuances of the armies such as supply trains and/or routes.

- **Troop Numbers/Numerical Figures** - When speaking of the number of combatants, which is the main aim for this paper, the terms “troop numbers” or “numerical figure(s)” will be used.

- **Frankish/Turkic-Syrian** - In lieu of an in-depth study of the religious aspect of the First Crusade, vocabulary for the contesting forces will be limited to ethnic and regional terms. Both factions manifest as coalition forces in the very nature of their composition, thus the term of “Frankish” will be used to describe the crusading forces, and “Turkic-
Syrian” for the forces of the local emirs and sultans in both Anatolia and the Syrian coast.

- **Oriental** - When describing the forces of local Amirs on the Syrian coast, or to simply provide a more general term for the opponents of the crusading armies, the term “Oriental” will be used to indicate the ethnicity of these feudal, coalition contingents. When a separate term is used to describe either faction yet does not fit neatly into the terms suggested above, the ethnicity of the body of troops in question will be used to attribute a term to it.